

DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE (“DCISC”)
(www.dcisc.org)

Committee Members: Najmedin Meshkati
Per F. Peterson
Raluca O. Scarlat

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Tuesday & Wednesday
June 16-17, 2026
Convening June 16-17 at Avila Lighthouse Suites
Reconvening on the Evening of June 17
at SLO County Board of Supervisors’ Chambers

Point San Luis Conference Room
First and San Francisco Streets
Avila Beach, California
1055 Monterey Street
San Luis Obispo, California

PUBLIC MEETING AGENDA

This public meeting will be webcast in real time at:

http://www.slo-span.org/local_webcast/DCISC/stream_index.htm and through <http://www.dcisc.org>.

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on San Luis Obispo local government access television, Channel 21.

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PARTICIPATION

You may participate in the DCISC’s public meeting in person or in real-time by accessing the Zoom webinar meeting via the weblink and the webinar ID given above or by calling any of the phone numbers provided at the top of this agenda. Instructions on how to access, view and participate in remote meetings are also provided by visiting the DCISC’s home page at <http://www.dcisc.org>. Attendees can make oral comments or ask questions of the Committee Members during the webinar meeting by using the “Raise Your Hand” feature or by pressing *9 on your telephone keypad if joining by telephone only. If you are unable to participate in real-time, you may email to dcisafety@dcisc.org with the subject line “Public Comment Item# ___” (insert the item number relevant to your comment) or “Public Comment – Non-Agenda Item.” Comments will be reviewed and distributed before the meeting if received by Noon on Monday, June 15, 2026. Comments received after that will be addressed during the item and/or at the end of the meeting. All comments received will be read into and become part of the record, subject to a time limit determined by the presiding officer. Subject to the requirements to publish an agenda in advance, the Committee will have the option to modify its actions on items based on comments received.

In accordance with the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (CA Govt. Code §§11120 et seq.) and the Committee’s Policies, for each item on the Agenda the Committee reserves the right, at the discretion of the presiding officer, to limit the total amount of time allocated for public comment on particular issues and/or for each individual public commenter. A time limit for each public commenter will be announced during every session. For any public commenter(s) who previously requested and at the discretion of the presiding officer were granted additional time an announcement will be made at the beginning of the session. Public commenters will not be recognized more than once during public comments on matters not on the agenda or during consideration of an agenda item but may be called upon subsequently to respond to questions from the Committee. Public commenters may not cede time to other public commenters.

Morning Session – 06/16/2026 – 8:30 A.M.

I CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL

II INTRODUCTIONS AND COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

ADVISEMENT

The Committee may consider at any time requests to change the order of a listed agenda item. Information distributed to the Committee at a public meeting becomes part of the public record of the DCISC. A copy of written or electronic material, pictures, etc., must be provided to the Committee's Legal Counsel for this purpose. Those persons making public comments are requested and encouraged to provide copies of any prepared written materials or electronic media they intend to use in their remarks to the Legal Counsel's office prior to addressing remarks to the Committee and in sufficient time such that they may be distributed. Correspondence received and sent by the Committee is on file with the Office of the DCISC Legal Counsel and copies are available upon request. Devices for attendees who may be hearing impaired are available upon request. The meeting will be webcast in real time.

III PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. (The public may comment on any matter listed on the morning's Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee.) *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced at the beginning of this session. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

IV DISCUSSION, DIRECTION AND ACTION, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE COMMITTEE, CONSULTANTS & COUNSEL

- A. Public Outreach, Site Visits, Review of Future Meeting and Fact-Finding Dates, Technical Consultant Rotation and Assignments, Guidance for the Preparation for and Conduct of Fact-Finding Meetings and other Committee Activities; and Documents Provided to the Committee.

V INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee of PG&E:

- 1) Presentation by PG&E on the State of the Plant Update Including Organizational Changes, Significant Past and Future Plant Activities, Power History, Significant Equipment Issues, Significant Human Performance Issues, and Other Station Activities since the DCISC's February 2026 Public Meeting.
- 2) Presentation by PG&E on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation, Open Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Status of Cross-Cutting Issues Matrix, Current and Future License Amendment Requests, Effects of Recent NRC Inspection Program Changes on the Number and Composition of Inspections at DCP, and Other Significant Regulatory Issues/Requests.

VI TECHNICAL CONSULTANT REPORT; RECEIVE, APPROVE AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E

- B. Consultant Lisa Darden:
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and approval of
March 18-19, 2026 Fact Finding Report.

VII ADJOURN MORNING SESSION

Afternoon Session – 06/16/2026 – 1:15 P.M.

VIII RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION

IX COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

X PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. (The public may comment on any matter listed on the afternoon's Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee.) *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced at the beginning of this session. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

XI INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

C. Presentations by the NRC's Resident Inspector for DCPD Mr. Eli Garcia on the NRC's Annual Assessment of DCPD's End-of Cycle Performance for Calendar Year 2025, and by NRC Region IV, Division of Reactor Projects Ms. Patricia Vossmer on the Changes to the Reactor Oversight Process Recently Approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

D. Presentation by the Honorable Robert J. Feitel, NRC Inspector General, and his staff on the Role of the Office of Inspector General in Overseeing the Work of the NRC.

XII TECHNICAL CONSULTANT REPORT; RECEIVE, APPROVE AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E

E. Consultant Richard McWhorter:
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and approval of
April 13-14, 2026 Fact Finding Report.

XIII ACTION ITEM

F. Nomination and Election of Chair and Vice-Chair
for the July 1, 2026 - June 30, 2027 Term.

Discussion/Action

XIV ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION

Evening Session – 06/16/2026 – 5:00 P.M.

XV RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION

XVI COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

XVII INFORMATION ITEM PRESENTED BY THE COMMITTEE

- G. Consultant Dr. Thomas H. Jordan Report on the Seismic Review Team's Comments on the Supplemental Response from PG&E to the Nine Seismic Review Team Recommendations Contained in the DCISC's 35th Annual Report. Consider Acceptance of SRT's Comments on Supplemental Response to the Nine Recommendations and Future Committee Actions.

XVIII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee of PG&E (Cont'd.):

3. Presentation by PG&E Updating the Scope and Schedule for Actions Taken in Response to the Nine Recommendations Contained in the DCISC's Seismic Review Team Report and Explaining How Such Actions will be Incorporated into DCP's Long-Term Seismic Program.
4. Presentation by PG&E on the Purpose, Organization, and Status of Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) Programs at DCP Including How Potential Changes in Seismic Hazard Analyses (Such as Discussed in the DCISC's Seismic Review Team Report) Affect SPRA Results and How Sensitivity Analyses for Such Changes are Performed.

XIX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

The public may comment on the matter listed on the evening's Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so following those comments. *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced after the presentation by the Committee. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

XX ADJOURN EVENING SESSION

Morning Session – 06/17/2026 – 8:30 A.M.

XXI RECONVENE FOR MORNING SESSION

XXII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

XXIII PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

The public may comment on the matter listed on the morning's Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so following those comments. *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced after the presentation by the Committee. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

XXIV ACCEPTANCE OF MINUTES

- H. Minutes of February 18-19, 2026 Public Meeting. Review/Accept

XXV TECHNICAL CONSULTANT REPORT; RECEIVE, APPROVE AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E

- I. Consultants Richard St. Onge & Lisa Darden:
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and approval of
May 6-7, 2026 Fact Finding Report.

XXVI DISCUSSION, DIRECTION AND ACTION, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE COMMITTEE,
CONSULTANTS & COUNSEL (Cont'd.)

- J. Committee Regulatory, Administrative and Financial Matters, Public Outreach and Engagement, Interaction with Governmental Agencies, Consideration of New Committee Policy on Response to DCPD Emergencies, Amend Policy on Review of Fact Finding Reports, Ratify and Approve Contract Changes with Committee Consultants and Counsel, and Other Committee Discussion.

XXVII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee of PG&E (Cont'd.):

5. Presentation by PG&E on Plans for Conducting Aging Management Inspections at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (Including Multi-Purpose Canisters) in Summer 2026.

XXVIII ADJOURN MORNING SESSION

Afternoon Session – 06/17/2026 – 1:30 P.M.

XXIX RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION

XXX COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

XXXI PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. (The public may comment on matters listed on the afternoon's Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee.) *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced at the beginning of this session. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

XXXII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee of PG&E (Cont'd.):

6. Presentation by PG&E on the Regulatory Requirements and Technical Standards for the Testing and Analysis of the Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule B and the Planned Submission of Results to the NRC and the DCISC.

XXXIII DISCUSSION, DIRECTION AND ACTION, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE COMMITTEE,
CONSULTANTS & COUNSEL (Cont'd.)

- K. Review of Open Items List and Status of Recommendations.

XXXIV ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION

Evening Public Outreach Session – 06/17/2026 – 5:30 P.M. (or as soon as matters may be heard)

The Public Meeting will adjourn to a different location – reconvening at the San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors’ Chambers located at the New Government Center, 1055 Monterey Street, San Luis Obispo.

- XXXV L. The Committee Members, Consultants and Counsel will hold a public outreach session and receive comments and questions and provide responses to any interested members of the public on matters concerning operational safety at Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

**XXXVI CONCLUDING REMARKS & DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
OF FUTURE DCISC ACTIVITIES**

- M. Future Actions by the Committee.
N. Further Information to Obtain/Review.
O. Confirmation of Future Site Visits, and Public Meetings.

XXXVII ADJOURNMENT OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEENTH PUBLIC MEETING

The DCISC’s policy is to schedule its public meetings in locations that are accessible to people with disabilities and to remain in compliance with state guidelines on prevention of communicable disease. Hand sanitizers and face coverings are available in the meeting room. The Avila Lighthouse Suites Point San Luis Conference Room and the San Luis Obispo Board of Supervisors’ Chambers are wheelchair accessible facilities. A person who needs a disability-related accommodation or modification in order to participate in the meeting may make a request by contacting the DCISC office (in CA 800-439-4688 or (831) 647-1044) or by sending a written request to the DCISC office at P.O. Box 4523, Carmel-by-the-Sea, CA 93921-4523. Providing your request at least five business days before the meeting will help ensure availability of the requested accommodation.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE	
AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM	
MEETING DATE:	June 16, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	IV-A
AGENDA TITLE:	Public Outreach, Site Visits, Review and Scheduling of Future Meeting Dates, Technical Consultant Rotation and Assignments, Guidance for Preparation for and Conduct of Fact Finding Meetings and other Committee Activities; and Documents Provided to the Committee.
CONSENT [☐] ACTION [☒] INFORMATION [☒]	
Staff Summary: It is expected that the Committee Members will hold a discussion on their public outreach activities and site visits and will confirm and schedule future activities of the Committee during the remainder of 2026 and for 2027. The Members are also expected to discuss with the Technical Consultants the Consultant's rotational assignments and to discuss with Consultants and Legal Counsel guidance for preparation for the conduct of fact finding meetings. The actual and proposed DCISC fact finding and public meeting items, with key dates, prepared by Committee Consultant McWhorter is provided for your use in reviewing and planning Committee activities. A timeline and primer for the conduct of fact finding meetings is also being provided concerning planning for fact finding meetings. Also provided is the Report Preparation Schedule for the 36th Annual DCISC Annual Report for 2025-2026. Attached for your information are copies of the transmittal memoranda which list the various documents provided to the Committee by PG&E since your last public meeting in February 2026.	
RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate	

2025 – 2026 (36th Annual Report)

July 21-22, 2025, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.1)

1. Reactivity Management Program Update
2. Operating Experience Program Update
3. Maintenance Rule Functional Failures
4. Meeting with Nuclear Regulatory Commission Senior Resident Inspector
5. Auxiliary Building Ventilation System
6. Electronic Procedures
7. Reports on 2024 Radiation Releases and Radioactive Environmental Monitoring
8. Workplace Seismic Safety
9. Artificial Intelligence Program Update
10. Plant Update
11. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Update

August 12-13, 2025, Fact-finding Meeting (NM, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.2)

1. PG&E Board of Directors Safety and Nuclear Oversight (SNO) Committee
2. Meeting with Officers Paula Gerfen and Maureen Zawalick
3. Safety Conscious Work Environment
4. Beyond Design Basis Accident Mitigation Guidelines - FLEX
5. Meeting with NRC Resident Inspectors
6. Electronic Procedures
7. Artificial Intelligence Update
8. Observe Plant Health Committee Meeting
9. DCISC Recommendations to PG&E
10. Single Point Vulnerability Update
11. Emergency Diesel Generator Walkdown
12. Nuclear Instrumentation Update
13. Observe FLEX Diesel Pump Test
14. Simulator Alternate Shutdown Panel

September 16-17, 2025, Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, RJB, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.3)

1. Institute for Nuclear Power Operations Mid-Cycle Assessment
2. Unit 2 Power Reductions in Response to Area Wildfires
3. Single Point Vulnerability Program
4. Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion
5. Root Cause Evaluation for Auxiliary Saltwater Pump Motor Failure
6. Refueling Outage 2R25 Update and Safety Plan
7. Transmission Systems
8. Observe Readiness Review Board Meeting
9. Station Update
10. Discussion of Seismic Review Team Recommendations
11. Meet with DCPD Senior Director
12. Emergency Diesel Generators
13. Plant Tour

October 22-23, 2025, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.3)

1. Update on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation, Open Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Status of Cross-Cutting Issues Matrix, Current and Future License Amendment Requests, and Other Significant Regulatory Issues/Requests
2. Current and Future Uses of Artificial Intelligence and Other Innovative Technologies at DCPD.
3. Committee Discussion of the Potential Relevance and Implications for DCPD of the Recent Passage and Approval of California Senate Bill 53: "Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act."
4. Report on the Results of the Continuing Work of the Seismic Review Team in Reviewing Concerns Raised Regarding the Seismic Hazard at the DCPD Site and Environs Including by Dr. Peter Bird and by Others.
5. Update by the SLO County Emergency Services & Nuclear Power Plant Program Manager Ms. Kelly Van Buren on County Emergency Services Activities, Local Nuclear Emergency Planning, and the County's Relationship with DCPD.
6. State of the Plant Update including Organizational Changes, Significant Past and Future Plant Activities, Power History, Significant Equipment Issues, Significant Human Performance Issues, Status of Preparations for Refueling Outage 2R25, and Other Station Activities
7. Decisions Made and Their Bases for Reducing Unit 2 Power in Response to Area Wildfires in July and August 2025

December 2-3, 2025, (Previously November 18-19) Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, RDM, w/LAD Remote) (AR Exhibit D.4)

1. Emergency Diesel Generator Mission Times and Operability Determination
2. Aging Management Programs
3. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update
4. Meet with DCPD Officers
5. Steam Generator Health
6. Meet with Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators
7. Meet with San Luis Obispo County Department of Emergency Services
8. Auxiliary Saltwater System Discharge Arrangement and FLEX Program
9. Artificial Intelligence Uses at DCPD
10. Plant Tour Inside the Radiologically Controlled Area
11. Chemistry Department
12. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors
13. Public Engagement and Outreach Programs
14. Tour of Outside Equipment Areas
15. Observe Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee Meeting (Remote)

December 15-16, 2025, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, LAD, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.5)

1. Maintenance Department Performance
2. Containment Structure Health and Inspections
3. Time-Based Surveillance Frequency / Online Monitoring
4. Observe Notification Review Team Meeting

5. Outage Performance Review
6. Online Maintenance
7. Radiation Protection Performance Post-Outage
8. Drone Activity At and Around DCPD
9. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors
10. Meet with DCPD Officer
11. Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion Update
12. Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion –Industry Study Update
13. Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program Update
14. Station Update

January 20-21, 2026, (Previously January 13-14) Fact-finding Meeting (NM, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.6)

1. Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Shutdown for Repair
2. Plant Tour
3. Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
4. Emergency Preparedness and Tour of Kendall Road Facilities
5. Artificial Intelligence Uses at DCPD
6. Corporate Employee Safety Culture
7. Staffing Update
8. Meet with DCPD Officers
9. Use of Common Cause Evaluations in the Corrective Action Program
10. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update
11. Station Update
12. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors
13. Safety-Security Interface
14. Quality Verification Program

February 18-19, 2026, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.6)

1. State of the Plant Update Including Organizational Changes, Significant Past and Future Plant Activities, Power History, Results of Refueling Outage 2R25, Significant Equipment Issues including Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak, Significant Human Performance Issues, and Other Station Activities since the DCISC's October 2025 Public Meeting.
2. Update on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation, Open Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Status of Cross-Cutting Issues Matrix, Current and Future License Amendment Requests, and Other Significant Regulatory Issues/Requests.
3. Update on Planning for Extended Operations including Status of License Renewal, State and Local Permitting, Project Planning, and Staffing.
4. PG&E Evaluations of and Response to Recommendations Made by the DCISC's Seismic Review Team Included as Recommendations SRT-1 through SRT-9 in the DCISC's 35th Annual Report.
5. Committee Discussion on PG&E's Response to DCISC 35th Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025, including a discussion with

the DCISC Seismic Review Team of PG&E's response to Recommendations SRT-1 through SRT-9.

March 18-19, 2026, (Previously March 11-12) Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, LAD, w/RSO remote) (AR Exhibit D.7)

1. Plant Health Subcommittee Observation
2. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspector
3. FLEX Support Guidelines for Propping Open Turbine Building Doors
4. Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Pump Leak Technical Specification Completion Time; Risk Informed Completion Time Application
5. Strategic Plan for Compliance with the New National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) and Clean Water Act 401 Water Quality Certifications
6. Meet with DCPD Officer
7. Field Observation of a Maintenance Activity
8. Safety Related Direct Current (DC) Power System Review
9. Station Update
10. Units 1 and 2 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment Error Analysis
11. Meet with Individual Contributors from Various Departments
12. Preparation for Future Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Inspections in August 2026

April 13-14, 2026, (Previously April 22-23) Fact-finding Meeting (NM, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.8)

1. Cyber Security Program
2. Station Update
3. DCPD 2026 Operating Plan
4. Human Performance and Plant Status Control
5. Long Term Seismic Program
6. Simulator Training Observation
7. Accompany a Nuclear Operator on Rounds
8. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspector
9. Observe Notification Review Team Meeting
10. Results of Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Failure Cause Evaluation
11. Meet with DCPD Officer
12. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update
13. Reactor Vessel Head Corrosion Industry Event Update

May 6-7, 2026, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, LAD, RSO) (AR Exhibit D.9)

1. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors
2. Meet with DCPD Officer
3. Station Update
4. Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders
5. Craftmanship Council Update
6. Equipment Reliability
7. Walkthrough Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders
8. Craftmanship Council Interviews with Craft Members
9. Nuclear Insurance

10. Crane Program

June 16-17, 2026, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.9)

1. State of the Plant Update Including Organizational Changes, Significant Past and Future Plant Activities, Power History, Results of Refueling Outage 2R25, Significant Equipment Issues including Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak, Significant Human Performance Issues, and Other Station Activities since the DCISC's February 2026 Public Meeting.
2. Update on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation, Open Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Status of Cross-Cutting Issues Matrix, Current and Future License Amendment Requests, Effects of Recent NRC Inspection Program Changes on the Number and Composition of Inspections at DCPD and Other Significant Regulatory Issues/Requests.
3. Presentations by the NRC's Resident Inspector for DCPD, Eli Garcia, on the NRC's Annual Assessment of DCPD's End-of Cycle Performance for Calendar Year 2025, and by Patricia Vossmer, NRC Region IV, Division of Reactor Projects, on the Changes to the Reactor Oversight Process Recently Approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
4. Presentation by the Honorable Robert J. Feitel, NRC Inspector General, on the Role of the Office of Inspector General in Overseeing the Work of the NRC.
5. Consultant Dr. Thomas H. Jordan Report on the Seismic Review Team's Comments on the Supplemental Response from PG&E to the Nine Seismic Review Team Recommendations Contained in the DCISC's 35th Annual Report. Consider Acceptance of SRT's Comments on Supplemental Response to the Nine Recommendations and Future Committee Actions.
6. Presentation by PG&E Updating the Scope and Schedule for Actions Taken in Response to the Nine Recommendations Contained in the DCISC's Seismic Review Team Report and Explaining How Such Actions will be Incorporated into DCPD's Long-Term Seismic Program.
7. Presentation by PG&E on the Purpose, Organization, and Status of Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) Programs at DCPD Including How Potential Changes in Seismic Hazard Analyses (Such as Discussed in the DCISC's Seismic Review Team Report) Affect SPRA Results and How Sensitivity Analyses for Such Changes are Performed.
8. Update on Plans for Conducting Aging Management Inspections at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (Including Multi-Purpose Canisters) in Summer 2026.
9. Presentation by PG&E on the Regulatory Requirements and Technical Standards for the Testing and Analysis of Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule B and the Planned Submission of Results to the NRC and the DCISC.

2026 – 2027 (37th Annual Report)

July 6-7, 2026, (Previously July 14-15) Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.1)

July 28-29, 2026, (Previously August 11-12) Fact-finding Meeting (NM, LAD, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.2) *includes observation of Emergency Preparedness Exercise (unevaluated) on July 29 and NSOC Exit on August 13.*

September 1-2, 2026, (Previously September 15-16) Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, RDM, RSO) (AR Exhibit D.3) *includes observation of ISFSI Inspections the week of August 19 (one day) and Emergency Preparedness Exercise (evaluated) on September 2.*

October 20-21, 2026, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.3)

December 2-3, 2026, (Previously November) Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, LAD) (AR Exhibit D.4)

December 8-9, 2026, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.5)

January 20-21, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (NM, RSO) (AR Exhibit D.6)

February 17-18, 2027, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.6)

March 17-18, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, RSO) (AR Exhibit D.7)

April 20-21, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (NM, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.8)

May 11-12, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, LAD) (AR Exhibit D.9)

June 16-17, 2027, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.9)

2027 – 2028 (38th Annual Report)

July TBD, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RSO) (AR Exhibit D.1)

August TBD, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (NM, LAD) (AR Exhibit D.2)

September TBD, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.3)

October TBD, 2027, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.3)

DCPP Key Dates

NSOC Meetings (DCISC invited only to the two-hour exit meeting on the final days below)

- March 17, 2025 (Exit Mtg: 3/20/25) – *PFP observed as part of 3/19/25 FFM*
- December 8, 2025 (Exit Mtg: 12/11/25) – *ROS observed as part of 12/2/25 FFM*
- August 10, 2026 (Exit Mtg: 8/13/2026) – *NM to observe as part of 7/28/26 FFM*
- November 30, 2026 (Exit Mtg: 12/3/26)

Refueling Outages

- 1R26 – Fall 2026
- 2R26 – Spring 2027
- 1R27 – Spring 2028

- 2R27 – Fall 2028

Emergency Preparedness Exercises

- July 29, 2026 (State Participation Exercise, Unevaluated) – *NM to observe as part of 7/28/26 FFM*
- September 2, 2026 (State Participation Exercise, Evaluated) – *ROS to observe as part of 9/1/26 FFM*

Abbreviations

Members: PFP=Per Peterson, NM=Najmedin Meshkati, ROS=Raluca Scarlet
Technical Consultants: RFW=Ferman Wardell, RDM=Rick McWhorter, LAD=Lisa Darden,
RSO=Rich St. Onge
Specialty Consultants: ACK=Andy Kadak, MTK=Mark Kirk

DCISC June Public Meeting Topics for Discussion on the Planning and Conduct of Fact-Finding Meetings

Fact-Finding Meeting Timeline

-45 Days	Using OIL, FFPM, and Member's interests, Technical Consultant prepares draft List of Proposed Agenda Items.
-40 Days	Technical Consultant sends draft List of Proposed Agenda Items to Member and resolves any comments with Member. The Member and Technical Consultant may desire to meet remotely to review the proposed agenda items and discuss their desires for the meetings prior to the drafting of the list.
-35 Days	Technical Consultant finalizes the List of Proposed Agenda Items. The list will include specific details about each proposed agenda item including priorities, suggested durations, Open Items List references, when the topic was last reviewed, questions and issues for discussion and a list of documents requested to be provided prior to the meeting.
-30 Days	Technical Consultant sends List of Proposed Agenda Items to PG&E
-21 to -10 Days	Technical Consultant meets remotely with PG&E to answer any questions and resolve any concerns with proposed agenda and document request.
-7 Days	Agenda and requested documents provided by PG&E (posted to Certrec).
-5 Days	The Member and Technical Consultant should meet remotely to review the agenda and their desires for discussion prior to the meetings. As desired, the Technical Consultant will provide the Member with background information such as copies of past Fact-Finding Reports for when the topics were previously reviewed.
During FF Meetings	Technical Consultant and PG&E Liaison will keep track of follow-up actions and documents.
ASAP but no > 1 Week	Follow-up documents provided by PG&E (posted to Certrec).
+2 Weeks	Technical Consultant finishes first draft report and sends to Member for review. (A longer time may be needed for complex topics or if follow-up documents are delayed.)
+3 Weeks	Member provides comments to first draft report.
+4 Weeks	Technical Consultant reconciles Member's comments and sends second draft report to other two Members, Technical Consultants, and Counsel for review. Members must respond only to consultant without copying other Members. See Committee Policy #8.
+5 Weeks	Technical Consultant incorporates all other comments into third draft report with consolidated/single redlines (no names) and sends to Member for comments/approval.
+6 Weeks	Technical Consultant sends third draft clean version to group for info/final reviews. (Typically, no comments received.)
+6 Weeks	Technical Consultant finalizes draft report (ready for review and approval at PM) and sends to Counsel one week prior to PM. Technical Consultant prepares PowerPoint for PM Presentation with copy to Member.
	<i>Note – the above report preparation schedule must be significantly accelerated for the Fact-Finding Meeting that occurs the month immediately prior to the PM.</i>

Fact-Finding Meeting Conduct

- Members and consultants should strive to include in the draft List of Proposed Agenda Items as much detail as possible on each agenda item including priorities, suggested durations, Open Items List references, when the topic was last reviewed, questions and issues for discussion and a list of documents requested to be provided prior to the meeting.
- Members and consultants should avoid changing/adding agenda items less than 30 days before the meeting unless there is truly an 'emerging issue' that needs to be addressed in the FFM.
- The number of proposed agenda items should result in about 7 hours of meetings on site per day for completion (travel schedules permitting). This will typically be 8 to 14 topics, depending on the length of time spent observing in plant or training.
- During meetings, Members should avoid straying too far or too long from the specific topic that was requested in advance. It's appropriate that each Member has their own specific areas of interest; however, members repeatedly steering conversations into their individual areas of interest detracts from full discussion of the planned topic and causes angst with the PG&E presenters who may not be prepared to discuss that particular area.
- During meetings, Members should respect a consultant's suggestion/advice about getting back on topic and support them returning to the planned topic. Note that the consultants often have planned to address items on the OIL. If we fail to adequately cover an OIL-related topic (due to side issues dominating the discussions), then we may not be able to accomplish the Committee's goal of completing the item as discussed and specified on the OIL.
- During meetings, both Members and consultants should avoid extended time working on digital devices during the meetings, particularly on work that is not related to the committee. We can plan specific break times if needed to deal with non-committee work. If one is using a digital device to take notes, try to avoid getting distracted by unrelated info that comes up on the device.

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee

**THIRTY-SIXTH REPORT ON THE SAFETY OF
DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATIONS**

July 1, 2025 - June 30, 2026

Report Preparation Schedule

Authors send First Drafts to Rick	August 14, 2026
Rick Sends First Draft Report to DCISC for Review	August 28
DCISC Sends First Draft Comments Only to Rick	September 11
Rick Sends “Track Changes” Second Draft to DCISC	September 18
DCISC Sends Second Draft Comments Only to Rick	September 25
Rick Sends Final Draft of Executive Summary to DCISC	October 2
DCISC Reviews/Approves Annual Report at October PM	October 21

December 2025
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	
		There are no LBIES for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
12/3/2025	DCL-25-087	Application to Utilize ADOPT Fuel Pellets for Improved Fuel Performance
12/17/2025	DCL-25-092	Annual Update: Diablo Canyon Power Plant License Renewal Application, Amendment 7
12/18/2025	DCL-25-096	Response to the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fifth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Power Plant Operations - July 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025
12/18/2025	DCL-25-094	License Amendment Request 25-07, Revise Technical Specifications to adopt TSTF-529, Revision 4, "Clarify Use and Application Rules," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
12/18/2025	DCL-25-090	License Amendment Request 25-06 to Update the Spent Fuel Pool and New Fuel Storage Vault Criticality Safety Analysis
12/18/2025	DCL-25-072	License Amendment Request 25-08 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-596, "Expand the Applicability of the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP)"

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
12/1/2025	(OUO) Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant – Cybersecurity Inspection Report 05000275/2025401 and 05000323/2025401
12/2/2025	Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 – Issuance of Amendment Nos. 254 and 256 Re: Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1 Using Risk-Informed Process for Evaluations (EPID L-2025-LLA-0124)
12/9/2025	Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 – Proposed Revision to the Quality Assurance Program
12/18/2025	DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2025003 AND 05000323/2025003

D. PSRC Documents (NSOC/PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/17/25	2025-020	- LAR 25-06, DCL-25-090, Update the Spent Fuel Pool and New Fuel Storage Vault Criticality Safety Analysis - LAR 25-08, DCL-25-072, "Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-296, "Expand

December
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

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		the Applicability of the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP)"" LAR 25-07, DCL-25-094, Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-529, Revision 4, "Clarify Use and Application Rules," Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process
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E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	SAPN 51304403	DA-RCP 2-1 #2 Seal Leak Off Alarm
2 WGE	SAPN 51291848	DA- Damper M-15B not fully closing CARB
2 WGE	SAPN 51299605	DA-1-TCV-23 SJAE Flow/CG Temp Oscillatio
2 WGE	SAPN 51299508	DA- 1-TCV-23 SJAE Flow/CG Temp Oscillati
2 WGE	SAPN 51227961	DA-SCW PP 11 no indicating lights - CARB
2 WGE	SAPN 51247028	DA-Trend: Warm Elect Termination - CARB
2 WGE	SAPN 51175457	LTCA DA-State Presr Vesse inspxn prgm de
Eff. Eval	SAPN 51092854	Multiple Unplanned Main Generator Outages
12/31/2025		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 12-01-2025 – 12-31-2025
12/31/2025		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 12-01-2025 – 12-31- 2025
1/7/2026		20 Oldest Non-LTCA DA Notifications as of 1/7/2026
1/6/2026		DCPP CAP Station Index

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
11/5/2025		Nuclear Quality Digest, November 2025
12/30/2025	QVA # 2025-AS-10	Work Verification
12/2/2025	QV # 2025- AS-12	Deferred Maintenance with Monitoring per AD7.ID2

December
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

2025

12/15/2025	QVA # 2025-AS-13	Maintenance Rule 1.5
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G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
1/13/2026	SAPN 51252827	Benchmark Fall 2024 RPM and RSTF Meeting
1/13/2026	SAPN 51218090	Benchmarking - Cyber Assessment Process
1/13/2026	SAPN 51301449	Benchmark: Crane Nuclear ACAD Adherence
1/13/2026	SAPN 51232823	Benchmarking-FME IWG Meeting (July 2024)
1/13/2026	SAPN 51315392	Benchmarking: ISTOG Meeting Dec 2025
1/13/2026	SAPN 51267629	Benchmark of Spring 2025 INPO RPM/RSTF
1/13/2026	SAPN 51293661	2025 NHUG Conference Lessons Learned
1/13/2026	SAPN 51228049	Benchmark 2024 Region 4 RPM/NRC meeting

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/18/2025		2026 Nuclear Generation, Roadmap to Generating Excellence
12/18/2025		2025-2030 Strategic Plan Nuclear Generation
12/3/2025		December 2025 PI Status Summary
Station Initiative		There are no new Station Initiatives for this month.

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

December
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

2025

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202549	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202550	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202551	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202552	T+1 Performance Critique

January 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
1/14/2026	DCL-26-003	Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 – 4Q25 – PI Data Elements
1/22/2026	DCL-26-005	LAR 26-02

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
1/14/2026	REASSIGNMENT OF U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BRANCH CHIEF IN THE DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR LICENSING FOR PLANT LICENSING BRANCH IV
1/20/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 255 and 257 RE: REVISION TO REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIMES CONSISTENT WITH NUREG-1431, REVISION 5 (EPID L-2024-LLA-0178)
1/20//2026	DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – NRC EXAMINATION REPORT 05000275/2025301 AND 05000323/2025301
1/21/2026	Acceptance Review: Diablo Canyon request to utilize ADOPT fuel for improved fuel performance (EPID: L-2025-LLA-0191)
1/21/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNITS 1 AND 2 - AUTHORIZATION OF PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE GEN-ISI-ALT-2024-01 TO USE ASME CODE CASE N-752-1. "RISK-INFORMED CATEGORIZATION AND TREATMENT FOR REPAIR/REPLACEMENT ACTIVITIES IN CLASS 2 AND 3 SYSTEMS. SECTION XI. DIVISION 1" (EPID L-2025-LLR-0064)
9/8/2025	Acceptance Review DCPD proposed rev to TS 3.8.1 using Risk Informed Process for Evals Epid I-2025-Ila-0124
10/17/2025	DCPD U1 U2 NRC INITIAL OP LICENSING EXAM APPROVAL 05000275 2025301 05000323 2025301
12/2/2025	DCPD U1 U2 - Issuance of Amendment 254 and 256 re Rev to TS 3.8.1 ML25324A367
12/9/2025	DCPD U1 U2 - Proposed Rev to Quality Assurance Program
12/18/2025	DCPD U1 U2 INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 2025003

D. PSRC Documents (NSOC/PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
1/21/26	2026-001	Special PSRC Meeting Minutes

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	SAPN 51250576	DA-Leak from AC unit drain
2 WGE	SAPN 51305875	DA-QAAF – Deferred Maintenance with Moni
2 WGE	SAPN 51320959	STP I-42-Stop BCN Procs Before Rod Dev M

January 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

2 WGE	SAPN 51320086	Incorrect Pressure Switch was Isolated
2 WGE	SAPN 51321077	DA-TCP walkdown interval exceeded
2 WGE	SAPN 51321710	DA-4Q25 MV – Delay in recogn of inop DG
2 WGE	SAPN 51311564	DA-SHF12: Blown Fuses UY-01 and UA
Eff. Eval		There are no Effectiveness Evals this month.
2/1/2026		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 1/1/2026-1/31/2026
2/1/2026		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 1/1/2026-1/31/2026
2/3/2026		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3
2/3/2026		Open RCEs
2/3/2026		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 1 & 2

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
1/8/2026	QVA 2026-AS- 01	Assessment to Determine Emergency Preparedness Audit Frequency

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
2/10/2026	SAPN 51273401	QC Benchmarking – Rad Shipping
2/10/2026	SAPN 51260759	Trip Report for RV Conference
2/10/2026	SAPN 51315266	Trip Report 2025 VI Western Conference
2/10/2026	SAPN 51315582	Informal P.V. STARS Weapons Safety Asst
2/10/2026	SAPN 51315508	Informal Benchmark Action Targets
2/10/2026	SAPN 51299098	Trip Report for RV Conference
2/10/2026	SAPN 51313548	Benchmark – 2025 NxA Users Group Confere
2/10/2026	SAPN 51316996	Informal Benchmark – Site Service Sched
2/10/2026	SAPN 51315528	Informal Benchmark Tucson Police Academy
2/10/2026	SAPN 51240567	2024 Security Equip SA
2/10/2026	SAPN 51235113	2024 DCPD ISFSI Pre Baseline SA

January 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/18/2025		2026 Nuclear Generation, Roadmap to Generating Excellence
12/18/2025		2025-2030 Strategic Plan Nuclear Generation
1/5/2026		January 2026 PI Status Summary
Station Initiative		There are no new Station Initiatives for this month.

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202601	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202602	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202603	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202604	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202605	T+1 Performance Critique

February
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

2026

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
2/11/2026	DCL-26-006	Supplement 5: Diablo Canyon Power Plant License Renewal Application, Amendment 8 Regarding the Coastal Zone Management Act Consistency Certification
2/11/2026	DIL-26-003	Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2025
2/17/2026	DCL-26-002	10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes for Peak Cladding Temperature for 2024

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
01/30/2026	Acceptance Review: Diablo Canyon request to update spent fuel pool and new fuel storage vault criticality safety analysis (EPID: L-2025-LLA-0201)
2/02/2026	Acceptance Review: Diablo Canyon request to revise Technical Specifications to adopt TSTF-529, Revision 4, "Clarify Use and Application Rules." (EPID: L-2025-LLA-0199)
2/2/2026	Acceptance Review: Diablo Canyon request to revise Technical Specifications to adopt TSTF-596, "Expand the Applicability of the Surveillance Frequency Control Program (SFCP)." (EPID: L-2025-LLA-0200)
2/17/2026	Pacific Gas and Electric Company - Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure (EPID: L-2025- LLA-0191)
2/23/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 256 AND 258 RE: REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO ADOPT TSTF-505, REVISION 2, "PROVIDE RISKINFORMED EXTENDED COMPLETION TIMES – RITSTF INITIATIVE 4b" FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.3.1 AND 3.3.2 (EPID L-2024-LLA-0177)

D. PSRC Documents (NSOC/PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no PSRC documents for this month.

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	SAPN 51273259	DA-ISFSI HI-STORM Lid Stud Inspection
2 WGE	SAPN 51240499	DA-Vol 9B Data sheets not updated -CARB

February 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

Eff. Eval		There are no Effectiveness Evaluations this month.
3/1/2026		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 02/01/2026 - 02/28/2026
3/1/2026		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 2/1/2026 - 2/28/2026
3/1/2026		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 2/1/2026 - 2/28/2026
3/3/2026		20 Oldest Non-LTCA DA Notifications as of 3/3/2026
3/3/2026		DCPP CAP Station Index

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
2/4/2026		Nuclear Quality Digest, February 2026
2/2/2026		2025 Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR)

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
8/26/2025	SAPN 51269370	EPRI – Work Planning Users Group (WPUG)
3/9/2026	SAPN 51290753	RP ALARA Conference Benchmark
3/9/2026	SAPN 51278145	Baker Dynamics/Benchmarking June 2025
3/9/2026	SAPN 51259379	Benchmark Industry IOTC programs
3/9/2026	SAPN 51223977	Benchmark diving activities
3/9/2026	SAPN 51319585	Projects Benchmark Report: WolkCreek
3/9/2026	SAPN 51288362	QV Benchmark of Columbia
3/9/2026	SAPN 51319306	Informal Benchmark De-Escalation
3/9/2026	SAPN 51292310	EPRI NDE Tech Week 2025 Trip Report
3/9/2026	SAPN 51319601	Chubu Electric OPS/Maint Benchmark SAPN
3/9/2026	SAPN 51269370	EPRI WPUG benchmark Report 2025
3/9/2026	SAPN 51278778	Security conference benchmark
3/9/2026	SAPN 51303428	QHSA for the FME Program - 2R25
3/9/2026	SAPN 51276209	Self-Assessment for Electrical Safety

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

February
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

2026

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/18/2025		2026 Nuclear Generation, Roadmap to Generating Excellence
12/18/2025		2025-2030 Strategic Plan Nuclear Generation
2/11/2026		February 2026 PI Status Summary
Station Initiative		There are no new Station Initiatives for this month.

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
ODM		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	January	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2601-2605

March 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
3/2/2026	DCL-26-009, DIL-26-004	Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Updates
3/3/2026	DCL-26-012	Response to Request for Additional Information for "License Amendment Request 25-02, Revision to Technical Specification 3.7.12, 'Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS)'"
3/4/2026	DCL-26-015	Technical Specification Bases, Revision 16
3/5/2026	DCL-26-013	Owner's Activity Report for Unit 2 Twenty-Fifth Refueling Outage
3/25/2026	DCL-26-018	2026 Annual Statement of Insurance for Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Diablo Canyon Power Plant
3/25/2026	DCL-26-016	Decommissioning Funding Report for Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2
3/30/20026	DCL-26-017	Submittal of the Snubber Examination, Testing, and Service Life Monitoring Program Plan for the Fifth Ten-Year Interval

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
3/2/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - REGULATORY AUDIT PLAN IN SUPPORT OF LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO UTILIZE ADOPT™ FUEL FOR IMPROVED FUEL PERFORMANCE (EPID L-2025-LLA-0191)
3/30/2026	Pacific Gas and Electric Company - Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure (EPID: L-2025-LLA-0201) Date:

D. PSRC Documents (NSOC/PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no PSRC minutes for this month.

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	SAPN 51283572	DA-Trend – Contractor Oversight
Eff. Eval		There are no Effectiveness Evals this month.

March 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

3/31/2026		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 03/01/2026 - 03/31/2026
3/31/2026		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 3/1/2026 – 3/31/2026
3/31/2026		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 3/31/2026
4/6/2026		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3 as of 4/6/2026
4/7/2026		Open RCEs as of 4/7/2026
4/6/2026		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 1 & 2

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no QV documents for this month.

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
4/13/2026	SAPN 51324231	Benchmarking Grassroots Safety
4/13/2026	SAPN 51273356	NEIL EAC Meeting, 2/11/2025 to 2/13/2025
4/13/2026	SAPN 51317552	Benchmarking License Renewal Task Force
4/13/2026	SAPN 51323933	NUPIC NOC Conference Trip Report
4/13/2026	SAPN 51327054	Benchmarking – NEIL EAC Meeting Feb 2026
4/13/2026	SAPN 51295595	PM Program QH Self-Assessment
4/13/2026	SAPN 51267518	Actions from 2024 RPM QHSA
4/13/2026	SAPM 51276380	QHSA for the FME Program - 1R25

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/18/2025		2026 Nuclear Generation, Roadmap to Generating Excellence
12/18/2025		2025-2030 Strategic Plan Nuclear Generation
4/7/2026		April 2026 PI Status Summary
3/2026		Diablo Canyon Power Plant 4Q2025 Station Excellence Plan

March 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
ODM		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202606	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202607	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202607	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202608	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202609	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202610	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202611	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202612	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202613	T+1 Performance Critique
	February	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2606-2609
	March	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2610-2613

April 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
4/15/2026	DCL-26-024	Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 – 1Q2026 – PI Data Elements
4/21/2026	DCL-26-022	License Amendment Request 26-04 License Amendment Request to Revise the 10 CFR 50.69 Categorization Process to Adopt the Enhanced Risk-Informed Categorization Methodology for Pressure Boundary Components
4/22/2026	DCL-26-021	2025 Annual Nonradiological Environmental Operating Report
4/22/2026	DCL-26-020	Annual Report of Occupational Radiation Exposure for 2025
4/28/2026	DCL-26-025	2025 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report
4/29/2026	DCL-26-023	2025 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report
4/29/2026	DCL-26-029	License Amendment Request 26-05 Revision to Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergency Plan

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
4/2/2026	ISSUANCE OF RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-80 AND DPR-82 FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
4/2/2026	Diablo Canyon ADOPT fuel audit question SNSB-01 dated April 2, 2026 (EPID: L-2025-LLA-0191)
4/6/2026	Diablo Canyon ADOPT fuel audit question SFNB-01 dated April 6, 2026 (EPID: L-2025-LLA-0191)
4/6/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - REGULATORY AUDIT PLAN IN SUPPORT OF LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO UPDATE SPENT FUEL POOL AND NEW FUEL STORAGE VAULT CRITICALITY SAFETY ANALYSIS (EPID: L-2025-LLA-0201)
4/7/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 257 AND 259 RE: REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.12, "AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM (ABVS)" (EPID L-2025-LLA-0122)
4/13/2026	SUMMARY OF APRIL 1, 2026, PRESUBMITTAL MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY REGARDING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.0.4.b FROM TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3.5.3, 3.7.5, AND

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	3.8.1 FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (EPID L-2026-LRM-0025)
4/30/2026	DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2026001 AND 05000323/2026001

D. PSRC Documents (NSOC/PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
4/16/2026		Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee Chairman's Report Diablo Canyon NSOC Meeting 2026-01
4/16/2026		Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee Field Notes Diablo Canyon NSOC Meeting 2026-01
4/14/2026	2026-002	- LBIE No. 2026-001, Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation (FP EE) 157, Lack of Area-Wide Det/Supp - LAR 26-04, "License Amendment Request to Revise the 10 CFR 50.69 Categorization Process to Adopt the Enhanced Risk-informed Categorization Methodology for Pressure Boundary Components
4/29/2026	2026-003	DCL-26-029, LAR 26-05, E Plan Rebaseline

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	SAPN 51281583	DA-1-PCV-65 Broken Valve/Housing
2 WGE	SAPN 51295818	DA-QAAF-ATS Procedure Revision Records
2 WGE	SAPN 51284310	DA-SR Pump STPs w/ Nonconservative Acc.C
Eff. Eval		There are no Effectiveness Evals this month.
4/30/2026		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 4/1/2026-4/30/2026
4/30/2026		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 4/1/2026-4/30/2026
4/30/2026		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 4/1/2026 - 4/30/2026
5/5/2026		20 Oldest Non-LTCA DA Notifications as of 5/5/2026
5/5/2026		DCPP CAP Station Index

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
4/2/2026		Nuclear Quality Digest, April 2026

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4/21/2026	#2026-IA-02	2026 Problem Prevention and Corrective Action Program Audit
4/27/20026	2026-EL-01	Maintenance Department HU Standards

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
5/12/2026	SAPN 51325265	INPO PIC/IRIS/OE Training 2026
5/12/2026	SAPN 51321052	Sec: Informal Benchmark SHOT Show
5/12/2026	SAPN 51263063	(Actions) Vogtle U2 OM Benchmark
5/12/2026	SAPN 51298433	Document lesson Learned EPRI TGUG
5/12/2026	SAPN 51310091	RCP Seal Agitation Benchmark
5/12/2026	SAPN 51325160	NDE EPRI RIC Feb 2026 Trip Report
5/12/2026	SAPN 51308918	Benchmark: Oct 2025 INPO Tng Mgr Meeting
5/12/2026	SAPN 51234129	Biennial Target Set SA 2026

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/18/2025		2026 Nuclear Generation, Roadmap to Generating Excellence
12/18/2025		2025-2030 Strategic Plan Nuclear Generation
4/7/2026		April 2026 PI Status Summary
Station Initiative		There are no new Station Initiatives for this month.

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

April 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202614	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202615	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202616	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202617	T+1 Performance Critique
	April	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2614-2617

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE**AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM**

MEETING DATE:	June 16-17, 2026
AGENDA ITEMS:	VI-B & XII-E, XXV-I
AGENDA TITLE:	Consultant Reports; Receive, Approve and Authorize Transmittal of Fact Finding Reports.

CONSENT [] ACTION [X] INFORMATION [X]

Staff Summary: It is expected that oral and written reports will be presented at the meeting by Technical Consultants Mr. McWhorter, Ms. Darden and Mr. St. Onge. These reports may be received by the Committee, approved as to form and content and be authorized for transmittal to PG&E for its consideration and response. The Committee reserves the right to revise any fact finding report prior to its inclusion in an Annual Report. Fact finding reports in their final “as approved form” become a part of the DCISC’s next Annual Report. These reports will be included in the DCISC’s 36th Annual Report for the period July 1, 2025 - June 30, 2026.

Fact Finding Reports are posted on the Committee’s website at www.dcisc.org prior to a public meeting and made available for public inspection immediately following their approval by the Committee at a public meeting

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION:

Receive and approve reports by Consultants and Members and approve resolutions certifying approval concerning fact-finding conducted on March 18-19, April 13-14, and May 6-7, 2026 [Resolutions 2026-04 through 2026-06].

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE	
AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM	
MEETING DATE:	June 16, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XI-C
AGENDA TITLE:	Presentations by the NRC's Resident Inspector for DCPD Mr. Eli Garcia on the NRC's Annual Assessment of DCPD's End-of Cycle Performance during Calendar Year 2025; and by NRC Region IV, Division of Reactor Projects Patricia Vossmer on the Changes to the Reactor Oversight Process Recently Approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
CONSENT ☐	ACTION ☐ INFORMATION ☒
Staff Summary: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted an end-of-cycle performance assessment of Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, reviewing performance indicators, inspection results, and enforcement actions from January 1, 2025, through December 31, 2025. The NRC's performance assessment provides important information to the PG&E as its Licensee of the NRC's assessment of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 during this period and the NRC's plans for future inspections. The NRC end-of-cycle inspection also determines the performance of Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 relative to the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix. On March 25, and April 2, 2026, the NRC Commission issued policy decisions to the NRC staff to adopt a leaner, more risk-focused oversight framework. Combined with efficiencies implemented in 2025 and others proposed for the NRC's security inspection program these changes reduced ROP baseline inspection hours by ~42%, reflecting improved industry performance, advances in technology, and direction from the bipartisan ADVANCE Act and Executive Order 14300.	
RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: Receive the presentation by Mr. Garcia and Ms. Vossmer and take any other action as may be appropriate.	



NRC NEWS

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Washington, DC, 20555-0001

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No: 26-056

May 20, 2026

CONTACT: [Office of Public Affairs](#), 301-415-8200

EO14300 Rulemaking

NRC Marks One Year of Modernization Under Presidential Order

Rockville, Md. — One year ago, President Trump signed Executive Order 14300 directing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to cut red tape and enable nuclear energy deployment in America. While the agency's work continues, there are already tangible results: a series of historic licensing firsts, sweeping regulatory reforms, and a restructured agency built for speed without sacrificing safety. The work builds upon successes of the bi-partisan ADVANCE Act of 2024.

"EO 14300 was the catalyst," said NRC Chairman Ho K. Nieh. "In twelve months, the NRC is delivering an unprecedented suite of new rules around the entire nuclear lifecycle. We are designing these rules to accelerate safe deployment and expansion of nuclear technologies. This is how the NRC supports America's energy security and global nuclear energy leadership."

Licensing Firsts

In the past year alone, the NRC achieved several historic milestones:

- Issued the first commercial advanced reactor construction permit in decades, to TerraPower's Kemmerer facility.
- Granted TrisoX the first-ever license to commercially manufacture tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel for advanced reactors.
- Approved the restart of the Palisades nuclear plant — the first time in U.S. history the NRC has approved a decommissioning plant to be returned to operational status.
- Authorized license renewals for 18 reactors, securing nearly 17,000 megawatts of power for 20 additional years.
- Completed the fastest-ever license renewal review finishing the Robinson plant renewal in under 12 months.

New Pathways for New Technologies

The NRC also built entirely new regulatory infrastructure designed for efficiency:

- **Part 53** – Finalized in March, this is the first new reactor licensing framework in decades. It creates a flexible, technology-inclusive pathway for advanced reactors and was completed nearly two years ahead of the congressional deadline set by the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act.
- **Part 57 (Microreactors)** – A proposed framework designed for high-volume, streamlined licensing of smaller, lower-risk reactors that have different safety profiles than traditional plants.
- **Fusion Licensing** – The NRC proposed the nation's first-ever regulatory framework for fusion machines, paving the way for an entirely new class of energy technology.

Regulatory Reform at Scale

At the same time, the NRC launched a wholesale review of its regulations to eliminate outdated, redundant, or unnecessarily burdensome rules. Of 27 planned rulemakings, the agency has finalized 5 rules and published 7 proposed rules for public comment.

Final Rules include:

- **Legal practices and procedures** – increased flexibility, streamlined hearing processes and rescinded rules that were inconsistent with or duplicated legal requirements.
- **Sunset Rule** – inserted conditional sunset dates consistent with applicable law, including for duplicative and outdated Aircraft Impact Assessment requirements.
- **Freedom of Information Act** – aligned with federal best practices and clarified how the NRC's FOIA public liaison assists people who request documents.

Proposed Rules open for public comment include:

- **Review of authorized reactor designs** – to streamline NRC review of demonstration reactor designs authorized by the Departments of Energy or War.
- **Physical protection of radioactive materials** – to eliminate outdated background check and reporting provisions, and right-size training and administrative requirements.
- **Contested hearings** – to accelerate timelines, simplify procedures, and reduce burdens.
- **Fees** – to establish fixed caps on certain fees and amend licensing, inspection, special project, and annual fees charged to applicants and licensees.

Rules under development will address:

- **Radiation protection** – to reconsider reliance on the linear no-threshold model and the "as low as reasonably achievable" standard for radiation exposure.
- **Reactor oversight** – to streamline construction and siting, introduce risk-informed and performance-based licensing alternatives, expand flexibility, and update various provisions to better accommodate advanced reactor technologies.
- **National Environmental Policy Act implementation** – to streamline procedures, eliminate unnecessary burdens, and expand flexibilities while complying with environmental mandates.
- **Materials** – to streamline licensing for DOE-authorized fuel facilities, establish a reprocessing licensing framework, and lower the burden for registration and decommissioning assurance for sealed and unsealed sources.
- **Low-Level Waste disposal** – to permit use of site-specific technical analyses to develop site-specific waste acceptance criteria and authorize disposal of greater-than-class C low level waste.
- **In Situ Recovery** – to codify risk-informed groundwater protection standards for uranium ISR facilities and reduce post-restoration monitoring.
- **Transportation package requirements** – to modernize requirements for large fissile material packages to accommodate transport of irradiated microreactors and similar packages.
- **Export** – to streamline the regulations on the export of nuclear reactor equipment and materials.

An Agency Transformed

A January 2025 update to the NRC's Mission Statement reaffirmed its safety and security focus while explicitly recognizing the agency's role in enabling nuclear technology. The NRC has also reorganized internally to align resources with emerging technologies and rebalanced its Reactor Oversight Process to match oversight intensity with actual industry safety performance.

The past year makes clear that rigorous safety regulation and rapid innovation can, and must, go together as America races to meet its energy future.

For more information on NRC modernization initiatives and opportunities to comment on proposed rules, visit [our website](#).

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was created as an expert, technical agency to protect public health, safety, and security, and regulate the civilian use of nuclear materials, including enabling the deployment of nuclear power for the benefit of society. Among other responsibilities, the agency issues licenses, conducts inspections, initiates and enforces regulations, and plans for incident response. The NRC is collaborating with interagency partners to implement reforms outlined in new Executive Orders and the ADVANCE Act to streamline agency activities and enhance efficiency.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE**AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM**

MEETING DATE:

June 16, 2026

AGENDA ITEM:

XI- D

AGENDA TITLE:

Presentation by the Honorable Robert J. Feitel, NRC Inspector General, and his staff on the Role of the Office of Inspector General in Overseeing the Work of the NRC.

CONSENT []

ACTION []

INFORMATION [X]

Staff Summary: The NRC Office of the Inspector General (OIG) was established on April 15, 1989, as an independent and objective Office to conduct and supervise audits and conduct investigations related to NRC's programs and operations. The purpose of the OIG audits and investigations is to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement, and promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in NRC programs and operations. In addition, the OIG reviews, analyzes and comments on the impact of existing and proposed regulations, legislation, and directives, and provides comments, as appropriate, regarding any significant concerns.

The Inspector General recommends corrective actions to be taken, reports on progress made in implementing those actions, and reports criminal matters to the Department of Justice.

The Inspector General provides leadership and policy direction and serves under the general supervision of the NRC Chair but operates with personnel, contracting, and budget authority independent of that of the NRC. The Inspector General keeps the NRC Chair and the Congress fully and currently informed about serious issues and concerns related to NRC programs and operations.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION:

Receive the presentation by the Inspector General and his staff and take any other action as may be appropriate.

The Honorable Robert J. Feitel



Robert J. Feitel was sworn in on May 27, 2020 by Chairman Kristine L. Svinicki as the third Inspector General in the NRC's history. He was awarded his Bachelor of Arts degree in English Literature from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor in 1987, and his Juris Doctor degree from the University of Maryland School of Law in 1990. During law school, Mr. Feitel clerked as a fellow for the Honorable Rosalyn B. Bell of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, and was appointed to the Moot Court board. Following law school, he served as a judicial law clerk to the Honorable Stephen M. Waldron, Circuit Court for Harford County, Maryland. In 1991, Mr. Feitel joined the law firm of Carr, Goodson and Lee, P.C. in Washington, D.C. as an Associate, where he focused on product liability defense and professional malpractice defense litigation. In 1995, he joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the General Counsel, as an Assistant General Counsel, where he managed contract and tort litigation, legal forfeiture matters, and advised Chief Division Counsel for all FBI field offices nationwide. While at the FBI, he served as Acting Unit Chief of the Civil Litigation Unit. He also served as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Virginia in 2001-2002. In late 2002, Mr. Feitel joined the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, where he served with distinction in the Appellate, Misdemeanor, Felony Trial, Felony Sex Offense & Domestic Violence, and Homicide Sections of the Superior Court Division, and the Federal Major Crimes Section of the Criminal Division. In 2009, Mr. Feitel was detailed to the President's Executive Order Task Force for the Review of Guantanamo Bay Detainees. At the completion of his task force tenure, in 2010, he was invited by the Chief of Staff of the Justice Department's National Security Division to work on a detail at the Office of Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism Unit. While on that detail, Mr. Feitel prepared extensive applications for court-authorized electronic surveillance and physical search of terrorism suspects and agents of foreign powers under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and appeared several times before the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In early 2011, Mr. Feitel returned to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, where he continued to investigate and prosecute some of the most challenging cases in the Homicide Section, until joining the Capital Case Section of Main Justice in August 2014. At the Capital Case Section, Mr. Feitel advised the Attorney General and his Capital Case Review Committee in relation to legal and factual issues relevant to the Committee's recommendations to the Attorney General in capital matters. Mr. Feitel also served as first chair trial counsel in federal capital trials around the nation, assisting U.S. Attorney's Offices with all facets of their respective capital litigation. He is admitted to practice law in state and federal courts in Maryland and the District of Columbia, as well as the United States Supreme Court. On October 30, 2019, Mr. Feitel was nominated by President Donald J. Trump to be Inspector General of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. On December 3, 2019, a Senate confirmation hearing was held before the Clean Air and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee of the Environment and Public Works Committee, and he was unanimously confirmed (87-0) by the U.S. Senate in a roll call vote on the Senate Floor on May 4, 2020.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE	
AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM	
MEETING DATE:	June 16, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XIII - F
AGENDA TITLE:	Nomination and Election of DCISC Chair & Vice-Chair for the July 1, 2026 - June 30, 2027 Term
CONSENT [☐] ACTION [☒] INFORMATION [☐]	
Staff Summary: Pursuant to the Committee Policy No.1 a Chair shall be selected from the Committee at the second public meeting of the calendar year, to serve for the next annual report period and shall preside at all meetings, coordinate the activities of the Committee and its members, as required, and execute all documents in the name of the Committee during that period. When appropriate, the Chair shall designate a DCISC members to execute consultant contracts and contract documents on behalf of the chair. A Vice-Chair shall also be selected at the second public meeting and shall act in the absence of the Chair.	
RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: On motion by a Member, Committee members should be nominated and elected to the offices of DCISC Chair and Vice-Chair.	

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE	
AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM	
MEETING DATE:	June 16, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XVIII- G
AGENDA TITLE:	Presentation by Dr. Thomas H. Jordan on the Committee Seismic Review Teams's Comments on PG&E's Supplemental Response on Nine Recommendations Made in the Committee's 35 th Annual Report.
CONSENT [☐] ACTION [☒] INFORMATION [☒]	
Staff Summary: In its 35th Annual Report the Committee approved fifteen Recommendations to PG&E, nine of which were put forward by the Committee's Seismic Review Team consisting of Dr. Thomas Jordan, Dr. Scott Marshall and Dr. Michael Oskin. PG&E subsequently submitted an 11-page Supplemental Response describing its plans to address the nine Recommendations and PG&E's Dr. Chris Madugo presented this response at the Committee's public meeting on February 8, 2026. Following the PG&E presentation the Committee requested the SRT to provide its comments on the PG&E responses. The SRT's Comments are provided herein.	
RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: Consider approval of a motion accepting the SRT's Comments on the Supplemental Response by PG&E to Nine DCISC/SRT Recommendations and provide direction and guidance concerning future Committee action as appropriate.	

To: Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC):
Per F. Peterson (chair)
Najmedin Meshkati
Raluca Scarlat

From: DCISC Seismic Review Team (SRT):
Thomas H. Jordan (chair)
Michael E. Oskin
Scott T. Marshall

Re: SRT Comments on the Supplemental Response by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) to
Nine DCISC/SRT Recommendations

1. Summary

With the release of its 35th Annual Report at the end of 2025, the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) officially transmitted to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) a set of nine recommendations (R1-R9) put forward by the DCISC's Seismic Review Team (SRT) in its *Review of the Bird Critique*.¹ On February 12, 2026, PG&E submitted to DCISC an eleven-page Supplemental Response² describing its plans to address these recommendations as part of its long-term seismic program (LTSP) for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). At the DCISC's most recent public meeting (Feb 18-19, 2026), the PG&E presented its response in viewgraph form, and the SRT provided comments, also in viewgraph form, on the technical issues associated with the response. Following these presentations, the DCISC requested that the SRT produce a short written evaluation of the available PG&E documents. This letter report responds to that request. Our evaluation can be summarized as follows:

1. The SRT finds the information in the PG&E Supplemental Response to be adequate for a preliminary assessment of PG&E's plans to address the SRT recommendations.
2. PG&E agrees that further action is warranted on all nine recommendations and has thoughtfully responded to each recommendation with specific research plans and priorities.
 - R2-R4 are currently being addressed by on-going LTSP research; future research will be guided in part by these recommendations.
 - R1 and R5-R9 will be addressed by research initiatives or substantially expanded research projects.
3. We endorse most elements of PG&E's response plan but identify several areas where the plans should be broadened and refined.
 - PG&E assigns a medium priority to research on reverse faulting beneath the Irish Hills and gives higher priority to research on the uncertainty of the ground motion characterization (GMC), the

¹ Jordan, T. H., M. E. Oskin & S. T. Marshall (05/31/2025). *Review of the Bird critique*, Report to the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee, 98 pp.

² PG&E (02/12/2026). *Supplemental Response by PG&E to Nine Recommendations by the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee's Seismic Review Team*, PG&E Letter DCL-26-007, 11 pp.

Hosgri fault hazard, and the time dependence of earthquake probabilities in the seismic source characterization (SSC). The SRT agrees that this prioritization is consistent with the *declared* epistemic uncertainties in the SSC and GMC models, but it notes that these comparisons do not fully consider the *undeclared* epistemic uncertainties that could potentially produce surprises. PG&E’s prioritization should consider the possibility that such ontological uncertainties are larger for the SSC than for the GMC.

- PG&E disagreed with R2. This recommendation was directed at testing the specific hypothesis that the difference between the long-term slip rate on the Southwest Boundary Zone (SWBZ) and the slip rate inferred from marine terrace uplift in the Irish Hills can be explained by an offshore subsidence rate unaccounted for in the current models. In discussions at the February public meeting, PG&E and the SRT agreed that this hypothesis could be tested (and probably rejected) through further analysis of existing offshore datasets. It is our understanding that PG&E now plans to conduct these tests.
 - PG&E discounted the study of Morro Bay subsidence (a part of R4) as an imprecise method for assessing potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend. We note, however, that understanding the origin of subsidence of Morro Bay and the Los Osos valley also serves as an important constraint on the geometry of the SWBZ at depth. In our opinion, the study of Morro Bay subsidence and other indicators of vertical motion, such as the deformed Memorial Terrace, should be retained as components of the LTSP.
4. PG&E’s Supplemental Response should be viewed as a preliminary assessment that will evolve as new projects are authorized and the technical details are refined. Additional information will be needed for a full review of a more mature PG&E response plan.
- PG&E concurs with R5-R7 that further GPS data analysis is warranted and proposes to add a geodetic modeling project to the LTSP. This new project may involve collaboration with Dr. Marshall, who conducted the SRT geodetic modeling. To our knowledge, no programmatic details or milestones have yet been set. Aspects of this new project are discussed in §4.b.
 - PG&E is developing sensitivity source model (SSM) as computational platform for the sensitivity analyses needed to address R9 (see §4.c). We strongly endorse development of the SSM software and look forward to examining its implementation details and the results of the sensitivity tests performed on this platform.

2. Background

Activities of the SRT during the past year relevant to this report are listed in **Box 1**. At its February 2025 public meeting (PM), the DCISC appointed the SRT to conduct a technical review of six filings by Dr. Bird to the DCISC, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regarding the seismic hazard from thrust faulting beneath the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). These filings together constitute the “Bird Critique.”

The SRT submitted a comprehensive written report, *Review of the Bird Critique*, to the DCISC at the end of May and presented its review at the June 2025 PM. The report contained nine recommendations to the DCISC and PG&E for future research that could further elucidate the hazards associated with reverse faulting beneath the Irish Hills. These recommendations were adopted by the DCISC at the June 2025 PM with the directive that they be included as appropriate in its 35th Annual Report.

The SRT met with the PG&E staff in Palm Springs on September 10, 2025, to answer technical questions about the recommendations. PG&E presented a preliminary response to the SRT recommendations at the October 2025 PM. Further reviews of the SRT report, including those presented at the October 2025 PM, uncovered no evidence or arguments that required changes to the SRT's findings and recommendations. The nine DCISC/SRT recommendations were thus transmitted in their original form to PG&E in the release of the 35th Annual Report on November 7, 2025.

On December 18, 2025, PG&E addressed the nine recommendations in a one-paragraph written statement included as part of its response to the DCISC 35th Annual Report. On January 13, 2026, the DCISC requested supplemental information on the PG&E response to allow the SRT to evaluate the technical adequacy of the response. On February 12, 2026, PG&E submitted an 11-page Supplemental Response to the nine recommendations. Our evaluation is based on this document and viewgraphs from the oral presentation by PG&E Senior Geologist Dr. Chris Madugo at the February 2026 PM.

Box 1. Timeline of DCISC/SRT Activities

- February 19-20, 2025, DCISC public meeting
 - SRT constituted by DCISC to conduct a peer review of the Bird Critique
- March 28, 2025
 - SRT met with PG&E technical staff to discuss issues raised in the Bird Critique
- June 10-11, 2025, DCISC public meeting
 - SRT presented *Review of the Bird Critique*¹ containing nine recommendations to PG&E
- September 10, 2025
 - SRT met with PG&E technical staff to clarify the recommendations
- October 22-23, 2025, DCISC public meeting
 - SRT reported on Dr. Bird's response to *Review of the Bird Critique*
 - PG&E presented its preliminary response to the SRT recommendations
 - DCISC formally adopted the SRT recommendations for inclusion in its 35th Annual Report
- November 7, 2025
 - DCISC released its 35th Annual Report containing the SRT recommendations
- December 18, 2025
 - PG&E submitted a 1-paragraph preliminary response to the SRT recommendations
- January 14, 2026
 - DCISC requested supplemental information from PG&E regarding their response to SRT recommendations
- February 12, 2026
 - PG&E submitted to DCISC an 11-page supplemental report² detailing its plans to address the SRT recommendations.
- February 18-19, 2026, DCISC public meeting
 - PG&E presented its supplemental response to SRT recommendations
 - SRT commented on PG&E supplemental response

3. Overview

In its Jan 14th request, the DCISC asked PG&E to provide: (1) sufficient information for the SRT to evaluate the technical adequacy of the PG&E response to the SRT recommendations; (2) individual responses to each recommendation, stating whether PG&E agrees that further research is warranted and, if so, the plans, priorities, and time frames assigned to that research; and (3) identification of which recommendations have the potential to make a significant impact on the DCPD hazard assessments, i.e., are technically defensible and likely to yield meaningful results.

Table 1. Summary Matrix of PG&E Response

	Rec #	Recommendation	PG&E endorsement	PG&E/LTSP priority	Project status	Project timescale	Potential for hazard impact	
							PG&E	SRT
Fault system modeling	1	Kinematically constrained fault models	yes	medium	Existing LTSP goal; preliminary research underway	~3 yr	unknown	medium
	2	Dating of low-stand abrasion platforms	no	low	Dating infeasible; subsidence rate addressed by ongoing research	-	low	low
	3	Monitoring of IRSL dating	yes	medium	Ongoing effort w/recent reports. Will initiate study of Oorderdonk terrace ages	2027	low	high
	4	Strike-slip faulting along Los Osos trend	yes	medium (seismotectonics), low (Morro Bay subsidence)	Multifaceted research program underway, including USGS CRADA	Reports by 2027	unknown, likely low	medium
Geodetic modeling	5	GPS modeling	yes	medium	Initiating geodetic research program to address SRT recommendations 5-7	TBD	unknown	medium
	6	Fault kinematic/mechanical modeling						
	7	Transpression ratio						
SSC modeling	8	Rinconada and Huasna slip rates	yes	medium	Initiating project with literature review and site evaluations; partner with academics and graduate student(s)	Plans by 12/26, ~3 yr study	unknown	low
	9	SSC sensitivity analysis	yes	high	Developing sensitivity source model (SSM) as evaluation platform for SRT-recommended model changes	SSM operational by 6/26, SRT FGM tested in 2026	unknown	medium

The information provided in the PG&E Supplemental Report includes the plans, priorities, and time frames for addressing all nine recommendations; these are summarized in **Table 1**.

- The SRT finds that the information in PG&E's Supplemental Response is adequate for assessing its preliminary response to the SRT recommendations.

Additional information will be needed to conduct a full technical review of the PG&E response plan after the plan's elements have been fleshed out as components of the LTSP. PG&E proposes a new geodetic modeling program to address R5-R7, for example, but no details are yet available. PG&E is also testing a new Sensitivity Source Model (SSM), which they intend to be the main computational platform for the sensitivity analyses needed to implement R9 and assess the other recommendations. PG&E indicates that the SSM validation is on a fast track and should be completed in the first half of this calendar year.

- The SRT endorses the development of the SSM as an efficient computational platform for SSC sensitivity testing and looks forward to understanding the implementation details and application results.

PG&E agrees that further action is warranted on eight of the nine recommendations (all but R2) and has responded to each recommendation with specific research plans and priorities. The SRT's comments on the individual responses are given in §4.

- The SRT endorses the overall structure of PG&E's preliminary response in terms of its plans, priorities, and time frames, but it notes several areas where the plans should be clarified and refined.

For example, PG&E disagreed with the SRT's priority on R2, which involves the dating of the offshore low-stand abrasion platforms; they cite the difficulties of making such measurements and the low probability of success. R2 was motivated by the need to test the hypothesis that the difference between the long-term slip rate on the SWBZ and the slip rate inferred from marine terrace uplift in the Irish Hills could be explained by an offshore subsidence rate of ~ 0.1 mm/yr. In discussions at the February public meeting, the PG&E geoscientists and the SRT agreed that this hypothesis can be tested (and probably rejected) through further analysis of existing offshore datasets. This issue is discussed in more detail in §4.b.

The PG&E Supplemental Report states (on p. 3), "In general, the relative priority of research tasks related to reverse faults beneath the Irish Hills is considered of *medium importance* based on current information and hazard model results, warranting ongoing LTSP research with the goal of reducing SSC uncertainties over a time frame of *multiple years*." (emphasis added)

- The SRT concurs with PG&E's overall priority of medium and its time frame of several years for the research tasks related to reverse faulting beneath the Irish Hills.

PG&E assigns a higher priority to research on the uncertainty of the ground motion characterization (GMC), the Hosgri fault hazard, and the time-dependence included in the seismic source characterization (SSC). It is common in PSHA practice to find that the model-based epistemic uncertainties are larger for GMC than for the SSC.

- The SRT agrees that this prioritization is consistent with the *declared* epistemic uncertainties in the SSC and GMC models, but we note that these comparisons do not fully consider the *undeclared* epistemic uncertainties, such as those due to "unknown unknowns," which can produce unmodeled, though potentially consequential, surprises (Black Swans).

An example would be a very large ($\geq M7.5$) thrust earthquake on the SWBZ. Such an event is given zero probability in the current SSC for DCP. The SRT speculates that such ontological uncertainties may be larger for the SSC than for the GMC. PG&E's prioritization of SSC research should recognize this possibility. The conceptual issues regarding the testing for ontological errors in hazard estimation have been discussed by Marzocchi and Jordan (2014).

Key metrics for response prioritization are the potential hazard impacts of further research. The potential impacts include (a) changes to mean hazard values, (b) changes to the epistemic uncertainties of those values, and (c) validation or rejection of alternative models. There are differences between the PG&E and SRT assessments of the potential hazard impacts, as shown in the last two columns of Table 1. The PG&E assessments are cautious: the potential impacts for R2 and R3 are rated as low and those for the other seven are listed as unknown. In contrast, we assign the potential impacts as low (R2, R8), medium (R1, R4, R5, R9), and high (R3).

The high SRT ranking for the potential impact of R3 stems from the recent controversy about the Infrared Stimulated Luminescence (IRSL) dating of marine terraces along central California coastline. One side of this controversy argues that the lowest marine terraces fringing the Irish Hills correlate with the MIS 3 sea-level highstand rather than MIS 5, as assigned in the PG&E SSC. This change would increase the uplift rate of the Irish Hills by ~ 1 mm/yr, significantly increasing the DCP thrust-faulting hazard. Citing a recently published study by Muhs et al. (2026), PG&E discounts the possible MIS 3

assignment and thus gives R3 a low hazard impact, whereas the SRT considers the hazard impact potential of R3 remains high, even in light of recent confirmation of the MIS 5 age assignments.

In a short response to R5-R7, PG&E concurs that further GPS data analysis and comparison with kinematic and mechanical models provide valuable confirmation of the geologic slip rates and fault kinematics used in their model. PG&E expresses interest in collaborating directly with Dr. Scott Marshall, who conducted the SRT geodetic analysis. Suggestions for how this project might be structured are given in §4.b.

4. Comments on PG&E plans to address individual recommendations

The PG&E Supplemental Report outlined its preliminary plans for addressing each of the nine DCISC/SRT recommendations. In this section, we comment briefly on those individual plans.

a. Fault system modeling

The first four SRT recommendations concern modeling of the kinematics of faults participating in the deformation and uplift of the Irish Hills.

R1. The SRT recommends the development of a set of kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults underlying the Irish Hills that can explain the folding observed since 5 Ma.

In response to R1, PG&E concurs with the need to develop kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults underlying the Irish Hills in support of their existing fault geometry models (FGMs). They also state that the existing FGMs within the SSC model are generally consistent with the geologic structure and uplift pattern of marine terraces around the Irish Hills. The SRT agrees that the existing FGMs for the Southwest Boundary Zone (SWBZ) produce block-like uplift consistent with marine terrace uplift constraints. We do not agree that existing FGMs are consistent with the geologic structure of the Irish Hills as recorded in folding and uplift of Miocene and Pliocene strata. The Obispo, Monterey, and lower Pismo formations, deposited prior to the onset of contractional deformation of the Irish Hills, were folded into the Pismo syncline as a response to slip on the underlying SWBZ fault system. Geologically consistent and technically defensible FGMs should directly account for this folding alongside the uplift constraints from younger geologic markers formed while contraction was underway, such as marine terraces and the overlap of Upper Pismo formation across the south limb of the Pismo syncline. The SRT produced one such candidate model and found that a 40° fault dip is required to produce these folding relationships, which is less than the 45°-70° dip range of FGMs used in the SSC.

PG&E proposes to develop kinematically constrained FGMs through incorporation of surficial and subsurface geological information east of San Luis Obispo Creek, where strata deposited during contraction are better preserved, and abundant subsurface data exists from petroleum exploration. The SRT agrees that information from this area provides valuable added insight into the geometry of the SWBZ. We encourage PG&E to consider this information as part of a holistic review of uplift and folding data used to constrain SWBZ FGMs. In addition, we continue to advocate for further attention to the pattern of deformation along the Los Osos trend and its relationship to marine terrace uplift north of Irish Hills, because this information is critically important for constraining the deeper geometry of the SWBZ, which affects the potential magnitude of thrusting events.

R2. The SRT recommends dating of low-stand abrasion platforms offshore, south of the Irish Hills, to further constrain the rate of footwall subsidence and its contribution to the SWBZ slip rate.

In its written response, PG&E rejected R2 with the justification that sampling and direct dating of low-stand abrasion platforms offshore was infeasible and that the results of such effort were unlikely to substantially change the hazard. PG&E further argued that the slip rate of the San Luis Bay fault is well constrained from marine-terrace offset, and that the lack of a sediment-filled basin offshore precludes a significant missing subsidence component to slip rate of the SWBZ. PG&E instead proposes to evaluate subsidence from existing marine surveys undertaken as part of the Coastal Imaging Project and later high-resolution CHIRP surveys presently under analysis by the U.S. Geological Survey.

The subsidence component of SWBZ slip may indeed be negligible, but it is not yet fully constrained. A missing subsidence component may be indicated by the difference between the SRT's 0.50 ± 0.10 mm/yr long-term slip rate and the 0.29 ± 0.07 mm/yr slip rate from marine terrace uplift. In addition to the San Luis Bay fault, where slip produces hangingwall uplift, there are other active strands of the SWBZ offshore such as the Oceano fault and Los Berros fault, where slip may produce footwall subsidence. The SRT did not specify an approach to dating the low-stand abrasion platforms, and we agree that sampling and direct dating may be difficult as well as expensive. PG&E's proposed approach to evaluate the position and stratigraphic architecture of low-stand terraces from existing seismic and CHIRP surveys has been successful elsewhere offshore California (e.g., Castillo et al., 2019). If PG&E can show from stratigraphic arguments that the low-stand abrasion platform has remained stable, this will adequately address the SRT recommendation. Further surveys and sampling may be warranted if they find evidence for progressive subsidence of older low-stand platforms and of stratigraphic features related to low-stand shorelines.

R3. The SRT recommends monitoring of IRSL-dating efforts and reassessment, if necessary, of the MIS 5 age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces surrounding the Irish Hills.

PG&E agrees with R3 and describes two new developments that affect age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces. First, a new publication (Muhs et al., 2026) confirms the MIS 5 age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces fringing the Irish Hills. These new constraints will be incorporated into ongoing work. Second, a reevaluation of IRSL age-dating from marine terrace deposits at Cayucos confirms prior MIS 5 age assignments here (N. Onderdonk, personal communication). Together, these developments show that PG&E is meeting the SRT recommendation. The SRT differs with PG&E on the potential impact of these age refinements, because, if the Q1 terrace was shown to be MIS 3 rather than MIS 5, this would lead to a substantial upward revision of slip rate of the SWBZ.

In their response, PG&E also describes a new effort to reevaluate age-dating constraints for the rate of activity of the Casmalia Hills thrust, located 25 km southeast of the Irish Hills. Though not directly addressed by the SRT, we concur that such re-evaluation is needed to test the high rate of activity proposed by McGregor and Onderdonk (2021).

R4. The SRT recommends further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its impacts on the pattern of marine-terrace uplift.

PG&E agrees that R4 is aligned with the goals of its long-term seismic program. Their response focuses on the problem of deducing whether deformation along the Los Osos trend is a result of strike-slip rather

than reverse faulting. A prior study of stream-channel deflections along the Los Osos trend did not show conclusive evidence for lateral slip; however, such evidence may not be present if the slip rate is low or if the faulting is mislocated or multi-stranded. PG&E also allude to ongoing work in the adjacent offshore region, in collaboration with the U.S. Geological Survey, that includes analysis of fault slip style (kinematics). These activities meet the SRT recommendation to assess the potential for strike-slip faulting.

PG&E rejected the analysis of Morro Bay subsidence as too speculative to yield a meaningful strike-slip rate for the Los Osos fault, and they also chose to down-weight the study of the deformed Memorial Terrace as a constraint on reverse slip across the Los Osos trend. These responses miss the second purpose of R4, which is to address uplift constraints on the deeper geometry of the SWBZ. In the SRT report, we found that, if subsidence of Morro Bay is a result of a dextral stepover of the Los Osos strike-slip fault, this could affect the pattern of marine-terrace uplift and change interpretation of the deeper geometry of the SWBZ. Documenting the uplift rate of the Memorial Terrace also serves to address the geometry and degree of dip change of the SWBZ across the Los Osos trend. Thus, we recommend continued attention to these problems as part of the response to R4 and R1.

b. Geodetic modeling

Four SRT recommendations concern the development of geodetic models to constrain the overall deformation of the greater Irish Hills region and the use of these constraints to validate the current DCPD SSC. Three of these, R5-R7, have been tentatively accepted by PG&E as roadmap for a new geodetic modeling project. PG&E affirms this response in a short paragraph:

“Based on the SRT’s initial findings and subsequent discussions, PG&E agrees that additional evaluation of GPS data and comparison to kinematic and mechanical models for faults between the San Andreas fault and Hosgri fault is useful confirmatory work for the geologic rates and fault kinematics used in the PG&E model. PG&E would like to work directly with Scott Marshall starting in 2026 on the tasks listed in recommendations 5 through 7.”

The details of this project have not yet been worked out. In absence of a more complete description, the SRT offers some additional information and suggestions for future work.

R5. PG&E should follow up SRT’s preliminary work with a more complete study of the available GPS data.

While the SRT report provided a detailed analysis of the Zeng (2022) GPS velocities, we focused on thrust faulting in the Irish Hills. Therefore, some aspects of this rich dataset were not fully analyzed. A more complete study of the GPS data could involve creating an updated GPS dataset from existing products. The Zeng (2022) data were published nearly four years ago and many of the time series used in that study were already several years old when the Zeng dataset was compiled. A new dataset will likely have more tightly constrained velocities and may contain additional stations. Because many GPS products are continually processed and made publicly available for download, it may be feasible to construct an updated GPS dataset within the three-year timeframe suggested by PG&E. We also note that, while the SRT analysis showed clear strike-slip deformation to the northeast of DCPD, we did not attempt to estimate the slip rates along any of these fault structures.

R6. The fault slip models that underlie the DCPD SSC should be developed into kinematic and mechanical models that can predict the interseismic deformation and can thus be directly tested against the GPS data.

The United States Geological Survey's latest 2023 National Seismic Hazard Model (NSHM) utilized GPS data and a suite of models to drive their earthquake rate model (e.g., Pollitz et al., 2022). The 2023 NSHM was not the first to incorporate GPS data and deformation models; these were previously included in the 2014 NSHM update (Powers and Field, 2014) and the 2013 Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast version 3 (UCERF3, Parsons et al., 2013). Deformation modeling and comparisons to geodetic data (e.g., GPS) are recognized as necessary owing to limitations in geologic slip-rate estimates, which often include sparse spatial coverage and large uncertainties in timing of past earthquakes that may not reflect the current behavior of fault systems (Pollitz et al., 2022).

Known limitations of these deformation models are that no viable geodetic model can uniquely resolve fault slip rates in regions of closely spaced faults and that different physics-based formulations can yield different answers when applied to the same dataset. To address these problems, the 2023 NSHM developers selected five different deformation model types to constrain their earthquake rate model (Pollitz et al., 2022). This experience shows that more than one model type should be considered in testing the PG&E SSC model. The most straightforward approach is a "geologic model" where the slip rates from geologic studies are kinematically applied to the SSC faults and compared against GPS data. While other models capable of handling complex FGMs may be used, block models are likely unsuitable for this effort. Because block models require connected faults, they have previously failed to clearly differentiate fault geometry and slip rate details within this complex and unconnected regional structure (e.g., Murray-Moraleda et al., 2011). Throughout this modeling process, the PG&E fault models should be compared to other existing regional fault models including the NSHM23 fault sections database (Hatem et al., 2021), and the Statewide California Earthquake Center's Community fault model (Plesch et al., 2024).

R7. PG&E should compute the relative contributions of strike-slip and reverse faulting to the regional deformation predicted by the SSC24 slip models and compare the values with the geodetic constraints.

Once the updated GPS dataset is compiled, analyses similar to those in the SRT report, such as strain rate inversions and 1D profiles, can be performed. As we have previously established, it is critical to account for motion along major strike-slip faults to the northeast of the DCPD to isolate deformation local to the Irish Hills region. Specifically, removing the influence of the San Andreas fault is necessary for accurate characterization. New data constraining San Andreas creep may be leveraged to refine this correction.

R8. Geologic slip-rate information should be acquired from the Rinconada and Huasna faults to permit better modeling of the shear component evident in the GPS data.

The SRT analysis indicates that even after accounting for San Andreas fault deformation, several millimeters of primarily strike-slip motion is distributed over the greater Irish Hills region. Modeling this deformation requires accurate geologic slip rate estimates for the Rinconada and Huasna faults, which are currently lacking. SRT agrees with PG&E that these faults contribute little to the hazard, owing to their distance from the DCPD; however, their broad interseismic deformation signatures make them essential for a complete regional geodetic model. We agree that identifying high-quality study sites and conducting thorough slip rate analyses will likely require several years.

c. SSC modeling

The last recommendation is an overarching recommendation to conduct full-model sensitivity analyses in evaluating the potential hazard impact of the other SRT recommendations.

R9. *PG&E should conduct modeling experiments to ascertain the sensitivity of DCPD hazard to the SSC modifications recommended by the SRT.*

PG&E accepts sensitivity analysis as a high LTSP priority. The DCPD SSC is an extremely complex model with hundreds of co-varying parameters, and the epistemic uncertainty of the model is represented by an intricate set of logic trees in which the alternative models are weighted by expert judgment. Investigating the hazard implications of the inferences from the SRT study therefore requires full-model sensitivity experiments to assess the hazard impact of imposing a new constraint.

PG&E assigned a high LTSP priority to R9, and they are actively developing a sensitivity source model (SSM) to be the computational platform for SSC sensitivity studies. According to their plan, a version of the SSM focused on faults closest to the plant will be operational by June 2026 and experiments for testing recommended changes to the fault geometry models for the Irish Hills will commence shortly thereafter.

- The SRT endorses the development of the SSM as a more efficient and transparent computational platform for SSC sensitivity testing and looks forward to understanding the implementation details and application results.

5. References

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DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:	June 17, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XXIV-H
AGENDA TITLE:	Minutes of February 18-19, 2026 Public Meeting

CONSENT [☐] ACCEPTANCE [☒] INFORMATION [☐]

Staff Summary: Attached are the Minutes which have been prepared from the Committee's one hundred and thirteenth public meeting held on February 18-19, 2026, in Avila Beach, CA and as a Zoom webinar.

(Each session was also webcast live in real time and is available for subsequent viewing, archived to the meeting agenda, by visiting the links on the Committee's website at www.disc.org or at www.slospan.org. Meetings are videotaped for later broadcast on Channel 21 in the San Luis Obispo, CA area, the governmental access television channel.)

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: Review and accept the Minutes by motion.

MINUTES
of the
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE'S
FEBRUARY 18-19, 2026, PUBLIC MEETING
[For Approval at the June 16-17, 2026, Public Meeting.]

Wednesday & Thursday
February 18-19, 2026
Avila Beach, California
Also conducted as a Zoom Webinar

Notice of Meeting.

A legal notice of the public meeting was published in the San Luis Obispo Tribune and a display advertisement was published in the New Times, both local newspapers of general circulation, and mailed and emailed to the media and those persons on the Committee's mailing list. The meeting agenda and the complete agenda packet for the meeting and the informational presentations made during the meeting together with the fact finding reports and reports of the Seismic Review Team to be considered for approval were posted on the Committee's website at www.dcisc.org prior to the meeting. The meeting agenda contained information on how to access the webinar using a computer or cellphone/telephone. This in-person meeting was also produced as a Zoom webinar by AGP Video, Inc. and was webcast live on SLO-SPAN at <http://www.slo-span.org> and through <http://www.dcisc.org> and was subsequently broadcast on San Luis Obispo, California, local government access television Channel 21. A supply of hand sanitizers and face coverings was available in the meeting room.

I CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL

The February 18-19, 2026, public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC), the one hundred and thirteenth public meeting of the Committee, was called to order by Committee Chair Dr. Per F. Peterson at 9:00 a.m. in the Port San Luis Conference Room at the Avila Lighthouse Suites in Avila Beach, California. Dr. Peterson briefly reviewed the professional backgrounds and appointment to the DCISC for each of his fellow Members, Dr. Najmedin Meshkati, the appointee of the Chair of the California Energy Commission and Professor of Civil Environmental Engineering, Industrial and Systems Engineering and International Relations at the University of Southern California with research areas encompassing risk reduction, reliability enhancement and human factors, and Dr. Raluca O. Scarlat, the appointee of the California Attorney General and a Professor of Nuclear Engineering with research area in chemistry and reactor safety at the University of California at Berkeley. Dr. Peterson serves on the DCISC as the appointee of the Governor and is a Professor at the University of California at Berkeley in the Department of Nuclear Engineering, holding the William and Jean McCallum Floyd Chair in the Department, and Dr. Peterson is a co-founder of Kairos Power, an American nuclear energy company that develops fluoride salt-cooled high temperature reactors, also known as molten-salt reactors, a type of small modular reactor.

Present: Committee Member Najmedin Meshkati
Committee Member Per F. Peterson
Committee Member Raluca O. Scarlat

Absent: None

II INTRODUCTIONS

Dr. Peterson introduced and briefly reviewed the professional backgrounds of the Committee's Technical Consultants and Assistant Legal Counsel present: Technical Consultant Mr. Richard D. McWhorter Jr. a U.S. Navy submarine service veteran who served previously as a Senior Resident Inspector for the NRC and as Vice President for Old Dominion Electric Cooperative. Technical Consultant Ms. Lisa A. Darden a 35-year veteran in the nuclear power industry who worked previously for Dominion Energy at Dominion's Surry and North Anna Power Stations, most recently as Site Vice President at Surry. DCISC Assistant Legal Counsel Mr. Robert W. Rathie who has worked with his partner, DCISC Legal Counsel Robert R. Wellington, on DCISC-related matters since 1993.

Dr. Peterson then introduced Mr. Tom Jones, DCPD Senior Director of Strategic Initiatives and Senior Director for Regulatory, Environmental and Repurposing and Ms. Carina Coral, Strategic Initiatives Manager. Dr. Peterson reported that Mr. Jones and Ms. Corral perform key roles on behalf of PG&E and Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP or sometimes the Plant) as principal liaisons with the DCISC in coordinating the Committee's activities, providing information and facilitating the Committee's public meetings and the frequent fact-finding visits conducted by a single member and a technical consultants.

Dr. Peterson recognized the presence of the technicians from AGP Video, Messrs. Travis Harms, James McRoberts and Chris Gardner and Mr. Rathie reported this meeting is being livestreamed and broadcast on the internet and he welcomed the technicians for AGP Video who provide this important component of the Committee's public meetings.

III PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Dr. Peterson requested Mr. Rathie to review the guidance on making public comments to the Committee. Mr. Rathie reminded the members and consultants of the importance of exercising discipline in making and responding to comments so that an accurate transcript may be produced. He then reviewed the rules adopted to entertain public comment during each session of this meeting on an equitable basis for all as follows:

- Speakers should come to the podium and identify themselves.
- Speakers will be recognized by the Chair in order, first from among those present in the room and then from among those attending virtually.
- Remarks will be limited to four minutes, but this may be varied for each session,
- Comments from public officials may be taken before those of members of the general public.

- Speakers may not cede their time to other speakers.
- Groups may be asked to appoint a spokesperson.
- Each speaker may only address the Committee once under either time for items not on the agenda, but within the Committee's subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., the operational safety of DCPD) or when a matter listed on the agenda is heard.
- The DCISC Chair reserves the right to stop any speaker if he or she believes the speaker is out of order.
- The Committee reserved the right to modify the rules in the interest of conducting an effective meeting including granting extra time to certain speakers upon request,
- Writings used in conjunction with remarks should be provided to the Committee's Legal Counsel.
- Email comments received will be read into the record subject to a time limit.

Mr. Rathie then reported that tomorrow's morning session of this public meeting would be convened at 8:15 a.m. and the notice in the New Times newspaper was not correct.

The Chair invited the members of the public who wished to address remarks to the Committee on items not appearing on the agenda for the public meeting to do so at this time.

Dr. Gene Nelson, President and Senior Legal Researcher for Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated a company called Alva Energy has developed a novel method of obtaining more power from a pressurized water reactor such as those at DCPD which he stated may help address a projected statewide need for more electric power. Dr. Nelson also reported he has recently sent several news articles and other material to the Committee through the Legal Counsel's office including mention of the California Coastal Commission's vote to extend DCPD operations to 2030. Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones reported that at the time DCPD replaced all eight steam generators, PG&E did not seek an uprate in power production as to do so would have changed the thermal discharge limits under California's Once-Through Cooling Policy and he reported a process to seek a power production uprate would require significant time. He reported the low pressure turbines were changed in the same timeframe and through the resulting increased efficiency, more than 40 megawatts of electrical power per unit were added.

Dr. Robert J. Budnitz was recognized. Dr. Budnitz remarked he served on the DCISC for 18 years and he thanked Dr. Peterson and members of the Committee's technical and legal staff and the PG&E staff for their work during that time.

IV A. Public Outreach, Site Visits other Committee Activities, Scheduling and Confirmation of Future Fact Finding Visits and Public Meetings.

Dr. Scarlat reported after her December 2025 fact finding visit to DCPD she met with representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of the Inspector General to better understand the scope and oversight of that office and she reported she had a brief meeting with representatives of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (Mothers for Peace) to learn about

the group's principal concerns. She reported she has also furthered her interest in emergency planning.

Dr. Meshkati reported he gave a talk at a meeting of the Eisenhower Foundation during which he discussed the role of the DCISC.

Members and consultants then discussed and confirmed future public meetings of the DCISC for: June 16-17, 2026, October 20-21, 2026, and February 17-18, 2027 and the Members and Consultants then scheduled a public meeting for June 16-17, 2027 [with the possibility of a public tour to include the Simulator on June 17].

Fact-finding visits were then confirmed subject to confirmation by DCPD that the plant can support visits on the selected dates and scheduled as follows¹:

[2026] March 18-19 [previously March 11-12 and 10-11] (ROS/LAD/RSO-remote), April 13-14 (NM/RDM) [previously April 14-15 and April 22-23], May 6-7 (PFP/LAD/RSO), July 6-7 [Previously July 14-15 and July 7-8] (PFP/RDM), July 28-29 [previously August 11-12] (NM/LAD/RFW) to observe unevaluated Emergency Exercise, August 13 NM/RDM remote observation NSOC exit meeting, August 19 one-day observation of ISFSI cask inspection (ROS/RSO), September 1-2 [previously September 15-16] (ROS/RDM/RSO) to observe evaluated Emergency Preparedness Exercise on September 2, November 30 (ROS/LAD) remote observation NSOC exit meeting, December 2-3 [previously November] (ROS/LAD), December 8-9 (PFP/RDM); and

[2027] January 20-21 (NM/RSO), March 17-18 (ROS/RSO), April 20-21 (NM/RDM), May 11-12 (PFP/LAD).

The Members and Consultants discussed possibly scheduling one or more fact findings, possibly starting in late May 2026, with Dr Mark Kirk and Dr. Scarlat for Dr. Kirk's review of the final Westinghouse report on the results of the testing of Unit 1 surveillance Capsule B and Mr. Jones stated that the report should be available in late 2Q or early 3Q 2026. [Subsequently deferred.]

Dr. Ken Koves was recognized. Dr. Koves stated he was retired from the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) and in response to Dr. Koves' inquiry, Dr. Peterson replied the dates set for fact finding and public meetings may sometimes be changed to accommodate conflicts.

V A. INFORMATION PRESENTATIONS REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF PG&E.

Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones then introduced DCPD Director of Security and Emergency Services Mr. Sam Williams and reported Mr. Williams has been employed at DCPD since 2006 and prior to that served in the U.S. Navy nuclear service for six years. Mr. Williams

¹ Lisa A. Darden (LAD), Najmedin Meshkati (NM), Per F. Peterson (PFP), Richard D. McWhorter (RDM), R. Ferman Wardell (RFW), Raluca O. Scarlat (ROS), Richard St. Onge (RSO). Meeting dates have been updated to include any changes made or proposed after the February public meeting.

is in charge of DCPD physical security, plant access, the station's Fire Department as well as the security force at PG&E's Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power Plant securing the plant's Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). Mr. Jones reported Mr. Williams holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering from New York's Excelsior College.

State of the Plant Update Including Organizational Changes, Significant Past and Future Plant Activities, Power History, Results of Refueling Outage 2R25, Significant Equipment Issues Including Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak, Significant Human Performance Issues, and Other Station Activities since the DCISC's October 2025 Public Meeting.

Mr. Williams reported Units 1 and 2 are presently operating safely at 100% power. He reported all NRC Performance Indicators are in Green status² and DCPD remains in Column 1 of the NRC Action Matrix.³ He reported on power history for both units. For Unit 1 earlier in 2025 refueling outage 1R25 occupied 35 days and 22 hours and in December 2025 there was a forced outage on Unit 1 to repair a secondary feedwater heater tube leak which took the unit offline for 44 hours. For Unit 2 a planned Circulating Water System tunnel cleaning was conducted in March 2025. In July when the Madre Fire was encroaching on the 500kV Midway lines 2 and 3 Mr. Williams reported a conservative decision was taken to reduce Unit 2 power to 50%. He reported grid conditions impose a limitation on maximum output of approximately 1,600 megawatts when only one of the three 500kV lines is in service. In August 2025 during the Gifford Fire the fire burned under the 500kV lines and Unit 2 was again reduced to 50% power for a period of 12 days. In October 2025 refueling outage 2R25 had a duration of 31 days and 8 hours. In response to Dr. Meshkati's comment Mr. Williams and Mr. Jones replied that the conservative decision to ramp down Unit 2 was made in consultation with the grid control team and the California Independent System Operator (CAISO).⁴ Mr. Williams confirmed that if two of the three 500kV lines are taken out of service without power generation being below a certain load setpoint, one of the units will preferentially trip⁵ offline to protect the grid. Unit 1 was selected for the Madre and Gifford files due to current equipment and reactivity considerations and he observed in some cases smoke from a fire can serve to conduct electricity. He reported the remaining 500kV line was inspected by helicopter to ensure it remained protected.

Mr. Williams reported that 2R25 was successful in terms of outage duration, radiation protection and reliability with all outage goals met or exceeded. He reported lessons learned from 1R25 were captured during 2R25 with replacement of the High Pressure Turbine and 1R25

² The safety significance characterizations used for the Performance Indicators as either Green (very low) calling for Baseline inspection, White (low to moderate), calling for additional NRC oversight, Yellow (substantial), requiring more NRC oversight, or Red (high), requiring the most NRC oversight. A Green non-cited violation indicates very low safety significance, with no impact to public health and safety.

³ The NRC determines its regulatory response in accordance with an Action Matrix that provides for a range of actions commensurate with the significance of the performance indicator (PI) and inspection results.

⁴ The CAISO manages the flow of electricity across high-voltage, long-distance power lines, operates a competitive wholesale energy market, and oversees transmission planning.

⁵ A reactor trip, also known as a scram, is the rapid and automatic or manual shutdown of a nuclear reactor. This is achieved by inserting control rods into the reactor core, which absorbs neutrons and halts the nuclear fission chain reaction. It is a safety mechanism to prevent damage to the reactor and its components.

duration was four days longer than for 2R25 and full power operations immediately after 2R25 continued for 90 days.

Mr. Williams stated that in November 2025 the NRC evaluated a reactor operator class which was successful in graduating 11 reactor operators and 11 senior reactor operators who are now all serving on crews supporting operations. One candidate in that class was unsuccessful. A subsequent reactor operator class has now commenced for 5 reactor operator and 7 senior reactor operator candidates.

Mr. Williams reported in mid-December 2025 there were **indications of a tube leak for secondary condensate on Unit 1 Feedwater Heat Exchanger 5C and a forced outage followed with repairs completed in 44 hours. In response to Dr. Scarlet's query Mr. Williams stated the feedwater heaters have been in service for 40 years and there are some tolerance issues and some minor leakage of certain components within the heat exchangers. A cause evaluation process has been undertaken and when that evaluation is complete an update will be provided to the Committee.** He reported at this time there are no operational challenges related to condenser saltwater tube leakage with all leakage being within range at less than one gallon per day.

Mr. Williams reported in coming weeks there is a planned curtailment to 50% power for Unit 1 to perform mid-cycle tunnel cleaning and DCP is working with grid control and system operators to identify the optimal period. In March 2026 the NRC will conduct its biannual Radiation Protection Inspection and a maintenance outage window for Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 1-3 and 1-1 will occur in March and May respectively. In response to Dr. Peterson's question Mr. Williams replied the EDGs are run at least once per month to test their emergency response and loading functions.

Mr. Williams reported there were no notable changes in leadership during the prior quarter and none are planned at this time. He reported the position of PG&E Vice President, Business and Technical Services is now filled by Mr. Blair Jones and Ms. Maureen Zawalick has been appointed PG&E Senior Vice President and Chief Risk Officer for the PG&E corporation.

Dr. Gene Nelson, Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. In reply to Dr. Nelson's questions Mr. Williams stated the staffing numbers for reactor operator and senior reactor operator license classes are determined without consideration of the 2030 date by which the state has determined DCP should cease operation and he commented the Employee Retention Program serves to provide forecast of attrition among reactor operators.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized. In response to Ms. Lewis' comment Mr. Williams confirmed smoke can serve to conduct electricity and can have an adverse effect on power lines, although this has not been experienced to date with any of DCP's high voltage lines.

Dr. Ken Koves was recognized. Dr. Koves commented that in his opinion PG&E made the right decision to curtail power on Unit 2, but he stated and Mr. Williams confirmed there was another choice available which was to keep running both units at full power and hope that a

trip did not occur. Mr. Williams stated conservative decision-making is a foundational operational principle at DCP. Dr. Koves remarked this event was a great example of putting safety over production.

Mr. Robert Sarvey was recognized. Mr. Sarvey requested and was permitted to address a concern he attempted to raise previously when he was unable to connect to the meeting via the Zoom webinar. He stated the passage of Senate Bill 846 (SB 846)⁶ requires the DCISC to annually transmit its findings and recommendations for improved DCP safety to the CPUC and for the CPUC to review the reports and recommendations of the DCISC and if the recommendations cause the CPUC to determine at its discretion that the cost of upgrades to address seismic safety or issues of deferred maintenance are too high due to the expectation of the plant closing sooner, to reestablish or revise the current license expiration dates. He observed the DCISC met this requirement in its 34th Annual Report, but he believes the CPUC refused to recognize the DCISC's recommendations. He observed that in Decision 25-12-007 the CPUC stated, in its Finding of Fact No. 6, that the DCISC made no recommendation for upgrades needed for extended operation and Mr. Sarvey stated in his view that was not true. He recommended a letter be sent from the Committee informing the CPUC of Recommendations made in the 34th Annual Report. He reported Legal Counsel Rathie provided a letter [email] which outlined the recommendations, which information he later submitted to the CPUC in the proceeding but which the CPUC ignored. [Mr. Sarvey made his request for the Recommendations in his email on 8/18/25 and an email response was provided by Legal Counsel that same date.]

A short break followed.

DCPP Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones introduced DCP Director of Risk and Compliance Mr. Jordan Tyman for an update on DCP regulatory performance. Mr. Jones reported the Mr. Tyman is responsible for oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory and Compliance Programs, enterprise and operational risk management, innovation and introduction of Artificial Intelligence (AI), nuclear cyber security, and emergency planning. Mr. Tyman has been employed by PG&E for nine years and spent ten years prior to coming to PG&E at Westinghouse Electric Corporation in support of the development of Westinghouse's AP1000 pressurized water reactor and with a number of Westinghouse's subsidiaries. Mr. Jones reported that Mr. Tyman has various academic partnerships and holds memberships on numerous industry committees and a Degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Massachusetts.

⁶ On September 2, 2022, Governor Newsom signed California Senate Bill 846, codified as Public Resources Code Sections 25233, 25233.2 and 25302.7, Public Utilities Code Sections 712.1 and 712.8, and Water Code Section 13193.5 which, together with the approval by the CPUC on December 14, 2023 of Decision 23-12-036, provides for the conditional extension of operations at Diablo Canyon beyond the current retirement date, up to five additional years, that is no later than October 31, 2029 for Unit 1 and October 31, 2030 for Unit 2, under specific conditions as provided by the legislation including approval by the NRC of extending the operating licenses for Diablo Canyon.

Update on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation, Open Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Status of Cross-Cutting Issues Matrix, Current and Future License Amendment Requests, and Other Significant Regulatory Issues/Requests.

Mr. Tyman reported that since the last meeting of the DCISC in October 2025, the oversight of DCPD by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has included approximately 1,000 hours of inspection time including by the two full-time resident inspection team who continued to perform inspections at DCPD during the government shutdown. There was, however, a reduction of inspection hours related to the 43-day government shutdown. In response to Dr. Peterson's question Mr. Tyman stated the NRC regional programmatic inspections are continuing. In response to Dr. Scarlet's question Mr. Tyman stated pursuant to the recent Presidential Executive Orders the NRC is evaluating its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) and focusing on risk and safety significance and Mr. Tyman stated DCPD would continue to use and leverage internal oversight programs to ensure plant performance is maintained.

During this period DCPD received 5 violations of very low safety significance. He reported DCPD continues to remain in the highest performance categories measured against the NRC's sixteen identified Performance Indicators with all indicators in Green status⁷. During this period DCPD did not initiate any Licensee Event Reports (LERs).

Of the 5 violations, two are related to cyber security and cannot be discussed in a public forum. He reviewed and discussed the other three as follows:

- EDG maintenance guidance lacking, resulting in a cotter pin on the fuel rack that was interfering with normal fuel-response movement and a bent cotter pin. Guidance provided, procedures revised to prevent recurrence along with entry into the Corrective Action Program.
- Safety-related fuse blown requiring review of Maintenance Rule⁸ interval. **Life-cycle bases for replacement/preventative maintenance reevaluated and entry made in the Corrective Action Program. In response to Dr. Peterson's question Mr. Tyman agreed to provide the service life of the blown fuse. Mr. Tyman agreed with Dr. Peterson that while DCPD evaluates timeliness of replacement of components, online monitoring which is a new focus for the industry might be employed to manage these types of assets. Mr. Tyman stated that during the system inoperability a backup system was available. Dr. Peterson remarked this would be a good subject for a fact finding meeting.** In response to Mr. McWhorter's question Mr. Tyman reported the fuse was specific to the application in that system. In response to Dr. Meshkati's query Mr. Tyman reported the Maintenance Rule interval is based upon risk and performance characteristics, along with operating experience including identified trends.

⁷ The safety significance characterizations used for the Performance Indicators as either Green (very low), qualifies for Baseline inspection; White (low to moderate), requires additional NRC oversight; Yellow (substantial), requires more NRC oversight; or Red (high), requires most NRC oversight. A Green non-cited violation indicates very low safety significance, with no impact to public health and safety.

⁸ The Maintenance Rule was generated by the NRC to assess maintenance plans against risk-informed performance based criteria.

➤ Human error during maintenance activity caused an electrical short that resulted in a blown fuse and brief period of inoperability for one EDG. **Mr. Tyman reported this was equipment based human error and corrective actions were taken through training and procedure guidance to enhance awareness. Dr. Peterson remarked this would be a good event to review for the potential impact of checks and flags that could be implemented through use of electronic procedures.** The event was entered into the Corrective Action Program and an evaluation is conducted in that context. **In response to Consultant McWhorter's reference to a Common Cause Evaluation being performed for lifting and landing of leads, Mr. Tyman replied this was a similar event involving a misplaced wire contact during the landing of an electrical lead, but he stated he would need to follow up on whether this event was included in that Common Cause Evaluation.**

Consultant McWhorter observed that some violations are characterized as violations of very low safety significance, but there are other issues that fall below that threshold. Mr. Tyman stated any issue, event, or equipment challenge is entered into the Corrective Action Program and receives the same amount of review rigor. **He reported the NRC works through its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) regarding evaluating, determining and assigning significance levels to identified issues with reference to reactor safety. He remarked this process is probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) based. He offered to provide the Committee with a copy of the document that provides examples of minor and more than minor significance. Mr. Tyman agreed with Drs. Meshkati and Peterson concerning the interface between safety and security and remarked that cyber security was impacted by that interface and he offered to provide the NRC inspection reports and to review the issue with the Committee during a fact finding.**

Mr. Tyman reported upcoming NRC inspection activity includes the NRC Radiation Protection Inspection in March 2026. He commented that concerning the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) radiation protection guidelines to minimize worker exposure through time-distance shielding, while the federal Department of Energy (DOE) has "sunset" the ALARA Program neither the NRC nor the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) have taken that action. In response to Dr. Scarlet's question Mr. Tyman said he thought the DOE's move away from ALARA might be motivated by enhanced technology. Dr. Scarlet observed resource utilization may also play a role. Dr. Peterson remarked he does not believe any changes would change the use of dosimetry or the use of outage dose as a performance metric for refueling outages. Dr. Meshkati thanked the members of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility and Ms. Rochelle Becker for sending an article with a transcript of an NPR broadcast. Dr. Meshkati also thanked Dr. Nelson for an article on grid inertia. In response to Dr. Scarlet's question Mr. Tyman stated elimination of ALARA will not have an impact on public safety and Mr. Jones confirmed DCP is 80% below the threshold set for occupational exposure of 5 millirem. Dr. Peterson observed worker dose in modern nuclear plants is quite small and he remarked coolant chemistry helps keep dose low prior to refueling outages. Dr. Scarlet observed that perhaps the ALARA application of what is currently reasonable has evolved, as what is reasonable is constantly evolving and the focus should be on what has the most impact on improving safety.

Mr. Tyman reported the NRC has been reviewing several License Amendment Requests (LARs) and approval has been received from the NRC for several including for optimization of technical specifications (tech specs)⁹ completion times and upgrading emergency action levels, and DCPD has submitted a number of LARs for NRC review approval. He reported DCPD plans to submit additional LARs over the next few months.

Mr. Tyman concluded his presentation by again reporting DCPD remains in the highest NRC category under the ROP for plant performance. Drs. Meshkati and Peterson commented on the INPO confidentiality requirements and confirmed the DCISC does have the opportunity to review confidential INPO information to ensure the Committee remains aware of concerns and can independently follow up on that information. Dr. Peterson remarked with INPO, the PG&E Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC), and the American Nuclear Insurers, the role of the DCISC is unique in that it also addresses questions and concerns from members of the public as well as those of state agencies and officials. Dr. Meshkati remarked Dr. Ken Koves, who commented earlier, has had a long and distinguished career at INPO. Dr. Scarlat observed having modes of oversight that are confidential is important for safety culture.

Dr. Gene Nelson, Californians for Green Nuclear Power, was recognized. Dr. Nelson commented INPO does provide statistical overviews of plant performance.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized. Drs. Peterson and Scarlat responded to Ms. Lewis' inquiry and stated online monitoring is not AI but rather involves the use of instrumentation for measuring and trending various parameters in the plant to optimize maintenance. Ms. Lewis commented nuclear power is a very dangerous technology and for that reason it has to be expensive.

The Chair thanked Mr. Tyman for an excellent presentation.

XI CONSULTANT REPORT & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF A FACT FINDING REPORT TO PG&E

A. The Chair requested Consultant Mr. McWhorter to provide a report on the December 2-3, 2025, fact-finding visit conducted with Dr. Scarlat and Ms. Darden. Mr. McWhorter reported Ms. Darden participated remotely in this fact finding. He reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the December 2025 visit as follows:

➤ EDG Mission Times and Operability Determination – Consultant McWhorter reported that on September 5, 2025 EDG 2-2, which was being returned to service after being out of service for maintenance, experienced a small leak (0.3 gallons per hour) from the jacket water pump seal. The station chose to return EDG 2-2 to service with the leak present because a work plan was not in place for the repair. He reported the repair was completed one month later. Mr. McWhorter reported an Operability Evaluation provided the justification for returning EDG 2-2 to service and for considering it operable. One of the questions for an Operability Evaluation

⁹ As part of an NRC license authorizing operation of a nuclear facility, Technical Specifications establish requirements for items such as safety limits, limiting safety system settings, limiting control settings, limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, design features, and administrative controls.

concerns mission time, that is, the time the equipment needs to be operable without operator action for the period it was designed to function in an accident scenario. In the case of the EDGs, that mission time is 7 days' which Mr. McWhorter reported is in line with the tech specs allowable outage time.

Consultant McWhorter reported an Operability Evaluation consists of simulating two types of follow up actions – compensatory actions and prudent actions. He reported compensatory actions are what the plant relied upon to consider EDG 2-2 operable with the seal leak. He stated prudent actions are additional levels of defense to ensure operability is maintained. In the case of the seal leak on EDG 2-2 the primary compensatory action was to have operators periodically check to ensure there was adequate coolant and the seal leak was not causing the expansion tank to drop below the minimum level. Mr. McWhorter stated the fact finding team (FFT) learned the expansion tank was alarmed in the Control Room such that the Control Room operators would have been aware of a loss of coolant. He commented the two-hour check of coolant level by operators in the plant was also a prudent action.

The FFT concluded the evaluation of the seal leak on EDG 2-2 and the associated Operability Evaluation was appropriate and justified the continued operation of EDG 2-2 with the leak unrepaired. The FFT recommended the Committee further review how tech specs required the completion time and how that was met and how a future event would be addressed under risk-informed tech specs [D12/2/25FF-3.1].

The FFT recommended closure of the previous Recommendation to the Committee [D9/25 FF – 3.12].

Dr. Scarlat commented the actions by operators regarding this event is considered a compensatory action to justify continued operation and the operator makes the decision on whether compensatory measures can be implemented. Dr. Scarlat observed it is important to have this degree of freedom in addressing problems such that maintenance can be scheduled during time of the lowest risk. She stated the FFT was not asking PG&E about completion time and completion times can be prescriptive per tech specs or risk-informed, which balances the risk with other risks, and risk-informed completion times are forward looking in the industry. Dr. Scarlat stated prudent action would result were the Control Room alarm to sound on a low level and a compensatory action would then be to continually refill the tank. Dr. Scarlat stated the FFT verified that knowledge of the EDG 2-2 operability issues was passed between relieved and relieving operating crews.

➤ Aging Management Programs – the FFT reviewed 5 Aging Management Programs for cabling. Mr. McWhorter reported here are 44 Aging Management Programs with plans managed and put into place through the License Renewal Project. The cabling Aging Management Programs reviewed by the FFT included those for high voltage cables, for radiation monitors, and nuclear instrumentation inaccessible cabling for greater than 480V lines. The FFT also reviewed the Aging Management Program for metal busses.

➤ Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Capsule B Update – Consultant McWhorter reported the container for surveillance Capsule B has been shipped to Pennsylvania, disassembled, with

confirmation by the thermal wire that there was no thermal overheating of any of the sample in the container and dosimetry counts have been completed to confirm radiation fluence exposure. He reported that Charpy and V-notch testing has been completed. Mr. McWhorter reported there was some reconstituted material from Capsule S previously reinserted into Capsule B and testing of that material will be done separately. He reported PG&E expects to receive the draft test report sometime this spring and the report is due to the NRC in fall 2026. Mr. McWhorter stated the Committee expects to receive the final test report sometime in May 2026 subject to confirmation. When the report is received by DCISC Consultant Dr. Kirk will review it. [Subsequently deferred.]

➤ Meet with DCPD Officers – Consultant McWhorter stated this was a rare opportunity to meet with all four PG&E site Vice Presidents including Vice President for Business and Technical Services and the Chief Nuclear Officer's Chief of Staff Mr. Blair Jones.

➤ Steam Generator Health – Mr. McWhorter reported this was a routine item on the Open Items List which is scheduled following a refueling outage. He reported there are 4 steam generators per unit and all 4 were replaced circa 2008-2009. Consultant McWhorter reported there at 4,444 tubes made of Alloy 69 ethanol steel in each generator. The steam generators are performing very well with the last review having been conducted during fall 2023 for Unit 1 during 1R24 and the FFT reviewed that inspection report. Mr. McWhorter reported DCPD can justify up to five operational cycles between inspection and on that basis the next inspection for Unit 2 will take place during 2R27 during fall 2028 and for Unit 1 the inspection interval comes after the five year extended operation period through 2030. Mr. McWhorter reported the steam generators were in good health and degradation assessments appeared appropriate. There have been 8 tubes plugged in the Unit 1 steam generators and 3 tubes in Unit 2 with the Unit 2 tubes having been plugged during fabrication. The FFT concluded the steam generators are in excellent health and the plans for future inspections were appropriate.

Consultant McWhorter reported the FFT recommended to the DCISC that it review the error analysis contained in the 2025 Degradation Assessment for the Unit 2 steam generators [D12/2/25 FF – 3.5].

➤ Meet with Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators – Consultant McWhorter reported this was an informal meeting with one senior reactor operator and two Turbine Building operators. He reported two DCPD managers also sat in on the meeting with the FFT. The FFT concluded meeting with the three operators provided good insights into their roles and daily routines.

➤ Meet with San Luis Obispo County Department of Emergency Services – Mr. McWhorter reported with Dr. Scarlat he met over dinner with Ms. Kelly Van Buren and one of her staff from the San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services (OES). He stated the discussion was technically oriented and allowed Dr. Scarlat to learn about OES' perspective on the station's relationship with the County and to ask questions about her concerns regarding Native American tribes and schools and how the County works with those organizations. The DCISC representatives discussed the yearly calendars distributed to provide emergency planning information which Mr. McWhorter reported is a primary mechanism used by the County and

PG&E for communicating emergency response information to the public. There was also discussion on the draft Committee Policy No. 9 on responding to DCPD emergencies. Dr. Scarlat reported she has reached out to the Department of Public Health Nuclear Emergency Response Program and has received a response and hopes to schedule a meeting soon. She stated she also has a particular interest in [emergency planning for] the two local detention facilities. The FFT concluded the meeting with County OES was productive.

The FFT recommended to the DCISC that Open Item D3/25FF-3.12 remain open regarding developing a policy for the Committee's response to a DCPD emergency [D3/25FF – 3.12].

➤ Auxiliary Saltwater System Discharge Arrangements and FLEX Program – Consultant McWhorter reported this was a follow up item from the April 2025 fact finding to review the configuration of the Auxiliary Saltwater System discharge piping which is located in the Discharge Structure and covered by earth. He reported the discharge configuration is addressed in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and it is not a regulatory concern. The FFT inquired concerning the application of FLEX¹⁰ guidelines to deal with a potential collapse of the Discharge Structure and the possible effect of that on the piping. He reported PG&E did an evaluation and found a collapse of the Discharge Structure was covered by the existing general FLEX guidelines addressing debris removal. While the Auxiliary Saltwater System is a safety-related system, it is not time sensitive as 72 hours are allowed to reestablish flow and there are alternate FLEX guidelines for supplying auxiliary saltwater using hoses and pumps to draw water from the Intake Cove. Mr. McWhorter reported the FLEX guidelines are in place for this alternate supply source because it requires assembling specialized equipment. He reported an alternate discharge path exists for auxiliary saltwater flows through the use of flexible hoses on the discharge to the component cooling water heat exchangers which would go through and out the doors of the Turbine Building basement.

The FFT concluded DCPD adequately reviewed the Committee recommendation and no additional FLEX guidelines were needed and the current Recommendation to PG&E [P4/25FF-3.8] should be closed.

The FFT did make a recommendation to the DCISC [D12/2/25FF-3.8] to review FLEX support guidelines for how the Turbine Building doors might be propped open should the alternate pathway through the Turbine Building basement be needed in a severe accident scenario.

➤ Artificial Intelligence Use at DCPD – the FFT reviewed DCPD's use of Neutron AI Document Search Tool (Neutron Search) and received a demonstration of its use. There was a discussion of new failure modes which could be introduced by AI and the FFT were informed

¹⁰ FLEX is not an acronym but describes a strategy developed by the nuclear industry to provide diverse and flexible coping strategies to address the loss of safety-related systems due to certain beyond design basis events. It is a group of supplemental components, many of them portable, which are seismically stored, and can be made available for timely attachment to permanent plant systems for accident mitigation.

that the Neutron Search is bounded by how the AI is trained on a limited database of NRC ADAMS¹¹ documents and Neutron Search does not access much new information. He reported the current use of AI at DCPD keeps humans in the role of decision-maker and responsible for validating the information provided by Neutron Search is appropriate and correct. The FFT concluded the initiative to use Neutron Search was positive and there were no significant safety concerns.

The FFT made a recommendation to the Committee to keep Recommendation D12/24FF-3.4 open and review the topic of the use of AI tools frequently.

Dr. Scarlat stated use of AI will continue to grow and the NRC has a strategic plan for implementing AI for inspections. She remarked that while humans are one part of managing the application of AI, new failure modes and how humans are trained to identify failure modes are also important as AI failure modes are not necessarily the failure modes of humans. She remarked it will be important for DCPD to be part of industry user groups and she commended PG&E for taking a proactive approach to AI.

➤ Plant Tour Inside Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) – the FFT toured extensively within the RCA of Unit 1 including viewing major safety related equipment, the Spent Fuel Pool, and outside areas around both units. The FFT concluded the areas containing the Emergency Core Cooling System and the equipment in the Spent Fuel Pool were clean and orderly, well-lit, and the equipment was observed to be in good order.

➤ Chemistry Department – Consultant McWhorter stated the FFT’s review of the EDG 2-2 coolant seal leak and the steam generators had raised questions for the Chemistry Department. The FFT reviewed the organization’s staffing and concerns including the pending issuance of a new National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) discharge permit and the number of sample points which will be increased as a result of the new permit. [But see B.6-17 re Tom Jones comment.] The FFT concluded the Chemistry Department’s programs were performing well with no major issues.

The FFT made a Recommendation [D12/2/25-3.11] to the Committee to follow up on implementation, staffing and training for the new NPDES permit and the federal Clean Water Act and the overall strategy for the Chemistry Department to interface with the Operations and License Renewal organizations.

➤ Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors – Mr. McWhorter reported the FFT met with the NRC resident inspection team to discuss topical areas covered during the fact finding and future changes to the Reactor Oversight and Inspection Programs.

¹¹ The NRC’s ADAMS (Agency Documents and Management System) website is the official way to access public documents from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

- Public Engagement and Outreach Programs – PG&E explained their multi-faceted approach to public outreach to the FFT including outreach to OES, schools and the Native American tribes and how the public is educated on the hazards of a nuclear power plant. The FFT also discussed the role of the Committee in response to an emergency at DCP. The FFT concluded PG&E's programs for public outreach appear to be appropriate for educating and informing the public about the station and its activities.
- Tour of Outside Equipment Areas – the FFT toured the outside areas behind the plant in the vicinity of the ISFSI, the FLEX equipment storage area, the switchyards, and the Old Steam Generator Storage Facility as well as the Intake Structure. All areas were found clean, orderly and well lit.
- Observe NSOC Meeting (remote) – Consultant McWhorter reported that the week following the December fact finding visit the FFT remotely observed a meeting of the NSOC, the stations external oversight committee consisting of five peer advisors who advise PG&E's Chief Nuclear Officer on safety policy and provide an independent perspective on performance. Mr. McWhorter stated there were some significant critical comments and the FFT found the meeting to be positive, thorough and comprehensive.

The Committee Members, Consultants and Counsel briefly discussed the effect of the approval of a fact finding report on the recommendations made in the report and determined approval of the fact finding report constitutes approval of the recommendations made therein.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized. In response to Ms. Lewis' question Mr. McWhorter reported the report on the testing of Capsule B is expected to be available for the Committee's review sometime in May 2026. Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones stated the report could be available later in the first quarter or early in the second quarter of 2026 [subsequently deferred] but will not be publicly available until it is submitted to the NRC in fall 2026.

Dr. Robert J. Budnitz was recognized. Dr. Budnitz reported when he served as a member of the DCISC he attended the fact finding meeting in September 2025 when the EDG 2-2 coolant leak was first discussed with the DCISC and he stated that the figure of merit is the mission time and he remarked there is considerable margin in the mission time which provides confidence that the decision to continue operating until the leak could be addressed was fully supported as not being a large safety compromise. He stated where the NRC criteria are conservative, the DCISC has an obligation to determine what is realistic rather than what is conservative.

Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones remarked regarding the steam generator Degradation Assessment Report, that the 8 plugged tubes and 3 plugged tubes result in 99.1 percent tube availability out of a total of 35,000 tubes. Dr. Peterson observed the advances in fabrication materials for the steam generators makes them very durable and the steam generators are part of Containment and a common accident scenario for emergency exercises for an offsite release involves a ruptured steam generator tube. Dr. Scarlat remarked Degradation Assessment Reports are important as they inform the inspection schedule going forward. Dr. Meshkati observed

before the accident in 2011 to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant (Fukushima) in Japan the most serious nuclear accident that had taken place in Japan involved a steam generator tube rupture which occurred in 1961 at the Mihama Nuclear Plant. He commented these types of accidents can be serious and it is important to be proactive concerning the health of the steam generators and maintenance and testing in this regard is very important. Dr. Scarlat observed one of the recommendations in the fact finding report concerns review of the uncertainty calculation and she remarked the uncertainty is there to verify and not as an indicator of failure.

On a motion made by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Meshkati, the December 2-3, 2025, Fact Finding Report was unanimously approved.

VII ADJOURN MORNING MEETING

The Chair adjourned the morning meeting of the DCISC at 12:15 p.m.

VIII RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING

The afternoon meeting of the DCISC was convened by the Chair at 1:15 p.m.

IX COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

The Chair welcomed those present and those attending remotely.

X PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Dr. Gene Nelson of California for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated he wanted to extend his earlier comments and reported that Region 3 of the State Water Resources Control Board is meeting at the end of this month and he commented that for PG&E's license renewal application for DCPD all safety issues have been covered by the NRC and the only matters holding up the new license is some state agency approvals. He reported a decision concerning the Indian Point Energy Center established the precedent that in the determination of the best technology available, the cost of that technology must be a consideration concerning remediating alleged environmental harms they cannot be wholly out of proportion to the cost imposed.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized. Mr. Lewis inquired as to the opinion of the Committee Members on a DOE proposal to change the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) guidelines for approving nuclear power plants to add a categorical exemption for nuclear power plants. Ms. Lewis stated her opinion that this would be a mistake as nuclear power is too complex and the waste is so lethal. Dr. Scarlat responded and stated with the introduction of new technology there will be new benefits and new risks and the regulator provides value to an industry, but a too rigid regulatory scheme makes it more difficult to innovate and those innovations could bring about safety, cost and societal benefits. Ms. Lewis observed that one nuclear accident can have catastrophic consequences.

XI INFORMATION PRESENTATIONS REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF PG&E

Ms. Corral asked Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones to begin the next presentation. She reported in his capacity Mr. Jones oversees regulatory processes and community and external engagement for both DCPD and the Humboldt Bay Power Plant ISFSI. This includes relicensing of DCPD and the stewardship of 10,000 acres and 14 miles of coastline which make up the Diablo Canyon properties. Mr. Jones previously served in Corporate Affairs and Local Government Relations with PG&E including as Director of Corporate Affairs for Energy Generation. Mr. Jones joined PG&E in 2001 and has always been a badged nuclear worker.

Update on Planning for Extended Operations including Status of License Renewal, State and Local Permitting, Project Planning and Staffing.

Mr. Jones reported PG&E will complete the state permitting process for all state activities during the first quarter of 2026 (Q1 2026) and he confirmed Dr. Nelson's statement that the Regional Water Quality Control Board will conduct a hearing at the end of this month to address an updated NPDES Permit and also a 401 Certification which certifies the activities are in compliance with the Clean Water Act. He reported the Board's staff has recommended approval. He stated the NPDES Permit will include additional monitoring but no additional discharge points. [But see B.6-14 re Chemistry Org. re: sample v. discharge points.] He confirmed the Chemistry Department has been requested to add additional monitoring areas or to repeat some studies which may result in the generation of foam on the beaches from the agitation of the water as it is discharged from the plant and he stated this is unrelated to nuclear operations and not unique to nuclear facilities. With California Coastal Commission approval having now been received, Mr. Jones stated DCPD expects the NRC to make its licensing action decision in 2Q 2026. [On April 2, 2026, the NRC issued license extensions for Unit 1 until 2044 and for Unit 2 until 2025.]

Mr. Jones stated the license renewal process has always been two-tracked in that the application is submitted to the NRC and reviewed for safety and environmental review but the NRC defers concurrently to the state for water quality and for the Coastal Zone Management Act Program. The state reviews must be concluded before the NRC concludes its process. In response to Consultant McWhorter's question Mr. Jones replied that the results of the testing of Unit 1 surveillance Capsule B is an ongoing issue but that issue will not preclude the NRC from taking action to issue the license. In response to Dr. Meshkati's comment Mr. Jones stated DCPD has already satisfied the NRC requirements for reactor vessel integrity and the additional information from Capsule B will not factor into the direct licensing action by the NRC of DCPD's ability to continue operations.

He displayed a graphic presentation of the 80 discrete and concurrent regulatory processes that make up the license renewal track. He reported SB 846 made a number of findings including that the CPUC would retire the previous retirement dates and change those dates to allow PG&E to continue to operate DCPD for up to five additional years and PG&E was directed to pursue every option to keep DCPD operating. He reported the license from the NRC is for twenty additional years but if the state wants to keep DCPD operating beyond the five years under SB 846 new legislation to extend that period will be needed. He commented the NRC conducts its inspections of plant passive systems based on the twenty year period and this creates

margin for a shorter operational period. Mr. Jones commented if legislation is to come to extend the operation of DCPD beyond the five years addressed in SB 846, that legislation needs to happen in 2026 due to the need for lead time to purchase nuclear fuel which takes about two years to secure. Without clarity in 2027, the timing will butt up against the retirement of Unit 1 in 2029.

In response to Dr. Scarlat's question Mr. Jones stated DCPD reviews maintenance planning for items that might require more than five years, but there are no active projects for issues that will require more than five years to address. He commented the area of most concern is over employee retention.

Ms. Corral then introduced DCPD Director of Strategic Projects Mr. Al Bates. She reported Mr. Bates rejoined the DCPD leadership team in 2023 and previously was engaged in new fuel strategies, spent fuel storage, and decommissioning planning. Mr. Bates previously led the DCPD Engineering organization and DCPD's initial license renewal effort. He served with Southern California Edison as Senior Manager of Regulatory Affairs and Technical Advisor to the Chief Nuclear Officer as well as leading the decommissioning efforts at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS). Mr. Bates holds a Bachelor's Degree in Nuclear Engineering from Purdue University and a Senior Reactor Operator's license (retired).

Mr. Bates stated his report would cover the major projects, including:

- Main Generator Relay Replacement – Mr. Bates stated the Main Generator relays provides monitoring and protection controls for the circuits associated with the Main Generator. These relays as installed and presently are electro-mechanical relays and these will be replaced by digital relays. He commented on the decrease in manhours involved with performing normal maintenance from approximately 800 hours to 200 hours per refueling outage. In response to Dr. Peterson's question Mr. Bates confirmed the same replacements will be made for Unit 2 and DCPD has been benchmarking¹² during spring outages at other nuclear sites.
- TriCon Control System Migration – Mr. Bates reported DCPD is replacing its previous analog control system with a digital system which reduced maintenance and increases the information available. He stated the TriCon Control System is triple-modular redundant, meaning that it has multiple inputs and has multiple processors and therefore the possibility of a failure of individual control systems is extremely low. Included with the TriCon Control System: the Turbine Control System, the Digital Feedwater Control System and multiple process control systems such as HVAC and tank and level monitoring and control systems. Mr. Bates stated the upgrade is essentially an upgrade of the hardware and the programming is being left unchanged. Mr. Bates commented the TriCon Control System is how the operators interface with the plant and the way the displays will appear to the operators will be the same. He reported that testing for the TriCon Control System migration will take place offsite. In response to Dr. Scarlat's observation Mr. Bates confirmed the system will continue harvest approximately the same amount of data and a digital control system provides for more information than an analog system.

¹² Benchmarking is the opportunity to assess DCPD performance against the best practices in the industry.

➤ Main Annunciator System Replacement – Mr. Bates stated the present Annunciator System uses light boxes with incandescent lights to alert operators of a change or off-normal condition in the plant. Most plants run with black annunciators with no windows lit in normal operation. The new system will be displayed using a large, flat panel screen to provide opportunities for operators and engineers to better monitor plant conditions with a larger set of data available. He commented the annunciator system being replaced is obsolete and components are no longer manufactured and the replacement will result in a newer system that is more easily replaceable. In response to Dr. Meshkati's observation Mr. Bates stated the new system will retain the same form and function as the operators are used to seeing, with all indicators in the same location as with the old system. In response to Dr. Scarlat's comment on the interface with human factors and training Mr. Bates stated both the TriCon Control and the Main Annunciator Systems make their hardware "backward compatible" and he gave examples for each system. He reported for human factors, the exact look and feel of the system will be retained and the operators will acknowledge alarms in the same way but training will be provided in the Simulator Facility¹³ on the new system. The new digital Main Annunciator System will be able to provide information on the operator's regular console on what occurred as a result of a previous annunciation.

➤ Circulating Water Pump Motor Rewind – Mr. Bates stated the circulating pump motor is a huge motor. There are two circulating water pumps per unit.

➤ Fuel Transfer System Replacement – Mr. Bates reported the Fuel Transfer System moves both new and spent fuel in and out of Containment. As the fuel has to go through a tube, it has to go from a vertical to a horizontal configuration and be placed on a cart. He stated this is how fuel is moved to and from Containment to the Fuel Handling Building. The system is approximately 40 years old and the winches, motors, and drive rollers that the cart sits on will be replaced and some of the instrumentation associated with proximity switches will now be replaceable without having to do so by going underwater. Mr. Bates stated this was an age-related replacement.

Mr. Bates reviewed and discussed activities planned in the next refueling outages as follow:

➤ Reactor Vessel Inspections, Baffle Bolts, and Vessel In-service Inspection – Unit 2 was inspected during the cycle 25 refueling outage and inspections of the core barrel and the 833 baffle bolts will be undertaken for Unit 1 without removal of the core barrel. Mr. Bates stated this was an in-service inspection type inspection using submarine drones adhering to the core barrel by suction to ensure full integrity of the bolts.

➤ Condenser Saltwater Elastomeric Joint Replacement.

➤ Intake Screen Wash Piping Replacements – these are the traveling screens at the Intake Structure which Mr. Bates stated function as a saltwater filter before the saltwater enters the

¹³ The Simulator facility is a full-scale mockup of the Unit 1 Control Room.

Circulating Water System. The water is delivered by the large (18"- 22") 40-year old piping and is also used to spray wash the traveling screens. The coatings of the pipes is aging and will be replaced with an alloy of stainless steel, impervious to the saltwater environment. He reported in response to Dr. Scarlat's question that the old piping was coated on the inside with a plastic core-type coating and on the outside hand-coated with a fibrous tar-like substance tape. Mr. Bates commented the piping is in close proximity to the circulating water pumps and the pumps must be protected from a saltwater leak.

- 230kV Replay Replacement – replacement of old electromechanical relates with digital relays.
- 500kV Tie-Line Relay Upgrade - replacement of old electromechanical relates with digital relays.
- Auxiliary Transformer 1-1 Radiator Replacement.

Mr. Bates reported 12 feedwater heaters per unit are reaching the end of their service lives and there is a contingency implementation project under another project director, Mr. Mark Sciacca, to replace the feedwater heaters should a feedwater heater fail beyond normal repair. Low pressure feedwater heaters, 12 per unit, have been purchased and will arrive in mid-2027 and they will be installed if required on a contingent basis. Mr. Bates confirmed Dr. Peterson's observation that there are complicated issues of access due in part to the seismic bracing installed after the feedwater heaters were installed and shoring will be needed on the decks to allow the feedwater heaters to roll across the deck and he described these as N-1 activities.

In response to Dr. Scarlat Mr. Bates stated the heaters are the size of two or three Volkswagen buses parked back-to-back and they will need to be rolled through narrow passages within the plant and various impediments to their passage will need to be temporarily removed. He stated the feedwater heaters generally have a 30-40 year lifespan and are not designed to be replaced. He stated the N-1 designation means the outage for their replacement is unknown. Mr. Bates stated the heater(s) being replaced would be removed prior to the outage. Mr. Bates observed use of the feedwater heaters provides higher efficiency and they are fairly complicated pieces of equipment. He remarked new computer codes will allow PG&E to design the feedwater heaters and they will be fabricated of new materials, more efficiently. Dr. Peterson observed by the increase in efficiency through new feedwater heaters this means getting more electricity on the grid and less waste heat into the ocean. Mr. Bates, responding to Dr. Scarlat, stated replacing the feedwater heaters is very costly and also disruptive and it takes a fairly long outage to do this work and the health of the operating heaters is being monitored closely including by eddy current testing on the tubes and by inspections conducted from the shell side.

Mr. Bates stated that if a tube breaks in a feedwater heater this caused the water level to go uncontrollably high which requires valving that heater out of service which in turn reduces thermal efficiency of the steam plant in a cascading fashion and one feedwater heater affects the others as they are interdependent and loss of a feedwater heater means a loss in megawatts. He stated DCPD is managing the health of the feedwater heaters. In response to Dr. Scarlat, he stated the economics presently dictate that maintenance be performed rather than proactive

replacement. He stated feedwater heater replacement planning is approximately an 18-month effort. In response to Dr. Scarlat, Mr. Bates stated that if the plant were to run for a full 20-year extension this plan would likely be different and it would be likely that all 12 replacement heaters would be needed and replacement would not be easy in any scenario as they cannot be simply cut out and replaced.

Dr. Peterson reported a DCISC FFT was on the site when the feedwater heater failed and precipitated shutdown and he remarked the heaters are very close to the end of life and since a propagating failure could cause catastrophic damage and this risk is mitigated if the feedwater heaters are replaced and he stated PG&E's strategy as described by Mr. Bates appears to be logical. Mr. Bates stated in order to install the feedwater heaters a longer than normal outage is required and this will increase the cost of the outage. Dr. Scarlat stated the use of the term "catastrophic" does not mean catastrophic for the public, but rather from an engineering perspective.

Mr. Bates stated the scenario he fears is where a tube breaks inside a feedwater heater and the tube then thrashes around and damages other tubes and this happening cannot be determined from external observation. He concurred with Dr. Meshkati's comment that a feedwater heater failure does not necessarily have plant safety impacts, but rather on plant performance. Mr. Bates confirmed in response to Dr. Meshkati's observation that funding and approval for ordering and receiving replacement feedwater heaters has been received, but Mr. Bates said he did not know when a second phase concerning their installation was planned but he stated it is not scheduled before 2030.

In response to Dr. Meshkati's comment concerning the Main Annunciator System Replacement Project Mr. Bates confirmed the system replacement will occur for Unit 1 during 1R26 and during the outage Mr. Bates stated that although the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms are adjacent and adjoining, he did not expect untoward disruption to the Unit 2 operators in the Control Room. He stated the system's presentation will be exactly the same for Unit 1 as for Unit 2 and the majority of the work will be done with both units operating by use of behind-the-scenes work to run cable. During the outage only the light boxes will be removed and the flat panels installed in that location. Dr. Meshkati stated his belief that there will be some disturbance by the work and Mr. Bates stated he did not envision untoward disruption to the Unit 2 operators and there are no plans to physically separate the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms. A mock-up of the new Annunciator System will be built to demonstrate the changes and the installation and the work will be performed with the least amount of disturbance and he confirmed the Simulator facility will receive the entire new system. He confirmed Consultant McWhorter's statement concerning DCPD having benchmarked the Annunciator Replacement Project with other nuclear power plants with a common control room and Mr. Bates stated some of those plants have done the replacement online. Following 1R26 Unit 2 will have the same work done during 2R26.

Mr. Bates displayed and discussed photos of the equipment and components he described during his presentation.

Ms. Corral introduced Director of Business and Technical Services Mr. Bryan Ketelsen to continue the PG&E presentations. She reported Mr. Ketelsen is responsible for financial

management and forecasting at DCPD including implementing the financial requirements of SB 846 and associated regulatory filings, DCPD extended operations, cost recovery, nuclear fuel procurement, spent fuel management, and decommissioning planning. Mr. Ketelsen joined PG&E in 2011 and has held increasingly responsible roles in financial management and he became Director of Business and Technical Services in 2022.

Mr. Ketelsen reported that since SB 846 was approved in September 2022, approximately 300 persons were hired in 2023 including for key positions in the Operations, Maintenance and Engineering organizations. Three non-licensed operator, three reactor operator and four Chemistry and Radiation Protection classes were conducted. In the Maintenance craft organization, 60 persons obtained basic and advanced qualifications and 50 engineers obtained their various engineering qualifications based on their roles. DCPD received a strength designation for training programs, including a job familiarization guide and a mentor program, from a 2024 evaluation.

Mr. Ketelsen reported the Employee Retention Program has entered its first multi-year period during extended operation for calendar years 2026-2028. He stated DCPD remains focused on key positions. Mr. Jones commented that many of the new Engineering and Operations employees were paired with experienced employees, taking into account attrition and retirements, and there was some reduction in the number of DCPD employees as of this January and going forward DCPD expects to have a normal number of employees. Dr. Peterson commented PG&E has been proactive in recruiting high quality staff and it is good that the State of California has enabled PG&E to provide generous compensation to employees. Mr. Tom Jones observed the Employee Retention Program is prorated such that employees hired after the commencement of the current retention period can benefit. In response to Dr. Scarlat's question Mr. Jones confirmed staffing plans would change for a horizon of three years as compared to twenty years and he compared the possible effect as akin to the staffing reductions from 2018 to 2022 when the plant was scheduled to close by 2025.

The Chair called for public comments.

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. In response to Dr. Nelson's comment about the noise produced by the circulating water pumps, Dr. Peterson stated the pumps that Dr. Nelson was referring to were the condensate pumps.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Lewis inquired whether and why the results of Capsule B testing will not preclude issuance of the extended license. Mr. Tom Jones replied and stated this was an open item, but the plant has already satisfied the NRC requirements on vessel integrity for both units. He stated Capsule B, as it has been in the reactor for a very long time, is going to show approximately 107 years of effect of operational neutron fluence and this data will be represented as a point on a curve to be interpreted in concert with other data points. Ms. Lewis stated her view and assumption that the major projects described by Mr. Bates would not be undertaken if PG&E were only planning to operate DCPD to 2030. She stated it was dishonest of PG&E in promoting for the passage of SB 846 to address only five years of extended operation as this effort was only to get 'a foot in the door' for twenty years of operation. Mr. Jones disagreed with Ms. Lewis and stated PG&E would never consider using a

lesser component based on operational duration. He stated components are typically designed for a 40-year operable lifespan. He stated there is an ongoing CPUC proceeding and oversight by the Department of Water Resources related to the five-year extended operation period. He stated that with a twenty year license and state-approved operating period DCPD would likely look uniformly at replacing all the feedwater heaters in one refueling outage and the way PG&E is approaching that project now is indicative of a short-term extended operational period. Dr. Scarlat commended PG&E for its proactive position regarding the five-year horizon while planning in parallel for other outcomes and she stated it is unfair to blame PG&E for being dishonest when in their efforts they are going above and beyond in supporting safety.

Dr. Nelson of California for Green Nuclear Power stated his opinion that an example of this proactive conservative approach was replacement of the steam generators in 2008-2009.

Dr. Scarlat commented on the hazards created by a nuclear power plant and the need to manage those hazards responsibly and she remarked this pertains to safe operation of the plant. She stated it was important not to mix a safety conversation with the desire to shut down the plant on the premise that nuclear power is not a hazard society wishes to manage. She stated such a mixed discussion is counterproductive to safety. She observed the job of the DCISC is to understand if the plant is being run safely, it is not to decide whether the plant should run for five or for twenty years.

XI CONSULTANT REPORT & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF A FACT FINDING REPORT TO PG&E

B. The Chair requested Consultant Ms. Lisa Darden to provide a report on the December 15-16, 2025, fact-finding visit conducted with Dr. Peterson. She reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the December 15-16 2025 visit as follows:

➤ Maintenance Department Performance – Consultant Darden reported 2025 was a year which imposed a huge workload on the Maintenance Department with two refueling outages and many projects including 5 EDG work packages. All required extensive preplanning and preparation as well as the need to manage everyday preventative maintenance work. Ms. Darden reported DCPD hired supplemental temporary staff for one-year contracts with selected skillsets to assist the Maintenance Department.

Ms. Darden stated the Unit 1 and Unit 2 High Pressure Turbine Rotor and Stator Replacement Projects represented major projects during the respective refueling outages for the Maintenance Department. She stated the work was performed first on Unit 1 and was not part of the critical path but became part of the critical path when cracks were found in the casing and the lessons learned were applied during subsequent work on Unit 2 when the work was part of the critical path from the commencement of the Unit 2 outage.

Ms. Darden reported DCPD employs the 12-week “T-week” readiness review used widely in the nuclear industry for its rotating routine maintenance work schedules, e.g., T-6 meaning there are six weeks prior to execution of the work. She reported all the metrics were Green with the

exception of the T-week which is in Red status with a recovery plan in place which involves leadership intervention.

Consultant Darden reported there were three human performance events in 2025 including two recordable injuries, one in each outage to contractor personnel and another which involved miswiring of a valve and lessons learned were immediately shared with outage staff. In response to Dr. Meshkati's question, Ms. Darden replied the FFT did not review the Cause Evaluations and believes they are still being processed. She reported the station supports a Safety Champion Program with all departments participating in cross-functional observations to identify good and bad safety performance and reporting out at a meeting at the end of the day. DCPD has initiated a Craftsmanship Council made up of 30 employees from all the maintenance shops as a grass roots effort to allow the employees to speak freely about what is and what isn't working in context of maintenance.

The FFT found the Maintenance Department performance was healthy and there was evidence of a continuous improvement culture.

The FFT made a recommendation to the Committee to review the charter for the Maintenance Department's Craftsmanship Council after its development is complete [D12/15/25 FF 3-1].

➤ Containment Structure Health and Inspection – Ms. Darden reported the concrete surfaces of the Containment domes are inspected every five years and an inspection was conducted of the areas where a steam valve would operate as a safety valve during the fall refueling outage for Unit 2. She reported the inspections are visual inspections, with workers rappelling down from the top of the Containment domes and manually inspecting their surfaces and this includes using a hammer to tap for sound to assess the integrity of the concrete. Ms. Darden reported for the last concrete inspection drones were used which did not allow for sounding and touching the concrete and required double and triple independent verification of each photo and accordingly provided to be very time consuming.

Dr. Meshkati recommended that PG&E review the experience from the aviation industry concerning conducting visual inspections and he observed a 1998 accident to an Aloha Airlines aircraft was due to an inspector missing the cracking or corrosion of the fuselage and this initiated a movement within the aviation safety industry to emphasize human factors in aviation maintenance and led the Federal Aviation Administration to commence the National Plan for Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance initiative. Dr. Meshkati observed the two pioneer industries on human factors are civil aviation and the nuclear power industry and the aviation industry is learning from the nuclear power industry about the application of probabilistic assessment. Dr. Dr. Scarlat reported the NRC does have guidance on human factors.

Ms. Darden reported any indications forthcoming from the concrete inspections, which are conducted by a vendor, are entered into the Corrective Action Program and evaluated and repairs are performed as determined by the Engineering Department. She reported concerning the Containment steel liners placed inside each Containment, the liners are inspected every 40 months, generally every other refueling outage, and the detailed reports from 2023 and 2024

visual inspections show no significant issues identified with the steel liner plates or their coatings. Any indications found would be entered into the Corrective Action Program.

The FFT concluded the Containment structure inspections were performed as required and there appear to be no safety issues or concerns.

The FFT made a recommendation to the Committee that it should review the Unit 1 and Unit 2 concrete inspection reports after refueling outage 1R26 and review DCP's disposition of the report and any resulting Notifications¹⁴ and repairs [D12/15/25 FF-3.2].

➤ Time-Based Surveillance Frequency/Online Monitoring – Consultant Darden reported this topic was presented at the October 2025 DCISC public meeting and was implemented by DCP prior to the fall refueling outage. The methodology was developed by the Analysis and Measuring Services Corporation (AMS). She stated the only components in the program are the transmitters of which there are 60 per unit. Online maintenance can identify specific transmitters for which their calibration has drifted. Some of these transmitters are calibrated every outage and some are calibrated every other outage. AMS provides DCP information on transmitters that should be checked for calibration twice each operating cycle. Ms. Darden stated the plant was moving from time-based to condition-based calibrations. There is a backstop method where some transmitters will be calibrated at some periodicity in any case. **Dr. Peterson observed online monitoring has the capability to ensure every transmitter that is out of calibration is calibrated and he remarked this is an area where the DCISC has identified an opportunity with the new tools to increase operational safety.** The FFT concluded the Online Monitoring Program is a very new initiative and is being implemented in accordance with NRC guidance and appears to have the proper level of ownership and oversight.

The FFT recommended to the DCISC that it should add Online Monitoring to the Open Items List with a regular periodicity [D12/15/25 FF – 3.3].

➤ Observe Notification Review Team – the FFT observed a meeting of the Notification Review Team which functions as part of the Corrective Action Program. The team reviewed approximately 80 Notifications from the previous day and Ms. Darden reported every department had already provided its input prior to the meeting. She stated her opinion that the meeting was very efficient and effectively performed.

➤ Outage Performance Review – Consultant Darden stated the two outages in 2025 both involved significant projects including:

- Reactor Coolant System draindown and refueling
- Core Barrel removal and inspection (Unit1)
- Fuel Transfer System upgrade

¹⁴ The notification process creates an input called a Notification into the Corrective Action Program whenever a deficiency is identified and those Notifications then go through multiple reviews.

- Two nuclear instrument replacements (Unit 2)
- High-Pressure (HP) turbine rotor and stator blade replacement
- Tank inspections for License Renewal
- Piping inspection for License Renewal

She reported challenges during the outages included emergent scope additions including repairing unexpected cracks in the High Pressure Turbine casing sealing surfaces and managing high radiation and contamination levels for the fuel transfer cart upgrade. Ms. Darden stated the DCPD outage organization focused on preplanning and readiness which resulted in outage execution being of shorter duration. She reported the outage critique process was strong. The outage included increased involvement by the Operations organization in preparation, scheduling, and risk review and staffing levels were improved in the Outage Control Center including documenting the experience of assigned personnel. Consultant Darden reported that now two outage schedules are produced each day and performance goals for each outage were met with the exception of the goal for recordable injuries.

The FFT concluded refueling outages 1R26 and 2R26 were successful and all planned scopes of work were completed and all performance goals were met with the exception of that for recordable injury and the Maintenance Department has taken ownership and has learned from those events.

➤ Online Maintenance – Ms. Darden reported DCPD begins online maintenance schedule development at T-30, that is 30 weeks in advance, planning starts at T-15, at T-9 the scope of work is frozen, at T-7 the Integrated Risk Review Team reviews the work for high or very high risk and assignments are made in readiness for the work, and at T-2 risk evaluation challenge reviews take place and the schedule is frozen. Ms. Darden reported DCPD also uses the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Phoenix risk model for probabilistic risk assessment which analyzes changes in the risk for the work scheduled relative to core damage frequency. The DCPD Work Management group is working on developing new work management processes and procedures to better define responsibilities and to provide teaching and learning opportunities for new personnel. DCPD has incorporated Power BI (Business Intelligence) software, a Microsoft data analysis tool into its online maintenance efforts regarding Notifications or updates from performance in the T-week process. The FFT concluded the Online Maintenance Program is healthy and has appropriate leadership engagement.

➤ Radiation Protection Performance Post-Outage – Ms. Darden reported staffing levels for the Radiation Protection Department were appropriate and staff hired for the outages were well managed. High radiation and contamination work during the outages was also well managed and Radiation Protection is working on innovations including partnering with California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo (Cal Poly) on automating surveys which could help reduce dose for personnel and also working on RFID (radio frequency identification) tags to prevent tools from leaving contaminated areas. The FFT concluded the Radiation Protection Department is healthy, properly staffed with qualified personnel. Ms. Darden reported personnel in the Radiation Protection and Chemistry Departments are trained in both areas.

- Drone Activity At and Around DCPD – Consultant Darden reported the first drone sightings around DCPD began in 2017 and 2018, all of which occurred over the Owner Controlled Area not the Protected Area, but since 2018 there have been only a few individual and infrequent sightings and for the past two years there having been no sightings. She reported DCPD is prepared to monitor drone activity as it occurs and it is one of only two nuclear power plants in the U.S. to have a permanent FAA no fly restriction over a portion of the Owner Controlled Area. The Security organization has a process for the plant to use drones for some purposes at the site including inspection activities and public relations. The FFT concluded DCPD continues to monitor drone activities and has a process for doing so and drones do not pose a substantial risk to nuclear safety at the site.
- Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors – the FFT met with the NRC Resident Inspectors to discuss DCPD's outage performance and the improved performance between Unit 1 and Unit 2 refueling outages.
- Meet with DCPD Officers – the FFT met with Vice President of Business and Technical Services Mr. Blair Jones and Vice President of Engineering Mr. Alan Wilson to discuss the fact finding agenda items. Consultant Darden reported the day of the meeting was the day DCPD received an alarm for the feedwater heaters and ramped down to 90% power and isolated two feedwater heaters. The FFT discussed with Mr. Wilson plans for future replacement of the feedwater heaters. She reported these meetings continue to be productive and should continue.

The FFT made a recommendation to the Committee that it follow-up on the findings and cause evaluation for the affected feedwater heat exchanger tube leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, as well as future plans to address feedwater heat exchanger health [D1/15/25 FF-3.10].

- Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion Update – Ms. Dardeen reported this was a follow up to previous investigations and this time the discussion was focused on questions from a member of the public on stress corrosion and cracking of the multipurpose canisters at the ISFSI to which DCPD provided written responses. The FFT found DCPD was using appropriate equipment for visual inspections and characterization monitoring and verifies the accuracy of the equipment using industry standards. DCPD monitors the canisters more frequently than required by regulation and plans to conduct an inspection every four years, including this coming summer with the inspection of 8 canisters which exceeds the regulatory requirement of 2 canisters. DCPD plans to use the same vendor as for the previous inspection and to use the most updated equipment available and will explore cleaning capabilities. The FFT concluded PG&E has adequately addressed any corrosion concerns regarding the ISFSI canisters and has implemented a conservative approach to inspection and monitoring such that a safety issue does not currently exist.

The FFT recommended to the Committee: (1) the DCISC should request PG&E make a presentation on the summer 2026 ISFSI canister inspection campaign at the DCISC's June or October 2026 public meeting and that Dr. Scarlat be invited to observe some of the

inspections; and (2) the DCISC should continue to monitor advances in canister inspection methods. [D12/15/25 FF – 3.11B].

Dr. Peterson observed the flow velocities inside the canisters are low and concerning the population of aerosols inside the canisters, given that the fuel assemblies have been flushed in a pool that has highly filtered high clarity water, the question is therefore how might aerosols be mobilized. **If a stress corrosion crack propagates through the canister wall it initially has a small aperture and it would take a long period for the canister to depressurize from the atmospheres of helium introduced in the storage process and this means the actual flow rates and velocities are very low. He stated the question of the potential dose consequence of a through-wall crack is something the DCISC should review.** Dr. Scarlat observed there is mention of a MELCOR model that Sandia Laboratories started in terms of generating validation data and there is an EPRI effort to coordinate a cross utility effort. Consultant Darden observed the efforts Dr. Scarlat referred to are paused at the present time, but the EPRI aging management groups are still generating interest in driving this issue. **Dr. Peterson stated the primary motivation for using helium in the process is for heat transfer and you want to create a high density so you can move with the same velocity. You actually establish stronger density gradients and get stronger convection in the higher thermal conductivity of helium, but when you're out at the age where the through-wall stress corrosion cracking becomes a concern the decay heat is dropping so you may not even need to have helium in the canister. Dr. Peterson stated it would be useful for the DCISC to develop an independent assessment of this because there are an enormous amount of assumptions and conservatism in this analysis.**

➤ Spent Fuel Canister Corrosion – Industry Study Update – Ms. Darden remarked a written update was provided and it is essentially what was discussed in the foregoing presentation. The efforts are paused but effort continues in the industry on this subject.

➤ Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Program Update – the FFT discussed risk-informed completion times and other topics. Consultant Darden reported DCPD is using its PRA program very strongly to inform and understand risk at the station. The FFT found the PRA Program team continues to provide excellent support for enhancing the safety of plant operations and extended operations.

The FFT recommended to the Committee that the DCISC request PG&E to make a presentation at its June 2026 public meeting on PRA tools and methods and how PRA issued in the plant, and the Plant Review Committee's role in approving PRA tools and methods [D12/15/25 FF – 3.13].

➤ Station Update – Consultant Darden reported a station update was provided on January 14, 2026, including a discussion of the feedwater heaters and the December 15, 2025 outage which was executed in 44 hours. Other topics included leadership changes and tunnel cleaning as presented earlier during this meeting. Ms. Darden reported a position as Safety Manager has been created which indicates a continuing focus on safety performance. The FFT concluded DCPD's update on recent station activities was informational and no major issues were identified.

The FFT made a recommendation to the DCISC to schedule an observation of electronic procedure usage in the plant during the next fact finding visit which includes Dr. Peterson as the member conducting the fact finding visit [D12/15/25 FF – 3.14].

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson commented on the issue of stress corrosion cracking of the spent fuel canisters and observed this has been an issue concerning which Ms. Donna Gilmore has raised concerns for a number of years and Dr. Nelson stated in his opinion Ms. Gilmore's concerns were based upon a failure to understand that spent fuel is a dense ceramic-like solid, twice as dense as lead.

On a motion made by Dr. Scarlat, seconded by Dr. Meshkati, the December 15-16, 2025, Fact Finding Report was unanimously approved.

C. The Chair requested Consultant Mr. McWhorter to provide a report on the January 20-21, 2026, fact-finding visit with Dr. Meshkati. Mr. McWhorter reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the January 2026 visit as follows:

➤ Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak & Shutdown for Repair – Consultant McWhorter stated this topic was in follow up to the December 15, 2025, Fact Finding Report to receive more details on the feedwater heater leak which occurred on that date. The feedwater heaters are shell and tube heat exchanges that use extraction steam to preheat the condensate water. There are six stages with three parallel trains¹⁵ in each. There is a total of 18 feedwater heaters per unit, with stage 1 being a part of the Feedwater System and stages 2 through 6 a part of the Condensate System, with condensate water flowing through the tubes with steam on the shell side. He displayed and described an illustration of the cascading operation, from Stage 6 to Stage 1 of the feedwater heaters.

On December 15, 2025, a high level alarm was received in the Control Room for Unit 1 Feedwater Heater 6C and upon inspection a large amount of drain water from Heater 5C was found to be draining to Heater 6C due to a tube leak in Heater 5C. Unit 1 power was reduced to 91% and Heaters 5C and 6C were isolated. Mr. McWhorter reported plant operation could have continued in that configuration indefinitely, albeit at lower power production levels. However, to perform repair of a feedwater heaters the plant needs to be fully shut down to isolate the steam on the secondary side¹⁶ as extraction steam is coming from the turbine and the boundaries for safety purposes from that extraction steam are inadequate. DCPD management made the decision on December 16, 2025, to shut down Unit 1 and make repair immediately. Upon opening Heater 5C a number of tubes were found ruptured and several had indications and 27 tubes were repaired and the feedwater heaters returned to service in 44 hours with full power restored at 0900 on December 19, 2025.

¹⁵ An equipment train is the sequential arrangement of machinery, units, or components used to produce a result or to process or move a product. It is often defined as a series of connected components.

¹⁶ Primary and secondary side refer, respectively, to the Reactor Coolant System which is used to remove heat from the nuclear reactor (Primary side) and to the Main Steam and Feedwater Systems which provide cooling to the steam generators and generate and provide steam to the turbines (secondary side).

Mr. McWhorter reported the December 15, 2025, event was similar to a tube leak on Heater 5B in 2021 and the DCISC reviewed the Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) on that event at the February 2022 public meeting and reviewed in depth during the February 2022 fact finding. The RCE found the tubes failed due to stresses in areas around the drain cooler shroud, where the coldest water enters the lower section of the heaters and the water draining from the condensed steam accumulates together in that section creating a mixed steam-water flow which is very hard on the tubes and shrouds causing them to erode away and allowing some of the mixture to damage the tubes. Mr. McWhorter reported at the time of the 2022 event the plant was planning to close by 2025 and feedwater heater replacement was not considered as a corrective action. Eddy current testing¹⁷ was done for Heater 5C during the spring 2025 refueling outage. There were also actions taken in 2022 to improve the operator's ability to diagnose and respond to these events and Mr. McWhorter reported those corrective actions were appropriate.

A Cause Evaluation (CE) will be performed for the 2025 event which will focus on whether there is anything else necessary for the bridging strategy but Mr. McWhorter observed the long term solution is to replace the feedwater heaters as they are at the end of their service lives and little can be done with the issues affecting the shrouds and supports inside the tube bundles which are inaccessible for repair or individual replacement. DCPD has procured 12 new feedwater heaters for each unit which is sufficient to replace all the heaters in Stages 3 through 6. Mr. McWhorter reported the Stage 1 and 2 heaters are in better condition and are easy to access without the need to move equipment. For the procurement, 18 of the 24 are expected to be delivered in late 2026 and the remaining 6 in 2027. Mr. McWhorter reported plans for installing the new heaters are not clear at this time and depend upon plans for future operation and the potential for another failure of a heater. He displayed photos of the FFT touring the area and inspecting the feedwater heaters. In response to Dr. Peterson's observation Mr. McWhorter reported replacement of feedwater heaters is a complex evolution that requires preplanning, staffing, and equipment and likely cannot be done in one month's time and would require more than a 30-day planned outage with the feedwater heater replacement being on the critical path. He described some of the complications with the load path required for replacement of the heaters which are very long and quite heavy. In response to Dr. Peterson's query Mr. McWhorter confirmed the complications of the physical layout affects the removal and replacement of the feedwater heaters and it also depends upon which feedwater heater is to be replaced and as the bulk of some of the feedwater heaters is within the neck of the condenser this further complicates their removal and replacement.

The FFT concluded the subsequent actions and shutdown after the December 15 feedwater heater failure were well managed by DCPD and the actions taken in 2021 in response to a similar event appear to have been effective. A cause evaluation for the 2025 event will be performed and DCPD is proceeding with acquiring 12 replacement heaters for each unit to be on site in late 2026 and early 2027, however no plan has yet been approved for installation of the replacement heaters.

¹⁷ Eddy current testing (ECT) is a non-destructive testing (NDT) method that uses electromagnetic induction to detect surface and near-surface flaws in conductive materials. It is highly sensitive, fast, and requires minimal surface preparation, making it ideal for finding cracks, corrosion, and measuring coating thickness in industries like power generation.

The FFT recommended to the DCISC that the previous recommendation should remain open concerning following up on the findings and cause evaluation for the December 15, 2025 feedwater heater exchanger tube leak as well as on future plans to address feedwater heater exchanger health. (D12/15/25FF – 3.10)

The FFT also recommended, consistent with a previous recommendation in the 34th Annual Report to the CPUC, that the CPUC and all other cognizant California state authorities support the implementation of the Feedwater Heater Replacement Project as soon as practically feasible as the DCISC believes these replacements are important for the plant's operational performance by avoiding unnecessary plant shutdowns, forced outages, and startups in the future. (D1/26 FF 3-1.)

➤ Plant Tour – Mr. McWhorter reported the FFT looked at the Unit 1 and Unit 2 feedwater heater locations.

➤ Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program – Consultant McWhorter reported this was a routine review of the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program which monitors leaks of system water from systems that contains boric acid. If boric acid leaks and lands on carbon steel components it can cause very rapid corrosion and failure of the component. Inspections are made of accessible areas every six months and once per cycle elsewhere including in Containment. Leaks are categorized from LK1 to LK4 with LK1 being the worst and LK4 being internal system leakage. Mr. McWhorter reported most leaks at DCPD are categorized as LK3 which create a white residue on the component. Mr. McWhorter stated the FFT found the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program was in Red health status meaning the numbers of LK3 leaks is well above the goals established for each unit and had been in Red status for some months.

Dr. Meshkati observed the only method for detecting boric acid leakage was visual and this makes the role of the human operator very important and he stated human factors in nuclear maintenance should be given a great deal of emphasis in this context. In response to Dr. Scarlat's question whether the large number of leaks was due to a backlog of unaddressed leaks or new and more leaks Mr. McWhorter stated he could not answer that as the information was received on the numbers after the fact finding meeting. Mr. McWhorter stated typically one would expect to see the number of leaks significantly reduced after a refueling outage and then to build up over a period of time but that was not seen in the data. In response to Dr. Peterson's query Mr. McWhorter stated he would expect boric acid leaks to be associated with valve stems, mechanical joints, or flanges and not cracks in the coolant boundary which would require the system to be declared inoperable. In response to Dr. Scarlat's query Mr. McWhorter stated he did not know whether there were industry practices that DCPD was not implementing. Dr. Meshkati remarked he has studied the event at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station in Ohio where boric acid corrosion was found on the reactor head. Dr. Peterson observed that replacement reactor heads have been installed for both DCPD units and the new heads are engineered with a gap between the insulation and the head to enable inspection of the areas where the problem occurred at Davis Besse. The members then discussed the wording of the recommendation to the Committee and decided to delete the work "more" from the recommendation.

The FFT concluded the Boric Acid Corrosion was being implemented in accordance with industry guidelines, however the number of leaks being tracked was unusually high.

With the amendment discussed above, the FFT recommended the DCISC should, based on industry experience with boric acid corrosion, implement more rigorous and systematic follow-up of boric acid corrosion monitoring at DCPD (D 1/26 FF – 3.3).

The FFT recommended to PG&E that PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair of the high number of leaks classified as LK3 in the plant with the goal of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals [P 1/26FF – 3.3].

➤ Emergency Communications & Tour of Kendall Road Emergency Facilities – Consultant McWhorter reported this visit was in furtherance of the Committee Policy on the DCISC's response to a DCPD emergency. He reported the Kendall Road facilities acts as the alternate location and center for technical and operations support in case other facilities are not available. He reported alternate locations for these technical and operations functions are required by regulation, but this is not true for the Emergency Operations Facility. [?]The FFT toured the Kendall Road facility and inspected the fiber interconnectivity, the server room, and radio systems as well as the portable decontamination trailer and found the facility to be versatile and functional with broad capabilities. He described a photo of the desktops in the auditorium each of which is equipped with a laptop which can be configured to enable the facility to be ready to function as an emergency response facility.

The FFT reviewed with DCPD the inter-operability of the internal radio multi-band systems used by emergency responders and found the PG&E radio system can be interconnected with San Luis Obispo County's systems but that function is not typically performed until late in an emergency situation and requires special equipment. He stated there are some security concerns with interconnectivity of the radio systems. Mr. McWhorter stated the interconnectivity issue does not apply to the DCPD Fire Department which is linked to County fire departments. In the interim, before full connectivity is established there is a designated liaison to pass information between the two radio systems and this interconnection was last tested in 2014.

The FFT concluded the Kendall Road facilities have broad capabilities and are versatile and functional and in good condition. PG&E emergency response communications systems were capable and well planned, however the DCISC is concerned about the lack of a means for quickly establishing interoperability between PG&E and County radio systems (other than with fire departments).

The FFT recommended to the Committee that the previous recommendation should remain open and that the DCISC should continue to develop a Committee policy for responding to an emergency declaration at DCPD [D 3/25 FF-3.12].

The FFT recommended to PG&E that PG&E should initiate targeted efforts with the County to coordinate, test, and evaluate the current means of establishing interoperability between the two systems as soon as possible and PG&E should investigate finding another means to establish interoperability between the two systems more easily and quickly during an emergency at DCPD [P1/26FF-3.4].

➤ Artificial Intelligence (AI) Uses at DCPD – Mr. McWhorter reported there is an industry initiative including EPRI and INPO to consolidate external industry databases to support AI driven searches and this includes consolidation of databases such that plants that have AI driven search engines integrate their AI search tools.

The FFT concluded DCPD's initiative to implement the use of the AI search and retrieval functions of the Neutron Search system for document data search, retrieval and reporting continues to be position and there are additional areas for applying the use of AI under consideration There continues to be no significant safety concerns associated with DCPD's current plans for use of AI at the station.

The FFT recommended the DCISC current recommendation to the Committee remain open as the application of AI tools has significant potential to change and to improve DCPD's operational safety and the DCISC should frequently review this topic. [D 12/24 FF-3.4].

➤ Corporate Employee Safety Culture – Mr. McWhorter stated this review was oriented around an open recommendation from the January 2025 fact finding concerning the survey and the PG&E Safety Excellence Management System (PSEMS) and the use of nuclear safety culture principles in that program and the benchmarking efforts undertaken outside the nuclear industry. The survey results, a standard survey from the National Safety Council, were that PG&E scored 84%, which Mr. McWhorter stated is considered a high score (90% being very high). Employee participation including 22,000 employees versus 16,000 in a 2022 survey and employee scores increased from that previous survey from 78 to 84 while the score for contractor employees declined from 94 to 88. Mr. McWhorter stated this decline was not discussed during the fact finding as the data was not available but he stated it may be based upon the definition of contractor and how contractor personnel are sampled. He reported the results of corporate-wide safety survey are generally positive. In response to Dr. Scarlat's query Mr. McWhorter stated he did not believe all the learnings from the survey were gathered at the time of the FFT's visit and the Members discussed and agreed to leave the previous recommendation open.

The FFT concluded PG&E's efforts to improve corporate safety culture included appropriate use of benchmarking non-nuclear industries and the results of the 2025 survey were generally positive and demonstrated an improving trend in the perception of corporate safety culture by employees. Dr. Meshkati observed the Committee should revisit the Corporate Safety Culture Survey.

The FFT recommended the previous recommendation to the DCISC should remain open [D 1/25 FF-3.9A].

- Staffing Update – Consultant McWhorter reported DCPD through slow attrition is reducing the number of employees to a target of 1,130 at the end of 2026, which is reduced from 1,188 at the end of 2025. The FFT found the reduction appropriate given the reduction in work now that license renewal activities have concluded.
- Meet with DCPD Officers – the FFT met with all four DCPD Vice Presidents to discuss the fact finding agenda items and other items of mutual interest. Mr. McWhorter reported the FFT concluded the regular meetings between DCISC and DCPD officers and directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.
- Use of Common Cause Evaluations in the Corrective Action Program – After having reviewed root cause evaluations and cause evaluations in past fact findings, the DCISC discussed common cause evaluations which Mr. McWhorter reported are a part of the Corrective Action Program. He reported there is no stand-alone procedure for conducting a common cause evaluation as there are for root cause and cause evaluations. Common cause evaluations are performed infrequently and are generally used to trend evaluations normally captured elsewhere. A common cause evaluation was performed in 2024 for clearance and tagging issues and Mr. McWhorter reported one common cause evaluation was currently in progress to address lifting and landing of leads. He reported DCPD believes the existing cause evaluation procedures provide adequate guidance.

The FFT concluded DCPD's process for performing common cause evaluation provided good quality evaluations for negative trends identified through the Corrective Action Program, however, the guidance provided by procedures for identifying the need for initiating and completing a common cause evaluation was unclear and needs further clarification and elaboration. Dr. Meshkati observed the common cause process appeared to be *ad hoc*. In response to Dr. Scarlet's observation that she has seen a document in the Certrec portal which describes both cause evaluations and common cause evaluations, Dr. Meshkati reported a common cause evaluation is addressed by a table with very brief suggestions on how to do a common cause evaluation and the triggering mechanics for a common cause evaluation is more than three similar events. However, a specific document addressing the common cause procedure was not produced. Dr. Scarlet stated that she could not vote to approve the recommendation as she has concerns about a loss of flexibility. [Dr. Scarlet after more discussion subsequently agreed to the Recommendation.]

The FFT recommends that PG&E should review and improve the limited guidance in procedures for completing common cause evaluations and elaborate when a common cause evaluation should be performed, how it should be systematically completed, and how it should be acted upon [P/ 1/26 FF – 3.9].

- Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update – Dr. Meshkati reported that although a member of the public had expressed a concern about a lack of information concerning Capsule B at this public meeting, there have been two fact finding reports addressing Capsule B. Dr. Peterson stated Dr. Kirk will review the data from the report on Capsule B when it is available.

- Station Update – Mr. McWhorter reported there was nothing learned which was new from the presentation during the morning session
- Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors – Mr. McWhorter reported in the discussion with the Resident Inspectors the FFT commented and the inspectors agreed that the Unit 1 feedwater heater leak was well managed by the Operations staff.
- Safety-Security Interface – In response to Dr. Scarlet's observation about the role of Security in FLEX guidelines Mr. McWhorter stated he believes this is addressed in the fundamental design of the FLEX Program as to where resources would be drawn. Dr. Peterson stated FLEX is a good example of a strong synergy between security and safety as the same capabilities apply to a variety of initiating events.
- Quality Verification (QV) Program – Consultant McWhorter reported Mr. Chris Newport has been appointed Acting QV Director and he commented QV produces the Nuclear Quality Digest each month, a document with a good summary of QV's findings.

Consultant McWhorter reported concerning the Recommendation to the CPUC regarding funding for the Feedwater Heater Replacement Project that replacement of the feedwater heaters sooner rather than later although not a safety concern was a prudent action to avoid plant shutdowns and startups and Mr. McWhorter stated in his opinion there will be another failure of a feedwater heater in the next four or five years. Dr. Meshkati stated and Drs. Scarlet and Peterson agreed that concerning this matter the responsibility to safely manage the plant should be decoupled from the question about its future operation. Dr. Meshkati remarked the wording of the recommendation was carefully considered and the prior feedwater heater problem in 2021 and the prior recommendation made to the CPUC in the 34th Annual Report were also considered. Dr. Peterson remarked the feedwater heaters are in such a degraded state that they will continue to cause problems to plant reliability with more incidents and although the plant may continue to run there will likely be forced outages as a result. Mr. Rathie commented he would work with Mr. Zizmor of the CPUC Energy Division on transmitting the Recommendation. [On February 26, 2026, the Committee Recommendation concerning the Feedwater Heater Replacement Project was sent by email to the CPUC Energy Division.]

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated he supported the recommendation to the CPUC concerning the feedwater heaters and as an amateur radio operator he was very aware of problems with interoperability of radios.

In response to a query from Consultant Kadak Mr. McWhorter confirmed that root cause evaluations and cause evaluations both look at extent of condition.

Mr. McWhorter requested approval of the Fact Finding Report with the changes to the recommendations discussed concerning the Boric Acid Corrosion Program and revisiting common cause evaluations, and on a motion made by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Scarlet, the January 21-22, 2026, Fact Finding Report was unanimously approved with Dr. Scarlet stating her approval included the Use of Common Cause Evaluation in the Corrective Action Program as

discussed. Review of the meeting Minutes from the October 2025 public meeting was deferred until after the evening presentations.

XIV ADJOURN AFTERNOON MEETING

The Chair adjourned the afternoon session of the DCISC at 4:55 p.m.

XV RECONVENE FOR EVENING MEETING

Dr. Peterson reconvened the evening meeting of the DCISC at 5:00 p.m. and welcomed those attending in person and remotely. He advised that public comment for the specific discussion and for matters not on the agenda would be deferred until the end of the presentation period.

XVI COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments by Committee Members at this time.

XVII INFORMATION PRESENTATIONS REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF PG&E.

Ms. Corral introduced Dr. Chris Madugo of the PG&E Geosciences organization, a registered geologist with more than twenty years' experience focused on earthquake geology. She reported Dr. Madugo received his Doctorate from the Oregon State University and spent his career characterizing fault activity and slip rates in support of critical infrastructure projects. During eleven years with PG&E Dr. Madugo has managed the company's seismic source models for different function areas and at DCP, with a focus on developing collaborative research to reduce model uncertainty projects with consultants, academic institutions, and with the United State Geological Survey (USGS).

PG&E Evaluations of and Response to Recommendations Made by the DCISC Seismic Review Team Included as Recommendations P/SRT-1- through P/SRT-9 in the DCISC's 35th Annual Report.

Dr. Madugo stated the DCISC's Seismic Review Team (SRT) issued nine Recommendations to PG&E based on the SRT's review of Dr. Peter Bird's filings which the has DCISC adopted in its DCISC's 35th Annual Report. These recommendations emphasize research tasks to improve the understanding of seismic hazards beneath the Irish Hills. He reported that PG&E Geosciences representatives met with the SRT during the process, both before and after the development of the Recommendations. He stated in general there were four Recommendations that dealt with fault system modeling, focusing on reverse and thrust faults beneath the Irish Hills; four Recommendations that dealt with geodetic modeling, and one Recommendation addressed Seismic Source Characterization (SSC) modeling where the SRT developed a proponent fault geometry model for PG&E's consideration in its seismic source modeling.

Dr. Madugo reported PG&E first issued a high-level response to the Committee's 35th Annual Report in which it committed to evaluate all the SRT Recommendations to identify the items that were not already being addressed as part of the PG&E/DCP the Long-Term Seismic Program (LTSP), those that are technically defensible, and those which are likely to provide

meaningful improvements in seismic hazard understanding. For the Recommendations that qualified under these criteria, during 2026 PG&E will then perform targeted sensitivity studies or assessments to evaluate potential impact on the seismic hazard characteristics and to inform research prioritization. He stated PG&E anticipated that the results [of all studies] would be reviewed by the SRT and possibly by the CPUC Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) for seismic study of DCPD and its environs, and many of these research topics are expected to take several years to address.

Dr. Madugo then reported that the DCISC subsequently asked for a more detailed response to address whether PG&E agrees with each Recommendation, whether the Recommendation has been addressed by the LTSP or by previous seismic assessments and if so to provide a summary of ongoing or recent work, and whether the results of the recommended work was likely to lead to meaningful changes to or advancement in the understanding of the seismic hazard, model uncertainty, model validation, or the application of new methods and whether there are plans to further address these Recommendations. He stated PG&E has prioritized the plans for additional study relative to other Recommendations and also relative to LTSP work that is ongoing.

Dr. Madugo then used a seismic source map to identify and describe the faults addressed by the SRT in the area around DCPD. He reported the Hosgri Fault is located to the southwest which he described as the most hazard-significant fault to DCPD but he stated the Hosgri Fault was not the principal focus of either Dr. Bird's contentions or the SRT's review. However, he commented the SRT's Recommendations focus on the reverse and thrust faults beneath the plant, which make up the Southwest Boundary Zone (SWBZ), specifically the San Luis Bay Fault which comes closest to the plant, the Los Osos Fault which the SRT refers to in its recommendations as the Los Osos Trend, and then to the northeast around in the area where the Huasna and the Rinconada Faults are located. In response to Dr. Peterson query about faults that were the focus of the SRT review, Dr. Madugo stated the SRT focused specifically on Dr. Bird's contentions regarding reverse or thrust faults beneath the plant, that is, on the San Luis Bay Fault, on a part of the Southwest Boundary Zone, and on the Los Osos Fault. Neither Dr Bird nor the SRT focused on the Hosgri Fault or the Huasna, or Rinconada Faults but the SRT discussed the Huasna and the Rinconada Faults as part of their geodetic analysis. The SRT specifically stated they were not reviewing the entire PG&E source model and that the SRT's work was constrained by Dr. Bird's contentions and those were focused on the reverse faults Dr. Madugo identified.

Dr. Madugo confirmed Dr. Peterson's understanding that it is the Hosgri Fault that dominates the seismic hazard. Dr. Madugo observed that one measure of the contribution to hazard is the distance from the fault to the plant but another measure is activity and the slip rate. He reported the Hosgri Fault slip rate is about 2.0 millimeters (mm) per year and for the other faults the slip rates are about 0.2 to 0.3 mm per year which is an order of magnitude less than for the Hosgri Fault and accordingly they have a smaller contribution to hazard. However, Dr. Madugo observed the Hosgri, the San Luis Bay, the Los Osos Faults and the Shoreline Fault, which is also quite close to the plant, are all hazard significant faults to DCPD.

Dr. Madugo then addressed the first DCISC/SRT Recommendation, Recommendation 1, regarding the development of a set of kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faulting underlying the Irish Hills that explains the folding observed over a period of five million years. He stated PG&E agrees with Recommendation 1 as it would strengthen the basis for the currently used fault geometry model. Currently PG&E does not focus on the [entire] past five-million year period but more on a period focused on the last hundreds of thousands to approximately one million years to define activity because PG&E believes this data will reflect the current seismic activity near the plant, but Dr. Madugo remarked there is importance in understanding the period over the last five million years and how we got to where we are now. Dr. Madugo reported the LTSP already has a goal to support the development of one or more structural models and PG&E has documented [versions of] these models and these models have been peer reviewed as part of the SSHAC process and the AB 1632 reports.¹⁸ [Point here is that existing PG&E fault geometry models will be updated and published additional models may be developed.] Dr. Madugo commented PG&E believes these models were well reviewed, but there would be an additional benefit to take these models to publication and peer review in research journals

Dr. Madugo stated that after receiving the SRT's recommendations a literature review was conducted to see what data could be used to look at this geologic evolution over the last five million years, and for the AB 1632 studies PG&E focused on the area in the vicinity of the Irish Hills and he displayed a map showing the area and the study data locations with cross-section lines and data in support of the geophysics collected. He observed PG&E did not focus as much to the southeast, which is also a part of this Pismo Basin structure, but there is a lot of industry data that could be used to address the SRT's recommendation to look at the long-term geologic history of the area and he reported PG&E will look in the vicinity of the Irish Hills, but also to the east where there may be a more complete geologic section. He commented that in that area there is more abundant subsurface data from hydro-carbon exploration and with long-term deformation in recent geologic history there are fluvial terraces, which are similar to the marine terraces that have been used to constrain PG&E's models that cross the hills and the geologic structures. Dr. Madugo reported these have been identified along the Pismo Creek and near Arroyo Grande and they could be utilized to test what long-term deformation is still occurring today.

Dr. Madugo reported that the anticipated impact of developing these new models or revising PG&E's existing models is it may change hazards or it may validate or refine or reject some elements of the existing models, but at this time the impacts cannot be determined until studies have been completed and the plan is for PG&E to continue this work in 2026. He observed useful data has been identified for these analyses and it will now be compiled and put into a geodata base and academic or USGS partnerships will be established for this research. He reported a complete structural modeling project takes several years to complete to publication level.

¹⁸ The AB 1632 report (mandated by a 2006 California Assembly Bill) is a foundational 2008 California Energy Commission (CEC) assessment evaluating the vulnerability of the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant to seismic events and aging.

Dr. Madugo addressed the DCISC/SRT Recommendation 2, which recommends dating low-stand abrasion platforms offshore, south of the Irish Hills, to further constrain the rate of footwall subsidence and its contribution to the SWBZ slip rate. He stated PG&E does not agree that direct dating of low-stand abrasion platforms south of the Irish Hills should be a priority because there is a low likelihood of success. PG&E has reviewed with researchers experienced in dating offshore deposits and was informed there are no deposits in that area, other than bedrock, in the area of the footwall of the fault. He remarked the slip rate for the San Luis Bay Fault is well constrained and the uplift of the marine terrace PG&E used as a marker was not tied [or based on] elevation relative to sea level [at the time the terrace formed]. Instead, the fault cuts the terrace and the terrace is on both sides of the fault, with the hanging wall going up relative to the footwall [allowing for a direct measurement of displacement using the same datum]. PG&E believes the slip rate is well constrained and any footwall subsidence would be relatively small in this interpretation. He stated PG&E believes that the anticipated impact would be very low due to the small footwall signal and the low total fault slip rate compared to the Hosgri Fault, as the slip rate on the San Luis Bay Fault is much lower than the Hosgri Fault slip rate and that footwall subsidence component would be very low relative to the total slip rate of the fault.

Dr. Madugo reported PG&E currently does not have a plan to directly date the low-stand abrasion platforms in the footwall of the SWBZ or the San Luis Bay Fault, however, the SRT's model could be evaluated and PG&E recommends a couple of ways to do this for the SRT to consider. PG&E is currently working on one option, working on an updated sequence stratigraphy models for offshore areas. He stated this refers to geophysics data that was collected in the past and it was recently reprocessed by the USGS and PG&E has worked with the Lettis Consultants International firm to have the data reinterpreted with the goal of publishing that information in a peer reviewed journal. He reported there is another study on strandlines, submerged shorelines in the footwall of the San Luis Bay Fault in that bedrock area. He reported PG&E would like to develop that into a report and hopefully a paper and this is already an appendix in the Shoreline Fault Report, but PG&E would also like to get it into a peer review journal. Dr. Madugo remarked those two different datasets when combined could potentially constrain the age of that footwall and then test whether there has been significant subsidence in the footwall of the fault. Dr. Madugo commented PG&E does not think that there is significant subsidence because of the bedrock and many of these reverse faults or stress faults have the hanging wall go up, the footwall go down, and if there is a significant amount of footwall subsidence the result is a basin filled with sediment not the bedrock platform that has been found.

Dr. Madugo commented another way this could be addressed is by avoiding that footwall platform and moving to the southeast into San Luis Bay and there is data that could be leveraged to evaluate the SRT's model. PG&E has collected 3-D seismic sections in the area as part of the AB 1632 studies and also very recently USGS collected additional data in the bay. Both datasets cross the Oceano Fault and this is part of the SWBZ that the SRT has interest in and the stratigraphic markers could be traced across the fault zone, the same ones in the hanging wall and footwall, and that footwall subsidence signal could be studied. He reported at this time PG&E does not have plans to do this but has considered ways of doing what the SRT recommends.

Concerning Recommendation 3, Dr. Madugo stated the SRT recommends monitoring Infrared Stimulated Luminescence (IRSL) dating efforts and if necessary reassessing Marine Isotope Stage (MIS) 5 marine terrace age assignment for the Q1¹⁹ and Q2 terraces surrounding the Irish Hills. He stated PG&E agrees with this recommendation and the LTSP program is already monitoring developments in age dating. Specifically, PG&E is interested in whether new age dating results would change the slip rates of the San Luis Bay and Los Osos Faults. Dr. Madugo observed when the SRT began its evaluation there were some interesting results that were forthcoming at that time including IRSL-dating results from the Cayucos Terrace north of the Irish Hills. These terrace ages have been traditionally dated with corals and faunal assemblages and were the basis for age assignments for terraces in the vicinity of DCP. The new data suggested that those terrace ages are much younger than previously thought which could impact slip rates if they are younger as there would be more deformation of the terrace in a shorter timeframe and accordingly the slip rate could be higher. Dr. Madugo reported PG&E sponsored a field trip in August of 2025 with Dr. Nate Onderdonk who was involved in those studies and Dr. Michael Oskin, a member of the SRT, participated in that field trip. Dr. Madugo reported PG&E has discussed Dr. [Onderdonk's] dating results in the vicinity of the Santa Maria Basin. After that meeting Dr. Madugo stated Dr. Onderdonk reviewed his age determinations and found that there was a calculation error for Cayucos, Palos Verdes, and San Diego terraces. Dr. Madugo reported these were all places where Dr. Onderdonk was getting younger ages and when that calculation error was corrected the IRSL ages were found to be close to the coral ages and accordingly the age issue was basically resolved for those sites, including the Cayucos site closest to DCP. He reported Dr. Daniel Muhs, one of those who performed the coral age dating and a faunal assemblage work published a new paper in January 2026 that re-evaluated Dr. Muhs' previously published results and confirmed them and is information that PG&E has used in the past and which has now been reconfirmed.

Dr. Madugo stated that one area where the IRSL dating still yields perhaps younger than expected results is in the Santa Maria Basin and PG&E plans to work with Dr. Onderdonk to better understand the ages in that Basin which can be explained in a number of ways, possibly high uplift rates along the Casmalia Fault or the age determinations may have some issues. Dr. Madugo remarked that at this time the anticipated impact of IRSL age dating is low, with the confirmation that the Irish Hills age dates at the Cayucos Terrace are close to the coral ages. He reported there is no anticipated impact on hazard or age dates. PG&E plans to sponsor research to evaluate the [remaining young ages for the] Santa Ynez, Orcutt Formation, and Santa Maria Basin ages over the next year. He reported this work is of medium priority, with incremental progress and publications expected over the next few years and PG&E will assess the impact of any results and findings.

Dr. Madugo remarked the work he discussed could involve Dr. Oskin as a reviewer or a participant and he questioned how to continue to involve members of the SRT as DCISC reviewers or as PG&E reviewers and he commented PG&E would like to collaborate with Dr. Oskin and Dr. Marshall on some of these tasks. Dr. Peterson responded and stated the Committee has made a substantial investment of effort associated with the SRT and is cognizant that those resources come from California ratepayers and the DCISC needs to be appropriate on its use of

¹⁹ In age dating and geology, the letter Q typically stands for the Quaternary, which is the current and most recent geological period.

resources and has additional topics for which it needs to engage expert consulting. Dr. Meshkati observed the Committee also passed a resolution last year thanking SRT and stating that Dr. Oskin and Dr. Marshall would be free to work with PG&E and others but Dr. Jordan would remain as a consultant to the DCISC. Dr. Meshkati stated he found it to be great news that PG&E has seen such great expertise in the SRT that it now wants two of its members to collaborate with PG&E to improve the seismic characterization. Mr. Rathie confirmed the resolution mentioned by Dr. Meshkati was passed on the premise that the Committee would be reviewing a report by the SRT on the PG&E Supplemental Response at this public meeting and that report was pending receipt.

Dr. Madugo observed that addressing many of the items identified in the SRT's recommendations will take several years as a research team needs to be assembled, research completed and preliminary findings issued, and there may be a need for more data before that research can be published. He stated PG&E has accepted most of the SRT's Recommendations and is now moving on to develop research plans but this will several years and he inquired whether Drs. Oskin and Marshall would be retained on the SRT or be free to participate in that research. Dr. Peterson replied and stated Dr. Jordan is willing to remain in a consultant role with the DCISC and addressing PG&E's responses to these recommendations will be a multi-year process.

Dr Madugo then addressed Recommendation 4 and reported the SRT recommended further investigation of potential strike slip faulting along the Los Osos Trend and its impact on the pattern of marine terrace uplift. He stated PG&E agrees with the SRT on this recommendation to further investigate strike slip kinematics.²⁰ This aligns with LTSP goals to reduce uncertainty on hazard-significant faults and the Los Osos Fault or trend is a hazard significant input for a seismic source model. This research also aligns with an IPRP research recommendation. Dr. Madugo commented the PG&E SSC model already incorporates a right lateral slip component on the Los Osos Fault in its outward-vergent fault geometry model and there was previous research for a seismic assessment that evaluated the strike slip potential. He stated this assessment may be something that the SRT is not aware of as it was presented in the second SSHAC workshop. Dr. Madugo stated accordingly this strike slip component was a knowledge gap that was identified in the first SSHAC workshop and a study was done and presented at that workshop.

Dr. Madugo stated there is detailed LiDAR²¹ data for drainages across the Los Osos Fault and the fault can be see along the northeast side of the Irish Hills. He reported this evaluation looked at as many stream channels that crossed the fault as possible looking for evidence of deflections. Dr. Madugo reported the Los Osos is considered a reverse fault and that the movement is primarily vertical but the SRT and the IPRP are interested in the potential for a lateral component. Dr. Madugo observed if there is a significant lateral component, systematic deflection of those stream channels would be seen. If this is correct, every stream channel that is

²⁰ Kinematics is a branch of classical mechanics that describes the motion of points, objects, and systems of groups of objects without considering the causes of that motion (such as forces and mass). It focuses purely on the geometry of movement using position, velocity, and acceleration.

²¹ LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) is a remote sensing technology that uses pulsed lasers to measure variable distances.

crossed by that fault should show some sort of right lateral deflection if the signal is large enough. He reported that out of more than 180 channel measurements there was no conclusive evidence of right or left lateral deflection and most of the channels had no deflection and for the remaining channels, it was either ambiguous or half had a right deflection and half had a left deflection. He reported at least using the channel information, PG&E did not find any evidence of deflection. Dr. Madugo stated the SRT also looked at this at a high level, to see if they could see the deflections and many other people through the years have done that as well and a consistent right lateral displacement signal onshore was not found.

Dr. Madugo stated the anticipated impact of a right lateral slip component on the Los Osos Fault is likely low as it is known that the signal is not really strong in the geomorphology of the stream channel. He stated PG&E's plan now is to document the existing stream channel offset analysis and develop it into at least a technical report by the end of 2026, and possibly a paper for a peer review publication, although he commented papers on investigations where nothing was found are not very exciting they are useful for information purposes. He reported there is also ongoing LTSP research focused on a project through the PG&E and USGS CRADA [Creative Research and Development Agreement], evaluating the Los Osos Fault kinematics along multiple reaches, primarily offshore and this research will incorporate the new offshore seismic or geophysics data that USGS collected from 2019 and this past fall and this report is scheduled to be in draft form by the end of 2026 and to be submittal to a journal in 2027. He reported PG&E considers publication of the stream channel and USGS seismotectonic studies to be the most robust path for evaluating strike slip deformation and directly addressing the SRT recommendation.

Dr. Madugo reported that prior to the June 2026 DCISC meeting, PG&E will review with its expert review group whether marine terrace deformation and Morro Bay subsidence could be used to constrain that strike slip component on the Los Osos Fault. He commented PG&E believes that using the vertical rate of deformation to get a lateral rate will have very large uncertainties compared to the other methods that PG&E is currently pursuing and hence PG&E has not prioritized this effort, but will review to see if those uncertainties can be reduced and Dr. Madugo asked if the SRT could provide a more guidance on this. He reported a similar study was done for the Hosgri Fault and the NRC chose this site that had a vertical sense of motion, and then turned it into a lateral sense of motion as an independent slip rate estimate for the Hosgri Fault, but it had very large uncertainties compared to another adjacent site in terms of lateral offset of markers on the Hosgri Fault. He reported that site had very low uncertainties and that is the highest weighted slip rate used by PG&E in its model.

In concluding his discussion of Recommendation 4 concerning Los Osos Fault Dr. Madugo stated that based upon the SRT recommendation, the LTSP will in the short term prioritize work on lateral slip characterization over research focused solely on long-term dip/slip or the vertical rates at the Memorial Terrace and older Quaternary terraces.

Dr. Madugo then addressed Recommendations 5 through 7 and reported these were focused on the geodetic modeling and evaluating the slip rate budget that's available to faults in the vicinity of the plant. So in context of the total amount of fault slip rate that is available to assign to different faults, it is PG&E's understanding that rates for individual faults cannot be

easily parsed using the geodetic modeling but the geodetic budget can serve as a check on the geologic slip rate budget, that is, the rates assigned to the fault.

Dr. Madugo reported PG&E agrees that further evaluation of the GPS data along with comparisons of kinematic and mechanical fault models between the San Andreas and Hosgri Faults provides valuable confirmation of the geologic slip rate and the kinematics used in the PG&E model but the anticipated impact is not known. He commented a primary goal of the work is to provide an independent test or confirmation of the geologic rates in the model and PG&E proposes to work directly with Dr. Marshall and with peer review from an independent review team to discuss how to address these Recommendations 5 through 7 and to develop a plan and execute the plan. Dr. Madugo stated he believes this will take a number of years before anything could be published.

Regarding Recommendation 8 concerning the geologic slip rate information that should be required for the Rinconada and Huasna Faults to permit better modeling of the sheer component evident in the GPS data, Dr. Madugo stated PG&E agrees with refining estimates of slip rates for these faults that are located away from the plant. He commented these faults are not the most important faults and they are located to the northeast. PG&E has done sensitivity studies in the past to show that they are not hazard significant but they account for part of the slip rate budget. A transect from the Hosgri Fault all the way to the San Andreas Fault is being done and Dr. Madugo remarked it is important to know what amount of that budget for these faults. He reported there are no past PG&E studies and information has been used from USGS and other sources rather than information that PG&E developed. Dr. Madugo stated after discussions with the SRT, PG&E has found value in developing those slip rates, and has elevated this as a research priority from low, meaning PG&E will monitor new information available on those faults, to medium priority to understand that this is important for characterizing hazard for the plant and will fund or support or develop research studies in a multi-year research studies under the LTSP.

Dr. Madugo reported that by the end of 2026 PG&E will have completed an initial literature review and geomorphic site assessment to determine if there are sites that can serve to constrain the slip rate and to evaluate the logistics. He reported PG&E has expertise in-house that can do this and then will partner with a university or the USGS, but the preference is with a university to develop a graduate research project with potential results emerging over the next several years. He observed that in any given area there are likely only one or two professional researchers that are focused on that area and the next generation of researchers need to be trained by having graduate students involved to address these issues twenty years from today with lots of experience.

Concerning the last recommendation, Recommendation 9, that PG&E should conduct modeling experiments to ascertain the sensitivity of DCP hazard to the SSC modifications recommended by the SRT, Dr. Madugo remarked these modifications were the change in dip, but basically their fault geometry model, that is, the mid-crustal ramp for which PG&E has a version, but he stated the SRT put their flat at a different depth than PG&E and Dr. Madugo reported PG&E has agreed to evaluate the proponent model developed by the SRT. Dr. Madugo remarked with this recommendation, the SRT has moved from a reviewer to a proponent role. He

observed that sometimes a proponent model emerges after a review. **He stated PG&E is in the process of completing a sensitivity source model that allows efficiently testing new proponent models and that model, at least a draft of it, was completed at the end of last year and PG&E is in the process of reviewing it with an expert review panel and he reported the first sensitivity that PG&E will develop with that model is testing the impact of the SRT's model and he stated he would report on progress during the DCISC's June DCISC public meeting.** He reported the anticipated impact of testing the model is unknown as it is a complicated process and as a new model is implemented there is a need to adjust different parts of the model and make sure that it all makes sense and it all works together. Dr. Madugo commented that this will be a process, but again the DCISC and the SRT reviewers will be updated regularly on the results.

Dr. Madugo summarized his presentation and stated PG&E agrees with all the Recommendations, except for the Recommendation 2 concerning footwall subsidence. PG&E has either LTSP ongoing research on the Recommendations, or that research is already planned. For Recommendation 2 he stated research could be done, but it is not currently planned as the anticipated impact is either low or unknown at this point. He described the medium research priority as focused on addressing the Recommendations through a LTSP research program. Low prior research means PG&E does not currently have a plan in place. High priority is given for the proponent model developed by the SRT and it is actively being tested. He reported most of the work will take two to three years, but for the proponent model Recommendation which has a high priority and he stated PG&E will have an answer by the end of this year. The geodetic work is to be determined and PG&E will consult with Dr. Marshall about developing a research plan.

Dr. Madugo stated there was interest in how these medium priority research items compare to other research that PG&E is pursuing under LTSP and he reported the largest hazard uncertainties are from ground motion characterization and considerable effort is dedicated to improving the ground motion model for DCPD and PG&E is working to apply data from certain fragile geologic features. These are features in the landscape and appear like they could be easily displaced because they are stone blocks that are standing up on end and he reported there are several of these in the vicinity of Diablo Canyon. He remarked it is one of the few ways to test hazard models with long term data, that is by dating how long the feature has been in its fragile or precarious position and then calculating the ground motion it would take to displace and he described this as an exciting area of research. He reported the USGS is having a special conference on how to apply this to their national hazard map models and there have been several places in the world where this has been applied and this is a focus for PG&E.

Concluding the presentation Dr. Madugo reported concerning several aspects of PG&E's plans including, listed from highest priority down:

- Nonergodic ground motions, which have the highest hazard uncertainties.
- Application of Fragile Geologic Features

- The development of new time dependent models and he reported this is something Dr. Oskin is also working on and it involves determination of the average timing of earthquakes and the likelihood that another big earthquake will happen in a certain amount of time.
- The Hosgri Fault slip rate which is almost an order of magnitude higher than some of the other faults and is very important for hazard, so PG&E is focusing a lot of research on that.
- Hosgri time dependence, as the timing of the last event on the Hosgri Fault has yet to be determined and Dr. Madugo stated he believes the USGS may be close to doing that.
- The San Luis Pismo Block items which he stated are medium priority items as they are not hazard significant and concern work which is not currently being undertaken.

In response to Dr. Meshkati's question as to the criteria and definition of "impact" and "priority" Dr. Madugo replied these words are used in context of a qualitative assessment and do not involve an impact score, but if the issue has the potential to significantly change the mean hazard, that would be a very high impact. If the issue only changes the hazard by a small percent up or down, then that is a lower impact item. He stated some or many of these items could have that lower impact, but they are designated as unknown now because PG&E has not started the studies. Mr. Meshkati and Dr. Madugo agreed that in PG&E's opinion a designation of low priority means the item is not going to have much impact on the hazard. Dr. Meshkati remarked this is a qualitative assessment and the SRT may reach different answers.

In response to Dr. Meshkati's inquiry about the criteria for a priority item, Dr. Madugo replied that this is something that will be discussed and described in June and he discussed the sensitivities in the tornado plots²² where different branches of the logic tree are given different weights to assess their impact on hazard and this is done for ground motion parameters and source parameters and the data is then organized from most impactful and largest uncertainties to least, and if a large hazard uncertainty that has a significant impact or significant potential impact to hazard that is prioritized, above other items that have low uncertainty and low impact.

In response to Dr. Meshkati's question concerning the relationship between assigning priorities and budgetary financial considerations Dr. Madugo reported the LTSP budget will cover all the tasks that he mentioned including all the SRT recommended research. He reported PG&E has evaluated the budget and will be able to fund the highest priority tasks plus the SRT tasks.

Dr. Jordan commented concerning Dr. Madugo's presentation that overall it is very positive but he observed in terms of the impact this research would have on the hazard, obviously if it were to increase the hazard, you could say that would a high impact. But there's also the impact of reducing uncertainty in the hazard and Dr. Jordan stated a number of the studies the SRT is advocating will do that and he stated that this is very valuable.

²² A tornado plot (or tornado diagram) is a specialized bar chart used in sensitivity analysis and risk management to visualize the impact of varying input variables on a specific outcome.

Dr. Peterson reported the Committee has scheduled additional discussion on the SRT review for the morning session. PG&E Senior Director Mr. Jones confirmed that the PG&E Geoscience team will be present tomorrow for that discussion so if there are a further discussion or questions, that will continue to tomorrow's morning session.

The Chair then opened the discussion to members of the public.

San Luis Obispo County Supervisor Dr. Buce Gibson was recognized. Dr. Gibson stated he was also a technical member of the Independent Peer Review Panel representing the County by virtue of his doctorate in geophysics and a first career doing research in reflection seismology. Dr. Gibson thanked the SRT and PG&E for all their work and he stated he was glad to see there are many paths available in order to assess the tectonics of the Irish Hills and he commented they have not been greatly studied to date. He commented concerning Recommendation 1 that there was a remark made that there is abundant subsurface data from hydrocarbon exploration. He stated he was unsure of what the comment referred to but it triggered his recollection that in the Central Coastal California Seismic Imaging Project which PG&E published in 2014, PG&E made an effort to determine the geologic structure of the Irish Hills by the most direct route, which was to conduct a seismic reflection survey across and along the Irish Hills. Dr. Gibson stated this is analogous to medical ultrasound and seeks to ascertain the imaging of those structures. Unfortunately, he stated the data that came out of that effort were not in any way definitive and a specific analysis of that situation was included in IPRP Report No. 8, which was published in December of 2014. Dr. Gibson observed there was no constraining information from that specific set of surveys regarding the geologic structure. He stated he wanted to get his observation on the record if it is in any way pertinent to the abundance of surface data. Dr. Gibson thanked the Committee for the opportunity to make his comments.

Dr. Madugo was recognized and he stated that in the Irish Hills where the studies Dr. Gibson referred to were done there are not many boreholes, but there are more boreholes to the east in the area of Price Canyon and a preliminary review has shown that they comprise a complete stratigraphic section for the Pismo Basin. He commented in terms of constraining deformation of the Pismo Syncline, in terms of its long-term history, those boreholes may prove useful. He remarked there is a dearth of that type of data in the vicinity of the Irish Hills. Dr. Madugo reported there is also additional industry seismic data to the east and the seismic data that was collected in the Irish Hills needs to be constrained with additional subsurface data if available and to the east that is an area where this could potentially be done. Dr. Madugo stated one could take the structure as the Pismo Syncline or the Pismo Basin and use that to inform structures in the vicinity of the Irish Hills.

Dr. Gibson stated these issues were the focus of his doctoral research, that is, of trying to image complex geologic structures, randomly heterogeneous in three dimensions which he stated is the very essence of the Franciscan Formation that underlies much of the area in question. He commented the problem is the resulting seismic image ends up as more or less a Rorschach test in that it is lots of energy coming back from unknown sources and therefore the ability to correlate the complex layers under the Irish Hills is complex and the topography makes getting the seismic reflection survey reduced to a flat datum very difficult. He remarked there is no means of correlating a particular event horizon to a borehole, especially if that geologic sample is

miles away and it is probably ten miles away at Price Canyon. He reported these issues were all very thoroughly discussed in IPRP Report No. 8 and the conclusion from the IPRP was that that reflection data really didn't constrain anything.

Dr. Madugo stated the seismic imaging of the Franciscan Formation was done in the attempt to try to understand the Los Osos and San Luis Bay fault planes, and in his previous statement Dr. Madugo was addressing the evolution of the Pismo Basin and for that, for the subsurface data, both the geophysics and the borehole data, there are markers that can be correlated to the east. He observed there are deposits that are riding on top of those faults and the effort PG&E intends to make is to understand how they are deforming in relation to those faults and those fault geometries over time.

Ms. Jane Swanson of Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Swanson stated she was also speaking as a lay person. Ms. Swanson stated she was surprised and disappointed that the SRT did not recommend that PG&E do a thorough evaluation of the possibility of a thrust fault under DCPD. She stated that Dr. Bird has asserted that there is such a thrust fault and that it would cause much more damage to the plant than would a strike slip fault. She remarked while Dr. Madugo reported on more research in reverse faults she commented on the lack of plans to explore the possibility of a thrust fault as defined by a dip of less than thirty degrees. She stated it was her understanding that a thrust fault is a subset of a reverse fault, but not all reverse faults are thrust faults. Ms. Swanson reported at the June 10, 2025 meeting of this Committee PG&E stated that it had not done the research needed to determine the nature of the fault in question by Dr. Bird. She referred to the comments of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility's attorney, Mr. John Geesman, on PG&E's lack of research in the video record of the June 10, 2025, DCISC public meeting and she reported she has sent his comment to Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie. She remarked it was her recollection that Mr. Geesman was following up on the questioning that had led to PG&E's admission that although the utility had been aware of that fault for a decade, it had not bothered to assess which type of fault it was. Mr. Swanson reported she was present at the June 10 meeting. Ms. Swanson observed the burden of proof is on PG&E to thoroughly evaluate this fault, not just to assume for more than ten years that it doesn't matter or that it does not need to be investigated. Ms. Swanson reported that in her message to Mr. Rathie she also referred to paragraphs from Dr. Bird's testimony relevant to what she stated today. She stated her conclusion is to urge the Committee to add to the SRT's assignment thorough research of the fault in question about which Dr. Bird raises concerns and to make up for the neglect of that study to date.

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power. Dr. Nelson stated he previously discussed with the Committee his correspondence with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and that he has been learning more about geology in conjunction with his work. He reported in his letter to the NRC rebutting Dr. Bird's contentions that evidence of thrust faulting is found where there is oil and he remarked there are no oil deposits beneath DCPD. He stated there are oil deposits nearby at Price Canyon, to the south, and off of Goleta, and then to the north at San Ardo and Dr. Nelson stated those are the locations where he would expect to find thrust faulting. He expressed his opinion that Dr. Bird's overall technique is to try to fit a hypothesis and not to look at the data.

Ms. Molly Johnson was recognized. Ms. Johnson stated she is a resident of San Luis Obispo County and her comments focus on seismic source characterization and thrust fault risk under current geological understanding. She reported research by geophysicist Dr. Peter Bird, Professor Emeritus at UCLA, shows that the California Central Coast is a region of disturbed crustal deformation, not simply strike slip motion along a few mapped faults and straining is also accompanied by blind thrust and reverse faults. She remarked these faults may not rupture TO the surface, but they can generate strong earthquakes with significant vertical ground acceleration and importantly this understanding is shared by other leading seismologists, including Dr. Thomas H. Jordan of USC, Dr. Mark Zoback of Stanford, and researchers with the USGS Survey, all of whom emphasize distributed deformation in structural complexity in California's crust. Ms. Johnson respectfully urged the Committee to engage more directly with Dr. Bird's work as his research addresses regional tectonics systematically and more in substantive technical evaluation than in this forum and includes real world examples. As an example she cited the 2003 San Simeon earthquake, a thrust fault earthquake that caused fatalities and buildings to collapse in Paso Robles and the 1994 Northridge Earthquake, which demonstrated how blind thrust faults can generate intense vertical motion that exceeded prior engineering expectations. She observed recent earthquakes in northern San Luis Obispo County were also thrust events and a sharp vertical jolting was directly felt less than five miles away from the epicenter. Ms. Johnson remarked this experience reflects what seismology reveals about vertical acceleration in this region and is directly relevant to DCP. She stated several regional faults were identified or better characterized after the plant was initially licensed and the original seismic design basis did not fully reflect today's understanding on distributed deformation and thrust fault geometry. Ms. Johnson observed that while updated probabilistic seismic hazard analyses have been performed, probabilistic modeling does not substitute for demonstrated seismic margin. She stated that the core question here is straightforward - has DCP been conclusively shown to maintain sufficient seismic margin under current geological understanding to withstand near thrust fault vertical motion and any decisions regarding extending the licenses should not be even thought of to be made until this information has been fully examined.

Ms. Linda Seeley, a representative of Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Seeley expressed her concern with PG&E's plan to engage the services of Drs. Marshall and Oskin as it is difficult to find an independent seismologist in California, that is, persons who have not been employed by PG&E. She commented that this independence requires someone who has not have been engaged financially with the company that they are making an assessment about. She commented that were she a member of the DCISC she would advocate for Drs. Marshall and Oskin to remain independent and members of the SRT because seismic questions will continue concerning PG&E, and the DCISC now has an independent review panel in place. Ms. Seeley stated she supports Ms. Swanson's comment about the thrust that goes directly under the plant and she heard the discussion by the SRT at the June 2025 DCISC public meeting and it is known that there is a fault that goes straight under the plant, but the SRT stated on that occasion that is was not under their purview to analyze that fault. Ms. Seeley suggested that the concerns of the public in this regard should be alleviated and she suggested the SRT be used to do that. Ms. Seeley commented that PG&E has decided which of the SRT recommendations that it will pursue but she wonders if the SRT has any authority to direct PG&E. Ms. Seeley commented whether or not DCP closes down in the next couple of years she hopes that the LTSP will continue to do its work after the plant is shut down because there will still be millions of pounds

of radioactive waste on the site and cooling water will continue to be needed to circulate through the spent fuel pools and this might be interrupted by a strong earthquake.

Dr. Robert J. Budnitz was recognized. Dr. Budnitz, a former DCISC member, observed for the longest time there has been a very broad consensus in the community of experts that the principal source of seismicity and the most important source of seismicity at site of DCP is the Hosgri Fault but there is uncertainty about the motion that arises from the Hosgri Fault or from the other faults because there's a lot of uncertainty in the ground motion models. He commented the energy from an earthquake has to go from the site of the earthquake to the plant. Dr. Budnitz commented that given the uncertainty in the ground motion models, PG&E has appropriately for the last thirty years concentrated not all but a very important fraction of their resources to reducing those uncertainties and Dr. Budnitz expressed his view that it would be unfortunate if a significant portion of those resources were diverted from studying the Hosgri Fault and the ground motion uncertainty. Dr. Budnitz commented Dr. Madugo described PG&E's actions in response to the SRT's recommendations and he stated he wonders whether any of PG&E's new investigations could be modified slightly to generate spin-off information that would help us understand the two issues he described, that is the size of the Hosgri Fault and the ground motion propagation from the source to the plant and in improving the understanding and uncertainties of those while investigating other things and if so, he urged that this opportunity not be missed.

Ms. Marilyn Brown was recognized. She stated her comments do not relate to this evening's agenda. She reported she has been a ratepayer and a taxpayer in San Luis Obispo County since 1972 and she is concerned about the financial cost of keeping DCPPP licensed to operate for the next few years, especially if that time is expanded to twenty years. She observed PG&E has made record profits for the past two years and she queried how the \$1.4 billion forgivable loan figures in for repayment to the ratepayers and taxpayers who will be burdened by an annual rising utility cost. She inquired whether the CPUC made an explicit finding that continuing DCPPP operations remains cost effective and consistent with just and reasonable rate requirements. She observed in 2024 the CPUC approved six rate increases for PG&E which resulted in PG&E becoming the most expensive electric company not only in California but the entire continental United States and only Hawaii is more expensive. Ms. Brown observed costs escalate as the plant ages and these costs include nuclear waste disposal, major equipment failures, accident clean-ups, and earthquake damage and she wonders why continue this very expensive and potentially dangerous method of boiling water when cheaper, cleaner and safer alternatives are ready to go online and employ hundreds if not thousands of our local population. She inquired how PG&E's policies affect the Committee member's judgment and their decisions and she commented that with the changes in the federal government she hopes federal regulations will not become lax at DCPPP.

Dr. Phil Johnson was recognized. Dr. Johnson stated that he is a member of the IPRP and the IPRP appreciates the SRT's report which he described as a very well thought document and helpful for an overall understanding of the Irish Hills. Dr. Johnson commented the IPRP was also hopeful that the SRT would undertake a review of the Hosgri Fault since it is the most important of the seismic sources. He stated the IPRP is concerned about the slip rate that PG&E is using for the Hosgri Fault. He commented PG&E is weighting four different slip rate sites and two of

them the IPRP reviewed and believes to be of quite low quality, specifically the San Simeon and Estero Bay Fault slip rate sites. He commented the IPRP, which is made up of members from many different state agencies, was hoping that Dr. Oskin would be involved in that review. He stated that speaking as an individual, the disbanding of the SRT prior to that review opportunity is disappointing. He reported PG&E discussed their findings on the Hosgri Fault slip rate in five reports, including IPRP Report No. 7 and more recently in IPRP Report No. 16 and this remains an ongoing comment issue for the IPRP,. He described the slip rate weighting being somewhat problematic in that there is one really high data quality site, that being the cross-Hosgri slope site that the USGS has fairly explored and investigated and on which it has provided very high quality data. Dr. Johnson reported there is also some new data for the Point Sal site that is farther to the south, where the data is at least of moderate quality, but the data for the two remaining sites, the San Simeon and Estero Bay sites, are rated by the IPRP as low to very low and these two comprise 45% of slip rate weighting. He observed for the Estero Bay site there isn't a clear correlation of the offset channel across the fault and for the San Simeon site there is no actual offset geological feature. He commented that this results in a model of what the current versus prehistoric shoreline would have looked like and it is not a very strong model as neither of those sites have very strong data and the IPRP was hoping for the SRT's assistance on these matters.

Dr. Peterson observed this has been a very productive, educational and helpful discussion of many different perspectives and useful information. Dr. Peterson stated that the SRT was formed principally to address concerns raised by Dr. Peter Bird and therefore was not focused on the Hosgri Fault directly. He stated he also appreciated Dr. Budnitz' comments as Dr. Peterson remarked he had not fully appreciated the importance of the ground motion modeling, as it was his lay understand that California is so seismically active and so faulted that seismic energy does not propagate very far which may a good thing, except it means that the most important source of risk will be faults that are closer rather than farther away. However, it also means that characterizing how the energy will come from the faults that create the highest risk is also challenging, which is an interesting perspective.

The Chair recognized Supervisor Gibson for a comment on a matter not on the agenda..

Dr. Gibson stated he was speaking as a member of the IPRP representing San Luis Obispo County and wanted to address the IPRP's ongoing review of PG&E's seismic update published in early 2024 as part of the requirements of SB 846. He stated and the Chair confirmed that the Committee, through the Legal Counsel's Office, was in receipt of two emails from Dr. Gibson on this topic describing the challenges the IPRP faced in getting that report published and he reported those issues have been resolved and the report is expected to be published on February 19, 2026. [IPRP Response to the 2024 Updated Seismic Assessment was published to the internet on February 19, 2026.] Dr. Gibson stated he wanted to provide the Committee with some context for this matter, because with the second email came a three-page summary that Dr. Gibson personally authored that detailed the technical substance of what the IPRP refers to as Report 16A. He stated the IPRP issued Report 16 with comments on the 2024 PG&E Updated Seismic Assessment citing areas the IPRP believes could be improved and PG&E responded a little more than one year later. Dr. Gibson reported in the IPRP's opinion, the PG&E response did not completely address the substance of the inadequacies of their analysis as documented by the IPRP in Report 16. Accordingly, the IPRP developed another set of comments (Report 16A)

summarized in Dr. Gibson's three-page document sent to the Committee. He commented that Report 16A had been sitting in the hands of the CPUC since late August 2025 and the reason for this extensive delay was not clear to the IPRP. On January 22, 2026, senior staff of the CPUC and the California Natural Resources Agency issued edits to the IPRP that the staff wanted the IPRP to incorporate into Report 16A. Dr. Gibson stated this was a deeply concerning action to the IPRP because the IPRP is an independent body and it is through the IPRP that the technical opinion of technical experts are to be heard and the IPRP found no authority nor justification for modification by any senior staff. He reported some of the proposed edits substantively modified the technical conclusions that the IPRP made in the draft of Report 16A. He reported the IPRP lodged objections with senior agency staff and after some back and forth these issues were resolved as of today Dr. Gibson was informed that the senior agency staff have agreed to publish the IPRP Report 16A essentially as submitted at the end of August 2025, with the only changes being formatting changes unrelated to the technical substance. He reported the subject of Report 16A is the IPRP's continuing concern about using the highest quality data for determining the Hosgri Fault slip rate and as his IPRP colleague Dr. Johnson has indicated the IPRP sees that there is one site which gives by far the best quality data and the IPRP's recommendation and request of PG&E is to run the seismic hazard analysis heavily weighting, if not completely weighting, the analysis on that one site that the IPRP believes produces the very best data.

The Chair thanked Supervisor Gibson for his comments.

Dr. Peterson reported that absent any additional comments, he looked forward to the Committee's continuing discussion in the morning, starting at 8:15.

XII ACCEPTANCE OF MINUTES

This item concerned review and acceptance of the Minutes of the Committee's October 22-23, 2025, public meeting conducted in Avila Beach and as a Zoom Webinar. A draft of the October 2025 Minutes was included in the public agenda packet for this meeting. Mr. Rathie reported that he was greatly assisted by Ms. Denise Righetti who prepared the Transcript from which the Minutes were compiled. Dr. Peterson remarked that the use of **bold** text in the Minutes is important as it captures and describes some action or commitment on the part of the Committee which is then included on the Committee's Open Items List. The Members and Consultants reviewed each page of the Minutes and provided corrections and substantive changes to certain sections of the Minutes which will be included in the final version of the October 2025 Minutes. The Members and Technical Consultants also discussed some follow-up actions to be taken, provided clarification concerning typographical errors and the accuracy of certain statements in the Minutes, and made editorial comments and changes concerning the draft of the October 2025 Minutes all of which were provided to Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie.

The Minutes of the October 22-23, 2025, public meeting were approved as revised by the discussion. The Minutes in their final approved version will become a part of the Committee's 36th Annual Report.

XIX ADJOURN EVENING MEETING

The Chair adjourned the afternoon session of the DCISC at 6:45 p.m.

XX RECONVENE FOR MORNING MEETING

The morning meeting of the DCISC was convened by the Chair at 8:15 a.m.

XXI COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments by Members at this time.

XXII DISCUSSION, DIRECTION AND ACTION, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE COMMITTEE, CONSULTANTS AND COUNSEL

F. Receive and Discuss PG&E's Response as Supplemented to DCISC 35th Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations: July 1, 2024 - June 30, 2025, Including a Discussion with the DCISC Seismic Review Team of PG&E's Response as Supplemented to Recommendations P/SRT-1 through P/SRT-9.

Dr. Jordan introduced his fellow members of the SRT, Dr. Michael Oskin and Dr. Scott Marshall, who were participating through the Zoom webinar. He summarized the timeline for the SRT's activities over the past year. The SRT was constituted at the DCISC's public meeting in February 2025 and was charged with reviewing documents that Dr. Peter Bird had submitted to DCISC and NRC regarding the thrust fault hazard beneath the Irish Hills (the "Bird Critique"). The SRT conducted its review and presented a report at the June 2025 DCISC public meeting. Dr. Jordan reported that within that review were nine Recommendations that PG&E might use to improve its understanding of the thrust fault hazard.

Dr. Jordan reported the SRT met with the PG&E Geosciences staff in September 2025 to review the Recommendations, to ensure that PG&E understood the intent of the Recommendations, and to clarify any technical issues associated with the Recommendations. PG&E provided a short Response to the Recommendations, which was included in the DCISC's 35th Annual Report. The DCISC subsequently requested a supplemental response with additional information that would allow the SRT to evaluate the technical adequacy of PG&E's response. PG&E was requested to respond individually to each Recommendation as to whether PG&E agreed with the Recommendation, agreed that there was a need for action to be taken regarding the Recommendation and, if there was a need for action to be taken, to summarize the proposed action, the timeline involved, and the priority PG&E gave to its action. PG&E was also asked to evaluate which Recommendations have the potential for a significant impact on the hazard model. Dr. Jordan stated that, in the SRT's formulation of what would constitute significant impact, it is not only how much the results might change the hazard model but also how much it might reduce the epistemic uncertainties²³ in the hazard forecasts or validate key modeling assumptions.

²³ Epistemic uncertainties are those due to our lack of knowledge about the hazard processes. These uncertainties can potentially be reduced by acquiring more knowledge about the hazard.

Dr. Jordan reported PG&E responded with a supplementary report and plans to address most of the Recommendations as a medium priority effort. PG&E commented that much of the research to address the Recommendations will take several years to complete. PG&E responded that the medium priority assignment was made due to other issues, such as the slip rate on the Hosgri Fault, the time dependence of the faulting, and projects related to ground motion modeling; these issues have a higher priority because PG&E believes, based on an epistemic uncertainty analysis, that they have larger uncertainties.

Dr. Jordan confirmed Dr. Peterson's observation that the scope of the SRT review was limited to the Bird Critique, which focused on thrust faulting beneath the Irish Hills. The SRT review did not investigate the seismic hazard at the plant due to the Hosgri Fault and related strike-slip faults. The SRT evaluated the effect of the Hosgri Fault on the geodetic signal, but it did not review information on the slip rate of the Hosgri Fault, which is recognized as a controversial subject. Dr. Peterson commented that, to the degree that it dominates the hazard, it is reasonable to focus significant effort on the Hosgri Fault, and he also noted the value of working on the issues described by the SRT. Dr. Jordan remarked that the Recommendations were not prioritized because the SRT recognized that proper prioritization must be done in the context of the other hazard issues being addressed by PG&E. Dr. Jordan displayed a matrix summarizing the PG&E response with an appended column showing the SRT's evaluation of the potential hazard impact.

Dr. Jordan stated Recommendations 1 through 4 focus on fault system modeling and that Dr. Oskin would be commenting on each. Recommendations 5 through 8 concern geodetic modeling. Dr. Marshall would be commenting on those. Dr. Jordan stated he would comment on the Seismic Source Characterization (SSC) modeling that is the subject of Recommendations 9. He then asked Dr. Oskin to continue the presentation.

Dr. Oskin stated Recommendation 1 was for PG&E to build a set of kinematically constrained models for the reverse faults that underlie the Irish Hills. He agreed with PG&E that outcrop exposures from west to east along the Irish Hills provide valuable information to constrain SWBZ fault geometry at different structural depths within the deformed Pismo Basin. The SRT endorses additional research on the eastern Pismo Basin where there are more abundant subsurface data and opportunities to use stream crossings and stream terraces as fault deformation markers. He commented that using these data in addition to the data closer to the plant makes sense. Dr. Oskin stated the SRT also wants to encourage continued work by PG&E on understanding the Morro Bay subsidence and the tilting of the Memorial Terrace. In its report the SRT specifically examined this problem as it pertains to understanding the geometry of the Southwest Boundary Zone (SWBZ) because, if there is uplift being masked by the localized subsidence of Morro Bay, understanding that uplift signal is important for constraining the deeper geometry of the fault, particularly as to whether it goes to a horizontal flat or to a more inclined ramp configuration.

In response to Dr. Peterson's question about the three-year timeline proposed by PG&E for addressing the nine Recommendations, Dr. Oskin confirmed that this was a reasonable estimate for the time required to synthesize the geologic data, construct models, and test those models against the data. Dr. Peterson observed that there is a concurrence between SRT and

PG&E that the scope of work will take about three years to perform, which implies that the DCISC is going to need to monitor PG&E's progress in this area over the next several years. The DCISC needs to discuss how this monitoring will be done and how it will be combined with other efforts to improve understanding of the DCPD seismic hazard, in particular, the related work of the IPRP. Dr. Scarlat concurred and observed it is important to communicate those expectations regarding the timeline. Dr. Jordan observed three years is the amount of time needed to address the full set of SRT recommendations. In response to Dr. Scarlat's question concerning the public's understanding of the long-term focus, Dr. Oskin replied that the SRT's written reports should provide the public with sufficient information to assess the SRT's analysis of the Bird Critique. He noted that the long-term issues concern the development of the SSC model and that PG&E has the Long-Term Seismic Program (LTSP) to address this development. The timeframes for addressing the Recommendations are similar to those for other problems that are being addressed by PG&E under the LTSP.

Dr. Scarlat commented, and Dr. Oskin concurred, that the risk decisions being made today are based upon existing models, and more developed models will allow even better decisions in the future. Dr. Oskin stated there is nothing in any of the SRT Recommendations that is likely to substantially increase the hazard beyond current values, although there might be modest changes. He remarked those changes will be documented, but there is nothing on the scale of the Bird Critique in terms of uncertainties or issues that would directly affect the estimation of the hazard.

In response to Dr. Scarlat's question about the value of developing a new model, Dr. Oskin stated it is important to realize that the hazard projections are very uncertain and that further model development should be aimed at reducing those uncertainties and validating model improvements with geologic and geodetic data. Dr. Oskin added that the geometry of the fault at depth is important for understanding the seismic moment that it could release.

Dr. Peterson commented that the research at the plant site constitutes one of the most detailed scientific investigations of seismic hazard ever conducted and that this research has substantially advanced the fundamental understanding of seismic hazards in other places. Dr. Peterson noted that the PG&E program to better predict and understand seismic hazards contributes to the public good because earthquakes can be enormously destructive, particularly in places where structures are not correctly engineered. This is one reason continuing to study these geophysical problems in central California is worthwhile. Dr. Jordan replied that he considers the region around DCPD to be a well-equipped natural laboratory for studying earthquake processes and that progress on understanding the seismic hazard achieved here should be translatable into other active tectonic regions, especially similar regions of transpression.²⁴

In response to Dr. Scarlat's query about a threshold where understanding is sufficiently complete to manage the hazard, Dr. Jordan replied that, in order to address the DCPD safety

²⁴ Transpression is a geological term describing a specific type of rock deformation where a strike-slip (side-to-side) movement occurs simultaneously with tectonic compression (horizontal shortening). Instead of just sliding past one another, tectonic plates or crustal blocks converge obliquely.

issues that the public is most concerned about, seismic hazard must be translated into seismic risk. Dr. Jordan stated the SRT has focused on the seismic hazard issues and is not equipped to comment on the DCPD risk. Dr. Scarlat agreed that it is out of the SRT's scope to describe the risk; only the hazards fall within the SRT's mandate. Dr. Jordan reiterated that there is a lot known about the area around DCPD owing to PG&E's and other research programs, but he cautioned that the region is tectonically complex and there is much that we still do not know. He noted that the SRT has addressed this epistemic uncertainty by recommending more geodetic research to understand the deformation that causes earthquakes in central California.

In further discussion of hazard management, Dr. Jordan emphasized the importance of sensitivity studies of the type Dr. Madugo had discussed previously when he discussed "tornado diagrams," which display the sensitivity of the hazard to uncertainties in the model components.²⁵ Dr. Jordan stated that sensitivity analysis is a very appropriate tool for guiding research priorities. Dr. Peterson commented there are data and information known about how the plant will respond to seismic events; earthquakes that have shaken the plant and, in some sense, the predictions for how the plant will respond have been validated. He emphasized that DCPD is engineered to a very high ground motion level.

Dr. Peterson commented that from the perspective of being able to mitigate any type of beyond design basis response there are direct pathways from the earthquake response procedures to the use of FLEX guidelines and equipment. Dr. Peterson stated his opinion that the combination of those things does reduce the risk that an earthquake, even a large earthquake, could cause problems at the plant and it is important to emphasize this when talking about the probability spectrum in terms of earthquakes. He observed the implications for neighboring communities are actually fairly severe and he gave as an example the earthquake in Japan in 2011 and the experience at a nuclear power plant located just north of Fukushima Daiichi which responded very well and achieved a safe shutdown, but that event resulted in the inundation of entire towns and 10% to 20% of their populations perished while the employees at the Japanese plant were working to achieve a safe shutdown. Dr. Peterson commented that when discussing really severe types of earthquakes it is important to recognize and acknowledge that it is not just the plant that should be considered, as to do that misdirects attention from other important consequences of a severe seismic event. Dr. Peterson remarked that one of the motivations for the Committee's focus on seismic safety in the workplace and the bracing of furniture is for the workers but it is also with the hope that they will employ those practices in their homes.

Dr. Scarlat stated the Committee has at present an understanding of the hazard and based on that hazard a prediction of whether the seismic events in the region would exceed the design basis of the plant. She commented the DCISC's understanding to date is that the hazard does not exceed the design basis and so it would not be responsible to say this plant cannot operate because our current understanding of the hazard and the design is that this plant can operate and that is a responsible decision. But she stated a continued understanding of the hazard is always

²⁵ A tornado diagram is a specialized bar chart used in sensitivity analysis to show how much individual uncertain inputs contribute to the overall variability of a model's output. In hazard and risk modeling, it ranks epistemic uncertainties from the largest to the smallest, creating a distinct funnel or "tornado" shape.

valuable and is part of the philosophy of how the nuclear industry functions and so the Committee will continue to develop the description of hazard and respond to it if new knowledge appears or if it doesn't then continue on the course. She commented there remains the question of what point is the hazard description considered sufficiently complete, recognizing it will never be proven complete. Dr. Jordan commented and Dr. Scarlat agreed it is incorrect to state the design basis cannot be exceeded; rather, a design-basis exceedance should be characterized by timescale and probability. Although this probability is thought to be small, we have to recognize that it is very uncertain.

Dr. Oskin reviewed Recommendations 2, 3 and 4, which are the other three recommendations directed at geologic modeling. He stated that Recommendation 2 was to date low-stand offshore abrasion platforms south of the Irish Hills to further constrain the rate of footwall subsidence. Recommendation 2 was not endorsed by PG&E. Dr. Oskin argued that constraining the rate of footwall subsidence is important in calculating the complete rate of fault slip across the SWBZ, which includes other known offshore faults, including the Oceana and Los Baros Faults, as well as the onshore San Luis Bay Fault. The motivation for Recommendation 2 was the SRT's concern that a missing subsidence component could be indicated by the difference between the long-term rate, which the SRT calculated to be 0.50 ± 0.010 mm/year, and the rate calculated from marine terrace uplift assuming no footwall subsidence, which is 0.29 ± 0.07 mm/year. The SRT agrees with PG&E that attempting to directly date the offshore platforms would be expensive and likely unsuccessful, but Dr. Oskin pointed out that was not the intention of the recommendation. He noted that PG&E plans to use stratigraphic constraints from existing data to understand more about the abrasion platform history offshore, and he stated that this type of research would likely be sufficient to resolve this issue. He concluded that the PG&E plan is an adequate response to Recommendation 2.

Recommendation 3 is to monitor IRSL-dating efforts and, if necessary, reassess the age assignments for the marine terraces that fringe the Irish Hills. Dr. Oskin reported these assignments are key data for estimating the uplift rates and slip rate of the SWBZ, and he noted there are published discrepancies between the IRSL assignments and those from other dating methods. In his earlier presentation, Dr. Madugo quoted recent revisions to the IRSL results that bring them into better alignment with the dates for the Q1 and Q2 terraces currently used in PG&E's model. Dr. Oskin reported there is an ongoing question concerning work to the south involving the Casmalia Hills thrust and age markers on the Orcutt formation that indicate a very high rate of slip. He has been in conversations on how to test the Orcutt formation ages. He concluded that the IRSL-dating issues identified in Recommendation 3 are close to being resolved.

In Recommendation 4, the SRT advocated further investigation of the potential for strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend north of the Irish Hills and its impact on marine terrace uplift and Morro Bay subsidence. Dr. Oskin stated that this was priority endorsed by PG&E, although there was some confusion about how to address this problem. The SRT endorses PG&E's renewed focus on the onshore and offshore evidence for strike-slip faulting. An updated study of strike-slip faulting will be important for understanding how tectonic transpression is expressed across the region. Dr. Oskin agreed with PG&E's concern that understanding the Morro Bay subsidence may not determine the strike-slip component of the Los Osos Fault very

well, but he emphasized that the real utility of this subsidence signal may be in constraining the deeper geometry of the SWBZ.

Dr. Jordan asked Dr. Marshall to continue the presentation on Recommendations 5 through 8.

Concerning the earlier comments about whether the hazard at the plant was sufficiently understood, Dr. Marshall observed that science is always evolving and the current SSC should be tested against more recent observations and modeling studies. He stated the geodetic recommendations fall under that mandate because satellite geodesy has much improved in the last decade.

Dr. Marshall stated that Recommendations 5, 6, and 7 urge PG&E to undertake a more complete study of the available GPS data. This includes developing the fault slip models that underlie the SSC into kinematic and mechanical models that can predict what GPS should see, and then test those predictions directly against the data. He stated PG&E should quantify the partitioning of the deformation of the greater Irish Hills region into strike-slip and reverse fault components, building on what the SRT has attempted in its reports. He stated that the SRT work illustrates how regional deformation can now be quantified better than it was when the 2015 SSC was developed over a decade ago. In its response, PG&E has endorsed these three Recommendations and agrees that they constitute research projects of medium priority.

Dr. Marshall stated there is a lot to be done, but he believes most of this work can be completed within a three-year period by leveraging existing deformation datasets, rather than creating new datasets from the raw satellite returns. For example, in its report, the SRT used the published National Seismic Hazard Model (NSHM) dataset instead of attempting to process the raw data. Dr. Marshall suggested that PG&E adopt the multiple-model approach taken by the U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS) in developing the NSHM, where models based on different datasets and modeling assumptions are solicited and incorporated into the SSC as technically defensible alternatives. In its 2023 NSHM update, the USGS solicited five different deformation models. Dr. Marshall noted, while five may not be required, there should certainly be more than one. He stated his willingness to work with PG&E and others on the deformation modeling and GPS comparisons.

Recommendation 8 addresses the need for more information about the Rinconada and Huasna Faults. Dr. Marshall described how those strike-slip faults northeast of the DCPD are far enough away that they do not directly pose a significant hazard to the plant, but he showed that they do contribute to the regional deformation and should be included in any model of Irish Hills deformation to be tested against the geodetic data. He reported PG&E has agreed to assess the Rinconada and Huasna slip rates as a medium priority project of the LTSP. As he noted, the SRT recognizes that finding appropriate sites where the mapping and dating of geological formation can constrain the slip rates is a complicated business and, consequently, the slip-rate studies will take several years to complete. Dr. Marshall commented that the literature review and site assessment proposed in the PG&E response are good first steps for addressing Recommendation 8.

Dr. Jordan addressed the response to Recommendation 9, which is an overarching recommendation that directs PG&E to perform modeling calculations that quantify the sensitivity of DCPD hazard to the SSC modifications recommended by the SRT. PG&E and the SRT both assign a high priority to Recommendation 9, and PG&E has an active project to develop a Sensitivity Source Model (SSM) that would serve as the computational platform for conducting the proposed sensitivity studies. Dr. Jordan stated the SRT strongly supports this development because the current SSC model is too complex and unwieldy to be easily used in the sensitivity studies recommended by the SRT.

Dr. Jordan said the SRT is aware that sensitivity analysis can be difficult because the sensitivity derived from changing one model component often involves changes to other model components; hence, these studies are not trivial and will take some time. PG&E reported that the SSM will be available by mid-June 2026, and it is their intention to begin using this computational platform to test the sensitivity of hazard to the fault geometry models, such as the ramp-flat-ramp faulting model described in the SRT report. He reported the SRT sees this as a good start and looks forward to learning more about the technical details of the SSM and its implementation in the requested sensitivity studies.

In summary, Dr. Jordan concluded that the PG&E Supplemental Response provided an adequate basis for the SRT to assess PG&E's preliminary plans, and that PG&E is proposing to push forward on a research program that the SRT can tentatively endorse. He noted that PG&E has responded to each of the SRT's Recommendations and agrees that further action is warranted on all nine. While PG&E did not accept Recommendation 2 as written, it proposes to conduct research on the issues raised by the SRT using existing offshore datasets. The SRT agrees that these data may be sufficient to test (and probably reject) the hypothesis that the difference between the long-term slip rate on the Southwest Boundary Zone (SWBZ) and the slip rate inferred from marine terrace uplift in the Irish Hills can be explained by offshore subsidence unaccounted for in the current models.

Dr. Jordan reported that some Recommendations are currently being addressed by PG&E's LTSP and others will be targets of new or expanded research programs. He pointed out that answering the important question of which of these Recommendations have the potential to significantly impact on the hazard estimates must await the recommended sensitivity studies, which is why they have such a high priority. Under the PG&E plan, the requisite information should become available over the next two to three years, although there may be some low hanging fruit that allows progress to be made on time scales as short as one year. Dr. Jordan summarized by stating that PG&E's response was adequate and sufficient to allow an evaluation of its planned responses. PG&E assigns a medium priority to research that addresses these Recommendations. It assigns a higher priority to research that addresses the Hosgri Fault hazard, uncertainties in the ground motion models, and the time dependence of the earthquake process. A particular issue is the date of the last event on the Hosgri Fault, which Dr. Jordan agreed should have a high priority.

Dr. Jordan returned to his earlier technical comment about how the epistemic uncertainties can be represented by tornado diagrams. As described by Dr. Madugo, PG&E is in the process of reviewing, and will shortly release, tornado diagrams for the DCPD seismic

hazard. While the SRT has not yet seen these diagrams, what they show is likely be similar to what is observed in other regions, where the *declared* epistemic uncertainties in the GMC models are larger than the *declared* epistemic uncertainties in the SSC models. However, Dr. Jordan noted that there are *undeclared* epistemic uncertainties not included in the models, such as those due to ‘unknown unknowns.’ He called this type of uncertainty ‘ontological’²⁶ and speculated that the ontological uncertainty of the SSC models is likely to be greater than that of the GMC models, because the physics underlying ground motion excitation is more straightforward than the physics of fault rupture. Dr. Jordan articulated the hypothesis that the GMC models have captured more of the actual uncertainty than the SSC models, and he suggested that PG&E’s prioritization of SSC research should recognize this possibility.

In his summary, Dr. Jordan stated that the SRT generally agrees with the response plans that PG&E has put forward. Among the few areas of disagreement was PG&E’s initial response to Recommendation 2. As Dr. Oskin has discussed, the motivating issue is testing the hypothesis that the difference between the long-term rate and the current rate of slip on the SWBZ is attributable to offshore subsidence of the low-stand abrasion platforms. The SRT agrees with PG&E that the current data does not favor this hypothesis but noted that more rigorous testing using existing offshore data would increase our confidence in the SWBZ slip rates.

Dr. Jordan concluded that additional information will be needed to conduct a full technical review of the PG&E response plan after the plan’s elements have been fleshed out as components of the LTSP.

Dr. Peterson thanked Drs. Jordan, Oskin, and Marshall. He then opened the floor for Committee questions.

Dr. Peterson remarked that advances in the geodetic studies have been significant, and it is his belief that those types of studies have the potential to provide even greater insights in the future and to improve the observational constraints faster owing to the ability to collect geodetic data over large areas. Dr. Jordan replied that, as Dr. Marshall previously observed, the data has really improved significantly. He noted, however, that geodetic data sets are limited in their ability to pin down slip rates on individual faults. The best strategy is to test whether the overall deformation associated with SSC model is consistent with the geodetic data and to investigate the causes of any significant discrepancies. Dr. Marshall added that the geodetic data are independent of other types of geophysical data, and he suggested that PG&E follow the USGS in integrating geodetic modeling into the SSC. Dr. Marshall commented geodetic data could provide insights on the slip rates of other faults such as the Rinconada and Huasna Faults and potentially the Hosgri Fault. Dr. Peterson commented that the ability to test independent measurement against other models is a very important development, and Dr. Marshall agreed.

Dr. Peterson said he believes there is good alignment between the SRT’s review and PG&E plans for the nine Recommendations with the exception of Recommendation 2, which

²⁶ Ontological uncertainty describes the errors that can occur when a model’s full quantification of uncertainty, both aleatory and epistemic, fails to capture the actual behavior of the real-world system. Unlike the traditional aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, for which probabilities can be calculated, ontological uncertainty is inherently unquantifiable (see Marzocchi & Jordan, *PNAS*, 2014; <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1410183111>).

needs to be addressed. If PG&E is willing to amend its response somewhat in that area, the Committee can move forward in accepting the response.

Dr. Meshkati thanked the SRT members, Dr. Thomas Jordan, Dr. Michael Oskin, and Dr. Scott Marshall, individually for their efforts. He reflected on the questions he had posed the previous day to Dr. Madugo concerning how PG&E defines ‘impact’ of proposed research and what criteria it uses to assess impact. Dr. Jordan replied there are three aspects that need to be assessed. The first is the impact on the estimates of the hazard; if the research has the potential to motivate large changes in the hazard estimates, then its assessed impact would be high. The second aspect is the impact on the epistemic uncertainties. There are very large uncertainties associated with many of the components of the model, and research that can reduce these uncertainties would be assigned a high impact. The third aspect concerns the model validation; research that validates one or more components of the SSC model in a significant way would have a high assessed impact.

Dr. Meshkati, following up on his previous question, expressed concern that PG&E rated the impact of the nine Recommendations as either low (two) or unknown (seven), whereas the SRT rated two of the Recommendations as low, six as medium and one as high. Dr. Meshkati remarked that the disparity between PG&E’s and the SRT’s assignments of impacts needs to be reconciled. Dr. Jordan responded that PG&E assessments are understandably more conservative than the SRT’s. PG&E has stated they will not be able to fully assess how the Recommendations may impact the hazard model until after the sensitivity analyses are complete. Dr. Jordan remarked that this wait-and-see attitude is defensible given the hazard model’s complexity and its large uncertainties. He noted that the SRT was more willing to speculate on possible impacts by phrasing the impact question in terms of key hypotheses. He gave as an example Recommendation 2, which addresses the hypothesis that significant subsidence offshore could possibly increase the estimated fault slip rate of the thrust faults beneath the plant and thus have a potentially high impact on the hazard. He acknowledged that PG&E has qualitative evidence that these platforms are not subsiding at a significant rate; for example, there are no offshore sedimentary basins associated with the subsidence. But rather than dismiss Recommendation 2 out of hand, the SRT would like to see a thorough and well documented test of this hypothesis against the alternative that the SWBZ slip rates have changed over the last five million years. The SRT and PG&E agree that Recommendation 2 can be addressed by more quantitative testing of the subsidence hypothesis using the existing offshore datasets. The SRT deems this to be an adequate response to the recommendation.

Dr. Peterson observed the SRT’s focus was on Bird Critique and thrust faulting beneath the plant, whereas the DCPH hazard is dominated by earthquakes on the Hosgri Fault. Dr. Jordan replied that the reason PG&E’s responses are assigned medium priority is because there are other issues that are of higher importance, including the Hosgri Fault slip rate. The SRT did not prioritize its recommendations, because it recognized that prioritization has to be done within the larger framework of SSC modeling and the LTSP.

Dr. Meshkati asked Dr. Jordan about the SRT’s interpretation of PG&E’s usage of the word ‘unknown’ in reference to the impact assignments, which he found to be a very noncommittal response. Dr. Jordan replied he believes PG&E is acting conservatively by

focusing primarily on the issue of the hazard value; that is, from PG&E's point of view, an issue is assigned a high impact only if it has the potential to change that hazard value significantly. The SRT's use of the term 'potential impact' encompasses more than just the estimate of the hazard; it includes the potential for uncertainty reduction and model validation. Dr. Meshkati inquired about what it would take to reconcile the SRT impact rating with PG&E's rating. Dr. Meshkati stated he views Recommendation 9 as a very important overarching Recommendation, and he noted it is considered by the SRT to be of medium priority while PG&E designates it as unknown. Dr. Jordan replied that impact is assessed on a relative scale; the SRT assigned a rating of medium impact to Recommendation 9 because resolving other outstanding issues (e.g., Hosgri rate) could potentially have a higher impact. Regarding the reconciliation of the two impact ratings, Dr. Jordan suspects that, if PG&E were required assign impact values of low, medium, and high to each recommendation, the values in most cases would not be much different from the SRT's. Dr. Meshkati reiterated that the two sets of impact assignments need to be reconciled.

Dr. Scarlat asked whether the initial results of the sensitivity analysis would enable PG&E to update their impact assignments. Dr. Jordan responded that he thinks that would be the case, but he cautioned that the sensitivity studies are complex and involve a number of interacting model elements, so it is difficult to predict what the sensitivity analysis will show. He suggested that this conservatism may be part of the reason PG&E says the impact is unknown: if PG&E waits for sensitivity analysis, they can do a better job of assessing the impacts. Dr. Scarlat stated that the Committee should follow up on this alignment after the sensitivity analysis is completed. Dr. Jordan observed that it is fair to say that, in context of the overall program, PG&E has assigned a very high priority to the sensitivity analyses, as reflected in its rapid development of the SSM. It is Dr. Jordan's understanding that PG&E is expecting at least some preliminary work to be undertaken during the next calendar year, perhaps assessing the sensitivity of the hazard to the fault geometry models that the SRT has discussed. To apply the sensitivity analyses to all of the areas of concern in the Recommendation set will probably take longer than one year.

Dr. Scarlat returned to Dr. Jordan's discussion of ontological uncertainty, inquiring whether the sensitivity tool will allow PG&E to evaluate the impact of this type of uncertainty. Dr. Jordan replied that ontological uncertainty concerns effects that you know nothing about or, if you do, you have decided to completely ignore in modeling the hazard. Were you to know something about these effects, then you should incorporate the information characterizing them in your epistemic uncertainty budget. By definition, ontological uncertainty describes the errors that might occur because your model lacks relevant information about the hazard processes and their effects. He remarked that trying to assess the potential for ontological uncertainty is a very subjective problem because it represents the potential for a surprise—for something that is outside the center, body, and range of the forecasting model. He illustrated the concept of an ontological error by an earthquake that occurs at an unsuspected location or with a magnitude outside the range of the model's epistemic uncertainty. Dr. Scarlat observed that sometimes bounding events can be defined and then that could be fed into a test of the analysis, and she inquired if this is the kind of model that PG&E is developing. Dr. Jordan replied that he did not believe that exploring ontological uncertainty was an explicit part of the PG&E model development program, noting that the issue of ontological uncertainty has not been widely discussed within the hazard community in general.

Commenting on the discussion about PG&E's assignment of 'unknown' to the Recommendation impacts, Dr. Marshall observed that several of those impacts involve the proposed geodetic work. He stated his belief that the geodetic modeling of the current SSC can provide an important independent test of the model. He speculated that the PG&E said the impacts are unknown because, if the SSC fits the geodetic data, then the model is validated and no changes have to be made (low impact), whereas, if it does not, the requisite model changes may affect the hazard values (high impact). In contrast, the SRT considers model validation to have a positive (medium) impact because it improves our confidence in the SSC model. Dr. Marshall stated that, when he read 'unknown' for the geodetic impacts, he did not interpret this as PG&E saying the geodetic studies are unimportant, but rather that PG&E is unwilling to say what the impact is going to be until at least some preliminary work has been done.

Dr. Peterson invited PG&E to provide feedback on the discussion related to the Recommendations and also in particular to clarify what the path forward will be on Recommendation 2.

Director of Geosciences for PG&E Mr. Jeff Bachhuber was recognized. Mr. Bachhuber stated in response to Dr. Meshkati's comment about the use of "unknown" with reference to the impact that the term is used because PG&E needs to collect data and perform a sensitivity analysis to develop an understanding of the impact. He confirmed that PG&E has yet to make its determination of a low, medium, or high impact and therefore use of "unknown" is appropriate. He stated as data is collected and sensitivity studies are performed PG&E will report periodically and this will require investigations to take place over a two to three year time period to collect enough data to be able to perform the sensitivity studies. As sensitivity studies are completed PG&E can provide periodic update reports so the DCISC can see the process and understand how the review is developing. Consultant McWhorter asked about what timeframe Mr. Bachhuber believes would be appropriate for a future update to the Committee on progress and Mr. Bachhuber replied that PG&E is targeting the June 2026 public meeting to present what has been collected and processed to that time, including the tornado plots.

Mr. Bachhuber remarked PG&E will also be evaluating a comment made by Dr. Johnson concerning using a weight of 100% for the cross Hosgri Fault slope slip in an evaluation and he reported PG&E performed that evaluation and reported on the results last year and by using the hazard model PG&E had at that time, giving the 100% weight to the cross Hosgri Fault slope slip produced only a slight and insignificant increase in the hazard. Mr. Bachhuber stated now that PG&E has updated the hazard model, the evaluation will be rerun and presented to the DCISC in June 2026.

In response to Dr. Peterson's request to discuss Recommendation 2 in terms of the path forward, given that PG&E and the SRT are not aligned on Recommendation 2, Mr. Bachhuber stated on PG&E's alternate approach is to collect data to directly date the age of the shelf and he stated one of the first sensitivity tests will be to evaluate the potential impact of the subsidence. Dr. Peterson commented he approves of this approach because it means there is alignment between SRT and PG&E on Recommendation 2 and a path forward and moreover the possibility of a presentation to the DCISC in June 2026 on this topic.

Mr. Bachhuber reported PG&E evaluated each of the SRT Recommendations and stated he believes PG&E has developed a well-functioning process for the Recommendations and a response and that PG&E appreciates receiving the SRT input as it will definitely help build out PG&E's models. He stated he anticipates much of the work will confirm what PG&E has been already developing in its previous studies.

Dr. Peterson then called for comments from member of the public.

Dr. Bruce Gibson was recognized. Dr. Gibson identified himself as the Second District Supervisor for the County of San Luis Obispo and a member of the IPRP. He stated in that role he would speak to the issues raised by Dr. Scarlat, which he commented are essential. He stated he finds it interesting that as a technical member of the IPRP and a local elected official a significant part of his role is making the translation to the lay public on the consequences of this technical work. He reported he is not an expert in seismic hazard as his work in seismology was in a different area. Dr. Gibson stated Dr. Jordan raised an important point about the probabilistic nature of seismic hazard analysis. Dr. Gibson stated it is his understanding of the Bird Critique that the kinematics of the tectonics there, that is the amount of slip that might be seen accommodated in the Irish Hills, is relatively low and much lower than the slip that is seen on the Hosgri Fault. As such, the likely contribution to the seismic hazard is relatively low. He returned to the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis and commented that while the potential for the probability of a significant event threatening the plant is low it is not zero and this raises the question whether probabilistic seismic hazard analysis is the right foundation for public policy. Dr. Gibson remarked if events occur that have an extremely low probability they can have exceedingly huge impacts and he has a deep concern that the ontological uncertainty should be resolved as soon as possible. He mentioned that the tornado diagram in his view represents epistemic uncertainty and the ground motions and Hosgri slip rate are the things that need to be ascertained, but the potential contribution to the hazard from the Irish Hills is likely not shown on the tornado diagram because of the ontological uncertainty.

Dr. Gibson commented as he looks at PG&E's responses and the SRT's continued discussion with PG&E that a three-year timeline for the sensitivity analysis is something he would like to see accelerated because of the need to reduce uncertainty and to come to a better understanding. He commented the implications for his constituents and the residents of this County are huge and he observed that anything that the DCISC could do to push this timeline forward to alleviate the ontological uncertainty and to put it into perspective with the epistemic uncertainties would be greatly appreciated. Dr. Gibson remarked that the most significant impacts from earthquakes during his lifetime have come from the Sylmar earthquake in 1971, the Northridge earthquake in 1994, and the Coalinga earthquake in 1987 and for those events it was not known that the transpression was great enough to actually trigger a very significant earthquake. He stated the geologic structure of the Irish Hills is not known completely or well enough to rule out a significant earthquake at a particular level of certainty, although the kinematics suggest the possibility that there is not enough energy to cause a problem. Dr. Gibson stated it is his position that this question should be resolved quickly.

Dr. Peterson reported the plant is engineered extraordinarily robustly from a structural and mechanical engineering perspective and people familiar with structural response have expressed this opinion. He remarked that when challenged as to what plant components might fail in a seismic event and what would the effect be the response is generally to refer to the vulnerability of failure of the Turbine Building and its safety-related equipment. Dr. Peterson commented that this where one gets into the strategies around managing these ontological risks because when considering beyond design basis accidents these are frequently caused by things that were missed by the engineers not things that exceeded some low probability. He reported this is the reason that the DCISC has posed numerous questions to PG&E on the FLEX response of having equipment staged and available, but you also need the people which is why the Committee has had a strong focus on work place seismic safety at the plant, and is hoping that seismic safety is employed in their homes as well because during beyond design basis events the workforce at the plant could be distracted because of deep concern about what is happening with their families.

Dr. Scarlat inquired of Dr. Marshall as to whether the two or three year timeline was driven by resource allocation priorities or the time required for use of state of the art technology. Dr. Marshall replied that people have to do this work and have to make time available and these things end up taking time and this is especially true for geodetic work for which Dr. Marshall stated multiple people will need to be involved. Dr. Marshall stated that does not mean there will not be any results for three years and he expressed his opinion there are some aspects of the Recommendations that can be done in the next year, such as PG&E reporting that the SSM model has been created and results will be reported in June 2026. Dr. Marshall commented that to complete these studies it is probably going to take several years. Mr. Bachhuber reported the model PG&E has built already was the subject of an aggressive program and there are multiple studies occurring at the same time involving significant review processes including third party review. He remarked there needs to be confidence in the data developed and if the process is rushed there will be a lack of confidence in the data and in the review process. He stated PG&E will be reporting as data is collected to a level where the sensitivity analysis on specific items can be performed and PG&E will be periodically providing updates, including at the June 2026 DCISC public meeting and this will include sensitivity studies once PG&E has collected the data. Dr. Scarlat observed that the point made by Mr. Bachhuber about third party review and proper work and the impact that accelerating would have on the quality of the work is important. Mr. Bachhuber remarked PG&E has in the past stated that studies benefit when they have been put through professional publications because then they're referenceable and it brings them to a higher level and PG&E has plans that these studies will result in peer review journal papers.

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated as he watched this process starting from the initial contentions made in the Bird Critique he was very impressed with the evolution of the process and the fact that PG&E has been quite responsive to the Committee and by the response of the Committee in assembling the SRT. Referring to Dr. Gibson's remarks he reported Californians for Green Nuclear Power also interact with the public and have a booth at the San Luis Obispo downtown farmer's market. He summarized his understanding of this material by saying when a major earthquake occurs he would much rather be at DCPPP than any other place in San Luis Obispo County because it is so well engineered for any plausible and defensible earthquake. Dr. Nelson commented that each

time he travels to Sacramento he makes a point of stopping at Cholame, as Cholame is where the San Andreas Fault intersects Highway 41. Dr. Nelson stated while there he inspects a piece of gas transmission pipeline that he believes was ordered to be taken above ground to facilitate repairs after the next earthquake on the San Andreas Fault and he continues to assess how the pipeline has been gradually bending more and more through a process called a seismic creep. Dr. Nelson observed the San Luis Obispo area is a living seismic laboratory which has assisted him in achieving a perspective of its seismic evolution over a period of the last 3,800 years. Dr. Nelson closed his remarks by stating he is impressed by the DCISC and by PG&E's activities.

Ms. Linda Seeley of Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Seeley stated her understanding that the SRT was assembled because of Dr. Bird's report and that report was subsidized by San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace due to the group's concern about how much was known about the seismic risk at Diablo Canyon. She commented that as an all-volunteer, non-profit organization Mothers for Peace had to raise the funds to pay a renowned expert to look at the data and now there is a whole set of data forthcoming about the seismic conditions at Diablo Canyon. She commented it was ironic to her that it would take a non-profit group of all volunteers to have this happen and it also concerns her because PG&E was willing to go ahead and give assurances about DCP's seismic safety and then after the DCISC assembled the SRT, PG&E now plans on hiring one or two members of the SRT. Ms. Seeley expressed her opinion that this is a very bad idea and she stated her belief the DCISC needs to keep an independent panel of seismic experts so that the DCISC can retain the ability to challenge PG&E's assumptions. She stated when the SRT members are hired by PG&E they lose that independent perspective and she commented she detects a too-close relationship now between the members of the SRT and PG&E which she acknowledged happens in a working relationship even if on opposing sides of the issue, such as with Mothers for Peace and PG&E. She remarked that over the years she has become very familiar with people at PG&E and likes them tremendously and feels very comfortable with them, but she observed true independence requires vigilance. Ms. Seeley stated concerning ontological uncertainty that this is what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld referred to when he stated there should not be unknown unknowns and she applies this principle to the review of safety of a nuclear power plant operating while sitting on unknown faults. She implored the Committee to remember its independent role and its remit to be a defender of the public and not a defender of PG&E and not to endorse PG&E's safety message.

Ms. Jane Swanson was recognized. Ms. Swanson stated regarding testing of surveillance Capsule B for the degree of embrittlement of Unit 1, that earlier during this meeting PG&E stated the results of the testing of Capsule B will be reported to the DCISC sometime in May but those results will not be reported to the NRC until sometime in the fall. She questioned the reason for this delay and PG&E's justification for withholding the test results from the federal regulator for several months. She asked when the results will be available to the public which has been awaiting this information for over two decades. Ms. Swanson stated her understanding that the test results will be submitted confidentially to the DCISC but will not be publicly available until they are submitted to the NRC and she wonders why these results cannot be made public from the beginning and what is the reason for withholding the results from the public. Dr. Scarlat replied and commented that independence and the layers of review that happen with every technical document are very important and during the presentation the DCISC received information about how the engineering tools are used in policy making. Dr. Scarlat stated her

opinion that it would be unwise to issue a report that may influence public policy in anything other than its final form and ready for public comment. Dr. Scarlat stated it was her understanding the timing of the release of the Capsule B test results does not impact timely decision-making as the NRC would have indicated if that were the case and the timeline is following the NRC's expectation.

Mr. Ace Hoffman was recognized. Mr. Hofman stated the DCISC has stated that its mandate is to make sure that the plant runs safely. He stated his belief that this was not accurate as it was his understanding the DCISC's mandate was to ensure that the public is protected from the plant and that the public is safe and therefore the DCISC needs to consider everything that is related to the plant and specifically spent fuel. Ms. Hoffman referred to the waste generated from the operation of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) which he stated he has been trying for twelve years to eliminate. He asked if nuclear waste is safe why SONGS spent fuel cannot be transferred to DCPD and he observed if DCPD were to operate for an extended period many more dry cask storage containers, between 300 and 400, will be needed. He commented that the analysis of spent fuel needs to consider addressing 400 casks and he questioned whether the casks would crash into or otherwise impact each other.

Mr. Hoffman then commented regarding drones that the greater concern is not over a single drone but with a drone swarm with highly sophisticated equipment and he stated he has no idea how to plan to protect against that.

Mr. Hoffman remarked that PG&E spokespersons used to refer to DCNPP, that is Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, and he commented their references are now to DCPD, for Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

Mr. Hoffman stated he was very impressed yesterday by all the PG&E personnel making presentations and he appreciated, enjoyed and was impressed by what appeared to him to be honest opinions and openness in some cases by persons with whom he does not agree. He stated he wished he could say the same for the Members of the DCISC with whom he was not impressed.

Dr. Scarlat read from the Committee's Charter concerning the scope of the Committee responsibilities to review DCPD operations for the purpose of assessing the safety of operations, which includes the plant and the spent fuel, and to make recommendations appropriate to enhance safety of operations. She remarked that should this language need to be changed that would be a separate discussion. She observed there is also an outreach scope for the Committee that the Committee should undertake public outreach in the affected community. Dr. Scarlat observed it is PG&E's responsibility to ensure that the public is protected as the DCISC's scope is to review the operation of the plant and make recommendations with regards to safety and spent fuel is certainly included as part of that scope.

Dr. Peterson observed the public comment period has now concluded and the Committee then moved on to regulatory and administrative matters, which will include the Committee making its decision about the Recommendations. He asked Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie to continue with the presentations for this public meeting.

G. Regulatory and Administrative Matters Including Funding for Committee's Current and Future Activities, and Consideration of Committee Policies on Committee Response to DCPD Emergencies and a Process Map for Committee Recommendations, Concerns, Conclusions and Observations, Ratification of Agreements for Consulting Services with Mr. Richard St. Onge and Dr. G. Kenneth Koves, and Other Committee Discussion.

Mr. Rathie reported the Committee has received PG&E's Response to the 35th Annual Report and he reported that in addition to the nine Recommendations generated by the SRT there were six other Recommendations in the 35th Annual Report and PG&E responded to all fifteen Recommendations. Mr. Rathie stated a motion would be appropriate to accept PG&E's Response. Dr. Peterson commented that specific actions in response to the Recommendations include receiving an update from PG&E on the responses to the seismic Recommendations during the June 2026 public meeting. Mr. Rathie reported Resolution 2026-04 has been prepared directing the SRT to submit a preliminary evaluation report, in letter form, based upon the comments received and the viewgraphs used during the SRT's presentation at this public meeting. He commented that when this preliminary evaluation is completed, in accordance with the Resolution adopted at the October 2025 public meeting Drs. Marshall and Oskin will be released from their contractual obligations to the DCISC and be free to pursue other research opportunities with PG&E and others. Dr. Scarlat requested Resolution 2026-04 be amended to ask for the SRT's evaluation to also respond to the public comment received at this meeting and she questioned how to ensure the possibility of independent review by the DCISC in the future. Dr. Peterson commented the Committee will be retaining the services of Dr. Jordan as an expert Technical Consultant to advise the Committee on seismic-related matters. Dr. Peterson stated that while the DCISC has undertaken a comprehensive review of the Bird Critique it is not the Committee's function to perform seismic hazard and research studies but rather to review those activities conducted by PG&E and the IPRP. The Committee opted to review the Bird Critique because it was not otherwise going to be reviewed in the level of detail the Committee thought was needed. Dr. Meshkati commented the Committee is privileged to be able to continue its association with Dr. Jordan and Dr. Jordan will assist with monitoring the next steps by PG&E and the latest IPRP Report. [IPRP Response to 2024 PG&E Updated Seismic Assessment issued on February 19, 2026.] Dr. Meshkati stated his view that it is a good outcome for Drs. Marshall and Oskin to have the opportunity to work with PG&E.

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. In response to a comment by Dr. Scarlat on intervenor compensation Dr. Nelson stated it is an arcane and challenging process and some politics appear to be involved. He reported Californians for Green Nuclear Power has not received anything in terms of intervenor compensation since 2018 while other groups opposing DCPD have received large sums. Dr. Nelson stated he strongly supports the Committee's decision to sever contractual relations with Dr. Oskin and Marshall and to continue to work with Dr. Jordan.

Ms. Linda Seeley of Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Seeley she appreciated the explanation of the Committee's next actions and she stated the Committee releasing Drs. Oskin and Marshall while retaining the services of Dr. Jordan made sense to her.

On a motion by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Scarlat, a motion was introduced and passed unanimously to accept PG&E's Response as supplemented to the DCISC's 35th Annual Report and to adopt Resolution 2026-04 regarding the next steps in the process of the review conducted by the SRT.

Mr. Rathie stated that during the discussion on the January 2026 Fact Finding Report there were amendments made to the report and the report contained a recommendation to the CPUC expressing Committee support for the funding of the Feedwater Heater Replacement Project. He reported it was his understanding the funding for that project would be addressed in a CPUC proceeding concerning allocation of the volumetric performance fees which may have a component regarding funding for replacing the feedwater heaters and the matter would be open for comments through March 31, 2026. Mr. Rathie expressed his view that the Committee's Recommendation concerning the Feedwater Heater Replacement Project should be expeditiously transmitted to the CPUC Energy Division and not wait for the completion of the 36th Annual Report which, per past practice, incorporates and transmits the Committee's Recommendations to the CPUC and others. He stated that Resolution 2026-03 provides for approval of the Fact Finding Reports presented at this meeting and for the transmittal of the Committee's Recommendation on the Feedwater Heater Replacement Project to the CPUC Energy Division following this public meeting.

Dr. Gene Nelson of California for Nuclear Power was recognized and stated Californians for Green Nuclear Power approves and endorses the course of action described by Mr. Rathie.

Ms. Linda Seeley of Mothers for Peace was recognized. In response to Ms. Seeley's question Mr. Rathie replied it was his understanding that the CPUC proceeding, if it takes up the issue of the Feedwater Heater Replacement Project, would be in the nature of an allocation of volumetric performance fees not an increase in those fees.

Mr. Robert Sarvey was recognized. Mr. Sarvey stated he was concerned that PG&E has convinced the CPUC that the DCISC made no Recommendations in its 34th Annual Report. He stated the DCISC Recommendations are important as any recommended upgrades need to be evaluated by the CPUC in terms of the collective costs of the project and a determination made as to cost effectiveness. [There were two Recommendations made to PG&E and one Recommendation made to the CPUC in the DCISC's 34th Annual Report and the Report was transmitted to the CPUC by Federal Express on December 30, 2024.]

On a motion by Dr. Meshkati, seconded by Dr. Scarlat, Resolution 2026-03 was unanimously adopted.

Mr. Rathie reported concerning financial matters and stated the Committee in 2026 is under a new baseline funding methodology, based upon an average of Committee expenditures for 2023, 2024 and 2025, that has produced a significant increase in Committee funding over the previous allocations. This new method will continue for future calendar year funding. Mr. Rathie cautioned the Committee would still be well advised to operate within its means each year and in response to Dr. Scarlat's query he stated that should the Committee overspend its funding allocation in any year, under the new methodology that amount is recovered in the next

calendar year. Should funds remain unspent at the end of a calendar year, those funds are remitted for credit to the ratepayers who provide the Committee' funding. Mr. Rathie expressed his appreciating to PG&E for its cooperation during the period from 2023 through 2025 in helping to ensure the Committee continued to have adequate funding resources during a period of substantial extra work due to the decision to extend operation of DCPD. He reported the Committee has not had to curtail or postpone any of its safety review activities. In response to Dr. Scarlet's request Mr. Rathie reviewed the source of DCISC funding and reported the Committee's funds are provided by PG&E ratepayers and after 2025 by ratepayers of all local serving entities under CPUC jurisdiction that benefit from DCPD extended operations. The Committee funding comes through PG&E but not from PG&E as DCISC funding is part of PG&E general rate cases.

Mr. Rathie reported there are two Committee Policies for discussion. The first is a policy setting from the procedures for a Committees response to an emergency declaration by DCPD and the second is a policy to lay out a process map and framework for workflow to define and address recommendations, concerns, conclusions and observations.

Concerning the Response to Diablo Canyon Emergencies policy, draft Policy No. 9, Mr. Rathie reported he has been working with Dr. Justin Cochran, Senior Nuclear Policy Advisor and Emergency Coordinator in the office of the Chair of the California Energy Commission, on a list of questions to be provided to the California Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) Radiological Protection Unit (RPU) prior to setting up a remote meeting with CalOES-RPU representatives. [A list of questions was subsequently submitted to Dr. Cochran on March 13, 2026.] Mr. McWhorter reported PG&E has accepted all the proposed changes made to the latest draft of Policy No. 9, included with the agenda packet for this meeting, and Dr. Meshkati after discussing the matter with Dr. Cochran and having had the opportunity to inspect the alternate emergency response facilities located on Kendall Road he has withdrawn his objection to the provisions for provisions for access for the Committee observers. **Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones suggested a meeting during a future fact finding with the Director and Manager of the Emergency Planning organization, Mr. Jordan Tyman and Mr. Andy Warwick, would be productive as to whether there could be an opportunity to test the DCISC policy during the Committee's observation of a future emergency exercise.** No further action was taken on this policy.

Concerning Committee Policy 8, Process Map for Recommendations, Concerns, Conclusions & Observations, Mr. Rathie reported that shortly before this public meeting Dr. Scarlet provided a revised draft with a table creating a process for public comment as part of the workflow process which was provided to the Members and Consultants. Mr. McWhorter commented that the current process for addressing public comments is through the use of **bold** for directory items identified by the members from comments from the public in the Minutes of the public meetings. In response to Dr. Scarlet's inquiry about the origin and identification of Concerns, Mr. Rathie and Mr. McWhorter reported that Concerns are identified and emerge in context of development of the executive summary as part of the process of developing each annual report and Concerns, as opposed to Recommendations to the Committee or to PG&E, are not generally identified in fact finding reports or on the Open Items List. Mr. Rathie stated concerning Observations that this is a new term suggested by Dr. Meshkati and Observations

have never been documented or identified in fact finding reports, the Open Items List or in annual reports. Dr. Meshkati stated his suggestion for identifying Observations is that they would be flexible and have a status lower than a Recommendation in context of an annual report and represent an item or issue which the Committee wants to bring to the attention of the public. Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones commented PG&E will react to each item as classified by the Committee but needs to understand the meaning of the terms and the Committee's expectations for PG&E to document its response to each of those classified categories. Dr. Scarlet stated her expectation at present is that PG&E would only need to respond to Recommendations. By consensus, the Members decided to adopt the Committee Policy No. 8 Process Map for Recommendations, Concerns, Conclusions & Observations subject to future review and possible revision.

Mr. Rathie then turned to the final item under this agenda item, ratification of Consulting Agreements for Mr. Richard St. Onge and Dr. G. Kenneth Koves. He reviewed the scopes of service for each engagement from the Consulting Agreements that were included in the public agenda packet for this meeting. On a motion introduced by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Meshkati, with Dr. Scarlet abstaining, the Agreements with Mr. St. Onge and Dr. Koves were ratified by the Committee.

Concluding his remarks, Mr. Rathie reported he was recently notified of the receipt of a draft of the Annual Committee Member Compensation Advice Letter for 2026 which PG&E is required to file annually on April 1 justifying the compensation furnished to Members of the DCISC as being commensurate with the compensation PG&E furnishes for similar services.

H. Review of the Open Items List and Status of Recommendations.

Dr. Peterson requested Consultant McWhorter lead a review of items on the Open Items List, which Dr. Peterson described as an important tool used by the Committee to set priorities, track and to follow issues, concerns, information requests and activities identified for subsequent action or receipt during fact-finding or public meetings. Mr. McWhorter reported newly added or changed items since the October 2025 public meeting were shown in *red italics* while items for which follow up was scheduled at the next three fact finding meetings prior to the February 2026 public meeting were shown in *yellow*, and items which were deleted or changed were shown in ~~strike-out~~ on the version of the Open Items List included with the agenda packet and certain items on the list were identified for closure. He reported the Open Items List now consists of four sections: open items, recommendations to the Committee, recommendations to PG&E, and plant systems and components.

Items discussed or concerning which action was taken included the following:

Open Items List²⁷

<u>Item</u>	<u>Re:</u>	<u>Action Taken/Next Action</u>
<u>Open Items:</u>		
PI-3	Application of AI	Add language re NRC Training Foundation Models Review 10/25PM 5 & 6 for new language
SF-7	Storage of >Class C Waste	Add language re generated during decommissioning activities
SF-8	EPRI Study – Cask Release	5/26 FF – add language
SF-9	Aging Management/	3/26 FF Cask Corrosion
SC-14	Monitor IPRP	Next Action 6/26PM re New Report
SC-16	SRT Recommendations 1-9	Add New Item re Follow-up - Next Action 6/26PM
SC-17	Seismic Hazard	Add New Item re review impact of new seismic hazard through the seismic PRA
SC-18?	Overall Seismic Safety	Add New Item
NR-6	Rev NRC Insp.Genl. etc.	NRC & NRC-OIG Presentations Next Action 6/26PM
EMB-3	Capsule B	Next Action 5/26FF [later deferred]
6/24PM-4	Public Tours	Revise language - Next Action TBD
2/25PM-34	Open Items/Process	Close
2/25PM-36	SRT Report & Hazard Eval.	Close
10/25PM-5	AI – Neutron Search	Next Action 3/26FF then close to Genl Item PI-3
10/25PM-22	CalOES Coordination	On going – keep open
10/25PM-23	Tribal Representation	On going – keep open

Recommendations to the DCISC:

D1/25FF-3.9A	Employee Safety Survey	Next Action 4/26FF – keep open
D2/2/25 – 3.11	Staffing NPDES/Clean Water Chemistry Dept. Interfaces	Next Action 3/26FF
D12/15/25FF-3.3	Feedwater Heat Exchanger Health	Next Action 4/26FF
D1/26FF -3.1	Feedwater Heater Recommendation	Close

Recommendations to PG&E:

AR23/24AR23-2	Capsule B Test Results	Next Action 5/26FF [Later deferred]
P8/25FF3-1	Meetings with SNO	Next Action 4/26FF [Later deferred]
SRT-9	Hazard Model	Next Action 6/26PM/then close below
SRT -1 thru 9	SRT Recommendations	Close All to SC-16

²⁷ Key to the abbreviations used: Fact-finding (FF), Public Meeting (PM).

DCPP Systems Review:

DC Power Update asap
Public Engagement ROS to work with L. Darden & K. Koves as an administrative matter

XXIV PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

There were no public comments.

XXIV CONCLUDING REMARKS & DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
OF FUTURE DCISC ACTIVITIES

- I. Future Actions by the Committee. Addressed above.
- J. Further Information to Obtain/Review. Addressed above.
- K. Confirmation of Future Site Visits, and Public Meetings.
 Addressed above.

XXV PUBLIC TOUR OF DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT

On the afternoon of Thursday, February 19, 2026, DCISC Members Drs. Meshkati, Peterson and Scarlat, together with Committee Technical Consultants Mr. McWhorter and Ms. Darden and Assistant Legal Counsel Mr. Rathie accompanied by eighteen members of the public participated in a tour of Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). The members of the public responded to the advertisement concerning the public tour placed in a local area newspaper and on the DCISC's website. The group assembled in the Port San Luis Conference Room for a brief introduction by Mr. Rathie of the DCISC and its Members and Technical Consultants and a discussion of the appointment of its members and the operations and responsibilities of the Committee. Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones gave an informational presentation about the plant and the operation of DCPP as a nuclear power plant. An opportunity was provided for questions.

The group then boarded a bus for the ride to the plant. The bus entered the plant site through the Avila Gate and arrived at the parking area. The tour split into two groups and visited in turn the Simulator Facility, full-scale mock-up of the Unit 1 Control Room, and the Intake Structure at the Intake Cove where the plant pulls in and discharges cooling water from and to the Pacific Ocean and received information on plant operations and land stewardship. The tour participants then reboarded the bus and drove by the plant Fire Station on the way to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation for viewing and a description of the operation of the dry cask storage system for spent nuclear fuel and to view the locations for the storage of FLEX equipment and the electrical switchyards.

The group then departed DCPP for return to the Avila Beach and had the opportunity to discuss the plant with individual DCISC members and consultants.

XXVI ADJOURNMENT OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEENTH PUBLIC MEETING

There being no further business, the one hundred and thirteenth public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was adjourned following the conclusion of the public tour at 3:45 p.m.

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DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE**AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM****MEETING DATE:** June 17, 2026**AGENDA ITEM:** XXVI - J

AGENDA TITLE: Committee Regulatory, Administrative and Financial Matters, Public Outreach and Engagement, Interaction with Governmental Agencies, Consideration of New Committee Policy on Response to DCPD Emergencies, Amend Policy on Review of Fact Finding Reports, Ratify and Approve Contract Changes with Committee Consultants and Counsel and Other Committee Discussion.

CONSENT [☐]**ACTION** [☒]**INFORMATION** [☒]**Staff Summary:**

It is anticipated the Members, Technical Consultants and Legal Counsel will hold a discussion and receive information concerning administrative, regulatory, financial and contractual matters.

The Committee is also expected to consider adopting and amending Committee Policies including (I) adopting Policy No. 10 Committee Response to Diablo Canyon Emergencies, and (ii) an amending Policy No. 8 Review of Fact Finding Reports.

Member are also expected to consider contractual matters including amendment of Agreements for Dr. Mark Kirk, Dr. Thomas Jordan, Mr. Richard St. Onge and ratification of an Agreement for Legal Services with Mr. Robert Rathie to serve as DCISC Legal Counsel.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION:

Discussion and take such action, by motion or otherwise, and/or provide direction as appropriate.

RESPONSE TO DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT EMERGENCIES**Committee Emergency Response Purpose**

Inherent with the use of nuclear power is the very small likelihood of an emergency which may directly affect members of the general public. When an emergency occurs at Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP), the plant staff are expected to follow DCPP's pre-approved Emergency Plan and make a prompt declaration of an emergency to governing entities. The purpose of this document is to provide a plan of action for the DCISC ("Committee") members and staff to ensure the Committee has access to a timely and continuing flow of accurate information regarding the emergency and PG&E's response to the declaration of an emergency at DCPP. Should an emergency be declared by DCPP, it is desired for the Committee to have an advance plan for:

- A) Being promptly informed by Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) of any emergency declaration under DCPP's Emergency Plan,
- B) Responding in accordance with its constitutive charter to "review Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant operations for the purpose of assessing the safety of operations" while recognizing that the Committee serves as a State of California advisory body and has no role or authority as a participant under DCPP's Emergency Plan,
- C) Delineating its role and responsibilities in responding to inquiries from state and local agencies, and
- D) Referring inquiries from the public to the pre-determined sources of public information available under DCPP's Emergency Plan.

2. Committee Emergency Response Goals

The goals of the Committee's response include:

- A) Obtain a timely understanding of the nature of the emergency,
- B) Establish a relationship and regular flow of information and communications with PG&E necessary to monitor the emergency event and PG&E's implementation of its Emergency Plan,
- C) Gather information about the event and independently evaluate its significance and PG&E's management of the event using means and methods similar to the Committee's

- typical Fact-Finding Meetings in anticipation of reporting on and reviewing the event at the Committee's next Public Meeting, and
- D) When requested, gather any additional information necessary to provide advice or otherwise assist its appointing entities, state and local agencies [such as the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES), the County of San Luis Obispo Office of Emergency Services (SLO County)], or PG&E.

3. Committee Emergency Response Guiding Principles

The Committee's response shall be guided by the following principles:

- A) When responding to an emergency at DCPD, the Committee will always conduct its activities in compliance with the Committee's charter and DCPD's Emergency Plan.
- B) When responding to an emergency at DCPD, the Committee will always conduct its activities in a manner that does not interfere with PG&E's or offsite authorities' responses to the emergency.
- C) When responding to an emergency at DCPD and for the time period that emergency response activities are actively in progress, any information provided by PG&E with the advice that it is not otherwise in the public domain will be treated and considered as confidential information and will not be distributed to the general public by the DCISC.
- D) When responding to an emergency at DCPD, the Committee will not make any recommendations (as that term is used in the Committee's Charter) to PG&E during the event. Any potential recommendations that arise during the Committee's response activities will first be documented in a Fact-Finding Report and then presented for discussion and approval by the full Committee at a Public Meeting. As discussed in 2.D herein, Committee Members or staff may provide advice or other assistance if requested to do so.
- E) When responding to an inquiry from state or local agencies, while cognizant of its independence the Committee will strive to avoid bypassing the relationships between PG&E and the agencies that have been designated in the Emergency Plan.
- F) When responding to an inquiry from the public, the Committee may provide responses to the public that include and explain the nature and classification of the event and the Committee's monitoring role in response; however, the Committee will strive to refer inquiries for information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) as designated in the Emergency Plan to handle public communications.

4. Emergency Significance and Classifications

In the event of an off-normal condition at DCP, the plant's Emergency Plan will be used to analyze the significance of the event and classify it according to pre-established guidelines approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Under the Emergency Plan, the four classifications for declared emergencies (in increasing severity) are:

- A) Unusual Event (UE),
- B) Alert,
- C) Site Area Emergency (SAE), and
- D) General Emergency.

In general, only the highest two classifications (SAE and General Emergency) are expected to involve a possible release of radioactive material offsite. Additional details about the four classifications of declared emergencies under the Emergency Plan are contained in Enclosure 1.

5. Actions for PG&E

In the event of a declaration of an emergency at DCP under any one of the four classifications in the Emergency Plan, PG&E has agreed to take the following actions to support the DCISC in its response to the event:

- A) PG&E will promptly notify the Committee of any event declaration.
- B) PG&E will provide a point of contact, the "Designated Liaison," for coordinating the flow of timely event-related information to the Committee (typically the PG&E employee normally assigned to coordinate the DCISC's activities).
- C) If the Committee desires to send a member and/or staff to the vicinity of DCP to facilitate its gathering of information, PG&E will facilitate providing the Committee's representatives with access to the site and/or emergency response facilities as discussed in Section 3A through 3D herein. Unless otherwise directed by PG&E, it is expected that the Committee's representatives will first report to the Alternative Operations Support Center/Technical Support Center, located at 1250 Kendall Road, in San Luis Obispo, to be used as a staging area for the Committee's activities. From that staging area, the Designated Liaison should facilitate further access and information gathering by the Committee's representatives to the Joint Information Center. Further access to the

Emergency Operations Facility or plant site by the Committee's representatives will be assessed and determined by PG&E depending on emergency operations and event conditions. Vests identifying the wearer as a representative of the DCISC should be provided and worn when in emergency response facilities.

The methods and details of the above actions will be discussed and agreed upon in advance between PG&E and the Committee and may change from time to time. Such plans should be revisited annually at the first Committee fact finding conducted by the Committee Chair during the calendar year to verify that both parties continue to be in agreement, and any changes should be reviewed and approved as a part of a Fact-Finding report by the Committee at its next Public Meeting.

6. Actions for the Committee for an Unusual Event

In the event of the declaration of an Unusual Event (UE) as classified under the Emergency Plan, the Committee should respond as follows:

- A) Any Committee member or staff receiving notification of a UE from PG&E will immediately pass on such notification to all other Committee members and staff.
- B) The Committee Chair will be the lead member in coordinating the Committee's response.
- C) The Committee will request that PG&E identify its Designated Liaison to the Committee and request that the Designated Liaison provide the Committee with current information and updates relative to the cause of the UE, actions taken by PG&E, and responses to any Committee questions.
- D) The Committee will provide PG&E with the Committee's designated point of contact for requesting and receiving communications about the UE to and from PG&E. The Committee should strive to channel all communications and questions regarding the UE through the Committee's designated point of contact and PG&E's Designated Liaison.
- E) The Committee members and staff should communicate internally to independently review and analyze the information provided by PG&E to assess the safety significance of the UE and the appropriateness of the actions taken by PG&E.
- F) The information gathered and the Committee's review of the UE should be treated like any information gathered during a Fact-Finding Meeting and documented in a subsequent Fact-Finding Report and discussed at the Committee's next Public Meeting.
- G) If a DCISC Public Meeting is scheduled during a time overlapping with or immediately following the declaration of a UE at DCP, the Committee should consider suspending or

cancelling and rescheduling that Public Meeting to a more appropriate time following the completion of emergency response activities.

7. Actions for the Committee for an Alert, SAE, or General Emergency

In the event of the declaration of an Alert, SAE or General Emergency as classified under the Emergency Plan, the Committee should respond as follows:

- A) Any Committee member or staff receiving notification of an Alert, SAE, or General Emergency from PG&E will immediately pass on such notification to all other Committee members and staff.
- B) The Committee Chair will be the lead member in coordinating the Committee's response.
- C) The Committee will request that PG&E identify its Designated Liaison to the Committee and request that the Designated Liaison provide the Committee with current information relative to the cause of the event, actions taken by PG&E, and responses to any Committee questions.
- D) The Committee will provide PG&E with the Committee's designated point of contact for requesting and receiving communications about the event to and from PG&E. The Committee should strive to channel all communications and questions regarding the event through the Committee's designated point of contact and PG&E's Designated Liaison.
- E) The Committee members and staff should initially enter a monitoring posture without any Committee members or staff responding directly to the area.
- F) The Committee members and staff should communicate internally to independently review and analyze the information provided by PG&E to assess the safety significance of the event and the appropriateness of the actions taken by PG&E.
- G) Information gathered and the Committee's review of the event should be documented in a subsequent Fact-Finding Report and discussed at the Committee's next Public Meeting. As is typical for Fact-Finding Reports, any information declared by PG&E to be confidential will be protected from public disclosure; however, the information contained therein may be reviewed by the Committee and used to develop its conclusions relative to operational safety.
- H) If a DCISC Public Meeting is scheduled during a time overlapping with or immediately following the declaration of an emergency at DCP, the Committee should suspend or cancel and reschedule that Public Meeting to a more appropriate time following the completion of emergency response activities.

- I) The Committee should take any necessary actions to prepare for and respond to any requests from its appointing entities or other state or local entities regarding providing technical assistance in evaluating the safety significance of the event and actions taken under DCP's Emergency Plan subject to the discussion in 3.D herein.
- J) The Committee should consider drafting and providing a press release or distributing a statement to members of the public on its website (www.dccsc.org) regarding its monitoring role and referring members of the public to other websites where the public can gain additional information (as coordinated with PG&E's Designated Liaison). In any press release or statement to the public the Committee will adhere, to the extent practicable, to the discussion in Section 3.F herein.
- K) The Committee Chair may consider appointing a Special Fact-Finding Team, consisting of one member and one or two consultants (no more than three individuals), to respond to the area near DCP in order to independently and in-person gather information about the cause of the event, actions taken in response to the event, and interactions between PG&E and federal, state and local agencies. Typically, this decision would consider whether the event could be reviewed as a part of the Committee's next regularly scheduled Fact-Finding Meeting or whether the event warranted that a Special Fact-Finding Meeting should be initiated. It should be understood and expected that the process of designating a Special Fact-Finding Team and having them respond to the local area would likely require a minimum of one to three days before the team would be able to arrive in the area to begin its work, by which time the event and emergency response activities may be completed. Any Special Fact-Finding Team responding to an event should plan to begin its work at the staging area discussed in 5.C herein and facilitate its gathering of information subject to the discussion in Section 3.A through 3.D herein.
- L) If so appointed, a Special Fact-Finding Team should assume the responsibilities as the central point of contact for the Committee with PG&E's Designated Liaison, and the Special Fact-Finding Team should provide regular updates to other Committee members and staff.
- M) If so appointed, a Special Fact-Finding Team should coordinate all of the Committee's activities with regards to inquiries from state or local agencies and the public under Sections 7.I and 7.J herein.
- N) If so appointed, a Special Fact-Finding Team should document all non-confidential information gathered in a Special Fact-Finding Report to be discussed and approved at the Committee's next Public Meeting. Any information declared by PG&E to be

confidential will be protected from public disclosure; however, the information contained therein may be reviewed by the Special Fact-Finding Team and used to develop its conclusions relative to operational safety.

- 0) The Committee should consider additional follow-up to review any event's causes and corrective actions at additional special or regularly scheduled Fact-Finding Meetings with subsequent follow-up in Fact-Finding Reports to be discussed at future Public Meetings of the Committee.

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Enclosure 1

Classifications of Emergency Events (from www.nrc.gov)

A. Unusual Event (UE) – A situation which could potentially degrade the plant's level of safety or indicate a security threat to the facility. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite actions are expected unless safety systems degrade further. This classification ensures the first steps for future response are being carried out, that operations staff are ready, and that the plant systematically handles unusual event information and decision-making.

B. Alert – Events are in progress or have occurred which have (or could) substantially degrade the plant safety, or a security event that could threaten site personnel or damage to site equipment. Any offsite releases of radioactive material that could occur are expected to be minimal. This classification ensures that emergency personnel are ready and available to respond if the situation becomes more serious or to perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required. It also ensures that offsite authorities receive current information on plant status.

C. Site Area Emergency (SAE) – Events which have caused (or likely will cause) major failures of plant functions that protect the public or involve security events with intentional damage or malicious acts that could lead to the likely failure of (or prevent effective access to) equipment needed to protect the public. Any offsite releases of radioactive material are expected to remain below public exposure guideline levels beyond the site boundary. An SAE declaration ensures: a) emergency response centers are staffed; b) monitoring teams are dispatched; c) personnel required for evacuating nearby areas are at duty stations if the situation becomes more serious; d) proper consultation with offsite authorities; and e) government authorities are providing updates to the public.

D. General Emergency - Events which: a) have caused (or shortly will cause) substantial reactor core damage, with the potential for uncontrolled releases of radioactive material, or b) involve security events that deny plant staff physical control of the facility. Offsite releases can be reasonably expected to exceed public exposure guideline levels beyond the site boundary. A General Emergency declaration initiates protective actions for the public including: a) on-going dose projections by the licensee and offsite organizations; b) additional protective measures as necessitated by potential or actual releases; c) consultation with offsite authorities; and d) updates to the public by government authorities.

REVIEW OF FACT FINDING REPORTS

1. The Consultant or Consultants who participated in the fact finding visit or are involved in preparation of the report of the fact finding (referred to herein in the singular as the “Consultant,” as each consultant may act in the other’s stead in this process) prepares the initial draft, prominently marked as such, of the fact finding report in MS Word format. If a report is prepared by more than one Consultant those Consultants may share drafts between themselves and then provide a complete draft, which may also include text provided to the Consultant by the participating member (the “Member”), for the Member’s review, revision, and comments. The Consultant and Member may exchange drafts until the Member approves a draft.
2. The draft report as approved by the Member is then provided by the Consultant to the other two members and to the other consultants (i.e., those not involved in preparation of the report) for their review. The other members and consultants review the report and provide suggested revisions and comments by separate email (i.e., without copying each other or the Member who conducted the fact finding) directly to the Consultant.
3. The Consultant, using the MS Word Track Changes feature, then incorporates as appropriate the revisions and comments of the other members and consultants into the draft circulated for that purpose without attribution as to the source and provides the revised draft by separate email to the other members and consultants who then have the opportunity to provide additional comment or revisions to the Consultant. If further revisions or comments are received this process may repeat until each of the other members and consultants either no longer respond or indicate that no further changes will be forthcoming.

4. Using Track Changes, but without attribution as to the source, the Consultant then revises the draft previously approved by the Member to incorporate the other members and consultants' revisions or comments and provides that revised draft directly to the Member.
5. Using Track Changes either the Member or the Consultant at the Member's direction either accepts or rejects each revision or comment and produces a "clean" public meeting draft.
6. The Consultant then provides the public meeting draft, prominently labeled as such, to the other members and consultants and to the Legal Counsel's office (preferably by individual email, but if the email has multiple addressees the advice "Please do not use reply to all if responding to this email" should be prominently included at the beginning of the email.) Prior to the next public meeting the Legal Counsel's office will prominently post the public meeting draft of each report on the Committee's website www.dcisc.org on the homepage.
7. After a presentation by a Consultant at the next public meeting and receipt of public comments on the presentation, and after a motion (preferably made by the Member who conducted the fact finding) is made and seconded to approve the report, discussion is then in order concerning any further changes proposed to the public meeting draft. The decision on whether to accept any such changes in the final version of the fact finding report to be voted upon is the sole prerogative of the Member who conducted the fact finding (whether or not that Member was also the made the motion for approval). Approval of the report requires the affirmative vote of at least two members.
8. Approval of a fact finding report at a public meeting constitutes approval of the recommendations made therein, if any, to the Committee and/or to PG&E.

(Adopted October 2024, Amended June 2026)

AMENDMENT No. 1
to
AGREEMENT FOR CONSULTING SERVICES
WITH THOMAS H. JORDAN Ph.D.

This Amendment No. 1 to the Agreement for Consulting Services between the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (“Committee”) and Consultant Thomas H. Jordan Ph.D.. (“Consultant”) is made as of June 17, 2026.

In consideration of the mutual promises contained herein, Committee and Consultant agree that the Terms and Conditions set forth herein are incorporated into the Agreement for Consulting Services between Committee and Consultant dated February 19, 2025 (the “Agreement”). Only the lettered recitals or numbered paragraphs of said Agreement which are being added, deleted, modified or otherwise revised are set forth in this Amendment to read as amended.

Recital F.1 is added to read: “At the June 10-11, 2025, public meeting the Seismic Review Team (Drs. Jordan, Marshall and Oskin) presented its “Review of the Bird Critique” containing nine recommendations to PG&E and at the October 22-23, 2025 public meeting the Committee formally adopted the SRT’s recommendations for inclusion in the Committee’s 35th Annual Report. On November 7, 2025, PG&E submitted a 1-paragraph Response to the SRT Recommendations and on February 12, 2026, PG&E submitted an 11-page Supplemental Response detailing its plans to address the SRT recommendations. On March 12, 2026, the SRT provided its Comments on the PG&E Supplemental Response. On April 1, 2026, the Committee termination its contractual relationship with Drs. Marshall and Oskin, thereby disbanding the SRT.”

Recital F.2 is added to read: “The Committee wishes to continue to engage the services of Consultant for those tasks more fully described in Exhibit A-1.

Recital H is deleted.

Paragraph 1 “Scope of Services” and “Exhibit A “Scope of Services” referenced therein are deleted and replaced in their entirety to read as follows:

“Scope of Services. Consultant shall provide to the Committee those services set forth in “Exhibit A-1 Scope of Services” which is attached to this Amendment. Such services may be modified from time to time, as required, by a written amendment to Exhibit A-1 which shall be signed by both parties.”

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee has caused this Amendment to be signed and executed on its behalf, and Consultant has signed and executed this Amendment the day and year written below.

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DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

By _____
Per F. Peterson, Chair

June 17, 2026
Dated

CONSULTANT

By _____
Thoms H. Jordan

June 17, 2026
Dated

EXHIBIT “A-1”

SCOPE OF SERVICES

Work to be performed for the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (“DCISC”) in accordance with the Fourth Restatement of the Charter for the DCISC approved by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).

1. This “Exhibit A-1 Scope of Services A-1” replaces and supersedes “Exhibit A Scope of Services” with the Scope of Services with the February 19, 2025 Agreement between Consultant and Committee.
2. Review, assess and provide advice to the DCISC concerning PG&E’s actions and the schedule for those actions with reference to the DCISC’s Seismic Review Team’s Comments on the Supplemental Response from PG&E to the Nine DCISC/Seismic Review Team Recommendations contained in the DCISC’s 35th Annual Report. Consider and advise the DCISC on future actions by the DCISC and/or PG&E regarding the Nine Recommendations contained in the DCISC’s Seismic Review Team Report and otherwise monitor and assess how such actions might or should be incorporated into the Diablo Canyon Power Plant’s (DCPP) Long-Term Seismic Program.
3. Provide support to the Committee from time to time as requested by a Committee Member and agreed by Consultant. This may include, but is not necessarily limited to, participating either remotely or in person in Committee meetings including public meetings and fact-finding visits to Diablo Canyon Power Plant or elsewhere; reviewing documents including, but not necessarily limited to, from DCISC, CPUC, Independent Peer Review Panel, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and PG&E reports and other studies and research documents as a basis for recommending potential seismic-related issues or concerns that the Committee may wish to pursue; identifying additional supporting specialists to assist in this review; coordinating and developing background material on specific seismic-related issues; and providing written material in support of Committee reports.
4. Assist the DCISC as agreed in the further evaluation of seismic conditions at and in the vicinity of Diablo Canyon Power Plant (the “Site”) and elsewhere as may be pertinent, with a special emphasis on the evaluation of the seismic hazard for the potential for impact on the safety of Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) operations.
5. Assist the DCISC as agreed in reviewing the schedule and areas for DCISC review and evaluation of PG&E’s Long Term Seismic Program (LTSP) and its development of a Sensitivity Source Model (SSM) and treatment of the epistemic uncertainty.
6. Assist the DCISC as agreed to assess the impact of PG&E’s plans and the schedule to review the Site seismic hazard and other activities that could impact upon seismic safety at the Site.
7. Given the final assessment of the seismic source characterization, the impact of the sources on core damage frequency (CDF) may need to be re-evaluated, assist the DCISC as agreed to revisit the overall risk to DCPP, of which the CDF would be an important component.

8. Assist the DCISC as agreed to review and assess required seismic-related regulatory changes, the DCPD Emergency Plan and emergency planning, and related California state regulatory issues.

9. Assist the DCISC as agreed in its seismic-related public outreach activities, including with respect to DCISC's interactions with the public, the State of California entities that appoint the members of the DCISC, PG&E's Geosciences organization, and the California Public Utilities Commission and its Independent Peer Review Panel (for seismic studies of Diablo Canyon Power Plant) and interested nongovernmental organizations.

10. As a resource for addressing discrete questions from the Committee concerning the interface between operational and seismic conditions at the Site.

11. Assist as requested and agreed in the DCISC general review and assessment of PG&E's plans for reviewing seismic conditions at the Site.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT
SAFETY COMMITTEE

CONSULTANT

By _____
Committee Chair

Thomas H. Jordan

AMENDMENT No. 6
to
AGREEMENT FOR CONSULTING SERVICES
With MARK KIRK, Ph.D.

This Amendment No. 6 to the Agreement for Consulting Services between the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee ("Committee") and Consultant Mark Kirk ("Consultant") is made as of April 14, 2026.

In consideration of the mutual promises contained herein, Committee and Consultant agree that the Terms and Conditions set forth herein are incorporated into the Agreement for Consulting Services between Committee and Consultant dated September 13, 2023 (the "Agreement") as amended by Amendment No. 1 on December 11, 2023, by Amendment No. 2 on February 21, 2024, by Amendment No. 3 on May 22, 2024, by Amendment No. 4 on August 19, 2024, and by Amendment No. 5 on February 27, 2025. Only the paragraph number of the Terms and Conditions of said Agreement which is being modified or otherwise revised is set forth in this Amendment.

Paragraph 2. "Compensation. Effective on the date first written above, for the services to be provided by Consultant under this agreement, Consultant shall be compensated at the hourly rate of \$200.00 per hour, not to exceed the total amount of \$152,000.00 without the written consent of the Committee's Chair. Time spent by Consultant for the services hereunder shall be recorded under generally accepted accounting practices and shall be itemized on any billings to the Committee. In addition to compensation for the Consultant's time above, the Committee shall also reimburse Consultant directly for all out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred by Consultant in connection with providing services to the Committee including, but not necessarily limited to, printing of any reports, photocopies, facsimile, postage, long-distance telephone and internet charges and for any travel specifically requested by the Committee and for lodging and subsistence (meals and incidental expenses) incurred during such travel. Time and expense reporting shall be in accordance with Committee Policy No. 6 "Consultant Guidelines" attached to the Agreement as **Exhibit "B."**

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Chair of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee has executed this Amendment as evidence of the Chair's authorization for Consultant to exceed the "not to exceed" total amount of \$120,000.00 provided by Amendment No. 5 in accordance with Committee Policy No. 6, Section 7, and the Consultant and the Chair have executed this Amendment on the date(s) and year written below. This Amendment No. 6 may be executed in counterparts, including counterparts transmitted by electronic mail in so-called pdf format and shall be legal and binding and have the same full force and effect as if paper originals with handwritten signatures had been exchanged. All executed counterparts shall constitute one agreement, and each counterpart shall be deemed an original.

This Amendment No. 6 shall be subsequently ratified by vote of the Members at the earliest opportunity, the June 16-17, 2026 public meeting or at the next legally noticed public meeting of the Committee, whichever shall occur first.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE



By _____
Dr. Per F. Peterson, Chair

April 7, 2026
Dated

CONSULTANT

By


Dr. Mark T. Kirk

April 14, 2026

Dated

AMENDMENT No. 1
to
AGREEMENT FOR CONSULTING SERVICES
WITH RICHARD ST. ONGE

This Amendment No. 1 to the Agreement for Consulting Services between the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (“Committee”) and Consultant Richard St. Onge (“Consultant”) is made as of June 17, 2026.

In consideration of the mutual promises contained herein, Committee and Consultant agree that the Terms and Conditions set forth herein are incorporated into the Agreement for Consulting Services between Committee and Consultant dated December 11, 2025 (the “Agreement”). Only the lettered recitals or numbered paragraphs of said Agreement which are being added, deleted, modified or otherwise revised are set forth in this Amendment to read as amended.

Recital F is deleted.

Recital F.1 is added to read: “The Committee wishes to continue to engage the services of Consultant to work collaboratively with other Committee consultants and the Committee members on the performance of the above referenced review and reporting activities, which services are described in **Exhibit “A-1”** (the “Scope of Services”) hereto.”

Paragraph 1 “Scope of Services” and “Exhibit A Scope of Services” referenced therein are deleted and replaced to read as follows:

“Scope of Services. Consultant shall provide to the Committee those services set forth in “Exhibit A-1 Scope of Services” which is attached to this Amendment. Such services may be modified from time to time, as required, by a written amendment to Exhibit A-1 which shall be signed by the Consultant and the Committee Chair.”

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee has caused this Amendment to be signed and executed on its behalf, and Consultant has signed and executed this Amendment the day and year written below.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

By _____
Per F. Peterson, Chair

June 17, 2026
Dated

CONSULTANT

By _____
Richard St. Onge

June 17, 2026
Dated

EXHIBIT “A-1”

SCOPE OF SERVICES

1. Participation in technical and programmatic reviews of the safety of Diablo Canyon Power Plant nuclear operations, DCISC public meetings, and in the development of DCISC fact-finding reports and Annual Reports. Provide support to the Committee as requested by Committee members. These tasks include, but are not limited to: reviewing Committee, PG&E, and documents from other sources as the basis for recommending potential issues or concerns that the Committee may wish to pursue; participating in Committee fact-finding visits and tours of Diablo Canyon Power Plant; helping to identify additional supporting specialists and developing background material on specific issues; and reviewing, preparing and presenting reports and public presentations concerning these activities.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT
SAFETY COMMITTEE

CONSULTANT

By _____
Per F. Peterson
Dated: June 17, 2026

Richard St. Onge
Dated: June 17, 2026

AGREEMENT FOR SERVICES AS LEGAL COUNSEL

This Agreement for Services as Legal Counsel ("Agreement") is entered into as of April 1, 2026, between Robert W. Rathie ("Attorney") and the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee ("Committee") for Attorney to provide legal services to the Committee as Legal Counsel in advising and representing the Committee in matters relating to carrying out responsibilities related to: regulatory matters; governing and other documents; appointment of its members; oversight by and interaction with governing agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and members of the public; the California Public Records Act and other statutory authority; contractual and financial matters; and related subjects. This Agreement will serve to record our agreement on terms and conditions of Attorney's provision of legal services to the Committee on these and future matters. This Agreement supersedes and replaces the prior Agreement dated March 27, 1990, with Robert R. Wellington to provide services as Committee Legal Counsel.

1. On matters covered by the Agreement Attorney agrees to provide such legal services as determined by Attorney to be reasonably required to advise and represent the Committee, to take reasonable steps to keep the Committee informed of facts and developments concerning the subject matter of this engagement as they come to Attorney's attention, and to respond to reasonable inquiries from the Committee. The Committee agrees to cooperate with Attorney, to keep Attorney informed of developments, to abide by this Agreement and to pay Attorney's statements for services in a timely manner.

2. Attorney's fee for services provided to the Committee pursuant to this Agreement will be calculated and billed based on hourly rates established for Attorney, associated attorneys, paralegals, clerks and service providers rendering services on Committee matters. Attorney's statements for services will provide the Committee with a description of services performed, the date they were performed, the time devoted to your matters and the specific hourly rate of the attorney, paralegal, clerk or service provider that performed the services on your behalf.

3. Attorney's rates generally are recorded and billed in 1/10th of an hour increments. It is expected that Attorney will render the bulk of the services under this Agreement. Attorney's services will be provided to the Committee at the rate of \$250.00 per hour. From time to time Attorney's rate structure in general, or the rates of particular attorney, paralegals or clerks may be increased. If so, the Committee will be advised of the new rates, which shall apply to work performed after the Committee has been so advised. Attorney's hourly rate applies to all time spent working on the Committee's behalf.

4. To aid in Committee matters it may become necessary to hire experts, consultants or investigators. Such persons may be employed by Attorney on the Committee's behalf, not by the Committee, so as to protect any privileged work from unauthorized disclosure, but Attorney will not hire such persons unless the Committee approves and also agrees to pay their fees and charges.

5. Attorney may incur various costs and expenses or provide support services while performing legal services. Committee agrees to pay for these items in addition to Attorney's fees for legal services. Examples of such costs and support services are expert or consultant's fees, out of town travel expenses, hotel and meeting charges and deposits, delivery charges including for overnight or express deliveries, postal charges for legally required notices, public meeting and public outreach charges including for those conducted by remote technology, document

storage charges, copy services, and for computerized research. Attorney does not charge for routine secretarial, internet, email, or telephone services.

6. Files for work performed pursuant to this Agreement are Committee property. Attorney will release such files to the Committee or anyone designated by the Committee upon written request of the Committee delivered to Attorney. Committee agrees that Attorney may, in Attorney's sole discretion, copy any portion of the files prior to such release. Attorney may send portions of Committee files that are not currently needed to an off-site storage facility at Committee's expense. Committee agrees that Attorney will not be responsible for any damage that may occur as a result of the loss of any stored files. Committee also agrees that Attorney may, after the passage of two years without Attorney having performed any work for Committee pursuant to this engagement for services, destroy Committee files, unless Committee has provided written instructions to forward the files to the Committee or a person designated by the Committee.

7. Attorney agrees to advise Committee promptly of any change in business address, email address or telephone number(s). Committee agrees Attorney may communicate by electronic mail, text message, or cellular telephone even though such communications may be less secure than other means of communication.

Attorney's business address:	Law Offices of Robert Wm. Rathie P.O. Box 4523 Carmel-by-the-Sea , California 93921-4523 (831) 578-5043 (mobile) bob@wellingtonlaw.com
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8. Attorney will send to Committee periodic statements for fees and costs incurred. Each statement will be payable upon presentation. If any statement or any portion thereof is not paid within 90 days, then the unpaid amount of such statement will bear interest at the maximum rate allowed by law, but not in excess of twelve percent interest per annum compounded monthly.

9. Committee may discharge Attorney as its Legal Counsel at any time. Attorney may withdraw as Committee Legal Counsel with Committee's consent, or for good cause. Good cause includes, but is not limited to: the Committee's breach of this Agreement; failure to pay Attorney's bills on time; refusal to cooperate with Attorney or to follow Attorney's advice on a material matter; development of irreconcilable disagreements between Committee and Attorney as to the conduct of the engagement; or any other circumstance that would render Attorney's continuing representation contrary to the Committee's best interests, or of law, or the rules of professional conduct. Attorney's choice not to withdraw as Legal Counsel on any one occasion shall not waive Attorney's right to do so if other such occasions arise. If Committee discharges Attorney or Attorney elects to withdraw, Committee agrees to secure forthwith other counsel to represent Committee and if Attorney is the Committee's attorney of record in any regulatory proceeding or litigation or other matter of record to cooperate in substituting such new counsel as Committee's attorney of record in the litigation.

10. Nothing in this Agreement and nothing in Attorney's statements to the Committee should be construed as a guarantee or promise about the outcome of any matter or any phase thereof. The amount of legal fees and costs which may be incurred on Committee's behalf

pursuant to this Agreement is not capable of precise prediction; Attorney has made no guarantees or promises and Committee has set no limits as to the cost of services Attorney provides Committee. Both parties acknowledge that this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement regarding the engagement to provide the Committee with legal services as Legal Counsel.

11. Attorney acknowledges and agrees to be bound by the privacy requirements of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and professional standards of confidentiality that are more stringent than the Act. Non-public personal information provided in the course of representation shall not be disclosed to anyone, except as expressly or impliedly authorized, permitted, or required by law and any applicable state ethics rules. In this regard, California law generally provides that an attorney is absolutely required not to reveal confidential information about clients, except as authorized by the client or as compelled by law.

12. This Agreement is made under and shall be construed in accordance with the substantive laws of the State of California without reference to its choice of law rules.

13. Attorney carries professional liability insurance subject to a significant deductible.

14. This Agreement will take effect when it is signed by both parties, but its effect will be retroactive to the date first written above.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT
SAFETY COMMITTEE



Per F. Peterson, Chair
Date: May 22, 2026

ATTORNEY



Robert W. Rathie
Date: May 22, 2026

WELLINGTON AND RATHIE

A Public Agency Law Firm

Robert R. Wellington
Robert W. Rathie

P.O. Box 4523
Carmel-by-the-Sea, CA 93921
attys@wellingtonlaw.com

By Email Only

Dr. Per F. Peterson
Chair
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee

Re: Resignation of Robert R. Wellington as DCISC Legal Counsel

Dear Chair Peterson and Members of the Committee:


I am writing today to advise and let you know that, due to continuing and increasing problems with my health, I have stepped down as DCISC Legal Counsel effective as of April 1, 2026.

I have been the DCISC Legal Counsel since the Committee was created in 1990 and worked then to draft all of the Committee's basic and founding documents.

This has not been an easy decision for me, as I have very much enjoyed my years of interesting and challenging work with this Committee and each of the dedicated Members and Technical Consultants who have been my colleagues and friends. It has been my honor to have been so closely involved in the considerable and innovative growth and development of this Committee over the years.

Bob started assisting with the DCISC work in 1993 and has served as the DCISC's Assistant Legal Counsel since around 2010, and in that role he has attended your public meetings and done the lion's share of the DCISC work for the past eleven years. Bob is an outstanding and dedicated lawyer and he is excited to continue to diligently serve your Committee as its new Legal Counsel. Fortunately, all of you are familiar with Bob and have worked with him recently. I firmly believe that I am leaving the Committee in good hands in this time of change as it moves forward to continue to serve the public and the State of California.

It has been my pleasure to work for the DCISC for all these years and I wish the Committee and everyone at the DCISC all my very best. I know that Bob will keep me informed as to developments and I look forward to continuing to follow your progress.

Very truly yours,

Robert R. Wellington

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE	
AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM	
MEETING DATE:	June 17, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XXXII- K
AGENDA TITLE:	Review and Discussion of the Open Items List and Status of Recommendations.
CONSENT [☐] ACTION [☒] INFORMATION [☒]	
Staff Summary: It is anticipated that the Committee will hold discussion concerning the items appearing on its Open Items List prepared by Committee Technical Consultant McWhorter with the assistance of Consultants Darden and St. Onge. The Open Items List now includes a record and the current status of recommendations made by the Committee for future Committee actions and review and recommendations made by the Committee to PG&E.	
RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate, review and provide direction.	

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Open Items List

Open Item Type: M= Monitor F = Follow-up I = Issue Items in **Red (Tracked Changes)** are new or revised
 Items in **Yellow** are for the next PM and 3 FFMs

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
OPEN ITEMS:				
DO		DCISC Outreach (D)		
DO-1	F	Conduct public tours (including simulator) in conjunction with Public Meetings. [Last tour at 2/26PM.]	2/26PM	10/26PM
DO-2	F	Consider changing location of Public Meetings to enhance public access. [Contract binding for 10/26PM in Avila; no contract yet for 2/27 PM.]		10/26PM
DO-3	F	Post Public Meeting agenda online for comments prior to PMs. [Done for 6/26 PM.]	6/26PM	??
CO		Conduct of Operations (CO)		
CO-7	M	Review DCCP storm response experience and strategy every two years [or as necessary] during or after annual winter storm season.	5/17FF 3/21FF	As necessary Mid-2026
CO-8	M	Monitor all reactor trips – automatic and manual – and forced outages. (review trip LERs at public meetings).	9/24FF	Post-trip FFs & PMs
CO-9	F	Reactivity Management – review every 18-24 months.	List end of OIL 4/24FF 7/25FF	Regularly
CO-10	M	Mispositioning Errors (Equipment Status) – monitor the status of mispositioning errors and actions to resolve.	5/24FF 4/26FF	2Q28FF or following incident
CM		Conduct of Maintenance (CM)		
CM-7	I	Review PG&E's progress in complying with (1) the amendment to 10CFR50.55a, which provides the requirements for ISI of containment structures (degradation) and (2) ASME Code requirements for steel liner weld inspections.	7/22FF 12/25FF#2	Each Pair of RFOs
CM-10	M	Online Maintenance: review the implementation of online maintenance bi-annually, including the 12-week Rolling Maintenance Schedule about how well it is working & impacting risk. Review trend of amount of online maintenance. DCCP Assessment of Maintenance Risk and Online Maintenance Risk Procedures have been substantially upgraded with the addition of an Integrated Risk Review Team.	See list at end of OIL 11/24FF 12/25FF#2	Regularly
CM-13	M	Review Maintenance Department performance measures, staffing, etc. approximately annually.	5/24FF 12/25FF#2	4Q26FF
CM-14	M	Review the work of the Maintenance Department's Craftsmanship Council	5/26FF	2Q27FF
EN		Engineering Programs (EN)		

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
EN-16	F	DCPP Systems – review a system (or structure or component), system health, long-term plan, Maintenance Rule performance & walkdown with System Engineer at FFs. [Note: Systems reviewed are listed with dates at the end of this Open Items List.]	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
EN-19	F	Review every 12-18 months major Engineering Programs, including Configuration Management, Management, System Engineering (system health & long-term plans), Valve Testing, Margin Management, Staffing, etc. [Note: Programs reviewed are listed with dates at the end of this Open Items List.]	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
EN-20	F	Each Member should review or observe Plant Health Committee, Notification Review Team (NRT), Corrective Action Review Board, Performance Review Quarterly Meeting, Plant Health Prioritization Committee, Plant Health Working Group, Outage Management Team and other regular meetings.	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
EN-21	F	Regularly review projects long-term planning. Reviews of planned projects completed through 2R25.	6/24PM 1/25FF	5/26FF 7/26FF#1
HP		Human Performance: Human Errors and Improving Safety & Efficiency of Plant Performance		
HP-1	M	Review human performance & human behavior items (including error reduction programs, HP Pls, aberrant behavior statistics, FFD, stress reduction programs, Personnel Accountability Policy, Human Performance Steering Committee & Subcomm, Centers of Excellence, Org. Development).	1/25FF 4/26FF	2Q28FF
HP-25	M	Further observations and improvements in the Management Observation Program should be reviewed by DCISC.	12/23FF 5/25FF	5/26FF 7/26FF#1
HS		Health, Nuclear Safety and Safety Conscious Work Environment		
HS-6	F	Follow DCCP progress in establishing/improving its safety culture (and its subset Safety Conscious Work Environment, including Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NSCMP), and their periodic reports, and including Employee Concerns & Differing Professional Opinion Programs).	1/25FF 8/25FF	4Q26FF
PI		Performance Improvement Programs		
PI-1	M	DCPP Performance Improvement Programs: Corrective Action, Self-Assessment, Operating Experience, Benchmarking, etc. Programs reviewed are listed with dates at the end of the Open Items List. [CAP reviewed 8/24FF] [Reviewed Cause Evaluation Process 1/25FF and 4/25FF - satisfactory.]	See list at end of OIL 4/25FF 1/26FF	Annually 1Q27FF
PI-2	F	Follow DCCP's use of electronic dynamic procedures and work orders to begin in 2025. [See also Recommendations D12/24FF-3.2, D12/15/25FF-3.14, and P12/24FF-3.2.] PFP provided walkthrough of new dynamic procedure tool at 5/26FF. NM and ROS should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during future FF Meetings.	8/25FF 5/26FF PFP	7/26FF#2 NM 9/26FF ROS
PI-3	F	Because the application of Artificial Intelligence tools has significant potential to change and to improve DCCP's operational safety, the DCISC should review this topic frequently. Possible applications include: Corrective Action Program; Design and Licensing Information Data; Design Change Process; Procedure Generation; Plant Improvement Initiatives/Projects to Improve Equipment Reliability. [See also Recommendation D12/24FF-3.4.] Monitor the risks to include reports from foundation model companies regarding the catastrophic failures of other models. Also, monitor for 'sycophancy' risk; meaning, the generation of incorrect information based on user desires/bias.	8/25FF 10/25PM 5/26FF	4Q26FF
EP		Emergency Preparedness (EP)		

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
EP-2	M	Attend and observe DCCP emergency drills and exercises annually [including Hostile Action Based Exercises], paying special attention to JIC communications to the media and public, including radiation release communications to the public, use of social media, coordination of information release with SLO County, and extension of drills to better exercise FMTs & JMC. DCISC drill attendees should assure the confidentiality of the drill scenario by keeping the scenario hidden and under their control at all times. [Observed Evaluated Exercise 7/31/24]	7/24FF 9/24FF	Next evaluated exercise - 7/29/26 NM 9/2/26 ROS
EP-3	F	Meet with Emergency Preparedness Group for updates and performance in years with no major exercises. Met with SLO County OES 3/25FF and 12/25FF#1.	10/25PM 12/25FF#1	1Q27FF
RA		Risk Assessment and Management (RA)		
RA-5	M	Review overall [non-seismic] PRA program annually. Include Fire PRA Upgrade & Shutdown Analysis. Review PRA Group resources/capabilities. (see SC-6).	11/24FF 12/25FF#2	6/26PM
RA-6	F	Review DCCP response to NRC re: 10CFR50.569 risk-informed rule changes. Review in FF. <u>Most risk-informed rule changes to date implemented at DCCP.</u>	2/25PM 12/25FF#2 3/26FF	6/26PM Close?
NS		Nuclear Safety Oversight and Review (NS)		
NS-5	M	Monitor NSOC meetings periodically to observe their processes and their review of nuclear safety issues.	3/19/25 PFP 6/27/25 NM 12/11/25 ROS	8/13/26 NM (7/26FF#2)
NS-9	M	Monitor DCCP's program to track INPO Areas for Improvement. <u>Reviews should include INPO Corporate Assessments performed about every six years.</u> Last reviewed 2020 Corporate Assessment (1/21FF). 2024 WANO Peer Review (11/24FF), and 2025 Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment (9/25FF). <u>Recommend receiving a briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Corporate Assessments following 2027 report issuance. [See also Recommendations D4/26FF-3.3B and P4/26FF-3.3.]</u>	11/24FF 9/25FF	4Q26FF (station) 2Q27FF (corp.)
NS-10	M	Monitor Insurance Programs including the results of insurer inspections and reports. <u>The DCISC should follow up on the insurance inspections expected to be completed in mid-2026.</u>	7/24FF 5/26FF	4Q26FF
NS-11	F	Meet with representatives of the PG&E Corporation Board Safety and Nuclear Oversight Committee members periodically to monitor their processes and their reviews of nuclear safety issues. [NM met with two members on 6/17/25.] <u>Recommendation response received from PG&E 5/28/26.</u>	8/25FF	3Q26FF
RP		Radiation Protection (RP)		
RP-3	M	Review Radiation Protection performance. Observed ALARA Committee meeting at 4/24FF.	6/25PM 12/25FF#2	Regularly
RP-12	M	Review annual DCCP radioactivity release report each year. Review at Summer or Fall FFs.	7/24FF 7/25FF	3Q26FF 7/26FF#1
QP		Quality Programs (QP)		

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
QP-3	M	Review the activities, organization and results of QV audits as well as PG&E's outside biennial audits, including timeliness of corrective actions. Review annually – include 4 th quarter QPAR with yearly results.	12/24FF 1/26FF	1Q28FF
QP-9	F	Software QA Program	See list at end of OIL	<u>4/26FF</u> <u>7/26FF#1</u>
NF		Nuclear Fuel Performance (NF)		
NF-9	M	Nuclear Fuel Performance & Issues (review after RFOs). Observed new fuel receipt and inspection 8/22FF.	1/24FF 3/25FF	Each pair of RFOs
ER		Equipment Reliability and Life Cycle Management (ER)		
ER-5	M	Monitor the Equipment Reliability Process approximately annually.	See list at end of OIL	Annually <u>5/26FF</u> <u>Close to EN-19 tracking.</u>
OE		Organizational Effectiveness & Development (OE)		
OE-1	F	Review DCCP Operating Plan each January after development.	2/25PM <u>4/26FF</u>	<u>2/27PM</u>
OE-2	F	Station Excellence Plan & Management Review Meeting [Check status of this plan and the meetings.] <u>4/26FF recommended: Meeting has evolved to a periodic review of INPO performance indicators (PIs). Add review of PIs to O-4 (Station Update) and close this item.</u>	3/23FF <u>4/26FF</u>	<u>Close</u>
SE		System and Equipment Performance/Problems (SE)		
SE-39	F	Review and tour the inspections and repairs of concrete Intake Structures following selected refueling outages. [See if Outfall has similar issues – Toured 4/25FF, satisfactory.]	4/25FF 5/25FF 12/25FF#1	Next RFO
SE-49	F	Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)	See list at end of OIL 4/24FF 9/25FF	Regularly
SE-50	F	Maintenance Rule Functional Failures.	11/23FF 7/25FF	Regularly
OM		Outage Management (OM)		
OM-3	M	During outages, monitor Outage Coordination Center, Control Room, and containment walkdown/inspection (end of outage). Review outage turbine work. Review Steam Generator performance metrics and inspection results.	5/25FF 12/25FF#2	Each RFO
OM-4	M	Review Outage Safety Plan, safety margin trends, outage results, including clearances, following each outage at FFs and PMs.	9/25FF 12/25FF#2	Each RFO
OM-5	M	Review FME Program Performance.	See list at end of OIL 12/25FF#2	Each RFO

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
SEC		Security (SEC)		
SEC-3	M	Monitor interaction of Security and Operations, Engineering, Maintenance, and Emergency Preparedness for effects on nuclear safety. Plant security per se not reviewed but reviewed only in the context of impact on plant operation.	3/25FF 1/26FF	1Q28FF
SEC-4	M	Review status of DCCP cyber security (but not physical security) program in compliance with NRC requirements.	3/24FF 4/26FF	2Q28FF
SF		Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation – ISFSI (SF)		
SF-1	F	Monitor ISFSI operations. Review and observe 2026 loading campaigns. (See Also D12/15/25FF-3.11A)	12/25FF#2 3/26FF	6/26PM 9/26FF
SF-2	M	Follow technical advances of relative risks of existing (Holtec) casks and pool storage. (See Also D12/15/25FF-3.11B)	9/25FF 12/25FF#2	As Needed
SF-4	F	Review the adequacy of the design for new (Orano) spent fuel TBD storage system focusing on items of safety significance including seismic adequacy, criticality control, storage of damaged fuel, thermal analyses, effects of extreme environmental conditions, long-term (>100 years) integrity assurance, radiation/neutron shielding, and accident analyses.	1/23FF 8/23FF#2	TBD
SF-5	F	Monitor the submittal and approval of license amendment(s) for the Orano spent fuel storage system.	6/23PM 8/23FF#2	TBD
SF-7	M	Monitor Plans for Storage of Greater than Class C Waste <u>that would be generated during decommissioning operations.</u>	8/22FF	TBD
SF-8	M	<u>Evaluate the dose consequences of a crack in a spent fuel storage canister.</u> EPRI study [Radiological Consequences of a Release of Radionuclides from a Spent Fuel Storage Cask] has not yet finished although some supporting studies have been concluded regarding source term and what flow rate should be estimated for use in the study. <u>He reported EPRI plans to issue its study in early spring of 2023 and the DCISC should review it at that time.</u> Update 12/25 – study completion deferred to obtain additional research data from DOE. Completion date unknown.	5/23FF#1 12/25FF#2	4Q27FF
SF-9	M	Monitor the implementation of aging management plans including any evaluations of canister corrosion indications by DCCP and the nuclear industry.	12/25FF#2 3/26FF	6/26PM 9/26FF
SC	M	Seismic, Tsunami and Other External Events		
SC-3	M	Long-Term Seismic Program: review periodically. (See also EO-9.). Met with Geosciences Staff 11/24FF (LTSP, IPRP, Dr. Peter Bird) 11/24FF. [See also SRT Recommendations 1-9.]	11/24FF 4/26FF	2Q28FF
SC-12	F	Workplace seismic safety – review annually.	5/25FF 7/25FF	4Q26FF
SC-14	M	Monitor the Work of the Independent Peer Review Panel, Including Future Reports. <u>Need to review new IPRP report issued on 2/19/2026 regarding the 2024 Updated Seismic Assessment.</u>	9/24FF 10/24PM	7/26FF#2 10/26PM
SC-15	M	Review significant seismic events with the potential to affect DCCP as they occur.		As needed

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<u>SC-16</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Review any new or updated information on the seismic hazard at DCCP for potential impact on the overall understanding of seismic safety risk at DCCP. This includes evaluating the impact of changes to seismic hazard evaluations on the fragilities of DCCP's structures and equipment and on the results of the plant's overall Probabilistic Risk Assessment.</u>		<u>6/26PM</u> <u>4Q26FF</u>
<u>SC-17</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Follow-up on actions taken by DCCP in response to the nine recommendations of the Seismic Review (34th AR Recommendations SRT-1 through SRT-9).</u>	<u>2/26PM</u>	<u>6/26PM</u>
FP		Fire Protection (FP)		
FP-5	M	Review NFPA-805-based Fire Protection Program and Systems every two-three years, including QV audits and NRC triennial inspections. Review the health and correction of degraded systems every six months. Monitor fire doors (Plant Door Life Cycle Management Plan) for correction of impairments.	See list at end of OIL 9/24FF	Regularly 3Q26FF
LD		Learning & Development Programs (LD)		
LD-3	M	Review <u>non-license</u> technical, operations & accredited training programs at least annually. [Reviewed Learning Services 5/24FF – satisfactory.]	5/24FF 9/24FF	<u>3/26FF</u> <u>4Q26FF</u>
LD-6	M	Observe operator <u>license</u> , re-qualification, classes periodically in FF meetings.	8/25FF <u>4/26FF</u>	<u>9/26FF</u> <u>Simulator</u> <u>Trg. ROS</u>
LD-7	F	Review the impact of Artificial Intelligence on training programs.		<u>3/26FF</u> <u>4Q26FF</u>
NR		Nuclear Regulatory Commission Items (NR)		
NR-3	M	Monitor the Non-Cited Violations at every Public Meeting.	Each PM	Each PM
NR-4	F	Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors regularly.	Most FFs	Regularly
NR-5	F	Follow proposed Presidential Executive Orders driven changes to NRC as to their impact on DCCP. [10/25PM Presentation delayed due to government shutdown, reschedule for 2/26PM.]	6/25PM	<u>6/26PM</u>
NR-6	M	Review any NRC Inspector General Reports or NRC employee Differing Professional Opinion filings which may relate to DCCP.		<u>6/26PM</u>
DEC	F	Decommissioning		
DEC-1	F	Review DCCP decommissioning plans periodically as a result of the Joint Proposal plant shutdown in 2025. Review the timing of spent fuel transfer from wet to dry storage and when the spent fuel pools are decommissioned the plant will lose the capability to open multipurpose canisters for inspection. DCISC should actively review the decommissioning plans for DCCP because of the potential impact on staffing and future options with respect to managing spent fuel.	2/23PM 6/23PM	TBD ACK
DEC-4	F	Emergency preparedness during decommissioning.	11/22FF 2/23PM	TBD ACK
DEC-5	F	DCCP's approach to submitting LAR requests for decommissioning appears appropriate and the DCISC should continue to follow from a safety perspective all the regulatory activities which will define the reduction in requirements which will occur at shutdown.	9/22FF 9/22PM	TBD ACK

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EO		Extended Operations (EO)		
EO-1	M	Monitor the Purchasing of New Fuel [12/22FF fuel performance & future purchases satisfactory for 2030 operation.]	12/22FF 3/25FF	4Q26FF
EO-3	M	Monitor the State and Local Permitting Process	2/25PM <u>2/26PM</u>	<u>Close</u>
EO-4	M	Monitor the NRC License Renewal Application and Review Process, including any seismic-related activities.	2/25PM <u>2/26PM</u>	<u>Close</u>
EO-5	M	Monitor Staffing for Extended Operations	1/26FF <u>2/26PM</u>	<u>2Q27FF</u>
EO-9	F	Review new seismic safety-related information from the IPRP, Dr. Peter Bird, NRC petitions, and any other third-party sources. Consider all future actions.	2/25PM 6/25PM	<u>7/26FF#2</u> <u>10/26PM</u>
EMB		Unit 1 RPV Embrittlement		
EMB-3	F	[Former SE-26] Review reactor pressure vessel compliance status after next set of surveillance samples (Capsule B) is analyzed and effective vessel lifetime projections are updated. [See also AR23/24AR23-2.] <u>PG&E to brief DCISC representatives in late-July 2026.</u>	1/26FF <u>5/26FF</u>	<u>6/26PM</u> <u>9/26FF</u> <u>10/26PM</u>
EMB-6	F	Review and comment on all new questions or requests for information related to vessel embrittlement in LRA proceedings. M. Kirk reviewed LRA NRC Safety Evaluation Report Section 4.2, letter dated 1/13/26.		As needed
O		Other Items (O)		
O-1	F	Perform observations of evolutions (work processes) within the plant periodically. Continue with these about annually. Work process observations: Observe in the plant work processes important to nuclear safety, such as operator rounds, Control Room shift turnover, surveillance tests, preventive and corrective maintenance, system modifications, system walk downs with system engineers; outage activities, etc.	<u>3/26FF</u> <u>4/26FF</u> <u>5/26FF</u>	Regularly
O-3	F	Review studies/reviews of drone activity at DCCP.	2/21PM 12/25FF#2	As Needed
O-4	F	Review plant activities since previous FF meeting ("Station Update"). <u>Include the following topics: power production, status of station performance indicators, equipment problems, human performance/mispositioning events, major maintenance activities, major projects, and NRC inspections/performance.</u>		Each FF

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PUBLIC MEETING ITEMS: (Reference: Public Meeting Minutes)				
6/24 PM 4	F	Direction was provided to explore a tour with members of the public in conjunction with the February 18-19, 2026 public meeting. [Deferred to February 2026 PM due to unavailability of the DCPD Simulator in June and Outage in October 2025.]		<u>6/26PM</u> then Close to new D-1
2/25 PM 5	F	Dr. Peterson observed that sometimes during fact finding a Notification is generated which enables the item to be entered into the Corrective Action Program. He commented the creation of a process map would be useful and he recommended the Committee take an action to create a process map, first for PG&E's review and comment and for the member's review and discussion at the next public meeting.	2/25PM	<u>6/26PM</u>
20	F	In response to Consultant Wardell's inquiry as to whether workplace seismic safety training is part of the initial or continuous training for new employees Mr. Jones stated he would need to check on and follow up during subsequent fact finding and he stated he did not believe specific workplace seismic safety training was part of initial training for new employees.	2/25PM	Response received 1/29/26
6/25 PM 23	F	Dr. Budnitz observed that after the work to address the Committee's recommendations is completed there will be some new insights among which could be that the seismic hazard at DCPD has not changed very much, or if what is learned modifies the seismic hazard then the next action is to ask the question what is the implication on the understanding of the safety of the plant? He recommended the Committee follow this in context of the broader picture and if important changes based on the best science are identified then the implications for overall seismic safety needs to be determined on a high priority basis.	6/25PM	2/26 PM (SRT Recs and LTSP impact) <u>Close to</u> new SC-16
34	F	Mr. Rathie stated the process for addressing recommendations and concerns will affect and complicate development of the Open Items List which is a very useful tool used by the Committee in its reviews. Dr. Peterson observed it is important for the Committee to have a specific process to address and track its recommendations and concerns and to close them when appropriate.	6/25PM	<u>Close to</u> 2/25PM#5
36	F	Dr. Peterson observed that the SRT's report did not evaluate the hazard, as that was completely out of the scope of their assignment which was to review the documents and associated materials that make up the Bird Critique. Therefore, it is important for the Committee to understand the sensitivity question of how these arguments would affect the assessment of the hazard to the plant, which ultimately is what the Committee should care about in terms of decisions around safety.	6/25PM	<u>6/26PM</u>
10/25 PM 5	F	Concerning SB 53, Dr. Gil stated the DCISC should be aware of and up to date on the reports coming from the foundation model companies about any kind of catastrophic risk. She remarked it would also be important to track how Neutron Search is being used and if any documents are in its operation in order to convey that information and any safety concerns to the developers of the model.	10/25PM	<u>Close to</u> words added to PI-3
6	F	He [Dr. Budnitz] identified a second problem he termed sycophancy related to the generation of results again and again and AI gives the user what the user wants to get rather than what the user should get as a result of the AI using only a subset of information which can create an incomplete or even erroneous results. He stated he believed the ability to review those new AI failure modes is one the Committee does not possess and how that will be reviewed is a challenge of great importance for the DCISC.	10/25PM	<u>Close to</u> words added to PI-3

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14	F	He [Mr. Wiseman] stated that given this situation there may be more emerging issues under 10 CFR 50.59 and he remarked this may be an issue for the DCISC to address through the Open Items List. Mr. McWhorter commented out of the list [of Plant Health Committee top ten items] perhaps four or five items had obsolescence concerns identified and projects, including for the Annunciator System, are planned to address those. Mr. Weisman observed that in some cases parts will likely simply need to be replaced for reasons other than obsolescence and he asked what would happen if there were no OEM replacements available. Dr. Peterson remarked that Mr. Weisman raised a valid point and the issue should be added to the Open Items List in context of the DCISC review of DCCP's 10 CFR 50.59 Program.	10/25PM	Review as part of next 50.59 program review. <u>Close to EN-19</u>
17	F	In response to Dr. Peterson's query Ms. Van Buren reported OES has not incorporated AI with respect to DCCP emergency response, but it is open to doing so and expects to review the issue in the future. Dr. Peterson stated the DCISC should follow OES progress with implementing AI solutions in context of its review of a wide array of different AI applications which could affect DCCP operational safety.	10/25PM	<u>Close to PI-3</u>
19	F	[Dr. Nelson provided a] form of improved public outreach regarding DCCP operational status and plant health and his stated his belief this falls within the public outreach mission of the DCISC and he suggested a joint PG&E/DCISC effort. He stated CGNP is working on legislation to extend DCCP operations beyond 2030 and he believes public outreach should be one component of this legislative package. Dr. Peterson suggested the DCISC should follow up on opportunities to provide more information on the status of the plant.	10/25PM	
20	F	He [Mr. Rogers] reported DCCP has clear guidance with other entities within PG&E that addresses the interface and the decision-making associated with the plant and the down time of the plant and no authorization or clearance from outside DCCP is required. He offered to provide Dr. Meshkati with a copy of the guidance document at a future fact finding.	10/25PM	<u>4/26FF</u> <u>7/26FF#2</u>
21	F	He [Dr. Peterson] reported Dr. Scarlat and Dr. Meshkati will both have the opportunity to observe an emergency response exercise and the focus of their respective fact finding visits should be on how much information can be obtained and made available to the Committee outside the EOF if in the judgment of PG&E the presence in the EOF itself of Committee representatives could be disruptive.	10/25PM	<u>ROS and NM EP drill observations scheduled on FFPM</u>
22	F	Mr. Jones commented he believes the DCISC should consider working with the State of California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) on the policy and Dr. Peterson agreed that additional investigation would be warranted.	10/25PM	<u>OES un-responsive</u>
23	F	Mr. Jones reported there is a bifurcation of tribal recognition between the federal and state governments and the nearest federally recognized tribe are the Santa Ynez Chumash and they are located outside of the Emergency Planning Zone, but the state has a Native American Heritage Commission which recognizes several tribes that are mostly likely descendants from the village sites in the area. He stated there are several tribes in the area including the Yak Tityu Tityu Yak Tihini tribe that are in the Emergency Planning Zone but they do not have facilities and live in the general population. Dr. Scarlat stated this is an area where the DCISC should follow up concerning representation and that all necessary connections are being made.	12/25FF #1	<u>TBD-ROS</u>

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<u>2/26 PM 1</u>	<u>F</u>	...there were indications of a tube leak for secondary condensate Feedwater Heat Exchanger 1-5C and a forced outage followed with repairs completed in 44 hours. In response to Dr. Scarlat's query Mr. Williams stated the feedwater heaters have been in service for 40 years and there are some tolerances and some minor leakage of certain components within the heat exchangers. A cause evaluation process has been undertaken and when that evaluation is complete an update will be provided to the Committee.	<u>2/26PM</u> <u>4/26FF</u>	<u>Close to</u> <u>4/26FF</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>F</u>	Safety-related fuse blown requiring review of Maintenance Rule interval. Life-cycle bases for replacement/preventative maintenance reevaluated and entry made in the Corrective Action Program. In response to Dr. Peterson's question Mr. Tyman agreed to provide the service life of the blown fuse. Mr. Tyman agreed with Dr. Peterson that while DCCP evaluates timeliness of replacement of components, online monitoring which is a new focus for the industry might be employed to manage these types of assets. Mr. Tyman stated that during the system inoperability a backup system was available. Dr. Peterson remarked this would be a good subject for a fact finding meeting.	<u>2/26PM</u>	<u>7/26FF#1</u>
<u>3</u>	<u>F</u>	Mr. Tyman reported this was equipment based human error and corrective actions were taken through training and procedure guidance to enhance awareness. Dr. Peterson remarked this would be a good event to review for the potential impact of checks and flags that could be implemented through use of electronic procedures.	<u>2/26PM</u> <u>5/26FF</u> <u>Review'd</u> <u>Dyn Proc</u>	<u>Close to</u> <u>5/26FF</u>
<u>4</u>	<u>F</u>	In response to Consultant McWhorter's reference to a Common Cause Evaluation being performed for lifting and landing of leads, Mr. Tyman replied this was a similar event involving a misplaced wire contact during the landing of an electrical lead, but he stated he would need to follow up on whether this event was included in a Common Cause Evaluation.	<u>2/26PM</u> <u>4/26FF</u>	<u>Close to</u> <u>4/26FF</u>
<u>5</u>	<u>F</u>	He reported the NRC works through its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) regarding evaluating, determining and assigning significance levels to identified issues with reference to reactor safety. He remarked this process is probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) based. He offered to provide the Committee with a copy of the document that provides examples of minor and more than minor significance. Mr. Tyman agreed with Drs. Meshkati and Peterson concerning the interface between safety and security and remarked that cyber security was impacted by that interface and he offered to provide the NRC inspection reports and to review the issue with the Committee during a fact finding.	<u>2/26PM</u> <u>4/26FF</u> <u>Rev'd CS</u> <u>Violation</u>	<u>Close to</u> <u>4/26FF</u>
<u>6</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Scarlat stated use of AI will continue to grow and the NRC has a strategic plan for implementing AI for inspections. She remarked that while humans are one part of managing the application of AI, new failure modes and how humans are trained to identify failure modes are also important as AI failure modes are not necessarily the failure modes of humans. She remarked it will be important for DCCP to be part of industry user groups and she commended PG&E for taking a proactive approach to AI.	<u>2/26PM</u>	<u>Close to</u> <u>PI-3 and</u> <u>D12/24FF-</u> <u>3.4</u>
<u>7</u>	<u>F</u>	The Committee Members, Consultants and Counsel briefly discussed the effect of the approval of a fact finding report on the recommendations made in the report and determined approval of the fact finding report constitutes approval of the recommendations made therein.	<u>2/26PM</u>	<u>Add clarity</u> <u>to Cmte.</u> <u>Policy #8.</u> <u>6/26PM</u>

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<u>8</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Peterson observed online monitoring has the capability to ensure every transmitter that is out of calibration is calibrated and he remarked this is an area where the DCISC has identified an opportunity with the new tools to increase operational safety.	<u>2/26PM</u>	Close to <u>EN-19 (list)</u> and <u>D12/15/25F F-3.3</u>
<u>9</u>	<u>F</u>	If a stress corrosion crack propagates through the canister wall it initially has a small aperture and it would take a long period for the canister to depressurize from the atmospheres of helium introduced in the storage process and this means the actual flow rates and velocities are very low. He stated the question of the potential dose consequence of a through-wall crack is something the DCISC should review.	<u>2/26PM</u>	Close to <u>SF-8</u>
<u>10</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Peterson stated the primary motivation for using helium in the process is for heat transfer and you want to create a high density so you can move with the same velocity. You actually establish stronger density gradients and get stronger convection in the higher thermal conductivity of helium, but when you're out at the age where the through-wall stress corrosion cracking becomes a concern the decay heat is dropping so you may not even need to have helium in the canister. Dr. Peterson stated it would be useful for the DCISC to develop an independent assessment of this because there are an enormous amount of assumptions and conservatism in this analysis.	<u>2/26PM</u>	Close to <u>SF-8</u>
<u>11</u>	<u>F</u>	He stated PG&E is in the process of completing a sensitivity source model that allows efficiently testing new proponent models and that model, at least a draft of it, was completed at the end of last year and PG&E is in the process of reviewing it with an expert review panel and he reported the first sensitivity that PG&E will develop with that model is testing the impact of the SRT's model and he stated he would report on progress during the DCISC's June DCISC public meeting.	<u>2/26PM</u>	Close to <u>6/26PM</u> <u>Presentation</u>
<u>12</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Peterson observed that there is a concurrence between SRT and PG&E that is imbedded in PG&E's response to Recommendation 1, with the important point being that this will take nominally about three years to perform the scope of work which Dr. Peterson stated appears to be reasonable. This in turn means that the DCISC is going to need to monitor over the coming years PG&E's progress in this area so that the DCISC can confirm that it's being addressed correctly and the Committee needs to discuss how it will monitor the progress on PG&E's efforts to address the SRT Recommendations over the coming three years and to embed this review in the Committee's ongoing efforts to monitor progress around a better understanding of seismic hazard, and particularly the related work of the IPRP.	<u>2/26PM</u>	Close to <u>SC-14</u> and <u>new SC-17</u>
<u>13</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Meshkati, following up on his previous question, expressed concern that PG&E rated the impact of the nine Recommendations as either low (two) or unknown (seven), whereas the SRT rated two of the Recommendations as low, six as medium and one as high. Dr. Meshkati remarked that the disparity between PG&E's and the SRT's assignments of impacts needs to be reconciled.	<u>2/26PM</u>	<u>6/26PM</u>

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<u>14</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Meshkati stated he views Recommendation 9 as a very important overarching Recommendation, and he noted it is considered by the SRT to be of medium priority while PG&E designates it as unknown. Dr. Jordan replied that impact is assessed on a relative scale; the SRT assigned a rating of medium impact to Recommendation 9 because resolving other outstanding issues (e.g., Hosgri rate) could potentially have a higher impact. Regarding the reconciliation of the two impact ratings, Dr. Jordan suspects that, if PG&E were required assign impact values of low, medium, and high to each recommendation, the values in most cases would not be much different from the SRT's. Dr. Meshkati reiterated that the two sets of impact assignments need to be reconciled.	<u>2/26PM</u>	<u>6/26PM</u>
<u>15</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Jordan responded that he thinks that would be the case, but he cautioned that the sensitivity studies are complex and involve a number of interacting model elements, so it is difficult to predict what the sensitivity analysis will show. He suggested that this conservatism may be part of the reason PG&E says the impact is unknown; if PG&E waits for sensitivity analysis, they can do a better job of assessing the impacts. Dr. Scarlat stated that the Committee should follow up on this alignment after the sensitivity analysis is completed.	<u>2/26PM</u>	<u>6/26PM</u>
<u>16</u>	<u>F</u>	Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones suggested a meeting during a future fact finding with the Director and Manager of the Emergency Planning organization, Mr. Jordan Tyman and Mr. Andy Warwick, would be productive as to whether there could be an opportunity to test the DCISC policy during the Committee's observation of a future emergency exercise.	<u>2/26PM</u>	<u>2027 or 28 EP Exercises</u>

ITEM NO.	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
RECOMMENDATIONS to the DCISC:			
D11/24FF-3.13	The DCISC should follow up on future corrective actions that may be initiated in response to an August 2024 dropped rod event.	11/24FF	5/26FF 7/26FF#1
D12/24FF-3.2	Because expanded use of electronic procedures can enhance plant operational safety subject to proper human systems integration, the DCISC should review this topic regularly. [See also PI-2. <u>Now referred to as "dynamic" procedures. PFP provided walkthrough of new dynamic procedure tool at 5/26FF. NM and ROS should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during future FF Meetings.</u>]	12/25FF#2 5/26FF PFP	7/26FF#2 NM 9/26FF ROS
D12/24FF-3.4	Because the application of Artificial Intelligence tools has significant potential to change and to improve DCCP's operational safety, the DCISC should review this topic frequently. The DCISC should maintain a list of potential future Artificial Intelligence applications that could enhance safety under item PI-3 on its Open Items List. [See also PI-3.]	12/25FF#1 12/25FF#2 1/26FF	3Q26FF
D1/25FF-3.9A	The DCISC should review the results of a PG&E employee safety culture survey following its completion.	1/25FF 1/26FF	4/26FF 7/26FF#2
D3/25FF-3.12	The DCISC should continue its effort to develop a committee policy for responding to an emergency declaration at DCCP.	1/26FF 2/26PM	6/26PM
D12/2/25FF-3.1	The DCISC should further review how the Technical Specification-required Completion Time was met for an October 2025 Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Pump leak event as well as how a similar event would be handled in the future following approval of the LAR and implementation of a risk-informed Completion Time.	12/25FF#1 3/26FF	Close to 3/26FF
D12/2/25FF-3.5	The DCISC should review the error analysis for calculations contained in the October 2025 Degradation Assessment for the Unit 2 Steam Generators.	12/25FF#1 3/26FF	Close to 3/26FF
D12/2/25FF-3.8	The DCISC should review FLEX Support Guidelines for how doors can be propped open, should this action be needed in a severe accident scenario. The propping open of doors can be a useful tool in responding to an unforeseen scenario, and the plant would be well positioned to have tools and training for how operators can effectively achieve the propping open of doors.	12/25FF#1 3/26FF	Close to 3/26FF
D12/2/25FF-3.11	The DCISC should follow up on the implementation, staffing and necessary training plans for complying with the new National Pollution Discharge Elimination System and Clean Water Act 401 Water Quality Certification, and the overall strategic plan for the Chemistry Department and its interface with Operations and License Renewal.	12/25FF#1 3/26FF	Close to 3/26FF
D12/15/25FF-3.1	The DCISC should review the charter for the Maintenance Department's new Craftsmanship Council after its development is complete.	12/25FF#2 5/26FF	Close to 5/26FF and New CM-14
<u>D12/15/25FF-3.2</u>	<u>The DCISC should review the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment concrete inspection reports, expected to be available after Refueling Outage 1R26 in the fall of 2026. The DCISC should also review DCCP's disposition of this report and any resulting Notifications and repairs.</u>	12/25FF#2	1Q27FF
<u>D12/15/25FF-3.3</u>	<u>Online Monitoring technology has the potential to increase plant operational safety. DCISC should add Online Monitoring to the Open Item List with a regular periodicity as determined by the DCISC.</u>	12/25FF#2	Close to EN-19 List

ITEM NO.	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
D12/15/25FF-3.10	The DCISC should follow-up on the findings and cause evaluation for the affected Feedwater Heat Exchanger tube leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, as well as future plans to address FW Heat Exchanger health.	12/25FF#2 1/26FF 4/26FF	Close to 4/26FF and new rec's.
D12/15/25FF-3.11A	The DCISC should request that PG&E make a presentation on the summer 2026 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation inspection campaign at the June or October 2026 Public Meetings and that Member Raluca Scarlat be invited to observe some of the inspections.	12/25FF#2 3/25FF	6/26PM 9/26FF 10/26PM
D12/15/25FF-3.11B	The DCISC should continue to monitor advances in canister inspection methods. [Summer 2026 ISFSI inspections to use improved methodologies.]	12/25FF#2	6/26PM 9/26FF
D12/15/25FF-3.13	The DCISC should request that PG&E make a presentation at its June 2026 Public Meeting on updates Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools and methods, how PRA is being used in the plant, and the NRC's role in approving PRA tools and methods	12/25FF#2	6/26PM 10/26PM
D12/15/25FF-3.14	The DCISC should schedule an observation of electronic procedure usage in the plant during the next FFM of which Member Per F. Peterson is a participant. [See also PI-2 and D12/24FF-3.2.]	12/25FF#2 5/26FF	Close to 5/26FF and PI-2
D1/26FF-3.3	Based on industry experience with boric acid corrosion, DCISC should implement rigorous and systematic follow-up of boric acid corrosion monitoring at DPCC.	1/26FF	7/26FF#2
D3/26FF-3.4	The DCISC should review the workflow of interfacing with the NRC Resident Inspector for a hypothetical scenario when a Notification mentions the need for a Compensatory Action but is later identified that the system was in fact operable and did not require a Compensatory Action.	3/26FF	9/26FF
D4/26FF-3.3A	The DCISC should follow-up on how Artificial Intelligence is being addressed as a part of the Artificial Intelligence Roadmap in the Strategic Plan. [See also D12/24FF-3.4 and PI-3.]	4/26FF	7/26FF#1
D4/26FF-3.3B	The DCISC should follow up on receiving an oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Institute for Nuclear Power Operations corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report. [See also NS-9]	4/26FF	2Q27FF
D4/26FF-3.10A	The DCISC should continue to follow and support DCCP's plans for future Feedwater Heater replacements.	4/26FF	4Q26FF
D4/26FF-3.10B	The DCISC should follow actions taken in response to the resolution approved at its February 2026 Public Meeting recommending that the California Public Utilities Commission and other cognizant state authorities support the implementation of the Feedwater heater replacement project at DCCP as soon as practically feasible.	4/26FF	4Q26FF
D5/26FF-3.3A	The DCISC should follow-up on the Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026.	5/26FF	4Q26FF
D5/26FF-3.3B	The DCISC should follow-up on the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026.	5/26FF	4Q26FF

ITEM NO.	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
RECOMMENDATIONS to PG&E: (SB 846 requires the DCISC to "make recommendations appropriate to enhance the safety of the operation at the Diablo Canyon powerplant.")			
AR23/24AR23-2	Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of reactor vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available. [Capsule B removed 4/25; Close after Capsule B evaluation complete (12-18 mos. after 4/25).]	5/25FF <u>4/26FF</u>	<u>6/26PM</u> <u>9/26FF</u> <u>10/26PM</u>
P12/24FF-3.2	The DCISC recommends that PG&E further expand their use of electronic-procedures-type applications, subject to proper human systems integration, because the improved human performance and documentation of work can directly improve the safety of operations. [See also PI-2.]	8/25FF <u>5/26FF</u>	<u>7/26FF#2</u> <u>9/26FF</u>
P8/25FF-3.1	PG&E should support and facilitate regular meetings (in-person or remotely) between the DCISC and designated members of the Board of Directors' Safety and Nuclear Oversight Committee (SNO) to learn about the Board's safety-related goals, priorities, administrative oversight, and budgetary policies vis-à-vis DCCP, and to review and coordinate strategic issues affecting the plant's equipment systems and occupational safety. [See also new NS-11.]	8/25FF	<u>PG&E</u> <u>Response</u> <u>Rec'd</u> <u>5/28/26</u>
P1/26FF-3.3	PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to repair the high number of leaks classified as "LK3" in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (<u>SAPN 51323599</u>)	1/26FF	<u>7/26FF#2</u>
P1/26FF-3.4	Regarding the interoperability of PG&E radio systems with San Luis Obispo County, PG&E should initiate targeted efforts with SLO County to coordinate and test the current means of establishing interoperability between the two systems as soon as possible. Additionally, PG&E should investigate finding another means to establish interoperability between the two systems more easily and quickly during an emergency at DCCP. (<u>SAPN 51323660</u>)	1/26FF	<u>7/26FF#2</u>
P1/26FF-3.9	PG&E should review and improve the limited guidance in procedures for completing Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) and elaborate when a CCE should be performed, how it should be systematically completed, and how it should be acted upon. (<u>SAPN 51323661</u>)	1/26FF <u>4/26FF</u>	<u>7/26FF#2</u>
<u>P4/26FF-3.3</u>	<u>PG&E should provide the DCISC with an oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Institute for Nuclear Power Operations corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report.</u>	<u>4/26FF</u>	<u>2Q27FF</u>

DCPP Systems/Components Reviewed Periodically (See EN-16)

4 kV – July 2022

230 kV & 500 kV – Sep 2025 (include grid stability/inertia)

Auxiliary Feedwater – Mar 2024

Auxiliary Saltwater – Mar 2024

Auxiliary Building Ventilation – July 2025

Chemical & Volume Control System and High Pressure Injection – Nov 2024

Component Cooling Water – Mar 2023

Compressed Air – Apr 2023

Condensate & Feedwater – Nov 2021 2Q26FF Jul 26FF#1

Containment Structure – Dec 2025 #1

Containment Spray – May 2022

Containment Ventilation and H₂ Purge – July 2023

Control Room Simulator – May 2024

Control Room Ventilation – July 2023

Digital Systems April 2024

DC Power – Mar-2022 Mar 2026

Emergency Diesel Generators – Sept 2025

Fire Protection & Detection Systems – Apr 2023

Nuclear Instrumentation & In-core Instrumentation – Aug 2025

Plant Protection System – Mar 2023

Radiation Monitoring – May 2023

Radwaste Processing Mar 2024

Reactor Coolant System & Pumps – Apr 2023

Buried Piping & Tanks – May 2023

RCS Process Control System – Dec 2024

Refueling Equipment – May 2024

Residual Heat Removal – Nov 2024

Rod Control & Indication – Aug 2023

Safety Injection Pumps – Nov 2024

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling & HVAC – Mar 2025

Steam Generators – Dec-2025 #1 Mar 2026

Special Protection System – Mar 2020

Turbine-Generator – Jan 2023

DCPP Programs Reviewed Periodically (See EN-19)
 10CFR50.59 Program – Nov 2024
 ALARA – May 2022
 Aging Management Programs – Dec 2025 #1
 Air Operated Valves – Jan 2024
 Benchmarking – Mar 2022
 Boric Acid Corrosion Control – Jan 2026
 Chemistry – Dec 2025 #1; March 2026
 Cranes – ~~Dec-2024~~ May 2026
 Configuration Management – Mar 2025
~~Corrective Action – CARB – May 2025~~
 Emergency Preparedness – March 2026
 Employee Concerns Program – Aug 2023
 Equipment Environmental Qualification – Dec 2022
 Equipment Reliability – ~~May 2024~~ May 2026
 Fire Doors & Door Life Cycle Mgm't. Plan – Jan 2022
 Fire Protection Program (NFPA-805) – Sep 2024
 FLEX Program – ~~Aug 2025~~ Mar 2026
 Flow Accelerated Corrosion – May 2022
 Foreign Material Exclusion – Dec 2025 #2
 Greater Than Class C Waste – Aug 2022 PFP
 In-service Inspection Program – Jul 2023
 Integrated Risk Assessment Program – Mar 2022
 Large Motors – Jul 2023
 Long-Term Capital Planning Process – May 2023
 MIDAS – May 2024
 Maintenance Rule – Jul 2025
 Margin Management Program – April 2024
 Motor Operated Valves – Jan 2024
~~Notification Review Team – Dec 2025 #2~~
 Nuclear Fuel Program – Mar 2025
 Nuclear Insurance Programs – July 2024 May 2026
 Online Maintenance – Dec 2025 #2
 Online Monitoring – Dec 2025 #2
 Operating Experience – Jul 2025 (review biennially)
 Operability Assessment Program – Jan 2022
 Operational Decision Making – April 2024
 PRA Programs (non-seismic) – Sep 2022
 Performance Improvement – Sep 2023 PM
~~Performance Review Quarterly Meeting – Apr 2024~~
~~Plant Health Committee/Subcommittee – Aug 2025~~

June 2026 Public Meeting

~~Plant Health Prioritization Committee – Aug 2023~~
~~Plant Staff Review Committee – Nov 2024~~
 Reactivity Management – July 2025
 Safety-Security Interface – Jan 2026
 Self-Assessment – Jan 2023
 Single Point Vulnerabilities – Sept 2025
 Seismic PRA – Feb 2025
 Seismically Induced System Interactions – Mar 2024
 Software QA - Aug 2021
 Spent Fuel Management – Dec 2025 #2
 System Engineering – Mar 2022
 Transformers, Large – May 2025
 Troubleshooting – Dec 2022
 Tsunami Hazard Analysis – Jan 2025
 Vibration Monitoring – July 2025

FF = Fact-finding Meeting PM = Public Meeting Q = Quarter

DCPP Meetings Reviewed Periodically (See EN-20)

Corrective Action – CARB – May 2025

Notification Review Team – Apr 2026

Performance Review Quarterly Meeting – Apr 2024

Nuclear Safety Operating Committee – Dec 2025 #2

Plant Health Committee/Subcommittee – Mar 2026

Plant Health Prioritization Committee – Aug 2023

Plant Staff Review Committee – Nov 2024

June 2026 Public Meeting

FF = Fact-finding Meeting

PM = Public Meeting Q = Quarter

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE**AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM**

MEETING DATE:	June 17, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XXXV- L
AGENDA TITLE:	Public Outreach Session.

CONSENT [☐] ACTION [☒] INFORMATION [☒]

Staff Summary: After recessing the afternoon session at the Avila Lighthouse Suites, the Committee Members, Consultants and Counsel will travel to the New Government Center, 1055 Monterey Street, San Luis Obispo and reconvene in a public outreach session in the Supervisors' Chambers. The purpose of this session is to receive comments and questions and provide responses to any interested members of the public on matters concerning operational safety at Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

Upon conclusion of the public outreach session, the June 16-17, 2026, public meeting will stand adjourned. The next public meeting of the Committee will be held in Avila Beach, CA on October 20-21, 2026.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: Receive public comments and questions from members of the public and take action or provide direction as appropriate.