Report on Fact-finding Meeting by Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) on July 20-21, 2005 by A. David Rossin, Member and Jim E. Booker, Consultant [16th Annual Report, Exhibit D.1]
1.0 Summary
The results of the July 20-21, 2005 Fact-finding trip to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant in Avila Beach, CA are presented. The subjects addressed and summarized in Section 3 include:
- Attend NSOC Meeting
- Performance Overview
- 1R13 Outage Planning and Goals
- DCISC Member Meeting with DCPP Management
- Change Management and Organization Development
- Organization Improvement Program
- Pipe Corrosion of Fire Protection System
2.0 Introduction
This Fact-finding trip to the DCPP was made to evaluate specific safety matters for the DCISC. The objective of the evaluation was to determine if PG&E’s performance is appropriate and determine if any areas revealed observations which are important enough to warrant further review, follow-up, or presentation at a public meeting. These safety matters include follow-up and/or continuing review efforts by the Committee, as well as those identified as a result of reviews of various safety-related documents.
Consultant Booker’s home suffered damage from hurricane Rita. As a consequence his draft report of this FF meeting was delayed. We recognize that some items were actually completed before this report was submitted to the DCISC for approval.
Section 4—Conclusions highlights the conclusions of the Fact-finding team based on items reported in Section 3-Discussion. These highlights also include the team’s suggested follow-up items for the DCISC, such as scheduling future Fact-finding meetings on the topic, presentations at future public meetings, and requests for future updates or information from DCPP on specific areas of interest, etc.
Section 5—Recommendations lists specific recommendations to PG&E proposed by the Fact-finding team. These recommendations will be considered by the DCISC. After review and approval by the DCISC, the Fact-finding report, including its recommendations, is provided to PG&E. The Fact-finding report will also appear in the DCISC Annual Report.
3.0 Discussion
3.1 Attend Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) Meeting
The DCISC Fact-finding Team attended the July 20, 2005 NSOC meeting. Those in attendance: DCPP Members present were: Donna Jacobs, Jim Becker, Jack Purkis, Paul Roller, Lynn Walker (for Chesnut) and, Bob Prigmore (for Belmont). The outside Members present were: Jack Martin, Kenneth Strahm and, Warren Fujimoto. The outside member absent was D. Mauldin. Also present were: Roy Willis, Kent Oliver, Stan Ketelsen, Joe Haynes, Jude Fledderman, and Ben Black.
- The DCISC last attended an NSOC meeting in April, 2005 (Reference 6.1). The agenda items discussed were:
- 1. Review Action Items from 4/27/05 Meeting
- 2. Plant Performance indicators and NRC PI’s
- 3. QV’s Assessment of Performance
- 4. 1R13 Outage Safety Plan
- 5. INPO Accreditation Preparedness
- 6. EP Assessment and Corrective Actions
- 7. Work Control and Conduct of Maintenance Subcommittee Report
- 8. Corrective Action and Oversight Subcommittee Report
- 9. Operations/Production Subcommittee Report
- 10. Configuration Management Subcommittee Report
- 11. Equipment Reliability Subcommittee Report
- 12. Review Today’s Action Items
A. Review Action Items from 4/27/05 Meeting: The committee reviewed 10 action items in detail from the April 27, 2005 NSOC meeting to discuss status and estimated completion date.
B. Plant Performance indicators and NRC PI’s: Jim Becker reported the following items on Plant Performance.
- DCPP has outstanding on-line availability, but outage execution is the biggest gap in performance
- Equipment performance is much better
- Currently experiencing the longest period of time without a reactor trip
- No disabling injuries have occurred in 2005. July 20, 2005 set record for longest time without a disabling injury.
- 2nd Qt. 2005 NRC performance indicators remain all green, but several are not meeting DCPP goals.
Outside NSOC members suggested that DCPP look at work packages to be sure they are only using enough workers to do the job to reduce radiation exposures. (See Conclusions below for DCISC Comments)
- QV’s Assessment of Performance: Bob Prigmore presented the overall assessment of the plant since the last NSOC meeting. Good or improving performance areas this quarter were:
- 1) Excellent safety performance,
- 2) Continual unit 1 & 2 run,
- 3) Work control schedule adherence,
- 4) Refueling outage management milestone performance,
- 5)Reactivity management,
- 6) Security protection strategy,
- 7) ERO manning improvement,
- 8) Operating experience screening backlog addressed, and
- 9) Good foreign material exclusion performance.
- Station key quality performance issues identified were:
- 1) Human performance,
- 2) Outage preparation & execution,
- 3) Outage extensions due to equipment failures,
- 4) Project cost estimating & coordination,
- 5) Learning organization, and Long standing equipment issues.
He also discussed 5 areas where in process actions was being taken to improve performance as well as 8 areas where challenges continue if improvement is to be made.
With the exception of the previously identified performance issues above, DCPP’s overall performance is meeting expectations. Performance continues to improve and plans are in place to address these issues. Mr. Strahm questioned as to why QV did not identify problems with a backlog of operating experience and suggested that QV be sure that this type of problem does not happen in other areas.
C. 1R13 Outage Safety Plan: Ben Black reviewed the outage safety plan for 1R13. He first reviewed the 1R13 key milestones and dates. Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) is to approve the safety plan on September 23 and the outage is schedule to begin October 24.
- The major outage safety issues were:
- 1) no "hot" mid loop,
- 2) Vital bus H & diesel generator 1-1 outage,
- 3) 500 kV breaker 532 replacement,
- 4)Site 230 kV outage,
- 5)Vital bus crosstie outage,
- 6) Component Cooling Water (CCW) header A outage, and
- 7) Battery 1-2 cell replacement.
- Other outage scope was also discussed. Mr. Black also discussed actions being taken with operations because of the large amount of 500 kV and 230 kV work.
Another item discussed was that DCPP is performing more on-line Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) work when the risk of having an EDG out of service is lower.
D. INPO Accreditation Preparedness: Mr. Joe Haynes reported on what DCPP was doing for preparation of the INPO Accreditation. There are 6 areas up for accreditation in 2005. He reviewed the 6 ACAD 02-001 objectives and the accreditation milestones. The Accreditation self evaluation report identified two findings. These were:
- Objective Two -
- Problems with simulator reliability sometimes impact the quality and realism of simulator training. Contributing are weaknesses in the review and disposition of known simulator deficiencies by Operations and training personnel. Corrective actions are complete and the finding status closed.
- Objective Six -
- Management goals for training observations were not consistently met in the initial license operator class. Corrective actions complete, finding status is open and effectiveness review scheduled for 8-1-05.
DCPP had an INPO Accreditation Team visit. There were no team-identified findings. The accreditation success strategies are: enter appropriate actions in corrective action program, aggressively address and complete corrective actions prior to board date, and conduct mock boards to prepare for INPO Board.
The outside NSOC members recommended that peers be utilized on the mock boards in preparation for the 9-21-05 Accreditation Board review. The outside NSOC member also mentioned that training is not covered by any of the subcommittees. Mr. Haynes stated that the simulator will be added to the Program Health Review Process to help lower the tolerance for simulator deficiencies and improve reliability.
E. Emergency Preparedness (EP) Assessment and Corrective Actions: Jude Fledderman discussed the problem with Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staffing. Since 7-23-04, DCPP has periodically had an insufficient number of fully qualified ERO members available to fully staff 3 teams, in response to an emergency event. A review of the DCPP operating experience from 1998 through the present resulted in four ARs involving the ERO team not being fully staffed.
The apparent cause was that recently the DCPP work force has experienced an increase in ERO attrition. Emergency Planning(EP) was not prepared to handle this increased attrition rate. A process to expeditiously fill open ERO positions or provide backup for existing positions has not been effectively established. The corrective action is to strengthen line management ownership of ERO participation for positions that fall under their home organization. Line management is to develop and maintain a list of qualified candidates to be submitted to EP.
The station leadership agreed that expectations for all plant personnel will include responsibilities in their assigned job, outage support, and ERO support.
F. Work Control and Conduct of Maintenance Subcommittee Report: Mr. Purkis and Mr. Fujimoto gave the report for this subcommittee. During July 2005 the subcommittee conducted interviews with two asset team supervisors, an asset team leader, the cycle coordinator, the Radiation Protection (RP) manager, and a shift manager to determine the status of improvements to the work control process.
The subcommittee concluded that substantial progress has been made in the implementation of the work control process since July 2004. Overall, the subcommittee was impressed with the positive comments and feedback from the individuals they interviewed. Scope stability and schedule adherence are consistently above 85% and 90%.
- The subcommittee had two recommendations which were:
- 1) consider RP resources in preparing the work control schedule, and
- 2) expeditiously evaluate the Work Week Manager position requirements.
The outside NSOC member encouraged station leadership to ensure that clear ownership and accountability exists to address concerns associated with compliance with station policies, procedures, and standards. The station leadership discussed actions underway to improve ownership and accountability through the Performance Improvement Board.
G. Corrective Action and Oversight Subcommittee Report: Mr. Prigmore and Mr. Martin presented a discussion and recommendations of the subcommittee.
- The Performance Improvement (PI) activities were:
- Corrective Action Program (CAP) and Human Performance now have action plans that are based on disciplined cause evaluations
- Action plan due dates continue to slip
- The recent QV assessment found numerous cases of non-compliance to new CAP procedures
- The subcommittee recommends that the CAP action plan due dates reflect any change from the original schedule
- In the area of Self-Assessments (SA) and Benchmarking (BM):
- An INPO AFI identified that the CAP is not effectively used to resolve shortfalls in SA and BM
- The Problem Prevention and Resolution (PPR) report will be a key tool for tracking improvements in these areas.
While there have been some improvements in the SA and BM programs, there still needs to more improvement. The outside member recommended that line management should be accountable for self-assessment of his/her programs.
Operations/Production Subcommittee Report: Mr. Roller and Mr. Fujimoto reported on the activities of the Operations/Production Subcommittee. The report provided a summary of the subcommittee interviews held during June and July 2005. The subcommittee conducted interviews with Chemistry and Radiation Protection technicians (C&RP), foremen, chemists, health physicists, trainers, and the managers of the Chemistry and Radiation Protection departments (C&RP). The subcommittee focus was on human performance and self-assessments.
The subcommittee concluded that alignment between the C&RP departments regarding human performance needs attention. The alignment of the human performance program between departments is essential since C&RPs are shared. It appears to the subcommittee that C&RPs might "lower their guard" when they rotate from Chemistry to RP due to departmental differences in human performance emphasis and alignment. The subcommittee also wonders why the major plant departments (Operations, Maintenance, RP, Chemistry, and Work Control) do not achieve full alignment on their human performance programs.
- The subcommittee had three recommendations:
- 1. Evaluate how the expectations, urgency, emphasis, and policy should be aligned between C&RP regarding the human performance program. Identify where C&RPs encounter different standards when moving between C&RP.
- 2. Evaluate if the Operations department human performance expectations should be used as a model for other DCPP line departments (Maintenance, Chemistry, RP, Engineering, and Work Control).
- 3. Determine how independent and different individual line departments can manage their human performance programs. Determine who has overall responsibility at DCPP to assure alignment and consistency of the plant’s human performance program. Determine how accountability, expectations, and consistency are to be monitored and corrected when required.
H. Configuration Management Subcommittee Report: Donna Jacobs reported on the activities of this subcommittee and their meeting on July 7, 2005. D. Mauldin was able to attend the subcommittee meeting by telecom.
- The key issues were:
- Adverse trend in effectively translating design requirements in procurement documents is being addressed.
- Status of the modification process improvement implementation, including field changes.
- The evaluation and corrective actions taken from the Seismically Induced Systems Interaction Program performance deficiency, in following program requirements.
- Vendor Technical Manual Program deficiencies.
- Current status of the Margin Management Program
I. Equipment Reliability Subcommittee Report: Ms. Walter and Mr. Strahm reported on the activities of this subcommittee.
- The items reported on were:
- Closed Cooling Water biofouling
- Status of the "Leaks Program"
- Long Standing Equipment Problems
- The Equipment Failure Trending Program
- Improving Equipment Performance Initiative
- Matrikon System Engineering Performance Monitoring Program
A comment was made that only a small percentage (~ 6%) of long term equipment problems have not been fixed because of funding.
J. Review Today’s Action Items: The last agenda item was a review of all of the actions items identified today to be sure all of them were captured.
- Conclusions:
- Overall, the NSOC meeting was well-planned, organized and important items discussed. The agenda for the NSOC meeting allows for the sub-committee reports on major issues and full discussion on items of concern. This allows NSOC to focus on bigger picture safety, oversight, and strategic issues.
- There was a good exchange of observations, opinions, and suggestions and good participation by the DCPP members and three outside members. One of the outside members was not able to attend the NSOC meeting and was only able to participate with the subcommittee meeting by telecom.
- Dr. Rossin feels that the suggestion ‘to be sure that DCPP is only using enough workers to do a job to reduce radiation exposures’ is an unwarranted interference by NSOC. He did not mention it to NSOC members at the time, because the team has an "Observer" status only. However, he feels that adopting such a suggestion would undermine good ALARA practice and could be counterproductive to outage planning and on-the-job management responsibilities.
- The sub-committee reports were very good and having an external member on each of the sub-committee is important. DCISC members should continue to observe the NSOC meeting when they are having a Fact-finding meeting at the same time. The NSOC Meetings are a very good opportunity for the DCISC Fact-finding members to learn a lot of details of NSOC’s concerns.
3.2 Performance Overview
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Bruce Terrell, Supervisor Corrective Action Program (CAP). The DCISC reviewed DCPP overall performance at May, 2005 Fact-finding meeting (Reference 6.2). The CAP includes Root Cause Analysis, Apparent Cause Analysis, Plant Trending, screening by the Action Review Team (ART), and the Corrective Action Review Board.
Mr. Terrell thinks that DCPP has been making improvements in Root Cause Analysis but still has a way to go to get where they should be. Their root cause analyses were good in the technical and procedure areas but were not as good with individual or organizational issues. All root cause analysis are being performed by the same group. They presently have 7 individuals (6 from Mr. Terrell’s group and 1 from the Human Performance group). All have been sent to offsite root cause training. Everyone has attended at least one of the different types of training classes. The plan is to send each one analyst to at least two different types of training classes.
Their goal is to have cause analyses completed in 60 days, but they have not met that yet. It is still taking about 90 days. They have gone on benchmarking visits to other utilities. They have also hired an outside consultant to help set up streaming analysis on organizational-type human performance. DCPP received an INPO AFI on the depth of the cause analysis they were performing.
They should be doing about 15 Root Cause Analyses and about 400 Apparent Cause Evaluations (ACE) each year. The ARRT selects which ARs are to have a Root Cause Analysis and which to have ACE. ARRT assigned about 70% and the Managers and Directors assign about 30% to be performed. They are revising all procedures involving root cause analysis and these should be ready by end of August, 2005.
Mr. Terrell also discussed the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) which was formed after the NRC identified the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting issue about a year ago. The CARB meets every 2 weeks for senior management oversight of the CAP. This includes review of all original and revised root cause analysis for accuracy, completeness, and timeliness. This also includes periodic review of selected ACE’s to sample evaluation quality and significant determination accuracy and to determine whether adjustments are appropriate to the threshold between NCRs and ACEs. Most utilities have a CARB, but DCPP was one of the last ones to set theirs up. Mr. Terrell also reviewed the agenda for the CARB meeting scheduled for 7-22-05 and the Problem Prevention and Resolution Health report.
- DCPP has developed an action plan for CAP improvement:
- Improve Senior Management oversight of the plant’s CAP
- Simplify the Corrective Action process
- Improve the quality of the Root Cause Analysis to prevent recurrences
- Formally define and implement an Apparent Cause Evaluation process
- Clarify and formalize CAP implementation Roles and Responsibilities
- Improve plant general knowledge of CAP requirements
- Strengthen Operability determination process and implementation
- Improve the Trending Program
- Improve metrics to more effectively measure the health of the CAP
DCPP is still trying to determine to what depth they need to go with the root cause analysis and ACE.
- Conclusions:
- It appears that DCPP is taking appropriate action to make improvements in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) and Root Cause Analysis. They have been sending their root cause analysis people to offsite training classes and bringing outside consultants to help with the program. They have developed an action plan that should also make improvements with the process. The Corrective Action Review Board should also improve the CAP and the effectiveness of the root cause analysis. DCISC should continue to monitor the CAP and root cause analysis efforts to observe improvements. This should be included in a Fact-finding Meeting in the 2nd or 3rd quarter of 2006.
3.3 1R13 Outage Planning and Goals
- The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Ben Black, Assistant Outage Manager (Outage Coordinator), to review 1R13 outage planning and goals. Mr. Black reviewed the goals for 1R13 as being:
- Industrial Safety: Zero Disabling Injuries (DI’s)
- Radiological Safety: < or = 120 Person Rem (100 Person Rem stretch)
- Nuclear Safety:
- No challenges to decay heat removal
- No Significant Equipment Damage
- No Significant Security Events
- Human Performance: No Significant Human Performance Events
- Power Ascension: < or = 6.0 days
- 100% Power: > or = 30 days
- Cost: < or = $38 M
- Schedule: < or = 39 days
- The major 1R13 scope tasks are:
- Reactor vessel head inspection
- Reactor vessel 10 year in-service inspection
- LP turbine retrofit project
- RCP 1-2 internals replacement
- Feedwater piping replacement
- RCP 1-4 motor – 10 year overhaul & stator swap
- Main condenser Plastocor coating
- Replace all 4 kV bus H & E cubicle door hinge wiring
- SG primary eddy current testing
- 500 kV breaker 532 replacement
- Firewater deluge piping replacement
- Mr. Black also reviewed charts showing the status of 1R13:
- 1) design changes,
- 2) work orders planned,
- 3) scope stability,
- 4) contract status,
- 5) materials identified, and
- 6) clearance preparation.
- The quality of the work orders are better than previous outages and are ready to go through the review process. They have held a 6-month readiness review, and 2 months before the outage, they will have a presentation on how well all organizations are prepared for the outage.
DCPP will not have a hot mid-loop operation because the steam generators are not on the critical path. They do not intend to have hot mid-loop operations in future refueling outages unless it would improve the outage duration by at least 48 hours.
During the 500 kV breaker replacement, the DCPP project engineer will be coordinating the work with PG&E transmission line group. They also have plans about what work cannot be performed when they have only one source of offsite power.
The freeze date for work scope is one year prior to the outage and they have been doing a lot better managing the freeze dates. They have been adding about 20-25% emergent work during each outage. This is high, and they would like to reduce it down to about 10%. Most plants have about 10-20% emergent work. Most of them plan ahead for manpower for emergent work.
- Conclusions:
- DCPP seems to be doing a good job of planning and preparation for their refueling outages. It appears that they set realistic goals and are careful of what jobs they can perform with only one source of offsite power. They have a great deal of electrical work to perform during this outage (1R13). DCISC should continue to review the scope and goals for each refueling outage.
3.4 DCISC Member Meeting with DCPP Management
DCISC Member Rossin met with Donna Jacobs, Vice-President Nuclear Services, to discuss items reviewed in this Fact-finding meeting and other items of interest to the Committee.
3.5 Change Management and Organization Development
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Mr. Pierre Dube, Senior Organization Development Consultant. The DCISC has discussed this at February, 2005 Fact-finding Meeting (Reference 6.3).
DCPP is in the process of conducting a 360 degree survey of any Officer, Director and Three Managers who have not had the survey in last year. The survey of an individual goes to the Supervisor, Peers, and direct reports. They have completed the selection and survey. Mr.Dube is having meetings with the individuals to discuss what plans they would take to address items identified with the survey. A comment section, which they did not have in the past, has been added to the survey. The 360 survey was sent to 10 people and then he interviewed 6 of those: Supervisor, Peers and direct reports.
They are currently just doing this on Directors and Managers. The long term plans go down to Supervisors and first-line foremen. Mr. Dube is not doing this with the Officers. Mercer Delta is performing this function with the Officers.
Mr. Dube then discussed efforts going on in change management. He said that to be effective in any change management, the most important effort for success was communication! communication! communication!. The major change efforts they are now working on are: Engineering, Maintenance, Plant Health Committee & Project Review Group, and Cost Estimating. These changes should come together by end of August, 2005 and be in effect in September, 2005. He believes that the plant should see some real benefits by end of 2006.
- He described five phases for change:
- Recognize need for a change
- Build solid foundation for change
- Test & modify and retest
- Implementation
- Evaluate and monitor
- Conclusions:
- It appears that DCPP is making progress in organization development and will take it down to the Supervisor and Line Foremen level as time permits. They are also making progress in change management with selected groups. DCISC should continue reviewing DCPP’s progress in these areas.
3.6 Organization Improvement Program
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Ardele Daniels, Supervisor Organization Improvement Program. This issue has been reviewed at the February, 2005 Fact-finding Meeting (Reference 6.3). Ms. Daniels discussed her experience and background.
She has four individuals reporting to her as project managers for performing cause analysis for organization or management as the underlying cause of errors or problems. She has been coaching the Root Cause Analysis (RCA) group in using the streaming program to incorporate organization analysis into RCA. One of the problems at DCPP RCA was they were not doing a very good job identifying the organization or management causes of the error or problem.
Ms. Daniels has been doing oversight of the root cause analyses currently being performed to be sure they are properly using the streaming program for organization analysis.
- Conclusions:
- It appears that DCPP is making improvements in root cause analysis in the area of organization and management, but they still have improvements to make. They have brought in experienced personnel in analyzing human performance and root cause. DCISC should continue to review the improvements that DCPP is making this area at future Fact-finding Meetings.
3.7 Pipe Corrosion of Fire Protection System
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Mr. Dave Powell, Fire Protection System Engineer, to discuss the pipe corrosion that has been trended in the fire protection system.The DCISC last reviewed Fire Protection at the April, 2005 Fact-finding Meeting (Reference 6.4).
Mr. Powell first reviewed the history of the corrosion problems. Corrosion concerns started in 1988. In 1989 an Non-Conformance Report (NCR) was issued due to concerns about blockage and corrosion in small bore piping. Lab analysis indicated the water was causing about 4 mil/yr corrosion. In 1991 corrosion was found around jockey pump piping and fittings and in fire pump large bore piping. Additional water tests indicated about 6 mil/yr corrosion. A corrosion task force was established in 1992 to study the problem.
Some of the results of the task force were; started treating the west raw water reservoir water to reduce corrosiveness, site-wide controls were implemented to reduce use of firewater for non-firewater purposes to reduce oxygen introduction, a design change was requested for monitoring equipment and equipment installed in 1996 and 1998, and a UT/RT program was developed to sample representative piping in the plant.
- Actions taken in the 1990’s were:
- Degraded piping repaired as identified
- Jockey pumps lines (small bore) replaced
- Fire pumps discharge elbows and some recirculation lines replaced
- Sections of cross-auxiliary building header replaced
- Check valve preventative maintenance
- Flow switch maintenance upgraded
A priority for future actions was developed and on-going monitoring was established. In 2001 the National Energy Insurance and Liability organization (NEIL) reviewed the task force plan and felt it was a model plan for the industry.
The current system health report for the system is Yellow for both units 1 & 2 due to the need to resolve corrosion, degradation and performance issues in the system. Many of these issues have been around for a long time. Two action plans have been prepared: the first in response to the 12/21/04 NQAL Fire Protection Audit, and the second for Fire Protection System Corrosion. These plans lay out actions that when completed will return the system to White (or better) status. The action plans have been reviewed and approved by senior plant management. Long-term plans have been established to fund large piping replacements over the years 2005 to 2011. These long-term plans have been included in the current rate case.
The system health report lists this scheduled major modification: replacement of the Honeywell Fire Computer with Johnson Controls equipment. This is in progress, but has been delayed by cable issues. Partial replacement of the Unit 1 outside deluge systems is planned for 1R13.
- The system health report also lists the System Team Comments, Concerns and/or Issues:
- Internal and external corrosion of Fire Water system piping and components continues to be a concern. Corroded components continue to be identified for repair and replacement.
- There is an increasing trend of outside firewater valves failing to operate or requiring maintenance to keep free movement.
- The water systems continue to develop leaks and other signs of corrosion damage. The water is being treated, corrosion rates are being monitored, but significant pipe and component replacement costs are expected in all future years.
- In addition, the system health report lists the System Trends and Margin to Design Limit Concerns:
- The most significant challenge to margin with the fire system continues to be the corrosion and occlusion of firewater piping and components.
- Sections of the system that are significantly corroded are being monitored and recommended for replacement to ensure that the necessary margin is maintained.
- The alternate supply to containment is a priority to ensure continued functionality of the firewater system. This option is currently funded for 2R13 and 1R14.
- Current objectives for the Fire Protection System are summarized:
- Provide a viable fire water system to last well beyond end of the current license
- Fire Pump Piping and Tank Coating
- Alternative Supply to Containment
- Cross-Auxiliary Building Header
- Auxiliary Building Ring and Vertical Header
- Turbine Building Ring and Vertical Headers
- Conclusions:
- The Fire-Protection System has had long tern equipment problems. DCPP has been working on these problems since 1990 and has corrected some of them but has not solved the longest-lasting ones. They have an action plan and long term plans which, if funded, should resolve these issues. It appears that it is taking a very long time to approve, fund, and implement the resolution of these issues. DCISC should continue to monitor the progress that DCPP is making with these issues at future Fact-finding Meeting in the 2nd or 3rd quarter of 2006.
- Recommendations:
- PG&E should assign a high-level project manager to monitor the progress being made in solving the long term equipment problems in the fire-protection system. This should be one of the issues DCPP upper management should be monitoring. They should also determine how they will fund these long-term projects without having to wait for the rate case results. One of the subcommittees of the NSOC should also be looking into the progress being made in resolving this issue.
4.0 Conclusions
- 4.1
- Overall, the NSOC meeting was well-planned, organized and important items discussed. The agenda for the NSOC meeting allows for the sub-committee reports on major issues and full discussion on items of concern. This allows NSOC to focus on bigger picture safety, oversight, and strategic issues.
- There was a good exchange of observations, opinions, and suggestions and good participation by the DCPP members and three outside members. One of the outside members was not able to attend the NSOC meeting and was only able to participate with the subcommittee meeting by telecom.
- Dr. Rossin feels that the suggestion ‘to be sure that DCPP is only using enough workers to do a job to reduce radiation exposures’ is an unwarranted interference by NSOC. He did not mention it to NSOC members at the time, because the team has an "Observer" status only. However, he feels that adopting such a suggestion would undermine good ALARA practice and could be counterproductive to outage planning and on-the-job management responsibilities.
- The sub-committee reports were very good and having an external member on each of the sub-committee is important. DCISC members should continue to observe the NSOC meeting when they are having a Fact-finding meeting at the same time. The NSOC Meetings are a very good opportunity for the DCISC Fact-finding members to learn a lot of details of NSOC’s concerns.
- 4.2
- It appears that DCPP is taking appropriate action to made improvements in the Corrective Action Program (CAP) and Root Cause Analysis. They have been sending their root cause analysis people to offsite training classes and bringing outside consultants to help with the program. They have developed an action plan that should also make improvements with the process. The Corrective Action Review Board should also improve the CAP and the effectiveness of the root cause analysis. DCISC should continue to monitor the CAP and root cause analysis to observe improvements. This should be included in a Fact-finding Meeting in the 2nd or 3rd quarter of 2006.
- 4.3
- DCPP seems to be doing a good job of planning and preparation for their refueling outages. It appears that they set realistic goals and are careful of what jobs they can perform with only one source of offsite power. They have a great deal of electrical work to perform during this outage (1R13). DCISC should continue to review the scope and goals for each refueling outage.
- 4.4
- It appears that DCPP is making progress in organization development and will take it down to the Supervisor and Line Foremen level as time permits. They are also making progress in change management with selected groups. DCISC should continue reviewing DCPP’s progress in these areas.
- 4.5
- It appears that DCPP is making improvements in root cause analysis in the area of organization and management, but they still have improvements to make. They have brought in experienced personnel in analyzing human performance and root cause. DCISC should continue to review the improvements that DCPP is making this area at future Fact-finding Meetings.
- 4.6
- The Fire-Protection System has had long tern equipment problems. DCPP has been working on these problems since 1990 and has corrected some of them but has not solved the longest-lasting ones. They have an action plan and long term plans which, if funded, should resolve these issues. It appears that it is taking a very long time to approve, fund, and implement the resolution of these issues. DCISC should continue to monitor the progress that DCPP is making with these issues at future Fact-finding Meeting in the 2nd or 3rd quarter of 2006.
5.0 Recommendations
- 5.1
- PG&E should assign a high-level project manager to monitor the progress being made in solving the long term equipment problems in the fire-protection system. This should be one of the issues DCPP upper management should be monitoring. They should also determine how they will fund these long-term projects without having to wait for the rate case results. One of the subcommittees of the NSOC should also be looking into the progress being made in resolving this issue.
- 6.0 References
- 6.1 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Fourteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2004 – June 30, 2005”, Approved October 12, 2005, Exhibit D.9, Section 3.1 “Observe NSOC Meeting.“
- 6.2 Ibid., Exhibit D.10, Section 3.12, “DCPP Human Performance.”
- 6.3 Ibid., Exhibit D.7, Section 3.4, “Organizational Development.”
- 6.4 Ibid., Exhibit D.8, Section 3.7, “Fire Protection Audit.”