4.0 Summary of Major DCISC Review Topics, 17th Annual Report - July 1, 2006 thru June 30, 2007
4.9 Nuclear Safety Oversight and Review
4.9.1 Overview and Previous Activities
Nuclear Safety Oversight and Review (NSOR) is an important function in the safe operation of nuclear power plants. NSOR represents an independent, higher and/or broader level of review of operations, events, occurrences, etc. than can be obtained from the organizations performing the day-to-day plant, technical and quality functions. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is charged by law to regulate the nuclear industry. In carrying out this responsibility the NRC issues regulations and guides for nuclear safety and performs inspections at facilities to assure regulations are met. NRC's role at DCPP is discussed in Chapter 3.0 NRC Assessments and Issues. NRC regulations require, and DCPP Technical Specifications (TS) provide for, a high level of oversight in the form of the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC).
PG&E has in-place the following review and oversight organizations/functions:
- President's Nuclear Advisory Committee (PNAC)
- Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC)
- Technical Review Groups (TRG) for Specific Issues
- Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC)
Additionally, the nuclear industry seeks operational safety and excellence with the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) which performs periodic performance evaluations of each operating nuclear plant; coordinates the collection, review and dissemination of operating event information; issues good practice guidelines; provides specific event, technical and functional reviews; and issues and monitors performance goals for the industry. PG&E is a member of INPO and participates in their programs.
The Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) provides an additional level of nuclear safety review and oversight. As stated in Chapter 1.0, DCISC is charged to ". . . review Diablo Canyon operations for the purpose of assessing the safety of operations and suggesting any recommendations for safe operations". In carrying out its responsibilities DCISC receives and reviews DCPP operating and technical and NRC documents; performs Fact-findings at DCPP and holds several public meetings and public plant tours each year to hear PG&E reports on plant operational safety and receive public input.
As part of its program, the DCISC has monitored the operation and effectiveness of all levels of PG&E review and oversight since its inception in 1990. Since 1990, DCISC has reviewed the following organizations and functions:
- PG&E safety committee and operating experience evaluation activities. The DCISC looked at the entire interfacing structure of review organizations.
- PG&E presentations of the structure of independent safety review groups to the DCISC at public meetings - PG&E has described the President's Nuclear Advisory Committee (PNAC), the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC), the Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC) and the Quality Verification (QV) Department.
- Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC). The PSRC was established to review overall plant operating and maintenance experience, proposed changes and tests, the adequacy of procedures, security, fire protection, environmental matters and other subjects which have a bearing on nuclear safety.
- DCISC Members and Consultants periodically attended regularly scheduled meetings of the President's Nuclear Advisory Committee (PNAC), Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC), and Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC).
- At each of the DCISC Public Meetings, PG&E gives a summary of the activities of the NSOC and PNAC meetings held since the last DCISC Public Meeting
The DCISC observed the following oversight meetings/items during the previous reporting period:
- July 20, 2005 NSOC Meeting
- Management Review Committee
- December 19, 2005 NSOC Meeting
- INPO Evaluation and DCPP Response and Actions
- April 5, 2006 Joint PNAC/NSOC Meeting
In the last report the DCISC found that, overall, DCPP Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) meetings appeared to be well-run and effective in their function to address high-level issues which could affect plant safety. Participation by both DCPP and external members was evident. The DCISC believes the selection of outside members is important. The use of subcommittees with external members appeared effective and could be made more so by involving plant directors and managers from functional areas other than the ones represented by the subcommittees themselves.
The DCISC had two recommendations regarding DCPP’s NSOC in the last period. The recommendations and DCPP responses are included below.
- Recommendation R06-2:
- DCPP should review the staffing of the QV Department to be sure they have sufficient staffing to perform the necessary audits (both regulatory required and others as needed) to ensure DCPP continues to operate in a safe and effective manner.
- DCPP Response R06-2:
- QV monitors QA/QC staffing levels based on work scope as well as through periodic monitoring of industry QA/QC staffing levels through our active participation in the Nuclear Quality Leadership Forum (NQML). During 2006, additional resources were added to QV to enhance the level of oversight in the procurement, maintenance and operations areas. Included was the addition of a currently qualified Nuclear Operations Shift Foreman to the Plant QA staff through a rotation from the Operations Department. QV core staffing levels are consistent with other operating plants. Other rotational opportunities into QV are being evaluated for 2007 and 2008. In addition, QV further augments staffing needs in support of strategic projects with qualified staffing including contract staff. As an example, additional staffing has been specifically added to QV to support project quality activities for major projects such as the Steam Generator Replacement Project. Additionally, QV periodically augments audit and independent inspection resources with technical peer support from other utilities and specialized contractors when needed.
- Recommendation R06-3:
- DCPP should consider expanding QV audits (and associated staffing) beyond those just required by regulation to aid management and NSOC in assessing and monitoring the health of programs, processes, initiatives and systems.
- DCPP Response R06-3:
- As recommended by the DCISC, the PG&E QV Manager will obtain input regarding the QA Audit evaluation scope from the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) Corrective Action & Oversight Subcommittee and from the other external members of NSOC.
- QV has conducted two focused quality assessments of the Corrective Action Program and its implementation during 2005. The results of these assessments were discussed with DCISC members during Fact-finding visits. Additionally, other audits performed in 2005 typically included within their scope an evaluation of corrective action performance for the organization audited. Starting in the 2005 Second Quarter Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR), QV added a section discussing the performance of the Problem Prevention & Resolution. For other organizational areas, the QPAR typically includes discussion on corrective action performance relative to the specific organization assessed. In 2006, QV will be conducting the Biennial Corrective Action Audit in accordance with the QA Program. QV has requested industry participation in this audit, and QV will also obtain input from NSOC external members and the NSOC Corrective Action & Oversight Subcommittee.
The DCISC determined that these two responses were satisfactory.
4.9.2 Current Period Activities
The DCISC reviewed the following oversight items during the period:
- INPO Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment
- NSOC Subcommittee Reports
- Maintenance
- Quality Verification
- Operations
- Engineering
- December 15, 2006 NSOC Meeting
- INPO Interface and Mid-Cycle Review
- INPO Evaluation Results
INPO-Type Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Ken Langdon, Outage Manager, at the September 6-7, 2006 Fact-finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.2, Section 3.4) to review the two-week DCPP July 2006 mid-cycle INPO-Type self-assessment. The DCISC also received a presentation on this subject at its October 18-19, 2006 Public Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit B.3).
The purpose of the mid-cycle self-assessment was to determine the progress DCPP was making in resolving the 13 Areas for Improvement (AFIs) in the prior April 2005 INPO evaluation. The overall result of the assessment was that " . . . there has been significant improvement in plant performance since the last INPO evaluation” as indicated by the following:
- Power history at industry best levels
- Station INPO Index at first quartile
- The 2005 INPO Evaluation Executive Summary findings have been resolved, i.e., long-standing equipment issues, performance improvement program implementation, and improved alignment around key station initiatives.
- The station’s most successful recent refueling outage (2R13) including breakthrough ALARA performance.
- Nuclear Safety Culture assessments identified no noteworthy shortfalls (although the DCISC reviews this area, this was something new which the DCISC should review.)
Eight Areas for Improvement (AFIs), six Performance Deficiencies, and four previous AFIs were considered open with concerns. The most significant areas in need of improvement were identified as follows:
- Some improvement efforts were falling short of targets: industrial safety, human performance, and worker qualifications. This has been due to lack of workforce engagement by management in terms of problem-solving and reinforcement of standards in the field.
- Work order package instructions and overall quality continue to require improvement.
- Four prior 2005 AFI s remain partially unresolved:
- - Work package quality
- - Operator errors resulting in status control issues
- - Response testing of personnel contamination monitoring instrumentation
- - Apparent cause evaluation quality
The most significant issue identified by the mid-cycle assessment involved gaps to industry leading maintenance work instructions. Improving work planner guidance documents and procedures to the point where less experienced individuals are comfortable using them is an important part of the corrective actions being taken. A formal Work Planner Improvement Program is being implemented and work package feedback documents are being developed. There is also increased emphasis on pre job walk downs by Maintenance supervisory personnel. Other areas for improvement include aligning chemistry goals with industry best practices, improving process and frequency for verifying worker qualifications, aligning with industry efforts to improve vendor performance and project oversight and incorporating key improvement plans and metrics into the DCPP business plan.
At the January 17-18, 2007 Fact-finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.6, Section 3.9) DCPP reported that all original AFIs and the mid-term AFIs had been closed. They had two concerns from the evaluations: 1) maintenance work package quality and 2) operator equipment mispositionings.
DCPP’s mid-cycle INPO-type self-assessment found a number of significant improvements in station performance and four prior Areas for Improvement needing resolution as well as several new deficiencies. These are being addressed in an action plan. The DCSIC will follow up on these action plans.
2007 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Evaluation
(Note: INPO information is considered confidential and privileged between the nuclear plant operator and INPO; therefore, only a limited amount can be reported in this public report.]
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Paul Roller, Performance Improvement Director, at the May 30-31, 2007 Fact-finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.9, Section 3.5) to review the results of the 2007 INPO evaluation and DCPP’s response. Mr. Roller also made a presentation on this subject at the June 13-14, 2007 Public Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit B.9).
DCPP had received an interim evaluation report from its February 2007 INPO evaluation and was preparing its response. The DCISC Fact-finding Team reviewed the report which was generally positive with conclusions on both strengths and areas for improvement (AFIs).
INPO restored DCPP’s “Excellent” rating and reported that overall station performance has improved in a number of areas. Two noteworthy items were:
- Strong management alignment and a clear direction have contributed to improved equipment reliability and a more effective corrective action program.
- The management team should model and reinforce desired behaviors to instill high standards within the workforce.
Beneficial Practices and Accomplishments were:
- Employee involvement in business planning process
- Training is used effectively to improve performance
- A robust Plant Health Committee
- Trending at the department level
- An effective strategy to address I&C [instrumentation and control] long-term obsolescence.
DCPP will provide its response to INPO by August 14, 2007 and will conduct a Mid-Cycle evaluation summer 2008. The DCISC will review the response and track progress on the items in future Fact-finding meetings.
The 2007 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) evaluation of DCPP resulted in the restoration of DCPP’s “excellent” rating. The evaluation contained Areas for Improvement (AFIs) and Strengths. DCPP is preparing its response to INPO. The DCISC will review the response and progress made on resolving the AFIs.
Overview of the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) Maintenance, Quality Verification, Operations, and Engineering Subcommittee Reports
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met separately with Jack Purkis, Director of Maintenance Services; Dave Taggart, Manager QV and Bob Prigmore, Supervisor Quality Assessment; Ken Langdon, Director Operations Services; and Ken Peters, Director Engineering at the November 28-29, 2006 Fact-finding Meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.4, Sections 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, and 3.10) to review how their organizations utilize the information provided by the NSOC subcommittee reports.
Maintenance
Mr. Purkis considers NSOC and the NSOC Maintenance Subcommittee helpful as they provide a different, independent view relative to maintenance performance and uses the NSOC subcommittee reports as self-assessment performers and includes their recommendations in the corrective action program. One of the NSOC external members is part of and participates in the sub-committee meetings. Mr. Purkis believes the external member should spend one day in the plant, one day with the Subcommittee Meeting and one day at the NSOC Meeting. The Subcommittee has been meeting with the employees to engage with them and he supports this practice.
Maintenance has made improvements the last year, but still needs enhancements in areas of work packages, planning, procedure adherence, and human performance. The maintenance asset teams were not efficient and the change to the more conventional functional arrangement, i.e., separate Electrical, Mechanical and I&C functions has been an improvement. Maintenance can perform more efficiently and more training can be accomplished with a functional organization. They have made improvement in reducing backlog of maintenance work.
Quality Verification
QV assigns action items to all recommendations included in the NSOC Subcommittee Report. Action Items are also assigned to other Departments where necessary. These action items are assigned an owner and scheduled for completion. QV finds the Subcommittee’s Report and the external NSOC Member were very helpful in obtaining a different aspect of their activities.
The plant was rated Yellow in the QPAR at the last NSOC Meeting. All the Departments are developing action plans to close the gap to return to Green status. DCPP continues to need to follow through on developed action plans in order to be assured they are effective and appropriate. QV incorporates the NSOC Subcommittee Report and the other Departments NSOC Subcommittee Reports into their assessments and audits.
Operations
Actions being taken in Operations Services to respond to the findings and recommendations in the NSOC Reports and also for improvements initiated within the department.
An Operations Fundamentals document will be presented to the employees. These fundamentals (e.g., human error prevention, pre-job briefs, operator rounds, log keeping, reactivity management, etc.) were developed utilizing INPO guidance and other utility developed fundamentals and once concurred on will be translated into action plans. Radiation Protection (RP) has already developed fundamentals and Chemistry has initiated a frame work for fundamentals and action plans.
Operations Performance Workshops conducted are centered on engaging employees to solve problems and the feedback from the employees has been positive. The director and operations managers are workshop participants.
One of the problems identified in the NSOC Subcommittee reports was excessive use of overtime. Actions have reduced overtime from 22% to 15% in October, 2006. A goal has been set to reduce overtime to 12% in the first quarter of 2007 and less than 10% in the second quarter of 2007.
They plan on hiring 10 new operators in April, 2007. A new SRO/RO operator class has just begun with 8 Senior Reactor Operator (SROs) and 10 Reactor Operator (ROs). When this class completes they will begin another class. They have projections on employee attrition and will add new employees to maintain appropriate staffing Operations will continue to rotate its employees to other departments for the purpose of cross-training and increasing additional functional awareness and experience.
Engineering
Engineering reviews the last subcommittee report to check on the status of action items. At the subcommittee meeting, both engineering managers and supervisors make presentations. At the NSOC meetings supervisors and engineers give the presentations on specific items requested by NSOC. NSOC will be obtaining a new external member early in 2007 who will probably be assigned to the Engineering Subcommittee.
The DCISC Team reviewed the Subcommittee Reports of June 9, 2006 and September 27, 2006 and the NSOC minutes of the June 14, 2006 and September 29, 2006 prior to the Fact-finding meeting. The Subcommittee Reports were detailed and identified areas that need attention. Action items were taken on some of these items at the NSOC Meeting, but there did not appear to be any follow up at the subsequent Subcommittee Meeting. At the September 2006 NSOC Meeting, of the 25 action items, only the two that remained open were discussed. It appears from the NSOC Minutes that the 23 action items which had been completed were not reviewed.
The Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) Subcommittee reports are good and appear to be helpful to the Maintenance Services, Quality Verification, Operations Services and Engineering Departments. They also contain much information that needs attention by the Department. The Departments have addressed the concerns and recommendations of each of the items identified. It does not appear that these items are then followed up on by the subcommittee unless they are not completed on schedule.
December 15, 2006 Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) Meeting
The Fact-finding Team observed the December 15, 2006 NSOC meeting (Volume II, Exhibit D.5, Section 3.6).
NSOC membership includes all DCPP officers and directors as well as three external members from the nuclear industry. The NSOC Chairman was Jack Keenan, PG&E Senior Vice-President Power Production and Chief Nuclear Officer. All three external members attended: Darrell Eisenhut, a former Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administrator; Jack Martin, a former NRC administrator; and new member Dhiaa Jamil, Duke Energy Group VP, Nuclear Support (replacing Warren Fujimoto). DCPP expects to add a fourth external member. The DCISC supports that decision.
All NSOC members attended. The meeting was facilitated by Lynn Walter, Assistant to the Senior Vice President of Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer, a non-NSOC member, selected to provide neutral facilitation to free all NSOC members to concentrate on the content of the meeting. She reviewed the previous meeting’s action item list which was included in the meeting materials. Each item was assigned clear responsibility with a specific due date. Many were already complete. At the end of each agenda item, she recapped any action items.
The new DCPP Nuclear Communication Manager, Pete Resler was introduced and attended the entire meeting.
Donna Jacobs reminded the Committee to have a questioning attitude during the meeting as an important nuclear safety culture attribute.
Jim Becker described the following two recent plant events involving reactor shutdowns:
- On December 10, 2006 with Unit 2 at 100 percent power, operators initiated an unplanned reactor shutdown due to indications of increasing stator temperature on reactor coolant pump (RCP) 2-2.
- On December 12, 2006, at 1:22 pm, Operations was conducting power ascension with Unit 2 at about 25 percent power. An electrical failure occurred in the Unit 2 circulating Water Pump (CWP) motor enclosure 2-1. An electrical transient occurred on Unit 2 12kV non-vital bus D, which in turn caused RCPs 2-2 and 2-4 motor-breakers to trip on undervoltage, initiating an automatic reactor trip. All plant systems functioned as required. At 1:40 pm DCPP declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NUE), Number 23, 'Confirmed Explosion Onsite'. The Unusual Event was terminated at 2:30 pm.
NSOC had no safety concerns regarding these events but issued actions to review
- (1) the fire response, fire detectors, and fire protection system in that area,
- (2) how critical components are monitored in the Root Cause Evaluation (RCE), and
- (3)any single point vulnerabilities of the equipment and systems involved.
The following agenda items were discussed:
Quality Verification’s (QV’s) Assessment of Performance – Dave Taggart, Manager QV, and Bob Prigmore, Supervisor, Quality Assessment, reviewed DCPP quality performance.
- QV reported that progress on actions from the recent INPO-style Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment was mixed but that actions were being taken to improve performance. An external member stated that two outstanding Self-Assessment items needed particular work: mispositioning and component verification (working on wrong component). Additionally, Alloy 600 problems are receiving much NRC attention (problems at Wolf Creek may result in shutdown). DCPP is closely following this on the potentially-affected Unit 2 only.
Operations Sub-Committee – External Member Eisenhut made an oral presentation on the following main points:
- The fire-affected Circulating Water (CW) Pump Room looked good.
- The new approach to operator engagement (pre-job tailboards) is good.
- Operator staffing has improved, consider attrition or NRC hiring of licensed operators.
- The three-to-four separate DCPP Security Protected Areas is manpower intensive.
Maintenance Sub-Committee – Jack Purkis, Director Maintenance Services, reported on the following based on interviews with Maintenance Craft and Supervisors:
- There have been improvements in personnel safety culture, although some craft are reluctant to report “first aid” items.
- Maintenance is still working to improve Work Package Quality with feedback from crafts to planners, pre-job walkdowns, and improved work procedures.
- Work efficiency has improved due to improved procedures, craft input to planning, and T-4 (four weeks to scheduled work) pre-job reviews, but better communication is needed with Operations during return to service.
- Craft engagement has improved due to increased craft participation in ALARA, personal safety, and helping correct problems.
External members of NSOC remain concerned about human performance issues in Maintenance, especially wrong unit/wrong component errors. Maintenance human performance remains in red status.
Engineering Sub-Committee – Ken Peters, Director Engineering, reported the following major items:
- The Engineering re-organization has been effective (based on employee feedback) with Projects personnel focusing on projects, Design Engineering being functional, and all component engineers reporting to one supervisor.
- Equipment Reliability efforts and Single Point Vulnerability reviews lag the industry. Efforts are in place to catch up.
- Condenser leakage is stable at 0.18 gpd in Unit 1 and has increased to 5.6 gpd in Unit 2. While undesirably high, Unit 2 operation can continue relatively unaffected. Leak detection and repair efforts continue.
- Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) loose rotor laminations (with potential to become a missile hazard) are being tracked with a Nonconformance Report.
- General Electric is designing, testing and fabricating DCPP’s Containment Recirculation Sump Screens. Challenges include testing with expected chemical mixture, fabrication and delivery schedules, and resolution of Steam Generator (SG) insulation issues. Progress to-date appears promising.
- The recent NRC Component Design Basis Inspection resulted in three potential Green NCVs and open issues and a finding which Engineering is resolving. The DCISC should follow up on this inspection.
External Member Martin questioned the number of systems in Yellow health, and Peters will discuss it at the next NSOC meeting.
Corrective Action, Oversight and Assessment Sub-Committee Report – External Member Martin presented this report.
- Review of the Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR) and selected audits since the last NSOC meeting resulted in the following comments:
- Major audits should have an outside peer.
- QPARs have improved by being more critical but could be more timely.
- Training should be used more to help improve performance.
- DCPP governance structure, including the Management Review Committee, is sound.
- Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACEs) reviewed were sub-par and comments made to the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Group and Corrective Action Review Board (CARB). CAP Group grading is now more critical. There should be a pre-job brief for each ACE preparer.
- Self-assessments may not be making a contribution to improvement because of a lack of follow-through and effectiveness reviews by the Self-Assessment Review Board (SARB). SARB is being reviewed for this and other issues.
Martin reported concern that Human Performance was not meeting expectations in that too many workers do not understand or value human performance tools. The recent USA Human Performance Assist visit gave us several yellow and red ratings.
- Leadership Gap Analysis
- – Paul Roller, Director Performance Improvement, and Ardela Daniels, Organizational Effectiveness Manager. The April 2005 INPO Evaluation, June 2006 Mid-Cycle Evaluation, and the most recent Premier Survey results pointed to gaps in leadership effectiveness primarily in the area of employee engagement, e.g., support and buy-in of management initiatives, employees not asked for their opinions, and employees not feeling fully recognized for accomplishments, etc.). DCPP Leadership has begun three initiatives in the following areas: (1) workforce engagement, (2) management involvement, and (3) rewards and recognition. Each initiative has several actions. DCPP leadership has attended several workshops on culture change, supervisor effectiveness, and “leadership foundations” and is working on coaching skills.
- Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak through the Moveable In-core Detector System (MIDS) Thimble Tube
- – Susan Wescott, Engineering Technical Support Manager, presented the subject August 31, 2006 leak which prompted a Technical Specification-required shutdown. The leak was caused by thimble tube wear for which DCPP has had a monitoring program. The event was captured in the Corrective Action Program, evaluated and corrected. Major corrective actions are to augment the wear monitoring and inspection program and to purchase wear-resistance tube replacements.
- Safety Culture Survey
- – Rick Burnside, Supervisor of the Employee Concerns Program, reported the results of the first quarterly safety culture survey conducted in November 2006. Examples of high scoring principles were that “personnel were asked to model safe behaviors and meet high standards,” “concerns over nuclear safety can be raised without fear of retribution,” and “supervisors provide a crucial role in supporting safety culture by being responsive to employee questions.” Examples of lower scoring principles were “internal system of rewards and negative sanctions are aligned in support of strong nuclear safety policies,” “management employees are selected and evaluated for their contribution to a strong nuclear safety culture,” and “the effects of impending changes are managed in such a manner that organizational trust is supported.” DCPP will use these results to monitor and enhance the safety culture.
Members were asked if there were any nuclear safety concerns or issues. There were none. Ms. Walter reviewed the action items taken during the meeting. External members commented that the Operations Sub-Committee would review Operational Decision Making (ODM) documents in their future visits.
DCPP Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) meetings are satisfactory and continue to improve. Three of the four external member positions are filled. Having a non-member facilitator appeared useful in allowing all members to focus on content instead of meeting dynamics and timing. The Committee reviewed each previous and new meeting action item to assure clarity, understanding, schedule, and responsibility. Agenda items were pertinent to nuclear and personnel safety. There was good attendance and participation by all with effective questioning and three-way communication. The NSOC sub-committee system works well, but the DCISC Fact-finding Team believes it would be beneficial for the sub-committee chairs and members to be from different disciplines for an outside viewpoint.
4.9.3 Conclusions and Recommendations
- Conclusions:
- Overall, DCPP Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) meetings appeared to be well-run and effective in their function to address high-level issues which could affect plant safety. Participation by both DCPP and external members was evident. NSOC Subcommittee reports are used and useful to Maintenance Services, Quality Verification, Operations Services, and Engineering, although plant responsiveness/corrective actions to some NSOC recommendations could be improved.
- Recommendations: None