Minutes of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee the June 2007 Public Meeting [17th Annual Report, Exbibit B.9] (Approved at the October 24, 2007 Public Meeting.)

Wednesday & Thursday, June 13-14, 2007. San Luis Obispo, California

Notice of Meeting

A legal Notice of Meeting was published in local newspapers, along with several display advertisements, and was mailed to the media and those persons on the Committee’s service list. A copy of the meeting agenda was also posted on the Committee’s website at www.dcisc.org.

Public Tour of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant

The Members of the DCISC accompanied by 32 members of the public, PG&E tour guides and the Committee’s consultants, conducted a tour of Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). The members of the public responded to the DCISC announcement for a public tour of the Plant. The group met at the PG&E Community Center for introduction to the Committee members and to receive background information on the role of the Committee. PG&E representatives provided a brief overview of DCPP including its history, operation, the nuclear fuel cycle, spent fuel storage and plant security. A presentation was made by PG&E on the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) and an opportunity was provided to ask questions. PG&E discussed how the cooling systems work, with the ocean water two barriers away from the reactor itself. The group then departed for DCPP.

The group first arrived at the Plant overlook site and received a briefing from PG&E representatives on the various external features and buildings, then drove by the site of the ISFSI for a description of its purpose and features. At the Control Room Simulator facility (a full-scale mockup of the U-1 control room) viewing room, PG&E discussed plant controls, operator training and accident response. Next, the group visited the Plant Intake and Discharge Structures where the group viewed the facility where DCPP takes and expels cooling water from and into the Pacific Ocean. The group then visited the Security Building for a demonstration of screening of personnel entering the protected areas of the plant.

Questions and Comments from the Public

During the ride back and at the Community Center the group received information on radiation protection and members of the public took the opportunity to ask questions of Committee members and consultants.

Conclude Public Tour

Agenda

I. Call to Order - Roll Call

The June 13, 2007, public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) was called to order by Committee Chair, Dr. A. David Rossin at 1:30 P.M. at the Embassy Suites Conference Center in San Luis Obispo, California. Roll call was taken.

Present:: Committee Member William F. Conway; Committee Member Per F. Peterson; Committee Member A. David Rossin
Absent:: None

II. Introductions

Dr. Rossin introduced the other members and the Committee’s consultants present including, Mr. Jim E. Booker, Mr. R. Ferman Wardell, Ms. Victoria Briant, and Legal Counsel Robert R. Wellington.

III. Public Comments and Communications

The Chair reviewed the procedures for members of the public to make comments to the Committee and inquired whether there was any person present who wished to address remarks to the Committee. There was no response to his invitation.

IV. Consent Agenda

The only item on the Consent Agenda was approval of the Minutes prepared from the Transcript of the Committee’s January 31 - February 1, 2007, public meeting held in San Luis Obispo. Members reviewed and discussed certain items identified in the Minutes for future consideration during Fact-findings or public meetings with PG&E’s Mr. Paul Roller, Director of Performance Improvement at DCPP, including review of an in-house, single point vulnerability study which was to have been completed by February 2007, and a voluntary Licensee Event Report (LER) which was considered for submission to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as a result of a thimble tube failure for Unit 2 (U-2). Mr. Roller confirmed the LER was not submitted but a formal root cause analysis was performed concerning the failure and that event is now part of the commitment-tracking database. Mr. Roller also promised to review and report back to the Committee concerning the status of the staffing of the three Emergency Response Organization (ERO) teams and concerning DCPP upper management’s involvement in review of issues and repeat items on the Key Issues List. Clarification and editorial changes were made to the draft of the January - February Minutes. The approved minutes from the Committee’s public meetings become part of its Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations (Annual Report).

V. Action Items

A. DCISC Review of PG&E’s Revised Response to Recommendation R06-2; DCISC 16th Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; July 1, 2005 - June 30, 2006:: Consultant Wardell reviewed with members and consultants PG&E’s revised response to the Committee’s second recommendation contained in its Sixteenth Annual Report concerning review of Quality Verification (QV) staffing to ensure sufficient personnel are available to perform necessary audits, both regulatory required and other audits as needed. The full text of the revised response was included in the agenda packet for the public meeting. In response to a request from Mr. Conway, Mr. Roller agreed to review PG&E’s statement that “QV ‘s core staffing levels are consistent with other operating plants” to determine whether PG&E ‘benchmarked’ its comparison with plants having two nuclear reactor units. On a motion by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Rossin, the DCISC unanimously accepted PG&E’s revised response to R06-2, subject to receipt of the information requested from Mr. Roller.
B. Update on Financial Matters and Committee Activities:: Legal Counsel Wellington reviewed information provided by the Committee’s accountant concerning income to and liabilities incurred on behalf of the Committee through May 31, 2007.
C. Discussion of Issues on Open Items and Guidelines Lists:: Mr. Wardell reviewed the latest edition of the Open Items List included with the public agenda packet for this meeting. The Open Items List is used by the Committee to track and follow items and activities identified during its public meetings and Fact-finding sessions with PG&E. Certain items were identified for closure or amendment on the List and discussed with PG&E’s Mr. Roller, while action was taken concerning others as follows:; HP-22: Item closed re the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) assist visit concerning change management.; Item to be added re the Nuclear Excellence Information System (NEXIS).; EN-28: Item to remain open re monitoring progress in hiring new engineers.; 2/06 PM 8: Item discussed and closed re emphasis of situational awareness to prevent injury.; 1/07 PM 2: Item closed re adding DCISC mailing address to public tour comment form.; 1/07 PM 13: Item discussed with Mr. Roller re providing feedback to the DCISC concerning DCPP upper management involvement in review of the Key Issues List and repeat items. DCISC agreed to follow up concerning this item during a scheduled August 2007 Fact-finding visit.; 1/07 PM 14: Item discussed with Mr. Roller re DCPP decision to use a contractor with little experience with making containment sump modifications and closed.
D. Nomination and Election of Chair and Vice-Chair for the July 1, 2007 - June 30, 2008 Term.: On motion by Dr. Rossin, seconded by Dr. Peterson, with Mr. Conway abstaining, the Committee elected Mr. Conway to the position of DCISC Chair for a term of office from July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008. Following discussion under VI below and the short break, on a motion by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Mr. Conway, with Dr. Rossin abstaining, the Committee elected Dr. Rossin to the position of DCISC Vice-Chair for a term of office from July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008.

VI. Committee Member Reports and Discussion

A. Public Outreach, Site Visits and Other Committee Activities:: The Chair commented that the format for the public tours conducted by and for the Committee has improved and he thanked PG&E’s Mr. Kent Oliver and Ms. Eleanor Ripley for their efforts. Dr. Peterson remarked on the importance of retaining the ability, if possible, for the tour groups to continue to visit the Plant overlook site after the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) facility becomes operational and he remarked that the members of the public afforded the opportunity to tour DCPP have continued to express their appreciation for opportunity to visit and learn about the operation of DCPP. The members agreed to schedule a public tour during the first day of their October public meeting, on October 24, 2007.; Dr. Peterson reported he has been in contact with representatives of the Avila Valley Advisory Council concerning a future meeting with that group to discuss their concerns related to evacuation planning.
B. Documents Provided to the Committee:: Mr. Wellington directed the Committee’s attention to the list of documents received since its last public meeting in February 2007. A copy of the list was included with the public agenda packet for this meeting.

A short break followed.

VII. Staff-consultant Reports & Receive, Approve and Authorize Transmittal of Fact-finding Reports to PG&E

Consultant Wardell discussed and reported to the Committee on the March 21-22, 2007 Fact-finding visit to DCPP with Mr. Conway and Ms. Briant.

Mr. Wardell reported he and Mr. Conway met with DCPP Director of Engineering, Mr. Ken Peters, to discuss operability issues related to previously gagged valves and containment fan cooling unit (CFCU) anti reverse rotation issues. Mr. Peters confirmed operability of the spring-loaded safety relief valves at DCPP is verified in accordance with the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code and does not require testing of those valves, after removal of a mechanical device to prevent them from opening, upon their return to service. PG&E has now performed a modification of the louvers of the CFCUs to address anti rotation and will be making further modifications in the future to reduce maintenance requirements associated with the CFCUs. Mr. Wardell suggested and the Committee members agreed that DCISC should continue to follow this issue.

Mr. Wardell and Mr. Conway reviewed the increasing numbers during 2006 of mispositioning events which take place when a valve or a relay or similar equipment is found to be non-conforming. Mr. Wardell discussed the root cause analysis performed for mispositioning events, which determined management ownership and institutionalization and the individuals involved not having employed verification practices as two of the major causes of these events. DCPP management is developing systems to analyze, trend and utilize human performance data and is working to standardize communication across the station relative to human performance including use of self-verification and other checking processes. Mr. Roller confirmed, in response to a query from Mr. Wardell, that the performance during the last refueling outage demonstrated a significant improvement in reducing error due to mispositioning. Mr. Wardell suggested and the Committee agreed to continue to follow the trend for mispositioning errors at DCPP.

The DCISC representatives met with Mr. Bob Waltos, Manager of Emergency Services, to review the emergency evacuation plan. This review was in response to comments received from a member of the public during the Committee’s last public meeting. Mr. Wardell confirmed the evacuation plan is the responsibility of San Luis Obispo County, not PG&E. A written response by the Committee to the person who raised questions concerning the emergency evacuation plan has been sent and a copy of the response was included with the public agenda packet correspondence for this meeting.

Mr. Conway and Mr. Wardell toured the Component Cooling Water System (CCW) and reviewed its operation and current issues with System Engineer Mr. Jeremy Cobbs. Mr. Wardell described the system’ health as being in white status, or satisfactory, for Unit-1 (U-1) and green, the highest rating, for U-2. He commented the CCW is on the DCPP top ten low margin systems list due to its sharing a common surge tank, leaking crosstie butterfly valves, and system fouling issues affecting the performance of the heat exchangers. These items have been referred to the Plant Health Committee for review and approval of corrective action.

The DCISC representatives also met with the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at DCPP Mr. Terry Jackson. Mr. Roller reported to the Committee that Mr. Jackson is expected to be replaced in September as the on site Senior Resident Inspector.

Mr. Wardell and Mr. Conway reviewed INPO accredited training programs including the 2007 INPO reaccreditation review of DCPP’s technical training programs. Mr. Roller confirmed, in response to a question from Dr. Rossin, the training database is now current concerning the status of qualifications of all DCPP employees. Mr. Booker cautioned PG&E concerning the importance of having supervisors, when assigning tasks to workers, ensure the workers are qualified to perform those tasks. Mr. Conway, who served on the INPO Accrediting Board for 10-years, commented that qualification issues, which had been a chronic problem across the nuclear industry, have been largely resolved.

The Fact-finding visit concluded with a meeting between Mr. Conway and DCPP Vice President for Nuclear Services Ms. Donna Jacobs.

Consultant Briant reported on her observations and activities during the March 21-22, 2007 Fact-finding with Consultant Wardell and DCISC Member Conway.

The DCISC representatives met with PG&E’s Mr. Rick Burnside and Ms. Julie Simco of the DCPP Employee Concerns Program (ECP) to discuss issues related to safety culture and safety conscious work environment (SCWE). Safety culture includes an organization’s values and behaviors, as modeled by its leaders and as internalized by the workforce, to ensure nuclear safety is an overriding priority. DCPP safety culture includes the eight principles for a strong nuclear safety culture identified in the INPO document of November 2004. Surveys of employees concerning safety culture were conducted in November 2006 and February 2007, and these surveys identified four areas for attention including leadership visibility and presence; human resources practices and organizational issues concerning staffing rewards and sanctions; communication between DCPP leadership and the workforce including addressing divergent views; and the effectiveness of communication during periods of change. Ms. Briant reported the Management Observation, Differing Professional Opinion and ‘Crucial Conversations’ Programs are being utilized to increase the effectiveness of communication by managers and supervisors to the workforce concerning the managers and supervisors expectations, and whether those expectations are being met by the workforce.

Ms. Briant observed the employee survey process is an important tool to utilize in determining how individuals view their own responsibilities for the safety of themselves, their coworkers and the general public. DCPP is using surveys developed by the Utility Services Alliance (USA), by INPO and by the Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing (STARS) joint utility initiative to do safety culture surveys on a quarterly basis of portions of the DCPP organization. Consultant Briant commented on the need for DCPP management to effectively communicate to the workforce concerning the importance of these surveys so that, by looking at the results from differing organizational levels and functional disciplines, management can pinpoint the kinds of actions that need to happen and where those actions should be directed within the DCPP workforce. Ms. Briant commented there is a concern that management may tend to try to take action on too many things and, over time, thereby lose focus on those areas which are most important. She recommended that the Committee continue to follow DCPP’s actions with respect to nuclear safety culture surveys and Safety Culture at DCPP.

The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Ms. Ardela Daniels, DCPP Manager of Organizational Effectiveness, the organization charged with providing oversight and direction for many different programs relating to people and their working together effectively. DCPP has created a governance document for organizational effectiveness and established a review process for the effectiveness of management’s assumption of leadership roles. The ‘Crucial Conversations’ training program and the Gordon Star Project were identified as two of the current projects which relate to safety culture. The Gordon Star Project uses teams of line employees from different disciplines to focus on work simplification, award and recognition, human performance and employee engagement, and safety culture. DCPP also employs the ‘Two C’s Meetings’ with Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. Jack Keenan meeting personally with employees to hear the employee’s concerns and complaints, including discussion concerning the topic of trust which Ms. Briant described as a critical issue to nuclear safety and to the culture of DCPP.

The topic of employee engagement was reviewed and identified as a particular goal of PG&E’s corporate-wide improvement effort, as well as forming a part of the DCPP Business Plan. Employee engagement involves using the opinions and thinking of DCPP’s employees to improve plant performance. Two initiatives to enhance employee engagement are being used at DCPP focused on recognizing excellence and work simplification. Three goals have been set for employee engagement for 2007, these include having zero injuries, improved human performance and a 10% improvement in responses to Question 17 from the Premier Survey concerning the employees’ perception of whether their opinions and thinking are being used to improve plant performance. The Gordon Star Project and the monthly Operations Workshops, led by a senior reactor operator coach are also being used to increase employee engagement and Ms. Briant commented those approaches appear to be effective and reasonable as actions to increase employee engagement.

The DCISC representatives met with DCPP Manager of Problem Prevention and Resolution, Mr. Cary Harbor, to discuss human performance issues and initiatives. Ms. Briant commented there has been substantial progress in human performance, as demonstrated by a dramatic reduction in the number of event-free human performance clock resets from 14 events in 2003, to10 events in 2004, to 7 events in 2005, to 4 events in 2006, to a total of 2 events to date during 2007. During 2006, DCPP hosted an assist visit by a review team from USA which identified areas concerning human performance that were working well and those which needed work. Areas identified as working well were work package quality feedback and use of the industry-wide operating experience database to provide information concerning equipment issues. Areas identified for improvement included making better and more consistent use of error prevention tools, revising out-of-date procedures and achieving more consistency in pre job preparation and walk downs. The DCPP Human Performance organization has developed a clear, concise Error Prevention Tools Standards manual to communicate to employees concerning standards and expectations and the use of error prevention tools and Ms. Briant described the manual as one of the best tools she has seen on this topic. Procedures are also being updated. The DCISC Fact-finding team concluded DCPP is responding well to areas needing improvement in human performance but cautioned further review is needed to monitor how successful leadership, management and supervisors are in reinforcing the message and in getting the tools developed, such as the Error Prevention Tools Standards Manual, into regular use by the workforce.

Ms. Briant discussed the cultural transformation efforts underway at PG&E corporate and at DCPP concerning how PG&E intends to continue to grow and reshape itself in the future to become the leading utility in the United States. Goals of this cultural transformation include achieving greater operational excellence and transforming the culture within the company. To achieve these goals, PG&E must be able to successfully communicate concerning the transformation and the value of transforming to all its employees and is using the ‘PG&E Tomorrow’ presentation given by senior officials, followed by a break out session to discuss the implications of the cultural transformation. PG&E has also recognized that it is necessary to develop and prepare leaders to be able to lead and model the cultural transformation. Leadership, management and all supervisory personnel will have received awareness and skills training through the Leadership Academy by the end of 2008. Managers, supervisors and directors are also focusing on the idea of alignment, to ensure they are consistently communicating the same message when leading employees in cultural transformation efforts. DCPP is also focused on meeting refueling outage goals in a safe and timely manner, reducing the unavailability of safety systems, improving human performance, continuing to accomplish work with minimal radiation exposure and instilling a sense of industrial and nuclear safety vigilance in all its employees to achieve operational excellence as a part of its effort toward cultural transformation. Ms Briant commented the DCISC representatives concluded from the Fact-finding that DCPP is moving in a positive direction concerning the effort toward cultural transformation.

The DCISC Fact-finding Team met with Mr. Terry Mutch, Senior Lead Coach at DCPP, to review the activities of the Leadership Coaching Development Team to reinforce and further develop the leadership skills and behaviors in supervisors, managers and directors at DCPP. Ten to twelve DCPP leaders will be selected to serve as peer coaches to their colleagues as collateral assignments to their current work assignments. Ms. Briant commented this effort appears to be a vital and rigorous resurrection of the notion of leadership coaching and involves a substantial commitment, which may be helpful to the effort to transform DCPP and she suggested the DCISC continue to review PG&E’s efforts to measure leadership effectiveness.

Following Ms. Briant’s report, the Committee, on a motion by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Mr. Conway, unanimously approved the March 21-22, 2007 Fact-finding Report and authorized its transmittal to PG&E. Committee Fact-finding reports become a part of the Committee’s Annual Report.

Mr. Wardell reported on the May 30-31, 2007 Fact-finding visit to DCPP with Dr. Peterson.

The DCISC representatives reviewed the Fire Protection System with System Engineer Mr. A. Hromyek. Mr. Wardell commented, in the past, the Fire Protection System at DCPP has been in the yellow, or unsatisfactory plant health status indicating it needs considerable work to achieve white, or satisfactory, status and, ultimately, green plant health status. The DCISC in its 16th Annual Report recommended PG&E place additional emphasis and resources on Fire Protection System improvement. The System Engineer confirmed a major emphasis for DCPP and for the Fire Protection System Engineer position is improving the health of the Fire Protection System from yellow to white, with the principal effort going to the Fire Protection System water suppression system due to corrosion issues. The current System Health Report for both units rates the Fire Protection System as in yellow status and the System Engineer reported both units are now expected to achieve white status by June 2009. QV has performed an annual audit of DCPP fire protection and found good progress toward improvement including forming a High Impact Team (HIT) to address 47 Action Requests (ARs) for corrective actions which include maintenance work; transfer of non engineering duties such as periodic testing and administrative tasks from the System Engineer to Operations; streamlining the periodic maintenance program and testing procedures; and strong advocacy by the System Engineer with the Plant Health Committee to get improvements to the system funded as scheduled. Mr. Wardell reported the Fire Protection System remains functional and operational but issues concerning corrosion and the system’s valves and tanks remain to be addressed, although progress is being made. In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Wardell confirmed DCPP plans to return the Fire Protection System plant health status to white by 2009 and to green status by 2011. Mr. Conway queried PG&E concerning a letter received from the NRC recognizing that DCPP switched its fire protection regulatory posture to NFP805, with a three year discretional enforcement deferral, and he questioned whether that deferral would negatively impact the schedule of work for fire protection improvements. Mr. Roller replied the schedule would not be affected by the NF805 deferral, as NFP805 was risk-based and focused mainly upon operator responsibility to respond to a fire rather than upon Fire Protection System equipment.

Dr. Peterson and Mr. Wardell, both of whom have been cleared to review confidential safeguarded security information, reviewed the progress made by DCPP in responding to and implementing NRC Security Issue B.5.b which deals with loss of a large area of a plant due to fire or explosion. While constrained by security concerns, Mr. Wardell reported DCPP has met with the NRC to discuss its strategies and proposed responses and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is also involved, on a generic basis, with this issue across the industry. PG&E is reviewing 15 strategies for implementation, as well as design and procedure changes, termed ‘Extensive Damage Mitigation Guidelines’ (EDMG), in response to B.5.b and that DCPP’s response should be complete by the end of this year. Mr. Wardell confirmed the procedural and design changes at DCPP in response to B.5.b will be addressed using DCPP’s design change procedures which require diverse review by all affected functions at the station to ensure operational safety is not compromised. Dr. Peterson commented PG&E’s proposed changes appear reasonable and responsive to the NRC’s mandate.

Dr. Peterson and Mr. Wardell met with DCPP Operations Manager Mr. Jim Welch to review DCPP operational decision making (ODM) which he described as a structured, rigorous decision-making process used principally by Operations for intermediate decisions typically involving a reduction of safety margin or when operational or regulatory limits are being approached. Ocean swell activity during winter storms was one such situation where the ODM process is employed and Mr. Wardell commented the ODM documentation reviewed by the Fact-finding team indicated it’s an effective process.

The DCISC representatives reviewed the Flow Accelerated Corrosion Control Program which monitors, measures, addresses and reports on wearing and thinning of components of the plant’s steam systems. Steam piping is replaced from time to time and Mr. Wardell characterized the program at DCPP as aggressive. Dr. Peterson commented, with replacement of the DCPP steam generators (SGs), corrosion and thinning of steam system components may be less of an issue due to the resulting improvement in steam quality. Mr. Roller confirmed steam quality would improve with the replacement of the SGs but he noted that most of the flow accelerated corrosion at DCPP occurs on the feedwater side due to water moving through piping systems.

Dr. Peterson and Mr. Wardell reviewed and found effective the DCPP Readiness for Restart process following refueling outages and reviewed the process and documents employed and generated for the Readiness for Restart review conducted following the fourteenth refueling outage for U-1 (1R14). In response to an inquiry from Mr. Conway concerning the Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC) special meetings to discuss the reasonableness of proposed mode changes, Mr. Wardell replied that it was not possible from the review of the Readiness for Restart documentation to make a determination as to the rationale employed to make mode change decisions during a restart. Mr. Roller stated he chairs the PSRC and the Readiness for Restart process is an ongoing process with required presentations made to the PSRC to approve mode transitions and recommend a mode transition to the station director. Mr. Roller commented the PSRC reviews the safety-related aspects of the plant’s readiness for restart but there is another procedure, termed ‘L-0’ that has fewer requirements to be signed off by various managers and other plant staff. Mr. Roller confirmed that many participants in the Readiness for Restart process are also members of the PSRC.

The DCISC Fact-finding team reviewed and toured the Main Feedwater Control System, a digital system, the function of which is to control flow to the SGs, and met with its System Engineer, Mr. Jose Medina. During refueling outages 2R13 and 1R14 a new, improved Digital Feedwater Control System replaced the former system and the new system has been operating satisfactorily. Mr. Conway complimented PG&E for its installation of the new digital feedwater control system in the Control Room Simulator facility. Mr. Roller commented feedwater transients are the leading cause of reactor trips in the industry and the DCPP operators are appreciative of a new system which provides better control.

To conclude the May 30-31, 2007, Fact-finding visit, Dr. Peterson met with Mr. Jim Becker, Vice President DCPP Operations and Station Director to discuss the visit.

Following PG&E’s informational presentations on the morning of June 14, the members approved the May 30-31, 2007 Fact-finding Report and authorized its transmittal to PG&E

Consultant Booker reported on the April 18-19, 2007, Fact-finding visit to DCPP with Dr. Rossin.

The DCISC representatives reviewed DCPP’s storm response for 2006-2007 and the changes in plans or programs to address the plant’s operational response to winter Pacific Ocean storm swell activity.

Mr. Booker reported review of the 1st Quarter 2007 Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR) included one new blue classification rating, representing excellent performance and five areas rated green for good performance. Eighteen areas on that QPAR were rated white for satisfactory performance, eight were rated yellow, indicating improvement needed, and one area, Emergency Planning and the Emergency Response Organization, was rated red for unsatisfactory.

Dr. Rossin and Mr. Booker reviewed the DCPP Configuration Management Program, employed to provide assurance that any design changes are documented with drawings and procedures. DCPP intends to revise its Configuration Management Program to include INPO’s guidelines.

The DCISC Fact-finding team met and discussed with PG&E representatives the status of the license extension for DCPP. PG&E submitted its application for funding to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) for a license renewal feasibility study as a part of its 2006 General Rate Case. Mr. Booker reported a DCPP employee has been assigned to Wolf Creek Generating Station, a plant with a similar design to DCPP, to monitor licensing renewal activities at that plant. PG&E now plans to have its license renewal feasibility study completed by 2009.

DCISC representatives reviewed the 2007 DCPP Business Plan and attended an all-hands meeting along with 400-500 DCPP employees where management imparted information about developments at DCPP including the 1R14 outage, outage safety and the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) radiation dose reduction program.

Mr. Booker and Dr. Rossin reviewed and discussed DCPP’s response to NRC Confirmatory Action Letter No. 07-034 concerning the alloy 600 issue which regards increased inspections and surveillance leak rate testing for primary water stress corrosion cracking and circumferential cracking indications occurring in pressurized water reactors when similar metals are welded together. Mr. Booker reported U-1 is not susceptible, however, U-2 does have some potentially susceptible welds and will receive structural weld overlays in areas around pressurizer penetrations.

The DCISC Fact-finding team also reviewed the Outage Safety Plan for 1R14. Mr. Conway queried PG&E’s Mr. Roller concerning PG&E’s philosophy regarding performing hot mid-loop operations and Mr. Roller confirmed hot mid-loop operations, when undertaken, generally constitute the highest risk evolution for any year at the plant and PG&E would have to determine there was a significant benefit to reduction of outage duration. Mr. Conway replied that undertaking a high-risk operation only to gain two or three days in an outage schedule may not be entirely justifiable. In response to a question, Mr. Roller confirmed that DCPP experienced a problem in 1987 with a hot mid-loop operation, which he characterized as the most significant event the plant has experienced. Mr. Roller further commented that, with the replacement of the SGs, the need to perform hot mid-loop operations would be much reduced because of the reduced level of required tube inspections.

Mr. Booker reported, to conclude the April 18-19, 2007, Fact-finding visit, the DCISC team toured the Spent Fuel Building. On motion of Dr. Peterson, seconded by Mr. Conway, the April 18-19, 2007 Fact-finding Report was unanimously approved and its transmittal to PG&E authorized.

Mr. Booker stated the Committee members and consultants had reviewed and provided comments on the January 17-18, 2007 Fact-finding Report, which was presented during the January 31-February 1, 2007 public meeting. Dr. Peterson suggested, and the Committee agreed, that the DCISC should conduct follow up concerning an issue reviewed in the January 17-18, 2007 Fact-finding Report regarding sample coupons which are sometimes placed in reactors to experience the same neutron irradiation history as the reactor vessel and, when tested for their degree of brittleness, will respond in the same way that the reactor vessel would. The January 17-18, 2007 Fact-finding Report was then approved and its transmittal to PG&E authorized.

Legal Counsel Wellington reported the Agreement to provide video and cablecast broadcast of the Committee’s public meetings with AGP Video was revised to provide for live-streaming video in real time and archived access to past recordings of the Committee’s public meeting on the worldwide web at www.slospan.org.

VIII. Correspondence

Copies of correspondence sent and received at the office of the Committee’s Legal Counsel were included with the public agenda packet for this meeting

IX. Adjourn Afternoon Meeting

The afternoon meeting of the DCISC was adjourned by the Chair at 5:15 P.M.

X. Reconvene for Evening Meeting

Dr. Rossin convened the evening meeting of the DCISC at 5:30 P.M.

XI. Committee Member Comments

There were no comments from the Committee members.

XII. Public Comments and Communications

There were no comments from members of the public at this time.

XIII. Information Items Before the Committee (Cont’d)

Dr. Rossin welcomed PG&E Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. Jack Keenan to the public meeting and asked Mr. Roller to commence the informational presentations requested by the Committee for this public meeting. Mr. Roller asked Mr. Bob Exner, Project Manager for the Steam Generator Replacement Project, to make that presentation.

Status of the Steam Generator Replacement, Scheduled for the Fourteenth Refueling Outage for Unit-2.

Mr. Exner stated fabrication of the replacement SGs for U-2 is on schedule. The replacement SGs were fabricated by the Spanish firm ENSA. All four replacement SGs are completely assembled and all welding and radiographic testing is complete. Hydrostatic testing is now in progress with no issues identified. He reported manufacturing and Quality Assurance (QA) program performance continue to be good. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Exner replied PG&E has two full-time resident inspectors working at the ENSA facility, one inspector working with the QV organization and one inspector working directly on the project.

Plans for pre service inspection of the replacement SGs have been finalized including 100% eddy current testing of all tubing and ultrasonic testing of all welds, PG&E will perform secondary eddy current and ultrasonic testing oversight, with the primary testing and analysis to be performing by Westinghouse. The replacement SGs are scheduled to be shipped during September and the U-2 replacement SGs are expected at DCPP sometime between mid-October and mid-November 2007. Mr. Exner displayed photos of the replacement SGs and the motor vessel selected to make the delivery.

Mr. Exner reviewed and discussed with the Committee the status of the installation contract as follows:

Design change packages (20 U-2 and common) will be completed and issued to PG&E by July 7.
Work package (147) development is in progress and will be completed and issued to PG&E by December 4.
N–1 outage for U-1 (1R14) was completed successfully.
Task plans (26) are being developed.
Construction of the Old Steam Generator Storage Facility is in progress.
Construction of an outside heavy lift system east of the Fuel Handling Building will commence in June.
Onsite staff build-up is in progress.
Activities are on schedule for 2R14’s scheduled start.

Mr. Exner reported DCPP has benchmarked its SG replacement project with the Comanche Peak nuclear plant, which successfully completed a SG replacement outage in less than 56 days, thereby setting a world record. He reported the DCPP SG Replacement team visited Comanche Peak and learned from its experience including the need to have a ‘barrier buster’ philosophy to facilitate and allow the contractor to work at full capacity, while providing oversight where it is needed. Mr. Exner mentioned Comanche Peak also employed a number of radiation protection innovations including shrinking the radiological control area. In response to a question from Mr. Conway concerning the experience level of SGT and Mammoet, the contractor and rigger selected by PG&E for the SG replacement project, Mr. Exner replied SGT and Mammoet have experience equivalent to that of Bechtel, which performed the work at Comanche Peak.

Mr. Exner reviewed the regulatory interactions required for the SG replacement project which include:

License Amendment Request (LAR) submitted in January 2007.
Obtaining two coastal development permits from the California Coast Commission in March 2007.
Obtaining San Luis Obispo (SLO) County building permit for the Old Steam Generator Storage Facility.
Application made to SLO County for building permits for temporary facilities.

Mr. Exner described the project challenges as including addressing a Differing Professional Opinion Report, generated between DCPP engineers and Westinghouse, concerning the LAR submitted relative to four issues concerning instrument uncertainty. PG&E reviewed and agreed with two of the issues raised by the Differing Professional Opinion Report and will be submitting a revision of the LAR in August. The other two issues, Mr. Exner reported, have been resolved with the author of the differing professional opinion. In response to a question from Mr. Conway concerning calculation of the transmitted instrumentation ‘drift’ Mr. Exner replied the transmitters to be used with the new SGs are similar to other applications and, therefore, PG&E believes, based upon DCPP operational experience, the similarity in technology will result in accurate prediction of drift. Other challenges to the Steam Generator Replacement Project include integration of the project and the entire DCPP organization into a single team to achieve world-class project performance.

In concluding his presentation, Mr. Exner stated DCPP is on schedule for successful completion of the replacement of U-2’s SGs during the second quarter of 2008 and for replacement of U-1’s SGs during the second quarter of 2009.

Mr. Roller introduced and requested Mr. Shawn Dienhart, DCPP Supervisor, Security Support Services, to make the next informational presentation to the Committee.

Update on Security Changes Since the February 1, 2007 DCISC Public Meeting.

Mr. Dienhart reported DCPP continues to evaluate the manner in which it deploys its defensive strategy, both as to physical security issues and to optimizing training and operational experience. Additional detection and delay enhancements are being installed and equipment has been upgraded to provide improved tools for the plant security officers. DCPP is evaluating major revisions to Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 73.55, based on a multitude of compensatory measures directives from the NRC.

Mr. Dienhart reported DCPP is revisiting the NRC’s proposed work hour restrictions relative to its security force. In response to a query from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Dienhart stated the work hour restrictions have, for example, affected DCPP’s opportunity to callback security personnel for overtime and he confirmed the work hour restrictions apply to other DCPP organizations as well as Security. Mr. Roller replied from his review, the work hour restriction affects mainly overtime and should not affect the routine hours put in by the station’s operators, however, although rules during outage and non outage periods differ and he confirmed operation during refueling outages could be affected by the new work hour restrictions proposed by the NRC.

In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Dienhart confirmed the Security organization has some long-standing issues in maintaining its physical assets, primarily concerning electronic systems, and a contractor has been hired to review security equipment issues.

Mr. Roller introduced and requested Ms. Janet Loduca to make the next presentation to the Committee.

Status of Legal Activities Concerning the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility.

Ms. Loduca stated the receipt by PG&E of a license for its ISFSI was challenged in the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Court subsequently held the NRC should have considered as a part of the environmental review of the license application, under National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the potential risk of terrorism. She reported the license for the ISFSI is now under review by the NRC relevant to that issue. On May 4, 2007, the NRC issued a supplemental environmental analysis. That analysis concluded that, even with the risk of terrorism, the ISFSI will not result in significant environmental effects. The public comment period on the supplemental analysis remained open for 60 days, with comments due by July 2, 2007.

Ms. Jane Swanson, present in the audience, was recognized by the Chair and identified herself as a member of the group San Louis Obispo Mothers for Peace and stated she was speaking as a member of the group and as an individual who lives 12 miles due east of DCPP. Ms. Swanson stated the public tour held earlier in the day was extremely informative. She questioned how PG&E is addressing the possibility that the NRC might order changes in the ISFSI project as a result of the Court mandated review and why there was no pause in the construction activities as a result of the Ninth Circuit’s decision? Ms. Loduca confirmed PG&E was proceeding with the construction and stated PG&E would address any modifications required by the NRC when and if they are issued. Ms. Swanson observed that PG&E’s decision to proceed with construction could have implications on the ISFSI project’s cost, which is being paid by PG&E’s ratepayers. Ms. Swanson questioned, when and if the ISFSI project is completed and operational, would there be changes by the Office of Emergency Services or SLO County in the emergency planning procedures affecting the public? Ms. Loduca replied when the NRC first reviewed PG&E’s license application for the ISFSI, the risk of terrorism was reviewed in context of security and security plans were revised and approved by the NRC to take the ISFSI Project into consideration. Mr. Roller commented the Plant Staff Review Committee (PSRC) has also been briefed numerous times and changes in classification of events relative to emergency planning have been proposed, but no changes to the Emergency Plan itself have been made as a result of the ISFSI Project.

In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Ms. Loduca replied, since the successful challenge in the Ninth Circuit, there has been a subsequent challenge in the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals concerning a spent fuel storage project at another nuclear facility and that it was her belief the existence of differing opinions between federal circuits might give rise to resolution of the issue by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Mr. Roller introduced PG&E Vice President Becker to make the next presentation.

Update on Plant Events, Operational Status and Performance Indicators.

Mr. Becker stated his presentation, to review plant status and operational performance since the last public meeting of the DCISC and would include information in a different format from that presented during past DCISC public meetings.

Mr. Becker reported during 2007 DCPP had one lost time accident, matching the total for all of 2006, which represents performance within the best quartile of the industry. Dr. Rossin commented, and Mr. Becker concurred, concerning the utility of using very low numbers to establish performance measures by quartile. Mr. Becker reviewed the one lost time accident which occurred during the last refueling outage and resulted when a mechanic cut his finger due to a saw blade slipping while he was cutting a bolt off a leak repair clamp. Mr. Becker reported the injury investigation found standards were not met and directions not followed. He reported DCPP has five recordable injuries to date for 2007, and commented PG&E views these injuries as a significant issue and is determined to reduce the number of injuries and has included that reduction as a focus area within the DCPP Business Plan. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Becker stated minor first aid reports are monitored for trends and to ensure all recordable or lost time accidents are included within the database and continues to communicate to the workforce concerning the need to report any injury.

Collective radiation exposure was 103 person-rem for the last refueling outage for U-1, which was the lowest for a U-1 refueling outage. However, this did not meet the goal set for the outage of 84 person-rem. Mr. Becker reported necessary work within Containment including replacing the containment recirculation sump and performing debris mitigation were responsible for a significant portion of the collective radiation exposure. Dr. Rossin commented on the need to review dose reduction planning and ability to estimate collective exposure.

Vice President Becker reviewed the INPO Performance Index, to date, which is 96.7 for both units, year-to-date, and is currently forecasted to be 97.2 by end-of-year. U-1 performance is in the top quartile and U-2 in the second quartile relative to industry-wide performance. Dr. Rossin commented that use of collective dose as a performance measure was largely meaningless, as it does not provide an indication of how good the radiation protection planning and programs actually are. Mr. Becker reported U-2’s capacity factor and forced loss rate have impacted its INPO Performance Index rating due, in part, to a December 2006 forced shutdown to investigate indication of a problem with the reactor coolant pump and a subsequent reactor trip due to a surge capacitor failure on a circulating water pump, both of these events were reviewed previously with the Committee. Fuel performance has also been an issue for U-2 as it currently has a ‘tight’ fuel defect, although activity levels remain low. Dr. Peterson commented the replacement of the SGs will cause the INPO Performance Index numbers to decline and Mr. Becker confirmed INPO does not have an adjustment for that type of project, however, other plants are also performing similar types of projects. He confirmed PG&E is committed to manage the activities at DCPP responsibly without reference to the effect on performance statistics such responsible management may have.

Mr. Becker reviewed the color-coded NRC Performance Indicators and reported DCPP’s performance is coded green when better than the industry median, yellow indicates a performance measure less than the industry median. The yellow indications for U-2 for unplanned power change and shutdowns are entirely the result of its December 2006 shutdowns. The U-1 yellow indication for Reactor Coolant System leak rate is the result of issues with the pressurizer level control. In response to a query from Mr. Conway, Mr. Becker reported during U-1’s last cycle there were issues related to control of the positive displacement charging pump. The pump has now been replaced with a centrifugal charging pump which runs on the same level control system as the safety-related centrifugal charging pumps, however, Mr. Becker reported while control is satisfactory, it is not yet optimized. He reported DCPP has an action plan to address Emergency Response Organization performance. DCPP is reviewing radiation protection coverage on its maintenance jobs due to a significant event involving a maintenance job in a high radiation area earlier this year that also resulted in a reset of the human performance clock. Although there were no radiological consequences, a cause analysis for this event was completed. In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Becker replied this event would be discussed with the INPO accreditation team during INPO’s review and renewal of DCPP’s technical programs.

Vice President Becker reviewed the daily load profile for each unit. U-2 experienced a 50% reduction in power during April to clean bio fouling from the circulating water tunnels. There have been no unplanned automatic reactor trips during 2007.

Vice President Becker reviewed and discussed the active and closed Prompt Operability Assessments (POA) including a closed assessment concerning analysis of the component cooling water heat exchangers. Active assessments include: addressing hairline cracks identified in the covers of vital batteries which have also been identified in the industry and have resulted in no failures, as only the covers are affected and the batteries themselves remain intact; review of procedures and operator training to de-energize flow control valve 355 in the event of a fire in certain areas of the plant to prevent its spurious closure; and review of internal blistering in the epoxy coating of the U-1 and U-2 condensate storage tanks to include draining the tanks and re application of the coating. In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Becker confirmed that epoxy flakes were found in the condensate storage tanks.

Mr. Becker reviewed and discussed Operation Decision Making (ODM) issues at DCPP which have including the following issues during 2007:

1R14 Cavity Seal leak.
Action items for mitigating U-1 SG sulfates to evaluate different resins.
U-1 increased SG sulfates related to performance of the condensate polisher resin.
U-2 ramp without the Plant Process Computer.
High in leakage U-1 RCDT from RCP 1-2 #2 seal

In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Becker stated the cavity seal leak was not a result of corrosion and PG&E does not view it as a Foreign Materials Exclusion (FME) issue as it is a mechanical seal, threaded into place, not an inflatable seal. The seal is scheduled for replacement during the next U-1 refueling outage. Mr. Becker confirmed, in response to Mr. Conway’s inquiry that the plant has been ramped previously without the involvement of the PSRC, however, the action is documented by an AR. In order to receive PSRC review a procedure, including certain types of mode changes, must require that review or a judgment must be made regarding the benefit of PSRC review. In response to Dr. Peterson’s question concerning historically documenting the ODM process, Mr. Becker confirmed every ODM analysis is electronically recorded along with the bases and rationale for the decisions taken, any compensatory actions taken and the personnel involved and DCPP periodically reviews its ODM data to assess past performance and identify possible areas of improvement.

Mr. Roller asked Regulatory Services Supervisor Mr. Stan Ketelsen to make the next informational presentation.

Review of Reportable Events, NRC Notices of Violations, Licensee Event Reports and NRC Performance Indicators.

Mr. Ketelsen reported two Licensee Event Reports, previously reviewed with the DCISC, were submitted in February 2007 and both were associated with the December 2006 forced outage:: On December 10, 2006, a U-2 reactor trip from Mode 3 (hot standby) was initiated. This was part of an unplanned reactor shutdown in response to indications of increasing reactor coolant pump (RCP) 2-2 stator temperature. Investigations identified that a stator resistance temperature detector (RTD) had failed causing a false RCP 2-2 increasing temperature indication.
Mr. Conway questioned Mr. Ketelsen concerning PG&E’s plan to identify and monitor RTD single point vulnerabilities and Mr. Ketelsen replied DCPP has taken steps to procure diagnostic equipment to electronically analyze an RTD signal and diagnose a failing RTD.: On December 12, 2006, an automatic reactor trip occurred from approximately 25 percent power on U-2 when an electrical failure occurred in the circulating water pump (CWP) 2-1 motor enclosure. The cause of the failure was a single random failure of the surge capacitor. All the 12kV three-phase surge capacitors have since been replaced for both units.
Mr. Ketelsen reported and reviewed with the Committee the nine non-cited violations (NCVs) received since February 2007, following five separate NRC inspections, all of which were classified as green, indicating very low safety significance. These included:: Self-revealing NCV received for inappropriate release of a contaminated safety harness from the radioactive control area, when the contamination was detected by the exit portal monitor.; An NRC-identified NCV received for use of a non-conservative flow rated used in Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) design calculations. Revised calculations confirmed the adequacy of the design and valve position was adjusted to provide additional margin.; An NRC-identified NCV received for failure to account for potential temperature variation in individual ASW flow tunnels when calculating instrument uncertainty for ocean water temperature. Revised methodology and test acceptance criteria ensure adequate margin.; An NRC-identified NCV received for inadequate evaluation if the use of a single cell battery charger to ensure operability of a battery with low voltage in one cell. The low voltage cell was bypassed following receipt of a License Amendment.; Self-revealing NCV received for a change in the ASW pump packing leak-off acceptance criteria without processing a design change. The change was ultimately determined to be acceptable.; An NRC-identified NCV received for not fully evaluating the operability impact of dirt found between a circuit card and ventilation control panel connections.; An NRC-identified NCV received for not properly updating the heat dissipation calculation for vital 480V switchgear rooms to reflect installed heat loads. Revised calculation subsequently confirmed adequacy of design.; An NRC-identified NCV was received for an undocumented temporary modification to Control Room Condenser CR-38 filter housing installed to stabilize corroded sheet metal connections. The filter was removed pending housing repair.

Mr. Ketelsen confirmed, in response to question from the Committee members and consultants, that none of these NCVs were self-identified by DCPP and he commented this was somewhat disappointing and confirmed that all NCVs are entered into the Corrective Action Program and an Apparent Cause Evaluation (ACE) is performed concerning each. He further confirmed DCPP does trend its violations for crosscutting issues that are part of the NRC’s Safety Culture Initiative and Mr. Roller confirmed that an Adverse Trend AR might be written because of the number of NRC-identified NCVs.

No notices of violation (NOV) were issued during 2007. Concerning NRC enforcement trends, seven of the nine NCVs issued for inspections performed during 2006. Two inspections were significant team inspections for Radiation Safety and Component Design. Three NCVs were issued for design calculations, however, the adequacy of the design was subsequently demonstrated in each case. Two NCVs involved issues for which operability was not adequately evaluated or documented. Ongoing investigation is being undertaken to assess the extent of the conditions.

Mr. Conway questioned whether DCPP was concerned regarding a February 13, 2007, NRC Inspection Report which identified three violations as crosscutting issues relating to Problem Identification and Resolution and Mr. Ketelsen confirmed DCPP is performing similar tracking efforts with a lower threshold for initiating ARs. Mr. Ketelsen stated the NRC identified and reviewed in-program identification and resolution and the different elements and components of those efforts. He stated that more than two violations in any one area results in an AR to review for commonalities and trends those aspects of the problem identification and resolution issues involved in an instance of multiple violations. Mr. Roller suggested sharing the DCPP matrix for this analysis with the Committee during a future Fact-finding. Mr. Ketelsen stated two areas in Problem Identification and Resolution have been evaluated for adverse trends through an AR. These include threshold issues for identifying issues and entering them into the Corrective Action Program and evaluation of the issues.

In response to a request from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Ketelsen agreed to provide information on the resolution of an unresolved safety item from the February 13, 2007 Inspection Report related to measurement and flow in the Component Cooling Water System.

The final agenda item for the evening meeting was deferred for consideration to the following day.

XIV. Adjourn Evening Meeting

The evening meeting of the Committee was then adjourned by the Chair 7:30 P.M.

XV. Reconvene for Morning Meeting

The morning public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was called to order by its Chair, Dr. Rossin, at 8:30 A.M.

XVI. Committee Member Comments

There were no comments by members at this time.

XVII. Public Comments and Communications

The Chair reviewed the protocol for addressing comments and communications to the Committee and inquired whether there was any person present who wished to address the Committee. There were no such persons present.

XVIII. Information Items Before the Committee

The Chair requested that Mr. Roller make the next informational presentation requested by the Committee.

Activities of PG&E’s Nuclear Safety Oversight and President’s Nuclear Advisory Committees.

Mr. Roller reported that during the March 9, 2007, meeting of the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) the items reviewed included the plant performance indicators including the December 2006 forced outage for U-2. The NSOC reviewed a summary of INPO findings. QV’s assessment of plant performance and the QPAR were reviewed and, in response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Roller confirmed the first quarter 2007 QPAR overall performance rating has dropped from white to yellow status and he agreed to review with the Committee the reasons for the drop which he stated may be due to the December 2006 U-2 forced outage.

The NSOC also received reports from its four constituent subcommittees including Operations, Maintenance, Engineering and Oversight/Self-Evaluations Subcommittees and Mr. Roller briefly reviewed the topics of the subcommittees’ reports including operator attrition and training issues by the Operation’s Subcommittee, the alloy 600 issue regarding U-2 pressurizer welds and the experience of the Wolf Creek nuclear station and resulting increased monitoring of Reactor Coolant System leakage, to ensure failure would be a leak before a break, by the Engineering Subcommittee. Dr. Rossin commented the ’leak before break’ philosophy is basic to the ability of any nuclear plant to operate and he encouraged PG&E to remain observant concerning the issue. In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Roller confirmed the NSOC Engineering Subcommittee does not currently have an external member. Dr. Rossin suggested and Mr. Roller agreed to review establishment of a standard format for the NSOC and NSOC Subcommittee reports. The NSOC Engineering Subcommittee also reviewed issues related to readiness to perform the containment recirculation sump replacement project. The NSOC Oversight and Self-Evaluation Subcommittee reviewed self-assessments, benchmarking and apparent cause evaluation issues. Finally, the entire NSOC reviewed issues related to employee engagement, the DCPP Business Plan and management of the 1R14 Outage Safety Plan and the outage safety schedule relative to minimizing areas of increased risk. Mr. Booker commented that the NSOC subcommittee reports appear to contain a great deal of valuable and useful information and stated his opinion that they are well prepared. Mr. Booker suggested PG&E may want to consider using a director from a different department as chair of an NSOC subcommittee to create more independence. Mr. Conway referred to a recent NSOC report concerning the 1R14 outage which included the statement that “it does not appear the (DCPP) organization fully believes in the Corrective Action Program as core business and a valuable tool to improve and maintain excellent performance” and further referred to a need for line management ownership of the program and to hold people fully accountable for implementing it and he requested Mr. Roller’s comments concerning these statements. Mr. Roller replied he did not agree with the statements, expressed his belief in the strength of the Corrective Action Program and stated that the recent INPO evaluation validated the strength of the Corrective Action Program, and the NRC has done likewise. Mr. Conway suggested that PG&E take a hard look at the statement and the reasons for the NSOC member’s conclusions, as the Corrective Action Program is vital to what PG&E is trying to accomplish within the DCPP organization. Dr. Rossin stated the anonymous nature of the NSOC report containing that statement makes the need for a standardized format, including the author’s name, for NSOC’s reports even more apparent.

Mr. Roller introduced DCPP Operations Director, Mr. Ken Langdon to make the next of the informational presentation.

Overview of the Operations Department Including Chemistry and Radiation Protection Organizations.

Mr. Langdon began his presentation with a review of an Operations Services (Ops Services) simplified organizational chart and stated his position as Ops Services Director has the Operations, Radiation Protection and Chemistry and Environmental Managers as direct reports and he reviewed the former Ops Services reporting structure which included six direct reports including an ALARA Manager, an Assistant Ops Director and an Ops Support Manager.

Mr. Langdon reviewed the 2007 focus areas for Ops Services, which were modeled on the DCPP 2007 Business Plan focus areas and include detailed business plans for each area identified. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Langdon briefly reviewed Ops Services efforts to ensure a sufficient number of highly qualified, new licensed operators will be available to fill positions as retirements and attrition make openings available. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Langdon stated that of the twelve newly hired operators, some with engineering degrees, all were from outside DCPP and were selected from in excess of one hundred diverse applicants from other nuclear facilities, petrochemical plant industries or operations-type backgrounds in other heavy industries and he stated there were fewer candidates with a nuclear Navy background Mr. Langdon, in response to a question from Dr. Rossin, stated the Work Control Manager position is a direct report to the Outage Director. Mr. Wardell commented that the family of one of DCPP’s newly trained operators participated in the public tour of DCPP conducted by PG&E for the Committee on the previous day.

Mr. Langdon reviewed a graph comparing Operations outage errors during refueling outages 2R13 and 1R14 and noted 2R13 was previously DCPP’s best outage performance with 8 errors until1R14 bettered that performance with 3 errors. Mr. Langdon attributed the improved performance to a standards and fundamentals initiative in Operations to refine standards, to the use of standards coaches, simulator reviews and the implementation of an Operations review team investigation process to address lower-level or near-miss errors. He also reviewed a graph of error comparison during 2R13 and 1R14 for other DCPP organizations. He confirmed there were no operational events during 1R14, which resulted in a station human performance clock reset. During 1R14 there was a single safety schedule change that reduced defense-in-depth due to an electrical grid transient causing a loss of 230kV startup power, all safety systems operating as designed and error-free operator response and restoration having taken less than two hours. A draft of a root cause evaluation has been prepared by the Transmission Distribution organization and is being reviewed. Mr. Langdon commented relay settings at a remote substation from DCPP might have contributed to a fault in the Morro Bay area, which resulted in loss of the Morro Bay 230kV feed to DCPP. The DCISC agreed to follow up on this safety schedule change and the root cause analysis during a future Fact-finding. In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Langdon confirmed that, upon the loss of 230kV, power to the fuel pool cooling pump is also lost and the pump does not restart by design, so operators needed to take action to restore its function.

Mr. Langdon identified and discussed two areas for future improvement in Operations refueling outage performance including more efficient administration of the new eSOMS clearance process and more efficient placement into service of outage level instrumentation.

Mr. Langdon reviewed and discussed with the Committee the performance of license candidates, which saw six of eleven candidates achieving success in obtaining NRC license in May 2007. Previous success rates for DCPP candidates averaged 96%. He stated actions to improve performance have included addressing labor relations issues, more effective candidate selection and recruitment, elimination of unnecessary course burdens and increasing the quality of line leadership in Operations training. Additional actions are being taken to ensure the current class of seventeen candidates is successful. Mr. Roller commented on his concern that DCPP requires an accurate way to assess candidates before they are examined by the NRC and, of the unsuccessful candidates for the May examination, some had problems with the written portion, the in-plant job performance or the simulator portion of the exam. The DCISC agreed to follow up on this topic during a future Fact-finding. In response to questions from the Committee, Mr. Langdon confirmed DCPP is currently reviewing its Operations training program with the NRC. In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Langdon confirmed overtime in Operations has been reduced below 10% during the first quarter of 2007 and is not expected to exceed 15% for the second half of the year, whereas in prior years overtime was in excess of 20%.

Mr. Langdon reported performance in Radiation Protection has included the station dose for the 1R14 refueling outage exceeding the goal set, and Mr. Langdon characterized this as unsatisfactory. However, the performance during 1R14 of 103 person-rem represented a best performance for U-1. Common cause analysis is being undertaken to improve performance including improving the plant’s ability to accurately estimate dose resulting from new projects. Dr. Rossin commented that accurate dose estimation was consistent with good ALARA practices while a focus on collective dose was not consistent with ALARA. Low-level contamination events at DCPP are at industry-best levels, coming in for 1R14 at 32 events, bettering the goal set of 40 and compared favorably to DCPP’s prior best performance of 49 events. Operations human performance during 1R14 saw zero radiation protection events and strengths were identified by INPO on DCPP’s focus on routine task observations and coaching. A root cause evaluation has been completed for an April 2007 radiation boundary control event due to failure to maintain line of sight control. In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Langdon confirmed DCPP has addressed staffing issues in Radiation Protection through its recruiting and hiring efforts.

Mr. Langdon reviewed and reported on performance in Chemistry and stated that Chemistry’s performance remains better than the 2010 industry goals and should be in the top quartile under the new INPO standards scheduled to take effect during the second half of 2007. DCPP has made and will make improvement to issues in connection with closed cooling water bio fouling for both service cooling water and intake cooling water by successfully completing chemical cleaning on U-1 during 1R14 and including the work within the outage scope of work for U-2 during 2008. Secondary system operating margin issues, identified as an Area For Improvement by INPO’s evaluation, are being closely monitored. These include management of the U-1 SG sulfate trend, the sulfate being created as a by-product from ion exchange in the resin, due to the performance of the new polisher resin, improvements in condenser saltwater in-leakage and resolution of the feedwater hydrazine issue. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Langdon stated the replacement of the SGs will not change DCPP’s strategies for chemistry control, including reducing the amount of iron transported into the SGs and he confirmed DCPP has reviewed the experiences at other nuclear plants which have replaced SGs. Mr. Langdon stated that human performance trends in Chemistry in connection with mispositioning of valves, etc., has been eliminated through the use of place keeping.

Mr. Roller introduced Ms. Babette Albin, Foreign Materials Exclusion Maintenance Coordinator at DCPP, to make the next informational presentation.

Report on Improvements in the Foreign Material Exclusion Program (FME) and FME Results During 1R14.

Ms. Albin stated, during 2006, a Nonconformance report (NCR) was issued for the FME. The NCR was initiated because of adverse trends in FME during refueling outage 2R13. Ms. Albin reviewed and discussed with the DCISC the actions identified to prevent recurrence including: strengthening line ownership by engaging senior DCPP leadership and establishing a Steering Committee made up of Operations, Engineering, Maintenance, Training and Radiation Protection representatives; revising the FME program procedure, to be completed by the Steering Committee by summer 2007; and implementing, in January 2008, a separate level of mandatory computer-based training programs for personnel with access to radiological controlled areas, access to the turbine area, etc. Worker training emphasizing FME awareness was also provided to other DCPP personnel.

Ms. Albin stated the Steering Committee meets approximately every three weeks to review ARs and to review procedure changes and industry developments. INPO is expected to issue an advance process document for FME by the end of 2007, and the DCPP FME Steering Committee has worked with INPO on that document. Program procedures are also being changed and shortened. She identified lack of proper FME procedure and training of program ownership as principally responsible for the 2006 NCR.

During 1R14, changes were made to training FME monitoring personnel including providing them additional time onsite to gain procedural knowledge and an eight-hour class for all monitors. During 1R14, DCPP had seven FME monitors with past, non-DCPP, outage experience and eleven with no nuclear experience prior to 1R14. Extensive training and testing were provided to the monitors concerning procedure and a focus was placed on assisting them to understand their function as FME monitors and, Ms. Albin stated, the eighteen person crew worked in two 12-hour shifts with nine monitors on each shift for work inside and outside of Containment and performed well during 1R14. Within U-1 Containment, there was one check-in station established for all five FME work areas. All areas remained at high risk, once posted, for the duration of the refueling outage. Five main areas were identified as focus areas including the SGs, Reactor Head, Polar Crane, Manipulator Crane and the Reactor Cavity. Walkdowns and cleaning, not less than two times per shift, for all FME maintained areas were performed and FME high risk areas were monitored and maintained for the duration of the outage. Ms. Albin commented the containment sump replacement project within U-1 Containment required a significant commitment by the FME Program. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Ms. Albin confirmed she expects to be able to use almost all the FME monitors during the next DCPP refueling outage and she stated the respect of the DCPP outage workforce and management support of the crew’s efforts during 1R14 was an important factor in gaining their commitment to return.

Ms. Albin reviewed the goals established for FME for 1R4 including no significant events and less than 20 ARs tracked against FME Performance Indicators. She stated FME goals and progress during the outage were tracked daily in the outage Plan of the Day. She reviewed with the Committee the standard categorization of significant events, threats and conditions. She commented that a telling indicator of FME performance during 1R14 should be whether U-1 goes through its operational cycle with no fuel leak contributed to by the presence of foreign material. During 1R14 there were 17 ARs generated by FME events, which was better performance than the goal set of 20. The ARs resulted from: 5 threats, representing errors in implementation posing a risk of personnel injury, equipment damage, fuel failure or loss of generation; and 12 conditions representing minor or administrative errors with no ill effects to a system or a component. Ms. Albin discussed with the members and consultants examples of threats and conditions which occurred during 1R14 including an unidentified coil spring discovered in the reactor cavity immediately following head lift and before the reactor was de-fueled. In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Ms. Albin stated she inquired whether there were similar springs on the fuel assemblies and was told there were no such similar springs, however, Mr. Roller stated there were steel plate springs on fuel assemblies which do not resemble a coil spring. Ms. Albin stated it was her belief the spring came from a tool and the presence of that spring will be used as an FME lesson learned from 1R14 in training before the next refueling outage.

In response to a question from Mr. Conway regarding an NSOC report concerning as-found conditions with respect to FME, Ms. Albin stated paint chips in containment caused by paint on the manipulator train tracks were an issue and the presence of the paint chips was addressed by vacuuming once per shift. She commented that she did not believe repainting the entire FME area within Containment would solve the problem and could actually cause more paint to flake. Ms. Albin stated, relative to the use of tygon tubing, that tubing is currently available only as clear tubing and, when used near an FME area, violates FME procedure and is an issue. However, she stated colored tygon tubing is expected to become available by this summer. Ms. Albin, in response to Mr. Conway’s inquiry, stated she has reviewed with the Maintenance organization the issue of insufficient FME coverage of the CFCU’s with the end valves removed and she commented that Maintenance did not use an FME tarp over the CFCU’s because of fear that the tarp might melt. She stated Maintenance now has a better understanding of FME’s expectations. In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Ms. Albin confirmed that the FME Program will change procedures prior to the next refueling outage scheduled for February 2008. She stated the FME Steering Committee will be involved with the changes to program ownership and that the new INPO document should be issued by the end of 2007, which is expected to also result in changes to FME procedures.

The Chair thanked Ms. Albin for an excellent presentation.

A short break followed.

Mr. Roller reviewed changes to the Committee’s agenda for the rest of this public meeting and requested Mr. Gary Close, DCPP Manager, Technical Support Engineering, to make the next presentation.

Fuel Performance for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Including Review of Fuel Leakage Issues.

Mr. Close initially addressed a Committee question from yesterday’s public meeting concerning identification of single-point vulnerabilities, which arose in connection with the reactor coolant pump RTD issue in December 2006. He stated DCPP completed a review of its annunciator response manuals in February 2007 with respect to single-point vulnerabilities. The annunciator response manuals define what actions operators should take under differing situations in response to annunciators. Additional components identified from the review will be incorporated in the Single-Point Vulnerability Implementation Program, a part of the overall DCPP Business Plan, and all single-point vulnerability studies are now scheduled to be completed by December 15, 2007.

Mr. Close described the fuel core for each DCPP reactor as having 193 fuel assemblies, each assembly being made up of 264 fuel rods, making a total of 50,952 fuel rods in each of DCPP’s two reactor cores. Each fuel rod consists of uranium dioxide pellets stacked and sealed within a zirconium alloy tube which is known as the fuel cladding. The fuel rod or cladding represents the first of three primary fission product barriers designed to prevent a radiological release, the other two being the reactor coolant system and the containment structures. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Close confirmed DCPP currently uses Westinghouse fuel and he promised to provide the model number of the fuel currently being used at DCPP.

Mr. Close reported that typically DCPP has three different generations of fuel within its cores and periodically implements upgrades to its fuel. He displayed and described a picture of a fuel assembly with a 17 by 17 array of individual fuel rods and described the on site inspection techniques employed at DCPP. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Close confirmed that approximately ten years ago DCPP discovered a thimble between rods during a routine on site inspection. Mr. Roller stated Westinghouse provides a very clean environment for the fuel it manufactures and performs an inspection using interlacing combs through the fuel assemblies. Mr. Close displayed and described a photograph of a DCPP partially unloaded reactor core.

Mr. Close stated that, since the commencement of operations at DCPP, U-1 has had a total of 1,349 fuel assemblies loaded in its core and U-2 a total of 1,289 fuel assemblies. He reported that 99.999% of the fuel rods have operated without defect in U-1, while 99.995% of the U-2 fuel rods have operated without defect. Dr. Peterson commented these statistics translate into approximately 10 defective rods out of 10,000. Mr. Close reported the nuclear industry has established a 2010 Initiative with a goal of zero defects in the entire industry. U-1 has not experienced a fuel defect since 1991. U-2 is currently estimated to have one leaking fuel rod, which was identified approximately 200 days into its current operating cycle. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Roller described the process of determining which rod is leaking by using a process termed ‘fuel sipping.’ Mr. Close confirmed Mr. Booker’s observation that, on past occasions, DCPP has been able to determine in which area of the core a leaking rod is located and whether the fuel is first, second or third generation through an analysis of cesium and different radio isotopes, principally iodine, and he stated that ultrasonic testing and video inspections performed by Westinghouse were also used to examine fuel rods. Mr. Close confirmed, in response to a question from Dr. Rossin, DCPP has the capability to remove and replace the pin from a fuel assembly with a defective rod on site and to replace a defective rod within an assembly with a stainless steel rod. He confirmed the defective pins are stored in a dedicated canister and he stated that DCPP has never sent spent fuel off site for further testing.

Mr. Close described the analyses to be performed for U-2 to determine where the flaw is located in the fuel element and to determine whether debris is present or whether the flaw is due to a manufacturing defect. He displayed and discussed a graph illustrating fuel reliability for pressurized water reactors manufactured by Westinghouse, indicating at the present time approximately 80% of those reactors are free of fuel defects. In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Close stated Westinghouse is customer-oriented in trying to eliminate fuel defects and has a strong corrective action program and good documentation. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Close stated the financial responsibility under the fuel warranty for a defective rod depends upon whether the defect is due to its manufacture or whether it was caused by debris.

Mr. Close stated DCPP has a comprehensive Fuel Management Program and he discussed the Program’s key preventive features:: Cooperative industry effort to oversee the fuel supplier’s quality control program.; Onsite detailed fuel inspection.; Careful control of fuel handling by Westinghouse.; FME Control Program for all plant systems in contact with fuel.; Strict chemistry control in the Reactor Coolant System to prevent corrosion.; Conservative limits on core power distribution to prevent hot spots in the core.; Fuel design features which protect against potential debris fretting of fuel cladding, usually occurring in the bottom of the fuel assembly, including adding a hardened oxide coating, beginning at the bottom, solid section of the rods.; Foreign object search and retrieval during outages using an articulated arm and camera with capability to go below the core plate to look for debris.

Mr. Close stated daily chemistry sampling is being done on U-2 to determine the nature of the suspected fuel defect. To date, because there have been no rapid swings in U-2 power level, it is undetermined if the defect is due to debris or manufacturing and whether it is within first or second generation fuel. Mr. Close commented, in the past, U-2 which has a different core design than U-1, was subject to bafflejetting due to water flowing up through the core and down the outside of the core barrel projecting through cracks in the baffle joints with the resulting harmonics causing the rods to vibrate and thereby creating leaks, usually in the upper portion of a fuel rod. DCPP eliminated its bafflejetting problem with modifications made during 2R13.

Key mitigation features of the Fuel Management Program were reviewed by Mr. Close and include:: Imposition of tighter restrictions on how fast power can be increased.; Inspection of all fuel during refueling outages, to ensure leaking fuel is not reused (and to identify the cause of failure).; Repair or replacement of leaking fuel.; All fuel will be inspected with special test equipment by fuel sipping or canister sipping, another Westinghouse technology.
Mr. Close reviewed the nuclear industry’s 2010 Initiative, a joint effort with INPO and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), to achieve 100% defect-free fuel by 2010. The 2010 Initiative is expected to issue guidelines for six main categories including:: Debris control and mitigation.; Grid-to-rod fretting.; Surveillance practices and failed fuel inspection.; Crud and corrosion control.; Pellet-to-clad interaction operating margin.; Fuel fabrication oversight.

DCPP will enter the guidelines into its Corrective Action Program and review industry experience for best practices. INPO will conduct review visits at each plant, and is expected to visit DCPP in 2008. DCPP personnel will participate in INPO reviews as peer reviewers at other sites and will apply lessons learned. Mr. Close commented U-1 has had solid fuel performance and it was important that this performance continue so that by 2010, DCPP will have eliminated fuel defects. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Close confirmed U-1 fuel performance was evidence of good FME results and he stated improvements to the FME program are expected in the future.

Dr. Peterson complimented Mr. Close on his presentation and stated that the Committee may want to consider, consistent with its mandate to conduct public outreach, providing further general information on nuclear power and the operation of pressurized water reactors such as DCPP so that members of the public might be better able to understand the relevance of PG&E’s informational presentations in context of DCPP and nuclear power operations in general. Dr. Rossin suggested the Committee may want to explore placing tutorials on its website or in conjunction with the archived webcast presentations of its public meetings.

Following Mr. Close’ presentation, Mr. Roller responded to an earlier question from Mr. Conway at this public meeting, during review of PG&E’s Revised Response to Committee Recommendation 06-2 concerning QV staffing benchmarking. Mr. Roller confirmed benchmarking was done against other two-unit nuclear plants to compare staffing numbers and activities performed by their QV organizations. The experience of utilities which operate multiple plants, and thereby share QV resources, was also factored into the benchmark assessment.

Results of the 2007 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Evaluation,

Mr. Roller reviewed the results of DCPP’s recent INPO evaluation. INPO is a group formed by the nuclear industry to move the industry to a level of excellence. He contrasted INPO’s role with the role of the NRC and he stated the NRC is charged with overseeing plant operations to ensure nuclear plants operate safely and within regulations. INPO goes beyond that role and strives to achieve levels of excellence beyond regulatory compliance. INPO utilizes a recurring evaluation process, with teams of inspectors visiting for approximately three weeks every two years. One quarter of the approximately 25-person teams is made up of INPO staff, one quarter from the nuclear industry working for INPO on assignment at its Atlanta GA headquarters and one half is made up of industry peers from other operating nuclear plants.

DCPP received its latest INPO evaluation in February 2007 and was rated by that evaluation as excellent, INPO’s highest rating. Mr. Roller reviewed and discussed comments and observations from that visit which included identification of station performance improvement in a number of areas; a strong management alignment, through communication of the Business Plan, and clear direction contributing to improved equipment reliability and a more effective Corrective Action Program including apparent cause and formal root cause evaluations and use of self-assessments; and direction that the management team could improve modeling and reinforcing desired behaviors to install high standards within the workforce, specifically in areas of industrial safety and human performance.

INPO identified DCPP beneficial practices and accomplishments as including:: Employee involvement in business planning process.; Training used effectively to improve performance.; A robust Plant Health Committee.; Trending at the department level.; An effective strategy to address Instrument & Control long-term obsolescence.

Mr. Roller briefly reviewed and provided examples of these practices. In response to a query by Dr. Rossin, Mr. Roller confirmed that replacement of the plant process computer will require significant training for the entire Operations Department and he confirmed DCPP is planning this training in conjunction with training now provided to operators. In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Roller confirmed INPO identified continuing issues at DCPP concerning: performance improvement related to self-assessment and benchmarking, which concern DCPP’s ability to more effectively use those programs to prevent problems; and around Operations mispositioning. In response to a question from Mr. Conway concerning the INPO-type evaluation performed prior to INPO’s February evaluation, Mr. Roller replied the mid-cycle evaluation provided an advantage and allowed DCPP to recognize there were opportunities for improvement in the area of employee engagement. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Roller replied, as part of its evaluation process, INPO reviews a large amount of data and spends time in the plant observing evolutions and maintenance practices and interviewing and observing workers.

Mr. Roller reported DCPP will provide INPO with a written response by August 14, 2007, and will be conducting a mid-cycle evaluation during the summer of 2008, after U-2 SG replacement, and expects the next INPO evaluation to occur in the summer of 2009. In response to a question from Mr. Conway concerning an opportunity for DCPP executive-level input to INPO concerning the strength of the INPO evaluation team, given the relatively new changes made to the style and conduct of INPO’s evaluations, Mr. Roller replied and confirmed there is an opportunity for DCPP senior executives to meet for a debriefing with the evaluation team lead.

Diablo Canyon’s Response and Activities Planned During 2007 for INPO Accreditation of Training Program.

Mr. Roller reported an INPO accreditation team visit is scheduled at DCPP for June 18-22, 2007. The INPO team will evaluate technical training programs in the areas of Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Engineering and Maintenance. He commented that INPO does not accredit the training programs but rather evaluates them to identify strengths and weaknesses. DCPP, prior to this visit, has identified and prepared an evaluation report for INPO’s review concerning perceived strengths and weaknesses in its training programs. Mr. Roller reported there is currently one open finding in that report concerning qualification of workers. INPO then prepares its report following the visit and evaluation by adding its observations to the report prepared by DCPP which will be presented by the INPO accreditation team lead to the National Nuclear Accrediting Board at a meeting scheduled in Atlanta GA on October 17, 2007. The Board is facilitated by INPO but is not a part of INPO. PG&E will be represented during the Board’s review, affording the Board members the opportunity to ask question of PG&E. The Board is made up of experts throughout the industry, within nuclear utilities, academia, corporate industry and usually an NRC member. At the conclusion of the Board’s review, a determination will be made on whether those training programs should receive re accreditation.

In response to a question from Dr. Rossin concerning whether DCPP was providing sufficient personnel for INPO peer exercises and reviews, Mr. Roller replied he believed DCPP was providing sufficient personnel to participate fully and has increased its participation over the last two years.

XIX. Adjourn Morning Meeting

Discussion was held concerning the dates for future DCISC public meetings and Fact-finding (see XXIV below.)

The members approved the May 30-31, 2007 Fact-finding Report, reviewed by Consultant Wardell earlier during this public meeting, and authorized its transmittal to PG&E.

The morning session was then adjourned by the Chair at 12:00 Noon.

XX. Reconvene for Afternoon Meeting

The afternoon meeting of the DCISC was called to order by Committee Chair, Dr. A. David Rossin, at 1:30 P.M.

XXI. Committee Member Comments

There were no comments from members at this time.

XXII. Public Comments & Communications

There were no comments from members of the public at this time.

XXIII. Information Items Before the Committee (Cont’d)

Mr. Roller requested Operations Planning Shift Manager Mr. Matt Coward to make the next of the informational presentations requested by the Committee.

Review of the History and Status of Mispositioning Issues, the Nonconformance Report and Actions Taken by PG&E.

Mr. Coward stated his was a newly created position and part of his job is to provide Operations leadership on planning and scheduling both daily and outage work, as DCPP has recognized better planning leads to fewer human performance challenges. Mr. Coward reviewed the status of the Mispositions Performance Indicator, which tracks occurrences on a monthly basis, based on a goal of 100, from which points are deducted as determined by severity of the potential consequences of a misposition occurrence.

Mr. Coward reviewed a consequential mispositioning which occurred during refueling outage 1R14 when an inadvertent water transfer from the Reactor cavity to the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) took place when a valve was mispositioned and the correct valve was not positioned correctly. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Coward confirmed this type of event is counted as a single misposition error. This resulted in a 2.5 point consequential deduction from the Performance Indicator, as 2.5 is the deduction assessed according to the determination that the consequential result was movement of water or energy. In response to a question from Mr. Conway concerning the root cause, Mr. Coward stated the Operations Review Team determined the event had two root causes: loss of focus during a tailboard briefing concerning a repetitive task; and mistaken identification of the valve which was manipulated. Mr. Coward stated an Operations Awareness bulletin was issued for this event to emphasize the need to review the description rather than just looking at a valve number and he stated during 1R14 a consistent message was sent to the Operations workforce that if an unexpected condition was discovered in the plant, the proper procedure is to resolve the question before continuing to perform the work. In response to an observation by Mr. Roller, Mr. Coward stated that concerning this event, the self-verification standard was not met and the pre job briefing may have been lax and Mr. Roller commented the corrective action lies in making sure these and other standards are met. Mr. Coward confirmed, in response to an observation from Mr. Conway, concurrent verification is not performed for all activities and is currently used when immediate adverse action may occur. He stated that unless a procedure specifically requires concurrent verification, typically the judgment to use independent or concurrent verification is made by the shift foreman, a senior licensed reactor operator, and he further confirmed that DCPP conducts monthly shift manager meetings to achieve as much alignment between shifts as possible. Mr. Roller confirmed there is procedure guidance for the verification practices document for the plant site with very explicit requirements. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Coward confirmed there was positive discipline involved as a result of the employee’s actions.

Mr. Coward stated DCPP uses the concept of a human performance clock reset, on both a departmental and a site-wide basis, to gauge progress on human performance and stated that consequential mispositionings result in a clock reset, while non-consequential occurrences do not.

Mr. Coward reported there have been three non-consequential mispositionings resulting in a one-half point deduction each from the Performance Indicator for:: Air valve to MSR dump valve found closed (Unknown).; Clearance problem during RTS (Operations).; FWP-1 filter found closed (Operations).

A Nonconformance Report action remains to be completed and includes sign-offs for the special instruction on clearances, including distinguishing between which ones apply to initiating and which ones apply to removal. Action to ensure the eSOMS clearance procedure provides this capability is to be completed by June 2007 and Operations procedure revisions are to be completed by September 2007. Mr. Coward reported Operations is in the process of consolidating all departmental standards into one procedure to be handed out as a pocket booklet to serve as a concise reference concerning human performance standards.

Mr. Coward displayed a graph of mispositioning occurrences during 2006 and stated mispositioning data is a trailing indicator and the data indicate DCPP is making progress toward its goal. Mr. Coward agreed with Dr. Rossin’s observation on the utility of six-month rolling averages, as compared to monthly data, being used to identify trends. Mr. Roller commented that rolling averages, however, are not skewed by one particularly good or bad monthly performance. Mr. Coward displayed a graph comparing Operations outage error performance during 2R13 with that during 1R14 on a daily and cumulative basis. He stated 1R14 represented the best outage performance relative to Operations errors for DCPP, with a total of 3 errors, which he attributed to operators use of the human performance tools developed to reduce error. Dr. Rossin observed, and Mr. Coward agreed, the graph indicated that error tends to occur at the beginning and end of refueling outage periods and Mr. Roller commented and confirmed that observation noting that Operations has responsibility for plant shutdown and startup at the commencement and termination of a refueling outage.

Mr. Coward reviewed the six noteworthy errors from 2R13, not all of which were due to mispositioning. He reviewed and discussed the Operations department-level events during 1R14 which included:: Danger tag found on a “closed” disconnect switch.; Inadvertent water transfer from U-1 cavity to RWST.; Clearance hung with a danger tag “open” on a valve.

In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Coward replied the nine noteworthy errors from 2R13 and 1R14 do not appear to indicate a common theme or precursor. Dr. Rossin questioned whether PG&E was looking at the potential consequences of each event and commented on the importance of maintaining a questioning attitude. Mr. Roller and Mr. Coward replied that the purpose of the Performance Improvement Roll-up Process is to look for common themes and observed the Ops Review Team evaluates each event for consequences and issues an operator bulletin within 24-hours of any Operations department-level event.

In response to a question from Consultant Wardell concerning the NRC’s and INPO’s concerns regarding mispositioning, Mr. Roller replied that an INPO-identified Area For Improvement (AFI) is related to mispositioning and the related need for clear standards and procedural adherence and he confirmed the NRC is interested in every mispositioning event at DCPP.

A short break followed.

Mr. Roller requested Mr. Dennis Petersen, Director of Outage Management at DCPP, to make the final informational presentation requested by the Committee for this public meeting.

Results of the Fourteenth Refueling Outage for Unit 1 (1R14) and Results of the “As Low As Reasonably Achievable” Radiation Exposure Reduction Program.

Mr. Petersen identified and discussed with the Committee members and consultants the major scope items, aside from refueling activities, during 1R14 which included:: Containment sump modification: due to a generic letter from the NRC and which increased the margin on the recirculation sump screens.; 4kV Vital Bus “F” hinge wire & cable replacement: due to age-related issues. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell Mr. Petersen replied the cabling is difference in appearance and is designed to include torsion to tolerate the flexing required when the cubicles are opened and closed.; RCS batch make-up system replacement: the control systems, fluid delivery piping and valves for the borated water system were replaced to provide a more precise blend and make-up volume to the reactor. In response to a question from Consultant Wardell, Mr. Petersen confirmed operability of the new system was confirmed prior to start-up.; Centrifugal charging pump (CCP) installation: replacing the positive displacement pump due to issues of maintenance and obsolescence. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson, Mr. Petersen stated issues of diversity and common mode failure were addressed by the increased reliability of the CCP and Mr. Roller commented the positive displacement pump replaced by the CCP was not an emergency safeguards pump, its role is related to fire protection.; Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) piping replacement: piping was replaced with piping with a higher chrome content or with cladded stainless on carbon piping, to address long-term wearing of feedwater and steam piping. In response to a question from Dr. Rossin, Mr. Petersen described the mechanism used to obstruct the flow in the piping to calculate and calibrate flow which is causing long-term wearing of the piping’s interior surfaces and he stated this was identified from industry experience. Mr. Petersen confirmed the obstructions to the flow were removed.; Main bank transformer (cooler replacement).; Service Cooling Water chemical cleaning.; RCP 1-1 10-year inspection.; RCP1-1 and 1-3 seal replacement.; Steam Generator (N-1) replacement activities.

Mr. Petersen reviewed and discussed with the Committee the goals set for 1R14 and performance achieved during the outage as measured against those goals:

Result of 1R13
Performance Area	Goals	Actual
Nuclear Safety Events	0	0
Disabling Injuries	0	1
Recordable Injuries	0	6
Dose	84 Person Rem	103.2 Person Rem
Human Performance Clock Resets	0	1
Significant FME Events	0	0
Duration	#25 days	29 days 20 hours
Power Ascension	< 5 days	3 days 22 hours
		(forecast)

Dr. Rossin commented that changes in outage scope should also be reviewed when assessing performance in dose against an established goal and that actual exposure as the scope changes may account for all or some of any difference. Mr. Petersen agreed and stated the goal for 1R14 was to have 10% or less scope expansion during the outage and the actual scope increase was between 12.2% and 12.4%, although not all of the scope change was related to radiological work. He stated DCPP will review the dose incurred and has initiated a corrective action document to follow up concerning the issue of better calculating dose goals for future refueling outages. In response to a question from Dr. Peterson concerning the use of BEACON, a Westinghouse real-time analytical core power level program, during power ascension, Mr. Petersen confirmed BEACON was used and resulted significant time saving by shortening power holds during power ascension and he commented time was also saved by eliminating some of the boric acid holds during power ascension on the steam side of the plant which was previously used to improve reliability and longevity of the SGs. He commented this was possible during 1R14 as DCPP will be replacing the U-1 SGs during the next scheduled U-1 refueling outage. He confirmed an observation by Dr. Petersen that, in the future with the new SGs, DCPP will not require the boric acid power holds and power ascension should be even faster, possibly in the 30-60 hour range, although he stated the industry is still reviewing the potential effect of quick power ascension on fuel failure and 72-hours might be a more reasonable estimate for power ascension after replacement of the SGs.

Mr. Petersen reviewed the injuries to workers during 1R14 and lessons learned and stated that of the 6 recordable and 1 disabling injuries, 6 were to supplemental personnel. There were approximately 1,400 supplemental personnel on site for the 1R14 refueling outage.

Mr. Petersen reviewed a graph comparing daily and cumulative Human Performance Noteworthy Errors from 2R13 to 1R14 and he commented the improved performance during 1R14 was attributable to very good performances by Operations and Engineering, while the performance of the Maintenance organization will be reviewed and further analyzed to identify areas for improvement.

Mr. Petersen reviewed the results of the SG inspections during 1R14, which resulted in 17 tubes plugged due to eddy current data indicating the presence of a flaw beyond the allowed threshold. Current status for tubes plugged in each U-1 SG is: 17 in SG 1-1; 25 in SG 1-2; 14 in SG 1-3 and 6 in SG 1-4. Cumulative percentage of tubes plugs for each of those SGs is now 7.3% for SG 1-1; 10% for SG 1-2; 3.1% for SG 1-3 and 5.7% for SG 104. In response to question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Petersen stated the technical specification (TS) limit for SG tube plugging is 15% in any single SG.

Mr. Petersen reviewed the trend in dose for 1R14 and he stated the 1R14 outage exposure dose goal was reached around Day 19 of the 29-day outage and that on Day 23 there was a significant increase in dose due to Containment cleanup and closeout activities. Days 16 through 24 saw dose increases due to work on the containment sump project and Mr. Petersen commented DCPP missed its re estimation of the 1R14 dose goal and this is being entered into and analyzed in the Corrective Action Program. In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Petersen stated it was not an unusual practice to change the dose goal during an outage and that establishing and communicating to the workforce concerning a new, challenging target for dose was important in continuing to manage an outage. Dr. Rossin commented on the need not to over emphasize dose reduction at the expense of quality work and stated such practices were not consistent with ALARA principles. Mr. Petersen, in response to a question from Dr. Rossin, stated there was no indication that the workforce, once the goal was exceeded, lost interest in keeping dose exposure low and he stated managing and emphasizing the need for personnel to determine how to optimize and employ resources without incurring unnecessary exposure were important, and he confirmed no items were removed from the outage scope due to dose considerations. Mr. Roller stated the ALARA Committee meets regularly during refueling outages to review data on dose rate and reviews adjustment to the exposure goals to ensure a challenging goal is maintained as the focus of the workforce and he commented the dose goal is not just a measure of radiation dose, it is also a measure of planning and efficient execution of work. Mr. Petersen confirmed, in response to an observation by Consultant Booker, that U-1 has always had a higher source term than U-2.

Mr. Petersen reviewed and summarized the challenges during 1R14 as follows:: Industrial Safety Practices - not an ingrained value.; ALARA performance.; Project performance for the Containment recirculation sump; Reactor Makeup System and Centrifugal Charging Pump 1-3 projects.; Schedule discipline including poor hand-off and inadequate schedule awareness.; Resource constraints due to tight schedule.

In response to a question from Consultant Booker, Mr. Petersen stated DCPP has put a great deal of effort into documenting lessons learned during 1R14 and has generated approximately 74 lessons learned, which will be useful in supporting the upcoming SG replacement and refueling outages.

Mr. Roller and Mr. Petersen commented, with respect to the containment recirculation sump modification for U-1 and U-2, there are two parts to the NRC’s generic letter, one of which involves increasing the sump screening area and the other to remove vulnerable debris and containment insulation material. Mr. Roller confirmed not all of the insulation material was removed during 1R14 and DCPP has received approval from the NRC to go beyond the end of 2007, until replacement of the U-1 SGs, to accomplish insulation removal. As the new SGs use a type of encapsulated insulation when they are installed in both units this should close out the issue of debris in containment.

In response to a question from Mr. Conway, Mr. Petersen confirmed the recirculation sump m