Report on Fact-finding Meeting by Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) on December 14 & 15, 2006 by Per F. Peterson, Member and R. Ferman Wardell, Consultant [17th Annual Report, Exhibit D.5]

1.0 Summary

The results of the December 14-15, 2006 Fact-finding Trip to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant in Avila Beach, CA are presented. The subjects addressed and summarized in Section 3 include:

  1. Auxiliary Feedwater System Review with System Engineer
  2. Attend Plant Health Committee Meeting
  3. Emergency Classification and Activation for Security Events
  4. Emergency Preparedness Update
  5. NRC February 25, 2002 @ June 20, 2006 Orders Section B.5.b
  6. Observe Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) Meeting
  7. DCISC Member Meeting with DCPP Management

2.0 Introduction

This Fact-finding Trip to the DCPP was made to evaluate specific safety matters for the DCISC. The objective of the evaluation was to determine if PG&E’s performance is appropriate and whether any areas revealed observations which are important enough to warrant further review, follow-up, or presentation at a public meeting. These safety matters include follow-up and/or continuing review efforts by the Committee, as well as those identified as a result of reviews of various safety-related documents.

Section 4 – Conclusions highlights the conclusions of the Fact-finding Team based on items reported in Section 3 – Discussion. These highlights also include the team’s suggested follow-up items for the DCISC, such as scheduling future Fact-finding meetings on the topic, presentations at future public meetings, and requests for future updates or information from DCPP on specific areas of interest, etc.

Section 5 – Recommendations lists specific recommendations to PG&E proposed by the Fact-finding Team. These recommendations will be considered by the DCISC. After review and approval by the DCISC, the Fact-finding Report, including its recommendations, is provided to PG&E. The Fact-finding Report will also appear in the DCISC Annual Report.

3.0 Discussion

3.1 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System Review with System Engineer

The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Tim Juarez, AFW System Engineer; Mark Frantz, Supervisor of the Balance-of-Plant Engineering Group; and Meg Wilson, I@C Component Engineer; to review the AFW System. The DCISC has not reviewed the AFW System recently.

The purpose of the AFW System is to:

The System Engineer reviewed the system design with the Fact-finding Team using the System Flow Diagram and Design Criteria Memorandum. The AFW System consists of one steam-turbine-driven pump, two motor-driven pumps, normal water supply from the Condensate Storage Tank, and associated piping, instrumentation and controls, and valves. The turbine-driven pump supplies all four SGs, and its steam supply comes from either of two SGs. Each of the two motor-driven pumps supplies two SGs and can be cross-connected to the other two SGs. Alternate sources of water are the Raw Water Reservoir and the Firewater Tank. Each pump discharges to the SGs through its own control valve and through the Main Feedwater lines.

The AFW System also has provisions for long-term water supply to the SGs via three portable Diesel-driven pumps, connections, and hoses which can be manually connected if the normal pumps are unavailable.

The AFW System Engineer reviewed the System Health Report. The health report is summarized below.

Auxiliary Feedwater System Health Card

Auxiliary Feedwater System Health Card
System Color Indicator Unit 1 Unit 2
Yellow Yellow
Gate
Items in MR (a)(1) Status 2 2
POAs 1 1 (Prompt Operability Assmnts.)
Critical Equipment Event Clock Reset 0 0
Significant Adverse Trend 2 2
Operating & Design Margin
Components in Alert 0 0
Control Board ARs 0 0 (Action Requests)
Critical Component Failures 0 0
Corrective Maintenance Backlog 0 0
Non-Green Performance indicators 1 1
Operator Burdens/Workarounds 0 0
Plant health Issues approved as threats 2 3

The AFW System was in Maintenance Rule (MR) (a)(1) status with two significant MR items for each unit. System health is Yellow primarily due to unavailability issues as described below. Issues driving health color are as follows:.

Unit 1 Issues:

Unit 2 Issues:

Common Issues:

Action Plans have been written for each of the above issues. White status is expected by 1st Quarter 2007 and Green in 2010.

The System Engineer led the Fact-finding Team on a tour of the Unit 2 AFW System, using the System Engineer Walkdown Checklist. The tour included the following:

The Team was required to enter the Radiation Control Area (RCA) to access the AFW components on the tour. The Radiation Protection (RP) screening, badging, and RCA entry processes were thorough and effective. Personnel radiation monitoring and screening equipment appeared to be in good working order and easy to use. The Team did not pick up any measurable radiation dose during the tour.

The plant appeared to be in good materiel condition with no noticeable water or steam leaks or oil leaks. Plant equipment appeared to be operating normally. The System Engineer was knowledgeable and thorough in his description of the AFW System and other aspects of the plant. He was thorough in his personnel safety and radiation protection briefings.

Conclusion:
Although the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Yellow health status) currently has some reliability issues, the system is operable and capable of carrying out its intended functions. DCPP is addressing these issues with action plans and a schedule to return the system to White status by the first quarter of 2007 and to Green status by 2010. The System Engineer appeared knowledgeable.

3.2 Attend Plant Health Committee Meeting

The DCISC Fact-finding Team attended the December 14, 2006 Plant Health Committee (PHC) meeting. The agenda is included as Attachment 1. The DCISC last attended this meeting in September 2006 (Reference 6.1) at which time it concluded the following:

DCPP’s actions to address and resolve long-standing equipment issues, including the Plant Health Committee and associated approval process, appear to be effective in approving, funding, and implementing equipment corrective actions.

This December meeting was chaired by Ken Langdon, new Director of Operations Services, who began the meeting by introducing visitors (there were three representatives from San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in addition to the two DCISC observers). The first order of business was to see whether there were any nuclear safety items to be discussed – there were none.

An emergent issue was the Red health status of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System due to CCW Pump 2-1 exhibiting mechanical seal leakage. A Prompt Operability Assessment (POA) had been written to support continued operation of the system. The CCW System Engineer had developed an Action Plan to return the system health to satisfactory (White) status by replacing the seals in January 2007. The PHC requested the System Engineer to prepare an Action Plan to achieve Green status and bring it to the PHC in January 2007 and requested the addition of a seal monitoring and trending program to the system health report.

The PHC then discussed Work Control status, status of funds in the Plant Health Checkbook (none remaining), and PHC Subcommittee reports (none).

The DCPP Lube Oil Engineer made a presentation on cleaning the Units 1 and 2 Main Turbine Lube Oil lines and replacing the oil. The lines had been in use over 20 years, and there was evidence of oil contamination and oil varnish build-up. The varnish needed to be removed by hydroblasting to avoid contamination of the new oil. The PHC discussed the proposal and approved it.

Security presented a proposal to weld closed a heavy station concrete missile door to prevent the high potential for personnel injury caused by opening and closing the door to test it. With the door in a welded-closed state no testing would be required. After checking with Operations, Maintenance and other plant groups, they determined that frequent access is not required, and if access through the door was needed, the weld could be removed temporarily. The change was approved.

The Solid Radioactive Waste System Engineer was next to present the health of the system; however, the Fact-finding Team left prior to this presentation for another meeting.

The Fact-finding Team observed good, penetrating questions, substantial use of three-way communication, and logical fact-based decision-making by PHC Members and participants.

Conclusion:
The DCPP Plant Health Committee (PHC) is part of the prescribed process to screen proposed changes to systems, structures and equipment to improve health. The process adds rigor and certainty to the way in which money is budgeted for plant improvement changes. The December 14, 2006 PHC meeting appeared to have been effectively run with good participation and questions by attendees.

3.3 Emergency Classification and Activation for Security Events

[Note: due to the sensitivity of nuclear plant security, information classified as “Safeguards Information” cannot be presented in this report, thus limiting the breadth and scope of the report. Both Dr. Peterson and Mr. Wardell have been cleared for access to DCPP Safeguards Information.]

The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Bob Waltos, Manager of Emergency Services, to review the Emergency Preparedness classification and activation process for security-type events. The DCISC last reviewed emergency preparedness in October 2006 (Reference 6.2).

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist event, the NRC issued a number of orders requiring upgraded security measures and features at domestic nuclear power plants. The DCISC has reviewed these orders and DCPP’s responses in previous Fact-finding meetings (References 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5) and has found DCPP’s responses satisfactory. The DCISC has also received regular general security updates at its public meetings.

One NRC Order required nuclear plant operators to incorporate security events into their Emergency Preparedness classification and activation plans. DCPP implemented that requirement by revising its Emergency Classification and Emergency Plan Activation Procedure (Revision 34, January 20, 2006). The procedure describes accident classification guidelines and Emergency Plan activation responsibilities. It identifies the four Emergency Action Levels (EALs) of emergency classification (Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency) based on the severity of such events as fires, fuel or reactor vessel damage, fuel handling accidents, release of radioactive material, loss of control room, loss of engineered safety features, loss of off-site electrical power, natural phenomena, primary or secondary system leaks, reactor protection system failure, and other hazards.

The added security event EAL classifications of security threats are as follows:

1. Unusual Event

  1. Security threat or attempted entry or attempted sabotage, or
  2. A credible site-specific security threat notification, or
  3. A validated notification from the NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

2. Alert

  1. Ongoing security compromise, or
  2. A validated notification from the NRC of an airliner attack threat <30 minutes away, or
  3. A notification from the site security force of an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact, or other “hostile action” within the owner controlled area.

3. Site Area Emergency

  1. Imminent loss of physical control of the plant, or
  2. A notification from the site security force that an armed attack, explosive attack, airliner impact, or other “hostile action” is occurring or has occurred with in the Protected Area.

4. General Emergency

  1. A “hostile force” has taken control of plant equipment such that personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions.

The procedure includes definitions of a number of security terms used, such as hostile action, explosion, intruder, sabotage, etc.

The procedure appears satisfactory for determining the EALs for various security events. Other Emergency Preparedness actions, activities, and responsibilities are included in the remainder of DCPP’s Emergency Plan and implementing procedures.

DCPP also developed three new casualty procedures for site specific security threat responses and actions. The DCISC should review these procedures in a future Fact-finding meeting.

Conclusion:
DCPP’s procedure revision for determining Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and activating their Emergency Plan for security events appears satisfactory.

3.4 Emergency Preparedness Update

The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Bob Waltos, Manager of Emergency Services, for an update on DCPP Emergency Preparedness (EP). The DCISC last reviewed EP in October 2006 (Reference 6.2) when it concluded the following:

DCPP Emergency Preparedness appears generally satisfactory, and NRC performance indicators are currently all Green; however, there are equipment reliability, facility, and staffing issues. DCPP is developing action plans for dealing with these issues. The DCISC should continue to follow these plans.

Mr. Waltos reviewed the Emergency Planning Health Report for the Third Quarter 2006. Overall health (scored at 68) had declined to Red (Score < 76) since the First Quarter 2006. The individual cornerstones contributing to the overall program health were as follows:

Emergency Planning Health Report
Monitored Parameter Criteria Color Comments
EP Personnel Right personnel with the right skills in the right positions to manage the program. Yellow EP leadership lacks experience & knowledge
EP staff vacancies
No clear succession plan
EP Program Infrastructure Quality of infrastructure to support EP Program Red Many Emergency Response Organization (ERO) vacancies
No Long-Term Plan for equipment health
Drill development @ implementation needs improvement
Drill Director position vacant
EP Program Implementation How well programmatic requirements executed Yellow Drill performance issues
NCR actions still open
EP Equipment/Related Plant Health of EP components White Equipment health

Each of the above Cornerstones has three or more sub-cornerstones which are monitored and measured. Their scores roll up to cornerstone scores which in turn roll up to the overall program score. This health measurement tool appears appropriate.

To drive improvement on the above program DCPP has developed a comprehensive “Emergency Services Long Term Plan” and has developed an “Emergency Services Standards of Excellence” document to guide Emergency Services Section personnel in the areas of nuclear safety, industrial safety, radiological safety, human error prevention, communication, corrective action and learning organization, critical thinking, professionalism, etc. The standards document appears to be an excellent guide for optimal nuclear plant individual and team behavior and work practices.

The DCPP Emergency Services Section has set as its goal to “. . . be recognized as the industry’s premier Emergency (Fire and Nuclear Incident) response and Industrial Safety Protection Service provider . . .” by following its Standards of Excellence and by implementing its Long Term Plan (LTP). The LTP is a three-year plan (Mitigation [2006], Stabilization [2007], and Improvement [late 2007 and beyond]) to take EP into the top quartiles and deciles in the nuclear industry. The LTP contains an EP Action Plan comprised of 26 Action Items (many with sub-items) with responsibilities, estimated completion dates and progress indicators. The Action Items align to the above Program Health Cornerstones. The plan appears comprehensive, aggressive and actionable

Conclusion:
DCPP Emergency Preparedness appears generally satisfactory, although the Third Quarter 2006 Emergency Plan Health shows unsatisfactory (Red) health. DCPP has developed a comprehensive three-year Long-Term Plan with actionable, aggressive, and measurable action plans for dealing with the health issues. The DCISC should continue to follow these plans.

3.5 NRC February 25, 2002 @ June 20, 2006 Orders Section B.5.b (Beyond Design Basis Security Events)

[Note: due to the sensitivity of nuclear plant security, information classified as “Safeguards Information” cannot be presented in this report, thus limiting the breadth and scope of the report. Both Dr. Peterson and Mr. Wardell have been cleared for access to DCPP Safeguards Information.]

The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Bob Waltos, Manager of Emergency Services, to review DCPP’s response to NRC’s February 25, 2002 @ June 20, 2006 Orders Section B.5.b which dealt with loss of large areas of the plant due to large fires or explosions which are generally beyond design basis events. Although aware of the order, this is the DCISC’s first review of Section B.5.b because very little has been required or done until 2006.

The NRC has issued the following security orders and requests since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack:

NRC has met with DCPP regarding Section B.5.b to review how DCPP would respond to (beyond design basis) losses of large areas of the plant due to fires or explosions and what features DCPP incorporates to help mitigate such losses and maintain control of the plant in a safe condition. Like other nuclear plants, DCPP had responded to NRC’s December 2, 2005 Demand for Information outlining its Section B.5.b strategy. Following industry responses, NRC issued its June 20, 2006 order requiring key radiological protection mitigation strategies and corresponding changes to DCPP’s Site Security Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan, Guard Training and Qualification Plan, and Emergency Plan. The strategies include the following general areas:

The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has coordinated industry actions and responses and released its NEI 06-12, “B.5.b Phases 2 @ 3 Submittal Guideline, Revision 2.” DCPP will respond to NRC in January 2007 referencing the NEI document, which NRC has approved and recommends, and committing to implement the strategies. NRC plans to issue a Safety Evaluation Report in April 2007 on the proposed changes. DCPP will have until the end of 2007 to implement the strategies. There are eleven strategies, including internal and external Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) strategies and Reactor and Containment strategies. The changes include development of a new set of procedures, Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines (EDMGs) which will be similar to existing Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMGs). A project team will develop the EDMGs using the Design Change Process to ensure that all affected plant organizations/functions have a chance to review them to assure plant access, control and safety. DCPP has developed a plan to complete all actions and is preparing a presentation to the Plant Health Committee for funding approval.

Conclusion:
DCPP is developing a January 2007 submittal to respond to requirements in NRC’s June 20, 2006 Security Order Section B.5.b (loss of large areas of the plant due to fires or explosions) and a plan to implement the order’s requirements. Implementation is to be completed by the end of 2007. It appears that DCPP is taking the correct steps to satisfy the NRC requirements.

3.6 Observe Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) Meeting

The Fact-finding Team observed the December 15, 2006 NSOC meeting. The DCISC regularly attends two NSOC meeting each reporting period and last attended in April 2006 (Reference 6.7) when it concluded the following:

The April 5, 2006 DCPP Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) meeting appeared to be well-run and effective in its function to address high-level issues which could affect plant safety. Participation by both DCPP and external members was strong. The use of subcommittees with external members appeared effective and could be made more so by involving plant directors and managers from functional areas other than the ones represented by the subcommittees themselves.

NSOC membership includes all DCPP officers and directors as well as three external members from the nuclear industry. The NSOC Chairman was Jack Keenan, PG&E Senior Vice-President Power Production and Chief Nuclear Officer. All three external members attended: Darrell Eisenhut, a former Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) administrator; Jack Martin, a former NRC administrator; and new member Dhiaa Jamil, Duke Energy Group VP, Nuclear Support (replacing Warren Fujimoto). DCPP expects to add a fourth external member. The DCISC supports that decision.

All NSOC members attended. The meeting was facilitated by Lynn Walter, Assistant to the Senior Vice President of Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer, a non-NSOC member, selected to provide neutral facilitation to free all NSOC members to concentrate on the content of the meeting. She reviewed the previous meeting’s action item list which was included in the meeting materials. Each item was assigned clear responsibility with a specific due date. Many were already complete. At the end of each agenda item, she recapped any Action Items.

The new DCPP Nuclear Communication Manager, Pete Resler, from Exelon was introduced and attended the entire meeting.

The meeting began with a discussion on employee safety, reviewing a recent fall caused in part by an employee not using the handrail on outside stairs. The message was to always use handrails. The Committee also discussed what to do in the event of an earthquake during the meeting. The proper action would be to get under the conference table. Donna Jacobs reminded the Committee to have a questioning attitude during the meeting as an important nuclear safety culture attribute.

Jim Becker describer the following two recent plant events involving reactor shutdowns:

  1. On December 10, 2006 with Unit 2 at 100 percent power, operators initiated an unplanned reactor shutdown due to indications of increasing stator temperature on reactor coolant pump (RCP) 2-2. Operators manually tripped the reactor in accordance with plant procedures when the RCP stator temperature reached 300@deg;F.
  2. On December 12, 2006, at 1:22 pm, Operations was conducting power ascension with Unit 2 at about 25 percent power. An electrical failure occurred in the Unit 2 circulating Water Pump (CWP) motor enclosure 2-1. An electrical transient occurred on Unit 2 12kV non-vital bus D, which in turn caused RCPs 2-2 and 2-4 motor-breakers to trip on undervoltage, initiating an automatic reactor trip. All plant systems functioned as required. At 1:40 pm DCPP declared a Notice of Unusual Event (NUE), Number 23, ’Confirmed Explosion Onsite’. At 1:56 pm, DCPP Fire Department first responders reported that the fire was out. There were no injuries associated with this event. The Unusual Event was terminated at 2:30 pm.

NSOC had no safety concerns regarding these events but issued actions to review (1) the fire response, fire detectors, and fire protection system in that area, (2) how critical components are monitored in the Root Cause Evaluation (RCE), and (3) any single point vulnerabilities of the equipment and systems involved.

These are events the DCISC should review at its next public meeting.

The following agenda items were discussed:

@#8226; Quality Verification’s (QV’s) Assessment of Performance – Dave Taggart, Manager QV, and Bob Prigmore, Supervisor, Quality Assessment, reviewed DCPP quality performance. Many topics were reviewed, and they are summarized as follows:
Quality Verification’s (QV’s) Assessment of Performance
Quality Rating Organization/Function/Project
Blue (Excellence) None
Green (Good) Steam Generator Replacement Project, Temp. Cask Pit Project, Security Services, Chemistry & Envir. Operations, Design Eng./Eng. Fix-It Now (EFIN), Maintenance Team Outage Support Team (OST), Regulatory Services
White (Satisfactory) Problem Identification & Resolution, Used Fuel Storage Project, Reactor Head Vessel Closure Project, Outage Management, Engineering (ICE/Project/Tech. Support/Mechanical), Radiation Protection As Low As reasonably Achievable (ALARA), Information Services, Maintenance I&C
Yellow (Needs Improvement) Operations, Fuel Handling Bldg. Crane Upgrade Project, NEXIS Project, Procurement Services, Emergency Services, Maintenance Planning/ Electrical/Mechanical, Emergency Response Org., Learning Services
Red (Unsatisfactory) Containment Recirculation Sump Project

QV reported that progress on actions from the recent INPO-style Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment was mixed but that actions were being taken to improve performance. An external member stated that two outstanding Self-Assessment items needed particular work: mispositioning and component verification (working on wrong component). Additionally, Alloy 600 problems are receiving much NRC attention (problems at Wolf Creek may result in shutdown). DCPP is closely following this on the potentially-affected Unit 2 only.

@#8226; Operations Sub-Committee – External Member Eisenhut made an oral presentation on the following main points:

@#8226; Maintenance Sub-Committee – Jack Purkis, Director Maintenance Services, reported on the following based on interviews with Maintenance Craft and Supervisors:

External members of NSOC remain concerned about human performance issues in Maintenance, especially wrong unit/wrong component errors. Maintenance human performance remains in red status.

@#8226; Engineering Sub-Committee – Ken Peters, Director Engineering, reported the following major items:

External Member Martin questioned the number of systems in Yellow health, and Peters will discuss it at the next NSOC meeting.

@#8226; Corrective Action, Oversight and Assessment Sub-Committee Report– External Member Martin presented this report.

Martin reported concern that Human Performance was not meeting expectations in that too many workers do not understand or value human performance tools. The recent USA Human Performance Assist visit gave us several yellow and red ratings.

Members were asked if there were any nuclear safety concerns or issues. There were none. Ms. Walter reviewed the Action Items taken during the meeting. External members commented that the Operations Sub-Committee would review DCPP Operational Decision Making (ODM) documents in their future visits. One external member reported than DCPP had fewer external members than most other plants and that some oversight committees’ members were all external. Mr. Keenan stated that they would be adding a fourth external member.

Conclusion:
DCPP Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) meetings are satisfactory and continue to improve. Three of the four external member positions are filled. Having a non-member facilitator appeared useful in allowing all members to focus on content instead of meeting dynamics and timing. The Committee reviewed each previous and new meeting action item to assure clarity, understanding, schedule, and responsibility. Agenda items were pertinent to nuclear and personnel safety. There was good attendance and participation by all with effective questioning and three-way communication. The NSOC sub-committee system works well, but the DCISC Fact-finding Team believes it would be beneficial for the sub-committee chairs and members to be from different disciplines for an outside viewpoint.

3.7 DCISC Member Meeting with DCPP Management

DCISC Member Per Peterson met separately with Jim Becker, Vice-President Diablo Canyon operations and Station Director, to discuss items reviewed in this Fact-finding meeting and other items of interest to the Committee.

4.0 Conclusions

4.1
Although the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Yellow health status) currently has some reliability issues, the system is operable and capable of carrying out its intended functions. DCPP is addressing these issues with action plans and a schedule to return the system to White status by the first quarter of 2007 and to Green status by 2010. The System Engineer appeared knowledgeable.
4.2
The DCPP Plant Health Committee (PHC) is part of the prescribed process to screen proposed changes to systems, structures and equipment to improve health. The process adds rigor and certainty to the way in which money is budgeted for plant improvement changes. The December 14, 2006 PHC meeting appeared to have been effectively run with good participation and questions by attendees.
4.3
DCPP’s procedure revision for determining Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and activating their Emergency Plan for security events appears satisfactory.
4.4
DCPP Emergency Preparedness appears generally satisfactory, although the Third Quarter 2006 Emergency Plan Health shows unsatisfactory (Red) health. DCPP has developed a comprehensive three-year Long-Term Plan with actionable, aggressive, and measurable action plans for dealing with the health issues. The DCISC should continue to follow these plans.
4.5
DCPP is developing a January 2007 submittal to respond to requirements in NRC’s June 20, 2006 Security Order Section B.5.b (loss of large areas of the plant due to fires or explosions) and a plan to implement the order’s requirements. Implementation is to be completed by the end of 2007. It appears that DCPP is taking the correct steps to satisfy the NRC requirements.
4.6
DCPP Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) meetings are satisfactory and continue to improve. Three of the four external member positions are filled. Having a non-member facilitator appeared useful in allowing all members to focus on content instead of meeting dynamics and timing. The Committee reviewed each previous and new meeting action item to assure clarity, understanding, schedule, and responsibility. Agenda items were pertinent to nuclear and personnel safety. There was good attendance and participation by all with effective questioning and three-way communication. The NSOC sub-committee system works well, but the DCISC Fact-finding Team believes it would be beneficial for the sub-committee chairs and members to be from different disciplines for an outside viewpoint
5.0 Recommendations:
None

6.0 References

6.1
“Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Sixteenth Annual Report” on Fact-finding Meeting at DCPP on September 5-6, 2006, Section 3.7, “Long-Standing Equipment Issues and Attend DCPP Plant Health Committee.”
6.2
“Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Report on Fact-finding Meeting at DCPP on October 25-26, 2006, Section 3.1, “Observe October 25, 2006 NRC Graded Evaluated Exercise” and Section 3.5, Emergency Preparedness Update.”
6.3
“Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Fifteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2004 – June 30, 2005”, Approved October 12, 2005, Exhibit D.8, Section 3.9, “Security Update.”
6.4
“Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Fifteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2006”, Approved October 18, 2006, Exhibit D.4, Section 3.1, “Plant Security Update.”
6.5
Ibid., Exhibit D.10, Sections 3.6 “Security Force-on-Force Drill” and 3.8, “Security Update”
6.6
“Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Report on Fact-finding Meeting at DCPP on October 25-26, 2006, Section 3.1, “Observe October 25, 2006 NRC Graded Evaluated Exercise” and Section 3.5, Emergency Preparedness Update.”
6.7
“Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Fifteenth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2005 – June 30, 2006”, Approved October 18, 2006, Exhibit D.8, Section 3.1, “Observe NSOC Meeting.”

DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT

Attachment 1

Plant Health Committee (PHC) Meeting Agenda

Thursday, December 14, 2006
1:00 – 2:30 p.m.
Blue Conference Room

Plant Health Committee (PHC) Meeting Agenda
Attendees Required As Necessary
Plant Health Chairman *^#
Operations Director *^
Engineering Director *^
Maintenance Director *^
Outage Management Director *^
Project Engineering Manager *
Work Control Manager *
Regulatory Services Manager *
Business Services Manager *
Radiation Protection Manager *
Equipment Reliability Supervisor *
Administrative Support *		 Site Services Director
Operations Support Manager
Maintenance Managers
Maintenance Assistant Director
Maintenance Rule Coordinator
Engineering Programs Manager
Technical Support Engineering Manager
Design Engineering Manager
ICE Engineering Manager
Mechanical Systems Engineering Manager
Chemistry Manager
Procurement Services Manager
Project Services Manager
* Required membership and attendance. ^ Voting Member. # Tie-breaking vote.
Quorum = four of five voting members, with a maximum of two alternates.
OBJECTIVES Review and Manage Plant Health Issues.
Determine Potential Threats to be Submitted to the Project Review Committee (PRC).
AGENDA TOPICS Weekly Topics / Items Presenter Time
Emergent: CCW System in Red Status J. Cobbs 10 min.
Work Control Status Update R. Oldenkamp 3 min.
PHSC Update R. Oldenkamp 3 min.
PHC Checkbook Review and Budget Update (as required) D. Ramos 2 min.
Presentations +
1. Hydroblast Lube Oil Lines & Replace Lube Oil – U1/U2 J. Nelson 20 min.
2. Safety Hazard While Testing Door 115 – U1 S. Dienhart 20 min.
3. Solid Radwaste System Health Review C. Miller 20 min.
Action Item Review 2 min.
+ Half of time allotment for presentation, half for Q&A
AGENDA TOPICS
Monthly
AGENDA TOPICS
Quarterly

cc Strategic Projects Director, Project Management Supervisor, Westinghouse Site Manager

NSOC
Attachment 2

December 15, 2006
AGENDA

NSOC Agenda
Tab Time Topic Presenter
0900 Safety Review Donna Jacobs
1 0910 Review Action Items from 06/14/06 Meeting Lynn Walter
2 0920 Plant Performance Indicators, NRC PIs, MSPI
Conclusions and Identify Actions		 Jim Becker
3 0935 QV’s Assessment of Performance
Conclusions and Identify Actions		 Dave Taggart
1000 Break
4 1010 Operations/Production Subcommittee Report
Status of worker engagement
Status of Operations “pipeline”
Conclusions and Identify Actions		 Darrell Eisenhut
5 1050 Maintenance Subcommittee
Status of worker engagement
Conclusions and Identify Actions		 Jack Purkis
6 1130 Engineering Subcommittee
Status of worker engagement
Update on sump issue
CDBI inspection results
Conclusions and Identify Actions		 Ken Peters
7 1210 Lunch
8 1230 Oversight @ Self Evaluation Subcommittee
Status of worker engagement
Increased oversight of vendor supplied equipment
Conclusions and Identify Actions		 Jack Martin
9 1310 Leadership Gap Analysis: Fundamentals of leadership, gaps and corrective actions.
Conclusions and Identify Actions		 Paul Roller/Ardela Daniels
1340 Break
10 1350 Unit 2 MIDS leak, root cause and corrective/interim action update
Conclusions and Identify Actions		 Susan Westcott
11 1420 Safety Conscience Work Environment
Conclusions and Identify Actions		 Rick Burnside
1450 Plus/Delta Lynn Walter
1500 Adjourn

For more information about DCISC contact:

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee
Office of the Legal Counsel
857 Cass Street, Suite D, Monterey, California 93940
Telephone: in Califonia call 800-439-4688; outside of California call 831-647-1044
Send E-mail to: dcsafety@dcisc.org