

DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE (“DCISC”)
(www.dcisc.org)

Committee Members: Robert J. Budnitz
Peter Lam
Per F. Peterson

* * * * *
Wednesday & Thursday Point San Luis Conference Room
February 15-16, 2023 First and San Francisco Streets
Avila Lighthouse Suites Avila Beach, California

PUBLIC MEETING AGENDA

This public meeting will be webcast in real time at:
http://www.slo-span.org/local_webcast/DCISC/stream_index.htm and through <http://www.dcisc.org>.

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PARTICIPATION

You may participate in the DCISC’s public meeting in person or in real-time by accessing the Zoom webinar meeting via the weblink and the meeting ID given above or by calling any of the phone number provided at the top of this agenda. Instructions on how to access, view and participate in remote meetings are also provided by visiting the DCISC’s home page at <http://www.dcisc.org>. Attendees can make oral comments or ask questions of the Committee Members during the webinar meeting by using the “Raise Your Hand” feature or by pressing *9 on your telephone keypad if joining by telephone only. If you are unable to participate in real-time, you may email to dcsafety@dcisc.org with the subject line “Public Comment Item#___” (insert the item number relevant to your comment) or “Public Comment – Non Agenda Item.” Comments will be reviewed and distributed before the meeting if received by 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, February 14, 2023. Comments received after that will be addressed during the item and/or at the end of the meeting. All comments received will be read into and become part of the record, subject to a time limit determined by the presiding officer. The Committee will have the option to modify its actions on items based on comments received.

Morning Session - 02/15/2023 – 9:00 A.M.

I CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL

II INTRODUCTIONS

ADVISEMENT

The Committee may consider at any time requests to change the order of a listed agenda item. Information distributed to the Committee at a public meeting becomes part of the public record of the DCISC. A copy of written material, pictures, etc. must be provided to the Committee's Legal Counsel for this purpose. Correspondence received and sent by the Committee is on file with the Office of the DCISC Legal Counsel and copies are available upon request. Devices for attendees who may be hearing impaired are available upon request. The meeting will be webcast in real time.

III PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. The public may comment on any matter listed on the Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. *There will be a time limit for each speaker as designated by the presiding officer. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

IV ACTION ITEMS

- A. Receive PG&E's Response to DCISC 32nd Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; July 1, 2021 – June 30, 2022. Accept
- B. Including Consideration of Funding for the Cost of Augmented Activities During 2023 Pursuant to California Senate Bill 846. Discussion/Action
- C. Discussion of Open Items List. Discussion/ Accept

V COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION

- A. Public Outreach, Site Visits and Other Committee Activities; Scheduling and Confirmation of Future Fact-Finding Visits and Public Meetings.
- B. Documents Provided to the Committee.

VI INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

- A. Informational Presentation Requested by the Committee:
 - 1) Presentation by the Manager of the San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services.

VII ADJOURN MORNING MEETING

Afternoon Session – 02/15/2023 – 1:30 P.M.

VIII RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING

IX COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

X PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

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XI TECHNICAL CONSULTANT & LEGAL COUNSEL REPORTS; RECEIVE, APPROVE AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT-FINDING REPORT TO PG&E

- A. Consultant R. Ferman Wardell:
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and Acceptance of
September 29, 2022, Fact Finding Report..
- B. Consultant Richard D. McWhorter Jr.
Consultant R. Ferman Wardell:
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and Acceptance of the
November 9-10, 2022, Fact Finding Report.

XII DISCUSSION BY THE COMMITTEE, CONSULTANTS & COUNSEL

Review, Evaluation and Assessment of, and DCISC Periodic and Annual Reporting on, Matters Affected by Extended Operation Under the Mandate of SB 846 Including Seismic Safety, Maintenance and Capital Project Planning; and Review of Continued Planning for Decommissioning.

XIII STAFF & CONSULTANT REPORTS & RECEIVE, APPROVE AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E (Cont'd.)

- C. Consultant R. Ferman Wardell.:
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and Acceptance of
December 6-7, 2022, Fact Finding Report.

XIV ADJOURN AFTERNOON MEETING

Evening Session – 02/15/2023 – 5:15 P.M.

XV RECONVENE FOR EVENING MEETING

XVI COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

XVII PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

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XVIII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

- A. Informational Presentations Requested by the
Committee of PG&E:
 - 1) Update on Planning for Both Decommissioning and Extended Operations Including Plans for License Renewal.
 - 2) Plans for Reviewing, Approving and Implementing Capital Projects and Changes to Maintenance Programs Needed to Support Extended Operations.
 - 3) Status of Retention Programs, Attrition, and an Update on the Efforts to Retain Qualified Staff in Support of Extended Operations.

XIX ADJOURN EVENING MEETING

Morning Session – 02/16/2023 – 9:00 A.M.

XX RECONVENE FOR MORNING MEETING

XXI COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

XXII PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. The public may comment on any matter listed on the Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. *There will be a time limit for each speaker as designated by the presiding officer. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

XXIII ACCEPTANCE OF MINUTES

A. Minutes of September 28-29, 2022, Public Meeting.. Accept

XXIV STAFF REPORTS (Cont'd.)

D Assistant Legal Counsel Robert W. Rathie:
Administrative, Regulatory and Legal Matters.

XXV INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)

- B. Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee of PG&E:
- 4) Presentation on the State of the Plant: including Key Events, Outages, Highlights, Organizational Changes, Results of Refueling Outage 2R23, Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Piping Leak, and other Station Activities Since the DCISC's September 2022 Public Meeting.
 - 5) Update on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspections Reports and Notices of Violation, Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Open Compliance Issues, Current and Future License Amendment Requests, and other Significant Regulatory Issues/Requests.
 - 6) Results of the 2022 Operating Plan and Key Elements of the 2023 Operating Plan.

XXVI ADJOURN MORNING MEETING

Afternoon Session - 02/16/2023 - 1:15 P.M.

XXVII RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING

XXVIII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

XXIX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. The public may comment on any matter listed on the Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. *There will be a time limit for each speaker as designated by the presiding officer. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

XXX STAFF & CONSULTANT REPORTS & RECEIVE, APPROVE AND AUTHORIZE
TRANSMITTAL OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E (Cont'd.)

- E. Consultant Richard D. McWhorter Jr.
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and Acceptance of.
January 31-February 1, 2023, Fact Finding Report.

XXXI INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)

- C. Informational Presentations Requested by the
Committee of PG&E:
- 7) Spent Fuel Management Update.

XXXII CONCLUDING REMARKS & DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
OF FUTURE DCISC ACTIVITIES

- A. Future Actions by the Committee.
- B. Further Information to Obtain/Review.
- C. Confirmation of Future Site Visits, and Public Meetings.

XXXIII ADJOURNMENT OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTH PUBLIC MEETING

The DCISC's policy is to schedule its public meetings in locations that are accessible to people with disabilities and to remain in compliance with state guidelines on COVID-19 prevention. The Avila Lighthouse Suites Point San Luis Conference Room is a wheelchair accessible facility. A person who needs a disability-related accommodation or modification in order to participate in the meeting may make a request by contacting the DCISC office (in CA 800-439-4688 or (831) 647-1044) or by sending a written request to the DCISC office at P.O. Box 4523, Carmel-by-the-Sea, CA 93921-4523. Providing your request at least five business days before the meeting will help ensure availability of the requested accommodation.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:	February 15, 2023
AGENDA ITEM:	IV-A
AGENDA TITLE:	DCISC Receipt of PG&E's Response to its Thirty-Second Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; July 1, 2021 - June 30, 2022.

CONSENT ☐ ACCEPTANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐

The Restated Charter for the DCISC approved by the California Public Utilities Commission in Decision 07-01-028 provides: *"The Committee shall prepare an annual report and such interim reports as it deems appropriate, which reports shall include any recommendations of the Committee. The report shall be submitted first to PG&E, and PG&E shall respond in writing within 45 days. PG&E's response is then included with the Annual Report."*

Public Utilities Code §712.1, enacted on September 2, 2022, by Senate Bill 846 provides: *"(e) In addition to the duties and responsibilities set forth in commission decisions, the Independent Safety Committee for Diablo Canyon shall to both of the following:*

(1) Consult with and incorporate into its assessments and recommendations the independent peer review panel established pursuant to Section 712.

(2) Transmit annually its findings and recommendations for improved safety to the Legislature, the Governor, the commission, the Energy Commission, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the company licensed to operate the Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2. The report transmitted to the Legislature shall be in accordance with Section 9795 of the Government Code.

(f) The company licensed to operate the Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 shall annually respond to the annual report provided for in paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) and distribute its response to the governmental entities specified in that paragraph."

The Committee made no recommendation in its Thirty-Second Annual Report for the period July 1, 2021– June 30, 2022.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION:

Motion to accept PG&E's Response to the DCISC's Thirty-Second Annual Report.



**Pacific Gas and
Electric Company**

Paula Gerfen
Senior Vice President &
Chief Nuclear Officer

Diablo Canyon Power Plant
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Avila Beach, CA 93424

805.545.4596
E-Mail:
Paula.Gerfen@pge.com

December 08, 2022

PG&E Letter ISC-22-001

Dr. Peter Lam
c/o The Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee
857 Cass Street, Suite D
Monterey, CA 93940

Response to the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Second
Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations - July 1, 2021
to June 30, 2022

Dear Dr. Lam:

On November 22, 2022, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) received the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee's (DCISC) Thirty-Second Annual Report on the safety of Diablo Canyon operations for the period of July 1, 2021 to June 30, 2022.

Your report concludes that PG&E continues to operate Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) safely and has no recommendations for PG&E during this report period.

As you are aware, operating the plant conservatively to protect public health and safety is our highest priority, and we will continue to ensure that we fulfill this commitment.

We welcome DCISC's independent review and oversight, which contributes to the continued safe operation of DCPP.

Sincerely,

Paula Gerfen
Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer

Dr. Peter Lam
December 08, 2022
Page 2

PG&E Letter ISC-22-001

cc/ Dr. Robert Budnitz
Dr. Per F. Peterson
Richard McWhorter
Robert W. Rathie
Ferman Wardell
Robert R. Wellington
Blair Jones

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:	February 15, 2023
AGENDA ITEM:	IV-B
AGENDA TITLE:	Update on Financial Matters, DCISC Activities and Funding for Cost of Augmented Activities During 2023 Pursuant to CA Senate Bill 846

CONSENT [☐] ACTION [☐] INFORMATION [☒]

Staff Summary: It is expected that the Committee Members will hold a discussion regarding Committee financial matters and DCISC planned activities during 2023. The Committee will also consider funding the cost of augmented activities during 2023 pursuant to the responsibilities placed upon the Committee by the passage in September 2022 of Senate Bill 846 by the California Legislature.

The Actual and Proposed DCISC Fact-Finding and Public Meeting Items, with Key Dates, prepared by Committee Consultant Ferman Wardell is provided for your use in reviewing and planning Committee activities.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate

DCISC Fact-Finding and Public Meeting Agenda Items for 2022-2023

July 20-21, 2022 Fact-finding Meeting (PL, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.1)

1. Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee Exit Meeting (Remote)
2. Observe Plant Health Committee Meeting (Remote)
3. Annual Radioactive Effluent Release and Radiological Environmental Operating Reports
4. Health of 4kV Electrical Systems and Tour
5. Containment Ventilation and Hydrogen Mitigation Systems
6. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector
7. Performance Improvement Program
8. Containment Liner Inspections
9. Radiation Monitoring Systems
10. Meet with DCPD Officer
11. Access to Technical Information for the New Spent Fuel Storage System
12. Industry Efforts to Evaluate the Radiological Consequences of a Release of Radionuclides from a Spent Fuel Storage Cask
13. Response to State Government Interest in Extending Power Operations Beyond 2025

August 16-17, 2022 Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.2)

1. Greater Than Class C Waste Storage Plans
2. License Renewal Status
3. Emergency Preparedness During Decommissioning
4. Feedwater Heater Tube Failure Follow-up
5. Tsunami Warning Response
6. Meet with NRC Senior Resident Inspector
7. NRC Resident Inspectors Access to PG&E Computer System
8. Observe Plant Health Committee Meeting
9. Equipment Reliability Update
10. Condensate Polisher Resin Issue
11. Meet with DCPD Officer
12. Large Motors Program
13. Radiation Surveys of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
14. Observe Receipt and Inspection of New Fuel

September 13-14, 2022 Fact-finding Meeting (RJB, RFW) [EP Exercise] (AR Exhibit D.3)

1. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Program Review
2. Safety Culture Update
3. Observe All Hands Meeting with PG&E Chief Executive Officer and Board of Directors
4. 2R23 Outage Safety Plan
5. Long-Term Seismic Program Update
6. Core Exit Thermocouple System Update
7. Cyber Security Update
8. Meet with Adam Peck, Site Vice-President
9. DCPD License Extension Update
10. Observe Evaluated Emergency Preparedness Exercise

September 28-29, 2022 Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.3)

1. Consider Dr. Andrew Kadak as a Technical Consultant
2. Consider Approval of the DCISC 32nd Annual Report
3. Review Open Items List
4. Acceptance of Minutes of June 22-23, 2022 Public Meeting
5. Future Fact-finding and Public Meetings
6. Reports by Technical Consultants on Three Fact-finding Meeting Reports
7. State of the Plant
8. Preparations for Refueling Outage 2R23
9. Potential Extended DCPD Operation
10. Remarks by the NRC Senior Resident Inspector
11. Update on DCPD Decommissioning Plans
12. Procurement of a New DCPD Spent Fuel Storage System
13. Emergency Preparedness September 14, 2022 Evaluated Exercise

September 29, 2022 Fact-finding Meeting (RJB, RDM, RFW, ACK) (AR Exhibit D.4)

1. Decommissioning Planning and Funding
2. Planning for Spent Fuel Storage
3. ISFSI Tour

November 9-10, 2022 Fact-finding Meeting (RJB, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.5)

1. Independent Peer Review Panel Meeting on October 26, 2022
2. Meet with San Luis Obispo County Emergency Services Director
3. License Renewal
4. Comprehensive Review of the Seismic Safety Program
5. Emergency Diesel Generators
6. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector
7. Plant Tour
8. Operations Department
9. Meetings with DCPD Officers
10. Technical Review of New Spent Fuel Storage System
11. Tour of Orano TN Fabrication Facility in Kernersville, NC, on November 9, 2022
12. Tour of Orano TN Training Facility in Aiken, SC, on November 10, 2022

December 6-7, 2022 Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.6)

1. Meet with NRC Resident Inspector and NRC PI&R Inspection Team
2. Outage 2R23 Results
3. Troubleshooting Program Update
4. Revised Capital Plan
5. Nuclear Fuel Performance and Plans
6. Plant Staffing Planning
7. Safety-Security Interface Update
8. License Extension Update
9. Observe Plant Health Committee

10. Meet with Site Vice-President, Adam Peck, and Industry Benchmark Results
11. Equipment Qualification Program Update
12. Transmission System Health Update
13. Sea Water Reverse Osmosis (Desalination) Plant Tour

January 31 – February 1, 2023 Fact-finding Meeting (PL, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.7)

1. SB846 Requirements Regarding Deferred Maintenance
2. Plans for Reviewing and Restarting Capital Projects
3. Meet with NRC Senior Resident Inspector
4. Engineering Department
5. Technical Review of New Spent Fuel Storage System
6. Auxiliary Saltwater System
7. Turbine and Generator
8. Cyber Security Update
9. FLEX Program Capabilities During a Seismic Event
10. Plant Tour
11. Plant Health Committee
12. Meetings with DCPD Officers
13. Licensee Event Report Review
14. SB846 Requirements Regarding an Updated Seismic Assessment
15. Self-Assessment Program
16. Motor Operated Valve Program

February 15-16, 2023 Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.6)

1. Receive and Accept PG&E's Response to DCISC 32nd Annual Report
2. DCISC Financial Matters
3. Discussion of Open Items List
4. Future Fact-finding and Public Meetings
5. Reports by Technical Consultants on Four Fact-finding Meeting Reports
6. Manager of the San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services
7. DCISC Reporting & Matters Affected by SB-846
8. Update on Planning for Both Decommissioning and Extended Operations, Including Plans for License Renewal
9. Plans for Reviewing, Approving, and Implementing Capital Projects and Changes to Maintenance Programs Needed to Support Extended Operations
10. Status of Retention Programs, Attrition, and an Update on the Efforts to Retain Qualified Staff in Support of Extended Operations
11. Plans for Spent Fuel Management in Support of Extended Operations and a Brief Update on the Status of the Orano System Procurement

March 14-15, 2023 Fact-finding Meeting (RJB, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.8)

April 19-20, 2023 Fact-finding Meeting (PL, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.9)

May 2-3, 2023 Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.10)

June 21-22, 2023 Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.9)

July 26-27, 2023 Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.1)

August 9-10, 2023 Fact-finding Meeting (PL, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.2)

August 30-31, 2023 Fact-finding Meeting (RJB, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.3)

September 13-14, 2023 Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.3)

November 14-15, 2023 Fact-finding Meeting (RJB, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.4)

December 6-7, 2023 Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.5)

January 24-25, 2024 Fact-finding Meeting (PL, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.6)

February 21-22, 2024 Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.6)

DCPP 2022 Key Dates

NSOC Meetings (DCISC invited only to the 2-hour exit meeting on the final days, which are shown below)

- February 23, 2023
- July 13, 2023
- November 30, 2023

Refueling Outages

1R24 October 1-26, 2023

2R24 TBD (Spring 2024)

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:	February 15, 2023
AGENDA ITEM:	IV-C
AGENDA TITLE:	Review and Discussion of Open Items List.

CONSENT [] ACTION [X] INFORMATION [X]

Staff Summary: It is anticipated that the committee will hold discussion concerning the items appearing on its Open Items List prepared by Committee Technical Consultant Ferman Wardell.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate, review and provide direction.

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Open Items List – 2022-2023

Open Item Type: M= Monitor F = Follow-up I = Issue Items in *Red Italics* are new or revised
Items in **Yellow** are for the next 3 FF Meetings

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
CO		Conduct of Operations (CO)		
CO-7	M	Review DCCP storm response experience and strategy every two years [or as necessary] during or after annual winter storm season.	5/17FF 3/21FF	As necessary
CO-8	M	Monitor all reactor trips – automatic and manual – and forced outages. (review trip LERs at public meetings).	11/21FF 2/22PM	Post-trip FFs & PMs
CO-9	F	Reactivity Management – review every 18-24 months. [Reviewed Reactivity Management 5/16FF, 4/18FF, and 11/19FF – satisfactory.]	List at end of OIL	Regularly <i>2Q23FF</i>
CO-10	M	Mispositioning Errors (Equipment Status) – monitor the status of mispositioning errors and actions to resolve.	12/20FF 12/21FF	2Q23FF
CO-11	M	Operator concerns and issues – review periodically the status of operator concerns and issues. Follow up on operator staffing for continued operation.	5/21FF <i>11/22FF</i>	<i>2/23PM</i>
CO-13	M	Review any initiatives to operate DCCP in different modes, such as load following due to renewable energy fluctuations, during its final years of operation. Include 230kV voltage stability issues. Dr. Peterson observed there is potential that an increase in the risk of transmission problems or outages might affect the availability of alternate off site power sources for DCCP due to increasing incentives to curtail power output because of production or grid-related reasons. Mr. Peck and Dr. Peterson agreed this might be a suitable topic for a future DCISC fact-finding which should include representatives from the PG&E transmission organization.	12/19FF 12/21FF	As necessary
CO-14	F	The DCISC team found the operator retention project to be effectively managed but the Committee should follow this issue closely with reference to licensed operators and well as the station in general. Review operator staffing.	2/22PM <i>11/22FF</i>	<i>2/23PM</i>
CM		Conduct of Maintenance (CM)		
CM-7	I	Review PG&E's progress in complying with (1) the amendment to 10CFR50.55a, which provides the requirements for ISI of containment structures (degradation) and (2) ASME Code requirements for steel liner weld inspections.	5/22FF 7/22FF	Each Pair of RFOs

CM-10	M	On-line Maintenance: review the implementation of on-line maintenance bi-annually, including the 12-week Rolling Maintenance Schedule about how well it is working & impacting risk. Review trend of amount of on-line maintenance. DCPD Assessment of Maintenance Risk and On-Line Maintenance Risk Procedures have been substantially upgraded with the addition of an Integrated Risk Review Team.	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
CM-13	M	Review Maintenance Department performance measures, staffing, etc. approximately annually.	3/21FF 5/22FF	2Q23FF
EN		Engineering Programs (EN)		
EN-16	F	DCPD Systems – review a system (or structure or component), system health, long-term plan, Maintenance Rule performance & walkdown with System Engineer at FFs. [Note: Systems reviewed are listed with dates at the end of this Open Items List.]	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
EN-19	F	Review every 12-18 months major Engineering Programs, including Configuration Management, Management, System Engineering (system health & long-term plans), Valve Testing, Margin Management, Staffing, etc. [Note: Programs reviewed are listed with dates at the end of this Open Items List.] Review Engineering reorganization 1Q23FF.	See list at end of OIL	Regularly 1Q23FF
EN-20	F	Each Member should review or observe Plant Health Committee, Notification Review Team, Corrective Action Review Board, Performance Review Quarterly Meeting, and other regular meetings.	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
HP		Human Performance: Human Errors and Improving Safety & Efficiency of Plant Performance		
HP-1	M	Review human performance & human behavior items (including error reduction programs, HP Pls, aberrant behavior statistics, FFD, stress reduction programs, Personnel Accountability Policy, Human Performance Steering Committee & Subcomm, Centers of Excellence, Org. Development). [Review biennially operator aging, physical fitness, “no solo” issues, attention enhancement, stress management, & incentives for operator focus. Further observations and improvements in the Management Observation Program should be reviewed by DCISC. <i>[Reviewed 4/19FF – satisfactory]</i>	3/20FF 12/20FF 4/21FF 4/22FF	4/23FF
HP-25	M	Health, Nuclear Safety and Safety Conscious Work Environment	4/19FF 7/21FF	1 or 2Q23FF
HS		Health, Nuclear Safety and Safety Conscious Work Environment		
HS-6	F	Follow DCPD progress in establishing/improving its safety culture (and its subset Safety Conscious Work Environment, including Safety Culture Monitoring Panel, and including Employee Concerns & Differing Professional Opinion Programs).	8/21FF 10/21PM 9/22FF	3Q23FF
PI		Performance Improvement Programs		
PI-1		DCPD Performance Improvement Programs: Corrective Action, Self-Assessment, Operating Experience, Benchmarking, etc. Programs reviewed are listed with dates at the end of the Open Items List.	See list at end of OIL	At least once per year 3Q23FF
EP		Emergency Preparedness (EP)		
EP-2	M	Attend and observe DCPD emergency drills and exercises annually [including Hostile Action Based Exercises], paying special attention to JIC communications to the media and public, including radiation release communications to the public, use of social media, coordination of information release with SLO County, and extension of drills to better exercise FMTs & JMC. [Next evaluated exercise 9/14/22.] Talk with new SLO County OES Director 9/22FF.	11/18FF 9/21FF 10/21PM 3/22FF 9/22FF	Next evaluated exercise (9/23 full scope)
RA		Risk Assessment and Management (RA)		

RA-5	M	Review overall [non-seismic] PRA program annually. Include Fire PRA Upgrade & Shutdown Analysis in next review. Much work underway (including plant specific shutdown risk analysis). Review PRA Group resources/capabilities. Turbine Bldg. (CCW & Condenser) internal flooding. Include external flooding and tsunami risk (see SC-6).	9/20FF 9/21FF 9/22FF	3or4Q23 FF RJB
RA-6	F	Review DCCP response to NRC re: 10CFR50.59 risk-informed rule changes. Review in FF.	2/22PM	2Q23FF
NS		Nuclear Safety Oversight and Review (NS)		
NS-5	M	Monitor NSOC meetings periodically to observe their processes and their review of nuclear safety issues.	7/21FF 7/22FF	Next meeting [see FFPM]
NS-9	M	Monitor DCCP's program to track <i>industry benchmark</i> Areas for Improvement. Review with DCCP Coordinator. Review DCCP August 2022 <i>industry benchmark</i> evaluation.	1/21FF 8/21FF <i>12/22FF</i>	<i>4Q23FF</i>
RP		Radiation Protection (RP)		
RP-3	M	Regularly review outage RP performance.	4/22FF 5/22FF <i>12/22FF</i>	Each RFO
RP-12	M	Review annual DCCP radioactivity release report each year. Review at Summer or Fall FFs.	7/21FF 7/22FF	3Q23FF
QP		Quality Programs (QP)		
QP-3	M	Review the activities, organization and results of QV audits as well as PG&E's outside biennial audits, including timeliness of corrective actions. Review annually – include 4 th quarter QPAR with yearly results.	3/21FF 5/21FF 3/22FF	2Q23FF
QP-9	F	Software QA Program	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
NF		Nuclear Fuel Performance (NF)		
NF-9	M	Nuclear Fuel Performance & Issues (review after RFOs). Observed new fuel receipt and inspection 8/22FF.	5/22FF 8/22FF <i>12/22FF</i>	Each RFO
ER		Equipment Reliability and Life Cycle Management (ER)		
ER-5	M	Monitor the Equipment Reliability Process approximately annually. The indicators for Deficient Critical Components Backlog and Operational Work-arounds rated as needing improvement and the DCISC should continue its review of this item in the future.	See list at end of OIL	Annually 3Q23FF
OE		Organizational Effectiveness & Development (OE)		
OE-1	F	Review DCCP Operating Plan each January after development.	3/21FF 2/22PM	2/23PM
OE-2	F	Station Excellence Plan & Station Oversight Committee (4 th Thursday of every month at 9:00am. Try to attend a meeting remotely following, but as part of, a future fact-finding meeting.)	10/21PM 7/22FF	<i>1Q23FF</i>
SE		System and Equipment Performance/Problems (SE)		

February 15-16, 2023 Public Meeting
Third Draft 2/2/23

FF = Fact-finding Meeting PM = Public Meeting Q = Quarter

SE-39	F	Review and tour the inspections and repairs of concrete Intake Structures following selected refueling outages.	12/19FF 8/21FF	Next RFO
SE-40	F	Monitor the status of transformers & leakage, failures, corrective actions. Follow status of transformer protection barrier. [Barrier project placed on hold.]	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
SE-49	F	Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
SE-50	F	Maintenance Rule Functional Failures [Change from SSFFs to MRFFs beginning 3/21FF.]	11/22FF	
OM		Outage Management (OM)		
OM-3	M	During outages, monitor Outage Coordination Center, Control Room, and containment walkdown/inspection (end of outage). Review outage turbine work. Review Steam Generator performance metrics and inspection results.	5/22FF 11/22FF	Each RFO
OM-4	M	Review Outage Safety Plan, safety margin trends, outage results, including clearances, following each outage at FFs and PMs.	5/22FF 9/22FF	Each RFO
OM-5	F	DCPP has determined that it needs to do a better job of foreign material exclusion (FME) and this resolution appeared satisfactory to the DCISC team. [Note: FME Program review dates at the end of the Open Items List.] [Reviewed 4/19FF – need to follow up on supplemental outage worked training]	See list at end of OIL 12/22FF	Each RFO
OM-6	F	<i>Monitor Changes in 1R24/2R24 Outage Scopes Needed to Support Extended Operations</i>	2/23PM 2Q23FF	
SEC		Security (SEC)		
SEC-3	M	Monitor interaction of Security and Operations, Engineering, Maintenance, and Emergency Preparedness for effects on nuclear safety. Plant security per se not reviewed but reviewed only in the context of impact on plant operation.	12/19FF 12/20FF 12/22FF	
SEC-4	M	Review status of DCCP cyber security (but not physical security) program in compliance with NRC requirements.	9/21FF 10/21PM 9/22FF	3Q23FF
SF		Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation – ISFSI (SF)		
SF-1	F	Monitor ISFSI operations, including the development of new procedures by Orano for the loading of new Dry Storage Canisters (DSCs), movement of DSCs from SFP to ISFSI, and loading of DSCs into new Horizontal Storage Module (HSM).	10/20PM 5/21FF	2Q23FF

SF-2	M	Follow technical advances of relative risks of existing (Holtec) casks and pool storage. Follow relicensing of ISFSI including seismic adequacy reviews and the implementation of aging management plans.	3/22FF 5/22FF 6/22PM	2Q23FF
SF-4	F	Review the adequacy of the design for new (Orano) spent fuel storage system focusing on items of safety significance including seismic adequacy, criticality control, storage of damaged fuel, thermal analyses, effects of extreme environmental conditions, long-term (>100 years) integrity assurance, radiation/neutron shielding, and accident analyses.	6/22PM 11/22FF 1/23FF	2/23PM 4Q23FF
SF-5	F	Monitor the submittal and approval of license amendment(s) for the Orano spent fuel storage system.	6/22PM	2Q23FF
SF-6	M	Dr. Budnitz remarked the DCISC should include an item on the Open Items List to review the inspection of the ISFSI systems, structures and components following a seismic event which should be a part of the aging management plan or the FSAR.	6/22PM	Close
SF-7	M	Monitor Plans for Storage of Greater than Class C Waste		
SC	M	Seismic, Tsunami and Other External Events		
SC-3	M	Long-Term Seismic Program: review periodically. Review significant seismic events as they occur. (See also EO-8.)	9/22FF 11/22FF	4Q23FF
SC-12	F	Workplace seismic safety – review annually. [Reviewed at 5/18FF – some problems – follow up on resolution and Control Room procedures “crash cart” stability. Discrepancies in workplace seismic standards (e.g., unbraced furniture) were caused by inadequate knowledge transfer during Building Services personnel turnovers, although the plant had a written standard. Control Room procedure card reviewed 12/20FF – satisfactory.]	12/20FF 4/22FF	5/23FF PFP
SC-14	M	<i>Monitor the Work of the Independent Peer Review Panel</i>	11/22FF	Regularly
FP		Fire Protection (FP)		
FP-5	M	Review NFPA-805-based Fire Protection Program and Systems every two-three years, including QV audits and NRC triennial inspections. Review the health and correction of degraded systems every six months. Monitor fire doors (Plant Door Life Cycle Management Plan) for correction of impairments [Fire doors Reviewed 1/22FF - satisfactory.]	5/21FF 1/22FF See list at end of OIL	Regularly 2Q23FF
LD		Learning & Development Programs (LD)		
LD-3	M	Review <u>non</u> -license technical, operations & accredited training programs at least annually.	1/21FF 5/22FF	3Q23FF
LD-6	F	Observe operator license, re-qualification, classes periodically in FF meetings. [Reviewed licensed operator simulator training 11/21FF & 12/21FF – satisfactory.]	11/21FF 12/21FF	2Q23FF
NR		Nuclear Regulatory Commission Items (NR)		
NR-3	M	Monitor the Non-Cited Violation Tracking & Trending Program annually at the Jan/Feb Public Meetings.	3/year	Each PM
NR-4	F	Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors regularly.	Most FFs	Regularly
DEC	F	Decommissioning		

DEC-1	F	Review DCPD decommissioning plans periodically as a result of the Joint Proposal plant shutdown in 2025. Review the timing of spent fuel transfer from wet to dry storage and when the spent fuel pools are decommissioned the plant will lose the capability to open multipurpose canisters for inspection. DCISC should actively review the decommissioning plans for DCPD because of the potential impact on staffing and future options with respect to managing spent fuel.	3/22FF 10/22PM	2/23PM 3Q23FF
DEC-4	F	Emergency preparedness during decommissioning. [Met with SLO OES 9/18FF – satisfactory there was concern by SLO County that their monies from PG&E would be reduced after operation ceases.]	11/22FF	2/23PM
DEC-5	F	DCPD's approach to submitting LAR requests for decommissioning appears appropriate and the DCISC should continue to follow from a safety perspective all the regulatory activities which will define the reduction in requirements which will occur at shutdown.	9/22FF 9/22PM	3Q23FF
EO		Extended Operations (EO)		
EO-1	M	Monitor the Purchasing of New Fuel	12/22FF	4Q23FF
EO-2	M	Monitor the Procurement of New Spent Fuel Canisters to Support Extended Operations and Changes to the Schedule for Fuel Movement from SFP to ISFSI	1/23FF 2/23PM	3Q23FF
EO-3	M	Monitor the State and Local Permitting Process	-	3Q23FF
EO-4	M	Monitor the NRC License Renewal Application and Review Process	11/22FF	2/23PM
EO-5	M	Monitor Staffing for Extended Operations	11/22FF 12/22FF	2/23PM
EO-6	M	Monitor Reviews of Preventative Maintenance Schedules and Deferred Capital Improvement Projects	12/22FF 1/23FF	2/23PM 2Q23FF
EO-7	F	Independently Look for Needed Improvements and Enhancements (Use PRA to Guide)	-	3/23FF
EO-8	F	Independently Review Seismic Programs; Report Results to IPRP and State Authorities	11/22FF	2Q23FF
O		Other Items (O)		
O-1	F	Perform observations of evolutions (work processes) within the plant periodically. Continue with these about annually. Work process observations: Observe in the plant work processes important to nuclear safety, such as operator rounds, Control Room shift turnover, surveillance tests, preventive and corrective maintenance, system modifications, system walk downs with system engineers; outage activities, etc.	3/22FF 11/22FF	Regularly
O-2	F	COVID-19 response/initiatives/practices.	9/21FF 1/22FF	Close
10/21 PM 3	F	Public Meeting Items (PM) (Reference: Public Meeting Minutes Pages) Mr. McWhorter stated that for the February 2023 public meeting, with the assistance of Consultant Wardell and Mr. Rathie, the Draft Post-Shutdown Matrix prepared previously and now available to the public on the Committee's website will be revised and the Open Items List reviewed in order to inform a discussion at the DCISC's next public meeting on February 15-16, 2023, which may include the periodicity of public meetings and fact-findings. [All decommissioning and extended operations items now incorporated into OIL.]	10/21PM 2/22PM Close	2/23PM Then Close
2/22 PM 4	F	He (Mr. McWhorter) reported the FFT concluded the Transmission System was in good health with minor problems being tracked for resolution and he recommended the DCISC next monitor the Transmission System one year from the December 2021 fact-finding.	2/22PM 12/22FF Close	Close to EN-16

5	F	Consultant Wardell responded that all the high voltage breakers in the 500kV and 230kV switchyards will have their own DC control power systems and he concurred with Dr. Budnitz' observation that these will not be part of the plant's DC system and Mr. Wardell suggested those DC control power systems should be included in the list of topics for the March 2022 fact finding. (March 2022 FF reviewed other Transmission issues.)	2/22PM 3/22FF	2Q23FF
21	F	Dr. Budnitz stated use of the NEI guidance [on Operability Determinations] is voluntary but DCCPP together with many other stations has adopted the NEI's guidance as a framework for completing operability determinations and Dr. Budnitz reported that probabilistic risk assessment results and insights are used to guide the importance and priority of different components which represents a new development in the industry. Dr. Budnitz recommended the DCISC conduct a future fact-finding to assess the efficacy of the use of the NEI guidance by DCCPP.	2/22PM	3/23FF RJB?
6/22 PM 12	F	Mr. McWhorter suggested the Committee should review the Engineering organization and the changes described by Mr. Waltons during the first quarter of 2023.	6/22PM 1/23FF <i>Close</i>	<i>Close to EN-19</i>
13	F	Mr. Jones stated he would need to check and get back to the Committee on how the Orano licensing approach may affect DCCPP's 10 CFR Part 50 license.	6/22PM	Awaiting DCCPP
14	F	Mr. Jones committed to provide the difference in time between 23 months and the time which would be required under an unmodified general license and commented that the number would be somewhere between 23 and 48 months.	6/22PM	Awaiting DCCPP
9/22 PM 1	F	<i>Dr. Budnitz remarked it is difficult to project the cost for the additional scope of review, to include the safety of the Orano spent fuel system, the potential license extension and the review of decommissioning and he suggested these matters and the format for a request of the CPUC for additional funding would be properly before the Committee at its public meeting in February 2023. He suggested and Dr. Peterson agreed that the Legal Counsel's Office should open an inquiry with the CPUC staff concerning the format for a request for additional funding and to develop a possible projection for the cost of Committee operation in 2023. Mr. Wardell volunteered to assist the Counsel's office with an estimate for Committee operations during 2023.</i>	9/22PM	2/23PM
2	F	<i>Dr. Budnitz remarked that when the DCISC reviews the Performance improvement Department in the future inquiry should be made concerning whether the scope has changed in light of continued operation after 2025.</i>	9/22PM	Future FFs
3	F	<i>The Engineering organization has been directed by the PHC to develop an excellence plan for the Radiation Monitoring System by late 2022 and the FFT recommends the DCISC follow up on the system and review the excellence plan developed to deal with reliability issues and to ensure continued problems are resolved. [Review along with DCISC review of license extension projects and maintenance.]</i>	9/22PM	1Q23FF
4	F	<i>Mr. McWhorter reported the EPRI study [Radiological Consequences of a Release of Radionuclides from a Spent Fuel Storage Cask] has not yet finished although some supporting studies have been concluded regarding source term and what flow rate should be estimated for use in the study. He reported EPRI plans to issue its study in early spring of 2023 and the DCISC should review it at that time.</i>	9/22PM	2Q23FF
5	F	<i>In response to Mr. McWhorter's comment Mr. Prentice agreed to highlight any cross-cutting aspects for which a current entry exists on the next list provided for DCISC review.</i>	9/22PM	2/23PM
6	F	<i>For Unit 2 Mr. Wardell reported the same inspection [feedwater heater tubes] will be performed during the upcoming outage and he recommended the DCISC review the results of that inspection following the outage.</i>	9/22PM	1Q23FF

7	F	In response to Consultant Kadak's inquiry Mr. Wardell reported the DCISC FFT did not ascertain when the watertight integrity or the seals of the Intake Structure rooms which contain the auxiliary saltwater pumps were inspected and the DCISC agreed to follow up on this inquiry.	9/22PM	1Q23FF
8	F	He [Mr. Wardell] reported DCCP has implemented a 2022 Equipment Reliability Excellence Plan and the FFT found the actions by DCCP to be appropriate and recommended the DCISC review equipment reliability again in six months.	9/22PM	2Q23FF
9	F	Due to the approval of the Joint Proposal the Large Motors Program's plans for replacements and overhaul of certain large motors was partially suspended and with the plan to extend operation Mr. Wardell stated the Large Motor Program will need to be reviewed and fully reactivated and the DCISC should review and monitor this effort. [Review along with DCISC review of license extension projects and maintenance.]	9/22PM	1Q23FF Close to EO-6
10	F	Mr. Wardell recalled that when DCCP was preparing for the original license extension application, all the feedwater heaters were planned for replacement for twenty years of operation but with the Joint Proposal it was determined the plant could operate satisfactorily to 2025 without replacing the feedwater heaters and he observed the lead time to obtain new feedwater heaters is lengthy, likely taking years. He observed this is an issue on which the plant will make a decision and the Committee will conduct a review. [Review along with DCISC review of license extension projects and maintenance.]	9/22PM	1Q23FF Close to EO-6
11	F	Dr. Budnitz reported the Long-Term Seismic Program also analyzes and assesses the seismic capacity of every piece of equipment and every plant structure and the DCISC will conduct a review of those efforts in the future.	9/22PM	Close to SC-3 & EO-8
12	F	Dr. Peterson stated the DCISC should review plans for maintenance or upgrades to the digital systems including for the Reactor Protection System. [Review along with DCISC review of license extension projects and maintenance.]	9/22PM	1Q23FF Close to EO-6
13	F	The FFT did not observe the critiques which followed the exercise and the DCISC will review the report of the critiques and the NRC evaluation when they are approved.	9/22PM	1Q23FF
14	F	Dr. Budnitz suggested context will need to be developed and a list [of extended operations projects] will need to be compiled for items to review and PG&E's list will be reviewed by the DCISC and a dialogue opened with the plant and the public. In completing its work the Committee will identify items for review and conduct fact-finding, review documents and, likely concerning certain issues, consult within the nuclear industry.	9/22PM	1Q23FF Close to EO-6
15	F	Dr. Peterson concurred with Dr. Budnitz remarks and the focus on the Open Items List as a vehicle for undertaking the work under SB 846, but with the added context of needing to identify additional things that the Committee will need to check and review for example concerning the resumption of certain capital projects.	9/22PM	2/23PM Close to EO-6 thru EO-8
16	F	Ms. Seeley stated DCCP was scheduled to conduct testing of a coupon from the reactor vessel to assess the extent of embrittlement of the Unit 1 vessel in March 2021 or 2022, but that test did not take place. She inquired if the DCISC were following up on the matter and whether the public could get answers about the embrittlement issue for Unit 1 which she stated PG&E claims as proprietary information. Dr. Peterson replied that the issue raised by Ms. Seeley is one the Committee should review in context of continued operation as it represents a key aging management question and a central part of the license extension review.	9/22PM	1Q23FF

17	F	Dr. Budnitz observed there is an interaction between decommissioning and extended operation which the DCISC will need to review to ensure a compromise to safety does not result. [Review along with DCISC review of license extension projects and maintenance.]	9/22PM	1Q23FF Close to EO-6
18	F	Drs. Peterson and Budnitz commented the key issue with the Eagle 21 System is obsolescence, not in the sense that it is wearing out but in consideration that at this time DCPD is able to secure replacement parts for the system, but the DCISC will be reviewing the Eagle 21 System in context of extended operation of DCPD. [Review along with DCISC review of license extension projects and maintenance.]	9/22PM	1Q23FF
19	F	Dr. Peterson stated his current thinking is the Committee should plan and prepare for the contingency of twenty-year license extensions and provide its input to state agencies, but the DCISC should not express any opinion as to the policy decisions implicit in this issue. [Review along with DCISC review of license extension projects and maintenance.]	9/22PM	1Q23FF
20	F	In response to Dr. Peterson query Mr. Hayes stated he would review the data and report during a Committee fact-finding visit the number of nuclear plants that like DCPD are in the Licensee Response column of the Action Matrix.	9/22PM	Awaiting DCPD
21	F	Dr. Budnitz remarked that the requirement to prepare simultaneously for both decommissioning and extended operation creates a burden on the plant's Training Organization to ensure both reactor operators and certified fuel handlers are available, and this will be an area the DCISC will need to review.	9/22PM	1Q23FF
22	F	In response to Dr. Kadak's inquiry Mr. Soenen replied the horizontally stored casks are subjected to stress analysis and each cask is bolted, with shield plugs in place, such that seismic modeling with reference to the effect of shaking has demonstrated the casks would remain within the storage modules and not be ejected in a seismic event. Dr. Budnitz commented this question was raised during a meeting of the Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel and on behalf of the DCISC Dr. Budnitz made the commitment that the Committee would review the completed final analyses of this issue and provide the Committee's independent evaluation. Mr. Soenen confirmed information required by the Committee in this effort would be made available.	9/22PM 11/22FF 1/23FF	2/23PM Close
23	F	Dr. Peterson remarked a recent Tesla battery fire at a facility in Moss Landing, California, resulted in an actual emergency situation and response which included closure of a state highway and he inquired whether there were lessons to be learned from this event. Mr. _____ stated the evacuation was conducted by the County of Monterey and the systems and plans in place did respond as designed and a total of six individuals were impacted by that event. Mr. Warwick stated the corporate emergency organization is continuing to investigate that incident. Dr. Peterson stated the DCISC should review the Moss landing battery fire incident during a future fact-finding concerning any lessons learned from that experience.	9/22PM	1Q23FF
24	F	Dr. Budnitz remarked SB 846 also explicitly requires one of the other state agencies to complete a separate seismic evaluation which the DCISC should review.	9/22PM 1/23FF	1or2Q23 VFF

DCPP Systems/Components Reviewed Periodically [Yellow = Upcoming FF]

4 kV – July 2022
 230 kV & 500 kV – Dec 2022
 Aux Feedwater – Sep 2021
 Aux Saltwater – Jan 2023
 Aux Bldg Ventilation – Apr 2021
 Chemical & Volume Control System and High Pressure Injection – Jan 2021
 Component Cooling Water – Apr 2020
 Compressed Air – Jul 2020
 Condensate & Feedwater – Nov 2021
 Containment Structure – July 2022
 Containment Spray – May 2022
 Containment Ventilation and H₂ Purge – July 2022
 Control Room Simulator – Nov 2020
 Control Room Ventilation – Jan 2021
 Digital Systems – Nov 2021
 DC Power – Mar 2022
 EDG – Nov 2022
 Fire Protection & Detection Systems – Aug 2020
 Nuclear Instrumentation & In-core Instrumentation – Sep 2022
 Plant Protection System – Mar 2021
 Radiation Monitoring – July 2022
 Radwaste Processing – Nov 2020
 Reactor Coolant System & Pumps – Aug 2021
 RCS Process Control System – May 2020
 Refueling Equipment – Jan 2022
 RHR – Jan 2021
 Rod Control & Indication – Sep 2020
 Safety Injection Pumps – Jan 2021
 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling & HVAC – July 2021
 Steam Generators – Aug 2020
 Special Protection System – Mar 2020
 Turbine-Generator – Jan 2023

DCPP Programs Reviewed Periodically [Yellow = Upcoming FF]

10CFR50.59 Program – July 2021
 ALARA – May 2022
 Air Operated Valves – Dec 2020
 Benchmarking – Mar 2022
 Boric Acid Corrosion Control – Apr 2021 (review biennially)
 Buried Piping & Tanks – Jul 2020
 Chemistry – Aug 2021
 Cranes – Dec 2021
 Configuration Management – Apr 2022
 Corrective Action – CARB – Apr 2022
 Emergency Preparedness – Sep 2022
 Employee Concerns Program – Aug 2020
 Equipment Environmental Qualification – Dec 2022
 Equipment Reliability – Aug 2022
 Fire Doors & Door Life Cycle Mgm't. Plan – Jan 2022
 Fire Protection Program (NFPA-805) – May 2021
 FLEX Program – Jan 2023
 Flow Accelerated Corrosion – May 2022
 Foreign Material Exclusion – May 2022
 Greater Than Class C Waste – Aug 2022 PFP
 In-service Inspection Program – Apr 2019
 Integrated Risk Assessment Program – Mar 2022
 Large Motors – Aug 2022
 Long-Term Capital Planning Process – May 2022
 MIDAS – Dec 2021
 Maintenance Rule – Apr 2021
 Margin Management Program – May 2020
 Motor Operated Valves – Jan 2023
 Notification Review Team – Mar 2022
 Nuclear Fuel Program – May 2022
 On-Line Maintenance – May 2022
 Operating Experience – Nov 2021 (review biennially)
 Operability Assessment Program – Jan 2022
 Operational Decision Making – Sep 2020
 PRA Programs (non-seismic) – Sep 2022
 Performance Improvement – July 2022

February 15-16, 2023 Public Meeting
 Third Draft 2/2/23

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Performance Review Quarterly Meeting – Apr 2021
 Plant Health Committee – Jan 2023
 Reactivity Management – May 2021
 Safety-Security Interface – Dec 2022
 Self-Assessment – Jan 2023
 Single Point Vulnerabilities – Jan 2022
 Seismic PRA – Sep 2022
 Seismically Induced System Interactions – Nov 2020
 Software QA - Aug 2021
 Spent Fuel Management – May 2022
 System Engineering – Mar 2022
 Transformers, Large – Jan 2021
 Troubleshooting – Dec 2022
 Tsunami Hazard Analysis – August 2022
 Vibration Monitoring – Mar 2021

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DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE	
AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM	
MEETING DATE:	February 15, 2023
AGENDA ITEM:	V-B
AGENDA TITLE:	Documents Provided to the Committee
CONSENT [] ACTION [] INFORMATION [X]	
Staff Summary: Attached for your information are copies of the transmittal memoranda which list the various documents provided to the Committee by PG&E since your last public meeting in September 2022.	
RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: None, information item only.	

September 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
09/07/2022	DCL-22-070	Nuclear Material Transaction Report for New Fuel 5n6
9/8/2022	DCL-22-069	(OUO) Revision to License Amendment Request 22-01 Request for Approval of Alternative Security Measures for Early Warning System (OUO)
9/8/22	DCL-22-071	DCPP Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis Using Most Recent Decennial Census Data
7/13/22	DCL-22-055, DIL-22-010	Biennial Exercise Scenario Data Package for the 2022 Evaluated Exercise (released on 9/14 after the drill due to confidentiality)
7/13/22	DCL-22-056	Biennial Exercise Scenario Data Package for the 2022 Evaluated Exercise FEMA (released on 9/14 after the drill due to confidentiality)
09/21/2022	DCL-22-074	Nuclear Material Transaction Report for New Fuel
09/21/2022	DCL-22-075	Nuclear Material Transaction Report for New Fuel
09/22/2022	DCL-22-076	Follow-Up to Alert and Notification System Siren 0818 Request to Disable
09/28/2022	DCL-22-080	Material Status Report for the Period Ending August 31, 2022
09/28/2022	DCL-22-077, DIL-22-011	Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Update
09/29/2022	DCL-22-078, DIL-22-012	Annual Review of the Emergency Action Levels (to the County of San Luis Obispo)
09/29/2022	DCL-22-079, DIL-22-013	Annual Review of the Emergency Action Levels (to the State)
09/29/2022	DCL-22-081	Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 -3Q2022 - (QR)

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
08/29/2022	DCPP Post Shutdown Decom Activities Report Public Meeting
09/06/2022	DCPP U 1n2 Issuance of Amendment Nos 241 and 242 Re Revision to TS to Adopt TSTF-577, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections, EPID L-20220LLA-0038.
9/8/2022	APPLICATION FOR RENEWAL OF THE DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION LICENSE NO. SNM-2511 – ACCEPTED FOR REVIEW (EPID NO. L-2022-RNW-0007)

September 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

09/26/2022	Approval to Request RE: FEMA Submittal, DCL-22-076, "Follow-Up to Alert and Notification System Siren 0818 Request to Disable"
09/29/2022	Summary of 9.27.2022, Closed Meeting with PG&E Re Planned Security Plan Changes for DCP, Units 1 and 2 (EPID L-2022-LRM-0066)

D. PSRC Documents (PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no PSRC documents for this month.

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	51155216	DA-QAAF - Calibration of Data Logger
2 WGE	51154610	DA-Work not scoped in MOW to meet due da
2 WGE	51142438	DA-U1 - Sys 23 - Cont HVAC PC1 Goal Sett
2 WGE	51157974	DA-OM6.ID1 Injury - Strained Arm
2 WG	51146815	DA-Calibration Activities performed W/O
2 WGE	51159205	DA-ECG 45.3.3. Breaker Testing Overdue
2 WGE	51155215	DA-QAAF CF5.ID2 QA records And AD10.ID1
2 WGE	51154599	DA-QAAF Material in Blocked Stock
2 WGE	51150659	DA-E-2 Inlet Vane Fail
2 WGE	51154597	DA-QAAF Resistance Testing Motors 10hp+
2 WGE	51139203	DA-CFCU 1-2 Starter Damaged on M-16E Sta
09/28/2022	51090410	IERL 1-17-5 Effectiveness Review
09/28/2022	51036927	Effectiveness Eval: Spray Add Tank leak
Eff. Eval		
9/1/2022		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 8/1/2022 - 9/1/2022
9/30/2022		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 9-1-2022 – 9-30-2022
09/30/2022		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 09/01/22 - 09/30/22
09/01/2022		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3 as of 09/01/2022
09/01/2022		20 Oldest Non-LTCA DA Notifications as of 09/01/2022
09/01/2022		DCPP CAP Station Index
09/01/2022		Open RCEs as of 9/1/2022
9/1/2022		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
08/31/2022		Quality Digest, September Edition 2022
09/21/2022	2022-IA-08	2022 Quality Assurance Program Audit
09/28/2022	2022-IA-07	2022 Maintenance Audit

September 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
08/11/2022	51158522	Benchmark - 2022 Palo Verde Maintenance
09/27/2022	51162118	July 2022 FAC Program Conf. Trip Report
08/16/2022	51158502	Benchmark - 2022 Mid-Cycle SA STP
08/25/2022	51158524	Benchmark - 2022 NEI Rad Eff and Env Wor
08/23/2022	51161934	FAC Program - Summer 2022 CHUG Trip Rpt
09/19/2022	51147102	2022 Travel Lessons Learned - EP
09/15/2022	51163705	ECP Informal Benchmark

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
1/31/2022		Generation Operating Plan 2021 – 2025, No new updates this month.
09/12/2022		September 2022 Emergency Planning PI Dashboard
08/30/2022		September 2022 Learning Services PI Dashboard
09/08/2022		September 2022 PI Status Summary
09/22/2022		September 2022 PI Status Summary
09/14/2022		September 2022 Engineering Services PI Dashboard
09/13/2022		September 2022 Operations Services PI Dashboard
09/15/2022		September 2022 Maintenance PI Dashboard
09/13/2022		September 2022 Security & Emergency Services PI Dashboard
09/16/2022		September 2022 Safety PI Dashboard
Station Initiative		There are no new Station Initiatives for this month.

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no ODMs for this month.

September 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

POA		There are no new POAs for this month.
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L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202236	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202237	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202238	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202239	T+1 Performance Critique
	August	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2231-2234

October 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
10/5/2022	DCL-22-063	DCPP Decommissioning – Santa Maria Valley Railroad Site (Osburn Site)
10/5/2022	DCL-22-064	DCPP Decommissioning – Santa Maria Valley Railroad Site (Betteravia Site) Development Plan Application Package
10/13/2022	DCL-22-084	Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 - 3Q2022 - PI Data Elements (QR)
10/12/2022	DCL-22-039	Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 Irradiated Fuel Management Plan, Revision 1
10/12/2022	DCL-22-041	Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 – Site-Specific Decommissioning Cost Estimate, Revision 1
10/12/2022	DCL-22-042	DRC2021-00092 – Diablo Canyon Power Plant Decommissioning: Response to Request for Additional Information
10/31/2022	DCL-22-085	Request to Resume Review of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant License Renewal Application or, Alternatively, for an Exemption from 10 CFR 2.109(b), Concerning a Timely Renewal Application

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
10/24/2022	DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2022003 AND 05000323/2022003, AND EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
10/26/2022	DCPP SECURITY BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000275 2022402 AND 05000323 2022402 (OUO)

D. PSRC Documents (PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
10/24/2022	2022-012	PSRC Meeting Minutes 2022-012

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
	51148869	DA-Trend: Unsecured Plant Doors
	50686840	LTCA DA-Permanent Solution to NSAL-15-1
	51161476	DA-QAAF - Rigging Standards and Practice
	51134399	DA-FWH 2-5B level rising unexpectedly

October 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

	51159779	DA-QAAF:Matrl Not Dispositioned per CF5
	51144314	DA-U2 FR-12 Low Flow, FR-12R Equal Vlv O
	51137906	DA-Trend DG LO HX
	51150559	DA-Loose debris around the 500 kv SW Yar
	51150940	DA-1R23 Injury Gflex Roll Struck Left Fo
	51151675	DA-OSHA RI Trend
	51153816	DA-RP - Reportable Injury Trend
	51157253	DA-NRC Ident: Barrels in RHR Pump Rooms
	51159596	DA-Security Equipment Issue Door found o
	51159261	DA-DG 2-3 Fuel Leak Cylinder 1L
Eff. Eval		
10/03/2022		Significance Level 1 and 2 WGE created 9/2/22 - 10/3/22
10/31/2022		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 10-1-2022 – 10-31-2022
10/31/2022		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 10/01/2022 - 10/31/2022
09/28/2022		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3 as of 09/28/2022
09/28/2022		20 Oldest Non-LTCA DA Notifications as of 09/28/2022
10/03/2022		DCPP CAP Station Index
09/28/2022		Open RCEs as of 09/28/2022
09/28/2022		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 1 & 2

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
09/30/2022		Quality Digest, October 2022
10/17/2022	2022-AS-04	Public Education Material Distribution Verification
10/27/2022	2022-AS-05	Operations Shift Logs

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
10/20/2022	2P2022 SCCR	NUCLEAR SAFETY CULTURE REVIEW REPORT 2ND PERIOD 2022

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
10/03/2022	51160667	Benchmark Callaway Training Committee
05/05/2022	51151788	Informal benchmark, PWROG PSC Apr 2022
09/30/2022	51165454	Grid Control Center Benchmarking (Ops)
10/05/2022	51144951	Benchmark: Comanche Peak
08/15/2022	51161053	Benchmark NITSL Cyber Conference 2022

October 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
1/31/2022		Generation Operating Plan 2021 – 2025, No new updates this month.
09/30/2022		October 2022 Learning Services PI Dashboard
10/25/2022		October 2022 Safety PI Dashboard
10/13/2022		October 2022 PI Status Summary
10/18/2022		October 2022 Emergency Planning PI Dashboard
10/19/2022		October 2022 Operations Services Performance Improvement Dashboard
10/16/2022		October 2022 Maintenance PI Dashboard
10/21/2022		October 2022 Engineering Services Performance Improvement Dashboard
10/18/2022		October 2022 Security & Emergency Services Performance Improvement Dashboard
10/25/2022		October 2022 PI Status Summary
Station Initiative		There are no new Station Initiatives for this month.

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

October 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202240	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202241	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202242	T+1 Performance Critique
	September	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2235-2239

November 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
11/18/2022	DCL-22-088, DIL-22-014	Revision 18 of the Physical Security Plan (OUO)

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
11/16/2022	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 242 AND 243 RE: REVISION TO EMERGENCY PLAN FOR POST-SHUTDOWN AND PERMANENTLY DEFUELED CONDITION (EPID L-2021-LLA-0190)

D. PSRC Documents (PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
11/04/2022	2022-011	PSRC Meeting Minutes, 2022-011
11/10/2022	2022-013	Special PSRC Meeting 2022-013 0900
11/10/2022	2022-014	Special PSRC Meeting 2022-014 1400
11/18/2022	2022-015	PSRC Meeting Minutes, 2022-015
11/21/2022	2022-016	PSRC Meeting Minutes, 2022-016

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	51171547	DA-2R23 Security Loggable Door Events Tr
2 WGE	51171541	DA-Trend: Sec Policy/Reqmnt Aw
2 WGE	51173684	DA-Min Load upon paralleling Mn Gen
2 WGE	51169636	DA-U1, Sys 18A - Fire Det. Sys Goal Sett
2 WGE	51170942	DA-2R23 Trend: Confined Space
2 WGE	51169805	DA-Trend - 2R23 Westinghouse Performance
	51137841	EE - CE SA Finding: Records Management
	51164376	DA-9/14/22 EE: UDAC UNSAT Obj I.2.2
Eff. Eval		
10/30/2022		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 10/04/2022 - 10/31/2022
11/30/2022		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 11/01/2022 - 11/30/2022
11/30/2022		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 11/20/2022

November 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

11/01/2022		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3 as of 11/01/2022
11/01/2022		20 Oldest Non-LTCA DA Notifications as of 11/01/2022
11/01/2022		DCPP CAP Station Index
11/01/2022		Open RCEs as of 11/01/2022
11/01/2022		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 1 & 2 as of 11/01/2022

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
10/31/2022		Quality Digest, November Edition 2022

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
11/29/2022	51171860	ECP Informal Benchmark
11/28/2022	51172456	Benchmark fingerprint equipment
11/10/2022	51166041	2R23 ISI NRC Inspection Self Assessment
11/08/2022	51170460	Security Safety plan self-assessment
11/29/2022	51155083	Benchmarking Vogtle Stn Excellence Plan
11/04/2022	51169645	NEI Sec Trng Task Force Trip Report
08/18/2022	51139860	2022 PI&R Self-Assessment
11/10/2022	51169802	2023 DC Security AA / AC Inspection

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
1/31/2022		Generation Operating Plan 2021 – 2025, No new updates this month.
11/08/2022		November 2022 PI Status Summary
11/15/2022		November 2022 Emergency Planning PI Dashboard
10/31/2022		November 2022 Learning Services PI Dashboard
11/15/2022		November 2022 Operations Services PI Dashboard
11/17/2022		November 2022 Maintenance PI Dashboard
11/15/2022		November 2022 Engineering Services PI Dashboard
11/16/2022		November 2022 Security & Emergency Services PI Dashboard
11/16/2022		November 2022 Safety PI Dashboard
11/22/2022		November 2022 PI Status Summary

November 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

November 2022	Station Initiative	Station Excellence Plan Published November 2022 from Data Set October 2022
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J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 2243	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 2244	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 2245	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 2246	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 2247	T+1 Performance Critique
	October	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2240 - 2243
	November	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2244 - 2247

December 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
12/20/2022	DCL-22-089	Core Operating Limits Report for Unit 2 Cycle 24
12/20/2022	DCL-22-091	Revised Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report for Diablo Canyon Power Plant Unit 2 Twenty-First Refueling Outage
12/21/2022	DCL-22-093	Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2022-001-00, Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Degradation

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
12/1/2022	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – CORRECTION TO ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 242 AND 243 RE: REVISION TO EMERGENCY PLAN FOR POST-SHUTDOWN AND PERMANENTLY DEFUELED CONDITION (EPID L-2021-LLA-0190)
12/13/2022	DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NOTIFICATION OF NRC INITIAL OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION 05000275/2023301;05000323/2023301
12/21/2022	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 243 AND 244 RE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND REVISED LICENSE CONDITIONS FOR THE PERMANENTLY DEFUELED CONDITION (EPID L-2020-LLA-0261)

D. PSRC Documents (PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/27/2022	2022-017	PSRC Meeting Minutes 2022-017

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	51167809	DA-2R23 Dropped Object Trend
2 WGE	51167229	DA-UVTA for 52RTB failed testing (U2)
2 WGE	51168633	DA-QAAF: Shift Log Errors/Omission
2 WGE	51162262	DA-Ammunition discovered in search train
2 WGE	51170942	DA-2R23 Trend: Confined Space
2 WGE	51167250	DA-Fuel Fab UT Scanner Issue for U2C24
2 WGE	51117570	LTCA - DA-PGen IA issue - Maint Quality
2 WGE	51160717	DA-QAAF: ISM results not recorded/CF5.ID
2 WGE	51151676	DA-Repeat Dnpwr After Outage Events
2 WGE	51160936	DA-QAAF: Gaps in CF5 Material Controls
2 WGE	51160261	DA-U2 - Sys 67B - PC4j Goal Setting

December 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

Eff. Eval	51096258	Effectiveness Evaluation - AFW Pipe Leak
11/30/2022		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 11/01/2022 - 11/30/2022
12/31/2022		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 12/01/2022 - 12/31/2022
12/31/2022		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 12/31/2022
11/1/2022		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3 as of 11/1/2022
11/05/2022		20 Oldest Non-LTCA DA Notifications as of 12/05/2022
12/06/2022		DCPP CAP Station Index
12/05/2022		Open RCEs as of 12/05/2022
11/01/2022		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 1 & 2

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
11/30/2022		Nuclear Quality Digest, December 2022
12/15/2022	2022-QP-02	2022 Period 2 Quality Performance Assessment Report

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/19/2022	51173237	Benchmarking Wolf Creek 71003 Inspection
12/19/2022	51166012	Constellation Benchmarking Trip
12/14/2022	51158459	Benchmark - 2022 Westinghouse Tech Week
12/14/2022	51143271	Reactor Engineering QHSA 2022
12/09/2022	51100639	DFMP Self Assessment per DF1.ID1
06/20/2022	51089944	2022 Self-Assessment - SPO
12/20/2022	51088928	2022 Self-Assessment - SPA
12/28/2022	51175130	Energy Northwest Report RMT
08/31/2022	51107568	FSA: Engineering Training Program 2Q22
12/13/2022	51154482	Benchmarking - Safety at Palo Verde
12/14/2022	51143274	EPX Informal Benchmark Industry Seminars

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/14/2022		True North Strategy Placemat
12/14/2022		Plan on a Page 2023
12/14/2022		Roadmap to Generating Excellence

December 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

10/31/2022		November 2022 Learning Services PI Dashboard
11/15/2022		November 2022 Emergency Planning PI Dashboard
11/16/2022		November 2022 Safety PI Dashboard
11/15/2022		November 2022 Operations Services Performance Improvement Dashboard
11/17/2022		November 2022 Maintenance PI Dashboard
11/15/2022		November 2022 Engineering Services Performance Improvement Dashboard
11/16/2022		November 2022 Security & Emergency Services Performance Improvement Dashboard
11/08/2022		November 2022 PI Status Summary
11/22/2022		November 2022 PI Status Summary
12/05/2022	PPIR	December 2022 PI Status Summary
Station Initiative		November 2022 Station Excellence Plan

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202248	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202249	T+1 Performance Critique

December 2022
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

	Week 202250	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202251	T+1 Performance Critique

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:	February 15-16, 2023
AGENDA ITEMS:	XI-A, B, XIII C, XXIV D and XXX E
AGENDA TITLE:	Consultant & Legal Counsel Reports; Receive, Accept and Authorize Transmittal of Fact Finding Reports, and receive report by Asst. Legal Counsel.

CONSENT [☐] ACTION [☒] INFORMATION [☒]

Staff Summary: It is anticipated that oral or written reports will be presented at the meeting by Technical Consultants Mr. Wardell and Mr. McWhorter and DCISC Assistant Legal Counsel Mr. Rathie concerning items listed or on other matters.

Fact finding reports may be submitted for consideration and comment by members and consultants since the last public meeting of the DCISC in September 2022. These reports may be received by the Committee, accepted as to form and content and be authorized for transmittal to PG&E for its consideration and response. The Committee reserves the right to revise any fact-finding prior to the inclusion in an Annual Report. Fact finding reports in their final "as accepted form" become a part of the next DCISC Annual Report. Fact Finding Reports and are available for public inspection following their acceptance by the Committee at a public meeting.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION:

Receive reports by Consultants and Assistant Legal Counsel reports and provide direction.

Motions to accept Fact Finding Report concerning fact-findings conducted on September 29, November 9-10, December 6-7, 2022 and January 31-February 1, 2023.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:

February 15, 2023

AGENDA ITEM:

XII

AGENDA TITLE:

Committee Discussion and Receive Comments Regarding Review, Evaluation and Assessment of, and DCISC Reporting on, Matters Affected by Extended Operations and Review of Continued Planning for Decommissioning.

CONSENT []

ACTION [X]

INFORMATION [X]

Staff Summary: On August 31, 2022, in the California Assembly, and on September 1, 2022, in the California Senate, the California Legislature passed and on September 2, 2022, Governor Newsom signed urgency legislation to invalidate the Joint Proposal which would have retired DCP Unit 1 in 2024 and Unit 2 in 2025 in order to preserve the option of continued operation of DCP beyond 2025 (California Senate Bill SB 846).

The legislation amends sections of the California Government Code, the Public Resources Code, the Public Utilities Code and the Water Code to require the Public Utilities Commission to set new retirement dates for DCP, conditioned upon the NRC extending the plant's operating licenses.

New legislation, Public Utilities Code §712.1, also established the DCISC in the Public Utilities Commission and continues and ensures funding for the Committee operation and to undertake additional duties including concerning the transmittal of its findings and recommendations.

It is anticipated the Members, Technical Consultants and Legal Counsel will hold a discussion on their review, evaluation and assessment of, and periodic and annual reporting on matters affected by extended operations under SB 846 including seismic safety, maintenance and capital project planning, and their review of continued planning for decommissioning.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: Discussion and provide direction as appropriate.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:	February 16, 2023
AGENDA ITEM:	XXIII-A
AGENDA TITLE:	Minutes of September 28-29, 2022 Public Meeting

CONSENT [X] ACTION [] INFORMATION []

Staff Summary: Attached are the Minutes which have been prepared from the Committee's one hundred and third public meeting held on September 28-29, 2022, in Avila Beach, CA and as a Zoom webinar.

(Each session was also webcast live in real time and is available for subsequent viewing, archived to the meeting agenda, by visiting the links on the Committee's website at www.disc.org or at www.slospan.org. Meetings are videotaped for later broadcast on Channel 21 in the San Luis Obispo, CA area, the governmental access television channel.)

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept the Minutes by motion

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

MINUTES
of the
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE'S
SEPTEMBER 28-29, 2022, PUBLIC MEETING
[For approval at the February 15-16, 2023, Public Meeting.]

Wednesday & Thursday
September 28-29, 2022
Avila Beach, California
Also conducted as a Zoom Webinar

Notice of Meeting.

A legal notice of the public meeting and several display advertisements were published in the San Luis Obispo Tribune and in the New Times, local newspapers, and mailed to the media and those persons on the Committee's mailing list. The meeting agenda and the entire agenda packet for the meeting together with the informational presentations made during the meeting were posted on the Committee's website at www.dcisc.org prior to the meeting and the meeting agenda contained information on how to access the webinar using a computer or a telephone. This meeting was also produced as a webinar by AGP Video, Inc. and was webcast live on SLO-SPAN at <http://www.slo-span.org> and through <http://www.dcisc.org> and was subsequently broadcast on San Luis Obispo, California local government access television Channel 21. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic a supply of hand sanitizers and face coverings was made available in the meeting room.

I CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL

The September 28, 2022, public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC), the one hundred and third public meeting of the Committee, was called to order by Committee Chair Dr. Peter Lam at 9:00 A.M. Dr. Lam briefly reviewed the professional backgrounds and appointment to the DCISC for each of his fellow Members: Dr. Robert J. Budnitz, the appointee of the California Attorney General, Dr. Per F. Peterson, the appointee of the Governor of California, and Dr. Budnitz briefly reviewed Dr. Lam's professional background and reported Dr. Lam serves on the DCISC as the appointee of the Chair of the California Energy Commission.

Present:	Committee Member Robert J. Budnitz Committee Member Peter Lam Committee Member Per F. Peterson
Absent:	None

II INTRODUCTIONS

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

Dr. Lam introduced and briefly reviewed the professional backgrounds of the Committee's Technical Consultants and its Assistant Legal Counsel: Technical Consultants Mr. R. Ferman Wardell, P.E., and Mr. Richard D. McWhorter Jr. and DCISC Assistant Legal Counsel Mr. Robert W. Rathie. Dr. Lam also introduced Dr. Andrew C. Kadak who was present and in attendance at the invitation of the Committee.

Dr. Lam then introduced Mr. Hector M. Garcia, Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Chief Nuclear Officer Support Manager. Dr. Lam remarked Mr. Garcia plays a key role on behalf of PG&E and DCPP as their liaison with the DCISC in coordinating the Committee's activities, providing information and facilitating the Committee's public meetings and the frequent fact-finding visits conducted by a single member and one of the technical consultants.

III PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

The Chair invited any members of the public in attendance who wished to address remarks to the Committee on items not appearing on the agenda for the public meeting to do so at this time.

Dr. Gene Nelson, Senior Legal Researcher for Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson remarked he was very appreciative of the recent passage of California Senate Bill 846 (SB 846)¹ which Californians for Green Nuclear Power supported. He remarked that in a short interview with the media on September 12, 2022, Governor Newsom stated that there was no dispute that without the 9% statewide baseload of electrical power generated by DCPP load reductions and blackouts would have been triggered during the week prior to the interview. Dr. Nelson observed that many persons living in the Los Angeles area or in California's Central Valley depend on a reliable supply of electricity which is sometimes taken for granted and he remarked in that respect DCPP plays an important role and he expressed his appreciation for the Governor's recognition of that fact and for taking a leading role to ensure DCPP's operation would be extended for at least five years as this issue is about saving lives.

Mr. John Geesman was recognized. Mr. Geesman recognized the passage of SB 846 as a true milestone and he remarked he reviewed the past California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) decisions which describe the role of the DCISC to assess safety of DCPP operations and suggest any recommendations for its safe operation. He observed that in 2004 the CPUC rejected a recommendation by PG&E to abolish the DCISC and removed PG&E from any role in the nomination of its members while mandating the DCISC to affirmatively conduct public outreach. He observed in 2007 the CPUC approved a First Restatement of the Committee's Charter and in 2021 a Second Restatement of the Charter. He remarked that with the passage of SB 846 and the

¹ Senate Bill 846 was passed by the California Legislature on September 1, 2022, and signed by Governor Newsom on September 2, 2022. This Bill invalidated the CPUC's approval of the Joint Proposal and PG&E's application to retire Unit 1 in 2024 and Unit 2 in 2025. The Bill requires the CPUC to set new retirement dates, conditioned upon NRC approval of license extensions. The Bill, in part, established the DCISC in the CPUC and requires the CPUC to ensure funding for the DCISC to attract qualified experts and requires the DCISC to under the take additional duties.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

adoption of Public Utilities Code Section 712.1 the DCISC now has a statutory function to make recommendations appropriate to enhance the safety operations and to transmit its findings and recommendations to the Legislature and other specified entities. Mr. Geesman observed these are larger responsibilities as the plant moves forward and he commented SB 846 also established new roles for the state's taxpayers and state ratepayers which are not in his opinion disconnected from the enlargement of the DCISC responsibilities. He observed the taxpayers under SB 846 are making a \$1.4 billion dollar forgivable loan to PG&E and he questioned what required improvements and enhancements to DCPD should a lender reasonably impose and stated the DCISC will have a role in that issue. He commented the ratepayers are now responsible under SB 846 for a \$300,000,000 liquidated damage fund replenishable annually to absorb the cost of forced outages not found to be reasonable and he remarked that while in the past ratepayers have always been responsible for forced outages determined to be reasonable but SB 846 expanded that liability to forced outages that are caused by PG&E's unreasonable conduct. He again posed the question of what required improvements and enhancements to plant reliability should such an insurer reasonably impose and commented those issues will fall within the DCISC's responsibilities. He closed his remarks by thanking the Committee for its dedication to its duties.

Dr. Budnitz stated the Committee Members understand the matters and distinctions raised by Mr. Geesman in his remarks and there is an item on the agenda for this public meeting to discuss the activities the Committee is proposing to undertake and those to be undertaken by DCPD over the period of the next few years and how those activities may be different than previously understood given the enactment of SB 846.

Mr. Ryan Pickering who described himself as a member of a group of young people working to keep DCPD open and online was recognized. Mr. Pickering stated he looks forward to continuing to monitor the actions of all groups associated with DCPD operation and stated during a meeting of the Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel (DCDEP) he listened to remarks made by Dr. Budnitz concerning the DCISC's analysis of the new spent fuel storage system to be procured from a new vendor and which system employs a horizontal configuration. Mr. Pickering commented that there is a belief that this decision was taken in anticipation of the plant closing as previously scheduled and he believes the decision should be examined. He expressed his hope the Committee would find that it is no longer in the best interest to change vendors so as to be able to focus on all the activities which will be required to keep the plant operating.

Dr. Peterson responded it is important for the Committee to review the new spent fuel storage system with respect to plans to extend operations to confirm the dry cask storage capabilities can be adopted to that purpose and if changes are needed to recommend that they be implemented. He reported the Committee's review of that matter to date has found there are some simplifications that come from the horizontal geometry of the new system with respect to seismic design and safety. Drs. Peterson, Budnitz and Lam remarked it is possible that it will remain logical to continue with Orano, the new vendor selected for the spent fuel storage system, as the Orano system has some advantages against rollover during a seismic event but its seismic properties require more examination by the Committee and this is an issue concerning which the

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

DCISC has begun and will continue to review in addition to its other responsibilities. Dr. Budnitz observed the role of the Committee is not to opine concerning a preference if both systems are adequately safe.

Mr. Rathie reported and brought to the Committee's attention an email received this morning from Mr. Tom Marrè concerning suppression of the SARS COVID 2 virus and mRNA vaccinations.

IV ACTION ITEMS

A. Consider Engaging Dr. Andrew C. Kadak as a Technical Consultant on an *ad hoc* Basis to Assist in the Review of Spent Fuel, Decommissioning and Regulatory Issues.

Dr. Budnitz reported at its last public meeting in June 2022 the Committee approved engaging a consultant to assist the Committee with its review of identified topics. In the intervening period Dr. Kadak was identified as an appropriate person for that engagement and Dr. Budnitz then made a motion, seconded by Dr. Peterson to engage Dr. Kadak as a technical consultant to the DCISC. Dr. Budnitz reported Dr. Kadak previously served as the Chief Nuclear Officer for the Yankee Atomic Station in Roe, Massachusetts, and in that capacity Dr. Kadak is one of only a very limited number of persons in the United States with experience in the safety of nuclear operations and decommissioning of a nuclear power station. Dr. Budnitz reported Dr. Kadak has previously served as President of the American Nuclear Society and on the faculty at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Kadak also served as a consultant to Southern California Edison regarding the decommissioning of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) and in those roles he has a long and distinguished history concerning issues regarding spent fuel, decommissioning, regulatory, cost, and implementation matters. In response to Consultant Wardell's comment concerning DCCP's plans to undertake extended operation while at the same time planning for decommissioning Dr. Budnitz confirmed that as extended operation is not yet assured decommissioning activities necessarily continue and there is a potential for interference between the two activities concerning which the Committee will need to be attentive. Dr. Peterson observed the amount of review work that the DCISC may be called upon to undertake in the next few years in support of continued operation will be significant and hence the timing is appropriate for the Committee to consider bringing in additional support in its work.

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson remarked he was truly impressed with Dr. Kadak's knowledge, skill and ability and he welcomed Dr. Kadak to the DCISC team.

The Committee Members then unanimously approved the engagement of Dr. Kadak as a consultant to the DCISC.

B. 32nd Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations: July 1, 2021-June 30, 2022.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

The Chair requested Consultant Wardell to lead the discussion concerning preparation of the 32nd Annual Report covering the period from July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022.

Mr. Wardell reported the process of development of its Annual Reports starts for the Committee in August and drafts with input from the Technical Consultants and the Assistant Legal Counsel are circulated for review. Mr. Wardell reported the Executive Summary was updated recently to address the passage of SB 846. Dr. Peterson observed the effort to prepare the annual reports is substantial and the annual reports contain a tremendous amount of information on safety of operation as well as any recommendations by the Committee.

Mr. Rathie reported the 32nd Annual Report covers a period that predates the passage of SB 846 and accordingly the 33rd Annual Report for the period July 1, 2022 through June 30, 2023 will adhere to the direction of the new legislation which substantively requires the Committee to consult with and incorporate the proceedings of the CPUC's Independent Peer Review Panel for the seismic study of DCPD and its environs and to submit its annual reports to the Legislature and to the NRC as well as the entities who now receive the annual reports including to PG&E for its response to each annual report and Mr. Rathie suggested the Committee follow the process in SB 846 for the 32nd Annual Report. The Committee publishes its annual reports as two bound volumes, on the internet at www.dcisc.org, on a compact disk and on a USB drive. Annual Reports are also distributed to the Document Room at the R.E. Kennedy Library at the California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo (Cal Poly) and to local libraries.

On a motion by Dr. Budnitz, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the Committee Members unanimously accepted and approved the Thirty-Second Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations for the period July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2022.

C. Update on Financial Matters and Committee Activities During 2022 & 2023. Dr. Lam requested Mr. Rathie to report on this item. Mr. Rathie reported the Committee has received three quarterly disbursements of funds from the grant provided by the PG&E ratepayers for the Committee's operation and it draws down those funds on a quarterly basis. He reported the Committee is operating within the amount of funds provided and at this time it appears the Committee will once again remit any unspent funds for calendar year 2022 to PG&E for credit to its ratepayers. He further reported that during 2020 and 2021 the COVID pandemic resulted in the DCISC conducting three of its six scheduled public meetings remotely as well as conducting fact-finding using remote meeting technology and this resulted in the Committee returning more funds to PG&E's ratepayers than would otherwise have been the case. Mr. Rathie observed due to the passage of SB 846 there will likely be increased expenses for the Committee and the Committee's finances increase in accordance with a CPUC Decision at the rate of 1.5% each year which at this point in time is less than the rate of increase in the Consumer Price Index and other measures of inflation.

Mr. Rathie remarked the legislation adopted by SB 846 directs the CPUC to ensure sufficient funds are available to the Committee for it to continue to attract very qualified

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

individuals to serve on the DCISC but at this point during 2022 Mr. Rathie did not see a need to seek additional funding for Committee operations. In response to Dr. Peterson's query Mr. Rathie reported the Second Restated Charter for the Committee requires the Committee to continue to follow the practice it has following in the past of returning any funds unspent during a calendar year to PG&E and therefore, despite the expected increase in the workload in 2023, the Committee would be precluded from carrying over any unspent funds from 2022 into 2023. Mr. McWhorter observed 2023 could be a very expensive year due to inflation and the Committee's increased activity and he queried whether the CPUC could grant authority to carryover 2022 unspent funds to 2023. Dr. Peterson observed that some years ago the Committee ran a deficit in a calendar year's funding which was made up from funds provided for its operation in the following year and he inquired whether the CPUC might be able to address that issue in light of the increased activity due to SB 846. Mr. Rathie remarked both these questions would likely need to be raised with the CPUC Energy Division. **Dr. Budnitz remarked it is difficult to project the cost for the additional scope of review, to include the safety of the Orano spent fuel system, the potential license extension, and the review of decommissioning and he suggested these matters and the format for a request of the CPUC for additional funding would be properly before the Committee at its public meeting in February 2023. He suggested and Dr. Peterson agreed that the Legal Counsel's Office should open an inquiry with the CPUC staff concerning the format for a request for additional funding and to develop a possible projection for the cost of Committee operation in 2023.** Mr. Wardell volunteered to assist the Counsel's office with an estimate for Committee operations during 2023.

Mr. Rathie then directed the Members and Consultants' attention to the green sheets in the public agenda packet which set forth the Committee's planned activities during the remainder of 2022 and for 2023.

D. Discussion of Issues on Open Items List.

Dr. Lam requested Consultant Wardell lead a review of items on the Open Items List, which he described as an important tool used by the Committee to set priorities, track and also to follow issues, concerns, information requests and activities identified for subsequent action or receipt during fact-finding of at public meetings. Mr. Wardell stated newly added or changed items were shown in *red italics* while items for which follow up is scheduled prior to the February 2023 public meeting were shown in *blue italics* on the version of the Open Items List included with the agenda packet and certain items are being identified for closure.

Items discussed or concerning which action was taken included the following²:

² Key to some abbreviations used: Fact-finding (FF), Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), Public Meeting (PM), Quarter (Q), Quality Verification (QV).

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

<u>Item</u>	<u>Re:</u>	<u>Action Taken/Next Action</u>
CO-10	Mispositioning Errors	2Q2023 FF
CO-13	Operation in Different Modes	Include w/Transmission System Item 2/22 PM-4
EP-2	Emergency Drills	Add wording re confidentiality of drill scenario synopsis
RA-5	Non-seismic PRA Review	Add context arising from license extension
OE-2	Station Excellence Plan/ Station Oversight Committee	1Q2023 FF
OM-4	Outage Safety Plan	12/2022FF and expand review and add new item (OM-6) due to additional scope for extended operation
SF-1	Monitor ISFSI Operations	11/2022FF & 1/2023 FF
SF-4	Orano System Review-	Expand seismic review Expand Item re Thermal Analyses at 11/2022FF
SF-5	LARs for the Orano System	11/2022FF
SF-6	Inspection of ISFSI Following Seismic Event	Remove
SF-7	Storage of >Class C Waste and Addtl. Spent Fuel New Pad in Proximity to the SG Storage Facility	Add new item 12/2022 or 1/2023 FF w/ACK
SC-3	Long-Term Seismic Program	RJB attend IPRP meeting on 10/6/2022 then include report w/11/2022 FF
SC-14	Monitor Activities & Reports of IPRP Develop DCISC Position if Appropriate	Add new item
SC-12	Workplace Seismic Safety	Change 3/2023FF to 5/2023FF
LD-6	Observe Operator License Requalification	2Q2023 FF
6/22PM-7	DCISC Position on License Renewal	Close
6/22PM-13	Orano Licensing and Effect on DCP 10CFR Part 50 License	9/2022FF & Close
New OIL Category	Add Category for Review of Deferred Maintenance Due to Planned Closure for Safety Implications	Review historical reviews circa 2016-2018 & identify additional reviews/activities Review at 2/2023PM
Second OIL	Create Decommissioning Open Items List	Review Current OIL

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

During discussion of the Open Items List Members and Consultant queried Mr. Garcia concerning the impact of DCISC review activities on plant operation particularly during refueling outage activities. Mr. Garcia confirmed PG&E's commitment to support the DCISC's reviews. Members and Consultants also discussed the mandate to review and recommend improvements and the need to use a criterion in continuing what has been the DCISC's issue-by-issue approach to the Committee's safety improvement review and development of recommendations.

Ms. Sherry Lewis, a member of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (Mothers for Peace) was recognized. Ms. Lewis inquired and Dr. Budnitz confirmed that should the Committee create new open items lists to address issues specific to decommissioning, spent fuel storage or license extension those lists will be available to the public.

Mr. David Weisman representing the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Weisman stated the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility had videorecorded all the meetings of the CPUC's Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) for seismic study of DCCPP and its environs and anyone wishing to view the meetings can go to YouTube and search for Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility[space]IPRP and access the videorecording of the first through the eleventh IPRP meetings. Dr. Budnitz thanked Mr. Weisman for this information and Dr. Budnitz commented that the reports issued by the IPRP are available through a link on the CPUC website.

Mr. John Geesman, on behalf of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility, was recognized. Mr. Geesman requested and Dr. Budnitz confirmed that the presentation later at this public meeting on the fact-finding held on September 13-14, 2022, would address the current status of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) aspects of plant-specific shutdown risk analysis.

Upon a motion made by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Lam, the Open Items List prepared for this meeting as revised by the Committee discussion was unanimously accepted by the DCISC.

V ACCEPTANCE OF MINUTES

This item concerned review and acceptance of the Minutes of the Committee's June 22-23, 2022, public meeting conducted in Avila Beach and as a Zoom Webinar. A draft of the June 2022 Minutes was included in the public agenda packet for this meeting. Mr. Rathie expressed his thanks to Consultant McWhorter for Mr. McWhorter's assistance with the preparation of the Minutes particularly with reference to the information provided during the evening presentation on the Orano spent fuel storage system. The Members and Consultants reviewed the Minutes and provided corrections and substantive changes to certain wording which will be included in the final version of the June 2022 Minutes. The Members and Technical Consultants also discussed some of the follow-up actions to be taken, provided clarification concerning typographical errors and the accuracy of certain statements in the Minutes and made editorial comments and changes concerning the draft of the June 2022 Minutes.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

The Minutes of the Committee's public meetings in their final accepted form become part of its Annual Reports on Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations (Annual Report). Upon a motion made by Dr. Budnitz, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the Minutes of the Committee's June 22-23, 2022, public meeting were accepted subject to inclusion of the changes provided to the Committee's Assistant Legal Counsel. As revised the June 2022 Minutes will become a part of the Committee's 32nd Annual Report.

VI COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION

A. Public Outreach, Site Visits and Other Committee Activities, Scheduling and Confirmation of Future Fact-Finding Visits and Public Meetings.

Dr. Peterson reported he was requested to and did speak on behalf of the DCISC during a panel discussion conducted by the California Assembly on August 26, 2022. Dr. Budnitz reported he attended and participated in a public meeting of PG&E's Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel (DCDEP) held on August 24, 2022, and over the period of the last several months he has received telephone calls from various organizations with interest in the safety of DCPD and during those conversation he discussed various safety issues, Committee agendas and the Charter for the Committee's activities from the CPUC.

The Members confirmed future public meetings of the DCISC for February 15-16, June 28-29 [subsequently changed after this public meeting from June 21-22], and September 13-14 2023, [changed at this meeting from September 20-21] and the Members and Consultants then scheduled a public meeting for February 21-22, 2024.

Fact-finding visits were confirmed and scheduled as follows:³

[2022] September 29 RJB/RDM/RFW/ACK; November 8-9 RJB/RDM; December 6-7 PFP/RFW; and

[2023] January 31-February 1 PL/RDM/ACK; March 14-15 RJB/RFW; April 19-20 PL/RDM; May 2-3 PFP/RFW; July 12-13 PFP/RDM; August 9-10 PL/RFW; August 30-31 RJB/RDM; November 14-15 RJB/RFW; December 6-7 PFP/RDM; and

[2024} January 24-25 PL/RFW.

B. Documents Provided to the Committee:

Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie observed that a list of documents received by the DCISC since its last public meeting in June 2022 was included in the public agenda packet for this

³ Robert J. Budnitz (RJB), Peter Lam (PL), Per F. Peterson (PFP), R. Ferman Wardell (RFW), Richard D. McWhorter Jr. (RDM), Andrew C. Kadak (ACK).

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

meeting. Dr. Lam remarked the Committee receives and reviews a large number of documents from PG&E and strives to always conduct its business in a transparent manner.

VII STAFF & CONSULTANT REPORTS & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E

A. The Chair requested Consultant McWhorter to provide a summary report on the July 14, 20 and 21, 2022, fact-finding visit with Dr. Lam. Mr. McWhorter reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the July 2022 visit as follows:

➤ Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) Exit Meeting – Mr. McWhorter reported on July 14, 2022, the DCISC Fact-Finding Team (FFT) observed an exit meeting of the NSOC which he described as an executive level peer review committee. He reported the number of members of the NSOC had been reduced from six to four at the time of the DCISC's observation and one of the four current members may retire at some point. The FFT concluded the NSOC continues to do effective work in providing the station with effective input.

➤ Observe Plant Health Committee (PHC) Meeting - Mr. McWhorter described the meeting as routine with a regular agenda to review the material condition of equipment and develop plans to deal with problems. The PHC considered an Operations Department tactical list consisting of portions of different lists of items important to operators as well as the Top Ten Equipment Reliabilities issues list. Mr. McWhorter stated there was a good discussion by the PHC on that list with reference to work to develop an appropriate action plan for each item. The FFT concluded the PHC meetings continue to be effective.

➤ Annual Radioactive Effluent Release and Radiological Environmental Operating Reports - Mr. McWhorter reported the effluent releases from DCPD during the previous year were extremely low and remained well within the small fractional limit allowed. The Annual Environmental Operating Report includes a large number of radiation measurements taken at 32 different locations, 800 air measurements, 1,400 thermoluminescent dosimetry (TLD) measurements and the analysis of solid and liquid samples from various locations. All data demonstrated there has been no increase of radiation in the environment as compared to prior to when DCPD commenced operation. In response to Consultant Wardell's inquiry Mr. McWhorter reported the primary variation in the data from year to year is dependent upon the number of refueling outages scheduled in a particular year with releases being slightly higher during those years with two refueling outages.

➤ Health of 4kV Electrical Systems and Tour - Mr. McWhorter observed the 4kV System is used to power medium voltage loads including for large motors used for both vital and non-vital equipment. The 4kV vital buses are supplied from two off-site power sources or by DCPD's emergency diesel generators (EDGs). He reported these systems were in good health with no major issues and since the breakers were replaced in 1990 there have been no problems or major issues that were not addressed by routine maintenance. He reported the 4kV Electrical System was being well maintained by DCPD.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

- Containment Ventilation and Hydrogen Mitigation Systems – these systems provide Containment cooling in normal conditions and during accident conditions provide Containment depressurization and hydrogen mitigation. Mr. McWhorter reported there are five Containment fan cooling units (CFCU) and both the Containment Ventilation and Hydrogen Mitigations Systems are Tier 2 systems and do not require health reports. He reported the systems are in good health but one CFCU is in Maintenance Rule status (a)(1) due to an electrical cable issue which took some time to resolve and should return to within the Maintenance Rule parameters during the next monitoring period. He reported the hydrogen recombiners and the Containment purge equipment are in good condition with no problems. Overall, the FFT concluded the systems were in good health.
- Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector – The FFT met with Senior Resident Inspector Mr. Mahdi Hayes who is now assigned as the full time Senior Resident to review recent inspection activities.
- Performance Improvement Program - Mr. McWhorter stated this program is intended to monitor performance and initiate effective performance improvement plans. He reported the program's departmental excellence plans focus primarily upon equipment reliability, leadership and talent development. The FFT reviewed the Performance Improvement Status Summary and found the Performance Improvement Department to be effective. In response to Dr. Budnitz' query Mr. McWhorter replied the decline in staffing in the Performance Improvement Department was due in part to the pending termination of operations in 2025 as well as to implementation of industry efficiency efforts and streamlining some performance improvement activities. Mr. McWhorter remarked the scope of certain performance improvement programs was narrowed due to the expectation the plant would cease operation in 2025. **Dr. Budnitz remarked that when the DCISC reviews the Performance improvement Department in the future inquiry should be made concerning whether the scope has changed in light of continued operation after 2025.**
- Containment Liner Inspections - Mr. McWhorter reported Containment test inspections generally consist of inspection of its concrete structure, the steel liner, and performance of an integrated leak rate test. The FFT reviewed the steel liner inspection reports for both units which did not identify any major issues and concluded the inspections were being properly performed and the Containment steel liners remain in good condition.
- Radiation Monitoring Systems - these systems provide general area radiation measurements for alarm indications and, in some cases, system actuation. There are numerous and diverse channels of information feeding into the system, which has experienced reliability issues. Mr. McWhorter reported DCPD is focused on maintaining the system and improving its reliability. The Radiation Monitoring System is a Tier 2 System with no health report required but would be considered in acceptable White system health condition and needing improvement if it were rated as a Tier 1 System. Mr. McWhorter reported there are several portions of the

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

system that are in Maintenance Rule (a)(1) status and corrective actions have been identified. **The Engineering organization has been directed by the PHC to develop an excellence plan for the Radiation Monitoring System by late 2022 and the FFT recommends the DCISC follow up on the system and review the excellence plan developed to deal with reliability issues and to ensure continued problems are resolved.** Consultant Wardell reported prior to approval of the Joint Proposal⁴ DCPD formed an intention to undertake a major capital project to replace the Radiation Monitoring System but when the plant was approved for closure by 2025 it was decided the system would remain operable to that point. Mr. McWhorter stated replacement of the Radiation Monitoring System may depend upon how many years the plant is to operate after 2025 as the system falls within a category of systems that might need components replaced with newer components during extended operations. Dr. Budnitz stated his recollection that the decision to continue with the system was based upon the system having sufficient redundancy.

- Meet with DCPD Officer – Dr. Lam met with Vice President of Decommissioning and Technical Services Ms. Maureen Zawalick.
- Access to Technical Information for the New Spent Fuel Storage System - Mr. McWhorter reported the FFT met with Decommissioning Environmental and Licensing Manager Mr. Philippe Soenen at PG&E's Kendall Road facility in San Luis Obispo to discuss DCISC access to technical information concerning the Orano spent fuel storage system. The FFT was provided with a large number of links to information which is publicly available through the NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS). This information includes the Safety Evaluation Report (SER), the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the original license for the Holtec spent fuel storage system, and information concerning the seismic qualifications for the horizontal storage modules and the casks to be utilized by the Orano spent fuel storage system. Mr. McWhorter described this information as being an adequate starting point for the DCISC's technical reviews.
- Industry Efforts to Evaluate the Radiological Consequences of a Release of Radionuclides from a Spent Fuel Storage Cask – Mr. McWhorter reported this review by the FFT was in follow up to the Electric Power Research Institute's (EPRI) effort undertaken to assess the consequences of such a release. He commented that the DCISC has plans in context of license renewal to inspect and ensure the boundary of the casks is not violated but the EPRI study is to determine what are the consequences should that occur. **Mr. McWhorter reported the EPRI study has not yet finished although some supporting studies have been concluded regarding source term and what flow rate should be estimated for use in the study. He reported EPRI plans to issue its study in early spring of 2023 and the DCISC should review it at that time.**

⁴ The Joint Proposal was entered into by PG&E, together with Friends of the Earth, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Environment California, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1245, Coalition of California Utility Employees and the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility in June 2016 to retire DCPD at the expiration of the current operating licenses for each unit, November 2024 for Unit-1 and August 2025 for Unit-2 and was subsequently approved by the CPUC in 2018 its Decision (D) 18-01-022.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

➤ Response to State Government Interest in Extending Power Operations Beyond 2025 - Mr. McWhorter reported the FFT briefing in July 2022 has now been overtaken by recent events and a presentation is scheduled on this issue later during this public meeting.

In response to Dr. Kadak's inquiry concerning the Aging Management and Replacement Parts Programs Mr. McWhorter confirmed those programs do exist at DCPD and for certain systems and DCPD has employed bridging strategies for systems approaching obsolescence such as the Eagle 21 Reactor Protection System which, prior to the Joint Proposal, was planned for replacement with an updated digital system but with the assurance of the availability of spare parts it was decided the system would be adequate to operate through 2025. Mr. McWhorter reported DCPD has an Aging Management Program for which, given extended operation, will increase in both intensity and scope.

Upon a motion made by Dr. Budnitz, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the July 14, 20 and 21, 2022 Fact Finding Report was unanimously accepted by the DCISC and its transmittal to PG&E was authorized. The report will become a part of the Committee's 33rd Annual Report.

B. The Chair requested Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie to provide a report on administrative, regulatory, and legal matters.

Mr. Rathie reported concerning the approval and pending issuance of the Committee's 32nd Annual Report. He offered congratulations to Dr. Kadak on his engagement as a DCISC Technical Consultant and reported the appointment of a member of the DCISC by the California Attorney General is currently pending and Dr. Budnitz is one of three candidates under consideration. Mr. Rathie reported Dr. Budnitz spoke to the DCDEP during the DCDEP's public meeting on August 24, 2022, and the next meeting of the DCPD is scheduled to be held on November 9, 2022, when the panel is expected to update its Strategic Vision document. Dr. Budnitz remarked a fact-finding visit to DCPD is planned for that date and with Consultant McWhorter Dr. Budnitz would consider attending the DCDEP's meeting in person. Mr. Rathie reported with the passage by the California Legislature and signature by the Governor of SB 846 on September 2, 2022, legislation is now in place to provide for the potential extended operation of DCPD. He reported that prior to the passage of SB 846 he participated with Dr. Lam in a conversation with Dr. Justin Cochran, Senior Nuclear Policy Advisor to the California Energy Commission (CEC), and on behalf of Dr. Peterson an outreach opportunity was extended to the Governor's Senior Advisor for energy matter. Mr. Rathie reported that all DCISC Members together with the Technical Consultant participated on July 12, 2022, in an NRC hearing on post-shutdown decommissioning matters and all members and consultants attended a joint agency workshop conducted by the CEC on October 12, 2022. He reported Dr. Peterson participated at the invitation of the Assembly Committee's legal counsel during the California Assembly hearing conducted on August 24, 2022. Mr. Rathie reported that on September 9, 2022, the CPUC formally reopened the proceeding that approved the Joint Proposal and the termination of the operating license for DCPD in 2024 and 2025, and he closed his remarks on regulatory

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

matters by reporting that the 2021 Nuclear Decommissioning Cost Triennial Proceeding has been opened.

Concerning website activity Mr. Rathie reported the Committee's website at www.dcisc.org is averaging 145 unique visitors each month with the greatest numbers coming from, in order of the number of visits, the United State, South Korea, India, the United Kingdom and Canada.

VIII ADJOURN MORNING MEETING

The Chair adjourned the morning meeting of the DCISC at 12:15 P.M.

IX RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING

The afternoon meeting of the DCISC was convened by the Chair at 1:30 P.M.

X COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

At this time there were no comments from the Members.

XI PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Dr. Lam invited members of the public to address the Committee on matters not on the agenda for this meeting. There was no response to this invitation.

XII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

The Chair introduced and requested Mr. Garcia to introduce the first of the informational presentations for this public meeting. Mr. Garcia recognized the presence of Mr. Philippe Soenen, Director of Strategic Initiatives at DCPD and then introduced DCPD Senior Director/DCPD Station Director Mr. Dennis Petersen. Mr. Garcia reported Mr. Petersen holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in aeronautical engineering from California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo and has been employed at DCPD for more than 34 years. Mr. Petersen has previously held leadership positions as Director of Operations Services, Director of Nuclear Work Management, Director of Learning Services, Director of Quality Verification and as an outage manager. Mr. Petersen spent the earlier part of his career in Operations and held a Senior Reactor Operator License.

Presentation on the State of the Plant including Key Events, Outages, Highlights, Organizational Changes, Preparation for Refueling Outage 2R23, and Other Station Activities since the DCISC's June 2022 Public Meeting.

Mr. Petersen stated in his presentation he would provide an update on the station's operation and upcoming key activities. He reported both DCPD units are operating at 100%

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

power with all probabilistic risk assessment indicators and NRC Performance Indicators currently in Green status. He reported during October 2022 DCPD will commence a refueling outage for Unit 2 which is scheduled to occupy four to five weeks duration. Mr. Petersen stated the major scope for the outage includes work on auxiliary saltwater pump 2-2, feedwater heater inspections, overhaul of the traveling screens and work on auxiliary transformers including auxiliary transformers 2-1 and 2-2 bushing inspection. Power factor testing will be performed on the startup transformer bank, as well as extensive maintenance on the 12kV and 4kV buses. The main condenser will have the expansion joint replaced and expansion joints will be replaced for all three low pressure turbine hoods. Mr. Petersen reported during this past summer, in advance of the refueling outage, preventive maintenance windows were completed for the Unit 2 emergency generators.

Mr. Petersen reported DCPD has added three director positions devoted to license renewal and extension of plant operational life including Director of Strategic Initiatives, Director of Outages and Director of Projects. In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry Mr. Garcia stated organizational changes are scheduled to be discussed later during this public meeting and DCPD continues to try to promote from within and conducts staffing committee meetings as well as meetings of its People Committee in the effort to ensure adequate numbers of employees are available to continue to operate the plant and knowledge transfer and succession plans are in place to support these efforts. Mr. Petersen stated some employees availed themselves of a company-wide voluntary separation plan which DCPD used as an opportunity to target specific positions and some organizational adjustments were based upon that effort and were aligned with industry benchmarks. In response to Dr. Lam's comment that while it is a positive development that qualified personnel are promoted from within there is also a negative aspect to the loss of talented personnel. Mr. Petersen responded that DCPD has always had the necessary talent to operate the plant and engages in the planning efforts described by Mr. Garcia to ensure that remains true. In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry, Mr. Garcia reported at the present time plant staff consists of approximately 1,100 persons aside from contract personnel, which compares to approximately 1,250-1,300 persons prior to the Joint Proposal. Mr. Garcia observed that because PG&E operates DCPD as a single station its workforce has always been somewhat larger than the workforces engaged by utilities which operate a fleet of nuclear power plants. Dr. Budnitz remarked some employee departures may be unrelated to the approaching plant closure generated by the approval of the Joint Proposal. Mr. Petersen agreed and gave as an example of staffing reduction the scenario that as many of the strategic large scale capital projects were concluded - and the capital budget accordingly reduced over time - DCPD has found ways to repurpose employees engaged in those efforts while others left DCPD employment. In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry seeking an estimate of DCPD's additional staffing needs in the event of continued operation beyond 2025 Mr. Petersen agreed additional personnel will be needed but stated he did not have a number to provide as projections were still being developed, but he observed the need for certain personnel with key expertise such as control room operators was being and has been addressed. Dr. Budnitz commented there will be different perspectives concerning capital projects which will, when resolved, drive personnel decision and the Committee will continue to review these issues.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

Mr. Petersen displayed a graphic profile of the performance of both units and he commented it shows a very strong, reliable performance. He reported DCPD has increased efforts to ensure the plant remains reliably available to the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) during the summer months. He reported during January – March long range schedules, including the risk and technical specification vulnerability aspects related to surveillance testing on systems with redundant multiple communication channels or trains⁵, are reviewed for the risk to generation throughout summer periods and those planning efforts are reviewed by senior leadership in April with maintenance work commencing on systems and components in May. When there is emergent risk Mr. Petersen reported that as the Chair of the Risk Challenge Board he and the Site Vice President Mr. Adam Peck have overlapping approval authority over all such risk-significant activities. In response to Dr. Kadak's question Mr. Petersen reported the electrical distribution system providing off-site power to DCPD is a different system from that which provides power to the local communities such that an electrical blackout in the local area would not necessarily affect DCPD. Mr. Petersen reported DCPD has an agreement with the grid and transmission system operators to ensure the plant is given top priority for power preservation and restoration.

Mr. Petersen reported upcoming station activities include:

NRC Emergency Preparedness Inspection – October 13, 2022;
Unit 2 Refueling Outage – Mid-October 2022;
NRC Problem Identification & Resolution Inspection – December 2022; and
Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) – December 2022 (first week).

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. In response to Dr. Nelson question as to a gradual decline of Unit 1 power production on the graph provided by Mr. Petersen, Mr. Petersen replied that this small decline represented reduced efficiencies in the secondary plant⁶ over the operational cycle. He reported DCPD conducts mid-cycle condenser tunnel cleaning periodically to restore the efficiency of the secondary plant.

Mr. John Geesman representing the Alliance of Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Geesman observed that with the second tranche of the Employee Retention Program having been successfully completed it was anticipated that in 2023 through 2025 PG&E would rely on enhanced severance benefits to retain DCPD employees and he inquired whether that matter was under reconsideration. Mr. Petersen confirmed there has been discussion and it is anticipated there may be a revisited retention incentive plan for DCPD employees because of the issue described by Mr. Geesman, but those discussions have not yet been finalized. Mr. Soenen

⁵ Train in this context means a series of parts or elements that together constitute a system or produce a result.

⁶ Primary and secondary side refer, respectively, to the Reactor Coolant System which is used to remove heat from the nuclear reactor and to the Main Steam and Feedwater Systems which provide cooling to the steam generators and generate and provide steam to the turbines.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

reported SB 846 addresses the implementation of a retention program which is to be addressed between PG&E and the CPUC. Mr. Geesman reported that earlier in the day PG&E submitted a filing with the federal Securities and Exchange Commission announcing its intent during the first quarter of 2023 to sell off a minority share of its non-nuclear generation assets and he inquired whether such a move was possible for PG&E's nuclear assets. Mr. Petersen stated he was not prepared to address Mr. Geesman's question and Dr. Peterson observed Mr. Geesman's inquiry falls outside the DCISC's remit.

Dr. Lam thanked Mr. Petersen for his presentation.

Mr. Soenen then introduced the Director of Risk and Compliance, Mr. Russell Prentice, to make the next presentation concerning the NRC's assessment of plant performance. Mr. Soenen reported Mr. Prentice was licensed in 2014 as a Senior Reactor Operator and has been employed at DCPD since 2009 including as Maintenance and Instrumentation & Controls Manager. In his present assignment Mr. Prentice oversees DCPD's regulatory and risk programs. Mr. Prentice is also the site emergency coordinator for Team C of the Emergency Response Organization. Mr. Prentice holds a Master's Degree in Mechanical Engineering from Cal Poly.

Update on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation, Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Open Compliance Issues and Current and Future License Amendment Requests, and Other Significant Regulatory Issues/Requests.

Mr. Prentice stated during his presentation he would provide an overview of DCPD's regulatory performance and stated regulatory performance of a station is also a reflection of its operational performance which he stated remains high. Mr. Prentice stated his report would cover a period of approximately four months which includes approximately 2,000 hours of NRC inspection time. During this period DCPD met and remained in the highest performance category for the performance expectations for all NRC Performance Indicators, all of which remain Green with respect to each performance category.

Mr. Prentice displayed the performance indicators used in the NRC's Regulatory Oversight Process which all remains in Green⁷ status, and for which margin is monitored for each of the 16 performance indicators:

- Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs.
- Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs.
- Unplanned Scrams with Complications.
- Safety System Functional Failures.

⁷ The safety significance characterizations used for the performance indicators as either Green (very low), White (low to moderate) Yellow (substantial) or Red (high). A Green non-cited violation indicates very low safety significance, with no impact to public health and safety.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

- Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System .
- Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System.
- Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System.
- Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System.
- Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems.
- Reactor Coolant System Activity.
- Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
- Drill/Exercise Performance.
- ERO Drill Participation.
- Alert & Notification System.
- Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness.
- Radiological Effluent Occurrence.

Four non-cited violations (NCVs), rated Green and of very low safety significance were issued by the NRC since the last public meeting of the DCISC. He discussed each as follows.

- Green (Very Low safety significance) NCV – The station did not provide adequate procedural guidance to control the tightening of Emergency Diesel Generator 2-3 fuel oil system bolts resulting in a fuel oil leak. This issue was extensively reviewed with the DCISC in June 2022. Procedures were modified concerning tightening of these banjo bolts to ensure the torque is verified after maintenance. This was a self-revealing issue. (No Cross-Cutting Aspect was assigned to this violation.)
- Green (Very Low safety significance) NCV – The station did not adequately relocate or secure items in the switchyard area in accordance with station procedures in preparation for expected higher than normal winds. There was a procedural misalignment related to the more restrictive procedure for tornado impact. Procedures have been revised. This was an NRC identified issue. (Cross-Cutting Aspect H.13, “Consistent Process”).
- Green (Very Low safety significance) NCV – The station did not secure temporary polyethylene bottles staged in the Residual Heat Removal System pump room in accordance with plant procedures. This was an NRC identified issue. (No Cross-Cutting Aspect was assigned to this violation).
- Green (Very Low safety significance) NCV – The station did not include certain equipment located in the 480V switchgear rooms in the station’s Equipment Qualification Program. This was related to measures to address a tornado event. The calculation to determine the heat-up rate in different areas which identified elevated temperatures in the 480V switchgear rooms was identified as conservative and a reanalysis is being performed to establish the actual temperature in those locations would be lower than previously determined. (No Cross-Cutting Aspect was assigned to this violation.)

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

In response to Dr. Lam's question Mr. Prentice explained a NCV of very low safety significance does not carry the monetary penalty that a cited violation can. Mr. Prentice stated all NCVs are entered into the Corrective Action Program and tracked by station leadership. In response to Consultant McWhorter's question as to the seven violations received so far in 2022, with three having been received in the first half of the year, Mr. Prentice replied DCP's operational performance has been consistent but there have been a number of temporary NRC Senior Resident Inspectors assigned and at the conclusion of 2021 there were some items that may have been able to be resolved in 2021 but that rolled over into 2022. Mr. Prentice confirmed the two NRC-identified items in the four NCVs he discussed were identified by the permanent NRC resident inspectors.

Mr. Prentice reported cross-cutting aspects of violations are tracked and the only cross-cutting aspect identified was for aspect H-13 concerning a consistent process for procedures. **In response to Mr. McWhorter's comment Mr. Prentice agreed to highlight any cross-cutting aspects for which a current entry exists on the next list provided for DCISC review.**

Mr. Prentice stated no licensee event reports have been submitted by DCP to the NRC since the last meeting of the DCISC in June 2022. Two Inspection Reports were issued by the NRC during the period June 2022 to September 2022: the Design Basis Assurance Inspection Report (2022-011, 08/09/2022) and the 2nd Quarter 2022 Integrated Inspection Report (2022-002, 08/10/2022). One generic industry license amendment was approved by the NRC to adopt a generically approved industry standard technical specification update to revise the surveillance frequencies for steam generator tube inspections. In response to Dr Budnitz' query Mr. Prentice confirmed the violation related to the 480V switchgear room was identified in the Design Basis Assurance Report.

Mr. David Weisman representing the Alliance of Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Weisman remarked Mr. Prentice's comment concerning 2,000 hours of NRC inspection time over a four-month period represents 500 hours per month or 8 hours for 22 days each month for 2.9 persons. Mr. Prentice responded that the 2,000 hours he cited includes inspection hours from additional NRC staff and not just by the two NRC resident inspectors permanently assigned to DCP.

A short break followed.

XIII STAFF & CONSULTANT REPORTS & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E

A. The Chair requested Consultant Wardell to provide a report on the August 16-17, 2022, fact-finding visit with Dr. Peterson. Mr. Wardell reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the August 2022 visit as follows:

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

- **Greater Than Class C Waste Storage Plan** - Mr. Wardell reported greater than Class C radioactive waste is the highest radioactive category of four categories of low level radioactive waste. Dr. Peterson stated the United States uses a deterministic criterion about the contents of different radionuclides that is not related in any significant way to actual hazards of handling and disposing of this waste. Dr. Peterson observed that greater than class C waste exceeds Class C limits for certain radio isotopes and this greatly complicates the management of these materials in the United States. Mr. Wardell reported that greater than Class C waste at DCPD is expected to include metal in the reactor vessel which receives a high neutron dose and has become activated. This includes reactor vessel nozzles and DCPD plans when decommissioning to segment the reactor vessels and remove the vessel internals and seal those materials in spent fuel-like canisters which will be stored above the ISFSI in a facility to be located in proximity to the old steam generator and reactor vessel head storage facility. In response to Dr. Kadak's query as to whether there is any greater than Class C waste in the spent fuel pools now and why a separate facility from the ISFSI is required, Mr. Prentice responded there is some greater than Class C waste in the spent fuel pools now from earlier operation and the ISFSI is licensed only for the storage of spent fuel and is sized for forty years of operation for that purpose.
- **License Renewal Status** - Mr. Wardell stated he would not be reviewing this item as the fact-finding visit predated the Legislature's adoption of SB 846 and there is a presentation later at this public meeting on this topic.
- **Emergency Preparedness During Decommissioning** - Mr. Wardell displayed and discussed a graphic representation of three stages of emergency planning: first during operation, second when all spent fuel is located both at the ISFSI and within the spent fuel pools, and third when all spent fuel is all stored within the ISFSI. He reported during the evolution from one stage to the next the amount of emergency preparedness required will diminish until during the final phase there will be no need for the Technical Support Center, the Operational Support Center, the Emergency Operations Facility or the Joint Information Center as all emergency-related activities, including the ISFSI emergency plan, will be conducted and managed from the Control Room.
- **Feedwater Heater Tube Failure Follow-up** - Mr. Wardell reported in 2021 DCPD experienced a feedwater heater leakage over-drain on Unit 2 as a result of feedwater heater tube failures. The leakage was repaired after two attempts. Since Unit 2 was restarted it has operated well. Mr. Wardell stated the Probable Cause analysis of the feedwater heater tube failure identified failure of the tubes or their supports which caused the tubes to fail and he reported the DCISC Fact Finding Team (FFT) found the Probable Cause and the corrective actions to be satisfactory. The FFT reviewed inspections done on Unit 1 during the outage during which probes were sent into the Unit 1 feedwater heaters and found their condition to be acceptable. **For Unit 2 Mr. Wardell reported the same inspections will be performed during the upcoming outage and he recommended the DCISC review the results of those inspections following the outage.**

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

- Tsunami Warning Response - Mr. Wardell reported the National Weather Service is the agency responsible for issuing a tsunami warning which is the most significant advisement which follows issuance of advisories, watches, and information statements. DCPD is required to respond to tsunami warnings and has a casualty procedure in place to do so. The calculated design basis for a tsunami is 32 feet above mean sea level and all plant facilities with the exception of the Intake and Discharge Structures are located at 85 feet above mean sea level. The auxiliary saltwater pumps are housed in watertight rooms within the Intake Structure and Mr. Wardell stated the FFT found the plant to be well protected from a tsunami with satisfactory procedures in place. **In response to Consultant Kadak's inquiry Mr. Wardell reported the DCISC FFT did not ascertain when the watertight integrity or the seals of the Intake Structure rooms which contain the auxiliary saltwater pumps were inspected and the DCISC agreed to follow up on this inquiry.**
- Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector - the FFT met with Mr. Hayes, the permanent Senior Resident Inspector remotely as Mr. Hayes was at that time recovering from COVID, to discuss the fact-finding agenda, the issue of fuel leakage from the emergency diesel generators discussed at the DCISC June public meeting, and the pending license extension matter concerning which Mr. Hayes stated much of the NRC's work will be generated from NRC Headquarters. Mr. Wardell stated the Committee's meetings with the NRC resident inspection team continue to be valuable for both parties.
- NRC Resident Inspectors' Access to PG&E Computer System - Mr. Wardell reported the NRC Resident Inspectors have limited access through laptops provided by DCPD to the PG&E computer system for the NRC inspector's use on the local area network, the SAP process including the Corrective Action Program, plant data, the Plan of the Day publication and the email system. For NRC dedicated work the resident inspectors have their own computers and laptops with separate systems including for email. Mr. Wardell stated this practice is now standard in the industry and the FFT found it to be a good practice.
- Observe Plant Health Committee (PHC) Meeting - PHC meetings are remotely conducted on a weekly basis with a purpose to assure or achieve system or component health and to work with the system engineers to that end. The PHC reviews action plans, the Operations tactical list and the top ten equipment lists which identify Operations Department needs as far as enhancements to system health⁸ and safety systems. Mr. Wardell stated the FFT found the PHC meetings to be effective.
- Equipment Reliability Update - The Equipment Reliability Program uses colors to measure performance. Unit 1 equipment reliability was rated Yellow due to condenser saltwater leakage, the two incidents of feedwater heater leaks which Mr. Wardell discussed previously,

⁸ On a scale of Green indicating a healthy performance and White indicating that achievable action plans are in place to return performance to healthy status. A Yellow rating would indicate the indicator shows deficient performance and needs improvement and Red would indicate unsatisfactory performance.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

and for a valve malfunction. Unit 2 equipment reliability is in Green status with the most significant issue being the Main Generator vibration problems following its rewind and the feedwater tube leaks which were resolved. Mr. Wardell reported most of the equipment reliability issues are on the secondary side of the plant. **He reported DCPD has implemented a 2022 Equipment Reliability Excellence Plan and the FFT found the actions by DCPD to be appropriate and recommended the DCISC review equipment reliability again in six months.**

➤ Condensate Polisher Resin Issue - Mr. Wardell reported the steam from the steam generators which is used to turn the turbines is condensed in the condensers and this condensate water is polished, that is to say cleaned, of corrosion from its interaction with metals and chemicals by large resin ion exchange demineralizers which pick up and flush the contaminants in a process that is repeated. Mr. Wardell reported DCPD employs full flow polishers with a capacity of 31,000 gallons per minute. After a shutdown, resins in the ion bed were found with iron due to corrosion of the iron-based piping in the system and the resins were releasing sulphates which Mr. Wardell stated is not good for the system. The ion bed manufacturer recommended a hot scrub and air rinse for the resin beds and Mr. Wardell reported this was successful.

➤ Meet with DCPD Officer – the FFT met with Site Vice President Mr. Adam Peck to review the fact-finding agenda and other items of mutual interest.

➤ Large Motors Program - large motors are motors which are fed by the 4kV and 12kV systems and produce more than 250 horsepower. Mr. Wardell reported this program is managed by a tactical engineer and is in Green health status. **Due to the approval of the Joint Proposal the Large Motors Program's plans for replacements and overhaul of certain large motors was partially suspended and with the plan to extend operation Mr. Wardell stated the Large Motor Program will need to be reviewed and fully reactivated and the DCISC should review and monitor this effort.** In response to Consultant Kadak's inquiry Mr. Wardell confirmed there are some safety-related systems included in the Large Motors Program including the auxiliary saltwater pumps, the component cooling water pumps, reactor coolant pumps and the safety injection pumps.

➤ Radiation Surveys of the ISFSI - Mr. Wardell reported with Dr. Peterson and DCPD Radiation Protection personnel the DCISC representatives were equipped with dosimeters and portable radiation detectors including gamma radiation and neutron radiation detectors. He reported the gamma doses within the perimeter of the ISFSI fence ranged from .4 to 2.5 millirem per hour depending on a person's location in proximity to a spent fuel storage cask. Outside the fence the gamma dose was 18 to 120 microrentgens which he described as extremely low. Very little neutron radiation was detected. The FFT received no recordable radiation dose during their investigation.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

➤ Observe Receipt and Inspection of New Fuel – the FFT observed DCPD's receipt, inspection, and handling of new fuel which was to be installed in Unit 2 during the 2R23 refueling outage. Mr. Wardell reported the fuel was manufactured by Westinghouse and shipped to DCPD from South Carolina in long metal strongback containers, 20 feet long by 8 feet in diameter, each containing two fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblies are 14 feet long and approximately 1 foot by 1 foot square. The fuel is lifted and transported by crane to the new fuel vaults where a detailed inspection takes place. Following this inspection the fuel is lifted over the spent fuel pool and are transferred, via the spent fuel pool and the transfer canal, into Containment and then placed in the reactor vessel for a three-year operational lifetime. The FFT concluded the operation was performed professionally and carefully and Mr. Wardell displayed photos taken during the FFT visit. Dr. Peterson commented the surface dose rate on a fuel assembly was about 2.5 millirem per hour which drops off rapidly as one moves away from the assembly.

Ms. Sherry Lewis, a member of Mothers for Peace, was recognized. In response to Ms. Lewis inquiry Mr. Wardell reported that if the watertight integrity of the Intake Structure's rooms which contain the auxiliary saltwater pumps was compromised there would be water leakage into the room and the operation of the pumps could be affected and in accordance with Dr. Kadak's observation the DCISC will follow-up on the issue of watertight integrity of the Intake Structure rooms containing the auxiliary saltwater pumps. Dr. Peterson remarked the most important equipment to be protected from a tsunami are the emergency diesel generators which are located 85 feet above mean sea level and Dr. Peterson observed the auxiliary saltwater pumps are not essential to safe shutdown. Mr. Wardell observed that should the auxiliary saltwater pumps be lost the FLEX⁹ Program capabilities provide a backup system.

Mr. John Geesman representing the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Concerning the feedwater heater tube issue described by Mr. Wardell, Mr. Geesman inquired whether there was a material difference in time between the feedwater heaters current Green health status and the status of the feedwater heaters for extended operation. He remarked during the June 2022 DCISC public meeting Mr. Petersen made the comment that replacement of the feedwater heaters would be a very significant project and represents a project that if DCPD were seeking a license extension would have definitely been undertaken Mr. Geesman stated the failure of the feedwater heaters caused Unit 2 to shut down and to start up twice and there is a valid concern that such shutdowns and startups should be minimized for safety reasons. Mr. Geesman referred to Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Report 20-04 entitled "The Nexus Between Safety and Operational Performance" and its conclusion that "[w]hen changes in processes or equipment are made that result in improvements to equipment reliability or availability, the outcome has a positive impact on both safety and operational performance" and he inquired relative to the feedwater heater tubes what timeframe or time horizon would the Committee

⁹ FLEX is not an acronym but describes a strategy developed by the nuclear industry to provide diverse and flexible coping strategies to address the loss of safety-related systems due to beyond design basis events.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

apply to the analysis as to whether something does or does not require replacement. Mr. Wardell stated he agreed that transients¹⁰ should be avoided on any system whether it be primary or secondary but he remarked the plant is designed to handle these transients but the higher the equipment reliability the fewer transients will be experienced. Mr. Wardell recalled that when DCPD was preparing for the original license extension application, all the feedwater heaters were planned for replacement for twenty years of operation **but with the Joint Proposal it was determined the plant could operate satisfactorily to 2025 without replacing the feedwater heaters and he observed the lead time to obtain new feedwater heaters is lengthy, likely taking years. He observed this is an issue on which the plant will make a decision and the Committee will conduct a review.** Mr. Wardell reported feedwater heaters are designed with significant margin to account for tube plugging on account of tube failure. Mr. Geesman commented that it was his recollection the Unit 2 feedwater heaters have approximately 20% of their tubes plugged. Dr. Peterson remarked feedwater heaters are not safety significant in that the limits on the steam generators are associated with heat removal for safety-related purposes. Mr. Geesman commented that too many feedwater heaters shutdowns could result in a unit shutdown for an extended period and under SB 846 a substantial cost is placed on the taxpayers and the ratepayers and justified as liquidated damages as a result of continuing to run an aging power plant and in Mr. Geesman's view those parties should be protected against such costs. Mr. Geesman remarked the statutes enacted under SB 846 do not distinguish between safety-related and non-safety related components and he suggested the DCISC should take a safety-oriented perspective as to both. Mr. Wardell commented the plant has and will be inspecting all the feedwater heaters to ensure their suitability for operation to 2025 but their operability beyond that date is an open question although an individual feedwater heater can be isolated from other feedwater heaters and the plant can continue to run albeit at lesser efficiency.

Dr. Budnitz observed that the confidence the plant can run effectively until 2025 needs to be based on something besides judgment and when the DCISC makes its inquiries it will ask about the operating experience in the industry for extended operation. Dr. Budnitz observed there are two possible extremes here, one that it creates a high degree of failure and another that there are number of plants running for extended periods with no significant problems and this is a calculus that DCPD will need to engage in and the Committee will need to review. Dr. Budnitz stated extended operation of DCPD creates many similar lines of inquiry for which the Committee will need to come to an independent review about whether the judgments are acceptable but he reiterated it takes more than judgment, it takes data. Dr. Budnitz remarked the only accident of consequence in the United States occurred at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in Pennsylvania and it began with a problem involving the failure of a polisher on the feedwater input and it is important to remember to be humble about things that don't look as if they're important as when they are combined with other factors they can contribute significantly to a problem. Mr. Geesman thanked Dr. Budnitz for his observation and remarked that at the February 2022 public meeting Dr. Budnitz expressed the view that the NRC should revisit its classification for safety and non-safety related systems and components which classification was developed in the 1970s. Dr. Budnitz replied there is a program under 10 CFR

¹⁰ A transient is defined as an event when a plant proceeds from a normal state to an abnormal state.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

50.69 for safety classification of system, structures and components which revisits the NRC's earlier classification and the 50.69 program was adopted a few years ago and is available to currently operating plants and he remarked that perhaps the 10 CFR 50.69 regulatory scheme could and should be used at least in part at DCP. Mr. Geesman thanked Dr. Budnitz for this information and he commended the DCISC for the manner in which it conducts its public meetings.

Upon a motion made by Dr. Budnitz, seconded by Dr. Lam, the August 16-17, 2022, Fact Finding Report was accepted by the DCISC. The report will become a part of the Committee's 33rd Annual Report.

The Chair requested Consultant Wardell continue his presentation and to provide a report on the September 13-14, 2022, fact-finding visit with Dr. Budnitz. Mr. Wardell reported that Dr. Budnitz would review two of the topics from the September 2022 visit to include probabilistic risk assessment and the long-term seismic program, while Mr. Wardell would review the other topics discussed with PG&E during the September 2022 visit as follows:

➤ Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Program Review – Dr. Budnitz reported the PRA model contains an identification of every important accident sequence including the initiating event and the likelihood and contribution of failures or human error that follow and lead to a final undesired result. Dr. Budnitz reported the PRA model is supported by both analyses and data and the PRA for DCP has long been recognized as superior and one of the best in the industry. The PRA is maintained and is continually updated for plant configuration changes and for the receipt of new data and periodically a total PRA model update is performed with the next being scheduled for spring 2023 which was planned to be the final update but with plans for extended operation that will likely not be the case. Dr. Budnitz stated the most important use of PRA is to inform safety decision-making when systems or components are removed from service during operations or during an outage. In this context PRA is used to ascertain the level of compromise, if any, to safety of operation. PRA also supports the evaluation of the significance of operating experience received from other nuclear power plants to inform DCP's decisions and is also employed to assist in prioritization during routine operations when components are maintained or serviced. The PRA model is also used to assess and understand the contribution of human error in the management of the power plant. He reported plant leadership, management, supervisors and maintenance personnel now all have an understanding of the importance of PRA in protecting components and systems. The DCISC fact-finding team (FFT) concluded the PRA model at DCP continues to be used effectively and to be emulated by other stations. Dr. Budnitz observed the plant will be relying on the PRA group to provide input in the decision-making process during the review and planning process for extended operation.

➤ Safety Culture Update – Mr. Wardell described safety culture as an individual's commitment to and recognition of personal accountability for safety on the part of every employee. Elements of safety culture include a willingness to ask questions and raise concerns in a respectful work environment that fosters effective communication with managers and leadership and maintaining an emphasis on the importance of nuclear safety. A Safety Conscious

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

Work Environment (SCWE) is part of nuclear safety culture. Mr. Wardell reported the DCISC has always assessed the safety culture and SCWE at DCPD as very strong. DCPD uses a Safety Culture Monitoring Panel consisting of managers, individual contributors and union employees to assess data from surveys and from the Corrective Action Program and elsewhere to judge safety culture on a continuing basis.

➤ Observe All Hands Meeting with PG&E Chief Executive Officer - Mr. Wardell reported the FFT attended and observed an all-hands meeting with the PG&E Chief Executive Officer, the Board of Directors and other corporate executives to discuss the potential for five additional years of continued operation and reported corporate leadership expressed appreciation for DCPD's excellent operating record. The concept of a "one team" culture was discussed as was employing the corrective action program, the employee concerns program and nuclear safety culture concepts in other areas of PG&E's operations.

➤ 2R23 Outage Safety Plan – the FFT reviewed the 2R23 outage safety plan and Mr. Wardell reported the plan is based on a defense-in-depth approach which includes ensuring an adequate number of components are available to account for differences in safety at any point in time. He reported classifications for shut down risk are rated as Green, Yellow, Orange or Red based on a PRA analysis tool known as Phoenix and DCPD does permit Orange or Red conditions during an outage. There are some Yellow windows during 2R23 due to components being out of service with a limited number of components left in service, with a preference for a minimum of two other components being required. The FFT concluded the safety schedule was comprehensive and effective.

➤ Long-Term Seismic Program Update – Dr. Budnitz reported the FFT reviewed the Long-Term Seismic Program which is supported by the PG&E Geo-Sciences group in an effort to understand and characterize the effect and the extent of the ground motion produced by different seismic events anywhere in the world on the power plant. He reported the program was and remains part of a NRC imposed license condition for DCPD to require continued understanding about the uncertainties produced by earthquakes wherever they are propagated in the vicinity of DCPD and to ensure the plant is capable of withstanding those effects. Dr. Budnitz reported the DCPD Long-Term Seismic Program is led by recognized experts and is reviewed by experts all over the world and has been found by those experts to be first-rate. The FFT learned about new and continued deployment of instruments to measure ground motion around the area of DCPD. Dr. Budnitz reported that on October 6, 2022, a meeting of the State of California's Independent Peer Review Panel for seismic study of DCPD and environs is scheduled at CPUC Headquarters in San Francisco and the DCPD team will make a detailed presentation at that public meeting which Dr. Budnitz stated he would attend as a representative of the DCISC. **Dr. Budnitz reported the Long-Term Seismic Program also analyzes and assesses the seismic capacity of every piece of equipment and every plant structure and the DCISC will conduct a review of those efforts in the future.** Dr. Budnitz remarked that in California earthquakes tend to produce lateral motion and therefore fault displacement is an important contributor to seismic hazard and the Long-Term Seismic Program employs a fault-displacement model in determining the location of plant structures including relative to the location of the planned greater than Class

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

C waste building and the Long-Term Seismic Program contributes to fault displacement work done by others including at the University of Southern California and at the U.S. Geological Survey in Menlo Park. Dr. Budnitz reported ground motion that occurs from the Hosgri Fault, located a few miles offshore from DCP, is measured as that motion comes to the plant site but those measurements are always uncertain due to the degree of variability and the Long-Term Seismic Program continues to take measurements to narrow that uncertainty and improve confidence in the ground motion models. Dr. Budnitz next reviewed the precariously balanced rock analysis, an assessment conducted using two large rocks located next to each other on the road leading to the plant. Analysis has shown, with some level of uncertainty, those rocks have been in their positions for tens of thousands of years and therefore there is a level of confidence that an earthquake large enough to dislodge one or both of the rocks has not occurred during that time. Dr. Budnitz mentioned that a report will be issued soon which he stated will be informative as to the local seismic conditions four miles from the plant site. He remarked the preliminary insight may be the seismic hazard at the site is lower than previously thought. In concluding his remarks Dr. Budnitz stated there is no doubt that the DCP Long-Term Seismic Program is an excellent program and the PG&E Geo-Sciences group continues to do excellent work.

➤ Core Exit Thermocouple System Update – Mr. Wardell reported core exit thermocouples are the different wires used to measure flow temperature created by heat from nuclear fission at numerous exit points from the reactor core. The data is made available in the Control Room and provides an indication of potential core damaging problems. The system consists of in-core thermocouples, wiring which goes through the Containment walls, penetration seals, and monitoring equipment. Mr. Wardell reported the System health is Green. Dr. Budnitz remarked the system can also detect asymmetries in the flow which can produce temperature differences and may be precursors to greater flow disruption or flow blockage.

➤ Cyber Security Update - Mr. Wardell reported the Cyber Security Program was developed to protect critical digital assets, that is, those digital assets related to safety-related and other important safety equipment functions as well as to some secondary functions. The program includes emergency preparedness functions and off-site communication. There are no critical digital assets at DCP that have access to the internet or to networks outside the plant and Mr. Wardell reported the plant's critical digital assets are triple isolated. He reported the DCP email system does not connect to any safety system or digital control systems at the plant and Dr. Peterson reported the use of optical beta diodes permits electricity to flow in only one direction thereby permitting data to go out at certain locations but preventing data from coming in across those diodes. Mr. Wardell reported the FFT found the Cyber Security Program to be very effective. In response to Consultant Kadak's inquiry, Mr. Wardell confirmed the Cyber Security Program includes review of the procurement of replacement electronic components in the plant and these components are tested in isolation to check for any problems. **Dr. Peterson stated the DCISC should review plans for maintenance or upgrades to the digital systems including for the Reactor Protection System.** Dr. Budnitz remarked there is a national standard promulgated by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) to assure integrity in procurement. Mr. Wardell reported there is a recent inspection report issued by the NRC for the Cyber Security Program.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

- Meet with Site Vice President Mr. Adam Peck – the FFT met with the DCPD Site Vice President to discuss the fact-finding agenda and other matters of mutual interest.
- DCPD License Extension Update – Mr. Wardell stated he would not provide comments at this time as there is a presentation on this topic scheduled later at this public meeting.
- Observe Evaluated Emergency Preparedness Exercise – the FFT observed this exercise and Mr. Wardell reviewed the scenario which led to a postulated radiation release due to a compromise in each of the three fission product protection barriers, the fuel clad barrier, the Reactor Coolant System barrier and the Containment barrier. The DCISC representatives observed the exercise from the Control Room Simulator Facility, the Emergency Operations Facility and from the Joint Information Center. Mr. Wardell described the exercise as well planned, well implemented and successful. **The FFT did not observe the critiques which followed the exercise and the DCISC will review the report of the critiques and the NRC evaluation when they are approved.** Dr. Budnitz reported that during the exercise he mistakenly left a copy of the exercise scenario in his briefcase which was unattended for a few minutes. The scenario document was never exposed but the action violated procedure and accordingly was entered into the Corrective Action Program. The FFT also engaged in a discussion which a monitor complained may have been distracting. The DCISC has now included an item on its Open Items List concerning maintaining confidentiality during its observation of emergency drill or exercise activities.

Dr. Gene Nelson for Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson remarked and Dr. Budnitz concurred that in previous remarks Dr. Budnitz has described the Long-Term Seismic Program as being the gold standard for such programs. Dr. Budnitz commented that no other utility has a Geo Sciences group akin to that of PG&E and the group provides support not just to DCPD but also other areas of PG&E's operations.

Ms. Sherry Lewis representing Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Lewis stated it was her understanding that several types of accident sequences are not identified or considered in the PRAs models described by Dr. Budnitz, such as two problems occurring at the same time. Dr. Budnitz responded that this was not correct in that simultaneous events occurring in sequence are considered by PRA modeling. Dr. Budnitz stated the only flaw in PRA is that it is a intrinsically inductive process which means it can never be proven to be complete and the confidence in the method then lies in thousands of experiences at 400 nuclear plants around the world and in that regard it is important to be humble concerning reaching conclusions. Dr. Budnitz confirmed that terrorism is not addressed by PRA as it is not possible to quantify the likelihood of the initiating event and the analysis concerning terrorism that is done is security safeguarded information.

Mr. David Weisman representing the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Weisman referred to a presentation given some years ago by Dr. Lam entitled "Black Swan" which identified a sequence of concurrent, unanticipated events. Dr. Budnitz

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

stated he agreed with Dr. Lam's identification in the Black Swan presentation but nevertheless predictive techniques and insights are used frequently, as while not perfect they offer tremendous benefits. Dr. Lam stated that his position has not changed since his development of the Black Swan presentation and he described nuclear technology as an unforgiving technology where a minor mistake can cause tremendous consequences.

Dr. Nelson representing Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson observed the real world experience of the nuclear power industry, including the accidents at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania where a partial core meltdown occurred and at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan where three reactors melted down, were examples of Black Swan events where there were no fatalities or injuries due to radiation. Dr. Budnitz responded one reason why almost no radiation exposure occurred as a result of those events was due to the evacuation of the local populations and the interdiction of food which was exposed to radiation to prevent it from being ingested by people but the results of those accidents represented a huge economic loss.

Mr. John Geesman representing the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Geesman inquired as to how much of the secondary side of the plant is included in the PRA model and how does the seismic PRA account for aftershocks in modeling human response to earthquakes including deployment of FLEX equipment. Dr. Budnitz responded and reported everything on the secondary side of the plant that is of consequence in an accident sequence is modeled in PRA. Concerning Mr. Geesman's second inquiry Dr. Budnitz stated modeling of aftershocks is imperfect, but it is not absent from PRA modeling rather it is modeled with a good degree of numerical uncertainty which makes the insights regarding core damage frequency taken from that modeling uncertain as well.

Upon a motion made by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Lam, the September 13-14, 2022 Fact Finding Report was accepted by the DCISC. The report will become a part of the Committee's 33rd Annual Report.

XIV ADJOURN AFTERNOON MEETING

The Committee having completed all its scheduled business, Dr. Lam adjourned the afternoon meeting of the Committee at 4:30 P.M.

XV RECONVENE FOR EVENING MEETING

Dr. Lam reconvened the evening meeting of the DCISC at 5:30 P.M.

XVI COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments by Committee Members at this time.

XVII PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Dr. Lam invited members of the public to address the Committee on matters not on the agenda for this meeting.

Mr. Eric Greening was recognized. Mr. Greening stated his comment touched on the

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

consequences of relicensing DCPD and the continuance of the application and the environmental review of the application. Mr. Greening stated he was concerned if the underlying project description and accordingly the environmental documents should change can residents be guaranteed an opportunity for a subsequent and accurate environmental impact report.

Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie stated email communications have been received from Ms. Terri Wood, Ms. K. Lindsey Hunter, Ms. Stephanie Fuller, Mr. Charles Ziegler, Ms. Laura Lynch, Ms. June Cochran, Ms. Susan Leonard, Ms. Rima Alwazir, Mr. Stephen Keene, Ms. Cathy Iwane, Ms. Carol Hisasue, and Mr. Nigel Crawford. He reported all these emails conveyed closely aligned messages concerning extending operation of DCPD and expressed concern with the potential for changing the closure dates for Units 1 and 2, questioning the use of tax dollars for the purpose of extending operation of DCPD, expressed concerns as to seismic risks, concerns with the use of aging and outdated components, the issue of a diminished workforce, concerns with the embrittlement of Unit 1's reactor vessel, delays in maintenance, the waiver of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) provisions imposed by SB 846, the continued use of once-through cooling and a corresponding detrimental effect on the marine environment, and concerning the storage of nuclear waste. He reported the messages received are now a part of the Committee's record.

Dr. Lam welcomed and recognized the presence of Dr. Victor Gilinsky and reported Dr. Gilinsky is a former NRC Commissioner who served two terms in that capacity. Mr. Rathie recognized and welcomed Ms. Shelly Abajian, Central Coast District Representative for U.S. Senator Diane Feinstein.

XVIII DISCUSSION BY THE COMMITTEE

Dr. Lam introduced the subject matter for this discussion by the Committee, that being the recent passage of SB 846 which provides for the possibility of extended operations by DCPD beyond the planned closure dates of 2024 (Unit 1) and 2025 (Unit 2).

Dr. Budnitz remarked that for more than thirty years the Charter of the DCISC has emphasized reviewing operational safety at the station, not only regarding the safety of its overall operation but also of specific issues. He reported the Committee's Open Items List includes dozens of items the Committee reviews from time to time and the Committee has always viewed its role as to perform an evaluation of whether the plant's safety is adequate in the Committee's view independent of the NRC's regulatory criteria. Dr. Budnitz observed SB 846, in enacting Public Utilities Code Section 712.1, has now established the DCISC as a statutory instrument of the CPUC, which created the DCISC in context of a settlement agreement entered into more than thirty years ago. He described the statute as effecting basically a continuation of the Committee's work to evaluate the safety of the plant now and over the future five years beyond 2025 and to make findings and evaluations about the safety of the plant over that period and make those findings and evaluations publicly available. Dr. Budnitz observed SB 846 asks the DCISC to evaluate any potential safety improvements and enhancements. The new legislation requires the DCISC to devote special attention [through consultation with and incorporation of the assessments and recommendation into its annual reports] to the State of California's Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) for seismic studies of DCPD and its environs. The Committee also continues to be charged with producing an Annual Report and

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

provide the report to various agencies, now including the California Legislature and the NRC.

Dr. Budnitz observed that since approval of the Joint Proposal [in 2016] DCPD has engaged in extensive planning in preparation to shut down operations in 2024 and 2025 which has affected programs, equipment and systems and the plant made significant efforts to assure certain items would run reliably until 2025 while understandably not considering operation of those items post-2025 and these efforts affected a large number of programs, equipment and systems. He reported the DCISC's review of DCPD's efforts in this regard is reflected in the Committee's Open Items Lists over that period. Dr. Budnitz reported the plant is going to need to carefully review each of its programs, equipment, and systems and develop plans and review those plans with the NRC to ensure they meet the NRC's criteria and the DCISC will review these efforts and reach its own independent evaluation and opinion. Dr. Budnitz remarked that the Committee in this effort will necessarily be in a reactive mode in its review and interaction with DCPD and these efforts by the Committee will require a significant amount of work.

Dr. Budnitz suggested context will need to be developed and a list will need to be compiled for items to review and PG&E's list will be reviewed by the DCISC and a dialogue opened with the plant and the public. In completing its work the Committee will identify items for review and conduct fact-finding, review documents and, likely concerning certain issues, consult within the nuclear industry. Dr. Budnitz remarked it is hard at this point to provide more specifics but, of course, it is the specifics that matter and the Committee will remain available to receive public comment.

Dr. Peterson concurred with Dr. Budnitz' remarks and the focus on the Open Items List as a vehicle for undertaking the work under SB 846, but with the added context of needing to identify additional things that the Committee will need to check and review for example concerning the resumption of certain capital projects. Dr. Peterson observed that through its public meetings the Committee provides a venue for state agencies and the public to raise questions which the DCISC can then investigate. He referred to the list of issues raised in the emails referred to in Mr. Rathie's remarks which summarize many of the major issues the Committee will need to review and for which it will need to be positioned during fact-findings and public meetings to receive public input and to provide information and he commented this provides a systematic approach to a comprehensive identification of issues raised by a decision to pursue extension of operations. Dr. Peterson confirmed Dr. Budnitz' comments that simple adherence to NRC regulations and safety criteria is not sufficient and one of the key determinations to be made by the Committee is how well does DCPD perform relative to other U.S. nuclear power plants and he reported generally DCPD has always been in the top quartile of performance in this respect. He noted that DCPD is located in a high seismic hazard area and therefore special attention is warranted on the issue of seismic safety, for which the plant has special provisions in terms of review and oversight including substantial differences in construction and specific design features. He gave the example of the gantry crane in Containment running on rails on the operating deck level as opposed to other nuclear power plants which employ a polar crane which runs on rails that are part of the containment structure.

Dr. Budnitz observed DCISC like all other U.S. nuclear power plants was licensed for a forty-year operational life. He reported most operating plants have received twenty-year license

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

extensions permitting sixty years of operation. He observed there is a process at the NRC and a list of activities required in order to obtain such an extension. Prior to approval of the Joint Proposal PG&E submitted an application for a license extension and that application was in process and included a draft Safety Evaluation Report, but this process was terminated after approval of the Joint Proposal by the CPUC [in 2018]. The Committee has access to the information developed at that time and Dr. Budnitz stated he expects PG&E will rely and build upon the previous work.

Dr. Lam stated he was comforted by the statutory mandate that provides for assurance of additional resources in manpower and budget for the DCISC. He remarked that because of the Joint Proposal there has been a delay in the replacement, maintenance, and repair of vital equipment as well as a decline in manpower amongst managerial and technical staff and an assessment of these issues needs to be part of the DCISC's priorities. Dr. Lam remarked the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) was licensed for twenty years of operation and an additional period of operation may place an additional demand on the ISFSI.

Mr. Rathie welcomed and recognized the presence via remote technology of Mr. Martin Mattes of the Nossaman law firm who assists the Committee as special counsel for regulatory matters. In response to Dr. Lam's request, Mr. Rathie observed SB 846 provides for continuance of the Committee review of operational safety at DCPD and for the Committee to continue to make recommendations in its annual reports for improvements that enhance the safety of the plant. He observed this is the mandate the Committee has been adhering to since it first commenced operation in late 1989. Mr. Rathie remarked that the composition of the Committee has changed over time as its members are appointed to staggered terms by the Governor, the Chair of the California Energy Commission and the California Attorney General. Each Committee as it is comprised at the time of preparing its annual report will employ its expertise, knowledge and available information and use its discretion in making its assessments and recommendations for the improvement of safety of the plant. He reported that earlier today the Committee approved the DCISC 32nd Annual Report on safety of operations which, akin to all other reports, contains the Committee Members conclusions, concerns and recommendations. He commented that now under SB 846 the Committee will be providing its annual reports to the Legislature and to the NRC as well as continuing to make its annual reports available to other entities and to the public.

Mr. Mattes stated he agreed with the comments made and emphasized that the reference in the legislation to recommendations or enhancements or improvements in safety is really a validation of the role the Committee has had for more than thirty years.

Dr. Budnitz stated the new activity required of the DCISC under SB 846 comes in addition to the ongoing role of the Committee to continue its evaluation of operational safety as the plant continues in operation, and includes preparing and commencing its review of the very considerable activities associated with planning for the decommissioning of the power plant, the storage of spent nuclear fuel including evaluation of a new spent fuel storage system and all preliminary activities taking place. Dr. Budnitz remarked that the effort to extend operations will necessarily change the planning for decommissioning, but PG&E is not placing decommissioning activities on hold and at this point in time and there is no assurance that DCPD

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

will receive a license from the NRC for extended operation. All of this remains within the DCISC's remit from the CPUC. Dr. Budnitz remarked there is an interaction between decommissioning activities and operation as the two initiatives are related.

Consultant Wardell stated he supported the comments of Drs. Budnitz, Lam and Peterson and he is working with Consultant McWhorter on an additional Open Items List of new action items to review concerning extended operation which will be presented to the Committee later during this public meeting.

Consultant McWhorter remarked he spent five years in charge of a major project building a combined cycle power plant and he stated while the Members all made excellent comments about what the Committee needs to do in the future he observed the Committee also needs to determine and review the planning that need to be put in place. He remarked the research and discovery phase of the Committee's work will pass very quickly and after three more years it will be time for PG&E to execute its plan and for the DCISC to review extended operations and all associated activities, which will be considerable and will need to be completed on time.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mother for Peace was recognized. Ms. Lewis inquired whether the Committee has the time to do all of the activities described during the discussion, would the Committee be visiting the local area more frequently, and if a problem is identified what can be done about it. Dr. Lam remarked he was assured by the statutory mandate for more funding for manpower and other assistance for the Committee if and when it is needed. Dr. Budnitz remarked he remains optimistic but the task will not be easy. Dr. Peterson observed this will generate additional work and is one of the reasons the Committee now has three technical consultants and he remarked that if additional resources are needed to conduct the work of the Committee it will be requested and Dr. Peterson expressed confidence it would be provided.

Dr. Gene Nelson for Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson suggested the Committee revisit the topics it had under review on June 20, 2016, the day prior to announcement of the Joint Proposal, and he observed the Committee would not be operating from a blank slate and the DCISC was pursuing its assessment of plant safety at that time. He stated his belief the task to develop a continuity and to actually achieve everything that needs to be done by 2025 is not insuperable.

Ms. Ann Hoskins was recognized. Ms. Hoskins stated she worked for a company that owned a nuclear unit, has served as a public utility commissioner, and has worked with renewable energy issues. She stated the DCISC has been given a tremendous assignment on very little time and she urged the Committee to ask for the resources and support it needs now because of how quickly this process happened and she commented she believes there are numerous persons in the community that support the Committee and its activities.

Mr. Eric Greening was recognized. Mr. Greening thanked the Committee for the commitments made today and he stated he recognized the difficulties involved. He stated one of his concerns in the process of relicensing the power plant, or with litigation around that matter, is that this process could extend beyond the expiration dates of the current licenses from the NRC and it was his understanding, from a presentation made by PG&E's Mr. Tom Jones given yesterday that while the NRC deliberates or a court conducts proceedings the plant would be

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

allowed to continue to operate and he characterized this as being a *de facto* license extension in the absence of completion of all requirements that go with a license extension. Mr. Greening stated he was also concerned, as he serves on a Social Services Transportation Committee, that evacuation planning is premised on most persons having access to a vehicle and he observed there is a growing number of persons residing in the local area who do not have such access and he commented attention needs to be given to evacuation capabilities in the event of an incident for those people without vehicles including pedestrians and persons dependent on paratransit. He remarked non-profit organizations cannot be deputized to perform evacuation functions and it is strictly voluntary on the part of those organizations.

Ms. Linda Seeley, a member of Mothers for Peace, was recognized. Ms. Seeley inquired whether a comprehensive list compiled by the DCISC of all the safety updates would be made available to the public and whether the DCISC has requested a list from PG&E of deferred maintenance items. She stated her belief that PG&E would need to apply for a license amendment from the NRC for any deviation from present requirements. Dr. Budnitz responded and stated PG&E would compile the lists described by Ms. Seeley and the Committee has requested to review those lists when they are available and the Committee will continue to conduct fact-finding, but as to the public nature and proprietary implications of those documents that would be a matter for discussion with PG&E. Dr. Lam remarked everything the Committee receives is normally open for public inspection except in certain circumstances where PG&E requests confidentiality. Ms. Seeley stated DCPD was scheduled in March of 2021 or 2022 to conduct testing of a [surveillance] coupon taken from within the reactor vessel to assess the extent of embrittlement of the Unit 1 vessel, but she stated that test did not take place. **She inquired if the DCISC were following up on the matter and whether the public could get answers about the embrittlement issue for Unit 1 which she stated PG&E claims as proprietary information. Dr. Peterson replied that the issue raised by Ms. Seeley is one the Committee should review in context of continued operation as it represents a key aging management question and a central part of the license extension review.** Mr. Seeley remarked that she understands that the construction of DCPD would not be allowed if it were under consideration today due to the presence of the Hosgri, Shoreline, and Diablo Cove faults and she does not understand how PG&E can say seismic studies are concluded and she inquired if the DCISC would be hiring a seismologist to study these faults. Dr. Budnitz replied the State of California has formed the Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) to study seismic issues in connection with DCPD, with experts including the California Geologic Survey, the Coastal Commission, CalTrans and others serving on the IPRP to continue an independent assessment of seismicity in the vicinity of DCPD and the DCISC is charged by the recent legislation to account for the IPRP's findings in the DCISC's recommendations. Dr. Budnitz reported the Committee has an independent charge to continue its assessment of PG&E's Long-Term Seismic Program which is also being assessed by experts in the field of seismicity and PG&E has a continuing licensing commitment with the NRC to continue the Long-Term Seismic Program for as long as the plant continues to operate. He reported new information and measurements are made on a continuing basis. Dr. Budnitz reported the next meeting of the IPRP is scheduled for October 6, 2022, in San Francisco at CPUC Headquarters and the meetings are also accessible online to member of the public.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

Mr. David Zizmor, Regulatory Analyst in the CPUC Energy Division, was recognized. Mr. Zizmor confirmed an online meeting of the IPRP is scheduled for October 6, 2022, between 2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. and he recommended interested persons review the daily CPUC website calendar for additional information. Mr. Zizmor stated that under SB 846 the recommendations of the DCISC are part of a larger process and that the recent legislation requires the CPUC to use the DCISC's reports and recommendations in its evaluations of the costs related to extending the operation of DCP. He remarked that both the DCISC and the CPUC have a great deal of work to do together and the CPUC proceeding which approved the retirement of the power plant by 2025 has recently been reopened as a first step in the process of an extension of operations. Mr. Zizmor stated he looked forward to working with the Committee in the future.

XIX INFORMATION ITEM BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)

The Chair requested Mr. Soenen to continue with the informational presentations for this public meeting requested by the Committee. Mr. Soenen introduced Mr. Tom Jones, Senior Director of Regulatory, Environmental & Repurposing and reported Mr. Jones has 21 years of experience with PG&E and has served in Corporate Affairs and local government relations. Prior to his current role Mr. Jones worked for State Senator O'Connell. Mr. Jones holds a Bachelor's Degree from the University of California at Santa Barbara and resides in Atascadero, California.

Update on Potential Continued Operations of Diablo Canyon.

Mr. Jones reported DCP is currently pursuing regulatory approvals for decommissioning as well as a license renewal project and PG&E is not taking the matter of a license renewal for granted as it is possible discretionary approval by the NRC may not be forthcoming. Mr. Jones observed SB 846 creates what he described as off-ramps for the state including with reference to cost effectiveness. He reported under SB 846 there is a requirement for subsequent legislation for a second allocation of funding, as the 2022 legislation offered approximately one-half of the funding needed to operate DCP in the interim period. Mr. Jones reported he was previously Director of License Renewal for DCP, then Director of Implementing the Joint Proposal, and now the license renewal team is being revived and reconstituted and it includes some DCP recent retirees who have joined the team and he remarked DCP's license renewal effort will not be short of resources. Mr. Jones reported DCP generates approximately 9% of California's energy and about 20% of the state's greenhouse gas-free energy and the present licenses for Unit 1 and Unit 2 are set to expire in November [2] 2024 for Unit 1 and August [26] of 2025 for Unit 2.

Mr. Jones reported Assembly Bill 180 (AB 180) enacted earlier in 2022 authorized \$75,000,000 for immediate action on extending operation through a contract between PG&E and the California's Department of Water Resources. Mr. Jones commented PG&E establishes its rates to support budget needs through a three-year process and had an alternate funding opportunity not been developed there would not have been funding available for extended operation after Unit 1 ceased operation. He reported that DCP had not been engaged in a procurement process for items necessary to extend operations and therefore AB 180 provided the immediate funding to engage with contractors to procure future delivery of fuel assemblies and

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

to change the planned Unit 1 fuel loading strategy for the next refueling outage for Unit 1 to allow for operation for a longer period. Mr. Jones reported that with the passage of SB 846 additional funding has been provided for continued operation with yet another third funding opportunity being provided. In addition to AB 180 and SB 846, DCPD is also seeking funding through the U.S. Department of Energy's Civil Nuclear Grant Program which could provide for compensation for performance in providing electrical generation by DCPD on October 1 of each year of its continued operation. Mr. Jones observed these federal funds would be treated as a pass-through from PG&E to the State of California to offset the funds received under AB 180 and SB 846 and therefor the Civil Nuclear Program Grant Program funds are not cumulative with state funds under AB 180 and SB 846.

Dr. Peterson remarked and Mr. Jones confirmed that one of the principal objectives of the funding provided under AB 180 was to enable the procurement of additional fuel. Dr. Peterson commented the DCISC fact-finding team recently observed the receipt of new fuel and remarked that a rough calculation found the cost of a BTU (British thermal unit) produced by a fuel assembly is approximately \$0.50 which he described as fairly impressive. Mr. Jones remarked the use of tranches or gaits in addressing energy needs was a thoughtful plan by the state in preserving options as a delay until next year could have resulted in an outage of a year's duration for Unit 1 while it waited for fuel, during which time Unit 2 would continue to operate which might have resulted in an exchange of their respective NRC operational licensing periods.

Mr. Jones reported DCPD is now engaged and working with its vendor on fuel purchasing and is planning fuel strategies for both extended operation and concurrent decommissioning and assessing what those alternatives mean with reference to the storage of spent nuclear fuel. He remarked DCPD is in a similar position to the DCISC in the regulatory process, that is, working with the regulator to ensure it is meeting their expectations. He stated a project team has been formed and DCPD is doing additional hiring and engaging contractors so the license renewal and decommissioning teams can proceed in parallel fashion. In response to Consultant McWhorter's query Mr. Jones stated a new plan for spent fuel storage is expected to be complete by the end of 2022, but it will be a slower moving plan as the plant will not be moving as much fuel at one time but he confirmed Mr. McWhorter's comment that fuel will be moved earlier than previously anticipated under the decommissioning only window and some fuel will be offloaded in 2027. He remarked the decommissioning plan, which was a major element of the contract announced with the Orano firm, would then be a sub-strategy if operations are extended. **Dr. Budnitz observed there is an interaction between decommissioning and extended operation which the DCISC will need to review to ensure a compromise to safety does not result.** In response to Dr. Peterson question, Mr. Jones reported that neither spent fuel pool is full at this time with the plant having what he described as fuel equilibrium with approximately 900-950 assemblies in each pool and more than 1,800 assemblies in the ISFSI in 58 casks with 32 assemblies each, leaving several hundred slots of inventory in the spent fuel pools. In response to Dr. Kadak's inquiry Mr. Jones reported DCPD will need to conduct a spent fuel loading campaign in three to four years, that is, after the final currently scheduled refueling outages, and the spent fuel casks manufactured by the Holtec firm presently occupy approximately 40% of the capacity of the ISFSI which was designed to hold 138 casks with 140 spaces available with two planned to

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

remain empty to preserve the ability to move neighboring casks if needed to service a third cask. He confirmed Dr. Kadak's observation that implementation of the Orano system is not necessary to continue operation.

Consultant McWhorter remarked that although not part of license renewal there is a need for DCPD to determine what inspection activities need to take place during the upcoming refueling outages. Mr. Jones agreed and confirmed that this matter is under review, but that issue is not a part of the information he was requested to present this evening. He reported the Outage Director position has been elevated for forthcoming refueling outages with Mr. Eric Warner, a senior reactor operator with 20 years' experience, serving as Outage Director of a more robust outage organization with additional resources which will also assess changes in maintenance strategies as well as inspections required by the Aging Management Program. He remarked this significant change in staffing also applies to the new project team charged to implement outage scheduling to accommodate regulatory requirements. Mr. McWhorter commented the outage management group will need to look at and review maintenance activities to identify activities that would have been performed during past outages had the license renewal efforts for extended operation not been abandoned after approval of the Joint Proposal. Mr. Jones agreed and reported the Engineering organization will also be involved in the activities described by Mr. McWhorter and the Design Engineering group will be brought back to assist in this effort. Dr. Budnitz remarked there are many systems involved and some systems have a system owner and the DCISC has met with the system owners many times over a number of years since approval of the Joint Proposal and each system owner has had an evaluation of what is necessary for their respective systems to operate reliability to 2025, but there are some systems for which operation beyond 2025 will require additional evaluation and planning. Mr. Jones replied that the effort to augment staffing includes the Engineering organization and this will assist in the necessary efforts described by Dr. Budnitz including in context of outage planning and aging management.

Mr. Jones displayed and described a visual depiction of the two concurrent pathways on which DCPD is continuing to proceed including for retirement of both units circa 2024-2025 and for their continued operation after 2025. He reported the site from the perspective of continuing to progress into decommissioning is relatively static except for the need for additional fuel and the safe management of the ISFSI and accordingly some level of effort with reference to decommissioning will be reduced, but with recognition of PG&E's business need to act ethically with its contractors who have or will bid on decommissioning-related work. He confirmed PG&E intends to keep the Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel (DCDEP) intact, to continue to work with San Luis Obispo County on the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for Decommissioning which is scheduled to be publicly released for comments soon and he remarked the County has the ability to modify the EIR now based upon the County's review of the prospect for continued operation. In response to Consultant Kadak's inquiry Mr. Jones reported PG&E intends to pursue a hybrid strategy for decommissioning DCPD, akin to the strategy employed for its Humboldt Bay Power Plant. PG&E would perform all licensing and permitting activities and retain some disciplines inhouse such as for security and radiation protection and then essentially perform as a general project manager for the job of

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

decommissioning the power plant while engaging specific contractor support accordingly for the work.

Mr. Jones reported DCPD is immediately restarting its license renewal application efforts and reviving the life-cycle evolutions described by Dr. Budnitz and he stated in this effort a focus on personnel career considerations and retention is equally or more important.

Mr. Jones remarked that the parallel pathway strategy is rigorous. He reported with reference to the license renewal process that the NRC draws its authority from the Atomic Energy Act and from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) which is similar to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). He stated the license renewal requirements include development of an aging management program and for continued safety operation which are additive to the baseline current licensing conditions and therefore extending operations involves an increase and not a lessening of regulatory standards. Mr. Jones reported the license renewal process involves both technical and environmental components. As more than five years have passed, DCPD will be starting over regarding the environmental aspects for continued operation under NEPA, but with more information based upon similar information developed under CEQA during the work done in preparation for decommissioning. Concerning the technical aspects DCPD will be able to build upon the technical work undertaken in context of the license renewal application performed prior to the approval of the Joint Proposal. Mr. Soenen confirmed in response to Consultant McWhorter's query that an update of the Severe Accident Mitigation Analysis (SAMA) will likely be required by the NRC as a part of its review under NEPA. In response to Consultant Kadak, Mr. Soenen stated DCPD is working through what will be required by the NRC on the technical side include identifying gaps between the Generic Aging Lesson Learned (GALL) process from the prior license renewal efforts to those which will need to be undertaken under SB 846. Mr. Soenen replied to Dr. Kadak's inquiry regarding the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) that all contentions, which he described as not being major issues, were previously satisfied under the earlier license renewal application process. In response to Dr. Kadak's question as to whether PG&E would apply for a five-year or a twenty-year license extension from the NRC Mr. Soenen reported a final decision on that matter has not been made. He described the authorization to operate DCPD as a multi-levered system with one lever held by the NRC, which could prospectively be for up to twenty years, with other levers being held by the State of California including funding and the continued use of once-through cooling and the right to occupy the shoreline for the location and operation of the plant's Intake and Discharge Structures. Mr. Soenen reported the recent legislation speaks to state funding for five more years of operation and PG&E is in discussions now with policy makers as to the term of an extended operating licenses for the two units. He reported there have been other nuclear power plants that have applied for twenty-year license extensions and then for a license amendment to reduce the license term in accordance with direction by the state. Mr. Soenen remarked that with the passage of SB 846 PG&E is becoming a contractor to the State of California and it intends to fulfill that contract and serve not just PG&E's customers but also all 58 counties in California and to support approximately 40 load-serving entities across the State of California.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

Dr. Kadak observed and Mr. Soenen agreed that the effort to apply for a twenty year license or a five year license is about the equal, but the difference lies in expenditures required for capital improvements for the longer-term license versus a shorter-term license. Dr. Peterson commented the reason a five year license is being discussed is that things which were anticipated to be done were not done and planning for extended operation can be challenging in context of safety of the plant if there is the possibility there could be further extension and he stated it was his preference to think in terms of longer term safety of operations. Dr. Peterson stated the final outcome will depend to a great degree on what happens with the deployment of other sources of energy.

Mr. Jones stated PG&E would build off the prior, relatively current, application for an extended license and he reported this previous effort was 80-90% through the process including concerning safety evaluations and the retirement of all contentions when the application was withdrawn because of approval of the Joint Proposal. He stated DCPD will need to align with the NRC on how the plant reenters the license renewal space. Mr. Jones commented that the NRC is cognizant that a decision to extend the licenses for DCPD represents a significant shift in the State of California's energy policy and he remarked the NRC will be rigorous in this process. He reported that the Long-Term Seismic Program requires PG&E to study seismic phenomena anywhere and to determine if the experience is applicable to DCPD and the Long-Term Seismic Program works with the Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP). Mr. Jones reported the license renewal component does not require new seismic studies but SB 846 has a provision which requires a covenant in the contract between PG&E and the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) that requires PG&E to conduct an updated seismic assessment and he reported PG&E will work with the DWR to determine the scope of that assessment. In response to Dr. Lam's query Mr. Jones confirmed PG&E will consult with the DWR concerning the interpretation of what this update will require and Dr. Budnitz remarked this will also entail consultation on the scope of the assessment. Dr. Peterson commented that due to its experience in operating dams in California the DWR has the necessary competence to determine the meaning of the requirement imposed by SB 846. Dr. Peterson remarked the 2011 earthquake in Japan placed very heavy seismic loads on a substantial number of nuclear power plants and provided an understanding of how hardware behaves which is useful in context of a seismic fragility analysis of DCPD. Dr. Peterson commented the reliability of the electrical supply due to the tsunami produced by the earthquake was at issue in the 2011 Japanese experience and this is a reason the DCISC has taken such an interest in DCPD's FLEX capabilities to restore electrical power using portable equipment, as the most likely occurrence from a seismic event that exceeds a plant's design basis would be the loss of electrical power. Dr. Budnitz remarked that it would take an earthquake much larger than the design basis earthquake to compromise the DCPD emergency diesel generators and their switchgear and he remarked the buses serving the emergency diesels are very strong compared to the seismic design basis. Mr. Jones remarked that PG&E's efforts to assess seismic safety will continue to be maintained for as long as the plant continues in operation.

Mr. Jones reported SB 846 also addresses and provides statutory ground for the important role to be played by the DCISC including incorporating the reports of the IPRP into

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

DCISC findings and recommendations, for the DCISC to transmit its findings and recommendations, and for the DCISC to fulfill a role in providing the Committee Members' analysis of DCP's safety.

Dr. Peterson observed SB 846 continues the plant's current baseline of once-through cooling without modification and as a result PG&E will pay mitigation compensation for the impact on the marine environment. Dr. Peterson observed this greatly simplifies many aspects of the review of the safety of continued operation and he remarked this was a prudent policy decision and represents an important part of the legislation.

Dr. Gene Nelson for Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated with reference to the scope of the EIR that DCP is a large dispatchable power source and given the limitations on its replacement the alternative would be electric power produced by coal coming from the State of Wyoming. Dr. Nelson stated Californians for Green Nuclear Power have established this matter in state filings and in filings before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and he requested clarification on whether PG&E will itself be raising that issue. Dr. Nelson commented in previous DCISC meetings PG&E representatives indicated the intent to complete operation in 2025 with excellence and he stated that was very fortuitous in context of extending operation beyond 2025. Drs. Budnitz and Lam reminded Dr. Nelson that the context of public comment at the time presentations are made to the Committee must be related to those presentations.

Mr. John Geesman representing the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Geesman inquired concerning the requirement contained in SB 846 for a consultant study to identify deferred maintenance issues and he stated it was his understanding this was also one of the covenants PG&E is required to make in its agreement with DWR and he inquired how the work of the consultant would interact with that of the DCISC and whether the DCISC would have a role in the scope of the consultant's contract or in reviewing the consultants reports. He also inquired as to the interaction between the role of the IPRP and DWR based on the covenant requiring the seismic update. Finally Mr. Geesman posed a question, as PG&E announced today that it is seeking a purchaser for 49.9% of its non-nuclear generation whether PG&E would rule out a similar sale of its nuclear generation assets. At Dr. Lam's request, Mr. Jones reported PG&E will execute whatever direction the DCISC, the IPRP, and the DWR provide to PG&E in context of the seismic update, but that direction will need to be resolved between those state agencies. In response to whether DCP has been for sale Mr. Jones reported the answer has been consistent that it is not for sale. Mr. Jones replied that the strategy to sell an equity position in PG&E's hydro facilities is based upon providing increased revenues to be available for safety in PG&E's overall system. In response to the role of the DCISC with regard to that of the consultant to be engaged to review deferred maintenance, Mr. Jones stated that is to be determined and he stated he did not expect the DCISC to relax in any way its safety review role.

Ms. Sheila Baker was recognized. Ms. Baker stated she appreciated the discussion and commented that it is hard for her to believe DCP would operate for only five years beyond

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

2025. She stated she supports the use of renewable power such as wind and solar and views continued operation of DCPD as an impediment to achieving increased use of renewable resources.

XX ADJOURN EVENING MEETING

Dr. Budnitz reported the DCISC is ending tomorrow's session of this public meeting at Noon as a fact-finding visit to the plant is scheduled for tomorrow afternoon. The Chair then adjourned the evening meeting of the Committee at 7:30 P.M.

XXI RECONVENE FOR MORNING MEETING

The September 29, 2022, public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was called to order by its Chair, Dr. Peter Lam at 9:00 A.M. Dr. Lam welcomed those persons attending in person and by Zoom Webinar and watching the proceedings on live streaming video.

XXII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

Dr. Budnitz commented that this morning's session would adjourn around Noon to allow a fact-finding visit to DCPD in the afternoon. Consultant McWhorter reported that with Consultant Wardell they have developed new items for consideration for inclusion on the Open Items List related to the possible extension of operation and he would present a power point later in this session dedicated to further actions by the Committee.

XXIII PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATION

The Chair reviewed the invitation to address remarks to the Committee on matters not on the agenda for this public meeting and invited any comments from members of the public who wished to address the Committee to do so now.

Ms. Laurie Johnson was recognized and she identified herself as a member of Mothers for Peace, Beyond Nuclear and the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility. Ms. Johnson stated there is a law which went into effect in 2006 that precludes the use of coal for energy generation in California and that law limits emissions from generation to no more CO₂ than is produced by a gas-fired power plant. She remarked a proposed decarbonization project near Bakersfield, California, the Hydrogen Energy California Project, was proposed in 2009 but was subsequently withdrawn in 2016. She reported this project would have removed approximately 90% of the carbon from coal.

Dr. Gene Nelson, senior legal researcher for Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson reported the Intermountain Power Plant, currently in operation, provides bulk power to Los Angeles' Department of Water and Power and seven other municipalities in southern California and it is a coal-fired plant located in Delta, Utah. He commented he finds it

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

unlikely a recent proposal to repower that plant would come to fruition. Dr. Nelson stated SB 1368 sets a performance standard for imported power but contains what he described as a loophole in that it only applies to long-term power contracts of five or more years. He reported Pacific Corporation is currently providing abundant coal-generated power to California in conjunction with the CAISO Western Energy Imbalance Market which enters into daily contracts on behalf of California for imported power and the Pacific Corporation is the leading financial beneficiary of this market. He reported the CPUC in a procurement order finalized on June 26, 2021, designated what it termed “unspecified imports” for 4,000 and 5,000 megawatts which Dr. Nelson described as a euphemism that mostly applies to imported coal-produced power and he remarked the procurement order was unusual in that power is generally procured in kilowatt or megawatt hours not in megawatts. He remarked this constitutes an order for 40 billion kilowatt hours which would be the largest power procurement order the CPUC has ever placed. Dr. Nelson stated the CPUC offers a model to show it can meet statutory requirements but in this effort they artificially set pollutants criteria for unspecified imports at zero which he stated equates to complying with the statute by playing with the model. Dr. Nelson concluded his remarks by stated if DCPD ceases operation the power it now produces will be replaced with dirty coal and he provided a website, government@cgnp.org for persons who may be interested in receiving more information.

Mr. John Geesman representing the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Geesman commented that with relevance to the question of an application by PG&E to the NRC for five-year or twenty-year licenses for DCPD extended operation, as long as the possibility of a twenty-year license term exists it compels the DCISC’s safety evaluation to extend and to encompass that full period of time. He stated Dr. Peterson’s remarks concerning the license term and what he described as the awkwardness of a partial stumble step in five-year increments were compelling issues but if there is a possibility of a twenty-year extended life for DCPD the DCISC’s safety analysis has to fully evaluate that prospect.

Mr. David Weisman of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. In response to Mr. Weisman’s inquiry as to whether the Eagle 21 Reactor Protection System was the same system as the Main Annunciator System Mr. McWhorter replied they were different systems. Dr. Peterson remarked the Eagle 21 Reactor Protection System was developed in the 1980s as a digital system. Dr. Budnitz observed the Eagle 21 System is commonly used by Westinghouse manufactured nuclear power plants such as DCPD and while the system continues to be supported by Westinghouse and remains highly reliable because of the large user base, a plan was in place at DCPD to replace the Eagle 21 System but the plan was abandoned after approval of the Joint Proposal and the system remains in operation. Drs. Budnitz and Peterson reported the Eagle 21 Reactor Protection System is a safety-related system that measures different parameters such as reactor power and the rate of neutron flux and it provides a direct measurement of the fission rate and generates a signal to the Control Room for what they described as off-normal conditions and for certain indications the system will automatically actuate reactor protection function and cause a trip¹¹ of the reactor. In response to Mr.

¹¹ The automatic shutdown of a nuclear reactor is called a reactor trip or scram.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

Weisman's inquiry Dr. Budnitz stated the Eagle 21 System is not presently considered to be operating under a bridging strategy pending plant closure. **Drs. Peterson and Budnitz commented the key issue with the Eagle 21 System is obsolescence, not in the sense that it is wearing out but in consideration that at this time DCPD is able to secure replacement parts for the system, but the DCISC will be reviewing the Eagle 21 System in context of extended operation of DCPD.** Dr. Lam stated he found Mr. Weisman's concern to be well-placed and the issue is one of time and money. Mr. McWhorter reported the Main Annunciator System is also an older system that is currently being maintained successfully but with possible extended operation it might be subject to upgrade in the future.

Ms. Sheila Baker, a resident of Sonoma County, was recognized. Ms. Baker stated she looks forward to a renewable energy future for all of California and she participates in a 100% renewal community aggregate program and hopes that DCPD does get decommissioned in 2024 and 2025, as to extend its operation would deny the potential development of renewable power.

Mr. Eric Greening was recognized. Mr. Greening stated he has the same request as that made by Mr. Geesman concerning the extended licensing period and he observed it will be the federal government that makes a determination as to the duration of the licenses for DCPD based on PG&E's application. He stated he believes a future session of the California Legislature might change the five-year mandate and he encouraged the DCISC to ensure that if relicensing occurs the Committee is prepared to review safety issues over a twenty-year period and to ensure that the public is aware and understands the Committee is acting on that basis unless the license application from PG&E is for a period of less than twenty years. He requested, based on the presentation made by Mr. Jones during the evening session concerning the underlying project description for decommissioning and any significant changes identified after the comment period on the draft EIR which is being prepared under a contract with the County of San Luis Obispo and its consultants which is paid for by PG&E, that PG&E make a commitment that if circumstances make the current EIR obsolete that PG&E will fund and participate in a subsequent EIR that will address the conditions at the time decommissioning takes place. He remarked it was his understanding that SB 846 removed CEQA scrutiny from the matter of extended operations but not from decommissioning activities. He observed the volume of accumulated waste may change when the plant finally does cease operating and a thorough environmental review and mitigation will be needed at that time. Dr. Peterson thanked Mr. Greening for his comments and **Dr. Peterson stated his current thinking is the Committee should plan and prepare for the contingency of twenty-year license extensions and provide its input to state agencies, but the DCISC should not express any opinion as to the policy decisions implicit in this issue.** Dr. Peterson remarked the SB 846 provides for the continued use of once-through cooling and a further extension of operation would need to consider questions about continuing that aspect of DCPD's operation. Dr. Peterson remarked the state faces major stresses due to the most severe drought in the U.S. southwest in 1,200 years and regarding the impact of climate change involving over-drafting of water supplies and these represent huge challenges and therefore the Committee must provide its best judgment to the

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

State of California in order that going forward the best possible decisions can be made. Dr. Lam remarked the federal requirement for granting a five year license extension is very different than for a twenty year license extension and this matter involves substantial uncertainty.

XXIV INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)

Mr. McWhorter introduced the NRC Senior Resident Inspector for DCPD Mr. Mahdi Hayes. Mr. McWhorter reported Mr. Hayes graduated from Texas A&M University with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering and began his career with the NRC as a Reactor Engineer at the NRC's Region IV office in Arlington, Texas, followed by an assignment as Resident Inspector at the Columbia Generating Station, a nuclear power plant in the State of Washington, followed by an assignment at Region IV as an Operation's Engineer and License Examiner and earlier this year Mr. Hayes reported to DCPD for his current assignment as the Senior Resident Inspector. Mr. McWhorter stated Mr. Hayes would review his role at the plant and the NRC's reactor inspection program in general, Mr. McWhorter reported that Mr. Hayes' area of expertise does not include the matter of a license extension for DCPD.

Mr. Hayes began his presentation by reviewing the NRC Mission Statement which states: "[t]he NRC licenses and regulates the Nation's civilian use of radioactive materials to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and to promote the common defense and security and to protect the environment." He remarked it is "to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection" from the inherent dangers of nuclear power that forms the basis for the resident inspectors' roles and he acknowledged that inspections and regulations do not provide assurance of absolute protection.

Mr. Hayes reported the NRC, headquartered in Rockville, Maryland, is led by a five member Commission and at present all five seats are filled. The Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Christopher Hanson, acts as its spokesperson and serves as the NRC Emergency Director in the event of an accident and with the other four Commissioners, Messrs. Jeff Baran, David Wright, and Bradley Crowell and Ms. Annie Caputo, is responsible to set the policies and direction of the Commission. He reported Mr. Daniel Dorman serves as Executive Director for Operations and is responsible for implementing policies, the Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs is Mr. Darrel Roberts whose responsibility is to implement the reactor oversight process and regulations. The NRC's regional organizations are divided into four regions with a technical training center located in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the NRC organization also includes the Nuclear Security and Incident Response and Nuclear Reactor Regulation organizations. Region IV includes DCPD and Mr. Scott Morris serves as Regional Administrator for Region IV.

Mr. Hayes stated that to qualify for the Resident Inspector Program the NRC looks for persons holding a bachelor's degree in a technical discipline such as engineering and a two-year qualification process is required along with inspection familiarity and training in reactor design and operation. A qualifications board and an oral board composed of senior managers examine each candidate. Once an inspector is qualified refresher training continues for a period of

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

approximately two weeks each year, objectivity reviews are conducted with the inspectors visiting other sites and an information exchange is conducted with colleagues. Mr. Hayes reported resident inspectors are limited in the time they can spend at each assignment to no more than seven years at any site. In response to Dr. Peterson's inquiry Mr. Hayes stated resident inspectors visit other sites to perform a wide range of inspection activities including specialized inspections and baseline inspections and he remarked some visits are conducted at plants utilizing different technology or components manufactures by other manufacturers from that at the site where the inspector is currently assigned and Mr. Hayes commented operating experience is valuable in all forms.

Mr. Hayes reported his colleague at DCPD is Resident Inspector Ms. Ayesha Athar who holds a Bachelor's Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Illinois and a Master's Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Michigan and he commented it is not common for both resident inspectors to hold degrees in nuclear engineering. Ms. Athar previously served as Acting Resident Inspector at the Grand Gulf, Comanche Peak, Clinton and Palo Verde nuclear power stations and served as a Performance Indicator Program lead at NRC Headquarters. Prior to joining the NRC Ms. Athar worked for the Areva firm as a shielding analyst.

Mr. Hayes reported the role of the resident inspectors, with the senior resident acting as team lead, is to take charge of the Baseline Inspection Program at their assigned sites and to be on-site in the role of emergency responder for any event. The resident inspectors' focus on day to day operation including any high risk significant activities and to assess the licensee's performance and provide an independent assessment to Region IV and NRC Headquarters. He remarked that the Resident Inspector Program was created following the accident in 1979 at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in Pennsylvania. The Baseline Inspection Program reviews a cross-section of a licensee's organization and activities and includes review of numerous components at the site. If warranted under the baseline inspections additional inspections may be performed. During 2021 Mr. Hayes reported there were approximately 1,900 hours spent on direct inspections and a total of 8,000 hours of inspection time charged including the Inservice Inspection and Design Basis Assurance Inspection. He stated all NRC inspection reports including the findings, safety significance and any enforcement actions, with the exception of security-related information, are publicly available at www.nrc.gov through the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). Mr. Hayes remarked that, as ADAMS can be somewhat difficult to use for those unaccustomed to accessing its features, Google searches also work to locate and review the reports and a list of inspection reports.

Mr. Hayes stated the regulatory framework in which the NRC works begins with the Mission Statement and proceeds to include reactor safety, radiation safety and safeguards and strategic performance areas. Inspection results are fed through a significance determination process and assigned risk significance which are themselves assessed in an Action Matrix to document the overall result of licensee performance. Performance Indicators are used and weighted in accordance with risk and counted toward thresholds of performance and fed into the

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

development of the Action Matrix. He described the Action Matrix concept as consisting of five columns representing, in order of increasing significance of inspection findings: Licensee Response, Regulatory Response, Degraded Response, Multiple Repetitive Degraded Cornerstones and Unacceptable Performance. Mr. Hayes reported DCPD is now in the Licensee Response column and has been for some years, which indicates that all inspection findings are Green, that is of very low safety significance, and all Performance Indicators are in Green status. **In response to Dr. Peterson query Mr. Hayes stated he would review the data and report during a Committee fact-finding visit the number of nuclear plants that like DCPD are in the Licensee Response column of the Action Matrix.** He reported that an increase in the significance of inspection findings translates into a greater number of inspections and NRC management interaction with the licensee and the facility management changes and moves to higher levels of discussion on the part of both parties. Mr. Hayes reviewed the colors used for the Action Matrix indications with increasing significance as categorized by Green, White, Yellow and Red indicators. He remarked that as a plant moves up the regulatory response column, from Licensee Response to Unacceptable Performance, additional supplemental inspections are performed by larger NRC inspection teams and corrective actions reviewed to ensure their scope and depth are appropriate for the circumstance and assessment letters are directed to different and higher levels of management.

Mr. Hayes reported concerning the impact of COVID on the NRC inspection activities and stated the initial response was to have inspectors work from home, but the resident inspectors came back to the sites much faster than other NRC representatives. Initially on site activities were conducted one person at a time to minimize contact and remote technology was employed for meetings to minimize personal interaction. Resident inspectors were also tasked with assisting the regional inspection teams and some inspections were moved into different scheduling windows. He reported at this time the resident inspectors are both on site daily and mask requirements have been lessened at DCPD and in-person meetings and observations are being conducted. The regional inspection activities have also resumed on a normal schedule. Mr. Hayes commented that some efficiencies were achieved during the time of the COVID pandemic response and it is important that those not be lost. In response to Dr. Peterson's inquiry Mr. Hayes commented that the use of photos and video worked well for some groups. Dr. Peterson observed some nuclear power plants are moving toward electronic procedures as opposed to paper as well as a more extensive use of Wi-Fi [wireless fidelity] technology and one of the benefits of electronic procedures is through the use of photos to record as-found and as-repaired conditions. Mr. Hayes confirmed that NRC resident inspectors carry and use cameras but he remarked that when someone else is creating an photographic record perspective can be lost.

Mr. Hayes closed his presentation by stating information on the NRC inspection procedures, NRC reports and findings, and the status of Performance Indicators are all available publicly and he provided contact information for purposes of reporting an emergency or a safety concern (allegation@nrc.gov) or for general information and questions (www.nrc.gov).

In response to Consultant Wardell's inquiry concerning the NRC evaluated emergency exercise which was conducted recently Mr. Hayes confirmed he participated in the exercise at

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

the Operational Support Center and reviewed the activities of the field teams, but the exercise evaluation has not yet been completed. In response to Consultant McWhorter's query Mr. Hayes described his relationship with DCPD as cooperative, respectful, and professional. In response to Dr. Lam's statement that Dr. Lam has often heard diverse opinions concerning the relationship of the NRC with its licensees, including from opponents of nuclear technology expressing the opinion that a too-close relationship exists between the NRC and its resident inspectors and its licensees, from others that the relationship is adversarial, from others that the relationship is professional and cooperative, and from still others stating that the relationship represents a creative and productive tension between regulation, enforcement and operation. Mr. Hayes responded the relationship between the licensees and the NRC's inspection role as an independent federal regulator is definitely one of independence, with the NRC responsible to set and enforce policies and he agreed the relationship can be adversarial and it can also be professional as the NRC sometimes forces its licensees to produce answers to difficult questions. In response to Consultant Kadak's query Mr. Hayes replied the resident inspectors meet regularly with appropriate level managerial personnel including up to the level of the Chief Nuclear Officer. Mr. Hayes remarked it is difficult to compare his previous experience at Columbia Generating Station with DCPD as the plants use different technologies and the licensing bases are not the same but both plants operate in a way that meets regulations. Mr. Hayes reported the resident inspection team reviews Notifications¹² that come through the Corrective Program that are generated in the Employee Concerns Program but the resident inspectors do not regularly interact with the Employee Concerns Program.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Lewis stated she finds the phrase from the NRC Mission Statement "reasonable assurance of adequate protection" to be laughable due to what she described as "wiggle room." Dr. Budnitz responded that this phrase was and is used as the criterion by the Atomic Energy Commission, the predecessor of the NRC, and it was incorporated into the legislation Congress developed and determined in approving the Atomic Energy Act and every federal agency properly takes its charter and mission statement from congressional legislation. Dr. Lam agreed with Dr. Budnitz and stated much time and effort has been spent in interpreting those words and he remarked in those efforts there is usually one set of facts and numerous sets of interpretations.

The Chair thanked Mr. Hayes for his presentation.

The Chair requested Mr. Soenen to continue with the informational presentations for this public meeting requested by the Committee.

Mr. Garcia introduced Mr. Tom Jones, Senior Director of Regulatory, Environmental and Repurposing. Mr. Jones holds a degree from the University of California at Santa Barbara and resides in Atascadero, California, and has over twenty years' experience with PG&E in corporate affairs and local government relations.

¹² A Notification is the document that initiates an entry into the Corrective Action Program.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

Updates on Decommissioning Planning, License Amendment Activities Related to Decommissioning, and Nuclear Decommissioning Cost Triennial Proceedings.

Mr. Jones stated his presentation would cover the decommissioning planning activities to date in context of the two track approach to simultaneously prepare for decommissioning and for extended operation. He reported PG&E began quite early in the decommissioning process to obtain necessary discretionary actions from the state and federal governments and the plan remains to go straight to a decommissioning project when the plant ceases operation. He reported this was based upon PG&E's experience with its Humboldt Bay Power Plant which Mr. Jones reported was the eleventh nuclear power plant to successfully decommission and proceed to retire its 10 CFR Part 50 license. The decommissioning plan is also based upon building two dry cask storage facilities, the replacement steam generator facility and benchmarking¹³ against the experience of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), a two-unit pressurized water reactor located on the coast in southern California.

Mr. Jones reported all these activities are now on schedule and the CPUC is in the process of conducting the 2021 Nuclear Decommissioning Cost Triennial Proceeding (2021 NDCTP) with hearings scheduled for November 2022 and he remarked that under the 2018 NDCTP an appropriate budget was created for the decommissioning project.

Mr. Jones reported PG&E intends to keep its Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel (DCDEP) intact and work is continuing on repurposing and future land use decisions. He observed interest has been expressed in future use of the "nuclear campus" in connection with the generation of offshore wind energy combined with battery storage but any such projects are years in the future. He commented that a key item involves repurposing the Diablo Intake Cove breakwater. In response to Dr. Lam's question Mr. Jones stated despite the prospect of continued operation he sees no diminishment of the need for public comment in the decommissioning process. The DCDEP was formed by PG&E seven years ago, prior to the end of the current license periods, because of the complexity of the decommissioning project and current and future Panels will build off of the work of previous Panels. Mr. Jones reported there is an average of twenty very diverse applicants for each seat on the DCDEP and appointment is a very competitive process. PG&E continues to meet with the DCDEP each month concerning administrative matters. Mr. Jones stated the origin of the DCDEP stemmed from future land conservation and repurposing concerns and the DCDEP has helped inform some of PG&E's decommissioning decisions and he commented there is funding in SB 846 for land conservation. Dr. Budnitz remarked that early on the DCISC agreed to serve as a technical resource to the DCDEP and the Committee's commitment in that regard continues to this day.

Mr. Jones reviewed the progress made in meeting discretionary or major milestones in the decommissioning regulatory process and what he termed the interdependencies of certain regulatory approvals. He commented that budget informs scope and scope informs the permitting

¹³ Benchmarking is the practice of comparing business processes and performance metrics to industry bests and best practices from other companies.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

work for the required licenses. He reported a draft Environmental Impact Report (EIR) is expected to be issued between December 2022 and March 2023 and will be circulated for comment. Under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) there is a process for an EIR to address changed circumstances and EIRs are often amended and updated as required under CEQA and he remarked these updates and amendments are not discretionary acts by the utility but legal requirements under CEQA when circumstances change. The applicant (PG&E) is required to inform the lead agency (the County of San Luis Obispo) of any changed circumstances and he reported PG&E has a very close relationship with the County and the County Planning Director serves as an *ex officio* member of the DCDEP. Mr. Jones reported the application for a Coastal Development Permit triggered the EIR and when the draft EIR is released and made public the County is required to open a public comment period of at least 45 days and he remarked PG&E anticipates the public comment period will be open for a longer period. The County as the lead agency is required to respond to every comment and that process is expected to take four or five months.

Mr. Jones reported license amendment requests (LARs) are pending before the NRC concerning emergency planning, to allow a step-down of the emergency planning organization as the risk profile changes commensurate with what has been done at other nuclear power plants. He remarked the NRC is now conducting a decommissioning rulemaking process and DCP's timing required the plant to continue with individual LARs rather than benefitting from a programmatic change to NRC policy. In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry Mr. Jones replied a request for a hearing on the NRC review and approval process has not been made.

Mr. Jones reported that in September 2022 DCP submitted a License Renewal Application for the license for the ISFSI which was accepted as sufficient with no requests for supplemental information received. The NRC has issued an initial review schedule and DCP expects to receive requests for additional information in February 2023. He reported the license renewal for the ISFSI is for a forty-year license, the current license having been issued for twenty years. Mr. Jones observed the license renewal period for the ISFSI should then be roughly aligned with the license period for the new Orano spent fuel dry storage system which is expected to be licensed for a forty-year period.

In response to Dr. Kadak's inquiry Mr. Jones reported the trust funds for decommissioning now total approximately \$4 billion in a qualified trust that is controlled by the NRC. But in the 2018 NDCTP the State of California created a nonqualified trust under the control of the State to permit limited work and procurement of materials to take place during operation of the power plant to assist in its transition to decommissioning. He reported the NRC uses a uniform formula of 3% of the balance, based on thermal megawatts, and PG&E applied for and received an exemption from the NRC to receive \$187 million which was in excess of the \$37 million allowed under the formula for the nine-year decommissioning planning project. In response to Dr. Kadak's question Mr. Jones stated the federal funds were placed in another fund and the California revenue comes to PG&E from the CPUC through a nonbypassable charge paid by PG&E's customers. Mr. Jones reported at this time PG&E is using only funds from the nonqualified trust and the qualified trust has an adequate balance to conduct the work once the

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

plant ceases operation and the fuel is removed from the reactors. He reported with repurposing concepts and expedited fuel transfer the decommissioning project is now estimated to cost \$3.9 billion and he remarked the DCDEP's input into this process has resulted in benefit to the community.

Mr. Jones stated with reference to NRC licensing activity a review process under the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) is applicable to coastal states and the CZMA generates a referral to the state agency charged with coastline protection. He observed because there is no impact to coastal resources from the ISFSI's relicensing, as no facilities are proposed for construction, PG&E is pursuing the same strategy for DCPD it used for the Humboldt Bay Power Plant with reference to the CZMA.

Mr. Jones reported in the next six months DCPD expects to receive approval for its permanently defueled technical specifications, for some of the LARs submitted for emergency planning, and also for its Certified Fuel Handler Program. He reported that a requirement for certified fuel handlers will replace the requirement for licensed reactor operators and the certified fuel handlers will be reasonable for the health and safety of the public. **Dr. Budnitz remarked that the requirement to prepare simultaneously for both decommissioning and extended operation creates a burden on the plant's Training Organization to ensure both reactor operators and certified fuel handlers are available and this will be an area the DCISC will need to review.** Mr. Jones agreed but stated DCPD is fortunate that many of the reactor operators will be retrained for both extended operation and subsequently for future positions as certified fuel handlers.

Mr. Jones reported that in the 2021 NDCTP the CPUC is holding hearings in November 2022 for contested issues and he commented the CPUC generally seeks settlements in context of a NDCTP but if settlement is not possible the issues are litigated before the CPUC. He reported the NDCTP process typically takes eighteen months and PG&E hopes for a resolution of the 2021 NDCTP during 2023 so a budget can be established and other matters resulting from a decision in the 2021 NDCTP can be resolved. Mr. Jones reported the current cost estimate in the 2021 NDCTP adjusted in 2020 dollars is \$3.96 billion with the main drivers for the reduction being repurposing and reducing spent fuel offload time with the current Technical Specifications requiring more than ten years and each of the bids for a new spent fuel dry cask storage system committing to accomplish offloading all the fuel in less than four years. Evidentiary hearings are scheduled for November with a decision in the 2021 NDCTP expected in mid-2023. Mr. Jones stated the 2021 NDCTP was expected to be the final triennial proceeding but should operations be extended this may not be the case as SB 846 requires both the continuance of the NDCTP process and for the CPUC to reopen the proceeding which approved the retirement of DCPD. Mr. Jones reported the CPUC is proceeding is to reopen the prior proceeding and PG&E will be required to provide information in that matter with the interested parties having an opportunity to participate and respond to PG&E's information.

In response to Dr. Kadak's inquiry Mr. Jones replied and he confirmed that should the NRC not complete its evaluation of DCPD's application to extend the operating licenses for both

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

units by the time the current licenses would have otherwise expired and provided DCP's application was deemed timely and sufficient, the plant could continue to operation and he remarked this is consistent with the experience of other nuclear power plants including the Indian Point Energy Center in New York.

Dr. Gene Nelson representing Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. In response to Dr. Nelson's inquiry as to a schedule for the reopening of DCP's license renewal application for Units 1 and 2 Mr. Jones responded DCP is still seeking guidance from the NRC on what the re-entry path will be for the license renewal application and analysis is on-going at this time concerning the application submitted previously and the current regulatory requirements.

Ms. Molly Johnson, a member of Mothers for Peace, was recognized. Ms. Johnson inquired regarding the additional quantity of spent nuclear fuel which would be produced from extending operation of DCP and where that fuel would be stored and whether that issue is included in the license renewal application process. Mr. Jones replied that the license renewal application for the ISFSI is only for the existing dry storage system manufactured by the Holtec firm and seeks a forty-year extended license for the period 2024-2064 and the application does not include other storage options. In response to Consultant Kadak's query, Mr. Jones confirmed the ISFSI license permits DCP to offload additional spent fuel using the Holtec casks and related technology.

Mr. Eric Greening was recognized. Mr. Greening stated it was his understanding SB 846 exempted the Coastal Development Permit process for the ISFSI license extension from CEQA provided that the physical layout of the ISFSI was not altered or expanded and he inquired if there would be a subsequent EIR prepared if the environmental circumstances of decommissioning were to change substantially at some future time. Mr. Jones responded that the use of the term subsequent EIR was imprecise as an EIR can be amended or supplemented in the circumstances described by Mr. Greening. Mr. Jones confirmed PG&E's intention is at the present time is to keep all spent fuel within the confines of the current ISFSI and the construction of a new ISFSI would require a separate coastal development permit and PG&E has never conflated permitting for the ISFSI with plant operations, in that they are separately permitted licensed facilities.

Mr. Garcia then introduced the Director of Strategic Initiatives at DCP, Mr. Philippe Soenen. Mr. Garcia reported Mr. Soenen was previously the Decommissioning, Environmental and Licensing Manager. Mr. Soenen holds a Bachelor of Science Degree from the University of California at San Diego, has more than twenty years' experience in the nuclear industry including holding positions at DCP as Licensing Manager, Project Manager for the DCP License Renewal Project and Project Manager for Licensing Engineering for the DCP and Humboldt Bay Power Plant ISFSI application.

Update on Procurement of a New Spent Fuel Storage System and the Proposed Schedule for Spent Fuel Transfers.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

Mr. Soenen reported DCPD stores spent fuel at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) which after eight loading campaigns now contains a total of 58 casks, all in a vertical configuration with 32 assemblies in each cask all of which were all manufactured by the Holtec firm. The ISFSI consists of seven storage pads with the 58 casks occupying three of the seven pads, with two spare locations reserved in order to provide access to a center location. He reported all spent fuel is stored in a seismic analyzed condition.

Mr. Soenen reported PG&E has recently entered into a contract with the Orano firm for a new spent fuel dry cask storage system, the NUHOMS Extended Optimized Storage (EOS) System, which will employ a horizontal configuration. The procurement requirements included that a new system be able to implement storage for the remaining terms of the 40-year licenses issued for each unit within the remaining four pads and without expanding the area of the ISFSI. The Orano System at the conclusion of 40 years of operation is expected to consist of 69 casks loaded with 37 assemblies each.

Mr. Soenen reported in response to SB 846 DCPD is reviewing the offloading requirements for spent fuel prior to the period of extended operation or shortly thereafter in order to be able to maintain the capability to perform a full core offload. He reported each reactor has 193 assemblies in its core during operation and full core offload means maintaining the capability to offload all those assemblies in the individual unit's spent fuel pool during a normal fuel cycle prior to a refueling cycle. Mr. Soenen reported part of the fuel offloading considerations include the requirement to maintain four older and cooler assemblies to act as a heat sink in proximity to each recently offloaded hot assembly. Dr. Peterson observed this is an important point with respect to the spent fuel pool hazard as the hazard is largely dominated by the freshly offloaded assemblies which have a much higher level of decay heat which over time drops substantially. Dr. Peterson remarked the heat generated by the entire inventory of the spent fuel pool over many years of operation is exceeded by the heat generated by freshly off loaded fuel and this situation continues for a period of approximately eighteen months and the requirement to position four older assemblies around a newly offloaded assembly increases safety. In response to Dr. Kadak's inquiry Mr. Jones reported there are more than 900 assemblies in each of the two spent fuel pools and each pool has capacity for more than 1,300 assemblies. Mr. Soenen remarked there is adequate inventory capacity in each pool to offload all the fuel generated during 40 years of operation, up to a period of extended operation, with spare locations in each pool. Mr. Soenen reported DCPD is continuing to evaluate how much capacity would be needed and the timing and offloading requirements necessary to ensure that capacity is available following refueling outages conducted during extended operation. Dr. Kadak observed and Mr. Soenen agreed that DCPD has the capacity to conduct a number of refueling outages during extended operation. Mr. Soenen remarked that based on 40 years' of operation DCPD was projecting a single offloading campaign to take place during decommissioning and he reported that strategy remains integral to concurrent consideration of decommissioning at the end of 40 years and of continuing operation beyond 40 years. In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry Mr. Soenen stated with DCPD's capacity to store the fuel required for 40 years of operational life at the ISFSI together with the capability to continue to store fuel in the spent fuel pools, there are at least

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

three different options available to DCPD and he described these as shipping older, colder spent fuel off of the plant site to a consolidated interim storage facility and thereby make room at the ISFSI, shipping fuel to a permanent repository if one were to become operational, or to utilize the capacity of the spent fuel pools which each have approximately 20 years of fuel storage capability and to potentially construct another ISFSI for the fuel that would be generated by extended operation. Mr. Soenen reported there is a currently licensed facility for horizontal casks produced by another vendor [not Holtec or Orano] and that this facility is planning to seek to implement a universal acceptance capability. Mr. Soenen reported the Holtec firm is also seeking receipt of a license possibly by next year for an interim consolidated storage facility.

Mr. Soenen reported DCPD is continuing with site-specific engineering analysis for the new Orano system including developing the licensing analysis to support a license amendment request submittal to the general license for the Orano system to meet the contract requirements for a single offload after shutdown. He reported there are specific requirements for loading _____ [sounds like “domes”], for loading patterns, and for an increased thermal capacity for the individual cells within the Orano casks. Mr. Soenen stated no physical requirement changes have been identified to Orano’s general license and the license amendment centers on the thermal analysis and the amendment is now expected to be submitted to the NRC for review during the fourth quarter of 2022. Mr. Soenen stated this effort is for a certificate of compliance which would include use of the Orano system at other plants and is not necessarily limited to DCPD-specific information. In response to Consultant Kadaks’ inquiry Mr. Soenen replied the specific methodologies sought in context of this license amendment are required to be bound by the seismic requirements for the DCPD site. **In response to Dr. Kadak’s inquiry Mr. Soenen replied the horizontally stored casks are subjected to stress analysis and each cask is bolted, with shield plugs in place, such that seismic modeling with reference to the effect of shaking has demonstrated the casks would remain within the storage modules and not be ejected in a seismic event. Dr. Budnitz commented this question was raised during a meeting of the Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel and on behalf of the DCISC Dr. Budnitz made the commitment that the Committee would review the completed final analyses of this issue and provide the Committee’s independent evaluation. Mr. Soenen confirmed information required by the Committee in this effort would be made available.**

Mr. Soenen concluded his presentation by stating the plant’s spent fuel management plans were affected by SB 846 and DCPD is reviewing the options for offloading fuel either prior to or shortly after extended operation to maintain full core offload capability while continuing to pursue the concurrent path of proceeding into decommissioning upon expiration of the current operating licenses from the NRC for each unit.

Ms. Molly Johnson, a member of Mothers for Peace and the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Ms. Johnson offered her congratulations to PG&E on its choice of a vendor other than Holtec. She stated she works closely with groups in Texas and New Mexico regarding consolidated interim storage facilities and she was not impressed by Holtec’s reputation. Ms. Johnson remarked that during the earthquakes which occurred in Japan a

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

horizontal spent fuel storage systems was used by Japanese nuclear power plants and the casks were contained within buildings and were not affected in any way by the earthquake or the tsunami that followed the earthquake. Ms. Johnson reported that a consolidated interim storage facility in Texas has been licensed by the NRC but the State of Texas has a law against the importation of high level nuclear waste from outside Texas. She further commented the State of New Mexico has recently filed a lawsuit to stop development of the Holtec interim waste storage project mentioned by Mr. Soenen as well as another project and she commented neither may offer a future possibility as an option.

Mr. Tom Marrè was recognized. Mr. Marrè reported Orano has recently filed a request to increase temperature limits with reference to storage of spent nuclear fuel in its system and he observed the aluminum frames used in the Orano canisters are much more affected by heat than are other materials including steel. He stated temperatures may approach 500 degrees and aluminum melts at 1,000 degrees and he queried whether the strength of the materials to be used in the Orano system are affected by temperature. Mr. Soenen responded that a margin boundary will be established and approved by the NRC for the requirements mentioned by Mr. Marrè and there are specific design requirements that will address the concerns he raises. Mr. Soenen stated Orano uses bi-steel material for the fuel baskets and the composition of the fuel baskets will be reviewed and approved by the NRC.

Dr. Lam thanked Mr. Soenen for his presentation.

Mr. Jones introduced DCPD Emergency Preparedness Manager Mr. Andrew Warwick and stated Mr. Warwick has sixteen years' experience in the nuclear power industry including twelve years' experience in emergency planning. Mr. Jones reported Mr. Warwick has recently returned to DCPD from a two-year rotational assignment at the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations and he holds a Bachelor's Degree in Business Administration from Cal Poly and a Master's Degree in Business Administration from Columbia Southern University.

Emergency Planning Update and Results of the September 2022 Emergency Planning Exercise.

Mr. Warwick reported a biennial emergency preparedness exercise was recently conducted with the NRC to demonstrate DCPD's ability to effectively implement its emergency plan and to thereby protect public health and safety. He reported an exercise was also conducted in 2021 as the exercise scheduled for 2020 was deferred due to the COVID pandemic. Mr. Warwick stated these exercises involve an integrated response between the DCPD Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and state and county agencies. He reported the overall assessment of performance showed the ERO effectively implemented the emergency plan, all major elements of which were tested, and the ERO demonstrated key knowledge and skills. Mr. Warwick stated DCPD's internal performance assessment of the recent exercise is not yet complete nor are the post exercise performance assessments by the NRC or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). He commented the NRC assessment, expected to be issued and reviewed with station personnel in October 2022, is integral to the NRC's inspection program and is an important part of the plant's critique process and he reported all performance

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

improvement opportunities identified during these critiques are entered into the Corrective Action Program.

Mr. Warwick reported FEMA evaluates the performance of the state, the county and aspects of PG&E's performance and FEMA conducted a public meeting on September 15, 2022, the same week as the exercise during which FEMA representatives reported to the public that during the exercise DCPD demonstrated the capability to maintain public health and safety. He reported FEMA is expected to finalize its After-Action Report within 90 days of the conclusion of the exercise.

Mr. Warwick reported and briefly discussed DCPD-identified strongest skill sets during the exercise as including:

- Control Room Simulator – protection of workers, communicating changes in plant conditions, and notifying other facilities when conditions changed.
- Technical Support Center – demonstration by the engineering group of strong assessment skills and repair plan development.
- Operational Support Center – strong focus on protecting workers and responding to the event.
- Emergency Operations Facility – excellent performance with respect to integrated response between DCPD and off-site response partners.
- Unified Dose Assessment center – coordination between DCPD and off-site agencies.
- Joint Information Center – strong performance in dissemination of information to the public via written and verbal communications.

Concerning the performance indicator summary Mr. Warwick reported DCPD assessed eight of eight opportunities for classifications, notifications and protective actions were met for the emergency scenario and the ERO demonstrated its ability to prioritize actions. In response to Dr. Peterson's inquiry Mr. Warwick replied fifteen minutes is the time limit between a declaration having been made and when notification must be made to responsible off-site organizations including the County of San Luis Obispo and the State of California. In response to Dr. Budnitz' request Mr. Warwick stated these governmental agencies are primarily located at the Emergency Operations Facility, located off-site in San Luis Obispo which is collocated with the County Emergency Operations Center and these agencies include the California Highway Patrol, CalFire, the County Department of Public Works, the Water Resources Agency, the Public Health Department, County Agriculture, CalTrans, and others. He reported the PG&E Los Padres Electric Operations and Distribution Division is also a participant in this exercise as were certain cities including the City of Pismo Beach. Mr. Warwick reported notification is made to the State Warning Center in Sacramento which distributes the notification to other agencies. In

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

response to Dr. Lam's query Mr. Warwick stated DCPD does not limit the number of observers and it conducts evaluations of the evaluators and he reported that at the Emergency Operations Facility, between all the agency participants, there are approximately 100-120 persons involved in an exercise.

In response to Consultant Kadak's inquiry Mr. Warwick identified occurrence of performance deficiencies in the Control Room Simulator in the use and interpretation of emergency operating procedures, concerning incorrect first dose inputs entered at the Unified Dose Assessment Center, and problems encountered in the use and updating of dose conversion factors by the off-site monitoring teams reporting to the Uniform Dose Assessment Center as representing the three performance improvement findings of the greatest significance during the recent exercise. Mr. Warwick reported as part of this exercise a protective action recommendation for an evacuation was declared for certain areas of the emergency planning zone. In response to Dr. Kadak's query Mr. Warwick stated the needs of persons who lack access to private automobiles is taken into account in the evacuation time estimates required by emergency planning regulation and that this estimate was recently revised and submitted to the NRC using the latest census data. He reported buses, carpools and rideshare alternatives are available and the planning for these alternatives to private autos is part of the County's Emergency Plan. He reported public educational materials are provided every year to members of the local community which includes information on the collection points. In response to Dr. Budnitz' request Mr. Warwick reported the Joint Information Center is the facility where PG&E, County and State personnel evaluate events and progress and develop the written and verbal briefings to be made available to the public and in this effort it is important that each agency is clear on what is occurring in order to develop accurate messaging. **Dr. Peterson remarked a recent Tesla battery fire at a facility in Moss Landing, California, resulted in an actual emergency situation and response which included closure of a state highway and he inquired whether there were lessons to be learned from this event. Mr. _____ stated the evacuation was conducted by the County of Monterey and the systems and plans in place did respond as designed and a total of six individuals were impacted by that event. Mr. Warwick stated the corporate emergency organization is continuing to investigate that incident. Dr. Peterson stated the DCISC should review the Moss landing battery fire incident during a future fact-finding concerning any lessons learned from that experience.**

Dr. Budnitz commented the emergency exercises described by Mr. Warwick begin with a simulated initiating event and proceed to some postulated radiological impact and he inquired whether any exercises have been conducted using a seismic event, that is, a large earthquake, as the initiating event as there would likely be a great impact on the surrounding infrastructure including on bridges and roads and on the availability of communication and power supplies. Mr. Warwick confirmed such exercises have been conducted in the past including in 2016 or 2018 which included dealing with impediments to evacuation. Mr. Warwick stated that after the accident to the Fukushima Daiichi plant in Japan in 2011 regulation 10 CFR 50.54(f) required U.S. nuclear power plants to train and incorporate into their emergency response programs an auto-response by ERO personnel in the event of a large scale natural disaster and to assume in such an event that they need to report to their assigned primary or alternate emergency response

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

facilities and establish communication using backup systems. In response to Dr. Lam's query about performing a realistic drill Mr. Warwick stated the ERO needs to test a variety of potential hazards or consequences including an aircraft impact through evaluated exercises, training and other types of drills and plants are required by the NRC and by FEMA to demonstrate the ability to respond to small or large events with certain defined elements incorporated into the scenarios to demonstrate reasonable assurance of maintaining safety during a radiological emergency.

Dr. Gene Nelson representing Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated the Moss Landing battery fire incident was distinguishable from occurrences in San Luis Obispo County in that the emergency sirens sounded in Monterey County for the purposes of responding to an actual emergency and the instructions given were to shelter in place in certain protective action zones. He remarked in 35 years of operation of Diablo Canyon there has been no comparable event.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Lewis stated she receives the informational material described by Mr. Warwick but she believes many persons do not read this material and in an actual emergency many persons would seek information by telephone and she questioned whether contact information is available and if there were the means to response to such inquiries. Mr. Warwick replied plans are in place for a coordinated effort to respond in an emergency to a significant increase in public calls and the Joint Information Center houses the telephone assistance center which is activated during an emergency and a phone number to call is listed in the informational material and phone calls will be answered as lines continue to become available and personnel will be prepared to provide assistance and to address rumors. He reported this element of emergency response is a part of the County's Emergency Plan. Dr. Nelson stated one of the ways such notifications systems are activated is based upon the number of calls to the 911 center and he stated during siren tests the 911 center receives approximately 150 such calls. In response to Dr. Kadak's inquiry Mr. Warwick confirmed that DCPD tested its public information and communication capacities in the recent exercise including publishing media statements and providing in person media briefings to persons acting as media representatives and information sharing also includes the sharing of information through and between the Joint Information Center and the Operations Center to ensure elected officials remain engaged and he reported the designated spokesperson for PG&E is a licensed individual who works from the Joint Information Center.

Mr. Rathie reported an email was received from Ms. Carol Hisasue which addressed emergency planning in context of electric vehicles and the State of California's plan to eliminate the sale of gas-powered vehicles by 2035 and the impact this might have on evacuation routes for electric cars given their need to be recharged.

The Chair thanked Mr. Warwick, Mr. Jones and Mr. Soenen for their presentations.

XXII CONCLUDING REMARKS & DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS OF FUTURE DCISC ACTIVITIES

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

Mr. McWhorter reported that with Consultant Wardell additional items have been identified and developed and are now proposed for addition to the Open Items List related to extended operation. Mr. McWhorter identified four immediate actions needed which he remarked may serve as a starting point for the DCISC review of the Open Items List, these concern fuel purchasing, with a two-year lead time requirement; spent nuclear fuel storage, with a two-year lead time requirement to contract, manufacture, transport and load canisters to support continued core reloads; the regulatory processes required to initiate complex federal and state applications for permits and funding including through the Department of Energy grant application process; and the formation of project teams to restart the license renewal application preparation, inspection, program development, and implementation phases of NRC requirements for license renewal and to meet the requirements of SB 846. Consultants McWhorter and Wardell then proposed to add a new category to the Open Items List to be called Extended Operations (EO) and in that category to open seven new items which Mr. McWhorter described and discussed per:

- Monitor Purchasing of New Fuel.
- Monitor Procurement of New Spent Fuel Canisters.
- Monitor State and Local Permitting Process.
- Monitor NRC License Renewal Application Process.

Mr. McWhorter stated the above four items correspond to the items presented during the presentation made during the previous evening.

- Monitor Staffing for Extended Operations.
- Create an Independent List of Deferred Improvements and Maintenance (Using previous fact finding reports) and track this as an Open Items List attachment.
- Look for Needed Improvements and Enhancements using probabilistic risk assessment tools to guide the process.

Mr. McWhorter recommended that the DCISC now consider deferring the creation of a Shutdown Open Items List until February 2024, the creation of such list having been included on the Open Items List from the discussion at the October 2021 public meeting.

Dr. Peterson commented that the items discussed by Mr. McWhorter represent an excellent list and an appropriate way in which to organize the Committee's investigation efforts. He commented that with reference to the development of an independent list of deferred improvement and maintenance items, his preference would be to defer a decision as to whether such a list should be developed by the DCISC until there is a better understanding of what the scope of such a list may entail. Dr. Peterson remarked such a list would necessarily involve a very large number of small items and could be difficult to manage and maintain and represents an onerous task that could consume and divert Committee resources from being directed to more valuable investigation. He agreed with Dr. Lam that the creation of an independent list be retained as a place-keeper and that it be retained and monitored as a general item until more is

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – FEBRUARY 1, 2023

known about the scope and the number of items involved and a decision can be reached as to the development of a DCISC-created list or whether monitoring the list that PG&E will develop and maintain might suffice.

Dr. Budnitz remarked SB 846 explicitly calls out the evaluation of seismic safety as an item for DCISC review including the Committee's review and incorporation of the evaluations and reports of the Independent Peer Review Panel and he stated this needs to be either on the list now being developed by the Consultants or the current Open Items List. **Mr. McWhorter replied that the item as described by Dr. Budnitz might be added and incorporated into the list of items to be added to the present Open Items List and Dr. Budnitz remarked the item could be labeled "Seismic Safety Evaluation." Dr. Budnitz remarked SB 846 also explicitly requires one of the other state agencies to complete a separate seismic evaluation which the DCISC should review.**

Upon a motion made by Dr. Budnitz, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the Committee unanimously approved adding the items identified by the Committee's Consultants and as discussed to the Open Items List and Dr. Peterson thanked the Consultants for their work on this important matter.

Mr. Garcia was recognized. Mr. Garcia reported regarding a question brought up earlier during this public meeting concerning the auxiliary saltwater pump watertight compartments. Mr. Garcia reported DCPD has in place inspection protocols and surveillance test procedures for those areas which include inspecting for water tight integrity and protection including inspection of the hatches, the penetration seals, and the doors and Mr. Garcia stated a copy of those protocols and procedures has now been provided to Consultant Wardell. Mr. Wardell stated he reviewed the material described by Mr. Garcia and it addresses the questions raised earlier during this public meeting. Mr. Wardell commented that if one of those compartments were to flood, there are four in total containing separate auxiliary saltwater pumps and any one of them could perform the required function for its assigned unit and the pumps are cross connected to provide additional backup.

There being no concluding remarks by the other Members, Dr. Lam expressed the thanks of the Committee to the members of the public who participated in this public meeting in person or remotely by Zoom or listened to the livestream broadcast and also to PG&E's senior managers Mr. Jones, Mr. Soenen, and Mr. Garcia for their assistance and participation in this public meeting, and to the technicians of AGP Video for supporting the Zoom webinar and livestream internet format.

XXXIII ADJOURNMENT OF ONE HUNDRED AND THIRD PUBLIC MEETING

There being no further business, the one hundred and third public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was then adjourned by its Chair, Dr. Peter Lam, at 12:30 P.M.