

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

Report on

Fact-Finding Meeting at DCP on April 13 and 14, 2026

by

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1.0 SUMMARY

The results of the DCISC April 13 and 14, 2026, Fact-Finding Meeting at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) in Avila Beach, CA, are presented. The subjects addressed and summarized in Section 3 are as follows:

1. Cyber Security Program
2. Station Update
3. 2026 Operating Plan
4. Human Performance and Plant Status Control
5. Long Term Seismic Program
6. Simulator Training Observation
7. Accompany a Nuclear Operator on Rounds
8. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspector
9. Observe Notification Review Team Meeting
10. Results of Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Failure Cause Evaluation
11. Meet with DCP Officer
12. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update
13. Reactor Vessel Head Corrosion Industry Event Update

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This Fact-Finding Meeting at the DCP was held to evaluate specific safety matters for the DCISC. The objective of the evaluation was to determine if Pacific Gas and Electric's (PG&E's) performance is appropriate and whether any areas revealed observations which are important enough to warrant further review, follow-up, or presentation at a public meeting. These safety matters include follow-up and/or continuing review efforts by the Committee, as well as those identified as a result of reviews of various safety-related documents.

Section 4 – Conclusions, highlights the conclusions of the Fact-Finding Team (FFT) based on items reported in Section 3 – Discussion. These highlights also include the FFT's suggested follow-up items for the DCISC, such as scheduling future Fact-Finding Meetings on the topic, presentations at future public meetings, and requests for future updates or information from DCP on specific areas of interest, etc.

Section 5 – Recommendations, presents specific recommendations to the DCISC and PG&E proposed by the FFT. These recommendations will be considered by the DCISC. After review and approval by the DCISC, this Fact-Finding Report, including its recommendations, will be provided to PG&E. The Fact-Finding Report will also appear in the DCISC Annual Report.

3.0 DISCUSSION

3.1 Cyber Security Program

The FFT met with Jordan Tyman, Risk and Compliance Director, for an update on DCP's Cyber Security Program. The DCISC last reviewed this topic during its March 2024 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.1), when it concluded the following:

DCP's Cyber Security Program appeared to be effectively managed, and efforts are continuing to ensure that the program is successfully sustained.

The DCISC charter focuses on operational safety. The DCISC only reviews security topics to the extent that they can impact operational safety. In general, good practices for cybersecurity are also beneficial and synergistic with safety, because they also decrease the frequency of unintentional cyber errors and problems.

The core elements of the Cyber Security Program include identifying and implementing protection for all the Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) at DCP. CDAs are digital computer and communications systems and components associated with safety-related and important-to-safety functions, security functions, emergency preparedness functions, and support systems which if compromised could adversely impact any of those functions. During the program's initial implementation in 2017, DCP identified approximately 4,000 CDAs across 66 critical systems. Slightly less than half of the 4,000 CDAs were in security-related systems, and the remainder were plant-related systems. Some examples of CDAs were the Programmable Logic Controllers in the Digital Electrohydraulic Turbine Control System, Operator Human-Machine Interface Computers, the Plant Process Control System, Security Cameras, and the Security Event and Monitoring System. Almost all the CDAs were located inside protected or vital areas of the plant. In general, implementation of the program ensured that none of these CDAs could be accessed from the internet, including the use of data diodes to block intrusion.

Mr. Tyman explained that DCP's Cyber Security Program continued to be focused on maintaining effective implementation. No significant changes had been made to the program in the two years since the DCISC's last review. DCP's initial implementation of its Cyber Security Program was based in part on industry guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 08-09, "Cyber Security Plan for Nuclear Power Reactors," Revision 6, dated April 2010. NEI 08-09 provides a framework for implementing Cyber Security Programs that meet the requirements of NRC regulations under 10 CFR 73.54, "Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks." PG&E was in the process of evaluating changes to the program to incorporate revisions contained in NEI 08-09, Revision 7, dated February 2024.

(Versions of both NEI 08-09 documents are available in public data repositories including the NRC ADAMS System.) He described that most of the changes included in the updated revision were in the areas of specifying and providing credit for the implementation of defense-in-depth strategies in Cyber Security Programs.

The FFT inquired regarding the results of DCP's most recent NRC inspection completed in August 2025. Mr. Tyman reported that the results of the inspection were generally favorable with two findings. One finding was self-identified by PG&E during a Cyber Security Program Self-Assessment and involved a deficiency in the installation of new computer equipment in a security video monitoring system. The other NRC inspection finding involved methods used for the monitoring wireless networks within the plant. The deficiencies driving both of the NRC findings were promptly corrected, including the implementation of programmatic changes where appropriate. Both findings were judged to be of very low security significance (Green) and classified as Non-Cited Violations by the NRC.

The FFT requested and reviewed a copy of program's most recent Quick Hit Self-Assessment (QHSA), Notification 51270602, "2025 Cyber Security QHSA," dated May 12, 2025. The FFT found that the QHSA team consisted of four individuals consisting of one PG&E employee and three peers from other nuclear power plants. The QHSA team's review appeared extensive and identified 3 Deficiencies, 8 Gaps, and 24 Enhancements. The issues identified did not appear to point to any major programmatic deficiencies, and most of the issues identified in the QHSA consisted of suggestions for programmatic improvements. The QHSA provided a comparison to the program's previous assessment performed in 2024 which identified substantially more Deficiencies and about twice the number of Gaps and Enhancements. Overall, the FFT found that the QHSA was effective in assessing the effectiveness of DCP's Cyber Security Program. The FFT concluded that DCP's Cyber Security Program continued to be implemented effectively.

Conclusion: DCP's Cyber Security Program continued to be implemented effectively in support of maintaining plant operational safety. The results of an NRC inspection in August 2025 were generally positive with two findings of low safety significance which were properly rectified.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.2 Station Update

The DCISC FFT met with Justin Rogers, Station Senior Director, for a Station Update. The DCISC last received a Station Update during its March 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.2), when it concluded the following:

DCP's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.

Mr. Rogers reported that both units had run at full power since the last update except for an approximately three-day reduction in power on Unit 1 over the weekend of February 28 and

March 1 to allow for cleaning of the Circulating Water Intake Tunnels. He reviewed with the FFT the purpose of that activity as well as its scheduling, which is typically performed about half-way between refueling outages. He noted that for this most recent tunnel cleaning activity, the station worked closely with the System Operations Center to schedule the activity at a time when the reduction in power would have minimal impact on the transmission system. In this case, it was decided that the maintenance activity would be performed over an off-peak weekend. Also, the station continued to refine planning and execution of the tunnel cleaning such that the duration of the power reduction would be minimized (56 hours for this most recent tunnel cleaning). Lastly, he reported that the station completed a Maintenance Outage Window (MOW) for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-3 in late March. Future MOWs for the other two Unit 1 EDGs were scheduled for later in 2026 and in 2027 for the three Unit 2's EDGs.

The FFT also discussed with Mr. Rogers the impact of the NRC's April 2, 2026, approval of DCP's License Renewal which allows for an additional 20 years of plant operations. Mr. Rogers reported that the NRC's action was welcome but also expected and would not immediately compel any changes in station operations. He noted that resolving uncertainty over operations beyond the 2030 as currently authorized by the state of California under Senate Bill 846 was also important and would have a larger direct impact on station operations.


Conclusion: DCP's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.3 2026 Operating Plan

The DCISC FFT met with Justin Rogers, Station Senior Director, for an update on DCP's Operating Plan for 2026. The DCISC last reviewed DCP's Operating Plan during its February 2025 Public Meeting (Reference 6.3), when PG&E made a presentation to the DCISC titled, "Results of the 2024 Operating Plan and Key Elements of the 2025 Operating Plan."

In the past, the DCISC reviewed DCP's Operating Plan annually at its February Public Meetings; however, time constraints in the February 2026 Public Meeting led the FFT to review the Operating Plan during this Fact-Finding Meeting. Mr. Rogers began by explaining that DCP's 2026 Operating Plan was based in part on the station's five-year (2025-2030) Strategic Plan, a copy of which was provided to and reviewed by the FFT. The illustration below shows the first page of the Strategic Plan:



DCPP 2025-2030 Strategic Plan

Mr. Rogers explained how the Strategic Plan was broken into four major areas with underlying initiatives (small print and arrows in above illustration). The four major areas contained in the Strategic Plan with a few examples of their underlying initiatives were:

- Safety
 - Execute Emergency Plan Enhancements
 - Implement Advanced Fuel Features
 - Continuously Mature PSEMS (PG&E Safety Excellence Management System)
- Reliability
 - Initiate System Health Programs
 - Execute Work Management Optimization
 - Enhance Preventative Maintenance Feedback Program
- Affordability
 - Implement Technical Specifications Optimization Efforts
 - Implement Artificial Intelligence Roadmap and Procedure Optimization
- People
 - Improve Proficiency and Learning Initiatives
 - Implement Commitment Period #3 Retention Program

Mr. Rogers further explained that DCP's 2026 Operating Plan was contained in a document titled, "2026 Roadmap to Generating Excellence," a copy of which was provided to and reviewed by the FFT. The Roadmap was fundamentally based on information contained in the above Strategic Plan with a focus on detailing the station goals and initiatives specific to 2026. The Roadmap contained specific, high-level goals for the plant, such as capacity factor, cost, recordable injuries, headcount, etc. Additionally, it contained restatements of the station's purpose, vision, virtues, and tenets. The second page of the Roadmap included key activities for 2026 that supported the Strategic Plan as shown below:

Key Activities to Achieve Success	
Excel in Safety	• Execute safety controls to mitigate key nuclear, personnel, and wildfire safety risks, verify risk reduction results, and achieve nuclear industry top-quartile safety performance • Mature our safety management program as part of the PG&E Safety Excellence Management System (PSEMS) and empower our grassroots safety team • Demonstrate commitment to safety of the community by improving performance in emergency preparedness drills and exercises
Operate Safely and Reliably	• Implement safe and error-free planning and execution of 1R26 and all online preventative and corrective maintenance and testing of DCP equipment • Prepare and execute a plan in support of peak Summer Reliability Season and Winter Storm Season, complete implementation of the climate vulnerability and resiliency assessments • Resolve all industry oversight identified feedback, including our INPO Areas for Concern • Implement project plans for continued safety and reliability projects and meet or exceed our R&SI target
Focus on Affordability	• Define and implement key controls to deliver on financial targets, with a focus on forecast accuracy and financial management processes
Reduce Costs to Customers	• Implement changes to reduce cost to customers through initiatives that decrease operating costs, increase capacity factor and optimize station generation availability, including reduced refueling outage and tunnel cleaning durations
Enhance Proficiency	• Demonstrate a high competence and expertise as nuclear professionals while consistently complying with station and industry standards, maintaining qualifications, and reinforcing and advancing our fundamentals • Leverage nuclear industry proficiency and teaching and learning guidance to increase skills and expertise
Execute Extended Operations	• Obtain state required approvals for NRC to issue operating license renewal • Submit 2027 cost recovery forecast application to the CPUC • Drive certainty into regulatory proceedings for continued operations
Mature Lean Processes	• Continue to advance the Lean operating culture by standardizing Lean plays and practices • Implement waste elimination to repurpose resources for other work, reduce cost to customers, implement innovation opportunities, and improve unit capacity factor
Invest in Our People	• I&B: Nurturing the "Power of We." Focusing on how we show up for each other, build trust, and create a workplace where everyone feels recognized, safe, supported, and connected • Joy at Work: Ensure coworkers feel known, loved, proud, and enjoy working at DCP • Cross Functional Teamwork: Identify ways departments can work best together through collaboration to solve long-standing station challenges
Manage Our Assets	• Strengthen internal awareness of cyber security threats and coworkers' vigilance of phishing attacks • Identify critical datasets, prioritize and establish management processes

DCP 2026 Roadmap Key Activities

The above initiatives were broken down further and tracked using Tactical Implementation Plans that were reviewed twice weekly by the Station Leadership Team. The plans were further reviewed monthly with all Directors at the station. Consistent with ongoing DCISC reviews on the implementation of Artificial Intelligence (AI) at DCP, the DCISC should follow-up on how AI is being addressed as a part of the AI Roadmap in the Strategic Plan.

The FFT then inquired about the status of periodic reviews of corporate operations by the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Mr. Rogers reported that INPO performs corporate evaluations approximately every six years with the last two having been performed at DCP in 2013 and 2020 and the next scheduled to be performed in early 2027. For single-unit utilities such as PG&E, the evaluation focuses on activities at the station officer level (Vice Presidents) and corporate support functions such as human resources, information technology, and finance. The FFT later asked if the DCISC could receive a briefing on the results of past and future INPO corporate evaluations, and PG&E staff responded that they would be willing to provide a briefing on those results to the DCISC during a future Fact-Finding Meeting.

The FFT also inquired if the station was still conducting Management Review Meetings, and Mr. Rogers reported that those meetings now consisted of a quarterly review of station performance indicators that were not green or in industry first quartile. In response to a question from the FFT, he reported that the meetings did not provide an opportunity for remote attendance or observation.

The FFT concluded that DCP's Annual Plan and the process underlying its preparation and execution were appropriately focused on initiating and tracking specific goals and actions that would generate future enhancements in station safety and reliability. The FFT recommends to the DCISC that changes be made in its open items list (as shown below) to support appropriate reviews of future activities in these areas.

Conclusion: DCP's Annual Plan was reviewed and found to be appropriately focused on initiating and tracking specific goals and actions that would generate future enhancements in station safety and reliability.

Recommendations to the DCISC:

- The DCISC should modify its Open Items List as follows:
 - Item OE-2, "Station Excellence Plan and Management Review Meeting," should be closed.
 - Item O-4, "Review plant activities since previous FF meeting (Station Update)," should be modified to include periodic reviews of the status of station Performance Indicators.
 - Item NS-9, "Monitor DCP's program to track INPO Areas for Improvement," should be modified to include reviews of the INPO Corporate Evaluation completed in 2020 as well as the next corporate evaluation planned for 2027.

- The DCISC should follow-up on how future uses of Artificial Intelligence at DCPD are being addressed as a part of the Artificial Intelligence Roadmap in the Strategic Plan. (D4/26FF-3.3A)
- The DCISC should follow up on receiving an oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Institute for Nuclear Power Operations corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report. (D4/26FF-3.3B)

Recommendation to PG&E: PG&E should provide the DCISC with an oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Institute for Nuclear Power Operations corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report. (P4/26FF-3.3)

3.4 Human Performance and Plant Status Control

The DCISC FFT met with Justin Rogers, Station Senior Director, for an update on Human Performance and Plant Status Control at DCPD. The DCISC last reviewed Human Performance during its May 2024 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.4), when it concluded the following:

DCPD's Human Performance has been excellent over the last two years based on data and trends in Human Performance events. DCPD has had no events classified with the highest significance of a Station Level Event since April 2021. The numbers and significance of Department Level Events and Plant Status Control Events remained very low.

DCPD reports and classifies all Human Performance (HU) Events and records them via the Corrective Action Program for action and resolution. HU Event classifications are governed by procedure OM15.ID11, "Human Performance Event Response," Revision 12, dated February 11, 2025, a copy of which was provided to and reviewed by the FFT. HU Event classifications are as follows:

- Station Level Events (SLEs; highest significance)
- Department Level Events (DLEs)
- Organizational Learning Opportunities (OLOs; lowest significance)

At the request of the FFT, PG&E provided an update on the numbers of SLEs and DLEs for the last year. The last SLE at the station occurred on April 18, 2021, when operators and maintenance personnel identified that two cooling water hoses inside the Unit 2 Main Generator had been incorrectly installed by a contractor. Combining data from previous reviews by the DCISC and recent information provided by PG&E, the FFT assembled the following table on the recent history of the number of DLEs at DCPD:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of DLEs</u>
2022	9

2023	4
2024	5
2025	1
2026 (year to date)	0

Mr. Rogers reported that some of the older DLEs were discretionary, but this practice was discontinued in 2025 to ensure that DCP's DLE numbers would be more directly comparable to industry data. The FFT requested copies and reviewed the five Notifications associated with the 2024 DLEs and found that they effectively captured lessons learned from the events which were of low safety significance. Mr. Rogers reported that the 2025 DLE occurred during Refueling Outage 1R25 when a contract employee fell from a ladder in Containment and suffered a broken foot. The DCISC previously reviewed that event during its April 2025 Fact-Finding Meeting.

Regarding OLOs, Mr. Rogers reported the station continued its process of conservatively identifying a large number of minor issues for formal evaluation by the HU review process and classifying minor issues as OLOs to ensure that all available lessons learned for minor issues were captured and disseminated to station employees. Data routinely provided to the DCISC via monthly Performance Improvement Reports continued to show a high number of events reviewed by the program along with a high number of OLOs recorded. Specifically, the most recent Performance Improvement Summary (data through April 5, 2026) showed 38 OLOs recorded for 2026 year-to-date with 7 of the OLOs classified as discretionary. Discretionary OLOs were events that did not specifically meet the criteria for classification as OLOs but were judged by management to warrant additional attention. The FFT considered that DCP's approach to recording and responding to OLOs represented a conservative and safety-focused approach to reporting, analyzing, and learning from all issues that could be caused by human errors, and that approach had contributed to reducing the frequency of more serious DLE and SLE events.

One area of human performance that had recently received an enhanced focus was the lifting and landing of leads during maintenance activities. Mr. Rogers explained that there were three HU events in this area over several months including one that led to an NRC non-cited violation. In response to this negative trend, the station initiated a Common Cause Evaluation (CCE). The FFT requested and was provided with a copy of the CCE, "DA-CCE for Lifting and Landing Leads," (performed under Notification 51313034) initiated on November 20, 2025, and approved by the Corrective Action Review Board just prior to the FFT's meetings. The FFT reviewed the systematic approach used in the CCE and found that it used appropriate tools to analyze the HU events, to determine their cross-cutting, common causes, and to capture and initiate appropriate corrective actions for organizational deficiencies. The FFT considered this systematic approach to be an example of good practices that should be codified into a formal CCE procedure as discussed in a previous recommendation the DCISC made to PG&E during its January 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting as follows:

PG&E should review and improve the limited guidance in procedures for completing Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) and elaborate when a CCE should be performed, how it should be systematically completed, and how it should be acted upon. (P1/26-FF3.9)

The FFT then discussed with Mr. Rogers the status of Plant Status Control at DCP. The goal of the Plant Status Control Program is to prevent Plant Status Control Events (a subset of HU events) which are also called and tracked as Misposition Events. A Misposition Event refers to events in which an operator or technician manipulates the wrong component (such as a valve or switch) or places a component in the wrong position. Tracking and monitoring of Misposition Events was governed by procedure OP1.ID6, "Plant Status Control," Revision 22, dated October 22, 2025, a copy of which was provided to and reviewed by the FFT. Mr. Rogers reported that DCP's recent performance had been strong with a green performance indicator based on data showing that no Misposition Events had occurred on either unit within the last six months.

Overall, the FFT found that DCP's Human Performance has been excellent over the last two years based on data and trends in HU Events and Misposition Events.

Conclusion: DCP's Human Performance has been excellent over the last two years based on data and trends in Human Performance events. DCP has had no events classified with the highest significance of a Station Level Event since April 2021. The numbers and significance of Human Performance Events and Misposition Events remained very low.

Recommendations to the DCISC: None.

Recommendation to PG&E: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *PG&E should review and improve the limited guidance in procedures for completing Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) and elaborate when a CCE should be performed, how it should be systematically completed, and how it should be acted upon. (P1/26FF-3.9)*

3.5 Long Term Seismic Program

The DCISC FFT met remotely with Jeff Bachhuber, Director, Geosciences; Albert Kottke, Principal Geotechnical Earthquake Engineer; Chris Madugo, Principal Geosciences Consultant (PG&E employee); and Jearl Strickland, Consultant, to discuss the history and status of PG&E's Long Term Seismic Program (LTSP). Delphine Hou, Deb Luchsinger, and Jerry Bischof from the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) participated remotely in the meeting. (DWR is the state agency charged with overseeing state funds allocated to facilitate the extension of DCP power operations under Senate Bill 846.) The DCISC last reviewed related geosciences programs during its December 2024 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.5), when it concluded the following:

PG&E provided information addressing each of several technical topics relevant to the seismic hazard at the DCP site. Most of the discussion was in response to the DCISC's questions, and the clarifications were helpful and in sufficient depth to provide the requested information.

The participants began their discussions with an inquiry and review of the status of responding to the most recent report issued by the Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) on February 19, 2026. The PG&E staff reported that they were working on a formal response to the IPRP's report, and

they expected to complete their response sometime in the fall of 2026. An extended time was needed so that PG&E could include in its response an evaluation of the sensitivity of the site Seismic Hazard Analysis (SHA) to the changes in the Hosgri slip rate such as advocated by the IPRP in its report. Both the FFT and PG&E staff agreed that the DCISC's October 2026 Public Meeting would be an appropriate time for the DCISC to consider the IPRP's February 2026 report and for PG&E to present its responses to the recommendations contained in that IPRP report. The participants also briefly discussed the status of PG&E's responses to the nine recommendations made by the DCISC's Seismic Review Team (SRT), and it was agreed that it would be appropriate for PG&E to provide an update at the DCISC's upcoming June 2026 Public Meeting.

The FFT then requested that PG&E provide an overview and history of the LTSP. Mr. Bachhuber reported that the program began late in the original NRC licensing process for DCPD in the mid-1980s. At that time, the LTSP was created to review new information on area faults and perform a detailed SHA for the site. The LTSP's initial SHA work was completed and submitted to the NRC in 1988. The 1988 SHA became the basis under which the plant's design was reassessed and modifications initiated to ensure adequate safety during seismic events. Following the 1988 SHA, PG&E committed to the NRC to continue indefinitely the LTSP to provide ongoing evaluations of seismic hazards at the site. The early LTSP purposed to keep abreast of new scientific knowledge and to monitor and evaluate all earthquakes that occurred in the local area. The later effort gave rise to the current Central Coast Seismic Network of earthquake monitoring stations. Since the early 1990s, additional topics and scopes of work were added to the LTSP as investigations and evaluations of the seismic hazard around the DCPD site expanded into other areas. Following the accident in Fukushima, Japan, formal reevaluations of site seismic hazards were required by the NRC for all nuclear power plants. DCPD then performed a complete reassessment of the site seismic hazard and integrated into that evaluation most of the LTSP's work from prior years. The updated evaluation was performed in accordance with the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) process and submitted to the NRC in March 2015 (Reference 6.6).

Mr. Bachhuber continued to explain that with the signing of the Joint Proposal in 2016 (which agreed to the cessation of operations at DCPD by 2025), the work of PG&E's Geosciences Department began to be reduced along with certain aspects of the LTSP work. Also over that time period, the Geosciences staff expanded its work to include providing support for other, non-nuclear areas of PG&E. When Senate Bill 846 (extending operations at DCPD to 2030) was passed in 2022, a requirement was included for PG&E to perform an Updated Seismic Assessment (USA), and PG&E expanded its geosciences efforts and completed that evaluation early in 2024. Currently, the Geosciences staff's activities included supporting both DCPD (including the ongoing work of the LTSP) as well as other PG&E areas with a current staffing of 21 individuals, which overall was a larger number than was present prior to the Joint Proposal.

Mr. Madugo reported that the current LTSP served to fund multiple areas of research related to the seismic hazard in the area surrounding DCPD. Much of this research was in the form of grants issued to university researchers (such as the University of California system schools) and other related organizations (such as the Statewide California Earthquake Center, the Cascadia Research Center, and the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory). The LTSP also supported coordination and information sharing efforts with government entities (such as the United States Geological Survey).

For many of these efforts, the LTSP served as a funding source for work that produced publicly available reports which benefited both DCP and the broader community of scientific activities related to area seismic hazard analyses. Also included in the LTSP's work were responding to other inquiries and needs, such as reviewing and responding to recommendations from the IPRP and SRT as discussed above.

Looking at current and future LTSP work, the PG&E staff reported that if DCP operations were extended past 2030, PG&E would initiate a project to perform a full update to its 2015 SHA and 2024 USA which would be completed in 2030. The 2030 SHA update would begin in the 2028 or 2029 timeframe and would again use the SSHAC process for its development. In response to the FFT's question as to what level of SSHAC review would be required, PG&E staff replied that the appropriate SSHAC level would be determined later as a part of the initial scoping process for the 2030 update and depended in part on the amount of new data that would need to be included at that time. The FFT found that PG&E's work under the LTSP was being effectively managed and contributed significantly to improving seismic safety at DCP and in the surrounding areas.

Conclusion: PG&E's work under the Long Term Seismic Program was being effectively managed and contributed significantly to improving seismic knowledge and safety at DCP and in the surrounding area.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.6 Simulator Training Observation

The DCISC FFT observed an Initial Licensed Operator Training (ILT) session in the DCP Control Room Simulator. Mr. Jason de la Vega, Initial License Training Supervisor, accompanied the FFT during their observations. The DCISC last observed a simulator training class during its January 2024 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.7), when it concluded the following:

The continuing operations simulator training session for the faulted steam generator scenario was successful in that the operations crew responded correctly to all simulated failures as well as the faulted Steam Generator condition. Additionally, the crew exhibited good human performance attributes such as three-way communication, clear and concise group updates, use of alpha-numeric terminology, and proper procedure use.

Licensed Operators at DCP receive their initial training over an 18-month period during which they are solely assigned to work in an Initial License Training (ILT) class of multiple trainees who participate in a comprehensive course of study consisting of classroom instruction, simulator exercises, dynamic learning activities, self-study, and testing. The ILT program is designed to conform to requirements of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and it receives and maintains plant training program accreditation through regular INPO reviews. The ILT program culminates in an individual taking an NRC Initial Licensing Examination consisting of both written and operating (simulator) examinations. Both Reactor Operator (RO) candidates and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) candidates participate in class together; however, the SRO candidates

receive additional training appropriate for their future role as supervisors overseeing plant operations.

The FFT observed a series of four short simulator scenarios during which training staff were providing operator candidates with opportunities to experience and respond to off-normal events. The full training session was scheduled for about two hours and included the following events:

- Nuclear Instrument N-42 Failure and the use of Abnormal Operating Procedure (AP) AP-5, “Malfunction of Eagle 21 Protection or Control Channel.”
- Two Control Rod Dops and the use of procedures AP-12C, “Dropped Control Rod;” Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) E-0, “Reactor Trip;” and EOP E-0.1, “Reactor Trip Response.”
- Pressurizer Spray Valve (PCV-455B) Stuck Open and the use of AP-13, “Malfunction of Reactor Pressure Control System.”
- Main Transformer Trouble (cooling loss) and the use of AP-25, “Rapid Load Reduction or Shutdown.”



Dr. Meshkati and Mr. de la Vega Observing Initial License Training in the Control Room Simulator

A copy of the lesson plan for the simulator training session was provided to and reviewed by the FFT while observing the events. Training objectives and expected operator actions were identified for each of the events, and the instructors evaluated the crew in their ability to complete all the required actions using task and communications practices which met performance expectations.

The crew being observed consisted of two RO candidates and two SRO candidates who rotated through all four assigned positions. The FFT considered the rotation that had RO candidates serve in SRO positions, and vice versa, was a good practice that provided all the candidates with a broader training experience.

Following the training session, Mr. de la Vega answered several of the FFT's questions regarding how initial emergency classifications and notifications were made by Control Room Operators, which were activities that were not covered in the training session observed by the FFT. Overall, the simulator training appeared to be effectively conducted, and operators performed well during the scenario.

Conclusions: An Initial License Training session in the simulator was well prepared, contained appropriate objectives, and was professionally conducted by the Training staff. Operators performed well in responding to the simulated off-normal events.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None

3.7 Accompany a Nuclear Operator on Rounds

The DCISC FFT accompanied Kyle Mahoney, Nuclear Operator, on his operator rounds in the Unit 1 Turbine Building. The DCISC last observed an operator on rounds during its November 2023 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.8), when it concluded the following:

On its plant tour the DCISC Fact-finding Team observed the Turbine Building areas to have been clean and orderly with all equipment operating normally. The DCCP Operator escorting the Team was knowledgeable about the various areas of the plant as well as the equipment.

The FFT attended a portion of the 0730 Daily Briefing led by Operations shift staff from the control room with all other station departments participating via voice conference call. Following the 0730 Daily Briefing, the FFT and Mr. Mahoney donned personnel protective equipment (hard hat, safety glasses, gloves, and hearing protection) and entered the Unit 1 Turbine Building. The FFT observed Mr. Mahoney as he descended to the bottom floor (85' Elevation) to inspect the following components, observing the general condition of the equipment and recording readings from numerous local instruments and gauges:

- Air Compressors and Dryers
- Lube Oil Pumps and Purifiers
- Main Feedwater Pumps
- Condensate Booster Pumps
- Condensate Pumps
- Turbine Building Sump Pumps
- Emergency Diesel Generator 1-3
- Other Miscellaneous Equipment



Dr. Meshkati and Mr. Mahoney Observing Operating Indications on a Plant Air Dryer



Mr. McWhorter and Dr. Meshkati at Emergency Diesel Generator 1-3

Mr. Mahoney discussed the various indications that were being checked, the use of handheld devices to record local instrument readings, and how off-normal indications were identified and tracked for further action. Overall, the Nuclear Operator was very knowledgeable about his responsibilities, including the logging and trending of operating parameters and setpoints for equipment in their assigned area. The Turbine Building areas visited appeared clean and orderly, and all observed equipment appeared to be operating normally.

Conclusions: The DCISC Fact-finding Team observed a Turbine Building Operator on their rounds checking for the proper operation of various equipment components and acceptable conditions in areas around equipment. The Nuclear Operator was very knowledgeable about their responsibilities, including the logging and trending of operating parameters and setpoints for equipment in their assigned area. Observed areas of the Turbine Building were found to be clean and orderly with all observed equipment in good material condition.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.8 Meeting with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspector

The DCISC FFT met with Eli Garcia, Acting NRC Senior Resident Inspector, for an update. The DCISC last met with the NRC Resident Inspectors during its March 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.9), when it concluded the following:

The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.

The participants discussed the following items:

- The temporary duty reassignment of the NRC Senior Resident, Mahdi Hayes, to a position in the Region IV office.
- NRC reorganization and changes being implemented to improve efficiency in the Reactor Inspection Program.
- Recent NRC inspection findings and concerns.
- Human Performance at DCP, including a recent Non-Cited Violation that resulted from a human performance-related event.
- Recent changes to the NRC's Differing Professional Views program.
- The NRC's desire to present the results of its annual assessment of DCP performance at the DCISC's June 2026 Public Meeting.

Conclusions: The meeting with the Acting NRC Senior Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.9 Observe Notification Review Team Meeting

The DCISC FFT observed the April 14, 2026, meeting of the Notification Review Team (NRT). The DCISC last observed a similar meeting during its December 15, 2025, Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.10), when it concluded the following:

The December 15, 2025, meeting of the DCP Notification Review Team was conducted efficiently and effectively. The team appropriately reviewed and dispositioned approximately 80 Notifications from the previous day.

Notifications are electronic documents used by plant personnel to identify and record plant problems, large or small, for tracking to resolution in the Corrective Action Program (CAP). Notifications are either “DAs” or “DNs.” DAs are for conditions adverse to quality. DNs are for less significant, work-only situations in which one-time corrective actions will be scheduled and no further action needs to be initiated. Each day, some 50-100 Notifications are initiated, and DCP’s threshold for submitting Notifications is very low. Each Notification is initially reviewed by the on-shift Operations Work Control Manager and the Control Room Shift Manager. Following the initial reviews, the multi-departmental NRT meets each weekday to review and approve disposition of the previous day’s Notifications. Lastly, the management-based Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) performs a high-level review of selected Notifications, and the DCISC also regularly observes CARB meetings.

The work of the NRT was covered under DCP Procedure OM4.ID14, “Notification Review Team (NRT),” Revision 40, dated October 16, 2025, a confidential copy of which was provided to and reviewed by the FFT. The NRT is responsible for evaluating and classifying each work-only DN and quality-related DA Notifications for appropriate disposition. DNs are assigned for all equipment/system problems for which corrective actions are necessary as well as for all other requested work not associated with problem resolution. DA Notifications are reviewed by the NRT, classified by significance level and evaluation needed, and assigned to the organization(s) responsible for initiating resolution typically within 30 days for low priority problems.

The April 14, 2026, NRT meeting was convened as primarily a remote meeting facilitated by David Owen, Performance Improvement Coordinator, and the FFT joined in-person with Mr. Owen during the meeting. The NRT reviewed approximately 70 Notifications from the previous day during the meeting. The FFT observed that each member had reviewed all Notifications prior to the meeting and electronically shared any comments or questions with the other NRT members. It appeared that the NRT members were well prepared for the meeting and knowledgeable about the notifications reviewed. A small number of the Notifications were reviewed in more detail during the meeting to address comments or questions raised by NRT members during their pre-meeting reviews. Two Notifications in particular (both DAs) were singled out as more significant, and each one was reviewed in detail to confirm that all team members agreed with the proposed disposition. Following the completion of the meeting, Mr. Owen spent time reviewing the process and answering questions with the FFT. The FFT concluded that the NRT meeting was conducted efficiently and effectively dispositioned the previous day’s Notifications in accordance with plant procedures.

Conclusions: The April 14, 2026, meeting of the Notification Review Team was conducted efficiently, and the NRT effectively dispositioned approximately 70 Notifications from the previous day in accordance with plant procedures.

Recommendation to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.10 Results of Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Failure Cause Evaluation

The FFT met with Micael Jackson, Engineering Services Director; Sean Dunlap, Secondary Systems Engineering Supervisor; and Steve Goschke, Secondary Systems Engineer, for an update on the Cause Evaluation performed in response to a December 15, 2025, event regarding the occurrence of a leak in Unit 1 Feedwater Heater (FWH) 5C. Harpreet Bhalla and Jerry Bischof from the Department of Water Resources (DWR) participated remotely in the meeting. (DWR is the state agency charged with overseeing state funds allocated to facilitate the extension of DCPD power operations under Senate Bill 846.) The DCISC last reviewed this event during its January 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.11) when it concluded the following:

A Unit 1 5C Feedwater Heater leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, and the subsequent plant shutdown for repair was well managed by DCPD staff. Actions taken in response to a similar event in 2021 appeared generally to have been effective in driving appropriate corrective actions, and DCPD will perform a new Cause Evaluation for the 2025 event to gather any needed additional corrective actions. DCPD is proceeding with procuring 12 replacement Feedwater Heaters for each unit, and the new equipment will arrive on site in late 2026 and early 2027; however, no plan has yet been approved for installation of the replacement heaters in the units.


Additionally, during the DCISC's December 15, 2025, Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.12), the following recommendation was opened:

The DCISC should follow-up on the findings and cause evaluation for the Feedwater Heat Exchanger tube leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, as well as future plans to address FW Heat Exchanger health. (D12/15/25FF-3.10)

DCPD's FWHs are shell and tube heat exchangers which use low-grade (extraction) steam from the Main Turbines to pre-heat Condensate and Feedwater prior to entering the Steam Generators to increase the thermal efficiency of the plant. Condensate and Feedwater flows inside the heat exchanger tubes and is heated by steam flowing through and condensing in the shell side. Condensate and Feedwater flowing through the tubes of the FWHs generally operates at a higher pressure than the steam flowing through the shell. DCPD uses one stage of Feedwater heating (Number 1 FWHs) and five cascading stages of Condensate heating (Numbers 2 through 6 FWHs). The FWHs are arranged in three parallel trains (A, B and C) for a total of 18 FWHs per unit. The cascade flow begins with Number 6 FWH and ends with the Number 2 FWH on the Condensate System followed by flowing to the Number 1 FWH on the Feedwater System and then to the Steam Generators.

The purpose of this FFT discussion was to review the confidential Cause Evaluation (CE) for an event that occurred on December 15, 2025, when a significant tube leak occurred in the Unit 1 FWH 5C (FWH 1-5C). At that time, managers decided to shut down the unit and complete repairs as soon as possible. Unit 1 was taken offline on December 16, and the unit returned online on December 18 following repairs (27 tubes plugged). During its January 2026 meetings, the DCISC reviewed with the PG&E staff the actions that were taken in response to a similar FWH tube leak

event that occurred in October 2021 on Unit 2 FWH 5B (FWH 2-5B) after which a Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) was performed. The 2021 RCE concluded that the FWH 2-5B failure was caused by fatigue fracture of the FWH tubes driven by excessive vibration of unsupported tube lengths due to breaches in the drain cooler shroud. The drain cooler shroud is located in a region of the FWH shell that contains mixed steam-water flow and is susceptible to long-term erosion of material from the vapor-liquid mixture. The drain cooler is a specific localized area within the FWH which sees the lowest temperature of condensate flow through the tubes and is designed to condense any remaining vapor to water and facilitate it draining from the FWH to the Main Condenser. Schematics of the FWH internals showing the location of the drain cooler and the leak included with the 2025 CE could not be included here due to the fact that PG&E declared the CE to be a confidential document; however, the following similar picture was retrieved from a public presentation made on the 2021 FWH 2-5B failure by PG&E at the DCISC's February 2022 Public Meeting:



Number 5 Feedwater Heater Showing Drain Cooler (Light Blue) and Leak Location

Corrective actions initiated in 2021 included implementing additional FWH internal inspections and performing preventive tube plugging based on the inspection results. In the tube-plugging process, a cable is also pulled through and left inside the tube to stabilize the tube to prevent further vibration and damage. Due to the internal arrangement of the FWH, options for internal modifications or refurbishments were limited. More extensive and strategic corrective actions that could be taken (such as FWH replacement) were not considered to be feasible in 2021 given the plan at the time to cease operations four years later in 2025.

Mr. Goschke explained that the CE for the December 2025 event was approved by the Corrective Action Review Board just prior to the FFT's meeting. A confidential (read only) copy of the CE, "FWH 1-5C Tube Leak," dated April 2, 2026, was provided to and reviewed by the FFT. He explained that the stated goal of the CE was to focus on how to further mitigate the effects of existing FWH degradation beyond the actions previously driven by the 2021 RCE and not to address implementation of possible future FWH replacements (which as an ongoing project were being separately being tracked and planned). The locations and nature of the 2025 failures on

FWH 1-5C closely mimicked the location and nature of the 2021 failures on FWH 2-5B. There was no evidence contrary to the conclusions of the 2021 RCE that the failures were caused by erosion and associated damage arising from mixed vapor-liquid flows in the area of the drain cooler shroud.

Mr. Goschke then reviewed in more detail the findings and actions initiated by the CE. The FWH 2-5B failure in 2021 and the subsequent RCE resulted in an increased monitoring and inspection program for all Unit 1 and Unit 2 FWHs. Preventive plugging based on findings of the monitoring and inspection program was also implemented on all vulnerable FWHs to help prevent future failures. During the most recent outage (Refueling Outage 1R25 in the spring of 2025), FWH 1-5C was opened and 20% of in-service tubes were inspected using Eddy Current Testing. A total of 33 tubes were plugged on FWH 1-5C during that outage, all of which were preventively plugged (none having been found to leak during the inspections).

The CE reviewed the conditions found during the December 2025 repairs and concluded that a single tube had likely failed and subsequently impacted seven adjacent tubes with eight total tubes having found to be leaking. The tube failures did not appear to be related to any indications found during the previous inspections earlier in 2025. Only one of the eight tubes that leaked previously showed any Eddy Current Test indications and that indication was of a type that was very minor and like numerous other indications found elsewhere during FWH inspections that had not yet resulted in any leaks for catastrophic tube failures. Following reviews of all available previous tube inspection reports and data from the 2025 failure, the CE concluded that there was no new information or analysis taken from the most recent failure that would contradict or require revision to any of the analysis, conclusions, or corrective actions in the 2021 RCE.

As is typical, the CE contained both Corrective Actions and Prudent Actions recommended in response to the CE's findings of cause. No new Corrective Actions were recommended in addition to 1) those immediately taken to repair FWH 1-5C, 2) those initiated by the 2021 RCE, and 3) the ongoing project to procure replacement tube bundle spares (FWH internals). Regarding Prudent Actions (which differed from Corrective Actions in that they served to proactively increase margins or validate assumptions rather than to directly correct a problem's cause), Mr. Goschke explained that the CE identified a total of 11 Prudent Actions that should be considered. The Prudent Actions included:

- Performing a detailed review of the FWH tube plugging and stabilization criteria to determine if improvements can be made or if additional conservatism can be applied.
- Performing 100% Eddy Current Inspections on FWH 1-5C during the next refueling outage and plug or stabilize tubes as needed based on the inspection results and any improved plugging and stabilization criteria.
- Preparing a design change to support modifying the divider plate in a FWH should that action be needed in the future to restore tube plugging margins constrained by divider plate differential pressure.

- Evaluating procedure revisions to ensure that FWHs are not overloaded during power curtailments.
- Evaluating options to raise the shell water level and/or operate on the high-level dump valve (versus the normal level control valve) for FWH 1-5C.

The Organizational Learning Tool (OLT) performed as a part of this 2025 CE identified a single critical issue: because the underlying shroud breach cannot be corrected in-situ, DCPD is currently relying on preventive tube removal from service (plugging and stabilization) as an interim measure, pending the procurement and on-site delivery of tube bundle replacement spares that would enable emergent replacement if required. To address this vulnerability and as a part of DCPD's project planning following the 2022 decision by the state to pursue extended operations, DCPD has initiated a multi-phase corrective action program involving the procurement of replacement FWHs and associated internal tube bundle assemblies. Although no replacement tube bundle spares were currently on hand, the manufacturing of spares for the numbers 3, 4, 5, and 6 FWHs was underway, with deliveries expected to begin in December 2026. Three corrective actions, detailed in Section 6.2 of the CE, were established to systematically track the procurement of replacement tube bundle spares across all affected FWHs on both units thereby ensuring that emergent tube bundle replacement capability will be available in the near future across the full scope of potentially affected FWHs.

The FFT inquired about the timing for completing the Prudent Actions, and Mr. Goschke reported that all were due to be completed prior to the next refueling outage (Refueling Outage 1R26 in the fall of 2026). Additionally, the FFT inquired about the timing of decisions and funding for the installation of new FWHs (Phase 2 of the FWH Replacement Project) and Mr. Jackson reported that if a decision was made by the end of 2026 to fund and proceed with Phase 2 of the project, he believed that the Phase 2 work could be completed during Refueling Outages 1R27 and 2R27 in the spring and fall of 2028, respectively.

Although the FWHs do not directly affect nuclear safety, the FFT believed that there is a strong link between overall plant operational performance/reliability and nuclear safety. This belief is supported by a March 2020 study and report by the Nuclear Energy Institute (Reference 6.13) on the nexus between safety and operational performance which concluded, "When changes in processes or equipment are made that result in improvements to equipment reliability/availability, the outcome has a positive impact on both safety performance and operational performance... [and] the NRC's own data and models show that improvements in equipment and operational performance have improved safety by a factor of 3 to 7 for broad range of plant designs," (pp. 9 and 13).

The FFT concluded that DCPD properly investigated the causes of the December 2025 FWH 1-5C tube failures which drove an unplanned plant shutdown to facilitate repairs. Conclusions related to causes and actions that should be taken in the future were logical and appropriate based on the available information. The FFT recommended that the DCISC should continue to follow-up on and support DCPD's plans for future FWH replacements.

Additionally, the DCISC should follow actions taken in response to the resolution made at its February 2026 Public Meeting to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC, Enclosure 1) recommending that the CPUC and other cognizant state authorities support the implementation of the Feedwater heater replacement project at DCPD as soon as practically feasible.

Conclusion: DCPD's Cause Evaluation for the December 2025 Unit 1 Feedwater Heater (FWH) failure which drove an unplanned plant shutdown to facilitate repairs was well performed. Conclusions of the Cause Evaluation regarding causes and future actions that should be taken were appropriate and supported by all of the available information. The DCISC should continue to follow-up on and support DCPD's plans for future FWH replacements.

Recommendations to the DCISC:

The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *The DCISC should follow-up on the findings and cause evaluation for the Feedwater Heater tube leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, as well as future plans to address Feedwater Heater health (D12/15/25FF-3.10).* Two new related recommendations should be opened as follows:

The DCISC should continue to follow and support DCPD's plans for future Feedwater Heater replacements. (D4/26FF-3.10A)

The DCISC should follow actions taken in response to the resolution approved at its February 2026 Public Meeting recommending that the California Public Utilities Commission and other cognizant state authorities support the implementation of the Feedwater heater replacement project at DCPD as soon as practically feasible. (D4/26FF-3.10B)

Recommendations to PG&E: None.

3.11 Meet with DCPD Officer

The DCISC FFT met with Blair Jones, Vice President Business and Technical Services, for a general update. The DCISC last met with a DCPD officer during its March 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.14), when it concluded the following:

The regular meetings with DCPD Officers and Directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.

The participants discussed the current meeting agenda items and other items of mutual interest.

Conclusions: The regular meetings with DCPD Officers and Directors continued to be beneficial for both organizations.

Recommendations to PG&E or DCISC: None.

3.12 Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update


The DCISC FFT requested an update on the analysis of Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B which was removed from the vessel on April 21, 2025. The DCISC last reviewed the status of Capsule B during its January 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.15), when it concluded the following:

DCPP reported that the testing and analysis of materials removed from Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Sample Capsule B was in progress, and results were expected to be available in July 2026.

Additionally, in the DCISC's 34th Annual Report (Reference 6.16), the following recommendation was opened:

Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of reactor vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available. (AR23/24AR23-2)

The FFT inquired about when the final test analysis for Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B would be available for review by the DCISC, and PG&E provided a brief written response to the DCISC. In its written response, PG&E reported that the testing laboratory experienced delays in completing the testing of material specimens due to test equipment failures and the subsequent need for repairs. The delay in test equipment availability caused a cascading delay in providing the required inputs for the embrittlement analysis to be performed. The capsule specimen testing was completed at the end of February 2026, and the current schedule was for the laboratory to deliver a draft test report in late second quarter of 2026, which would support submitting a final test report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the third quarter of 2026. At the time of the FFT's meetings, it was planned that the DCISC would receive the final report concurrent with its submittal to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in August 2026. Below is a summary timeline provided by PG&E for the testing and analysis of the Capsule B specimens.



Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Test and Analysis Timeline

Following this Fact-Finding Meeting on April 30, 2026, Dr. Meshkati and Mr. Robert Rathie, DCISC Legal Counsel, met with the Chair of the California Energy Commission (CEC), one of the appointing agencies to the DCISC, and members of his staff to review the Committee's current activities. Among the topics discussed was the status and plans for the Committee's review of the testing and analysis for the Sample Capsule B materials. Following the CEC meeting on May 5, 2026, the Committee sent a letter to PG&E regarding the expediency of the testing and analysis for the Sample Capsule B materials. A copy of this letter is attached as Enclosure 2 to this report. On May 16, 2026, PG&E responded to the Committee's letter, and a copy of that response is attached as Enclosure 3 to this report.

Conclusion: PG&E reported that the testing and evaluations for materials removed from Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Sample Capsule B were delayed but continued to be in progress. Results were expected to be finalized and made available to both the DCISC and the public in the third quarter of 2026.

Recommendations to the DCISC: None

Recommendations to PG&E:

The following previous recommendation to PG&E was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of reactor vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available.* (AR23/24AR23-2)

3.13 Reactor Vessel Head Corrosion Industry Event Update

The DCISC FFT requested an update on an industry event wherein stress corrosion cracking on a weld on the Reactor Vessel Head was discovered at another U.S. nuclear power plant. This was in part a precautionary follow up from the DCISCs' last review of DCP's Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program during its January 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.17), when it concluded the following:

DCP's Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program was being implemented in accordance with applicable industry guidelines; however, the number of leaks being tracked by the program was unusually high. PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as "LK3" (inactive leaks) in the plant.

The FFT inquired about PG&E's knowledge about an event at another U.S. nuclear power plant that was reported to the NRC on March 9, 2026, (Event Report Number 58186) and any possible applicability to DCP. The event involved the identification that a Control Rod Drive Mechanism to Reactor Vessel Head weld was degraded when liquid penetrant testing identified an unacceptable indication (defect) in accordance with codes from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.

In its written response, PG&E reported to the FFT that at the time of the meetings the industry event report had not been finalized and issued for a formal review. However, PG&E was aware of the event and reported that the subject plant had identified similar weld degradations in the past and had not replaced its original heads which contained Alloy 600 weld material. DCP's Reactor Vessel Heads were replaced in 2009 (Unit 2) and 2010 (Unit 1) with heads containing Alloy 690 material. The Alloy 690 material offered far better resistance to primary water stress corrosion cracking and intergranular attack, and the insulation design on the replacement heads facilitates better access for inspections of welds on the heads. Though an official review of the event had not yet been completed, PG&E did not believe there would be a need for any changes to its existing corrosion control programs based on past reviews of similar Alloy 600 degradation events.

Conclusion: A recent industry event in which a defect was found in a weld on a Reactor Vessel Head did not pose any urgent safety concern for DCP based primarily on the fact that DCP's Reactor Vessel Heads have been replaced with a material that has better resistance to stress corrosion cracking.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

4.1 DCP's Cyber Security Program continued to be implemented effectively in support of maintaining plant operational safety. The results of an NRC inspection in August 2025 were generally positive with two findings of low safety significance which were properly rectified.

- 4.2 DCP's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.**
- 4.3 DCP's Annual Plan was reviewed and found to be appropriately focused on initiating and tracking specific goals and actions that would generate future enhancements in station safety and reliability.**
- 4.4 DCP's Human Performance has been excellent over the last two years based on data and trends in Human Performance events. DCP has had no events classified with the highest significance of a Station Level Event since April 2021. The numbers and significance of Human Performance Events and Misposition Events remained very low.**
- 4.5 PG&E's work under the Long Term Seismic Program was being effectively managed and contributed significantly to improving seismic knowledge and safety at DCP and in the surrounding area.**
- 4.6 An Initial License Training session in the simulator was well prepared, contained appropriate objectives, and was professionally conducted by the Training staff. Operators performed well in responding to the simulated off-normal events.**
- 4.7 The DCISC Fact-finding Team observed a Turbine Building Operator on their rounds checking for the proper operation of various equipment components and acceptable conditions in areas around equipment. The Nuclear Operator was very knowledgeable about their responsibilities, including the logging and trending of operating parameters and setpoints for equipment in their assigned area. Observed areas of the Turbine Building were found to be clean and orderly with all observed equipment in good material condition.**
- 4.8 The meeting with the Acting NRC Senior Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.**
- 4.9 The April 14, 2026, meeting of the Notification Review Team was conducted efficiently, and the NRT effectively dispositioned approximately 70 Notifications from the previous day in accordance with plant procedures.**
- 4.10 DCP's Cause Evaluation for the December 2025 Unit 1 Feedwater Heater (FWH) failure which drove an unplanned plant shutdown to facilitate repairs was well performed. Conclusions of the Cause Evaluation regarding causes and future actions that should be taken were appropriate and supported by all of the available information. The DCISC should continue to follow-up on and support DCP's plans for future FWH replacements.**
- 4.11 The regular meetings with DCP Officers and Directors continued to be beneficial for both organizations.**

- 4.12 PG&E reported that the testing and evaluations for materials removed from Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Sample Capsule B were delayed but continued to be in progress. Results were expected to be finalized and made available to both the DCISC and the public in the third quarter of 2026.
- 4.13 A recent industry event in which a defect was found in a weld on a Reactor Vessel Head did not pose any urgent safety concern for DCPD based primarily on the fact that DCPD's Reactor Vessel Heads have been replaced with a material that has better resistance to stress corrosion cracking.

5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to the DCISC:

- 5.1 The DCISC should modify its Open Items List as follows (Section 3.3):
- Item OE-2, "Station Excellence Plan and Management Review Meeting," should be closed.
 - Item O-4, "Review plant activities since previous FF meeting (Station Update)," should be modified to include periodic reviews of the status of station Performance Indicators.
 - Item NS-9, "Monitor DCPD's program to track INPO Areas for Improvement," should be modified to include reviews of the INPO Corporate Evaluation completed in 2020 as well as the next corporate evaluation planned for 2027.
- 5.2 The DCISC should follow-up on how future uses of Artificial Intelligence at DCPD are being addressed as a part of the Artificial Intelligence Roadmap in the Strategic Plan. (D4/26FF-3.3A)
- 5.3 The DCISC should follow up on receiving an oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Institute for Nuclear Power Operations corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report. (D4/26FF-3.3B)
- 5.4 The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting (Section 3.4) and remains open: *PG&E should review and improve the limited guidance in procedures for completing Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) and elaborate when a CCE should be performed, how it should be systematically completed, and how it should be acted upon.* (P1/26-FF3.9)
- 5.5 The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting (Section 3.10) and should be closed: *The DCISC should follow up on*

the findings and cause evaluation for the Feedwater Heater tube leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, as well as future plans to address Feedwater Heater health. (D12/15/25FF-3.10) Two new related recommendations should be opened as follows:

- 5.6 The DCISC should continue to follow and support DCPD's plans for future Feedwater Heater replacements. (D4/26FF-3.10A)
- 5.7 The DCISC should follow actions taken in response to the resolution approved at its February 2026 Public Meeting recommending that the California Public Utilities Commission and other cognizant state authorities support the implementation of the Feedwater heater replacement project at DCPD as soon as practically feasible. (D4/26FF-3.10B)

Recommendations to PG&E:

- 5.8 PG&E should provide the DCISC with an oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Institute for Nuclear Power Operations corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report. (P4/26FF-3.3))
- 5.9 The following previous recommendation to PG&E was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting (Section 3.12) and remains open: *Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of reactor vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available.* (AR23/24AR23-2)

6.0 REFERENCES

- 6.1 "Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fourth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2023 – June 30, 2024," Approved October 10, 2024, Volume II, Exhibit D.7, Section 3.5, "Cyber Security Program."
- 6.2 "Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026," Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.7, Section 3.9, "Station Update."
- 6.3 "Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fifth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025," Approved October 23, 2025, Volume II, Exhibit B.6, "Minutes of the February 19-20, 2025, Public Meeting."
- 6.4 "Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fourth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2023 – June 30, 2024,"

Approved October 10, 2024, Volume II, Exhibit D.9, Section 3.4, “Human Performance and Plant Status Control.”

- 6.5 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fifth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025,” Approved October 23, 2025, Volume II, Exhibit D.4, Section 3.6, “Meet with Geosciences Staff.”
- 6.6 “Seismic Hazard Screening Report, Diablo Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2,” submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an attachment to PG&E letter DCL-15-035, “Response to NRC Request for Information pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding the Seismic Aspects of Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident; Seismic Hazard and Screening Report,” March 11, 2015, NRC ADAMS Accession Numbers ML15070A607 and ML15070A608.
- 6.7 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fourth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2023 – June 30, 2024,” Approved October 10, 2024, Volume II, Exhibit D.6, Section 3.10, “Observe Reactor Operator Continuing Simulator Training.”
- 6.8 Ibid., Exhibit D.4, Section 3.11, “Accompany Unit 2 Operator on Rounds.”
- 6.9 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.7, Section 3.2, “Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspector.”
- 6.10 Ibid., Exhibit D.5, Section 3.4, “Observe Notification Review Team Meeting.”
- 6.11 Ibid., Exhibit D.6, Section 3.1, “Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Leak and Plant Shutdown for Repair.”
- 6.12 Ibid., Exhibit D.5, Section 3.10, “Meet with DCPD Officers.”
- 6.13 Nuclear Energy Institute Report NEI 20-04, “The Nexus Between Safety and Operational Performance in the U.S. Nuclear Industry,” March 2020, pages 9 and 13.
- 6.14 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.7, Section 3.6, “Meet with DCPD Officer.”
- 6.15 Ibid., Exhibit D.6, Section 3.12, “Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update.”

- 6.16 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fourth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2023 – June 30, 2024,” Approved October 10, 2024, Executive Summary, Recommendations, “PG&E Recommendation No. 23-2.”
- 6.17 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.6, Section 3.3, “Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program.”

DRAFT

RESOLUTION NO. 2026- 03

**RESOLUTION OF THE DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE
APPROVING REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MEETING
AT DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT (DCPP)
ON JANUARY 20-21, 2026**

**THE DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE HEREBY
RESOLVES AS FOLLOWS:**

WHEREAS, the above-captioned draft report having come regularly before the Committee on the agenda for consideration at the Committee’s public meeting on February 18, 2026; and

WHEREAS, the Committee Members received a presentation and discussed the report; and

WHEREAS, the report contains the following recommendation:

“Recommendations to the DCISC:

In its 34th Annual Report dated June 30, 2024, the DCISC recommended to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) that they “and all other necessary California state authorities support the funding of the plant upgrade projects recommended by DCPD.” Consistent with this previous recommendation and subsequent technical evaluations by the DCISC, the DCISC should further recommend to the CPUC that it and all other cognizant California state authorities support the implementation of the Feedwater Heater replacement project at DCPD as soon as practically feasible. The DCISC believes that these replacements are important for the plant’s operational performance by avoiding unnecessary plant shutdowns, forced outages, and startups in the future. (D1/26FF3.1)

The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *The DCISC should follow-up on the findings and cause evaluation for the affected Feedwater Heat Exchanger tube leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, as well as future plans to address FW Heat Exchanger health. (D12/15/25FF-3.10)”*

WHEREAS, an opportunity was provided for public comment on the report.

NOW, THEREFORE, the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee hereby approves that certain report entitled "Report on Fact-Finding Meeting at DCPD on January 20-21, 2026, by Najmedin Meshkati, Member, and Richard D. McWhorter, Consultant," including the Recommendation set forth herein, copy on file in the office of the Committee's Legal Counsel, and a copy of the approved report was posted to the Committee's website prior to the meeting and made available to the public at the public meeting and is attached to this resolution as Exhibit A.

THE FOREGOING RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED at a regular meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee held on the 18th day of February 2026, by the following vote:

AYES: MESHKATI, PETERSON, SCARLAT

NOES: —

ABSENT: —

ABSTAIN:



Per F. Peterson, Chair

ATTEST:



Robert Rathie, Asst. Legal Counsel

DCISC

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

WEBSITE - WWW.DCISC.ORG

NAJMEDIN MESHKATI
PER F. PETERSON
RALUCA O. SCARLAT

Copy Via Email to:
bxjk@pge.com

May 5, 2026

Mr. Blair Jones
Vice President, Business & Technical Services
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Avila Beach, California

Re: **Recent Meeting with the Chair of the California Energy Commission.**

Dear Mr. Jones:

On April 30, 2026, DCISC Member Dr. Meshkati and Legal Counsel Mr. Rathie met in Sacramento with the Chair of the California Energy Commission Mr. David Hochschild and members of his senior staff together with staff from the office of CEC Vice Chair Mr. Siva Gunda. The purpose of the meeting was to review the Committee's current activities and topical areas of inquiry and to answer questions and respond to requests.

Among these topics was the status and plans for the DCISC's review of evaluations of DCP Unit 1 surveillance Capsule B. During the discussion the DCISC representatives explained that, while PG&E sought to expedite the process, a period of 12-months is usually the minimum to complete the necessary analyses to assess a capsule's embrittlement properties. We understand that since the capsule was removed from the vessel in April 2025 there have been delays due to equipment issues experienced by the Westinghouse testing facility and the report is not expected to be received, reviewed by PG&E and made available to the NRC until sometime in the Q3 2026.

The DCISC representatives also explained that, while previously the Committee expected to receive an advance copy of Westinghouse's report, designated as confidential, prior to its submission to the NRC to allow for an expedited review by the Committee and its Consultant Dr. Mark Kirk, PG&E currently plans to provide the report to the Committee at the same time that it is submitted to the NRC and made available to the public.

Letter to Mr. Blair Jones

May 5, 2026

Page 2.

Mr. Hochschild requested that the DCISC make a request that PG&E provide a written response to the Committee explaining in more detail why more than one year is being required to complete the embrittlement evaluation process. He specifically asked why the report is late and suggested that the Westinghouse report be provided to the Committee at the earliest practicable opportunity, in advance and prior to its submission to the NRC, as also discussed at the DCISC's February 2026 Public Meeting. Mr. Hochschild further emphasized that the embrittlement issues is one of his top safety priorities and urged the Committee to request that PG&E reconsider its position and provide an advance copy of the Westinghouse report to the Committee. Hence this letter.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter and I hope to hear from you within ten business days. Should you have any questions both Dr. Meshkati or Mr. Rathie are available to assist.

Sincerely,



Per F. Peterson
DCISC Chair

PFP:rwr

cc/email: CEC Chair Mr. David Hochschild

Dr. Justin Cochran, Emergency Coordinator/Nuclear Advisor to CEC Chair

Ms. Carina Corral , Strategic Initiatives Manager, DCPD

DCISC Members

DCISC Technical Consultants



Blair C. Jones
Vice President
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PG&E Letter DCL-26-032

Dr. Per Peterson
c/o Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee
Office of Legal Counsel
SW 4th & Mission, Suite 2, P.O. Box 4523
Carmel, CA 93921-4523

Response to DCISC Letter to Mr. Blair Jones, Dated May 5, 2026, Re: Recent Meeting with the Chair of the California Energy Commission

Dear Dr. Peterson:

Thank you for your letter regarding Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) discussions with the California Energy Commission regarding the status and plans for evaluation of Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Unit 1 reactor surveillance Capsule B.

As background, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) complies with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (10 CFR 50 Appendix H) that require a Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program for DCPP Units 1 and 2. The purpose of this program is to monitor vessel material changes over time through periodic withdrawal and testing of surveillance capsules installed in the reactor vessels to ensure safe operations. PG&E has satisfied the Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program requirements for DCPP Units 1 and 2 for the initial 40-year licensed operating period. As discussed in the DCPP License Renewal Application and independently confirmed by NRC in their safety evaluation report,¹ existing capsule data evaluations have demonstrated that both Unit 1 and 2 will meet the reactor vessel integrity criteria for 60 years. To support license renewal (operations for an additional 20 years), PG&E committed to withdraw and test one more Unit 1 surveillance capsule (Capsule B) to further confirm the integrity of the reactor vessel for at least 60 years of operations.

NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, requires "Each capsule withdrawal and the test results must be the subject of a summary technical report to be submitted...within eighteen months of the date of capsule withdrawal..."² As shown in the Enclosure, this corresponds to a summary technical report submittal requirement of October 2026. PG&E discussed in previous DCISC public meetings and fact findings (see the DCISC 35th Annual Report; the June 2025 public meeting slides and minutes³), that the Unit 1 Capsule B testing and analysis report

¹ See Sections 3.0.3.2.13 and 4.2 at <https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML2515/ML25153A508.pdf>

² <https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-10/chapter-I/part-50#Appendix-I-to-Part-50>

³ https://www.dcisc.org/event-public-meeting_47.htm

