Report on Fact-finding Meeting by Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) on November 9-10, 2005 by Per F. Peterson, Member and R. Ferman Wardell, Consultant [16th Annual Report, Exhibit D.4]
1.0 Summary
The results of the November 9-10, 2005 Fact-finding trip to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant in Avila Beach, CA are presented. The subjects addressed and summarized in Section 3 include:
- Plant Security Update
- 1R13 Radiation Protection Goals & Performance
- Meeting with New NRC Resident Inspector
- Nuclear Fuel Overview & Issues
- Ten-Year In-service Inspection for Outage 1R13
- Tour of Plant During Outage 1R13
- Measuring & Test Equipment Program Review
- Recent Environmental Protection Agency Emissions Requirements for Diesel Engines and Impact on DCPP
2.0 Introduction
This Fact-finding trip to the DCPP was made to evaluate specific safety matters for the DCISC. The objective of the evaluation was to determine if PG&E’s performance is appropriate and determine if any areas revealed observations which are important enough to warrant further review, follow-up, or presentation at a public meeting. These safety matters include follow-up and/or continuing review efforts by the Committee, as well as those identified as a result of reviews of various safety-related documents.
Section 4-Conclusions highlights the conclusions of the Fact-finding team based on items reported in Section 3-Discussion. These highlights also include the team’s suggested follow-up items for the DCISC, such as scheduling future Fact-finding meetings on the topic, presentations at future public meetings, and requests for future updates or information from DCPP on specific areas of interest, etc.
Section 5-Recommendations lists specific recommendations to PG&E proposed by the Fact-finding team. These recommendations will be considered by the DCISC. After review and approval by the DCISC, the Fact-finding report, including its recommendations, is provided to PG&E. The Fact-finding report will also appear in the DCISC Annual Report.
3.0 Discussion
3.1 Plant Security Update
[Note: due to the sensitivity of nuclear plant security, information classified as “Safeguards Information” cannot be presented in this report, thus limiting the breadth and scope of the report. Both Dr. Peterson and Mr. Wardell have been cleared for access to DCPP Safeguards Information.]
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Bob Zimkowski, Security Manager; John Huddle, Security Shift Supervisor; Terry Garrity, Security Shift Supervisor; Bill Ryan, Access & Fitness-for-Duty Supervisor; and Steven Hamilton, Senior Licensing Engineer, to review updates in DCPP Security since the last DCISC Fact-finding on Security in April 2005 (Reference 6.1) and Public Meeting in June 2005 (Reference 6.2). In these meetings the DCISC reviewed NRC-required security upgrades since September 11, 2001 and how DCPP has balanced Operations, Maintenance and Emergency Preparedness requirements with the new security upgrades. In its April 2005 Fact-finding Report, the DCISC stated the following:
“The DCISC is not charged to review DCPP security per se; however, it does feel obligated to be sufficiently familiar with DCPP security plans, practices, analyses, and features to assess the degree to which security requirements affect plant safety, and to assure that prudent measures have been taken to identify potential interactions between security and safety and to provide appropriate mitigation. Based on its one-day security review and tour, it appeared to the DCISC that DCPP is well equipped to defend itself and meets NRC security requirements. It also appears that DCPP has carefully reviewed recent security upgrades to assure acceptable impacts on operations, maintenance, and emergency response.”
NRC, in its October 2004 Security Advisory, provided guidance to commercial nuclear plants to intermix freshly discharged and older spent nuclear fuel in spent fuel pools as a precaution to overheating in the event of loss of water due to terrorist-related activities. DCPP had been operating in a similar manner and with spent fuel placed in alternating spaces as a normal practice as a margin for nuclear fuel sub-criticality in the pool.
- A February 25, 2005 NRC spent fuel pool enhanced Security Guidance Document was to be implemented in the following three phases:
- Phase I:
- PG&E’s response with information requested by NRC was sent to NRC on May 25, 2005. PG&E committed to completing the enhanced measures by August 31, 2005.
- Phase II:
- NRC performed an onsite assessment of the spent fuel pool, make-up water sources, damage control, and radiological impact of loss-of-water. PG&E knew of some recommendations but was awaiting the NRC written report to respond or take any actions. Prior to the NRC assessment, the Nuclear Energy Institute had a security engineering firm assess the DCPP facility. Results of that assessment were not yet available.
- Phase III:
- A NRC comprehensive review of the entire DCPP facility will be performed likely in July 2006. PG&E was awaiting specific notification. The review is expected to involve Emergency Preparedness, Operations and Security.
- NRC issued Bulletin 2005-02, “Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events” on July 18, 2005 to all licensees requesting information on actions planned or taken in the following areas:
- 1. Security-based emergency classification levels and emergency action levels (EALs), emergency response organization augmentation for security-based events, and a security-based EP drill and exercise program. The DCISC should review this area further.
- 2. Accelerated NRC notifications and onsite protective measures.
PG&E provided its response on August 17, 2005.
PG&E reported that they knew of no new status or actions underway by NRC or PG&E on the National Academy of Sciences report on spent fuel pool security.
DCPP performed a “table top” security drill in July 2005 in which participants seated around a table discussed their imminent threat procedures, actions and responses during a prepared scenario in which an airplane was assumed to have crashed into the plant. Participating were PG&E, NRC, Federal and California FEMA organizations, and local emergency response agencies. The exercise was found useful to all participants in improving their responses and coordination.
PG&E reported that NRC reviews the Design Basis Threat (DBT) twice per year. The DBT is that threat for which each nuclear plant must be prepared to defend. Defenses include multiple physical barriers, electronic surveillance and armed guards.
The DCISC Fact-finding Team reviewed two NRC “Physical Security Limited Baseline Inspection Reports” dated May 27, 2005 and September 30, 2005. The inspections reviewed access authorization; security equipment performance, testing and maintenance; owner-controlled area controls; protective strategy; security training; problem identification and resolution; and performance indicator verification. No findings of significance were identified; however, one non-cited violation was issued for two cases where safeguards information was found temporarily in improper locations, but promptly corrected. NRC considered this NCV to be of very low safety significance.
The Fact-finding Team reviewed DCPP “insider mitigation” measures with Bill Ryan, Supervisor of Access Control and Fitness-for-Duty. As a result of 2003 NRC access authorization and DBT orders and inspections, DCPP was augmenting its Behavior Observation Training (BOT). The training is being extended to employees, whereas formerly only supervisors received this training. The training focuses on what behaviors are considered off-normal for individuals and inappropriate for the nuclear plant workplace. Additionally, background, criminal and credit investigations and psychological testing are being performed more frequently on critical employees. These orders also include requirements for equipment tampering and other measures during threat conditions. The DCISC should look more closely at insider mitigation in future Fact-finding meetings. In general, equipment tamper detection and related measures have positive impacts on safety as well as security.
The Fact-finding Team inquired about additional security measures for the 1R13 Outage. Compensatory measures were being taken to address the Containment equipment hatch being open, maintenance access to the Intake Structure, more equipment and materials brought into the plant, additional outage workers, and access to the Meteorological Tower. The outage activities called for additional personnel and overtime.
The DCPP Third Quarter Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR) rated Security “White” or “consistently meeting expectations”. This was based on two NRC inspections, significant improvement in maintenance of security equipment, satisfactory Security Performance Indicators, and an improved Action Request (AR) backlog. Human Performance (HP) errors were improving but needed additional attention. Safeguards Information (SGI) problems were being addressed and SGI Program enhancements were underway.
The Fact-finding Team reviewed the August 30, 2005 NRC “Midcycle Performance Review and Inspection Plan for Physical Protection – Diablo Canyon” report for the first half of 2005. The conclusion of the report was that “ . . . all inspection findings being classified as having very low safety significance (Green) and all PIs indicating performance at a level requiring no additional NRC oversight (Green).”
DCPP plans a Force-on-Force drill on December 5, 2005 which the DCISC should review afterwards.
- Conclusions:
- Although based on limited review scope in the area of nuclear plant security, the Fact-finding Team believes DCPP is satisfactorily addressing NRC security requirements.
3.2 ALARA Review Committee and Outage 1R13 Radiation Protection Performance
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Bob Hite, DCPP Radiation Protection (RP) Manager, to observe an ALARA review Committee meeting and to review Outage 1R13 Radiation Protection performance. The DCISC last reviewed RP at the February 2005 Public Meeting (Reference 6.3).
The Team observed the November 9, 2005 meeting of the ALARA Review Committee to discuss radiation performance for the 1R13 Outage. This was the second Committee meeting during the outage. The meeting consisted of reports by groups actively participating in the outage, such as Operations, Maintenance, In-Service Inspection, RP, etc. Actual 1R13 outage exposure (57.8 person-Rem) was running slightly higher than DCPP’s stretch goal (54.1 person-Rem). This was due primarily to higher dose rates in the Auxiliary Building (AB), especially on Residual Heat Removal (RHR) piping from Cobalt 58 following the initial flush. This usually occurs following forced oxygenation, something they were investigating.
RP doses were higher than planned because of RP technicians making surveys in the AB. Dose rates were also higher than normal in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) and Reactor Cavity because cleanup of particulates was slower than normal. This resulted in higher doses to personnel performing fuel handling, although total doses in this area to-date were low (approximately 0.4 person-Rem). Installation and removal of ISI tools caused higher-than-expected doses to ISI personnel (typically 2.5 vs. 2.0 person-Rem). The Committee requested that RP identify and implement actions such as additional use of remote instrumentation and "cold" waiting zones to better control its radiation dose accumulation.
Examples of good RP performance were primary SG eddy current inspection and tube work and under-reactor-head volumetric penetration inspections.
Mr. Hite reported that there were no significant dose emergent issues in the outage to date. Management and RP were working to continue to drive awareness of the stretch ALARA goals to line organizations. The meeting ended with a recap of action items. The meeting was well-attended and appeared to have been well-run.
A comparison of dose rates in the last several outages revealed a 30% reduction from 1R11 to 1R12 but essentially no change from 1R12 to 1R13, except that doses for personnel working in Containment were about half of previous due to lower RV internals and SG dose rates.
- Conclusions:
- PG&E had set challenging “stretch” goals for its Outage 1R13 radiation exposure and was close to meeting them. Areas where exposures were higher than planned were being addressed. The well-run and well-attended ALARA Committee meeting appeared useful for helping to openly discuss and manage personnel doses.
3.3 Meeting with New NRC Resident Inspector
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Tim McConnell, new NRC Resident Inspector, to discuss items of mutual interest. The DCISC had previously met with a NRC Resident Inspector in May 2005 (Reference 6.4). Items discussed previously had included the two substantive cross-cutting issues on Human Performance (which had been closed) and Problem Identification and Resolution (known at DCPP as the Corrective Action Program [CAP]) which had been subsequently closed.
Dr. Peterson briefly explained the function of the DCISC.
Mr. McConnell is one of two Resident Inspectors at DCPP. He holds a B.S. Degree in Electrical Engineering. DCPP is his first plant assignment, having transferred from the NRC Region IV Office in Arlington, Texas. He is preparing for a local December 2005 NRC “Town Hall” meeting on the DCPP Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) which NRC had recently approved.
The Team asked Mr. McConnell about the safety culture at DCPP. He believed there was good management support, particularly in determining "extent of condition" when identifying and resolving problems; however, he was concerned that the Operating Experience function had only one person; an NRC report addressing OE was to be issued in 2005. The DCISC had made a similar comment on OE staffing in its December 2004 Fact-finding Report (Reference 6.5). The DCISC should follow up on this item. A long-term issue he would be following was the aging of Class 1E electrical equipment.
- Conclusions:
- DCISC’s meeting with DCPP’s new NRC Resident Inspector revealed no new significant issues or concerns. The two significant NRC cross-cutting issues on Human Performance and Problem Identification & Resolution had been resolved prior to this meeting.
3.4 Nuclear Fuel Overview and Issues
The Fact-finding Team met with Bill Bojduj, Senior Advisory Engineer in the Reactor Engineering Group, to review nuclear fuel issues. The DCISC last reviewed nuclear fuel in April 2005 (Reference 6.6) and nuclear fuel issues in May 2003 (Reference 6.7). At that time (April 2005) the DCISC learned that in the then current operating cycles (Cycle 13) both reactor cores were running defect-free. Unit 1 had been clean with no defects since Cycle 4, and Unit 2 since Cycle 11. Unit 2 has had a history of a small number of fuel rod leaks since initial operation. The leaks had been caused primarily by manufacturing defects, debris, and baffle-jetting impingement. PG&E had developed an aggressive program to address the Unit 2 leaks. The program has been effective.
- In this meeting the focus was on nuclear fuel issues which DCPP and/or the industry had experienced. These issues were as follows:
- 1. Boraflex Degradation: the neutron absorber Boraflex had been leaching out of the sides of the individual spent fuel pool rack fuel assembly cans, potentially adversely affecting subcriticality. DCPP removed credit for the Boraflex from its subcriticality calculations and subsequently received NRC approval for credit for boric acid in the pool water. This issue can be considered closed.
- 2. Stuck Control Rods: DCPP has not experienced stuck control rods, but it has been following this industry issue. Stuck rods were a result of rod swelling due to high fuel burnup. DCPP’s fuel burnup and power density are lower than other four-loop Westinghouse plants where stuck rods have occurred. The fuel assembly control rod guide tubes have been modified to alleviate the problem, and assemblies containing control rods have burnup restrictions. DCPP has replaced its control rod assemblies to prevent effects of wear and swelling. This issue can be considered closed.
- 3. Axial Flux Offset Anomaly: this is not considered a significant problem because of DCPP’s lower power density and core temperatures.
- 4. Axial Flux Offset Deviation: DCPP has experienced deviations in the axial neutron flux caused by improperly loaded burnable poison-coated fuel pellets in fuel rods by the manufacturer. This has been corrected, and any remaining small problems can be predicted and measured.
- 5. ATWS MTC: DCPP has not had a problem with excessively-positive Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) for Anticipated Transients without Scram (ATWS) reasons, but MTC must be accommodated, and represents a limit on the amount of burnable poison rods utilized.
- 6. Top Nozzle Spring Bolting Failures: this problem has been fixed with new top fuel nozzles not utilizing bolts.
- 7. Nuclear Fuel Gap Re-opening: this was an analytical issue which has been resolved.
- 8. Extended Fuel Cycle: DCPP has decided to not employ extended burnup fuel cycles (i.e., two years and beyond) but uses 19-20-21 month cycles with maximum enrichments of 5%. This minimizes any long-burnup fuel/clad materials problems.
- 9. Moveable Incore Detector Operator Burdens/Workarounds: the incore moveable detector system is working well with adequate pathways, thus causing no operator burdens/workarounds; however, there is a long-term plan to replace detectors.
- 10. Unit 2 Baffle-jetting: DCPP will perform its upflow conversion in Outage 2R13 to minimize baffle-jetting which has caused water impingement on and scoring of peripheral fuel assemblies. This will cause some higher temperatures and additional restrictions, but this is considered acceptable.
- No other significant nuclear fuel issues exist for DCPP fuel; however, DCPP continues to make improvements to its fuel design and materials.
- Conclusions:
- It appears that DCPP has eliminated or has firm plans to eliminate or accommodate any nuclear fuel problems or issues. DCPP has a strong, aggressive fuel management program.
3.5 Ten-Year In-Service Inspection for Outage 1R13
The Fact-finding Team met with Dave Gonzales, In-Service Inspection (ISI) Program Manager, to review the program and inspections performed during Outage 1R13. The DCISC has not reviewed ISI recently.
NRC Regulation 10CFR50.55a requires regular in-service inspections of Reactor Coolant System vessel and piping welds in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI. The Code specifies that inspections be distributed over ten-year periods. Outage 1R13 represents the end of the second 10-year period, and PG&E concluded the inspection cycle with ultrasonic (UT) inspections of the Reactor Pressure Vessel and connected nozzles.
PG&E contracted with Westdyne to perform the inspections which were performed by a robotic device lowered into the vessel. The inspections were performed to identify any cracks which may have developed since the vessels were new and the baseline inspections were performed. Cracks above specified sizes would have to be ground out and weld-repaired. The inspections had just been completed at the time of the Fact-finding meeting. Mr. Gonzales, a certified Level III inspector, oversaw the operation for PG&E and reviewed selected data and results. An Authorized Nuclear Inspector, independent of PG&E, performed reviews of all aspects of the inspections, and NRC inspectors spent a day reviewing reactor vessel head inspection results and data.
It was too early at the time of the Fact-finding meeting for any meaningful ISI results. The DCISC should review the ISI results in another Fact-finding meeting or a public meeting.
- Conclusions:
- In Outage 1R13 PG&E concluded its second ten-year in-service inspection (ISI) of the Reactor Coolant System with inspections of the reactor vessel welds. Although it was too early for results, the DCPP ISI Program appears sound overall.
3.6 Tour of Plant During Outage 1R13
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Steve Hamilton and Don Malone, both Regulatory Services Licensing Engineers, for a tour of the overall plant and a tour of Containment during Outage 1R13. The DCISC last made an outage plant tour in April 2004 (Reference 6.8).
The tour included the turbine deck where the Unit 1 high pressure rotors were being replaced and other work was in progress. The rotor replacement work was complex but appeared to be handled well. The Turbine Rotor Project Manager, Harry Phillips, was knowledgeable and enthusiastic about the project, and determined to perform a quality job on-schedule. The tour of Containment included essentially all levels and locations accessible by foot. RP personnel were evident and radiation "cold zones" were posted in many locations. Work appeared to be performed in an orderly and determined fashion. The Containment was at a cleanliness level appropriate for an outage.
The Fact-finding Team processed through the Radiation Control Area to both enter and exit the Containment and associated radiation zones. Personnel in the RCA were knowledgeable and professional in implementing the Radiation Work Permits and dosimetry required to access the RCA. Radiation detection equipment appeared to be up-to-date and in good working order.
- The Team reviewed several Plans of the Day, a daily outage newsletter provided to all on-site. The newsletter contained the following sections:
- 1. Outage Overview – a brief statement of the status of each unit and selected outage statistics (typically personnel safety, ALARA dose, and security events).
- 2. A Key Outage Focus Area – an update or reminder of such topics as Personnel Safety, Outage Lessons Learned, Recent Progress/Next Steps, ALARA, etc.
- 3. Human Performance – a statement about Human Performance or reminder to use good HP practices
- 4. Key Activities Last 48 Hours and Next 48 Hours – major activities accomplished and planned
- 5. Outage Milestones – major outage milestone status
- 6. Outage Safety Plan – critical safety equipment status and alignments, color-coded risk significance of equipment/systems, and status of reactor cooling
- 7. Operating Experience – brief descriptions of both DCPP and industry events related to outage status or work in progress
- 8. ALARA update and reminders to use good ALARA practices
- 9. Pertinent sections of the detailed outage plan
- 10. “Quick Info” – short, miscellaneous items of interest to plant personnel
- 11. Outage Scorecard – progress on important outage measures: Safety (Industrial Safety, Radiological Safety, Nuclear Safety and Human Performance), Reliability (Power Ascension and days at 100% Power) and Generation & Cost.
- 12. DCPP Vision and Mission Statements
- The Plan of the Day was found to be informative and well-written.
- Conclusions:
- The DCISC Fact-finding Team tour of the plant, including Containment, during Outage 1R13 revealed a professional, well-coordinated workplace. Radiation Protection, in particular, was handled effectively and professionally. The Outage Plans of the Day were well done.
3.7 Measuring and Test Equipment (MTE) Program Review
The Fact-finding Team met with Derek Bell, MTE Program Manager, to review the Measuring and Test Equipment (MTE) Program. This was the first review the DCISC has performed of this program.
As part of Maintenance Services, the MTE Group consists of a supervisor (Bell) ten technicians, and three tool clerks. The MTE Program controls the use and calibration of non-plant measuring devices used to assure that plant parameters are within established values. It also controls the calibration of non-plant radiation monitoring devices that are used to assure that radiation dose and count rates are accurately measured for plant areas and for personnel. The devices are divided into the three following areas:
- 1. Conventional MTE (approximately 3200 meters, torque wrenches, pressure gauges, micrometers, etc.)
- 2. Portable Radiation Monitoring Equipment (approximately 600 dose, count, and flow rate monitors)
- 3. Non-plant Radiation Monitors (approximately 40 personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, small article monitors, laundry monitors, continuous air monitors, etc)
In all three areas, individual maintenance procedures are used to conduct calibrations for each type or model of instrument. The instruments and calibration schedules are contained in three databases. Calibration activities are conducted in eight lab facilities in various locations in the plant and in maintenance shop buildings.
DCPP considered MTE Program health to be good based on adequacy of calibration facilities, number of qualified personnel, budget, instrument population and performance, management support, interface between MTE and users (mostly Maintenance), and industry participation.
- Two issues were:
- (1) attrition of experienced personnel via retirement and
- (2) age of instruments and availability of equivalent replacements.
- Upcoming improvements include:
- Transfer of responsibility for technical adequacy of calibration procedures from the Procedure Services Group to Metrology, allowing MTE greater control over the content and timeliness of procedure revisions.
- The current MTE main database (part of the Plant Information and Management System [PIMS]) and two stand-alone databases will be incorporated into the new PIMS replacement, SAP, being developed in the NEXIS Project, allowing all instruments to be included in a single database in the new plant data system.
- An analysis of lost and damaged instruments is planned to determine program changes which will reduce the losses and damage.
The Fact-finding Team reviewed a March 2, 2005 biennial audit of the MTE Program required by the Final Safety Analysis Report. The audit was conducted by Quality Verification (QV) to verify that MTE was calibrated to verifiable standards, MTE use was controlled, out of tolerance MTE and standards were evaluated for impact on plant equipment, and MTE Program activities were properly documented. QV concluded that the effectiveness of the DCPP MTE Program was satisfactory and did not identify any significant problems. There were several minor problems identified in Action Requests. There have been no recent NRC inspections of the MTE Program.
- Conclusions:
- The DCPP Measuring and Test Equipment (MTE) Program appeared satisfactory and in good health. Specific improvements were planned which should enhance the program. The Program Manager appeared knowledgeable and proactive.
3.8 Recent Environmental Protection Agency Emissions Requirements for Diesel Engines and Impact on DCPP
The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Tom Esser, Environmental Specialist, to discuss recent Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) emissions requirements for diesel engines and possible effects on DCPP Emergency Diesel Generators (EGDs). The DCISC last reviewed DCPP EDGs in September 2005 (Reference 6.9) when the EDG System health was considered by DCPP to be “Red” (but operable) mostly due to lubrication system problems, and a corrective action plan was developed to restore health to “Green.”
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) implements the US EPA Act, and the 2004 CA regulation Airborne Toxic Control Measure for Stationary Compression Ignition Engines (ATCM) requires use of “CARB Low Sulfur Diesel” or a “clean” fuel alternative for 50 and larger brake horsepower engines beginning January 1, 2006. The low sulfur (and low aromatics) fuel produces less NOx and particulate matter.
The requirement affects DCPP’s six EDGs, the Security Diesel Generator, and the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) Diesel Generator. Although ATCM contains an exemption for nuclear power plant EDGs, PG&E will begin using CARB low sulfur fuel for the EDGs no later than December 31, 2005 (and phasing in an ultralow sulfur fuel in 2006). It has been using this fuel for the Security and EOF Diesels for many years without problems.
PG&E commissioned a comprehensive diesel reliability study by SAIC to determine the effects of the new fuel on their EDGs. Sulfur enhances lubricity and heat content of fuel. The study showed no lubricity concerns; however, because of lower heat content, the minimum required amount of fuel in the fuel oil tanks was increased with NRC approval. Fuel oil pump seals were also replaced. The DCISC Fact-finding Team reviewed the study and found it comprehensive and thorough.
- Conclusions:
- DCPP will begin using diesel fuel oil with lower sulfur and aromatics by the end of 2005 on its Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) because of new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and California requirements. PG&E determined that there would be no significant problems on the EDGs with the new fuel.
4.0 Conclusions
- 4.1
- Although based on limited review scope in the area of nuclear plant security, the Fact-finding Team believes DCPP is satisfactorily addressing NRC security requirements.
- 4.2
- PG&E had set challenging “stretch” goals for its Outage 1R13 radiation exposure and was close to meeting them. Areas where exposures were higher than planned were being addressed. The well-run and well-attended ALARA Committee meeting appeared useful for helping to openly discuss and manage personnel doses.
- 4.3
- DCISC’s meeting with DCPP’s new NRC Resident Inspector revealed no new significant issues or concerns. The two significant NRC cross-cutting issues on Human Performance and Problem Identification & Resolution had been resolved prior to this meeting.
- 4.4
- It appears that DCPP has eliminated or has firm plans to eliminate or accommodate any nuclear fuel problems or issues. DCPP has a strong, aggressive fuel management program.
- 4.5
- In Outage 1R13 PG&E concluded its second ten-year in-service inspection (ISI) of the Reactor Coolant System with inspections of the reactor vessel welds. Although it was too early for results, the DCPP ISI Program appears sound overall.
- 4.6
- The DCISC Fact-finding Team tour of the plant, including Containment, during Outage 1R13 revealed a professional, well-coordinated workplace. Radiation Protection, in particular, was handled effectively and professionally. The Outage Plans of the Day were well done.
- 4.7
- The DCPP Measuring and Test Equipment (MTE) Program appeared satisfactory and in good health. Specific improvements were planned which should enhance the program. The Program Manager appeared knowledgeable and proactive.
- 4.8
- DCPP will begin using diesel fuel oil with lower sulfur and aromatics by the end of 2005 on its Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) because of new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and California requirements. PG&E determined that there would be no significant problems on the EDGs with the new fuel.
- 5.0 Recommendations
- None
- 6.0 References
- 6.1 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Fifteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2004 – June 30, 2005”, Approved October 12, 2005, Exhibit D.8, Section 3.9, “Security Update.”"
- 6.2 Ibid., Exhibit B.9, “Effects of Security Upgrades on Plant Activities.”
- 6.3 Ibid., Exhibit B.6, “Results of Outage 2R12.”
- 6.4 Ibid., Exhibit D.10, Section 3.7, “Meet with NRC Resident Inspector.”
- 6.5 Ibid., Exhibit D.5, Section 3.4, “Operating Experience Assessment Program.”
- 6.6 Ibid., Exhibit D.8, Section 3.2, “Nuclear Fuel Overview.”
- 6.7 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2002 – June 30, 2003”, Approved October 2, 2003, Exhibit D.8, Section 3.4, “Nuclear Fuel System Review and Status of Issues.”
- 6.8 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Fourteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2003 – June 30, 2004”, Approved October 5, 2004, Exhibit D.9, Section 3.10, “1R12 Outage Review and Plant Tour.”
- 6.9 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Fifteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2004 – June 30, 2005”, Approved October 12, 2005, Exhibit D.3, Section 3.8, “Emergency Diesel Generator Update.”