

**Diablo Canyon
Independent
Safety Committee**

**Public Meeting
February 18 and 19, 2026**

Avila Lighthouse Suites

Diablo Canyon Power Plant: State of the Plant Update

February 18, 2026



Sam Williams for Diablo Canyon Station Director


Plant Operation

- Units 1 & 2 are safely operating at 100% power
- All Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Performance Indicators (PIs) are Green



Daily Load Profile: Past 12 Months

Daily Capacity Factor Power History Curves



Key Events - Recently Completed Activities

- **Completed Unit 2 Refueling Outage 2R25**
- **Nov 2025: Initial License L24-1 Completed NRC exams**
- **Nov 2025: Commenced License Class L25-1**
- **Dec 17-19: 1X26 Outage for Repair of Feedwater Heater 1-5C**

Key Events - Upcoming Station Activities

- **Unit 1 curtailment to 50% power for tunnel cleaning the weekends of Feb 20-23 and Feb 27- March 2 (each weekend focusing on one of two circulating water tunnels for Unit 1)**
- **March 2-6: NRC Radiation Protection Inspection**
- **Diesel Generator (DG) Maintenance Outage Windows (MOWs): DG 1-3 March 22 - 29; DG 1-1 May 31 – June 6**

Leadership Changes

- **No notable leadership changes this last quarter**



Diablo Canyon Power Plant: State of the Plant Update

Questions?

Sam Williams
Diablo Canyon Power Plant



Diablo Canyon Power Plant Regulatory Performance Update

Jordan Tyman
Director, Risk & Compliance

February 18, 2026



October 2025 – January 2026

- DCPP continues to provide safe, clean, and reliable electricity to Californians
- Since the last update to the DCISC, the NRC oversight of DCPP included approximately ~1,000 hours of inspection time (*less than the typical ~2,000 hours due to the 43-day government shutdown*)
- Update on the very low safety significance violations received since the last DCISC update
- DCPP remains in the highest performance category for all NRC Performance Indicators

DCPP remains in the highest performance category

- In addition to performing inspections, the NRC also evaluates every nuclear plant using performance indicators
- NRC gauges licensee performance using 16 separate indicators related to various aspects of plant operation
- DCPP remains in the highest performance category of the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix
 - No inspection findings of more than very low safety significance since the last DCISC update
 - Performance indicators within the expected range (i.e., green)

Unplanned Scrams (G)	Safety System Functional Failures (G)	Reactor Coolant System Activity (G)	Drill/Exercise Performance (G)	Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (G)	RETS/OCDE Radiological Effluent (G)	Protected Area Equipment (G)
Unplanned Power Changes(G)	Emergency AC Power Systems(G)	Reactor Coolant System Leakage(G)	ERO Drill Participation(G)			
Unplanned Scrams with Complications(G)	High Pressure Injection Systems(G)		Emergency Response Facility and Equipment(G)			
	Heat Removal Systems(G)					
	Residual Heat Removal Systems(G)					
	Cooling Water Systems(G)					

October 2025 – January 2026

NRC Violations

- DCCP received 5 violations of very low safety significance (Green) since the last DCISC update:
 1. Maintenance guidance lacking resulting in a cotter pin that was interfering with normal fuel-response movement.
 2. Safety related fuse blown requiring review of maintenance rule interval
 3. Human error during a maintenance activity caused an electrical short that resulted in a blown fuse and brief period of inoperability for one emergency diesel generator.
 - 4/5. Two findings were noted in the cybersecurity inspection; however, the specific details are security related and restricted from public release.



Regulatory Update



October 2025 – January 2026

Licensee Event Reports (LER)

- There were no LERs issued during the reporting period



Upcoming Inspections



Upcoming NRC Inspections

Radiation Protection – March 3-6, 2026

- NRC Program Inspection
- Inspection Procedure IP 71124.01

License Amendments

- DCPP received NRC approval of several License Amendment Requests (LARs) since the last update to the DCISC (e.g. Optimization of TS Completion Times)
- DCPP has submitted a number of LARs, which are with NRC for review and approval (e.g., Aux Bldg. HVAC TS Completion Time Extension, NEI 99-01 Rev 7, etc.)
- DCPP plans to submit additional LARs over the next few months consistent with industry best practices (e.g., E-Plan rebaseline to NUREG-0654 Rev. 2, standard industry LARs, (e.g., TSTFs), etc.)

DCPP Regulatory Performance

- DCPP remains in the highest NRC regulatory performance category
- DCPP continues to provide safe, clean, and reliable electricity to 4 million Californians



Thank You

Jordan Tyman
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Director, Risk & Compliance





**Raluca Scarlat, Member, with Richard McWhorter and Lisa Darden (remote),
Consultants**

1. Emergency Diesel Generator Mission Times and Operability Determination
2. Aging Management Programs
3. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update
4. Meet with DCCP Officers
5. Steam Generator Health
6. Meet with Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators
7. Meet with San Luis Obispo County Department of Emergency Services
8. Auxiliary Saltwater System Discharge Arrangement and FLEX Program
9. Artificial Intelligence Uses at DCCP
10. Plant Tour Inside the Radiologically Controlled Area
11. Chemistry Department
12. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors
13. Public Engagement and Outreach Programs
14. Tour of Outside Equipment Areas
15. Observe Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee Meeting (Remote)



Emergency Diesel Generator Mission Times and Operability Determination

- **Follow-Up Item from September Fact-Finding Meeting**
- **Questions Regarding Operability Evaluation for Small Leak (0.3 gph) on Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Pump Seal**
- **Reviewed Evaluation of Why Acceptable to Consider Operable with Leak Present**
- **Reviewed Mission Time (Seven Days) and Its Basis**
- **Reviewed Evaluation of Leak Rate Impact on Maintaining Adequate Coolant Volume for Mission Time**
- **Reviewed Compensatory and Prudent Actions**
- **Leak Repaired in Early October**



Emergency Diesel Generator Mission Times and Operability Determination (continued)

Conclusion: DCPD provided additional information regarding evaluations of a seal leak on the Jacket Water Cooling Pump for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-2 and the associated Operability Determination which justified the continued operability of the EDG with the leak remaining present. The DCISC found that the Operability Determination was appropriate and that the leak was repaired about one month following its discovery.



Emergency Diesel Generator Mission Times and Operability Determination (continued)

Recommendations to the DCISC:

As a case study for Risk-Informed Completion Time, the DCISC should further review how the Technical Specification-required Completion Time was met for an October 2025 Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Pump leak event as well as how a similar event would be handled in the future following approval of the License Amendment Request and implementation of a risk-informed Completion Time. (D12/2/25FF-3.1)

The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and is recommended for closure: *The DCISC should further review DCCP's basis for developing mission times used in an operability determination for a jacket water pump seal leak on Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 (D9/25FF-3.12).*



Aging Management Programs

- Inquired Regarding How Aging Management Plans (AMPs) Applied to Instrumentation and Cabling at DCPD
- Reviewed 5 AMPs (of 44 Total) that Applied to Different Categories of Cabling
- Discussed Aging Management for Pressure/Temperature/Flow Instruments
- Discussed Current Status of Overall AMP Management at DCPD

Conclusion: The DCISC found that Aging Management Programs for instrumentation and electrical cables were being appropriately managed by DCPD.



Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update

- **Sample Capsule Shipped to Lab in Churchill, PA; Disassembly Completed**
- **Thermal Wires Confirmed no Thermal Overheating**
- **Dosimetry Counts Completed**
- **Charpy V-Notch Testing Completed; Data Analysis in Progress**
- **Directed Reconstitution and Testing of Re-Inserted Capsule S Weld Materials**
- **PG&E Expected to Receive Draft Test Report in Spring 2026; Due to NRC in Fall 2026**
- **Following Report, PG&E Will Review and Supplement License Renewal Application (if Required)**

Conclusion: DCPD reported that the testing and analysis of materials removed from Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Sample Capsule B was in progress, and results were expected to be available as planned in mid-2026.



Meet with DCPD Officers

- **Lunch Meeting with All Four DCPD Vice Presidents and Chief of Staff**
- **Discussed the Fact-Finding Agenda Items and Other Items of Mutual Interest**

Conclusion: The regular meetings between DCISC and DCPD Officers and Directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.

Steam Generator Health

- All Steam Generators (Four per Unit) in Excellent Health Since Replacements in 2008 and 2009. Currently Eight Tubes Plugged on Unit 1 and Three Tubes Plugged on Unit 2 (no change from previous reviews).
- Inspections Typically Consist of Eddy-Current Testing on Primary Side and Visual Inspections and Cleanings (“Sludge Lancing”) on Secondary Side
- Last Inspections:

– 1R24 (Fall 2023) on Unit 1 – 2R21 (Fall 2019) on Unit 2	Next Planned Inspections: – 1R29 (Spring 2031) on Unit 1 – 2R27 (Fall 2028) on Unit 2
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- Unit 2 Degradation Assessment Reviewed, and the FFT Had Follow-Up Questions Regarding the Error Analysis Used in Calculations.



Steam Generator Health (continued)

Conclusion: DCPD's Steam Generators were in excellent health, and plans for future Steam Generator inspections were appropriate.

Recommendation to the DCISC: The DCISC should review the error analysis for calculations contained in the October 2025 Degradation Assessment for the Unit 2 Steam Generators. (D12/2/25FF-3.5)



Meet with Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators

- **Informal Meeting with Three Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators**
- **Discussed Various Topics Including Training, Shift Rotations and Turnovers, Rounds, Staffing, Reporting of Concerns, and Positive/Negative Aspects of Operator Work**

Conclusion: An informal meeting with several licensed and non-licensed operators provided good insights into the roles and daily routine, recruiting, career prospects, and training programs of operators at DCP.



Meet with San Luis Obispo County Department of Emergency Services Staff

- **Informal Meeting with County Emergency Response Program Manager and an Emergency Services Coordinator**
- **Discussed Various Topics Including County Relationship with DCP, Roles and Responsibilities, Interactions with Schools and Native American Tribes, Public Engagement, and the DCISC's Role in Responding to an Emergency at DCP.**



Meet with San Luis Obispo County Department of Emergency Services Staff (continued)


Conclusion: The DCISC Fact-finding Team's visit with the San Luis Obispo County Department of Emergency Services Nuclear staff was beneficial to learn about the status of the county's emergency preparedness programs and to discuss the role of the DCISC.

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *The DCISC should continue its effort to develop a committee policy for responding to an emergency declaration at DCPD (D3/25FF-3.12).*



Auxiliary Saltwater Discharge Arrangement and FLEX Program

- **Follow-up from January and April 2025 Discussions**
- **Review of New Tsunami Analysis Raised Question on Configuration of Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) Discharge Piping in Discharge Structure**
- **ASW Discharges Located Under Concrete Structure and Earthen Fill**
- **Not a Regulatory Concern; Addressed in Safety Analysis Report**
- **Questioned Why No Guidelines for Loss of ASW Discharge Included in FLEX Program**
- **PG&E Agreed to Research Question Further and Provide a Future Response**



ASW Discharge Arrangement in Discharge Structure



Auxiliary Saltwater Discharge Arrangement and FLEX Program (continued)

- **PG&E Completed Its Evaluation, Concluded Situation Covered by Existing FLEX Guidelines**
- **Review of Design and Licensing Basis Concluded Debris Unlikely to Block Flow**
- **If Blocked, FSG 44, “Site Debris Removal” Would Apply**
- **If Discharge Completely Unavailable, FSG 05, “Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging” Would Guide Developing Additional Options and Actions**
- **Not Considered a Time Sensitive Issue; Guidelines Based on 72 Hours for Responding to a Loss of Auxiliary Saltwater**



Auxiliary Saltwater Discharge Arrangement and FLEX Program (continued)

Conclusion: DCPD adequately reviewed the DCISC's recommendation regarding whether additional FLEX guidelines should be developed for a possible blockage of the Auxiliary Saltwater System discharge from a collapse of the Discharge Structure. It was found that no additional FLEX guidelines were needed, and the DCISC accepted this conclusion.



Auxiliary Saltwater Discharge Arrangement and FLEX Program (continued)

Recommendation for the DCISC: The DCISC should review FLEX Support Guidelines for how doors can be propped open, should this action be needed in a severe accident scenario. The propping open of doors can be a useful tool in responding to an unforeseen scenario, and the plant would be well positioned to have tools and training for how operators can effectively achieve the propping open of doors. (D12/2/25FF-3.8)



Auxiliary Saltwater Discharge Arrangement and FLEX Program (continued)

Recommendation to PG&E: The following previous recommendation to PG&E was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and is recommended for closure: *PG&E should review if DCPD should have considered developing FLEX guidelines for providing an alternative discharge path for the Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) System following a Beyond Design Basis event that may cause a collapse of the Discharge Structure or otherwise obstruct the ASW System discharge (P4/25FF-3.6).*



Artificial Intelligence Uses at DCPD

- **Discussed the Possibility that New Failure Modes Could be Introduced by the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI)**
- **PG&E Emphasized that Current Approaches Keep the Human in the Role of Decision-Maker and DCPD Had No Current Plans to Automate Decision-Making**
- **PG&E Provided a Demonstration of the Neutron AI Document Search Tool**



Artificial Intelligence Uses at DCPD (continued)

Conclusion: DCPD's initiative to implement the use of an Artificial Intelligence platform named Neutron Enterprise for document and data search, retrieval, and reporting continued to be positive. There were no significant safety concerns associated with DCPD's current plans for the possible use of Artificial Intelligence at the station.

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this report and remains open: *Because the application of Artificial Intelligence tools has significant potential to change and to improve DCPD's operational safety, the DCISC should review this topic frequently (D12/24FF-3.4).*



Plant Tour Inside the Radiologically Controlled Area

- **Unit 1 Containment Spray Pumps (73' Elevation)**
- **Unit 1 Safety Injection Pumps (85' Elevation)**
- **Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (100' Elevation)**
- **Units 1 and 2 Spent Fuel Pools (140' Elevation)**
- **Units 1 and 2 Refueling Water Storage Tanks, Condensate Storage Tanks, and Primary Water Storage Tanks (85' Elevation Outside)**

Conclusion: The DCISC toured areas containing Emergency Core Cooling System equipment and the Spent Fuel Pools inside the Radiologically Controlled Area. The areas toured were clean, orderly, and well lit, with observed equipment in good condition.



Chemistry Program

- **Discussion to Follow-up on Chemistry Questions From Other Topics**
- **Discussed How Corrosion Inhibiting Chemicals are Maintained in EDG Coolant Including When a Leak is Present**
- **Discussed Steam Generator Chemistry Program**
- **Reviewed Department Organization and Staffing**
- **Discussed Possible Impact of the Pending Issuance of a Revised National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit**

Conclusion: DCCP's Chemistry Program was performing well with no major issues.



Chemistry Program (continued)

Recommendation for the DCISC: The DCISC should follow up on the implementation, staffing and necessary training plans for complying with the new National Pollution Discharge Elimination System and Clean Water Act 401 Water Quality Certification, and the overall strategic plan for the Chemistry Department and its interface with Operations and License Renewal. (D12/2/25-3.11)



Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors

- **Items Discussed Included:**
 - **NRC Reorganization and Future Changes to the Reactor Inspection Program**
 - **DCPP' s Safety Culture and Corrective Action Program**
 - **Recent NRC Inspection Findings and Concerns**

Conclusion: The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspectors was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.



Public Engagement and Outreach Programs

- Update on PG&E Efforts to Reach Out and Engage With the Public
- Multi-Pronged Approach Includes:
 - Meeting with Public in Various Group Settings
 - Using Four Avenues of Social Media
 - Providing Tours (~1000 people per year)
 - Speaker Program
 - Direct Interaction with Local Media and Special Interest Groups
- Also Discussed the Role of the DCISC in Responding to an Emergency

Conclusion: The DCISC reviewed PG&E's programs for public outreach and engagement, including those associated with Emergency Preparedness, and found them to be appropriate for educating and informing the public about the station and its activities.



Tour of Outside Equipment Areas

- Intake Structure Top Deck (19' Elevation)
- Old Steam Generator Storage Facility
- 230kV and 500kV Switchyards
- FLEX Equipment Storage Area (near ISFSI)
- Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility

Conclusion: The DCISC toured the Intake Structure, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, and other outside areas. The areas toured were clean, orderly, and well lit, with observed equipment in good condition.



Observe Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee Meeting

- **Remotely Observed the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee' s (NSOC' s) Exit Meeting on December 11, 2025**
- **External Committee of Five Outside Executive-Level Industry Peers**
- **Advises the Chief Nuclear Officer on Safety Policy and Provides an Independent Perspective on Plant Performance**
- **Typically Meets and Visits DCPD Three Times per Year**

Conclusion: The DCPD Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee appeared to be thorough and comprehensive in their evaluations and candid in their reports.

**Raluca Scarlat, Member, with Richard McWhorter and Lisa Darden (remote),
Consultants**

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Update on Planning for Extended Operations



Tom Jones, Sr. Director, Regulatory, Environmental and Repurposing

Al Bates, Director, Nuclear Projects

Brian Ketelsen, Director, Business and Technical Services



Extended Ops – Status of License Renewal, State and Local Permitting



- All permits approved Q1 2026
- This allows license to be issued
- License to be issued Q2 2026




Extended Ops – Status of License Renewal, State and Local Permitting



Diablo Canyon License Renewal Planning Path

Published Date: 2/12/2026



*A black outline indicates completed actions **A pink outline indicates Timely and Sufficient Application Milestone

Chart to be updated quarter-

ACRONYMS:

AMP – Aging Management Program
CCC – California Coastal Commission
CEC – California Energy Commission
CNC – Civil Nuclear Credit

CNRA – California Natural Resources Agency
CPUC – California Public Utilities Commission
CSLC – California State Lands Commission
CZMA – Coastal Zone Management Act

DCPP – Diablo Canyon (DC) Power Plant
DOE – Department of Energy
DWR – Department of Water Resources
ISFSI – Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

LR – License Renewal
LRA – License Renewal Application
NMFS – National Marine Fisheries Service
NRC – Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PEO – Period of Extended Operations
RWQCB – Regional Water Quality Control Board
S&S – Scoping and Screening
USFWS – United States Fish and Wildlife Service



Extended Ops – Major Projects in Next Refueling Outages



There are 11 projects in the upcoming 1R26 outage that enhance and maintain equipment reliability:

Major Projects:

- Main Generator Relay Replacement
- TriCon Control System Migration
- Main Annunciator System Replacement
- Circulating Water Pump Motor Rewind
- Fuel Transfer System Replacement

Additionally:


- Reactor Vessel Inspections, Baffle Bolts, Vessel ISI
- Condenser Saltwater Elastomeric Joint Replacement
- Intake Screen Wash Piping System Replacement
- 230kV Relay Replacement
- 500kV Tie-Line Relay Upgrade
- Auxiliary Transformer 1-1 Radiator Replacement



TriCon Migration - F.A.T. in Massachusetts



Main Generator Relay Replacement (21 EM to 6 Digital)



Main Annunciator System Replacement




Fuel Transfer System Replacement



Circulating Water Pump Motor Rewind



Intake Screen Wash Piping System Replacement



Reactor Vessel Inspections



Condenser Saltwater E.J. Replacement (12ft dia)



Transformer Radiators (behind fans)



230kV Relay Replacement (with digital Switcher)



500kV Tie-Line Relay Upgrade



Plant Staffing



Staffing Update

- In support of Senate Bill 846 and extended operations, DCPD hired approximately 300 individuals in 2023
- These new employees filled critical pipelines in operations, maintenance, and engineering
- DCPD received a “Strength” in our 2024 review of training citing – “The senior leadership team collaborated to identify the required knowledge, skills and capacity to achieve the new direction and systematically acquired best candidates and strengthen the mechanisms to increase their proficiency to include knowledge transfer processes, dedicated mentors and new job familiarization guides”
- January 1, 2026, marked the beginning of the current retention period, which is the first multi-year retention period in extended operations spanning through the end of 2028
- We continue to remain focused on knowledge retention and maintaining pipelines for key positions



Per F. Peterson, Member, with Ferman Wardell and Lisa Darden, Consultants

- 1. Maintenance Department Performance**
- 2. Containment Structure Health and Inspection**
- 3. Time-Based Surveillance Frequency / Online Monitoring**
- 4. Observe Notification Review Team**
- 5. Outage Performance Review**
- 6. Online Maintenance**
- 7. Radiation Protection Performance Post-Outage**
- 8. Drone Activity At and Around DCPD**
- 9. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors**
- 10. Meet with DCPD Officers**
- 11. Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion Update**
- 12. Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion – Industry Study Update**
- 13. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program Update**
- 14. Station Update**



Maintenance Department Performance

- High work-load in 2025 – two refueling outages and five Emergency Diesel Generator major maintenance work packages
- Supplemented staff in 2025 with long term contractors
- Lead for refueling outage projects, notably Unit 1 and Unit 2 High Pressure Turbine rotor and stator blade replacements
- Performance metrics are all Green except T-week (routine work schedule) adherence which is Red. Recovery plan in place.
- Three human performance events and two recordable injuries in 2025
- Supports station Safety Champion program and initiated the Craftsmanship Council



Maintenance Department Performance (continued)

Conclusion: DCCP Maintenance Department performance was healthy and there was evidence of a continuous improvement culture.

Recommendation to the DCISC: The DCISC should review the charter for the Maintenance Department's new Craftsmanship Council after its development is complete. (D12/15/25FF-3.1)



Containment Structure Health and Inspection

- **Containment concrete surface inspections are required every five years per 10CFR50 Appendix J and ASME Section XI Code**
- **Unit 2 inspections are in progress and Unit 1 inspections will follow. Expect to complete in the fall of 2026**
- **All issues will be entered into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) for immediate disposition and to track any further actions required**
- **Inspection methods are using direct, hand-on visual and sounding techniques via lifts and rappelling equipment**
- **Expect final report from vendor upon conclusion of the inspections in the fall of 2026**



Containment Structure Health and Inspection

(continued)

- **Visual inspections of the steel liner plate inside containment are required every 40 months per 10CFR50 Appendix J and ASME Section XI Code**
- **Unit 1 inspections were complete in Refueling Outage 1R24 in the fall of 2023**
- **Unit 2 inspections were complete in Refueling Outage 2R24 in the spring 2024**
- **There were no significant issues identified with the steel liner or the coatings during the inspections on either unit**



Containment Structure Health and Inspection

(continued)

Conclusion: The DCISC found that all Containment Structure inspections were being performed as required and that they appear to have no safety issues or concerns.

Recommendation to the DCISC: The DCISC should review the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment concrete inspection report, expected to be available after Refueling Outage 1R26 in the fall of 2026. The DCISC should also review DCPD's disposition of the report and any resulting Notifications and repairs.
(D12/15/25FF-3.2)



Time-Based Surveillance Frequency/Online Monitoring

- Topic presented at October 2025 Public Meeting
- DCCP implemented Online Monitoring (OLM) prior to Refueling Outage 2R25 in the fall of 2025 and after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved a methodology developed by Analysis and Measuring Services Corporation (AMS)
- OLM methods can identify specific transmitters that have drifted in calibration so that they are the focus for calibration checks
- AMS identifies the transmitters that should be scheduled for calibration checks via reports sent to DCCP twice per operating cycle
- Moving from time-based to condition based calibrations
- A total of 120 transmitters in the OLM program; 60 per unit



Time-Based Surveillance Frequency/Online Monitoring

(continued)

- **Conclusion:** The Online Monitoring program is a very new initiative that DCCP has implemented. The implementation was done in accordance with regulatory guidance and appears to have the proper level of ownership and oversight. The capability of OLM has clear potential to increase plant operational safety by focusing maintenance activities on components that require maintenance.
- **Recommendation to the DCISC:** Online Monitoring technology has the potential to increase plant operational safety. DCISC should add Online Monitoring to the Open Item List with a regular periodicity as determined by the DCISC. (D12/15/25FF-3.3)



Observe Notification Review Team

- The Notification Review Team (NRT) reviewed approximately 80 Notifications from the previous day
- Members provided electronic feedback prior to the meeting and actively participated during the meeting
- Approximately 10 of the Notifications were reviewed in more detail during the meeting

Conclusion: The December 15, 2025, meeting of the DCCP Notification Review Team was conducted efficiently and effectively. The team appropriately reviewed and dispositioned approximately 80 Notifications from the previous day.



Outage Performance Review

- **Notable work activities completed during Refueling outages 1R25 (spring 2025) and 2R25 (fall 2025):**
 - **Reactor Coolant System Drain Down and Refueling**
 - **Core Barrel removal and inspection (Unit 1)**
 - **Fuel Transfer System Upgrade (carts, wheels, sheaves, cables, etc)**
 - **Two Nuclear Instrument Replacements (Unit 2)**
 - **High-Pressure (HP) Turbine Rotor and Stator Blade Replacement**
 - **Tank Inspections for License Renewal**
 - **Electrical Inspections for License Renewal**
 - **Piping Inspections for License Renewal**
- **Outage challenges include emergent scope addition (repairing unexpected cracks in the HP Turbine casing sealing surfaces) and managing high radiation and contamination levels for Fuel Transfer Cart upgrades**



Outage Performance Review

(continued)

- **Actions attributed to improved outage performance:**
 - Focus on pre-outage planning and readiness
 - Usage of Outage Critiques and implementation of lessons learned
 - Increased Operations involvement in outage preparation, scheduling, and risk reviews (Shift Managers and Senior Reactor Operators)
 - Ensuring strong staffing in the Outage Control Center (OCC)
 - Publishing two schedules per day verses only one
- Performance goals for 1R25 and 2R25 were all met except for recordable injuries. The Maintenance Department had one recordable injury early in each outage. Immediate actions were taken to refocus on safety to prevent further events.



Outage Performance Review

(continued)

- Conclusion: DCPD's Refueling Outage 1R25 and 2R25 were successfully performed. All planned scope of work was completed, and all performance goals were met except for recordable injuries. The Maintenance Department has taken actions to address deficiencies in safety performance. DCPD has initiated improvements which have continued to elevate their outage performance.



Online Maintenance

- Reviewed DCCP's work week process including the prioritization of Notifications, scheduling of emergent and project work, and the 12-week rolling matrix (T-12). Milestones include:
 - T-30 (30 weeks prior to scheduled maintenance) schedule development starts with the T-12 matrix work, low priority items, and project items
 - T-15 planning starts
 - T-9 scope of work is frozen
 - T-7 Integrated Risk Review Team (IRRT) reviews work for high or very high-risk work and assignments are made for readiness of this work
 - T-2 risk evaluation challenge reviews and schedule is frozen
- DCCP also uses the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Phoenix Risk Model for Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). This method analyzes changes in risk for the work scheduled (core damage frequency).



Online Maintenance

(continued)

- Initiatives the DCPW Work Management (WM) group is working on include developing new procedures that include responsibilities of all supporting departments, providing Teaching and Learning for personnel new to the WM process, and incorporating Power BI (Microsoft data analytics tool) for monitoring performance trends earlier.

Conclusion: The DCPW Online Maintenance Program is healthy and has appropriate leadership engagement and team involvement in place to successfully accomplish maintenance during plant operation while minimizing risk.



Radiation Protection Performance Post-Outage

- Reviewed Radiation Protection (RP) staffing, outage staffing hires, outage performance for high radiation and contamination jobs, and current innovations the RP department is working on.

Conclusion: The DCCP Radiation Protection (RP) department is healthy, properly staffed with qualified personnel, and has established robust plans for obtaining outage RP staff support with qualifications to safely support station needs.



Drone Activity At and Around DCP

- Initial drone sightings occurred in 2017 – 2018
- Since 2018, a few individual and infrequent sightings; last few years – none
- All the 2017–2018 sightings were over the Owner Controlled Area (OCA)
- DCP is one of two nuclear power plants in the U.S. to have a permanent airspace restriction over a portion of the OCA from the Federal Aviation Administration
- Security has a process to allow drone usage on-site (inspections, etc.)

Conclusion: DCP continues to monitor any drone activity near the power plant and has acted appropriately when such activity was observed in the past. In general, drone intrusions do not seem to pose a substantial risk to nuclear safety at DCP.



Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors

- **Items Discussed Included:**
 - **Effects the Executive Orders have had on the NRC**
 - **DCPP' s 2025 refueling outage performance**
 - **Recent NRC Inspection Findings and Concerns**

Conclusion: The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspectors was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.



Meet with DCPD Officers

- Discussed the Fact-Finding Agenda Items
- Discussed the emergent issue on Unit 1 Feedwater (FW) Heat Exchanger that occurred December 15, 2025. A tube leak occurred requiring Unit 1 to be ramped down in power and plans were being made to shutdown and repair the heat exchanger. This and future plans for FW Heat Exchanger health were discussed.

Conclusion: The regular meetings between DCISC and DCPD Officers and Directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.

Recommendation to the DCISC: The DCISC should follow-up on the findings and cause evaluation for the affected Feedwater Heat Exchanger tube leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, as well as future plans to address FW Heat Exchanger health. (D12/15/25FF-3.10)



Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion Update

- The FFT reviewed DCPD's response to several follow-up questions received from a member of the public in response to DCPD's initial response to Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) canister corrosion
- The FFT confirmed that DCPD uses appropriate equipment for visual inspections and characterization monitoring, verifies accuracy of the equipment used per industry standards, monitors more often than regulatorily required, and uses proper evaluation techniques for current assessments and future predictions
- **DCPD 2027 ISFSI Canister Inspection Progress:**
 - Inspections will be performed early (summer 2026)
 - Contracts are being developed; Plan to use the same vendor
 - Plan to use the most up-to-date inspection equipment
 - DCPD is exploring cleaning capabilities for potential areas of corrosion or defect
 - Eight Canisters will be inspected; minimum required is two.



Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion Update

(continued)

Conclusion: The DCISC determined that PG&E has adequately addressed any corrosion concerns regarding ISFSI canisters at DCP. They have implemented a conservative approach to inspection and monitoring such that a safety issue does not currently exist.

Recommendations to the DCISC:

- 1) The DCISC should request that PG&E make a presentation on the summer 2026 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation inspection campaign at the June or October 2026 Public Meetings and that Member Raluca Scarlat be invited to observe some of the inspections. (D12/15/25FF-3.11A)**
- 2) The DCISC should continue to monitor advances in canister inspection methods. (D12/15/25FF-3.11B)**



Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion – Industry Study Update

- **DCPP provided a written status update:**
 - Action items from 2024 EPRI Aging Management Working Group meeting are still open
 - Generation of validation data for key codes is stopped
 - Current code data shows six orders of magnitude reduction in normalized aerosol mass depletion in the order of one to five hours
 - EPRI is in discussions with DOE and NRC to enable the generation of validation data with no commitment date
 - The Extended Storage Collaboration Program (ESCP) Fuel subcommittee is collecting data on release fractions and particle sizes. Report anticipated late 2026 or early 2027.
 - This data will enable more realistic dose calculations and reduce excess conservatism in the models.

Conclusion: The DCISC determined that PG&E's response provides a satisfactory update to the DCISC that the industry continues to pursue this information, that initial indications are that effects are small, and that DCPP continues to monitor progress.



Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program Update

- DCCP provided an update on risk-informed program changes using PRA methods that have been implemented or are in review:
 - Risk-Informed Completion Times (approved and implemented in 2024)
 - Risk-Informed Surveillance Frequency Control Program
 - Risk-Informed In-Service Inspections
 - Supporting the NFPA-805 Fire Protection Program
 - Supporting Maintenance Rule (a)(4) Online Risk Assessments
 - Risk-Informed Categorization of Systems, Structures and Components (10 CFR 50.69) (approved)
- Current focus is on converting the PRA analysis software from “Riskman” to “CAFTA” (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis) which has become the industry standard



Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program Update

(continued)

Conclusion: The PRA Program and Team continue to provide excellent support for enhancing the safety of plant operations and for extended operations.

Recommendation to the DCISC: The DCISC should request that PG&E make a presentation at its June 2026 Public Meeting on updates Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools and methods, how PRA is being used in the plant, and the NRC's role in approving PRA tools and methods. (D12/15/25FF-3.13)



Station Update

- DCPP provided the FFT with a station update on January 14, 2026
- The December 2025 Unit 1 Feedwater Heat Exchanger tube leak repair was discussed. Scheduled duration was 64 hours, and it was safely executed in 54 hours. A Cause Evaluation was assigned and is in progress.
- Upcoming power production was discussed. Unit 1 Tunnel cleaning is scheduled for two weekends in February 2026. Requires power derates.
- Leadership changes were discussed. There were no changes since the last update, but DCPP has added a Safety Manager position.

Conclusion: DCPP's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.

Recommendation to the DCISC: The DCISC should schedule an observation of electronic procedure usage in the plant during the next FFM of which Member Per F. Peterson is a participant. (D12/15/25FF-3.14)



Per F. Peterson, Member, with Ferman Wardell and Lisa Darden, Consultants

- 1. Maintenance Department Performance**
- 2. Containment Structure Health and Inspection**
- 3. Time-Based Surveillance Frequency / Online Monitoring**
- 4. Observe Notification Review Team**
- 5. Outage Performance Review**
- 6. Online Maintenance**
- 7. Radiation Protection Performance Post-Outage**
- 8. Drone Activity At and Around DCPD**
- 9. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors**
- 10. Meet with DCPD Officers**
- 11. Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion Update**
- 12. Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion – Industry Study Update**
- 13. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program Update**
- 14. Station Update**




Najmedin Meshkati, Member, with Richard McWhorter, Consultant

- 1. Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair**
- 2. Plant Tour**
- 3. Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program**
- 4. Emergency Communications and Tour of Kendall Road Emergency Facilities**
- 5. Artificial Intelligence Uses at DCP**
- 6. Corporate Employee Safety Culture**
- 7. Staffing Update**
- 8. Meet with DCP Officers**
- 9. Use of Common Cause Evaluations in the Corrective Action Program**
- 10. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update**
- 11. Station Update**
- 12. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors**
- 13. Safety-Security Interface**
- 14. Quality Verification Program**



Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair

- **Follow-Up Item from December 15 Fact-Finding Meeting**
- **Feedwater Heaters (FWHs) are Shell/Tube Heat Exchangers Using Extraction Steam to Preheat Condensate and Feedwater**
- **Six Stages with Three Parallel Trains (18 Per Unit)**
- **FWH Stage 1 in Feedwater System; Stage 2 through 6 in Condensate System**
- **Condensate Water Flows Through Tubes At Higher Pressure than Steam in Shell Side**
- **Portions of the Shell Side Operate At Saturation Conditions (Water/Steam Mixture)**





Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair (continued)

- December 15, ~8:00 a.m. – High Level Alarm in FWH 6C
- Investigations Revealed Large Amounts of Water Flowing from FWH 5C to FWH 6C, Diagnosed as Large Tube Leak in FWH 5C
- ~11:00 a.m. – Unit 1 Power Reduced to ~91%; FWHs 5C and 6C Isolated
- Operations Could Continue Indefinitely at Reduced Power
- Plant Shutdown Required for Repairs (to Fully Isolate Steam Hazard)
- Management Chose to Shutdown Unit and Repair Immediately (rather than wait for next planned outage in Fall 2026)



Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair (continued)

- **December 16, ~12:15 p.m. – Power Reduction Commenced**
- **December 16, ~11:40 p.m. – Unit 1 Offline**
- **Testing Performed and 27 Tubes Required Plugging**
- **Repairs Completed in About 44 Hours**
- **December 18, ~8:15 p.m. – Unit 1 Returned Online**
- **December 19, ~9:00 a.m. – Unit 1 Returned to Full Power**



Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair (continued)

- Event Very Similar to FWH Tube Leak on October 15, 2021 (Unit 2 FWH 5B)
- DCISC Reviewed the Previous Event and Its Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) at Its February 2022 Public Meeting and August 2022 Fact-Finding Meeting
- RCE Concluded Failures Due to Tube Stresses in Areas Where Drain Cooler Shroud Eroded Leaving Tubes Unsupported
- FWH Replacements Not Considered As a Corrective Action in 2022 Due to Planned Cessation of Operations
- Regular Routine of Eddy Current Testing Implemented (Bridging Strategy)
- Unit 1 5C FWH Last Tested During Refueling Outage 1R24 (Spring 2025)
- RCE Also Implemented Extensive Operating Procedure Revisions
- Operator Diagnosis and Responses to This Recent Event Were Appropriate



Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair (continued)

- Cause Evaluation Will Be Performed to Capture Lessons from This Event
- Reviewed the Current Status of FWH Replacement Planning:
 - Following SB846, Project Initiated to Procure Replacements for FWHs Stages 3, 4, 5 and 6 (12 Per Unit; 24 Total)
 - Scope and Sequence of FWH Replacements Driven by Physical Layout in Plant
 - FWHs Stages 1 and 2 (6 Per Unit; 12 Total) in Better Condition and Easier to Access
 - 18 FWHs Expected to Be Delivered in Late 2026; Remaining 6 in 2027
 - Specific Date for Replacements in Plant Pending Clarity in Funding and Future Operations







Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair (continued)

Conclusion: A Unit 1 5C Feedwater Heater leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, and the subsequent plant shutdown for repair was well managed by DCPD staff. Actions taken in response to a similar event in 2021 appeared generally to have been effective in driving appropriate corrective actions, and DCPD will perform a new Cause Evaluation for the 2025 event to gather any needed additional corrective actions. DCPD is proceeding with procuring 12 replacement Feedwater Heaters for each unit, and the new equipment will arrive on site in late 2026 and early 2027; however, no plan has yet been approved for installation of the replacement heaters in the units.



Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair (continued)

Recommendation for the DCISC: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *The DCISC should follow-up on the findings and cause evaluation for the affected Feedwater Heat Exchanger tube leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, as well as future plans to address FW Heat Exchanger health. (D12/15/25FF-3.10)*



Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair (continued)

Recommendation for the DCISC: In its 34th Annual Report dated June 30, 2024, the DCISC recommended to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) that they “and all other necessary California state authorities support the funding of the plant upgrade projects recommended by DCCP.” Consistent with this previous recommendation and subsequent technical evaluations by the DCISC, the DCISC should further recommend to the CPUC that it and all other cognizant California state authorities support the implementation of the Feedwater Heater replacement project at DCCP as soon as practically feasible. The DCISC believes that these replacements are important for the plant’s operational performance by avoiding unnecessary plant shutdowns, forced outages, and startups in the future. (D1/26FF3.1)



Plant Tour

- Units 1 and 2 Turbine Deck (140' Elevation)
- Unit 1 Turbine Building (104' Elevation), Feedwater Heaters (FWHs) 3A through 6C (12 Feedwater Heaters)
- Unit 2 Turbine Building (104' Elevation), FWH 5B (location of 2021 Feedwater Heater leak event)
- Unit 1 Turbine Building (140' Elevation), at opening looking down on FWHs 1A through 2C (6 Feedwater Heaters)

Conclusion: The DCISC toured areas containing the Units 1 and 2 Feedwater Heaters in the Turbine Building observing the complexity of heater replacement movement paths and the operation of Level Control Valves. The areas toured were clean, orderly, and well lit, with observed equipment in good condition.



Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program

- Program to Inspect for and Monitor Leaks of Water Containing Boric Acid that Could Cause Corrosion of Carbon Steel
- Formal Inspections of Accessible Areas Every Six Months and Once Per Cycle Elsewhere (Including Inside Reactor Containment)
- Locations of Identified Leaks Are Monitored and Tracked for Repairs
- Leaks Categorized “LK1” through “LK4” (most to least severe)
- Most Leaks Tracked are LK3 and Monitored by Performance Indicator
- Leak Performance Indicator Currently Categorized as “Red”
- Also Discussed Training and Certifications for Inspectors and Industry Operating Experience



Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program (continued)

Conclusion: DCCP's Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program was being implemented in accordance with applicable industry guidelines; however, the number of leaks being tracked by the program was unusually high.

Recommendation for the DCISC: Based on industry experience with boric acid corrosion, DCISC should implement more rigorous and systematic follow-up of boric acid corrosion monitoring at DCC. (D1/26FF3.3)

Recommendation to PG&E: PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as "LK3" in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (P1/26FF-3.3)



Emergency Communications and Tour of Kendall Road Emergency Facilities

- Reviewed Design Functions and Capability of Kendall Road Facilities
- Serves as Alternate Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center As Well As Backup Emergency Operations Facility
- Toured Facility Including Reviewing Communications Capabilities
- Facility Has Broad Capabilities, Is Versatile in Function, and In Good Condition





Emergency Communications and Tour of Kendall Road Emergency Facilities (continued)

- Reviewed Communications Systems and Interoperability with San Luis Obispo (SLO) County
- Concern Based on Problems Experienced with Interoperability in Kerr County, Texas
- Two Categories of Communications Systems Supported by DCCPP:
 - External – Communications to Public (Alerting and Communication of Emergency Event Details)
 - Internal – Used by Emergency Responders, Primarily Multi-Band Radios



Emergency Communications and Tour of Kendall Road Emergency Facilities (continued)

- **PG&E Radio System Can be Interconnected with SLO County, but Not Typically Performed Until Late In an Emergency**
- **PG&E's Emergency Response Organization Includes a Liaison to Monitor Both Radio Systems and Pass Information Across As Needed Until Interconnection Link Established**
- **Interconnection Link Last Tested in 2014**



Emergency Communications and Tour of Kendall Road Emergency Facilities (continued)

Conclusion: The DCISC's tour of emergency response facilities at PG&E's Kendall Road offices found that the facilities had broad capabilities, were versatile in function, and were in good condition. PG&E's emergency response communication systems were very capable and well planned; however, the DCISC was concerned about the lack of a means for quickly and easily establishing interoperability between the PG&E and San Luis Obispo County radio systems (other than fire departments).



Emergency Communications and Tour of Kendall Road Emergency Facilities (continued)

Recommendation for the DCISC: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *The DCISC should continue its effort to develop a committee policy for responding to an emergency declaration at DCPD (D3/25FF-3.12).*

Recommendation for PG&E: Regarding the interoperability of PG&E radio systems with San Luis Obispo County, PG&E should initiate targeted efforts with the county to coordinate, test, and evaluate the current means of establishing interoperability between the two systems as soon as possible. Additionally, PG&E should investigate finding another means to establish interoperability between the two systems more easily and quickly during an emergency at DCPD. (P1/26FF-3.4)



Artificial Intelligence Uses at DCCP

- **Update on the Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) Search Tool (Neutron)**
- **Discussed Limited Susceptibility of Neutron to Creating Incorrect Information**
- **Discussed Industry Initiative to Consolidate External Industry Databases to Support AI-Driven Searches**



Artificial Intelligence Uses at DCPD (continued)

Conclusion: DCPD's initiative to implement the use of an Artificial Intelligence platform named Neutron for document and data search, retrieval, and reporting continued to be positive, and additional areas for applying the use of Artificial Intelligence were under consideration. There continued to be no significant safety concerns associated with DCPD's current plans for the use of Artificial Intelligence at the station.

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this report and remains open: *Because the application of Artificial Intelligence tools has significant potential to change and to improve DCPD's operational safety, the DCISC should review this topic frequently (D12/24FF-3.4).*



Corporate Employee Safety Culture

- **Corporate Safety Culture Improvement Initiatives since 2023 Have Been Centered Around Development of PG&E' s Safety Excellence Management System (PSEMS) and Led by Matt Hayes (former manager at DCPD).**
- **Discussed Use of Nuclear Safety Culture Principles and Benchmarking with Oil and Gas Industries in Developing PSEMS**
- **Discussed the Use of Case Studies from Outside the Nuclear Industry in Station Leadership Training Courses**



Corporate Employee Safety Culture (continued)

- **2025 Survey of Corporate-Wide Employee Safety Culture Completed and Results Being Communicated to Employees at Time of January Meetings**
- **Standard Survey from National Safety Council, Previously Used by Over 1,400 Companies, Targeted to Measure Employee Safety Perception**
- **PG&E Overall Score Was ‘High’ at 84%; Meaning, PG&E Scored Higher than 84% of Companies Surveyed**
- **Employee Participation was High and Improved Over Similar 2022 Survey**
- **Overall Score for Employees Increased (78.8% to 84.0%)**
- **Overall Score for Contractors Decreased (94.5% to 88.8%)**



Corporate Employee Safety Culture (continued)

Conclusion: PG&E's efforts to improve its corporate safety culture included an appropriate use of benchmarking against other non-nuclear industries. The results of a corporate-wide survey of employee safety culture completed in 2025 were generally positive and demonstrated an improving trend in perception of corporate safety culture by employees.

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and is recommended for closure: *The DCISC should review the results of a PG&E employee safety culture survey following its completion. (D1/25FF-3.9A).*



Staffing Update

- Prior to SB846, DCPD Staffing Was About 1,030 Employees
- Following SB846, Staffing Was Increased to About 1,300 Employees to Accommodate the Increased Workload of Extending Operations
- Staffing for Extended Operations Considered a Significant Success by DCPD
- Benchmarking for Extended Staffing Completed Against Similar Nuclear Plants
- Target of About 1,130 Employees Set for End of 2026 (Was 1,188 at End 2025)
- Reduction Generally Being Managed Through Attrition and Redistribution of Work
- Some Difficulty Dealing with Unexpected Losses In Engineering

Conclusion: PG&E's plans for future staffing at DCPD were appropriate.



Meet with DCPD Officers

- Meeting with All Four DCPD Vice Presidents
- Discussed the Fact-Finding Agenda Items and Other Items of Mutual Interest

Conclusion: The regular meetings between DCISC and DCPD Officers and Directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.



Use of Common Cause Evaluations in the Corrective Action Program

- **Inquiries Based on Knowledge Gained During Previous Reviews (2025) of Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedures for Performing Root Cause Evaluations (RCEs) and Cause Evaluations (CEs)**
- **Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) Are a Part of the CAP, but There Is No Standalone Procedure for Performance**
- **CCEs Generally Used to Evaluate Trends Not Otherwise Captured by CAP**
- **Discussed Practice for Initiating and Examples of Recent CCEs (One in 2024 and One in 2025/2026)**
- **Reviewed Guidance – DCPP Considers Existing CE Procedure to Provide Adequate Guidance for CCEs**



Use of Common Cause Evaluations in the Corrective Action Program (continued)

Conclusion: DCCP's process for performing Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) provided good quality evaluations for negative trends identified via the Corrective Action Program. However, the guidance provided by procedures for identifying the need for initiating and completing a CCE was unclear and needed further clarification and elaboration.

Recommendation to PG&E: PG&E should review and improve the limited guidance in procedures for completing Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) and elaborate when a CCE should be performed, how it should be systematically completed, and how it should be acted upon. (P1/26FF-3.9)



Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update

- **Sample Capsule Shipped to Lab in Churchill, PA**
- **All Disassembly and Testing Completed; Data Analysis in Progress**
- **PG&E Expected to Receive Draft Test Report in April 2026 with Final Report to be Completed in May 2026 (Due to NRC in Fall 2026)**
- **Following Report, PG&E Will Review and Supplement License Renewal Application (if Required)**
- **Report Should Be Available for DCISC Review in June 2026 (Targeting July 2026 Fact-Finding Meetings)**

Conclusion: DCPD reported that the testing and analysis of materials removed from Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Sample Capsule B was in progress, and results were expected to be available in July 2026.



Station Update

- **Station Update:**
 - **Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak Event**
 - **Human Performance Initiatives**
 - **Organizational Changes**

Conclusion: DCPD's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.



Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors

- **Items Discussed Included:**
 - **Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Failure and DCPD's response**
 - **NRC Reporting Requirements**
 - **Recent and Upcoming NRC Inspection Activities**
 - **Staffing at DCPD**
 - **The Use of Artificial Intelligence at Nuclear Power Plants**

Conclusion: The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspectors was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.



Safety–Security Interface Program

- **Manage Changes to Safety and Security Activities to Prevent Adverse Effects on Safety or Security**
- **Core Activity is Regular Participation by Security in Operations Planning Activities (Example – Security Drill Held During Team’s Visit)**
- **No Recent Issues**
- **Also Discussed Security Staffing, Training and Qualification**

Conclusion: The Safety–Security Interface Program at DCPD continued to be properly designed and implemented satisfactorily.



Quality Verification Program

- **Quality Verification (QV) Is an Independent Group Reporting Directly to the Chief Nuclear Officer**
- **QV's Responsibilities Include Audits, Assessments, Quality Control Inspections for Maintenance, Material Receipt Inspections, Commercial Grade Parts Dedication, and Vendor/Supplier Audits**
- **Reviewed Monthly "Nuclear Quality Digest"**
- **Discussed QV's Role In Vendor Oversight for Feedwater Heater Procurements**

Conclusion: DCCP's Quality Verification Department continued to perform well in fulfilling its role as an independent quality assurance group.



Najmedin Meshkati, Member, with Richard McWhorter, Consultant

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- 14. Quality Verification Program**

Response by PG&E to Nine Recommendations by the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Seismic Review Team

Chris Madugo – PG&E Geosciences

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Commission Public Meeting

February 18, 2026





Background

- The Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) Seismic Review Team (SRT) issued nine recommendations to PG&E based on review of Dr. Bird's filings
- The recommendations emphasized research tasks to improve understanding of seismic hazards beneath the Irish Hills
- The recommendations were accepted by the DCISC during its public meeting in October 2025 and formally documented in DCISC's 35th annual report



SRT Recommendations

Fault System Modeling	Geodetic Modeling	SSC Modeling
R1 Develop kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults beneath the Irish Hills	R5 Follow up on SRT's preliminary work with more complete study of GPS	R9 Conduct modeling experiments to ascertain sensitivity of DCPD hazard to SSC modifications recommended by the SRT
R2 Date low-stand abrasion platforms to constrain footwall subsidence and its contribution to SWBZ slip rate	R6 Develop slip models for faults that underlie DCPD into kinematic and mechanical models that can be tested against GPS	
R3 Monitor IRSL dating efforts and reassess, if necessary, MIS 5 age assignments for Q1 and Q2 terraces	R7 Compute relative contributions of strike slip and reverse faulting and compare to geodetic constraints	
R4 Further investigate strike slip faulting along Los Osos trend and pattern on marine terrace uplift	R8 Geologic slip-rate information should be acquired from the Rinconada and Huasna faults to improve modeling of the shear evident in the GPS data	



PG&E Response to SRT Recommendations in 35th Annual Report


- PG&E will evaluate all SRT recommendations to identify items
 - not already addressed in the LTSP
 - that are technically defensible
 - likely to provide meaningful improvements in seismic-hazard understanding
- For recommendations that qualify, PG&E will perform targeted sensitivity studies or assessments in 2026 to evaluate potential impacts on seismic hazard characterization and inform research prioritization
- PG&E anticipates that results will be reviewed by the DCISC SRT and the Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) through 2026 and beyond



PG&E Detailed Response

In a supplemental response PG&E addressed whether:

- PG&E **agrees** with the recommendation
- The recommendation has been **addressed by LTSP** research or past seismic assessments
 - summary of ongoing and recent work
- Results of the recommended work are likely to lead to **meaningful changes to, or advances in understanding of**
 - seismic hazard
 - model uncertainty
 - model validation
 - application of new methods
- There are **plans** to address or further assess the recommendations



PG&E, 2015


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Figure extent and additional connected fault sections

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EXPLANATION

- ★ DCPD site
 - Fault source, surface trace, or updip surface projection. Two-letter codes describing sections are explained in Table 6.5.
 - ? — Quaternary fault trace: solid where well located, dashed where approximately located, offshore faults dotted where buried by undeformed unconformity H10 or older strata, onshore faults dotted where buried, short dashed where inferred, queried where existence is uncertain
- Slip Rate**
- ? — 1–5 mm/yr
 - ? — 0.2–1 mm/yr
 - ? — <0.2 mm/yr
- Note: Fault sources are defined as simplified representations of Quaternary fault traces.



Development of Fault Sources for All FGMs

DCPD SSC REPORT

PG&E Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Figure 7-3

R1: The SRT recommends the development of a set of kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults underlying the Irish Hills that can explain the folding observed since 5 Ma




PG&E agrees that kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults beneath the Irish Hills could strengthen the fault geometry models used in the DCPD SSC



LTSP: Recommendation addressed by the LTSP goal to support development of one or more structural models that explain Late Quaternary uplift of the Irish Hills

LTSP Research: 2025 Data Review

- Preliminary review of available data found opportunities in the eastern part of the Pismo Basin (EPB) to characterize the long-term structural evolution and Quaternary deformation of the Irish Hills:
 - a preserved Miocene to Pliocene geologic section
 - more abundant subsurface data from hydrocarbon exploration
 - potential preservation of fluvial terraces along multiple drainages that cross the EPB





R1: The SRT recommends the development of a set of kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults underlying the Irish Hills that can explain the folding observed since 5 Ma

Anticipated Impact: New or revised fault geometry models may change hazard, depending on whether they validate, refine, or reject elements of the existing SSC models

- impacts cannot be determined until modeling and sensitivity are completed


Plan: PG&E will continue this work in 2026, focusing on data compilation for the EPB and establishing academic or USGS partnerships to lead the research

- a complete structural modeling project will take several years to complete

R2: The SRT recommends dating of low-stand abrasion platforms offshore, south of the Irish Hills, to further constrain the rate of footwall subsidence and its contribution to the SWBZ slip rate

- PG&E does not agree that dating low-stand abrasion platforms south of the Irish Hills should be a priority for LTSP funding for the following reasons:
 - Direct dating of submarine bedrock platforms has a low likelihood of success
 - Slip rate for the San Luis Bay fault is well-constrained
 - Footwall subsidence is a minimal contributor to total vertical deformation across the San Luis Bay fault


Anticipated Impact: Low due to small footwall signal and low total fault slip rate compared to the Hosgri fault




R2: The SRT recommends dating of low-stand abrasion platforms offshore, south of the Irish Hills, to further constrain the rate of footwall subsidence and its contribution to the SWBZ slip rate

Plan:

- PG&E does not currently plan to date low stand abrasion platforms in the footwall of the SWBZ
- SRT's footwall subsidence model *could* be evaluated using the following datasets and models, some of which are in development:
 - Updated sequence stratigraphy model (update of PG&E, 2013; manuscript in progress 2026-2027)
 - Evaluation of strandlines in the footwall of the San Luis Bay fault (update of PG&E, 2011; manuscript planned 2026-2027)




AB-1632 Studies, PG&E, 2013, 2014



R2: The SRT recommends dating of low-stand abrasion platforms offshore, south of the Irish Hills, to further constrain the rate of footwall subsidence and its contribution to the SWBZ slip rate

Plan:

- PG&E does not currently plan to date low stand abrasion platforms in the footwall of the SWBZ
- SRT's footwall subsidence model *could* be evaluated using the following datasets and models, some of which are in development:
 - Existing 3D Seismic Data of the northern part of the Oceano fault (PG&E, 2014)
 - New CHIRP lines collected by the USGS across the Oceano fault in late 2025 (USGS, personal communication)
- Whether to do an evaluation will be decided in 2026 after discussion with PG&E's external review team



R3: The SRT recommends monitoring of IRSL-dating efforts and reassessment, if necessary, of the MIS 5 age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces surrounding the Irish Hills



PG&E agrees to monitor IRSL and other age dating methods




LTSP already monitors developments in age assignments to the Q1 and Q2 marine terraces surrounding the Irish Hills

- changes in marine terrace ages would impact slip rate estimates for San Luis Bay and Los Osos faults

R3: The SRT recommends monitoring of IRSL-dating efforts and reassessment, if necessary, of the MIS 5 age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces surrounding the Irish Hills

Age-dating developments and monitoring work sponsored by PG&E since the SRT review process began:


- New post infrared stimulated luminescence (pIRSL) marine terrace ages at Cayucos (Rivera et al., 2025) along the Santa Ynez River (Santa Maria Basin) are younger than long-accepted MIS 5 age assignments for marine terraces near DCPD
- PG&E sponsored August 2025 field trip by Dr. Nate Onderdonk and attended by SRT rep (Mike Oskin) to share recent terrace dating results from the Santa Maria Basin



R3: The SRT recommends monitoring of IRSL-dating efforts and reassessment, if necessary, of the MIS 5 age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces surrounding the Irish Hills

Age-dating developments and monitoring work sponsored by PG&E since the SRT review process began:

- Revised pIRSL results from Cayucos, Palos Verdes, and San Diego reevaluated in late 2025 in general agreement with published U-series ages
- Muhs et al. (2026) reconciled geochronology and paleozoogeography, supporting past marine terrace age assignments for Cayucos and Irish Hills
- Terrace ages in Santa Maria Basin do not match coral-based MIS correlations, highlighting a scientific discrepancy that researchers are currently working to resolve





R3: The SRT recommends monitoring of IRSL-dating efforts and reassessment, if necessary, of the MIS 5 age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces surrounding the Irish Hills

Anticipated Impact: Low. No current impact to age dates or hazard

Plan: Sponsor research to evaluate Dr. Onderdonk's Santa Ynez River and coastal terrace ages using alternative Quaternary dating methods.


- Work is medium priority with incremental progress and publications expected over the next couple years. PG&E will assess the impacts of any results and findings.
- This research could involve Dr. Mike Oskin (SRT) as a technical advisor because he is a subject matter expert

R4: The SRT recommends further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its impacts on the pattern of marine-terrace uplift

-  PG&E agrees with the SRT recommendation to further investigate strike-slip kinematics, which aligns with LTSP goals to reduce uncertainty on hazard-significant faults and inform alternative FGMs.
-  The PG&E SSC model already incorporates a right-lateral slip component on the Los Osos fault in the outward-vergent FGM.
-  Past research for a seismic assessment evaluated the strike slip potential


R4: The SRT recommends further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its impacts on the pattern of marine-terrace uplift

- A detailed lidar-based geomorphic stream channel analysis was done in 2012 to support SSC development



R4: The SRT recommends further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its impacts on the pattern of marine-terrace uplift

- The study showed that any onshore strike-slip signal was too small or distributed to be expressed in channel geomorphology (based on >180 channel thalweg crossings from the 2012 SSHAC-3 Workshop)





R4: The SRT recommends further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its impacts on the pattern of marine-terrace uplift

Anticipated Impact: Unknown, likely low. Lateral slip component likely low.

Plan: PG&E will document the existing stream-channel offset analysis and develop it into a technical report by the end of 2026 and assess potential for a future peer-reviewed publication

- Ongoing LTSP research includes a PG&E-funded USGS CRADA project evaluating Los Osos fault kinematics along multiple reaches, incorporating CHIRP seismic data from 2019 and 2025; a manuscript is targeted for late 2026–early 2027
- PG&E considers publication of the stream-channel analysis and USGS seismotectonic study to be the most robust path for evaluating strike-slip deformation and directly addressing the SRT recommendation



R4: The SRT recommends further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its impacts on the pattern of marine-terrace uplift

- Plan (continued):** Prior to the June 2025 DCISC meeting, PG&E will review whether marine terrace deformation and Morro Bay subsidence could provide additional constraints on horizontal slip
- Analog modeling shows this approach has large uncertainties, making it low priority
 - PG&E will consult with the USGS on whether its 2025 CHIRP surveys identified offshore geomorphic or structural markers suitable for estimating horizontal slip rates
 - Based on the SRT recommendation, LTSP will prioritize work on lateral slip characterization over research focused solely on long-term dip-slip rates at Memorial Terrace and older Quaternary terraces

Recommendations 5, 6, 7

- **Recommendation 5: PG&E should follow up the SRT's preliminary work with a more complete study of the available GPS data**
- **Recommendation 6: The fault slip models that underlie the DCCP SSC should be developed into kinematic and mechanical models that can predict the interseismic deformation and can thus be directly tested against the GPS data**
- **Recommendation 7: PG&E should compute the relative contributions of strike-slip and reverse faulting to the regional deformation predicted by the SSC24 slip models and compare the values with the geodetic constraints**

Recommendations 5, 6, 7



PG&E agrees that further evaluation of GPS data—along with comparisons to kinematic and mechanical fault models between the San Andreas and Hosgri faults—provides valuable **confirmation** of the geologic slip rates and kinematics used in the PG&E model

Anticipated Impact: Unknown. Primary goal of work is to provide an independent test, or confirmation of geologic rates in the SSC model

Plan: Starting in 2026, PG&E proposes to work directly with Scott Marshall with peer review from an independent expert to accomplish tasks outlined in SRT Recommendations 5 through 7

Geologic slip-rate information should be acquired from the Rinconada and Huasna faults to permit better modeling of the shear component evident in the GPS data



- PG&E agrees** that refining slip-rate estimates for the Rinconada and Huasna faults is valuable, as these faults may contribute significantly to the slip budget west of the San Andreas fault.
- **LTSP: No past studies.** SSHAC-3 sensitivity studies show these faults are not hazard-significant for DCP, and reasonable slip-rate updates would not change site hazard

Discussions with the SRT highlighted the value in slip rate constraints for constraining geodetic models

- Elevates research priority from low to medium



R8: Geologic slip-rate information should be acquired from the Rinconada and Huasna faults to permit better modeling of the shear component evident in the GPS data

Plan: By end of 2026, PG&E will complete an initial literature review, geomorphic site assessment, and logistics evaluation to determine study feasibility

- PG&E will investigate partnering with a university to develop the study into a graduate research project, with potential results emerging over the next several years
 - Late Quaternary slip-rate studies require well-preserved geomorphic markers and site access, and even under favorable conditions, mapping and dating can take several years to complete

R9 PG&E should conduct modeling experiments to ascertain the sensitivity of DCPD hazard to the SSC modifications recommended by the SRT



PG&E agrees to evaluate DCPD hazard sensitivity to SRT proponent model and parameters

- PG&E developed a sensitivity source model focused on faults nearest DCPD to efficiently evaluate how changes in source parameters may influence seismic hazard; the SRT's recommendation aligns directly with use of this model
- The sensitivity model is under review and is expected to be finalized in early 2026, after which PG&E will test the SRT-recommended fault geometry as one of the first applications of the model

R9 PG&E should conduct modeling experiments to ascertain the sensitivity of DCPD hazard to the SSC modifications recommended by the SRT

Anticipated Impact: Unknown.

Plan: As part of the hazard sensitivity analyses, PG&E will explore and document alternative modeling approaches and assess how each affects hazard outcomes, acknowledging that sensitivity studies are complex and seldom straightforward.

- Implementing the sensitivity model will require consideration of multiple modeling elements beyond fault dip, including ramp-flat geometries in the seismogenic crust and adjustments to the frequency–magnitude distribution.
- PG&E will provide updates on progress during scheduled public and fact-finding meetings as development of the sensitivity model continues.

Summary Matrix

SRT Rec	PG&E Agrees	LTSP Research	Anticipated Impact	Research Priority	Planned work in 2026	Anticipated Completion
R1	Yes	Yes	Unknown	Medium	Data compilation	2028
R2	No	Possible	Low	Low	None	
R3	Yes	Yes	Low	Medium	Alternative dating study	2027
R4	Yes	Yes	Low	Medium	-Document channel study -USGS manuscript offshore Los Osos	2027
R5	Yes	Planned	Unknown	Medium	Work with Scott Marshall	TBD
R6	Yes	Planned	Unknown	Medium	Work with Scott Marshall	TBD
R7	Yes	Planned	Unknown	Medium	Work with Scott Marshall	TBD
R8	Yes	Planned	Unknown	Medium	Internal feasibility study	2028
R9	Yes	Planned	Unknown	High	Sensitivity study	2026

LTSP Research Priorities

Relative Priority

- GMC: Application of nonergodic ground motions
- Application of Fragile Geologic Features
- SSC: Development of new time dependence models
- Hosgri slip rate
- SSC: Hosgri time dependence – timing of last event
- SSC: SLPB Slip Rates
- SSC: SLPB Fault Geometry Models
 - Testing SRT proponent fault geometry model

THANK YOU

SRT Comments on PG&E Response to Nine DCISC/SRT Recommendations

Seismic Review Team

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Professor, Department of Geological and Environmental Sciences, Appalachian State University

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Public Meeting

February 19, 2026

Timeline of SRT Reviews and PG&E Responses

- **February 19-20, 2025, DCISC public meeting**
 - SRT constituted by DCISC
- **June 10-11, 2025, DCISC public meeting**
 - SRT presents “Review of the Bird Critique” with 9 recommendations to PG&E
- **September 10, 2025**
 - SRT meets with PG&E technical staff to clarify recommendations
- **October 22-23, 2025, DCISC public meeting**
 - SRT reports on Dr. Bird’s response to “Review of the Bird Critique”
 - PG&E presents preliminary response to SRT recommendations
- **December 18, 2025**
 - PG&E responds to DCISC 35th Annual Report, including preliminary response to SRT recommendations
- **January 14, 2026**
 - DCISC requests supplemental information from PG&E on response to SRT recommendations
- **February 18-19, 2026, DCISC public meeting**
 - PG&E presents supplemental response to SRT recommendations
 - SRT comments on PG&E supplemental response

DCISC Request to PG&E for Supplemental Information

- Supplement the PG&E response to include additional information that is sufficient for the DCISC's Seismic Review Team (SRT) to evaluate the technical adequacy of the response
- Respond to each of the nine recommendations individually, stating whether PG&E agrees that the Committee's recommendation for further action by PG&E is warranted
 - If PG&E concludes that no further action is needed on a recommendation, explain why
 - If PG&E plans further action in response to a recommendation,
 - summarize its priority relative to the other recommendations, as well as to the current priorities of the LTSP not considered by the SRT
 - provide a timeframe for the response
- Evaluate which recommendations have the potential to make a significant impact on the hazard or have the potential to raise potentially significant uncertainties
 - i.e., identify which recommendations are “technically defensible” and “likely to yield meaningful results”

Summary of the PG&E Response

From p. 3 of the PG&E response:

- “In general, the relative priority of research tasks related to reverse faults beneath the Irish Hills is considered of **medium** importance based on current information and hazard model results, warranting ongoing LTSP research with the goal of reducing SSC uncertainties over a time frame of **multiple years**.”
- “Research tasks that are currently considered to be of a higher or equal priority under the LTSP, based on evaluation of tornado plots, include:
 - **projects associated with addressing ground motion model (GMM) uncertainties**
 - **projects addressing uncertainties in the Hosgri fault slip rate, and**
 - **projects exploring uncertainties related to time dependent behavior of fault sources.**”

PG&E provided individual responses to each of the nine recommendations.

Summary of the PG&E Response

	Rec #	Recommendation	PG&E endorses?	PG&E/LTSP priority	Project status	Project timescale	Potential hazard impact
Fault System Modeling	1	Kinematic modeling	yes	medium	Existing LTSP goal; preliminary research focused on eastern Pismo Basin	~3 yr	medium
	2	Dating of low-stand abrasion platforms	no	low	Dating infeasible; subsidence rate addressed by ongoing research	~3 yr	low (PG&E) to medium (SRT)
	3	Monitoring of IRSL dating	yes	medium	Ongoing effort w/recent reports; initiating study of Onderdonk terrace ages	~3 yr	medium to high
	4	Strike-slip faulting along Los Osos trend	yes	medium (seismotectonics) to low (Morro Bay subsidence)	Multifaceted research program underway, including USGS CRADA	Reports by 12/26	medium
Geodetic Modeling	5	GPS modeling	yes	medium	Initiating geodetic research to address SRT recommendations 5-7	~3 yr	medium
	6	Fault slip modeling					
	7	Transpression ratio					
	8	Rinconada and Huasna slip rates	yes	medium	Initiating literature review & site studies; seek academic partners	Plans by 12/26, ~3 yr study	low
SSC Modeling	9	SSC sensitivity analysis	yes	high	Developing sensitivity source model (SSM) as computational platform for sensitivity studies	SSM approved by 6/26, SRT FGM tested in 2026	medium

Recommendation #1

The SRT recommends the development of a set of kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults underlying the Irish Hills that can explain the folding observed since 5 Ma.

- Endorsed by PG&E: Yes
- PG&E/LTSP priority: Medium
- Potential hazard impact: Medium
- Project status: Existing LTSP goal; new research focused on eastern Pismo Basin
- Project timeline: ~ 3 yr

SRT comments

1. Outcrop exposures from west to east along the Irish Hills provide valuable information to constrain SWBZ fault geometry at different structural depths within deformed Pismo basin
2. SRT therefore endorses *additional* research on eastern Pismo Basin where there are more abundant subsurface data and opportunities to use stream terraces as deformation markers
3. SRT encourages continued work on understanding Morro Bay subsidence and tilting of Memorial Terrace to understand uplift north of Irish Hills to constrain deep SWBZ geometry

Recommendation #2

The SRT recommends dating of low-stand abrasion platforms offshore, south of the Irish Hills, to further constrain the rate of footwall subsidence and its contribution to the SWBZ slip rate.

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *No*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium (ongoing research) to low (direct platform dating)*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Low (PG&E) to medium (SRT)*
- **Project status:** *Dating infeasible; subsidence rate addressed in ongoing research*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 3 yr*

SRT comments

1. Constraining footwall subsidence is important for understanding complete rate of slip across the SWBZ, including San Luis Bay fault, Oceano fault and Los Berros fault
2. A missing subsidence component may be indicated by the difference between 0.50 ± 0.10 mm/yr long-term slip rate and 0.29 ± 0.07 mm/yr slip rate from marine terrace uplift
3. SRT recommendation to date low-stand abrasion platforms need not involve direct sampling. Stratigraphic constraints on low-stand platform position and stability would be sufficient

Recommendation #3

The SRT recommends monitoring of IRSL-dating efforts and reassessment, if necessary, of the MIS 5 age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces surrounding the Irish Hills.

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Medium to high*
- **Project status:** *Ongoing effort; initiating study of Onderdonk terrace ages*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 3 yr*

SRT comments

1. Recently presented IRSL results from Cayucos proposed younger dates for Q1 and Q2 terraces that would substantially increase hazard
2. Newly published U-series dates and author reevaluation of IRSL results shows that existing MIS 5 age assignments are correct
3. Dr. Oskin is willing to participate as an advisor to new work to re-date Orcutt formation to test high slip rate estimates for Casmalia Hills thrust

Recommendation #4

The SRT recommends further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its impacts on the pattern of marine-terrace uplift.

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium (seismotectonics), low (Morro Bay subsidence)*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Medium*
- **Project status:** *Multifaceted research program underway, including USGS CRADA*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 3 yr*

SRT comments

1. SRT endorses renewed focus on offshore and onshore evidence for strike-slip faulting along Los Osos trend
2. Updated study of strike-slip/dip-slip strain partitioning along the Los Osos trend using observed seismic source mechanisms will further address this recommendation
3. Understanding Morro Bay subsidence and tilting of Memorial Terrace are both important for constraining geometry of SWBZ at depth and especially the dip of lower fault section

Recommendations #5-7 (Geodetic Studies)

#5 PG&E should follow up SRT's preliminary work with a more complete study of the available GPS data.

#6 The fault slip models that underlie the DCPD SSC should be developed into kinematic and mechanical models that can predict the interseismic deformation and can thus be directly tested against the GPS data.

#7 PG&E should compute the relative contributions of strike-slip and reverse faulting to the regional deformation predicted by the SSC24 slip models and compare the values with the geodetic constraints

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Medium*
- **Project status:** *Initiating geodetic research to address SRT recommendations*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 3 yr*

SRT comments

1. Much to be done, but PG&E can leverage existing geodetic datasets
2. Should follow overall NSHM approach: multiple models based on different methods
3. Dr. Marshall is willing to participate; likely need others involved

Recommendation #8

Geologic slip-rate information should be acquired from the Rinconada and Huasna faults to permit better modeling of the shear component evident in the GPS data

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Low*
- **Project status:** *Initiating literature review & site studies; seek academic partners*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 3 yr*

SRT comments

1. PG&E's increase in the priority of this topic recognizes its potential to improve geodetic modeling
2. We agree that the potential hazard impact at DCPD is low but that these slip rates are needed to properly characterize the regional geodetic deformation
3. Identifying, mapping, and dating of slip-rate sites will require multiple years to complete; literature review and site assessments are a logical first step

Recommendation #9

PG&E should conduct modeling experiments to ascertain the sensitivity of DCPD hazard to the SSC modifications recommended by the SRT.

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *High*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Medium*
- **Project status:** *Developing sensitivity source model (SSM) as computational platform for sensitivity analyses*
- **Project timeline:** *SSM operational by 6/26, SRT FGM tested in 2026*

SRT comments

1. We agree with PG&E that hazard sensitivity analyses of the SSC are seldom straightforward because they can involve adjustments of many model elements
2. We strongly endorse development of the SSM software, which should facilitate the hazard sensitivity studies recommended by the SRT
3. The SSM will be focused on faults closest to the plant; SRT looks forward to examining the implementation details

SRT Evaluation of PG&E Supplemental Response

- Supplement PG&E response to include additional information that is sufficient for the DCISC's Seismic Review Team to evaluate the technical adequacy of the response.
 - ***Information in the PG&E supplemental response was adequate for a preliminary assessment of PG&E's plans to address the SRT recommendations***
- Respond to each of the nine recommendations individually, stating whether PG&E agrees that the Committee's recommendation for further action by PG&E is warranted.
 - ***PG&E responded to each recommendation and agrees that further action is warranted on all nine recommendations***
 - ***Recommendations #2-#4 are currently being address by on-going research***
 - ***Recommendations #1, #5-#9 will be addressed by new or expanded research projects***
- Evaluate which recommendations have the potential to make a significant impact on the hazard or have the potential to raise potentially significant uncertainties
 - ***Full evaluation will require results from planned sensitivity studies***

SRT Evaluation of PG&E Supplemental Response

- PG&E's preliminary response to the DCISC/SRT recommendations included sufficient information for a preliminary evaluation of the planned response
 - Shows careful attention to all nine of the SRT recommendations
- PG&E assigns a medium priority to research on reverse faulting beneath the Irish Hills and gives higher priority to GMM uncertainty, Hosgri hazard, and SSC time-dependence
 - This prioritization is consistent with the known epistemic uncertainties, but does not consider the ontological uncertainty of the SSC, which is probably higher than that of the GMM
- We agree with most of the response plan but identify some areas of concern
 - e.g., Recommendation #2: Difference between the long-term slip rate and the slip rate from marine terrace uplift could be explained by an offshore subsidence rate of ~ 0.13 mm/yr. Testing this hypothesis deserves a higher priority. This problem may be addressed through further analysis of existing offshore datasets
- Additional technical information will be needed for a full review of the PG&E response plan
 - e.g., details on the implementation of the SSM

End