Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee’s January 31 - February 1, 2007 Public Meeting [17th Annual Report, Exbibit B.6] (Approved at the June 13-14, 2007 Public Meeting)

Wednesday & Thursday, January 31- February 1, 2007, San Luis Obispo, California

Notice of Meeting

A legal Notice of Meeting was published in local newspapers, along with several display advertisements, and was mailed to the media and those persons on the Committee’s service list. A copy of the meeting agenda was also posted on the Committee’s website at www.dcisc.org.

Public Tour of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant

The Members of the DCISC accompanied by 44 Members of the public, PG&E tour guides and the Committee’s consultants, conducted a tour of Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). The members of the public responded to the DCISC announcement for a public tour of the Plant. The group met at the PG&E Community Center for introduction to the Committee members and background of the Committee. PG&E representatives provided a brief overview of DCPP, including its history, operation, the nuclear fuel cycle, spent fuel storage and plant security. A presentation was made by PG&E on the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) and an opportunity was provided to ask questions. PG&E discussed how the cooling systems work, with the ocean water two barriers away from the reactor itself. The group then departed for DCPP.

The group first arrived at the Plant overlook site and received a briefing from PG&E representatives on the various external features and buildings, then drove by the site of the ISFSI for a description of its purpose and features. At the control room simulator (a full-scale mockup of the U-1 control room) viewing room, PG&E discussed plant controls, operator training and accident response. The group experienced a mock earthquake in the Simulator and observed a simulated automatic reactor shutdown. Next, the group visited the Plant Intake and Discharge Structure where the group viewed the facility where DCPP pulls in and expels cooling water from and into the Pacific Ocean. The group then visited the Security Building for a demonstration of screening of personnel entering the protected area of the plant.

Questions & Comments From the Public

During the ride back and at the Community Center the group received information on radiation protection and members of the public took the opportunity to ask questions of Committee members and consultants.

Conclude Public Tour

Agenda

I. Call to Order - Roll Call

The January 31, 2007, public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) was called to order by Committee Chair, Dr. A. David Rossin at 1:30 P.M. at the Embassy Suites Conference Center in San Luis Obispo, California. Roll call was taken.

Present:

Committee Member William F. Conway

Committee Member Per F. Peterson

Committee Member A. David Rossin

Absent:

None

II. Introductions

Dr. Rossin introduced the other members and the Committee’s consultants present including Mr. Jim E. Booker, Mr. R. Ferman Wardell, and Legal Counsel Robert R. Wellington.

III. Public Comments and Communications

The Chair reviewed the procedures for members of the public to make comments to the Committee and inquired whether there were any persons present who wished to address remarks to the Committee.

The Chair recognized Mr. Wellington and Ms. Nancy Castle of AGP Video to discuss a matter listed on the Agenda for the meeting under report of Legal Counsel (see discussion and action taken below under Item VII).

There were no comments from members of the public at this time.

IV. Consent Agenda

The only item on the Consent Agenda was approval of the Minutes prepared from the Transcript of the Committee’s October 18-19, 2006, public meeting. Members reviewed and discussed with PG&E’s Mr. Steve Chestnut, DCPP Director of Generation Services, certain items identified in the Minutes for future consideration during Fact-findings or public meetings including the review of mispositioning errors, gagging of the main steam safety valves and subsequent declarations of their operability, possible tours of DCPP by engineering student groups and containment fan cooler modifications and maintenance. Direction was provided concerning adding the containment fan cooler modification and maintenance issue to the DCISC’s Open Items List and clarification and editorial changes were made to the draft of the October Minutes. The minutes from the Committee’s public meetings become part of its Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations (Annual Report).

V. Action Items

A. DCISC Review of PG&E’s Response to 16th Annual Report; July 1, 2005 - June 30, 2006:: On January 4, 2007, PG&E provided its Response to each of the four Recommendations made in the Committee’s Sixteenth Annual Report.; Members reviewed PG&E’s response to Recommendation R06-2 concerning review of staffing of the Quality Verification (QV) Department to ensure sufficient personnel are available to perform both regulatory required and other audits. Mr. Conway observed, and Dr. Peterson concurred, PG&E’s reference to a 2005 QV staffing review was open-ended and only partially responsive to the Recommendation as it does not address actions taken in 2006 and planned for the future. At the invitation of the Chair, Mr. Chestnut responded that PG&E requests 60-days to provide a revised written response to DCISC Recommendation R06-2 and any other Committee comments on PG&E’s Response to the Sixteenth Annual Report .Dr. Rossin observed there is an agenda item scheduled for this public meeting concerning the QV organization and more information might be provided during that presentation.; The Committee deferred taking action on accepting PG&E’s Response to the DCISC’s Sixteenth Annual Report until later in this public meeting.; Following informational presentations by PG&E, the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee unanimously received and accepted PG&E’s Responses, to be subsequently supplemented by PG&E’s further written response to R06-2, to the Recommendations contained in its 16th Annual Report.
B. Update on Financial Matters and Committee Activities:: Legal Counsel Wellington reviewed information provided by the Committee’s accountant concerning income to and liabilities incurred on behalf of the Committee through December 31, 2006, and observed the Committee, as it did in 2005, will refund a balance of unspent grant funds to PG&E.; Mr. Wellington reviewed the effect of adoption by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) of a Restated Charter for the DCISC and commented that Members would again be receiving annual retainers for 2007 as all are now serving within regularly appointed terms.
C. Discussion of Issues on Open Items and Guidelines Lists:: Mr. Wardell reviewed the latest edition of the Open Items List included with the public agenda packet for this meeting. The Open Items List is used by the Committee to track and follow items and activities identified during its public meetings and Fact-finding sessions with PG&E. Certain items were identified for closure or amendment and future actions were scheduled concerning others including:; Item CM-7 concerning conduct of maintenance rescheduled from the January to the April 2007 Fact-finding;; Item HP-22 concerning Human Performance rescheduled from the May to the April 2007 Fact-finding;; Item PIL-3 concerning Performance Improvement Programs closed and the term “learning” to be removed from the category title;; Item SEC-2 concerning Security to be updated to address monitoring efforts at mitigation;; Item SC-2 concerning Seismic to be followed up;; Item PM 6-06 concerning the public tour closed.
A short break followed.
D. Nomination and Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for the July 1, 2006-June 30, 2007 Term:: On motion by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Mr. Conway, the Committee approved continuing the terms of Drs. Rossin and Peterson as DCISC Chair and Vice-Chair for a term of office from July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2007.
A short break followed.

VI. Committee Member Reports and Discussion

A. Public Outreach, Site Visits and Other Committee Activities:: In response to a query from Dr. Peterson, members and consultants reviewed the conducting of the public tour on the first day of a public meeting and agreed to conduct the public tour during the June 2007 public meeting during the first day. At Consultant Booker’s suggestion the Committee’s address will be added to the public comment form distributed during the tour.
B. Documents Provided to the Committee:: Mr. Wellington directed the Committee’s attention to the list of documents received since its last public meeting in October 2006. A copy of the list was included with the public agenda packet for this meeting.

VII. Staff-consultant Reports & Receive, Approve and Authorize Transmittal of Fact-finding Reports to PG&E

Consultant Wardell discussed and reported to the Committee on the October 25-26, 2006 Fact-finding visit to DCPP with Dr. Peterson.

The DCISC team observed the October 25, 2006, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) graded emergency exercise. Mr. Wardell reviewed the exercise’ scenario including simulated off-site radioactive releases which challenged all features and organizations of the Diablo Canyon Emergency Response Plan. The DCISC representatives observed the exercise from the Control Room Simulator, at the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Emergency Off-Site Facility (EOF), and the Joint Media Center (JMC). Mr. Wardell commented the DCISC team believed PG&E did a good job in quantifying, explaining and putting into perspective the news releases concerning radiation releases, however, performance during the media briefing session could be improved by use of a single, officer-level spokesperson to provide more factual and understandable information concerning release of radiation. The DCISC team also observed a critique of the JMC performance. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Wardell responded that planning for or consideration of providing lengthier media briefings during future exercises was not a part of this exercise.

The DCISC Fact-finding team reviewed the use of Best Estimate Analyzer for Core Operations-Nuclear (BEACON), a Westinghouse-developed analytical tool for predicting the power and flux distribution in nuclear cores to ensure operation within design limits. Technical specifications (TS) require periodic measurement, particularly after a refueling outage. Use of BEACON permits more accurate prediction of core flux distribution with less frequent use of the Moveable In-Core Detection System (MIDS), an electro-mechanical system. Mr. Wardell reviewed the function and operation of BEACON in reactor core power distribution measurement and its use to advise Operations on boration and de-boration to balance reactivity during reactor ramp planning and ramping activity. BEACON also allows for improvements during power ascension following a refueling outage. The DCISC team concluded use of BEACON should maintain, and likely improve, safety of operations at DCPP. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Wardell and Dr. Peterson confirmed that MIDS is used to calibrate BEACON calculations. Dr. Peterson commented BEACON allows a detailed depletion analysis and tracking of isotopic inventory distribution in the core to allow more accurate predictions of power distribution and thereby enhances safety. Mr. Wardell confirmed PG&E has checked the proof of concept and proof of principal aspects of BEACON at DCPP, using MIDS to validate BEACON for each new core. The DCISC agreed to follow up PG&E’s DCPP-specific validation of BEACON during a ’slow shutdown’ during a future Fact-finding.

Mr. Wardell and Dr. Peterson reviewed use of the Outage Risk Analyzer-Maintenance (ORAM), a workstation-based program that incorporates some of the DCPP probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) data to allow plant operators to evaluate the risk of taking various components out of service for repair, maintenance or testing. ORAM is used to calculate outage as well as on-line maintenance risk. Mr. Wardell reported a new program termed Safety Monitor, which has been developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), will be replacing ORAM in the future and it is now being tested at DCPP.

The DCISC representatives, both of whom have clearance to review safeguarded information, reviewed changes to DCPP Security and met with DCPP’s Security Manager. Mr. Wardell reported that, following the October Fact-finding, Security succeeded in achieving green status in the Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR) complied by the DCPP QV organization. Security has been involved with plans for the ISFSI and installation of temporary racks in the spent fuel pools, as well as with the upcoming Steam Generator Replacement Project. Security is also preparing for another force-on-force drill by ‘hardening’ some buildings and installing new surveillance cameras.

The DCISC team met with the Director of Station Services to receive an update on emergency preparedness and equipment reliability issues and reviewed a new control rod worth test used during power ascension. Mr. Wardell briefly reviewed sub-critical physics testing done to measure flux and provide data on control rod worth, which serves to provide a better degree of safety by allowing the reactor protection system to remain fully in service. The DCISC team also met with the manager for the ISFSI Project and toured the construction site. To conclude the Fact-finding visit, Dr. Peterson met with DCPP Vice President for Nuclear Services, Ms. Donna Jacobs, to discuss the visit.

On motion by Mr. Conway, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the Committee unanimously received, approved and authorized transmittal to PG&E of the October 25-26 Fact-finding Report. Committee Fact-finding reports become part of the Committee’s Annual Report.

Mr. Wardell reported on the December 14-15, 2006 Fact-finding visit to DCPP with Dr. Peterson.

The DCISC Fact-finding team received a report on the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System which supplies water to the steam generators when the main feedwater system is not available; serves as an engineered safety feature for removal of decay heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) via the steam generators following plant transients when the main feedwater system will not be available or is not within its range of operability; and provides a means to cool down the Reactor Coolant System during shutdown to place it on residual heat removal. Dr. Peterson and Mr. Wardell toured the system with the system engineer and reviewed the design of the system. He reported the system is currently in yellow, i.e., unsatisfactory, status because of an availability issues due to control valve failures, and the system is currently expected to return to white status by the first quarter of 2007 and to green status by 2010.

The DCISC representatives observed a meeting of the Plant Health Committee, chaired by the director of Operations Services, which discussed the red category of the health status of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System due to mechanical seal leakage and DCPP’s plans to return that system to white status.

A meeting was held with the manager of Emergency Services to discuss emergency classification and activation for security events in response to the NRC’s post 9-11 orders. Mr. Wardell reported the DCISC will review PG&E’s development of three new casualty procedures for site-specific security threat response during a May 2007 Fact-finding.

The DCISC team received an update on the October 2006 Emergency Preparedness Exercise and the long-term plans for improvement of the current red health status of the Emergency Preparedness Organization due, in part, to Emergency Preparedness and Emergency Response Organization personnel vacancies and staffing issues. Mr. Wardell and Mr. Chestnut responded to a question from Dr. Rossin concerning preparations by the three Emergency Response Teams, the regular plant staff and the offsite local county and state responders for drills and exercises and the differences which might be encountered during an actual emergency response. Mr. Chestnut commented DCPP is required to meet very specific NRC performance criteria and, therefore, extensive scenarios are generally required to completely test the plant’s capabilities. Dr. Rossin observed that planning drills and exercises on a worst-case basis may not be the most effective way to exercise the organization’s response to future actual events which may just barely cross the threshold for categorization as an emergency. The DCISC agreed to follow issues of Emergency Preparedness planning and staffing during future Fact-finding and at public meetings.

Dr. Peterson and Mr. Wardell reviewed DCPP’s response to the NRC’s February 25, 2002 and June 20, 2006, Security Orders Section B.5.b, concerning how nuclear plants would respond to losses in a plant due to a large-area fire or explosion. Mr. Wardell reported DCPP has developed new procedures, termed Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines, similar to the existing Severe Accident Management Guidelines, in response to the NRC’s orders. The DCISC will follow up on PG&E’s progress during a May 2007 Fact-finding visit. In response to a query from Mr. Conway, Mr. Chestnut and Dr. Peterson confirmed PG&E’s general response is in keeping with the Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI) generic response and the expected responses by other nuclear plants, while containing certain site-specific strategies to mitigate severe events. In response to Mr. Chesnut’s observation that information related to B.5.b may contain security safeguards materials, Mr. Wardell confirmed that he and Dr. Peterson have been thoroughly trained with regard to security safeguard information and that DCISC security-related Fact-finding reports were provided to DCPP’s Security Manager for review prior to being made public.

On December 15, 2006, the DCISC representatives observed a meeting of DCPP’s Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) which was facilitated by a PG&E employee who is not an NSOC member and Mr. Wardell briefly discussed their observations, evaluation and suggestions concerning the conduct and effectiveness of that meeting and the reports of the NSOC’s constituent subcommittees. Mr. Conway inquired concerning NSOC’s response to a negative report generated by an external NSOC member dealing specifically with the NSOC member’s interview of DCPP operators to which Mr. Wardell replied that during the NSOC meeting there was discussion about a new approach to operator engagement but no specific discussion of that prior negative report. Mr. Conway remarked that the Committee should remain engaged in review of any information with respect to addressing issues raised by the negative report.

Following the Fact-finding, Dr. Peterson met with DCPP Vice President of DCPP Operations and Station Director, Mr. Jim Becker, to discuss the visit.

Subject to receipt and incorporation of editorial comments from members and consultants, on a motion by Mr. Conway, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the December 14-15, 2006 Fact-finding Report was unanimously received, approved and its transmittal to PG&E authorized.

Consultant Booker reported on a November 28-29, 2006, Fact-finding visit to DCPP with Mr. Conway. Items reviewed during that visit included review of the status of the Management Observation Program with the DCPP Human Performance Coordinator. The DCISC representatives reviewed the Program’s background, purpose and defined standards. Mr. Booker reported PG&E has determined that coaching hours rather than numbers of observations should be used to determine the success of the Program, which will involve both craft and management personnel. In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Chestnut confirmed the "Do It Right" cards to be employed as a part of the Management Observation Program, have been approved for use at DCPP.

The DCISC team reviewed the status of the red and yellow systems identified by System Health Reports and recovery plans for those systems. There are 17 systems in those categories including 5 electrical and 12 mechanical systems. The DCISC representatives reviewed each schedule for recovery efforts which, in some cases, extend corrections through 2009-2010.

The status and effectiveness of the six-member Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing (STARS) joint nuclear utility initiative were reviewed including actions to improve the objectivity of the management review by STARS senior leadership of site-specific performance indicators and to identify and communicate lessons learned from Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO) experience and identify programs and processes for improvement. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Chestnut replied each of the STARS members will also be a member of the seventeen-member Utility Service Alliance (USA) group because many of the activities previously done under STARS will now be done under USA.

The DCISC representatives reviewed information provided by the report of the NSOC Maintenance Subcommittee and met with each of the directors involved with the NSOC subcommittee recommendations, including QV, Operations and Engineering, to review what is being done with the subcommittees’ reports and Mr. Booker briefly reviewed each of these meetings and summarized the comments from the directors on their use of input from the NSOC subcommittees.

The Fact-finding team reviewed the Make-Up Water System and accompanied the system engineer on a system walkdown. The system, which supplies make-up water for the plant and also for the domestic water system, is presently rated in yellow status due to problems with its condensate storage tanks which are scheduled for repairs during refueling outages 2R14 and 1R15. Mr. Booker commented the lack of a formal system description or system procedures, although the Make-Up Water System is a non-safety system, is of concern and may be part of a subsequent recommendation. Mr. Chestnut replied DCPP does have several documents which document that system including the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and design criteria memoranda (DCM) with detailed explanations of all instrument and control and mechanical components of the Make-Up Water System.

The results of the QV self-assessment were reviewed and Consultant Booker responded to a query from Consultant Wardell about the Nuclear Industry Evaluation Program’s (NIEP) audit of QV’s receipt inspections of the DCPP warehouse, which were determined to be twice what other plants do regarding receipt inspections. The QV backlog for inspections has increased from about 250 to more than 800.

The DCISC representatives also reviewed the Plant Performance Improvement Report (PPIR) and the Management Review Meetings (MRM) and reviewed those items from the PPIR identified as needing improvement.

Consideration of approval of the November 28-29, 2006, Fact-finding Report was deferred pending receipt of comments from the Chair and a vote will be taken by email prior to its receipt, approval and authorization for transmittal to PG&E.

Consultant Booker’s report on the January 17-18, 2007, Fact-finding visit to DCPP with Dr. Rossin was postponed until later during this meeting.

Following the informational presentations by PG&E on the second day of this public meeting, the Committee considered the January 17-18, 2007, Fact-finding visit to DCPP. Consultant Booker reported he and Dr. Rossin visited DCPP over January 17-18 and he discussed topics and matters reviewed during that visit. Dr. Rossin commented during the Fact-finding visit there was a grass fire on PG&E property, outside of the area including DCPP, which included about 3,000 acres and was subsequently brought under control without any impact on transmission lines to or from the plant.

The status of the Root Cause Analysis Program was reviewed and Mr. Booker reported it appears PG&E has improved its root cause analysis since last year due to implementation of formal training programs. The DCISC representatives also reviewed the Reactor Pressure Vessel Surveillance Program and determined reactor embrittlement is not likely to be a factor for the life of DCPP’s reactor vessels. Dr. Rossin commented the original calculations for neutron exposure for most nuclear plants were conservative and it now appears most reactor vessels currently in service will serve out their lifetimes plus any plant life extensions which may be granted, but the industry will continue to monitor this issue.

Mr. Booker stated the DCSC Fact-finding team reviewed issues and plans related to margin management, such as for the containment structure design pressure which is designed for 45 psi but which has an ultimate design pressure of possibly up to 60 psi, while the actual analysis may be around 30 psi, with any design changes potentially affecting that margin. The margin management responsibility at DCPP belongs to the Engineering Department, although ownership of margins is not exclusive to one organization. Margin management includes issues of insuring knowledge is transferred and margins documented. Dr. Rossin stated there were generic issues involving “as constructed” margin ownership between the regulator, the NRC, and a licensee. Mr. Booker reported INPO has determined DCPP meets INPO’s expectations for margin management. Ten systems, reviewed in the Fact-finding Report, were identified as having low margin and are being evaluated and reviewed. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Chestnut stated he was unaware of any plans for a programmatic system health report for margin management.

The DCISC representatives toured DCPP including the control room and U-2 diesel generator rooms, noting an improvement in materiel condition of the diesel generator rooms and Mr. Booker commented that housekeeping throughout the entire Plant was good.

The Performance Improvement Organization was reviewed during the January 17-18, 2007 Fact-finding, Dr. Rossin and Mr. Booker attended the first hour of a Management Review Meeting which he described as well organized, although the room’s acoustics made hearing somewhat difficult. The DCISC team received a presentation on the status of supervisor effectiveness and training and the coaching program, toured the site of the ISFSI and received a status report on the plans for used fuel storage at DCPP. Dr. Rossin and Mr. Booker reviewed with Mr. Chuck Belmont, DCPP’s designated liaison with INPO, progress in the mid-cycle reporting process and INPO’s findings and identified improvements including no repeat findings, improvements to work package quality and reducing operator mispositioning errors, including valve mispositioning events, during the fuel handling process. Dr. Rossin commented the format of the mid-cycle reports might be better organized to make the reports more readable.

The DCISC representatives met with the DCPP Manager of Human Resources concerning the safety culture and leadership training sessions and observed a meeting of the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB). In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Chestnut confirmed DCPP made significant changes during 2006 to the Performance Management Program based on feedback received from employees and plans on making further changes, based on the lessons learned during 2007. Dr. Rossin and Mr. Booker commented the CARB meeting appeared to focus on review of relatively minor issues and changes made and included discussion of alternative design which, Dr. Rossin stated, in his opinion, seemed to make the process somewhat inefficient.

Concluding the Fact-finding visit, Dr. Rossin met with DCPP Vice President of Operations and Station Director Mr. Jim Becker to discuss the DCISC team’s impressions.

During the public comment period opening the meeting, the Chair recognized Ms. Nancy Castle of AGP Video, the firm which produces the cablecast broadcast and video and audio recording of Committee meetings. Ms. Castle presented a proposal, included with the agenda packet for this public meeting, for live-streaming and archiving and indexing of video to allow immediate access to real time cablecast of DCISC public meetings and access to a particular agenda item from a previous public meeting for persons accessing a public meeting of the DCISC through the San Luis Obispo public access television station’s website at www.slospan.org. Dr. Peterson and Mr. Conway concurred with Ms. Castle’s observation that the proposal would enhance the DCISC’s public outreach efforts. Members, Consultants Wardell, Booker and Mr. Wellington discussed with Ms. Castle the possibility of accepting public comment by telephone or email during a public meeting.

A motion was made by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Mr. Conway and approved unanimously by the Members to accept AGP Video’s proposal for enhanced cablecast and video services for Committee public meetings.

VIII. Correspondence

Copies of correspondence sent and received at the office of the Committee’s Legal Counsel were included with the public agenda packet for this meeting.

IX. Adjourn Afternoon Meeting

The afternoon meeting of the DCISC was adjourned by the Chair at 5:15 P.M.

X. Reconvene for Evening Meeting

Dr. Rossin convened the evening meeting or the DCISC at 5:30 P.M.

XI. Committee Member Comments

There were no comments from the Committee members.

XII. Public Comments and Communications

The Chair reviewed the procedures for members of the public to make comments to the Committee and inquired whether there were any persons present who wished to address remarks to the Committee. Ms. Joyce Palaia, a resident of Avila Beach, California, was recognized and addressed the Committee.

Ms. Palaia identified herself as a member of the Diablo Canyon Subcommittee for the Avila Valley Advisory Council. She stated a recent article appeared in a local newspaper concerning the NRC’s determination that, in the unlikely event of terrorist use of a large aircraft against a nuclear power plant, there would be sufficient time to implement mitigation activities such as a local evacuation. Ms. Palaia observed there was currently a plan to remove a bridge between Avila Bay Drive and San Luis Bay Drive and stated she was worried about the effect of the removal of the bridge on evacuation plans for the Avila Beach area. She asked for the Committee’s written support concerning this issue.

Dr. Rossin replied the nuclear industry plans and prepares for many events which are unlikely to occur and he confirmed the newspaper article Ms. Palaia referred to discussed the NRC’s conclusion that no further changes in regulations were required in the event of the use of a large aircraft against a nuclear power plant. The DCISC has received past presentations on such an event and has concluded the likelihood of a successful strike resulting in a break in DCPP containment was very remote. Mr. Conway asked Ms. Palaia whether she discussed her concern with the local authorities who are also involved with evacuation plans. Ms. Palaia replied that she had discussed evacuation planning at great length with the fire and sheriff’s departments but, while evacuation plans exist, the local authorities have never involved local citizens in their planning process and there exists a lack of public confidence in those plans. Mr. Conway suggested it would be appropriate for the Committee to have discussions with the local authorities concerning the topic. In response to Dr. Peterson’s inquiry, Ms. Palaia confirmed it was the bridge connecting San Luis Bay Drive to Avila Bay Drive which is scheduled to be removed and the road is to be closed for approximately one year. She confirmed an alternate route was to be used. The Chair suggested, and Ms. Palaia agreed, that further contact and discussion with Ms. Palaia should take place during a future Fact-finding visit.

Mr. David Weisman, a resident of Morro Bay, California, identified himself as the Outreach Coordinator for the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility, and was recognized by the Chair to address remarks to the Committee.

Mr. Weisman suggested the Member of the San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors for the district including Avila Beach, Mr. Jerry Lenthal, might be contacted concerning Ms. Palaia’s concern.

Mr. Weisman commented that, in response to a recent judicial decision cited in the newspaper article referred to earlier, the NRC would be required to do further studies with regard to the design basis threat at nuclear facilities, at least as far as those threats relate to above-ground storage of spent nuclear fuel at DCPP.

Mr. Weisman stated his question arose from an early decision that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) should not act concurrently as a regulator and proponent of atomic energy and the resulting decision to create both the NRC and the U.S. Department of Energy to fulfill those roles. He stated during a teleconference at the California Energy Commission (CEC), a proposal was made that the current moratorium on the construction of new nuclear plants in California be lifted, that nuclear energy then be reinstated in California and new nuclear power plants subsequently developed. He stated the proponents suggested it was appropriate to now lift the moratorium as there now exists a safe, permanent solution to the problem of spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. He questioned whether Dr. Peterson’s participation in that teleconference suggested a conflict of interest and Mr. Weisman asked for a further explanation of how the problem of safe, permanent storage of nuclear materials has been solved.

Dr. Peterson replied and confirmed he took part in the teleconference. As a professor at U.C. Berkeley, Dr. Peterson stated he is involved in a wide variety of activities related to nuclear energy and nuclear technology. He stated that as a member of the DCISC, he cannot take a position on issues such as license renewal for DCPP, but he observed that new nuclear plant designs have characteristics much different from earlier plant designs and the new designs benefit from significant improvements regarding safety. Public policy decisions, therefore, differ today for these new plant designs. Dr. Peterson stated he carefully balanced his role as a member of the Committee in context of any outside activity concerning important decisions on the use of new nuclear technology and he briefly reviewed some of the future plans to expand energy production by use of coal and the environmental problems associated with this use os coal. He stated he has worked extensively on the issue of how geologic isolation works for nuclear waste and the problems involved and he compared current scientific understanding of those problems to the context and knowledge necessary to address the effects of global climate change. He stated concerning the continued operation of existing plants including DCPP and whether or not the safety of those plants is sufficient and whether the operators are doing a capable and effective job, he is very willing to question and make sure that is the case. He observed that plants such as DCPP, which were designed in the 1960’s, require a high level of human performance in order to sustain acceptable levels of safety. Dr. Peterson offered to meet with Mr. Weisman to discuss these issues further. In response to Mr. Weisman’s comment about California lifting the current moratorium, Dr. Peterson stated that California law is very explicit that the federal government must demonstrate an approved technology, but not necessarily to build a storage facility for nuclear material. Dr. Peterson remarked that whether the current moratorium makes sense in an environmental perspective in context of efforts to balance global climate change is an open question.

Dr. Rossin commented that the earlier decision affecting the AEC referred to by Mr. Weisman was essentially a political decision.

XIII. Information Items Before the Committee (Cont’d)

Dr. Rossin asked PG&E’s Mr. Chestnut to commence the informational presentations requested by the Committee for this public meeting. The Chair requested DCPP Director of Operations Mr. Ken Langdon to make that presentation.

Overview of December 10, 2006, Unit-2 Manual Reactor Trip.

Mr. Langdon stated on December 10, 2006, the Unit-2 (U-2) reactor coolant pump resistance temperature detector (RTD), an electric element imbedded in the reactor coolant pump (RCP) stator, failed in a manner that mimicked a valid indication of an impending catastrophic failure of the 12kV RCP motor. Plant procedures were followed for the indicated condition to manually shut down U-2 prior to tripping the affected motor. The cause was determined to be plant staff being unable to confirm the gradually increasing temperature as an RTD failure with the motor in operation. Contributory causes included annunciator response procedures not having been reviewed for single point vulnerabilities, to identify single points in the plant where a unit trip could be caused, and diverse indications not available to provide input for operational decision making. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell Mr. Langdon replied other plants reviewed a broader spectrum of passive single point vulnerabilities than had DCPP. In reviewing operating experience at other nuclear plants, DCPP identified a similar event which occurred during 1993, however, he commented that it is likely that even if failure of an RTD was identified as a single point vulnerability there would have been essentially no action taken based on the normal nature and low likelihood of RTD failure. Normally, an RTD failure is a straight short or open circuit causing instant failure, while this failure happened over a number of hours In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Langdon stated the temperature increase was non-linear but was very gradual and more exponential at the end.

Mr. Langdon reported that during the U-2 manual trip all control rods fully inserted in response to the reactor trip, all systems functioned as required, all major equipment including the three emergency diesel generators (EDGs) remained operable and DCPP’s licensed operators took appropriate conservative actions in accordance with plant procedures.

Mr. Langdon reviewed and discussed the corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence and otherwise which include:: Developing a program for RTD health monitoring by August 2007;; Revising annunciator response procedure to provide improved operator guidance for response to RCP stator high temperature indications by March 23, 2007;; Implementing a permanent alarm setpoint change for the Unit-1 (U-1) and; U-2 RCP stator RTDs by February 23, 2007;; Performing single point vulnerability study on alarm response procedures for single point vulnerabilities by February 23, 2007;; Performing a study and providing the Plant Health Committee with options to enable dual indications of stator temperature and providing diverse indications outside the crane wall in containment by June 30, 2007.

In response to a question from Mr. Conway concerning whether DCPP is considering implementing a program to consider operating life of an RTD, Mr. Langdon replied that currently there isn’t an industry standard for an established lifespan for an RTD, which are essentially run to failure components, however, the RTD health monitoring program may be able to establish a predictive ability to identify when an RTD is about to fail. The RTD which failed was original plant equipment at DCPP and Mr. Langdon commented that, for 3,700 operational years of operational history for RCPs and pressurized water reactors in the U.S., there have been only two failures including the December 10, 2006, event at DCPP and the 1993 event mentioned earlier. He commented that establishing the absolute cause of the RTD failure would require opening up the RCP motor and examining the RTD, which is imbedded in the motor, and would destroy the motor. The corrective actions being taken are within the two highest categories of priority, corrective action to prevent recurrence and corrective action for a quality concern, and each is assigned to an individual manager or owner and completion is tracked in an electronic database. Any change or revision in the date for completion for a corrective action to prevent recurrence requires review by and approval of the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) and receives effectiveness evaluation of the intended and actual outcome.

In response to a question from Consultant Wardell concerning the major safety consequences of the event, Mr. Langdon stated, because of the nature of the response, when the RCP indication reached 300 degrees, the procedural trip set point, the plant was already sub-critical and the event was determined to be of low safety significance under the NRC’s significance determination process. He commented the event represented a significant condition adverse to quality which, technically, did not require the level of response and corrective action DCPP took and is taking which were performed due to the operational significance. Mr. Langdon confirmed, had plant operators not tripped the reactor there was no safety significance because the event was due to a false signal. Mr. Langdon commented that if there were an actual problem with the RCP motor it would be difficult to speculate on how significant the damage to the motor might have been and he confirmed that a resulting transient and automatic reactor trip as a result of an RCP motor failure has been analyzed. He confirmed, in response to a question from Dr. Rossin, that each RCP motor has six imbedded RTDs, two per phase, although only one of those is connected to the plant process computer. He confirmed the RCP motor temperature did not go above normal during the event.

Mr. Chestnut stated that Vice President Becker had joined the meeting and Mr. Chestnut asked Mr. Jack Purkis, Director of Maintenance Services at DCPP to make the next presentation.

Overview of December 12, 2006, Unit-2 Reactor Trip.

Mr. Purkis reported that the December 12, 2006, U-2 automatic reactor trip occurred due to a loss of an electrical fault associated with Circulating Water Pump (CWP) 2-1, which took out the electrical bus and tripped two RCPs, which caused an automatic reactor shutdown. A 3-phase surge capacitor on CWP 2-1 catastrophically failed and caused a local fire which was contained within the termination box of the CWP.

The presumptive cause, required due to the almost complete destruction of the capacitor involved, of this event was the surge capacitor experiencing a phase-to-phase internal fault due to insulation breakdown. Mr. Purkis stated DCPP originally had three 1-phase capacitors, one for each phase on the CWPs, but in 1993 this configuration was changed to a single 3-phase capacitor. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence include replacing each single 3-phase capacitor with three 1-phase capacitors and establishing a Preventative Maintenance Program to replace and monitor 12kV capacitors on all four CWP motors.

Mr. Purkis reported the contributory cause of the CWP 2-1 surge capacitor failure was the replacement parts equivalent analysis done in 1993 which allowed the use of a single 3-phase capacitor without evaluating the increased probability of a phase-to-phase fault. Corrective actions included performing a line performance training analysis to enforce evaluation of increases in consequences or probability of failure for engineers. Vice President Becker, in response to a query from Mr. Conway, stated all processes were followed concerning the design configuration control of the plant when the decision to change from three 1-phase to a single 3-phase capacitor was made. Mr. Becker confirmed the Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC), before the plant recovered from the trip, reviewed the preliminary cause analysis and a more detailed process would come later as part of the Licensee Event Report (LER) submitted by DCPP to the NRC.

In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Purkis replied that the AFW was manually started due to the failure of the one circulator running at the time of the trip while the plant was operating at 30% power, resulting in the loss of the condenser and the normal supply of condensate feedwater and the AFW started as a result and in accordance with procedure. Vice President Becker confirmed that, if the plant were operating at full power at the time of the trip, the AFW would have started automatically.

Vice President Becker made the next presentation to the DCISC.

Update on Plant Events, Operational Status and Performance Indicators

Mr. Becker reviewed generation history for U-1 and U-2 over the past 12-months and observed the two shut downs for U-2 due to RTD and surge capacitor issues, discussed previously, were major items. U-1 has had a very good, reliable operational year, with a planned reduction to 50% power in November to clean bio-fouling from the circulating water tunnels. The surge capacitor initiated trip for U-2 was the first unplanned automatic reactor trip of a DCPP unit since 2002. Collective radiation exposure for 2006 was the lowest ever for DCPP during a calendar year which, Mr. Becker stated, was attributed to good organizational and chemistry performance. There was one lost-time injury to plant personnel during 2006. The INPO Summary Performance Index for DCPP through December 2006, a 12-month rolling average of statistics reported to INPO on a quarterly basis, was a composite performance of 96.8 which exceeded the goal set for 2006 of 94. Mr. Becker attributed the performance exceeding the goal as due to good plant availability and the on-time performance of refueling outage 2R13. The INPO Summary Performance Index goal for 2007 will be 98.4. In response to a question from Mr. Booker on how the 2006 goal was established, Vice President Becker replied that establishing a goal for 2006 was challenging because INPO has established new goals for the period 2006-2010 in all areas measured by the Index and, accordingly, the refueling outage, historical improvement in radiation exposure, equipment issues and the need to do tunnel scraping all figured into the setting of the 2006 goal of 94. Mr. Becker commented the 2007 goal of 98.4 also reflects changes to the Index related to fuel reliability. Mr. Becker identified the U-1 refueling outage durations as contributing to U-1 not meeting the 2010 goal for capability factor and reported U-1 is not meeting the 2010 industry goal for radiation exposure. U-2, due to the 2R13 refueling outage and the December forced outages, is not meeting the 2010 goal for capability factor and is also short of the goal for forced loss rate due entirely to the two December 2006 forced outages. U-2 currently is meeting the 2010 goal for radiation exposure.

In response to a question from Mr. Conway concerning notice to DCPP employees regarding an indication of a U-2 fuel defect, Mr. Becker replied the fuel defect has been stable. When U-2 was restarted following the forced outage due to the surge capacitor failure, a slight increase in activity levels in the U-2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) was identified, however, over the next few weeks the indication stabilized, albeit at a higher level of activity than before the U-2 forced outage, thereby confirming the existence of a defect on a fuel assembly inside the U-2 reactor vessel. As a precaution, U-2 is not being ramped or changing power levels to support statewide power grid requirements. DCPP is planning on finding and fixing or removing the defective fuel assembly during the next refueling outage for U-2. In response to a follow up question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Becker confirmed that DCPP employees have been kept informed concerning the U-2 fuel defect.

Mr. Chestnut asked Mr. Paul Roller, Director of Performance Improvement at DCPP to make the next presentation.

Review of Reportable Events, NRC Notices of Violations, Licensee Event Reports and NRC Performance Indicators.

Mr. Roller began his presentation with the observation that all NRC performance indicators are currently in green status, indicating very low safety significance. There have been no Notices of Violation (NOVs) issued by the NRC, no findings, and 2 Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) of very low safety significance. DCPP is preparing Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for three recent U-2 events.

A NCV of very low safety significance was issued for NRC identification of a human performance violation for failure to identify incompatible parts pre-staged to cross connect the Fire Water System to the Auxiliary Feedpump suction per station procedures. The connecting flange, fabricated at DCPP, did not fit. The flange will be repaired and Mr. Roller and Mr. Chestnut confirmed this NCV is now entered into the Corrective Action Program.

A NCV of very low safety significance was received for a NRC-identified Maintenance Rule violation for not including Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room floor drains in the Maintenance Rule monitoring program. The floor drains are required to mitigate flooding.

No LERs have been submitted by DCPP since the last public meeting of the Committee in October 2006, and there have been only three LERs submitted to date for 2006. LERs were submitted for discovery of dead birds on the intake bars at the Intake Structure; a greater than 10% plugging of steam generator tubes during 2R13; and in conjunction with a Part 21 Notification to the industry for a manufacturing defect discovered in a check valve to have been installed in the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System. Both U-2 forced shutdowns in December will result in LERs. Based on discussions with the NRC resident inspectors, a voluntary LER may be submitted for an August 2006 U-2 thimble tube leak.

The number of DCPP violations to date remains below the rolling average for NRC Region IV plants, with DCPP having received 14 violations in the last 12-months while the Region IV plant average for the last 12-months was 15.2 violations. Mr. Roller reviewed the unit-specific NRC performance indicators and observed all color-coded indicators remain green. Data for unplanned reactor scrams increased to one indication and data for unplanned scrams with loss of normal heat removal also registered an increase.

Mr. Roller continued at the podium for the next presentation.

Activities of PG&E’s Nuclear Safety Oversight and President’s Nuclear Advisory Committees

A joint meeting of the PG&E President’s Nuclear Advisory Committee and the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committees for the Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) and DCPP was held on November 8, 2006, and Mr. Roller reviewed the discussion concerning the following:: DCPP/HBPP Performance Indicators; DCPP Follow-up Actions to Engage Workforce; Future HBPP NSOC Membership; HBPP Corrective Action Program Status; Preparations for Decommissioning HBPP Unit-3; QV Assessment of Performance for DCPP and HBPP; DCPP Review of Red & Yellow Systems; DCPP Follow-up on Safety Hit Team

Mr. Conway questioned Mr. Roller concerning the results of an employee survey which indicated 50% of DCPP’s employees did not know where to find a copy of the DCPP Business Plan. Mr. Roller replied off-site meetings to present the DCPP Business Plan have been held with more than 1,100 employees. Mr. Roller confirmed the Business Plan is now available electronically and in a paper copy and is reviewed on the in-house Diablo News Network system. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell concerning the red and yellow system review, Mr. Roller replied that the Plant Process Computer, which has no control function but which is used to monitor the plant, is in red status and was the focus of much discussion and is in the process of being replaced. In response to a comment from Consultant Booker, Mr. Roller stated that systems in red status require referral to the Plant Health Committee to review and approve a plan and timetable for system improvement.

On December 15, 2006, the DCPP NSOC met, with DCISC representatives present as observers, to consider:: Plant Performance Indicators; QV Assessment of Performance; NSOC Subcommittee Reports; U-2 Movable In-core Detection System Leak; Safety Conscious Work Environment

Mr. Roller confirmed that INPO performs its evaluations every two years and during those years when no review is performed by INPO, DCPP conducts its own assessment as an INPO-type mid-cycle review, termed the "INPO Mid-Cycle Review." NSOC subcommittees provided reports to the NSOC: the Operations Subcommittee reported on long-term operations staffing and the status of training classes for new operators, both licensed and unlicensed; the Maintenance Subcommittee reported on human performance in Maintenance, and the Engineering Subcommittee reported on the status of the containment recirculation sumps.

Mr. Chestnut introduced Mr. Jearl Strickland, Manager of the Used Fuel Storage Project at DCPP to make the next presentation.

Status of Legal Activities Concerning the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility.

Mr. Strickland reported the base infrastructure for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation has been completed and PG&E is proceeding to install the passive security barriers and finalize the design of the active security systems and their connection to plant security systems, now scheduled for completion by August 31, 2007. He displayed several photos of the site and described the ISFSI configuration and recent construction activities and equipment used. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson concerning protecting the steel and concrete from corrosion in a marine environment, Mr. Strickland replied the storage overpacks will be imbedded within the concrete foundation and have class one coating applied, concrete slab surfaces have also been grout-patched and sealed.

Mr. Strickland reported that two foundations, each with the ability to each store 20 casks, have now been installed. The completed ISFSI at full capacity would have capability for 138 storage casks on 7 total foundations. He displayed several photos of the completed foundations with empty storage overpacks in place. Mr. Strickland reported the Holtec Company has completed fabrication of the transfer cask and 8 multi-purpose canisters and storage overpacks. Fabrication of rigging is progressing and the nuclear quality grade transporter, the first to be so designated, has finished its NRC performance testing and should be onsite at DCPP within six weeks. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Strickland stated the multi-purpose canisters are not qualified for use at a future federal depository such as that planned for Yucca Mountain in Nevada. The multi-purpose designation refers to their qualification for use as interim storage and for transportation of the spent fuel. Mr. Strickland displayed several photos of a multi-purpose canister and described its interior configuration. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Strickland replied a detailed structural analysis of the transporter was performed for rigidity of structure due to its seismic qualification for use at DCPP and he reviewed design changes to the DCPP transporter from the transporter used at the Fitzpatrick nuclear plant, a photo of which was displayed.

Mr. Strickland reported modifications to the existing plant were required to support the ISFSI and its operation including single fireproof capability upgrading of the fuel handling building crane to address issues related to suspended loads, and are scheduled for completion by Fall 2007; and installation of seismic restraints, a rail system and other miscellaneous modifications are scheduled for completion by November 30, 2007. Mr. Strickland stated the seismic restraint modifications are required only to the U-2 side of the plant, where the final transfer will take place, the single fuel handling crane being capable of serving both units. Mr. Strickland reviewed the schedule for ISFSI operations:

Result of 1R13
Schedule for ISFSI operations:
Facility Operational	November 2007
Startup Program	2nd Quarter 2008
NRC Dry-Run	June 2008
Loading Campaign	3rd Quarter 2008

In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Strickland confirmed PG&E has filed with the NRC its request for the NRC to delineate the issues and procedures with reference to the Environmental Impact Statement’s (EIS) assessment of the terrorist issue that is required for completion of the EIS, in response to a recent decision by the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal following the U.S. Supreme Court refusal to consider a further appeal of the 9th Circuit’s decision by PG&E.

In concluding his presentation, Mr. Strickland reported that installation of the temporary storage racks in the spent fuel pools was completed in December 2006, and provides interim storage of spent fuel for DCPP operations, including full core discharge for both units, through 2010.

XIV. Adjourn Evening Meeting

The evening meeting of the Committee was then adjourned by the Chair at 7:40 P.M.

XV. Reconvene for Morning Meeting

The morning public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was called to order by its Chair, Dr. Rossin, at 8:30 A.M. Dr. Rossin asked the other members, consultants, and legal counsel to introduce themselves.

XVI. Committee Member Comments

There were no comments by members at this time.

XVII. Public Comments and Communications

The Chair inquired whether any persons wished to address comments to the Committee and reviewed the established process for addressing remarks to the DCISC.

Ms. June Cochran was recognized. Ms. Cochran identified herself as a member of the group San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and stated she attended the evening session of this DCISC public meeting and had questions concerning some of the matters discussed.

Ms. Cochran questioned whether continued construction of the ISFSI was appropriate, given the recent court ruling requiring further planning considerations for the ISFSI and she questioned if dispersing the storage facility or locating it underground might not offer safer alternatives to the current ISFSI configuration.

With reference to the discussion on violations, Ms. Cochran stated that although the safety significance of DCPP’s non-cited violations were rated as low, they are still violations and she stated that in a previous year PG&E was assessed a $200,000 fine with reference to numbers of violations at the plant and she cited several violations of California’s statutes and Code of Regulations by DCPP. She observed that aging components apparently contribute significantly to these violations and commented that the discussion of new technology in the nuclear field, which is apparently far superior to that employed at DCPP. She commented the evacuation plans for the local area residents in the event of an emergency at DCPP are probably unworkable and have been of concern to local residents for years. Ms. Cochran commented although valuable training invariably takes place following a problem, it’s always after the fact. She closed her comments by observing that the local community does not feel safe with DCPP in the vicinity.

The Chair responded and commended and thanked Ms. Cochran for her attendance at the public meeting and interest in issues concerning DCPP and he encouraged more citizens to attend DCISC public meetings. Dr. Rossin replied, concerning the ISFSI, that the safety of the casks to be used has not been an issue in the legal proceedings, which involved issues with regard to the required EIS and PG&E is awaiting further information from the NRC before proceeding further. Dr. Rossin observed that the decision of ‘how safe is safe enough’ with respect to storage of spent fuel on site at nuclear facilities has been settled. Dr. Peterson remarked that the DCISC monitors the plant’s violations for proper documentation and use of a system and process to determine the root cause for their occurrence, the measures taken to identify and fix the problems as well as any future corrective actions, including necessary actions, training and modifications of procedures, identified to preclude recurrence. He stated it was also necessary that assessment be made of things happening at other nuclear plants and commented that PG&E was doing a good job, relative to the industry, in doing all these things but, as with most things related to performance, improvement is always a possibility. Dr. Peterson stated that in many cases corporate reliability and safety goals align, and in some areas they may not. Both are monitored by oversight committees, such as the DCISC, as well as by the NRC with particular attention to the later.

Mr. Conway assured Ms. Cochran of the Committee’s continuing interest, through its public meetings and during frequent Fact-finding visits to DCPP, in maintenance activities at DCPP and stated the DCISC has on a number of occasions rigorously challenged PG&E concerning events which have occurred and the steps taken to prevent recurrence. Mr. Conway stated that, concerning location of the U-2 fuel leak the location of what is believed to be a defect the size of a pinhole, it is known to be within the reactor core.

Dr. Rossin mentioned a question was raised concerning DCPP evacuation planning during the public tour and stated that the DCISC would schedule review of evacuation and emergency planning during a future Fact-finding. Ms. Cochran stated that concerns regarding evacuation planning were not associated only with the proposed closure of a bridge in the Avila Beach area, but extend to the entire San Luis Obispo local area.

Mr. Conway, in response to an observation by Ms. Cochran concerning systems at DCPP in yellow status, stated that during DCISC Fact-findings the Committee specifically targets systems for in depth review that are currently ranked as yellow in category including assessing PG&E’s plans and timing for returning such systems to white and green status. Committee review of these systems is addressed within its Fact-finding reports which become a part of its annual reports.

The Chair recognized Mr. Klaus Schumann, who stated he was addressing the Committee in an individual capacity and as a representative of the Green Party. Mr. Schumann confirmed that he has addressed remarks to the Committee on several past occasions.

Mr. Schumann stated that use of earthen berms and visual barriers in conjunction with spent fuel storage installations has been recommended by the National Academy of Sciences, in its report on safety and security of commercial spent fuel storage at Point 4. 2.3 of that report; and by members of Congress and he stated that improvements to the ISFSI at DCPP were possible. Dr. Rossin commented on his recollection that the National Academy’s report was not site-specific and observed, just because a measure might be taken it doesn’t necessarily follow that it should be taken at a particular facility.

Mr. Schumann commented that, like the National Academy of Sciences, the DCISC is an independent agency with the ability to make recommendations.

Mr. Schumann, speaking as an individual, referred to a newspaper article concerning the NRC’s revised security policy directing nuclear plant operators to focus on preventing a radiation release and improving evacuation plans to protect the public health and safety in the event of a terrorist attack. He commented at DCPP there are two potential sources for the release of radiation, the two reactors which are protected by containment domes and the two spent fuel pools (SFPs) which have no such protection. Mr. Schumann observed the SFPs have far more disbursable radiation than the reactors and the SFPs could self-ignite pool fires which would release large amounts of radiation into the environment. He suggested the SFPs would be a place to begin to fulfill the NRC’s directive and further suggested returning the SFPs to their original, pre-1986, low-density configuration would contribute to such an effort. He commented transfer of fuel from the SFPs to dry cask storage on an accelerated timetable could serve to virtually eliminate the SFP’s ability to catch fire and stated that without such accelerated transfer, the community would be forced to live with the threat of a nuclear catastrophe from the reactors and the SFPs for decades. Mr. Schumann requested the DCISC, as an independent state agency, to issue an appropriate recommendation to PG&E concerning such accelerated transfer.

Mr. Schumann continued his remarks as a representative of the Green Party and stated the Green Party submitted a report of the National Academy of Sciences from 2005 to the DCISC concerning safety and security of commercial spent fuel storage and in June of 2005, the Green Party requested the DCISC recommend implementation of the report’s findings and suggestions to PG&E for implementation at DCPP. He then reviewed certain sections of a summary of that report with the Committee including provisions for rearrangement of fuel assemblies within SFPs and for water spray systems capable of cooling the fuel in the event the pools or the overlying buildings were damaged. He observed that dry cask storage has inherent advantages over the storage of spent fuel within pools. He queried the Committee members concerning the DCISC’s consideration of the Green Party’s request.

The Chair replied that the Committee has dealt with these specific topics in depth in the past and Dr. Rossin stated it was his belief that the topics addressed by Mr. Schumann were addressed by the NRC, although not adopted, in previous decisions made concerning storage of spent fuel at DCPP. Mr. Schumann reiterated that he, the Green Party, the local community and people all across the nation are not satisfied with the steps taken so far by the NRC, as the federal regulator, and PG&E, as the NRC’s licensee, although he acknowledged there have been some improvements. He commented PG&E’s plan to install temporary racks in DCPP’s SFPs increases their capacity and, correspondingly, the danger from a pool fire and he again stated accelerating transfer of the fuel to dry cask storage offered the best solution at this point in time. Mr. Schumann stated DCPP was originally designed to have low density SFPs and that the original design had input from the local community which was not the case with the subsequent change to higher density SFPs.

Dr. Peterson commented that the complete National Academy’s study was a classified document and only a subset of material was released to the public as a summary. Dr. Peterson stated he holds a Department of Energy security clearance and was a peer reviewer of some of the aspects of that study. He observed, in order for the DCISC to properly consider the National Academy’s study, each Committee member would be required to obtain security clearances they do not currently possess. He observed, for that reason, ultimate decisions about the adequacy of nuclear security measures must be made by the NRC. Dr. Peterson observed the DCISC is not in a position to make the recommendation to PG&E sought by Mr. Schumann and the Green Party. The DCISC’s role is to assure the Plant is safe from the perspective of safety-related events and decisions or recommendations concerning a design-basis threat from terrorists’ acts are not within the DCISC’s capabilities to analyze. Mr. Schumann replied that when the local community has attempted to address these issues with the County Board of Supervisors, the California Coastal Commission and the DCISC, the answer is always that the local body is required to defer to the authority of the NRC and he observed the NRC’s latest response appears to pass responsibility on to the Federal Homeland Security Administration and the military. He closed his comments by thanking the Committee and reaffirming his frustration, on behalf of the public, in attempting to bring these issues forward in an effective manner.

Consultant Wardell confirmed the Committee has addressed many of the issues Mr. Schuman’s again raised in his remarks and has documented its research in its annual reports and Fact-finding reports which are available on the Committee’s website, as well as in written form at the R.E. Kennedy Library Reference Department on the campus of the California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo and from the Committee office in DVD format.

XVIII. Information Items Before the Committee

The Chair requested Mr. Chestnut continue with the next informational presentation requested by the Committee. Mr. Chestnut introduced Mr. Cary Harbor, Manager of Problem Prevention and Resolution at DCPP to make that presentation.

Status of the Corrective Action Program: 2006 Program Performance and Future Plans and Overview of the Performance Improvement Organization: Performance Improvement Steering Committee and Performance Improvement Roll-up Process.

Mr. Harbor reviewed the NRC’s identification in 2004 of the DCPP Corrective Action Program (CAP) performance as a cross-cutting issue of concern. Improvements were made through extensive benchmarking reviews of top performing plants and DCPP exited the NRC’s cross-cutting status for the CAP in 2005. He commented on and discussed several programs, implementations and improvements which occurred in three categories to resolve the cross-cutting aspect of the CAP:

Program Improvements: Corrective Action Evaluations; Improved Operability Reviews; Longstanding Issue Evaluation and Approval Process
Conducted Training to Improvement Performance
Governance Improvements: Performance Metrics; Periodic Review with Leadership Involvement

Mr. Harbor reviewed with the DCISC the corrective action evaluations, which have included a formal root cause team process and apparent cause evaluations including institution of a revised grading process and review of pre-job briefings, with manager ownership; and improved prompt operability assessment reviews including implementing senior reactor operator licensed review of equipment performance problems, along with engineering review. Mr. Conway, Consultant Wardell and Dr. Rossin discussed with Mr. Harbor the broad-based contribution of the review of pre-job briefings in the apparent cause evaluation process and the management observation and personnel requirements for this improved process including plans to follow up concerning the contribution of the improvements to pre-job briefings. In response to a query from Mr. Conway, Mr. Harbor confirmed the Differing Professional Opinion Program was available to resolve differences between senior licensed operator and engineering, although that program has not been used for some time. Mr. Harbor confirmed the DCPP shift manager, as a senior reactor operator, holds the responsibility to approve recommendations from engineering concerning operability assessments. Longstanding equipment issue evaluation and approval process improvements have included use of a common site priority matrix to rank issues, implementation of a Plant Health Committee (PHC) based on industry best practices, and prioritizing and approving issues based on risk ranking.

Mr. Harbor reported that training has been conducted for root cause analysts in multiple techniques including streaming analysis, tap root, barrier analysis and management oversight risk tree (MORT) analysis. Apparent cause training was provided to more than 230 individuals and managers, CAP training to more than 1,000 plant staff, and training has been provided for trending and evaluation.

Mr. Harbor reviewed and discussed Program Governance principles established to:: Ensure Performance Sustainability; Focus on Improving Line Ownership; Establish a Continuous Improvement Structure; Recognize & Encourage Good Performance; Identify & Address Program Shortfalls; Allow Leadership to Monitor & Drive Performance; Improve Metrics for Program Monitoring Focusing on Quality & Timeliness

In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Harbor stated DCPP conducts apparent cause evaluations or root cause evaluations to generate corrective actions as a result of INPO findings. The corrective actions are then reviewed for status at a Management Review Meeting of officers and directors, with self-assessments subsequently conducted to review results. He confirmed, in response to Mr. Booker’s observations, the latest mid-cycle self-assessment of INPO findings identified several areas which indicated further improvements were needed. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Harbor stated the Management Review Meeting has now replaced the former Performance Improvement Board

Mr. Harbor described the Performance Improvement efforts at DCPP as line ownership of a continuous, focused process involving analysis, improvement and monitoring. He reviewed and discussed each of the results achieved to date at DCPP which include:: Apparent Case Timeliness Reduced to Below 30 Days.; Apparent Cause Quality Grading (75% to 95%); Improved Root Cause Quality Noted by the CARB; Root Cause Timeliness Reduced Below Goal; Zero Overdue Quality Action Requests (ARs) December 2006; Significant Reduction in Maintenance Backlogs; Identification that Longstanding Issues Were Addressed During 2006

Mr. Harbor reviewed with the Committee certain quotes from INPO documents concerning performance improvement at DCPP regarding the need for management blending of proactive and reactive measures to preclude a station or organization from living in the past and reacting to emerging problems rather than predicting and resolving issues before they become consequential. He discussed with the Committee the workings of the Performance Improvement Roll-up Process to establish the periodic, proactive review of issues and identification of performance gaps including:

Summary Performance

Review of Performance Data from Inputs

(CAP, Human Performance, Self-Assessments/Benchmarking,

Operating Experience, Observations, Training)

Metrics

Previous Trends & Actions Taken

Review of Training Performance

In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Harbor stated that critiques by participants which result from their training experiences are evaluated and management personnel also observe classroom activities. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson concerning closing ARs, Mr. Harbor replied ARs are ranked in various levels, those determined to have the highest significance, with a formal root cause analysis performed, have effectiveness evaluations performed subsequent to being closed out and are followed up by the CARB. ARs of a lower significance, with an apparent cause analysis performed, are reviewed by managers. ARs of the lowest significance are reviewed in Management Review Meetings and through review of equipment trending data to ensure they are closed out properly. In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Harbor stated that trending is initiated through entry into a database of any error, no matter how small, and all data are reviewed by performance improvement coordinators to determine if an adverse trend can be identified. He reviewed a schematic diagram of the Performance Improvement Process and described the input, roles of those persons involved in the collective review, the options offered by the process and gave an example of how the process functions to identify trends and confirmed the process has successfully identified issues at DCPP. In response to an observation by Mr. Conway that self-assessment has become a key tool within the Performance Improvement Roll-up Process, Mr. Harbor agreed and stated his opinion that the self-assessment program at DCPP was strong. He identified, in response to Mr. Conway’s request, inclusion of effectiveness evaluations as a significant gap in the self-assessment process and he confirmed that the process has worked to allow self-critiques by organizations to identify key issues within their respective areas. He commented that senior leadership at DCPP participate in the Self-Assessment Review Board and, in response to a question from Consultant Booker, stated a grading process has been instituted for self-assessment to establish consistent performance. INPO has adopted DCPP’s self-assessment training for use by other nuclear facilities. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Harbor stated that if an instructor was not effective, the Performance Management Process would be invoked to review whether that individual was meeting the goals set.

Mr. Harbor reviewed the current status of the Performance Improvement Roll-up Process as follows:: Performed in Multiple Organizations; Identifying Trends Prior to Becoming Significant; Involving All Levels of the DCPP Organization for Buy-In; Evaluate Results at the Department Level; Roll-up into Station Trending Review; Results Reported at Management Review Meetings (MRM)

He identified and discussed resolution of issues which have been identified and are being addressed through the process including those involving control board clearance tagging, maintenance red tag issues, verifications in maintenance and quick procedure change processing. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Harbor and Mr. Chestnut identified documentation issues and human performance as often being involved on a high level with the most common causes. Mr. Harbor identified the next steps in development as:

Continue Benchmarking to Learn from Top Performers

Continue Enhancing Training Interface with Programs

Continue Improving Metrics to Drive Performance

Additional Performance Improvement Coordinator Training

Incorporating Leadership from Other Nuclear Plants in the MRMs

Incorporating Station & Departmental Fundamentals into Performance Improvement Roll-ups

Perform Rigorous Self-Assessments on Processes with Outside Support

Implement Improvement Recommendations

Dr. Rossin stated he and Consultant Booker attended a MRM meeting which was also observed and benchmarked by personnel from the Southern California Edison Company, and Mr. Harbor confirmed that valuable feedback was received from their visit. Dr. Rossin commented the DCISC representatives found the size of the group and the room used for the MRM created some problems concerning communication, including a three-way communication concerning action items during the meeting he and Consultant Booker observed.

Dr. Rossin thanked Mr. Harbor for a valuable presentation.

A short break followed.

Mr. Chestnut asked Mr. Bob Waltos, Manager of Emergency Services at DCPP to make the next presentation.

Emergency Planning’s October 25, 2006 Drill Results: Including Interface with Local, County and State Agencies.

Mr. Waltos stated his organization, Emergency Services, involves the emergency planning and emergency response groups working in cooperation with fire protection, safety and medical services and facilities. The NRC-evaluated exercise held on October 25, 2006, demonstrated DCPP’s ability to respond to a tsunami warning with good cooperation and coordination in protecting the health and safety of the public during a simulated radiological release. The exercise provided an opportunity to practice some lessons learned from a June 2005, tsunami warning. The next evaluated exercise at DCPP is tentatively planned for October 29, 2008, and he reported evaluated exercises are required every two years by NRC regulation. The exercises required involvement not only by the DCPP Emergency Response Organization (ERO) but also by the San Luis Obispo County (SLO) and State of California Office of Emergency Services. The exercise was evaluated by DCPP, the NRC, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Mr. Waltos stated the October 2006 exercise scenario was developed in coordination with SLO and the State Office of Emergency Services and he discussed with the Committee its objectives which included testing the emergency response plans and procedures learned from the June 14, 2005, tsunami warning; testing the new California Warning Center Notification System; and evaluating response to radiological release including testing the coordinated efforts to mitigate consequences and protect public health and safety. The exercise scenario included loss of offsite power, a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and fuel damage which led to a radiological release. Areas evaluated by DCPP included attainment of the exercise’ objectives, the NRC Emergency Plan Performance Indicators and the ERO Team performance competencies. Results of this evaluation included ERO demonstration of effective coordination with State and SLO to protect public health and safety and the ERO Team functioning in a manner demonstrating effective response to accident mitigation. All items from the post-exercise critique, which Mr. Waltos confirmed go above the minimum regulatory requirements, and from lessons learned were captured in the critique database and appropriate items, numbering between 40 and 50, were entered into DCPP’s Corrective Action Program. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Waltos replied that DCPP’s drills generally result in a greater numbers of items identified than evaluated exercises.

The NRC’s conclusions in evaluating DCPP’s evaluation process and observation of the evaluated exercise were generally complimentary of DCPP’s performance including the demonstrated ability to effectively protect public health and safety and the NRC did not identify any new issues in its observations. Overall, the NRC observed improvement was possible in the area of accurate notification forms, with differences noted between the time on the form and the verbal declaration of the time of an event or condition and the NRC noted there were communications challenges with a disjointed flow of information between facilities. Mr. Waltos and Mr. Chestnut confirmed Dr. Rossin’s observation on the importance of accurate logging of time of an event or condition and stated the NRC’s observations were entered into the DCPP Corrective Action Program and training is being provided to Operations personnel. Mr. Waltos reported DHS and FEMA’s team of 25 evaluators concluded at a post-exercise public meeting there were no deficiencies or open areas requiring corrective action, emergency response personnel were focused on actions to protect public health and safety and PG&E personnel worked closely with SLO and State personnel in response to the scenario. There were no Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified.

In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Waltos confirmed that FEMA reviews the DCPP evacuation plan prior to an evaluated exercise. Dr. Rossin confirmed Mr. Waltos’ statement that no members of the public were actually evacuated or moved as a result of an exercise. Mr. Waltos stated that DCPP, in concert with SLO, has plans to review evacuation planning and Dr. Peterson requested a copy for review, for a possible future Fact-finding, of the 2002 report prepared by a consultant concerning DCPP’s current evacuation plan. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell concerning the staffing of the ERO, Mr. Waltos replied there are six Emergency Response facilities with both minimum staffing, required to report to their respective facilities within 60-minutes, and support staffing requirements. DCPP has a goal of three-deep minimum staffing in place, through its use of three ERO teams, for all critical positions, however, training is ongoing in several critical, intensive areas, such as dose assessment, to attain three-deep staffing which he stated should be achieved by the end of March 2007, with a further reserve team in place by the end of 2007. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Waltos stated proficiency is evaluated through background review, training, and performance is assessed during tabletop type drills before an individual is actually assigned to an ERO team. In response to a query from Mr. Conway, Mr. Waltos stated he was confident by the end of March 2007, DCPP will have fully staffed its three ERO teams and he confirmed that DCPP is predicting attrition using demographics in order to get personnel qualified for the ERO teams and the reserve teams. Mr. Waltos confirmed Consultant Booker’s observation that obtaining personnel from the line organizations to staff the ERO teams was challenging. and he confirmed that the ERO has management’s support in identifying staff to fill the various functional positions on the ERO.

In response to Consultant Wardell’s question concerning what DCPP is doing in addition to minimum regulatory requirements, Mr. Waltos stated DCPP has set higher objectives for both the risk-significant and non risk-significant 16 planning standards set by the NRC which define minimum regulatory requirements. DCPP also has higher thresholds for the NRC performance indicators and he gave as an example the drill and exercise performance indicator concerning timely and accurate classification and notification which the NRC has set at 80% as 12-month rolling average threshold for increased scrutiny, and for while DCPP’s goal is set at 95% or higher. Dr. Rossin questioned the efficacy and need for reporting that information by quartile, and Mr. Waltos confirmed the indicator was an NRC requirement and observed that the higher percentages indicate the fundamentals are being done very well. Mr. Conway inquired regarding PG&E submission to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) for approval of methodology to be used to establish schemes for emergency action levels and why PG&E is training personnel prior to NRC approval of its new schemes for emergency action levels, to which Mr. Waltos replied the drills through the end of 2007 will be performed using the current emergency action levels while parallel training is being conducted on the new emergency action levels, which are expected to be used during and after 2008 and he confirmed this was a challenging effort with a potential for error which will be addressed by a change management plan, procedure updates and tracking and a self-assessment shortly after implementation of the new emergency action levels.

Mr. Chestnut requested Mr. Dave Taggart. Manager of Quality Verification at DCPP, to make the next informational presentation to the Committee.

Overview of the Quality Verification (QV) Organization Including Staffing, Performance, Current Issues and Quality Performance Assessment Report Trends.

Mr. Taggart stated DCPP continues to be operated safely and conservatively and the overall plant operational performance indicators continue to improve, however, a number of challenges continue to exist as barriers to achieving industry excellence. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Taggart reported that DCPP has revised its color scheme for reporting in the last Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR) to include an excellence criterion, with a blue color to indicate a level higher than green, however, at present DCPP performance, on section and departmental levels, is rated as being in an improving, white, status.

Mr. Taggart identified and discussed with the DCISC members and consultants areas identified a performance gaps and challenges including:: Implementation of Mid-Cycle Station Self-Assessment Recommendations Using INPO Criteria;; Inconsistent Maintenance Pre-Job Walkdowns;; Documentation and Quality of Work Packages;; Operations Plant Status Controls and Human Performance;; Recirculation Sump Project & DCPP’s Pending Request for an Extension to Complete the Project;; Plant System Health with More White and Yellow Systems Identified than Previous;; Industrial Safety Performance;; Learning Services for Accredited and Non-Accredited Programs (Training and Qualification Audit Results);; Emergency Planning/Emergency Response Organization.

Mr. Taggart identified and discussed with the Committee areas at DCPP identified with sustained high performance, including:: Radiological Environmental Monitoring; Security; Fitness-For-Duty Program; Maintenance Skill and Workmanship; Reactor Engineering Support in Plant Operation; Reactivity Leadership Team; Rate of Overdue Corrective Maintenance ARs

In response to questions from Consultants Wardell and Booker, Mr. Taggart confirmed that skill and pride of workmanship have always been areas identified with DCPP performance and the foreign materials exclusion program’s identification of issues during the last refueling outage, 2R13, was reviewed by the Corrective Action Program and improvements were made.

Mr. Taggart identified and reviewed areas at DCPP with satisfactory and improving performance as including:: Fire Protection System Engineering; Self-Assessments (Mid-Cycle, Margin Management & In-Service Testing); Engagement of Plant Workers with the Safety High Impact Team

Mr. Taggart reviewed areas currently being monitored by QV as key station issues including:: Industrial Safety Behaviors, Standards & Results; Outage Preparedness; Longstanding Equipment Issues; Performance Improvement in Quality of Apparent Cause Evaluation, Self-Assessments & Training; Human Performance in Maintenance & Operations; Operations Mispositioning Error Rate; Maintenance Processes & Work Practices including Pre-Job Walkdowns, Documentation & Work Package Quality; Material Storage & In-Storage Maintenance

Members and Consultants discussed with Mr. Taggart issues in connection with the Materials Storage and In-Storage Maintenance areas including conversion in connection with the NEXIS Project, the need to implement ANSI standards and procedural compliance issues including implementing corrective actions by Maintenance, and storage to prevent cross contamination issues by segregating carbon from stainless steel. Mr. Taggart confirmed DCPP has made improvements concerning longstanding equipment issues but stated the QV organization will continue to monitor this area.

In response to a question from Mr. Conway concerning when review of repeat items on the Key Issues List might be escalated to upper management for resolution, Mr. Taggart replied that repeat issues related to corrective actions were elevated and were the subject of a recent Management Review Meeting but he confirmed that QV can only monitor, including advocating through use of the Performance Improvement Roll-up Process, and leverage regarding the problems it identifies, it cannot fix those problems, responsibility for which remains with the individual organization. Mr. Chestnut agreed to follow up Mr. Conway’s concern with upper DCPP management’s involvement in review of the Key Issues List and repeat items and to provide further feedback to the Committee.

In response to the DCISC’s Recommendation R06-2 concerning QV staffing, Mr. Taggart stated DCPP’s response reviewed the results of its benchmarking during 2005 within the industry and included confirmation of adjustments made within the QV organization including additional audit personnel assigned to Maintenance. He confirmed there were also other areas which had QV staffing increases including in the supplier quality and projects areas. Mr. Taggart stated DCPP was presently on par with other stand-alone nuclear plants with regard to QV staffing, with a prior major weakness in the area of QV staffing in Maintenance now having been successfully addressed. In response to a question from Consultant Booker concerning an NSOC identified issue regarding QV staffing to ensure DCPP is above and beyond regulatory requirements for audits and assessments, Mr. Taggart replied that QV continues to review INPO audit criteria and to focus audits and self-assessments on achieving excellence, as well as regulatory compliance, and he gave as an example DCPP’s engineering programs being focused on INPO’s excellence criteria. Mr. Taggart confirmed an observation by Consultant Booker concerning INPO’s focus on quality activities and organizational effectiveness areas at nuclear plants to ensure a QV organization is technically based and performance oriented. This focus will include a more intensive review of what is happening regarding issues identified by a QV organization and he discussed the review by the Nuclear Industry Evaluation Program (NIEP) under the auspices of the NEI, which goes into more detail than INPO.

At the Committee’s request, Mr. Chestnut agreed to provide within 60-days a revised written response, based, in part on Mr. Taggart’s comments, to Recommendation R06-2 contained in the Committee’s 16th Annual Report.

In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Taggart replied that the DCPP NSOC has indicated it is now satisfied with the current staffing level of the DCPP QV organization. In response to a query from Mr. Conway, Mr. Taggart confirmed the NSOC has provided QV with input concerning identifying core organizations or gaps to industry best performance which has proven to be of assistance in keeping QV reviews abreast with what the industry as a whole is accomplishing. He confirmed Mr. Conway’s observation that the DCPP Business Plan cascades down to each of DCPP’s constituent organizations, although he stated the development of the Business Plan did include input from the lower levels of the organization, but the specific objectives, including achieving excellence rather than just regulatory compliance, of the established Plan are directed at obtaining the support of DCPP’s internal organizations. Mr. Conway suggested that a QV audit of the status of the DCPP Business Plan might be a valuable effort to verify progress with respect to efforts to achieve excellence in performance and Mr. Taggart confirmed that DCPP has had internal discussions regarding such an audit. Mr. Taggart confirmed he reports to Mr. Jack Keenan, PG&E Senior Vice President for Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer.

XIX. Adjourn Morning Meeting

The morning session was adjourned by the Chair at 12:15 P.M.

XX. Reconvene For Afternoon Meeting

The afternoon meeting of the DCISC was called to order by Committee Chair, Dr. A. David Rossin, at 1:30 P.M.

XXI. Committee Member Comments

There were no comments from members at this time.

XXII. Public Comments and Communications

The Chair reviewed the protocol for addressing remarks to the Committee and Mr. Otto Schmidt, a resident of Santa Margarita, California, was recognized to address the DCISC.

Mr. Schmidt stated he wanted to have entered into the Committee’s records his "continued disgust and disillusionment with the ongoing collusion between the NRC, this Safety Committee and the PG&E’s Devil’s Canyon." He observed a declaration by the NRC one week ago resulted in the NRC failing to follow the directions of the Congress of 2005, specifically the U.S. Energy Policy Act, leaving "Devil’s Canyon’s unique, unarmored spent fuel storage building and pools left exposed to possible terrorist attack or accident, only relying on the silhouettes of the containment domes and the surrounding typography to protect the people of my community." Mr. Schmidt stated he found this situation illegal and unconscionable. He remarked that he accompanied Dr. Rossin on a tour of DCPP four or five years ago and made Dr. Rossin aware of an airliner which crashed vertically into the ground, disintegrating within a ten-mile radius of DCPP.

Dr. Rossin stated he remembered Mr. Schmidt and remarked this was an example of a comment on which the Committee would take no action. He confirmed there has been discussion of the safety of the spent fuel pools at many previous DCISC public meetings, as well as earlier during this public meeting. He observed the spent fuel pools were part of the original design of DCPP. Modifications to the pools were submitted to the NRC for a stringent and intensive review and, even with the knowledge gained by the attacks on 9-11-2001, the pools’ vulnerabilities are well understood, including consideration of the conjectures contained in numerous articles written since the terrorist attack of 9-11. A decision was made not to retract licenses for the pools and they are considered to be adequate and safe under the circumstances. Theoretically, he stated, the pools could be made safer, however, careful consideration and review was given to the adequacy of the present safety measures. Dr. Peterson commented that DCPP does not fall within the category of plants where an aircraft crash, even in theory, have potential to cause damage to the spent fuel pools which would cause a loss of water in the pools. Legal Counsel Wellington commented Mr. Schumann had addressed remarks to the Committee during its morning session concerning adequacy of the spent fuel pools and a 2003 letter from the Committee to Mr. Schumann was reviewed and Mr. Wellington subsequently provided a copy of that letter to Mr. Schmidt.

XXIII. Information Items Before the Committee (Cont’d)

Mr. Chestnut introduced Mr. Jeff Knisley, 1R14 Refueling Outage Manager at DCPP, to make the next presentation to the Committee.

Preview of the Fourteenth Refueling Outage for Unit-1 (1R14); New & Significantly Changed Processes and "As Low As Reasonably Achievable" (ALARA) Plans.

Mr. Knisley began his presentation with a review of the goals established for 1R14 including zero injuries (disabling and recordable); zero human performance event clock resets; zero foreign material exclusion significant events; and a less than or equal to 25 day breaker-to-breaker schedule duration. He described continuing goals as including: less than or equal to 5 day power ascension; 100% power for greater or equal to 30 days; and an outage dose of less than or equal to 84 Rem. Mr. Knisley stated 1R14 is scheduled to commence on April 30, 2007. In response to a question from Mr. Conway concerning the origin of the 100% power run goal of more than 30 days, he stated the 30-day goal ties into incentive plans in place for the outage. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin concerning whether there was concern, pressure or punitive fear over setting zero goals, Mr. Knisley stated that during past outages there was such concern, however, he affirmed that based on DCPP past outage performance, zero goals were achievable, adequate and appropriate for those categories if DCPP is to continue to strive to be the best power plant in the industry. Mr. Knisley confirmed that the goal of zero injuries was also a business goal for 2007, although the plant has had one injury to date.

In response to Dr. Rossin’s question concerning the outage dose goal of less than or equal to 84 Rem, Mr. Knisley stated that goal was based on the work to be performed during 1R14 and on the results, work and estimates from 2R13, which had an outage does goal of less than or equal to 100 Rem and actual performance during 2R13 of 84 Rem. Mr. Knisley stated he did not consider 84 Rem to be a ‘stretch goal,’ and confirmed that none of the goals were so categorized.

Mr. Knisley reviewed and discussed with the Committee the major scope items to be addressed during 1R14 including:: Containment Sump Modification; 4kV Vital Bus “F” Hinge Wire & Cable Replacement; Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Batch Make-Up Integrator Replacement; Centrifugal Charging Pump Installation; Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) 1-2 Pump, Motor & Concrete Work; Main Feedwater Flow Accelerated Corrosion/Piping Replacement; Main Bank Transformer (Cooler Replacement); Auxiliary 1-1 Transformer Bushings; Service Cooling Water (SCW) Chemical Cleaning; Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1-1 10-year Inspection; RCP 1-1 and 1-3 Seal Replacement; Steam Generator (U-1) Replacement Activities

He confirmed the Containment sump modification will be the critical path at certain times during the middle of 1R14 outage, however, he stated that going into 1 R14, the critical path would be the shut-down reactor disassembly core offload. He commented the 25-day schedule would challenge the organization. He confirmed an observation by Mr. Conway that having several persons working within a small area during the containment sump modification installation, as well as concurrent work going on with other systems, were the most difficult parts of work related to the sump modification. He confirmed that PG&E is working closely with the contractor concerning addressing contingencies encountered during the sump modification work. Mr. Knisley stated he would need to review before answering Mr. Conway’s question concerning whether the contractor PG&E is using has been involved previously with making containment sump modifications at other nuclear facilities and he agreed to review Mr. Conway’s observation on whether giving the work to a contractor who had not done similar work previously was carefully thought through by PG&E and confirmed an observation by Dr. Rossin that other nuclear plants of similar vintage to DCPP have previously made similar modifications to their containment sumps and stated that DCPP has reviewed lessons learned from their experiences.

In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Knisley confirmed the contractor doing the Steam Generator Replacement Project is presently onsite at DCPP and would remain onsite through 1R14 and he confirmed, in response to a question from Mr. Conway that DCPP has previously performed chemical cleaning for piping.

Mr. Chestnut made the final informational presentation requested by the Committee for this public meeting.

2006 Business Plan Results and Overview of the 2007 Business Plan.

Mr. Chesnut stated 2005 was a very strong year in terms of improvements and the most reliable year in terms of generation for DCPP in its operational history. PG&E’s vision to be the leading utility in the nation includes DCPP achieving a ranking as the best power plant in the United States. For 2006, Mr. Chestnut discussed and reviewed with the DCISC each of the items DCPP identified as "The 6 to fix in 2006" including:

Improving Generation Availability by Resolving the Eight Longstanding Equipment Issues - Goal Met;

Improving Human Performance and Safety by Achieving a 30% Reduction in Significant Human Errors - Goal Met;

Completing All Self-Assessments and Benchmarking on Schedule and Implement Recommendations within 180 Days on Average - Goal Met;

Completing 2R13 in #39 Days - Goal Met (by 6-hours);

Lowering Collective Radiation Dose by Completing 2R13 Refueling Outage < 100 Person-Rem and, for 2006, < 108 Person-Rem - Both Goals Met;

Improving Cost by Replacing the Plant Information Management System (PIMS) with SAP Without Significantly Impacting Business - Goal Not Met.

Mr. Chestnut stated he served as lead for the root cause analysis for the failure to replace PIMS with SAP during 2006, and the SAP replacement is now scheduled to be operational in August 2008. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Chestnut identified the causes of DCPP’s failure to replace the PIMS and implement SAP as including ineffective project oversight, project management of up-front scoping and to monitor scope control, cost, resource loading and other factors including inadequate staffing and provision of subject matter expert resources. Dr. Rossin commented that it was his opinion that DCPP approached the PIMS Replacement Project as a change management challenge rather than as a major project which required top management involvement to succeed.

Mr. Chestnut reviewed significant plant events during 2006 as including the 2R13 refueling outage, the results of the mid-cycle assessment, the study comparing DCPP to industry leading plants, and U-2’s end-of-year equipment challenges. He commented DCPP reviewed its major successes during 2006 which included reducing the elective and corrective maintenance backlogs and improving the control board maintenance backlog. He discussed the key elements identified as contributing to these successes as "Looking Outside Our Own Box" and committing to aggressive goals, which are made the focus of the entire organization by establishing clear lines of ownership, with teamwork requested and given and resulting successes celebrated.

Mr. Chestnut stated that during 2007, DCPP expects to leverage what was learned during 2006, and to concentrate on focus areas he discussed and reviewed as follows.: Industrial Safety and Human Performance; Zero-In on Safety; Improve Human Performance Behaviors; Energized Employees; Recognize Excellence; Work Simplification; ALARA; Achieve 2010 Industry Exposure Goal by 2008; Refueling Outage Performance; Meet all Performance Goals for 1R14; Meet all Performance Goals for Steam Generator Replacement Outages; Performance Improvement; Fully Leverage Performance Improvement Rollups; Strategically Utilize Training to Improve Performance; Project Performance; Project Management Excellence; Complete All Milestones for Used Fuel Storage, NEXIS and Plant Process Computer Projects; Equipment Reliability Project

In response to a question from Mr. Wardell, Mr. Chestnut replied that work simplification will include engaging an employee-led team which will review taking a systematic approach to implementing a process-based approach identification of those areas where simplification can be achieved to allow greater efficiency and to realize continuous improvement. Mr. Conway observed during PG&E’s presentations the need for additional training has been a significant item and he queried whether DCPP should include a review of the need to accommodate these identified needs for additional training. Mr. Chestnut replied PG&E has and will continue to review and manage training issues and staff needs and he confirmed DCPP has subject matter experts to provide focused training as necessary. Mr. Conway suggested that issues related to DCPP’s 2007 focus areas, oversight and milestones achieved be followed up during future public meetings of the Committee. Dr. Rossin observed that with an organization such as DCPP, which is optimized in terms of assignment of personnel, calling for further project-specific training schedules for individuals was challenging. In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Chestnut stated Mr. Oliver Kingsley was engaged, on request of Senior Vice President Keenan, to review DCPP leadership and Mr. Kingsley identified the lack of a detailed implementation plan for department fundamentals, process inefficiencies, and the level of workforce engagement as significant issues to be addressed at DCPP and Mr. Chestnut confirmed DCPP is taking steps during 2007 to address these areas, an example of which includes the creation of the Safety High Impact Team to address industrial safety issues. Mr. Chestnut confirmed the DCPP workforce had a successful off-site meeting to engage personnel with the 2007 DCPP Business Plan. In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Chestnut stated he was not surprised by the results of INPO’s evaluation, however, he explained the issues identified by INPO are not subject to quick changes, such as within the month between the release of the results of the mid-cycle assessment and the leadership review, as they involve cultural change and leadership-style changes which can only be achieved over time.

Dr. Rossin thanked Mr. Chestnut for the excellent presentations made by all the PG&E presenters during this public meeting.

A short break followed.

XXIV. Concluding Remarks & Discussion by Committee Members of Future DCISC Activities

Following the informational presentations by PG&E, the Committee returned to consideration of its 16th Annual Report (see Item V. A, above).

Future public meetings of the Committee are scheduled for June 13-14 and October 24-25, 2007, and the Members scheduled a meeting for January 20-21, 2008.

The Committee then considered the report of the January 17-18, 2007, Fact-finding visit to DCPP conducted by Dr. Rossin and Consultant Booker (see Item VII B, above). Dr. Rossin stated that the Fact-finding report draft would be completed and sent to the members and consultants for review and comment, in the hope that it could be approved by email or at the June 2007 public meeting. Dr. Peterson was required to leave the public meeting prior to discussion of this report.

Dr. Rossin thanked Mr. Chestnut for the participation and presentations by PG&E during this public meeting. Legal Counsel Wellington reminded the Committee that this public meeting was the fiftieth public meeting conducted in the San Luis Obispo area by the DCISC.

XXV. Adjournment of Fiftieth Public Meeting

There being no further business, the fiftieth public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was adjourned by the