Report on Fact-finding Meeting by Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) on September 7-8, 2005 by Per F. Peterson, Member and Jim E. Booker, Consultant [16th Annual Report, Exhibit D. 2]
1.0 Summary
The results of the September 7-8, 2005 Fact-finding trip to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant in Avila Beach, CA are presented. The subjects addressed and summarized in Section 3 include:
- Meeting with Three Junior Engineers
- QV’s Assessment of Plant Performance
- 1R13 Outage Safety Plan
- Review Cause Analysis on the NRC Cross-Cutting Issues
- Management Review Committee
- Self-Assessment Program Status
- Models and Codes – Plant Simulator
- Spent Fuel Pool & System Walkdown
- Engineering Reorganization
- Implementation of On-Line Maintenance
- Human Performance Improvement Status
- DCISC Member Meeting with DCPP Management
2.0 Introduction
This Fact-finding trip to the DCPP was made to evaluate specific safety matters for the DCISC. The objective of the evaluation was to determine if PG&E’s performance is appropriate and determine if any areas revealed observations which are important enough to warrant further review, follow-up, or presentation at a public meeting. These safety matters include follow-up and/or continuing review efforts by the Committee, as well as those identified as a result of reviews of various safety-related documents.
Section 4—Conclusions highlights the conclusions of the Fact-finding team based on items reported in Section 3-Discussion. These highlights also include the team’s suggested follow-up items for the DCISC, such as scheduling future Fact-finding meetings on the topic, presentations at future public meetings, and requests for future updates or information from DCPP on specific areas of interest, etc.
Section 5—Recommendations lists specific recommendations to PG&E proposed by the Fact-finding team. These recommendations will be considered by the DCISC. After review and approval by the DCISC, the Fact-finding report, including its recommendations, is provided to PG&E. The Fact-finding report will also appear in the DCISC Annual Report.
3.0 Discussion
3.1 Meeting With Three Junior Engineers
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Larry Cossette, Engineering Human Performance, and Junior Engineers to get their perspective on work at the plant and the mentoring they received. The three Engineers were: Shane Guess, Reactor Engineer; David Beals, Steam Generator Engineer; and Chris Beard, Plant Metallurgist. The DCISC last met with newly-hired engineers in the April, 2003 Fact-finding Meeting (reference 6.1).
Each of the Engineers discussed when they were hired, what college they graduated from and their degree. They were very open with their comments and seemed pleased to have the opportunity to share their experience with the team.
Chris Beard graduated from Cal-Poly in 2000 in Materials Engineering and after rotation is assigned as Metallurgist. He was one of the first teams of Engineers to go through the rotation process. The rotation process consisted of assigning the Engineer to various departments for a period of time (6 months in a department and/or outage duration). Mr. Beard was assigned to 3 different rotations plus 2 outages. He stated that the rotation process was very good as it allowed him to better understand the DCPP organization. He mentored under the Plant Metallurgist, who is now retired, and is now the Plant Metallurgist and now has an additional Metallurgist in his staff. He is also involved in corrosion/erosion program and working with the in-service inspection group. He wants to stay in the in-service inspection program and hopes to be a supervisor in the future.
Mr. Beard finished his discussion by stating that he does not think that California will build a new nuclear plant, but DCPP will continue to operate.
David Beals graduated from Cal-Poly in 2003 with BS & MS in Mechanical Engineering. He had 2 rotations for 1 & ½ years. He rotated in the Environmental Group and the Steam Generator (SG) outage group. He stated that PG&E encourages Professional Engineering Registration in California. He attended the 12 week Systems Class (Systems & Operations) which was 10 weeks of systems and 2 weeks of engineering. He is involved in the Industry Group on SG, but feels that life may be less exciting after the SGs are replaced.
He recently met with his Manager and Director to discuss long term plans for him. He would like to attend the License Operator Class and spend some time in Operations. He stated that the replacement of the SG indicated to him that DCPP will be operation for a long time. He is involved in young group to promote Nuclear Power and would be disappointed if California passed law prohibiting license extension.
He thinks the most important items for safety are: Human Performance (simulator & training), STAR (Stop, Think, Act & Review) Program, and the new clearance process. The plant has been focused on equipment reliability the last 5 years and needs to look at aging of the plant. He said the local comments he hears in the community are about security and terrorist even though DCPP is not located for easy access.
Shane Guess graduated from U.C. Berkeley in Nuclear Engineering in 2002. He was first assigned for 2 years in the Licensing group and rotated in the SG group during 2 outages. He is now assigned to the Reactor Engineering Group where he has been since 2004. He did not go through the formal rotation program. He went to a 3 week Station Engineers class at Westinghouse after assignment to the Reactor Engineering Group. Part of his duties is to maintain all software in Reactor Engineering.
He answered a question from the DCISC Team that central coast living is very expensive. He has a real concern about how he will be able to purchase a house in the area. One advantage DCPP has is that the new engineers from Cal-Poly want to stay in the San Luis Obispo area.
All three of the engineers stated that the safety requirements at DCPP are reasonable (both nuclear & industrial safety).
Mr. Cossette stated that DCPP did not have any new hire Engineers in 2004 & 2005, and that Engineering is now above the target goal for total employees.
- Conclusions:
- The training rotation for new engineers at DCPP seems to be very good, and junior engineers that were interviewed thought that it was beneficial in that they were able to learn more broadly about the various departments. These engineers seemed to know their jobs very well and knew what they wanted to do next. They also have a very good attitude and enjoy working at DCPP. Engineering plays a key role in sustaining plant safety, and an important issue is whether experience from senior engineers is transferred effectively to junior engineers. The practice of hiring "classes" of engineers has proven to be highly effective in promoting mentoring and effective education and training of junior engineers. This appears to be the best approach to sustaining long-term engineering capability at DCPP.
3.2 QV’s Assessment of Plant Performance
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Dave Taggart , Manager QV (Quality Verification), Jeff Hodges, Engineering QA (Quality Assurance) Supervisor, and Bob Prigmon, Plant QA Supervisor to discuss QV’s assessment of Plant Performance. The DCISC last reviewed this activity at the April, 2005 Fact-finding Meeting (Reference 6.2).
Mr. Taggart discussed the overall responsibilities of the QV Department going back to the License Conditions and requirements of 10CFR50, App. B and ANS 18.7. QV provides audits of all Departments and Programs at the plant. They identify quality problems which are fixed through the Corrective Action process. He also discussed the Corrective Action Program and the Action Requests (AR’s) that are issued to fix the problem and establishment of funding by priorities.
Mr. Taggart reviewed some of their problems in the past and stated that after 2001, a lot of funds were spent on upgrading security. Now that most of security has been completed, there should be more funds available to complete necessary corrective action AR’s, although the large funds made available for security did not impact funds available for fixing long term problems. Two issues of particular importance at DCPP are actions to correct long-term, existing problems, and barriers in place that cause actions to be put off. They also discussed the changes at DCPP when deregulation was adopted in California. QV did report that DCPP is now correcting many of the long term problems and doing a better job in setting priorities of funding.
QV also reviewed the Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR) for the second period of 2005 (April 1 to June 30). The QPAR stated that DCPP’s quality performance continued to improve during this period. However only 1 area (Strategic Projects) was rated green, 6 areas (Operations, Chemistry, Outage Management, Emergency Preparedness, Work Control, and Problem Prevention & Resolution) were rated white, and 4 areas (Maintenance, Engineering, Radiation Protection, and Security) were rated yellow.
These ratings are:
- Green -
- Overall performance is satisfactory regarding implementation of policies, programs, and procedural requirements with no significant areas of concern.
- White -
- Performance is consistent at meeting expectations regarding implementation of policies, programs, and procedural requirements with minor/few areas of concern.
- Yellow -
- The functional area has demonstrated behaviors or had events that indicate performance is not meeting expectations in some aspects and/or effectiveness of management actions to correct area performance have not fully developed
- Conclusions:
- The Quality Verification (QV) Group did a good job in reviewing the background of QV activities at DCPP. The Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR) provides an effective tool for DCPP Management to review the overall performance of all departments and areas during the reporting period. The QV department should be more aggressive in prodding the departments to resolve the long tern equipment problems.
3.3 1R13 Outage Safety Plan
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Brad Hinds, Outage Manager Unit 1 to review 1R13 outage scope and outage safety plans. The DCISC last reviewed outages in the May, 2005 Fact-finding Meeting (Reference 6.3).
Mr. Hinds reviewed the 1R13 site readiness review meeting on August 26, 2005 which covered all aspects of the outage for all departments. The meeting covered the 1R13 goals, objectives and major scope. The outage is scheduled to start Oct. 24, 2005 and be completed in 39 days.
The major scope included:
- Reactor vessel upper and lower heads inspection
- Reactor vessel 10 year inspection
- Low Pressure Turbine retrofit project
- RCP 1-2 internals replacement
- Feedwater piping replacement
- RCP 1-4 motor – 10 year overhaul & stator swap
- Main Condenser Plastocor coating
- Replace all 4 kV bus H 7 E cubicle door hinge wiring
- 4 kV Bus H feeder cable replacements
- SG primary eddy current testing
- Incore thermocouple cable replacement
- 500 kV Breaker 532 replacement
- Firewater deluge piping replacement
Mr. Hinds then reviewed the Outage Safety Plan. The purpose of the plan is to provide shut down safety and to control the configuration of the plant to be sure they have equipment available for protection of the plant and defense in depth. ORAM-Sentinel will be used to analyze the status of the shutdown safety functions based on the outage schedule information as of the date of the start of the outage. They will not be performing hot-mid loop activity during this outage.
An Outage Safety Plan is required to be written and approved for each refueling outage. The PSRC is scheduled to approve the Plan on Sept. 23, 2005. The Plan is to provide information on outage safety requirements and contingencies to the plant staff. In order to assess outage safety impact, the Outage Safety Plan should be referred to prior to making major schedule changes. Industry events during refueling outages continue to show that plants are susceptible to a variety of potential situations that could challenge safety during shutdown conditions. A list of some recent DCPP and industry outage events is attached to the safety plan.
DCPP’s Outage Safety Program is designed with 3 major purposes in mind:
- Prevention of any accident initiating event.
- Mitigation of an accident before it potentially progresses to core damage.
- Control of radioactive material if a core damage accident should occur.
Mr. Hinds stated that if they do have schedule changes, they have a process where they evaluate the change against the safety plan and then move on with the change or develop plans to change defense in depth.
- Conclusions:
- DCPP has a large number of major activities during 1R13. They also developed the Outage Safety Plan to provide information on outage safety requirements and contingencies to the plant staff.
3.4 Review Cause Analysis on the NRC Cross-Cutting Issue
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Cary Harbor, Manager of the Problem Prevention & Resolution Department for an overview of the root cause analysis on the NRC Cross-Cutting issue on Problem Identification and resolution (PI&R). He is in charge of Human Performance, Corrective Action, Employee Concerns, Operating Experience, and Self-Assessment & Benchmarking.
Mr. Harbor discussed in detail Nonconformance Report (NCR) N2178,on the NRC Cross-Cutting issue of Problem Identification & Resolution identified by NRC letter dated March 3, 2004. This issue has been presented by PG&E at previous Fact-finding meetings and Public Meetings. DCPP root cause analyses performed in the past have been satisfactory in identifying technical and procedure problems but lacking in identifying management and organization problems and taking appropriate action to correct the problem. Also there was a lack of line ownership with root cause analysis and an inexperienced staff performing them. There was lack in training of the root cause analysis staff and techniques not being implemented.
The root cause analysis report identified the following causes:
- Management expectations for the implementation of the Corrective Action Program have not been developed and promulgated
- Line management is not assigned accountability for problem resolution quality and results
- Station personnel are not consistently held accountable for routine problem evaluation and resolution activities
- Cause advisors and analysts were not adequately prepared through formal training, mentoring, and availability of a range of evaluation tools.
The report listed the following corrective actions to prevent recurrence:
- Establish Corrective Action Program (CAP) elements as a high focus area in the DCPP Performance Plan and Objectives.
- Establish quality CAP performance and metrics from the program health report as a key responsibility in performance management plans (PMP’s) for Directors, Managers, Supervisors, cause analysts, System Engineers, and PPR Coordinators with detailed expectations commensurate to job duties for 2005.
- Developed a detailed set of procedure expectations
- Formally present/train appropriate individuals in CAP expectations.
- Develop a “Program Health” report for CAP with appropriate metrics, reviewed by CARB quarterly.
- Clearly identify organizations, positions, and/or individuals who are accountable for the various program elements.
The corrective action identified for the Root Cause Analysis Program were:
- Redefine the Technical Review Group (TRG) process to use a cause analysis team. The cause analysis team will be chartered to the accountable manager/director who has ownership of the affected process/component.
- Revise the Cause Advisor/Analyst qualification process to include formal cause evaluation training, either in addition to, or replacing the local apprenticeship training.
- Establish a CAP Users Group to provide collegial discussion of cause analysis in process or completed.
- Set an expectation that where possible, results in verification using a different analysis technique as a normal part of the cause analysis process.
- Combine Quality Evaluations (QE) and Nonconformance Reports (NCR) into a single root cause protocol.
- QV review QPARs and initiate ARs on issues which are assessed as having significant problems for which ARs have not already been generated.
- Generate a self-assessment procedure, which includes CAP/OEA attributes to be evaluated when conducting section level self-assessments.
- CARB to perform a sampling review of ARRT QP determinations and ACE evaluations to verify standards/quality.
- Implement an integrated trending program that incorporates equipment, human performance, and process trending.
- Formally identify who are the PPR Coordinators in each of the line organizations and clarify their roles and responsibilities.
- Expand the “tool kit” for cause analyst to include additional techniques and access to external resources.
The root cause analysis report was a very good report and sets an example for future reports. They have developed plans to get from where they are today to where they want to be in the future. They have sent the cause analysts off site for training and have brought in consultants to improve training. They have also brought in peers to review their root cause program. Mr. Harbor stated that they have made some improvement, but still need more improvement. Their biggest challenge for the root cause analysis is still recognizing management and organization causes.
Mr. Harbor also reported on improvements with the apparent cause evaluations (ACE) of ARs. In the past DCPP took approximately 90-100 days to complete whereas industry average was 30 days. Most DCPP departments now complete the ACE in 30 days. He also reviewed the Plant Performance Improvement Report (PPIR) issued July, 2005 which includes the DCPP corrective action program performance indicators.
Mr. Harbor discussed the DCPP Performance Improvement Board which is now meeting monthly. The Board members are the three Vice Presidents, all Directors and some Managers. The purpose is to drive continuous performance through assuring effective:
- Implementation and use of Self-Assessment
- Implementation and use of the Corrective Action Program
- Implementation and timely use of Operating Experience
- Benchmarking
- Human error prevention
- Management observations
Mr. Harbor completed his presentation by stating that the NRC has removed PI&R as a cross-cutting issue in their August 30, 2005 letter to PG&E.
- Conclusions:
- PG&E has taken appropriate action to correct the problems with Problem Identification & Resolution (PI&R )and seems to be making improvements with their root cause analysis program and the corrective action program. The NRC has removed PI&o as a cross-cutting issue in their August 30, 2005 letter to PG&E. The DCISC should review the status of the corrective actions identified in the Root Cause Analysis Report NCR 2178 to see if they have been completed and were effective in resolving the problems. This should be reviewed in the 2nd or 3rd quarter of 2006.
3.5 Management Review Committee
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Jim Becker, VP Diablo Canyon Operations & Station Director, to discuss the establishment of the Management Review Committee. This committee will be established in stages and will be an outgrowth of the Performance Improvement Board (PIB) that was discussed in section 3.4. It will be composed of Officers, Directors, and Managers to review performance. It will take the place of the existing PIB with the goal of pushing line ownership further down in the organization and improve performance. They have been benchmarking other Nuclear Plants to determine how they are accomplishing similar improvements. Mr. Becker stated that he was responsible for day to day operations of the facility.
- Conclusions:
- It is too early to determine the effectiveness of the Management Review Committee (MRC) as it has not been completed yet. The DCISC should review this item again after the MRC is organized and in operation, and should attend some its meetings during future Fact-finding Meetings.
3.6 Self-Assessment Program Status
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Cary Harbor, Manager Problem Prevention & Resolution Department for an update on the DCPP Self-Assessment (SA) Program. The DCISC has reviewed this program at the April, 2005 Fact-finding meeting (Reference 6.4). Self-Assessment is another mechanism for DCPP to assess how they are performing.
Mr. Harbor reported that during the INPO April 2005 evaluation, the Self-Assessment and Benchmarking (SA/BM) Programs were identified as areas requiring improvement. The AR prepared to address this stated: In some cases, SA/BM results have not been implemented in a timely manner. Additionally, SA of some important programs have not been performed in accordance with station requirements and good industry practice. Actual and potential consequences weaknesses in SA/BM increase the potential for the organization to fall behind industry norms and standards of excellence in key areas. In addition, performance shortfalls may not be recognized until the problems are revealed by events or other occurrences.
DCPP performed an apparent cause evaluation on the INPO Areas for Improvement (AFI) for the SA/BM program. This identified three elements:
1) Program criteria – no Self-Assessment procedure (had guidelines that were not very good), 2) Rules and responsibilities not defined, and 3) lack of management support for line ownership. They put together an action plan and benchmarked some other plants which were known to have good SA programs. They have assigned owners and completion dates for each of the items in the action plan and are in the process of assigning a senior management sponsor for the program. They use INPO training material for training leaders of SA.
The SA are still being graded and have improved with the SA, but they still have a lot more work to do to get the program up to where it should be. They also need upper management support with SA to get where they desire to be. Each department should be doing about two SA per year which would be about 20-24 per year for the plant.
Mr. Harbor also discussed improvements to the Management Observation Program. This included:
- Program Purpose
- Documentation
- What Observations are intended to accomplish
- Management Responsibilities
- Frequency of Observations
- What Observation Program improvements will include
- Benefits of the new system
- Conclusions:
- During the INPO April 2005 evaluation, the Self-Assessment and Benchmarking (SA/BM) programs were identified as areas requiring improvement. PG&E performed an apparent cause evaluation for this problem and developed action plans to improve these programs. They have completed some of the actions required to improve the program, but some are not scheduled to be complete until late this year and early 2006. DCISC should continue to review these programs to determine if the corrective actions are being effective. DCISC should review these programs at a Fact-finding meeting in the 2nd Quarter of 2006.
3.7 Models and Codes – Plant Simulator
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Dave Burns, Operations Training Supervisor and Jim Bigblow, Simulator Engineer to discuss the simulator computer system RELAP modeling program crash that occurred during the Dec. 8, 2004 Emergency Planning Evaluated Exercise which the DCISC observed during the Dec. 2005 Fact-finding Meeting (Reference 6.5). Such crashes can occur with modeling codes when parameters fall outside ranges that permit stable simulations. In this case, the simulation program was successfully restarted each time with minor delays by the Simulator Support Group during the emergency exercise.
The main simulator task is to run normal plant operations and events for training purposes. Emergency plans must make the plant run out of water to have a release to simulate off site plans. The RELAP numerical models can have problems with stability under these conditions. These types of computer code crashes have been observed before, and thus the simulator engineers were able to restart the simulation in the short period of time (5 minutes), and have it run smoothly afterward.
DCPP has a special version of the RELAP code for the simulator. The plant used a different code, RETRAIN, for licensing. They then took the SEABROOK RELAP model and the DCPP RETRAIN model, to develop the special RELAP "input deck" used to model transient response for the DCPP simulator. For steady state operations, there is no significant difference between simulator and the plant. For plant events, they tune simulator program to match plant. For normal transients, the secondary side of the plant is typically more difficult to simulate, since the two-phase flow occurring on the secondary side is complex. Training wants the operators to interact with the simulator just like they would with the actual plant. RELAP does not model core damage processes and radionuclide releases, so for emergency exercises radionuclide releases are modeled separately.
- Conclusions:
- The DCPP simulator uses the RELAP code, with a plant model developed specifically for DCPP. As can happen, the code crashed during the Dec. 8, 2004 Emergency Planning Evaluated Exercise under the condition where the water inventory in the core was very small. This type of code crash can be expected to occur with computer models. Simulator engineers successfully restarted the simulation, with only minor delays, because they have had substantial experience with the plant models and thus had the ability to reset and restart the code rapidly.
3.8 Spent Fuel Pool & System Walkdown
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Troy Finger, System Engineer for the Spent Fuel Pool System for a discussion and walk down of the System. The DCISC last reviewed this system in the April, 2005 Fact-finding Meeting (Reference 6.6).
Mr. Finger gave a description of the pool and cooling system. This included reviewing the pipes that enter into the pool. He noted that all pipes entering into the pool have a design for suction above the top of the fuel to prevent siphoning. Water is maintained 8 ft. over the tops of the fuel assemblies and 9 feet over the actual top of the fuel pins. They have two 100 % cooling pumps and one 100 % heat exchanger. The system in a class 1 but not category 1 “NRC” and is category 1 for seismic. They have procedures to add additional water and several sources of backup water. Mr. Finger also discussed the cooling heat exchanger and backup makeup water for evaporation, leakage, for any unknown reason and boiling. The water in the cooling system must be kept below 140 degrees for normal conditions. The structural design of the spent fuel pool walls was also discussed.
The Health Report for the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System for both units was reviewed and they are in a green condition which is the best. The nit 1 spent fuel pool skimmer pump has minor leak through the mechanical seal and an AR has been issued to component engineering for seal evaluation. The boric acid leaker list tracks several small leaks. They also have oil leaks on spent fuel pool pumps which have ARs issued. They have an upcoming NRC fuel pool assessment.
After the discussion on system, Mr. Finger took the Fact-finding team on a tour of the Spent Fuel Building and the cooling system. During the tour, Mr. Finger pointed out that the gate seals in the Spent Fuel Pool had been changed out in the summer of 2005. The material condition of the Spent Fuel Pool Building and the system equipment appeared to be in good condition.
- Conclusions:
- The System Engineer seemed to be very knowledgeable of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and the health report was in the green condition which was also good. The material condition of the building and the system also seemed to be in good condition.
3.9 Engineering Reorganization
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Steve Chesnut, Director Engineering Services to discuss Engineering’s reorganization. Mr. Chesnut discussed ongoing engineering activities before going into reorganization. These included steam generator replacement, reactor head replacement, life extension, security upgrades, etc. All large capital projects should be completed by the 2010-2011 timeframe. Engineering has lead on all major projects.
The Engineering Reorganization is divided into three phases. The first phase was to move Design Engineering which was under Strategic Projects back under Engineering Services. This was completed June 30, 2005. The second phase will be to reshuffle Engineering in August, 2005. The third phase will be to pull in more Engineers from Strategic Projects into Engineering in early February 2006. Engineering will then do more work for Strategic Projects. They will also do more outsourcing on a turn key basis.
Phase two set up five groups in Engineering. These included: Design Engineering, Project Engineering, ICE Systems, Technical Support Engineering, and Mechanical Systems.
- Conclusions:
- The reorganization in Engineering has moved more Engineers from Strategic Projects into Engineering Services. PG&E expects to complete the major capital projects in the 2010-2011 time frame and will do more outsourcing on a turn-key basis. DISC should review the Engineering Organization in the 3rd Quarter of 2006 to assess the results of the reorganization.
3.10 Implementation of On-Line Maintenance
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Tim King, Assistant Maintenance Director, Ken Pazdan, Construction Manager, and Mark Frauenheim, Electrical Discipline Lead/Acting Maintenance Director to discuss on-line maintenance. This topic was discussed at the Dec. 2004 Fact-finding Meeting (Reference 6.7).
DCPP has a Cycle Manager who looks over next two years for major projects and when to do on-line maintenance. They are using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and ORAN to determine when to do on-line maintenance. They also noted that the total number of outage hours for their Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was above the industry average and were not too sure why, except DCPP has 3 EDG’s per unit while most other plants have 2 EDG’s per unit. They count total numbers of hours out of service for all 3 EDG’s. for each unit.
They are giving more attention in the selection of equipment for on-line maintenance than in the past. Also they are now using more detailed planning and scheduling for the equipment. They perform all Technical Specification (TS) required preventive maintenance (PM) and testing on-line. In general, they plan to perform work on a piece of equipment that takes only 50 % of time allowed by T.S. On the secondary side of the plant, they perform on-line maintenance where it does not impact reliability.
- Conclusions:
- DCPP uses Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) and ORAN to determine when to do on-line maintenance. They perform all Technical Specification (TS) required Preventive Maintenance (PM) and testing on-line and in general, they plan to perform work on a piece of equipment that takes only 50% of out-of-service time allowed by TS. It appears that PG&E is using the proper selection process to perform on-line maintenance of equipment.
3.11 Human Performance Improvement Status
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Ardela Daniels, Supervisor Organization Improvement Program, to receive an update on Human Performance Improvement at DCPP. Ms. Daniels has been hired from the WANO Paris Center and had worked in South Africa for many years in organizational change. The DCISC last talked with Ms. Daniels at the May, 2005 Fact-finding Meeting (Reference 6.8).
Ms. Daniels first discussed what Human Performance was involving Organization, Leadership and Work Force. She also discussed the NRC cross-cutting issue on Human Performance. DCPP had no performance indicators to show or recognize this as a cross-cutting issue. They were using error rates as a performance rating.
There was no full blown cause analysis and no formal program driving human performance. Ms. Daniels stated that the problem with cause analysis was that management and organization problems were not being identified in the root cause analysis. She also stated the industry as a whole was having problems finding capable people qualified to perform proper cause analysis. DCPP is trying to train existing personnel to perform proper cause analysis in the area of management and organization.
She discussed some of the things that need to be evaluated to improve human performance. These were:
- what are results at department levels,
- what are the trends, and
- are they trending or measuring the right things.
They need to know what the culture and climate are like in the human performance area, and what the observations are in the field. She also said that DCPP is improving in this area, but has a ways to go. Every nuclear plant is struggling in solving problems in Human Performance.
- Conclusions:
- It appears that PG&E is moving in the right direction in making improvements in the Human Performance area and has brought in experienced personnel to assist them. DCISC should continue to monitor their progress in this area.
4.0 Conclusions
- 4.1
- The training rotation for new engineers at DCPP seems to be very good, and junior engineers that were interviewed thought that it was beneficial in that they were able to learn more broadly about the various departments. These engineers seemed to know their jobs very well and knew what they wanted to do next. They also have a very good attitude and enjoy working at DCPP. Engineering plays a key role in sustaining plant safety, and an important issue is whether experience from senior engineers is transferred effectively to junior engineers. The practice of hiring "classes" of engineers has proven to be highly effective in promoting mentoring and effective education and training of junior engineers. This appears to be the best approach to sustaining long-term engineering capability at DCPP.
- 4.2
- The Quality Verification (QV) Group did a good job in reviewing the background of QV activities at DCPP. The Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR) provides an effective tool for DCPP Management to review the overall performance of all departments and areas during the reporting period. The QV department should be more aggressive in prodding the departments to resolve the long tern equipment problems.
- 4.3
- DCPP has a large number of major activities during 1R13. They also developed the Outage Safety Plan to provide information on outage safety requirements and contingencies to the plant staff.
- 4.4
- PG&E has taken appropriate action to correct the problems with Problem Identification & Resolution (PI&R) and seems to be making improvements with their root cause analysis program and the corrective action program. The NRC has removed PI&R as a cross-cutting issue in their August 30, 2005 letter to PG&E. The DCISC should review the status of the corrective actions identified in the Root Cause Analysis Report NCR 2178 to see if they have been completed and were effective in resolving the problems. This should reviewed in the 2nd or 3rd quarter of 2006.
- 4.5
- It is too early to determine the effectiveness of the Management Review Committee (MRC) as it has not been completed yet. The DCISC should review the MRC again after it is organized and in operation, and should attend some its meetings during future Fact-finding Meetings.
- 4.6
- During the INPO April 2005 evaluation, the Self-Assessment and Benchmarking (SA/BM) programs were identified as areas requiring improvement. PG&E performed an apparent cause evaluation for this problem and developed action plans to improve these programs. They have completed some of the actions required to improve the program, but some are not scheduled to be complete until late this year and early 2006. DCISC should continue to review these programs to determine if the corrective actions are being effective. DCISC should review these programs at a Fact-finding meeting in the 2nd Quarter of 2006.
- 4.7
- The DCPP simulator uses the RELAP code, with a plant model developed specifically for DCPP. As can happen, the code crashed during the Dec. 8, 2004 Emergency Planning Evaluated Exercise under the condition where the water inventory in the core was very small. This type of code crash can be expected to occur with computer models. Simulator engineers successfully restarted the simulation, with only minor delays, because they have had substantial experience with the plant models and thus had the ability to reset and restart the code rapidly.
- 4.8
- The System Engineer seemed to be very knowledgeable of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System and the health report was in the green condition which was also good. The material condition of the building and the system also seemed to be in good condition.
- 4.9
- The reorganization in Engineering has moved more Engineers from Strategic Projects into Engineering Services. PG&E expects to complete the major capital projects in the 2010-2011 time frame and will do more outsourcing on a turn-key basis. DISC should review the Engineering Organization in the 3rd Quarter of 2006 to assess the results of the reorganization.
- 4.10
- DCPP uses Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) and ORAN to determine when to do on-line maintenance. They perform all Technical Specification (TS) required Preventive Maintenance (PM) and testing on-line and in general, they plan to perform work on a piece of equipment that takes only 50 % of out-of-service time allowed by TS. It appears that PG&E is using the proper selection process to perform on-line maintenance of equipment.
- 4.11
- It appears that PG&E is moving in the right direction in making improvements in the Human Performance area and has brought in experienced personnel to assist them. DCISC should continue to monitor their progress in this area.
- 5.0 Recommendations
- None
- 6.0 References
- 6.1 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2002 – June 30, 2003”, Approved October 2, 2003, Exhibit D.7, Section 3.14 “Meeting with New Engineers.”
- 6.2 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Fourteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2004 June 30, 2005”, Approved October 12, 2005, Exhibit D.9, Section 3.4 “Update on QA Activities.”
- 6.3 ibid., Exhibit D.10, Section 3.10, “Plans for Outage 1R13.”
- 6.4 ibid., Exhibit D.9, Section 3.10, “Self Assessment Program.”
- 6.5 ibid., Exhibit D.5, Dec. 8, 2005, “Graded Emergency Exercise.”
- 6.6 ibid., Exhibit D.8, Section 3.1, “Spent Fuel Pool.”
- 6.7 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2002 – June 30, 2003”, Approved October 2, 2003, Exhibit D.4, Section 3.13 “Up Date of On-Line Maintenance”.
- 6.8 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Fourteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2004 June 30, 2005", Approved October 12, 2005, Exhibit D.10, Section 3.12 “DCPP Human Performance”
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