

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

Report on

Fact-Finding Meeting at DCP on May 6 and 7, 2026

by

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with Lisa Darden and Richard St. Onge, Consultants**

1.0 SUMMARY

The results of the DCISC May 6 and 7, 2026, Fact-Finding Meeting at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) in Avila Beach, CA, are presented. The subjects addressed and summarized in Section 3 are as follows:

1. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector
2. Meet with DCP Officer
3. Station Update
4. Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders
5. Craftmanship Council Update
6. Equipment Reliability
7. Walkthrough of Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders
8. Craftmanship Council Interviews with Craft Members
9. Nuclear Insurance
10. Crane Program

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This Fact-Finding Meeting at the DCP was held to evaluate specific safety matters for the DCISC. The objective of the evaluation was to determine if Pacific Gas and Electric's (PG&E's) performance is appropriate and whether any areas revealed observations which are important enough to warrant further review, follow-up, or presentation at a public meeting. These safety matters include follow-up and/or continuing review efforts by the Committee, as well as those identified as a result of reviews of various safety-related documents.

Section 4 – Conclusions, highlights the conclusions of the Fact-Finding Team (FFT) based on items reported in Section 3 – Discussion. These highlights also include the FFT's suggested follow-up items for the DCISC, such as scheduling future Fact-Finding Meetings on the topic, presentations at future public meetings, and requests for future updates or information from DCP on specific areas of interest, etc.

Section 5 – Recommendations, presents specific recommendations to the DCISC and PG&E proposed by the FFT. These recommendations will be considered by the DCISC. After review and approval by the DCISC, this Fact-Finding Report, including its recommendations, will be provided to PG&E. The Fact-Finding Report will also appear in the DCISC Annual Report.

3.0 DISCUSSION

3.1 Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector

The FFT met with Eli Garcia, acting NRC Senior Resident Inspector, for an update. NRC Resident Inspector, Madhi Hayes, had been temporarily re-assigned to the Licensing Branch from Region IV. The DCISC last met with the NRC Resident Inspectors during its April 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.1), when it concluded the following:

The meeting with the Acting NRC Senior Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.

The participants discussed the following items:

- Recent flashover event occurring at DCP Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2
- Confirmed NRC presentation for the June 2026 Public Meeting
- NRC approval of significant revisions to Reactor Oversight Process
- NRC consideration of additional organizational changes in the Agency

Of particular interest for the DCISC was the issuance of major revisions to the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) in late March 2026. During the meeting, the FFT was briefed by Mr. Garcia on the overall changes that are envisioned in the ROP Revision.

Conclusions: The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.

Recommendation to the DCISC or PG&E: None

3.2 Meet with DCP Officers

The FFT met with Adam Peck, Site Vice President. The DCISC last met with a DCP officer during its April 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.2), when it concluded the following:

The regular meetings with DCP Officers and Directors continued to be beneficial for both organizations.

The group discussed the fact-finding agenda items and other items of mutual interest.

Conclusions: The regular meetings with DCPD Officers and Directors continued to be beneficial for both organizations.

Recommendation to the DCISC or PG&E: None

3.3 Station Update

The FFT met with Justin Rogers, Station Director, for a station update. The DCISC's last station update was during its April 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.3), when it concluded the following:

DCPD's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.

Mr. Rogers provided an update on the following recent activities at DCPD as follows:

On May 4, 2026, Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 experienced a bus bar arc strike. Mr. Rogers indicated that the DCPD management team was assessing the event and the extent of condition along with determining the most expedient path to return the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 to service. The station entered Technical Specification 3.8.5 Limiting Condition for Operation for an impaired Direct Current power supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater System for this event. DCPD had previously submitted to the NRC, and subsequently obtained a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) based method to extend the Completion Time for repairs from 72 hours to approximately 11 days. Mr. Rogers's periodic updates were very helpful to the FFT, keeping the Team informed of progress while we were on-site. The bus bar was repaired and the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 was back in service at 9:00 a.m. on May 13, 2026. The FFT recommends that the DCISC follow-up on the Cause Evaluation for this event as well as the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation versus a Root Cause Evaluation.

According to Mr. Rogers, the Station concluded that the best time to have power curtailments to perform tunnel cleaning is on weekends. This scheduling change will be performed going forward and will be mindful of expected weekend power demands that may become elevated during the summer heat. This cleaning process requires reducing Unit power to 50% and securing one Circulating Water (CW) pump to support the side being cleaned (east or west). Mr. Rogers explained that the power reduction and restoration to 100% has been recently performed well with no issues.

There have been no leadership changes since the last station update.

Mr. Rogers also provided an update on the Long-Term Critical Projects that comprise the station's top Five List of Projects as follows:

- Circulating Water Pump Rewind. Activity to occur at the Pump House due to size.
- New/Spent Fuel Transfer System Upgrades. Working with Vendor.

- Main Annunciator Upgrade. Retrofit project with upgraded Digital Capabilities.
- Tri-Conex Upgrade. Systems affected mostly are Feedwater and Turbine Control.
- Main Generator Relay Replacement Upgrades. Obsolete support equipment.

Mr. Roger's also discussed the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Assist Visit for Long Term Critical Projects that was in progress at the Station at the time of the FFT's meetings. The INPO assist team included successful project managers from across the U.S. nuclear fleet and provided comprehensive methods to manage these large and complex projects. The subject of Long-Term Critical Projects was requested for this Fact-Finding Meeting but was deferred by DCPM Management due to the ongoing Project Assist Visit from INPO which required the full attention of Station Project Leaders. The FFT recommends that the DCISC follow up on reviewing these projects in a near-future Fact-Finding Meeting.

Conclusion: DCPM's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.

Recommendations to the DCISC:

The DCISC should follow-up on the Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3A)

The DCISC should follow-up on the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3B)

The DCISC should follow up on reviewing the Long-Term Critical Projects for DCPM. This will be tracked on the DCISC's Open Items List under item number EN-21.

Recommendations to PG&E: None.

3.4 Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders

The FFT met with Mr. Jordan Tyman, Director of Risk and Compliance, on the subject of Dynamic (formally Electronic) Procedures and Work Orders on. The DCISC last reviewed Dynamic Procedures during its August 2025 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.4), when it concluded the following:

The DCISC FFT endorses DCPM's decision to pursue electronic procedures. Electronic procedures provide many benefits in improving human reliability and documenting work, thereby creating substantial opportunities to improve the plant's operational safety.

Additionally, during the DCISC's December 2024 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.5), the following recommendation was opened:

Because expanded use of electronic procedures can enhance plant operational safety subject to proper human systems integration, the DCISC should review this topic regularly. (D12/24FF3.2)

Mr. Tyman opened the discussion stating that the station was developing, testing, and prototyping the implementation of the Dynamic Procedures for Operations equipment rounds. The Dynamic Procedure Team has developed prototype procedures that largely eliminate errors by personnel when performing rounds and equipment status changes (e.g., systems alignments, equipment starts/stops, surveillances, etc.). Examples provided included automatic entry of the recorded measurement data into the station's equipment Data Historian. For example, temperatures, liquid levels, vibrations, pressures, motor speeds, etc. are all examples of data that are recorded during a typical Operator round. If that measurement is higher or lower than the prescribed value, a Notification is automatically generated at that moment in time and records the identity of the person taking the data. The Notification can also host videos and pictures if the operator has additional evidence that is important to assessing the equipment condition. The typical hand-held device for the equipment rounds is a standard iPad. Apple iPads have emerged as their preferred tablet technology because iPads do not require fan for cooling so cannot become internally contaminated when used in radiation protection areas. Company and personal iPhones can also be registered and used during implementation of the equipment rounds. The equipment rounds data that is out of specification will also trigger actions in the Electronic Shift Operations Management System (eSOMS) plant database.

The Notifications generated from the equipment rounds procedure are screened each morning by the station's Notification Response Team (NRT). The multi-departmental NRT meets each weekday to review and approve disposition of the previous day's Notifications.

Mr. Tyman indicated that 20 other procedures are being updated to include all the features available from the Dynamic Procedure model. This model has checks and balances built into the Dynamic Procedures. For example, if a rounds taker skips a step, the procedure will alert the rounds taker to complete the missed step before proceeding with completing the remaining rounds.

Mr. Tyman responded to a FFT question regarding the source of the procedure model. His response was that the software was developed by NextAxiom Software and there is an existing Users group consisting of over 30 Users across the country that are working to develop successful software and to continue to improve the capabilities of the software. DCP is focusing on Dynamic Procedures at this time, and work will begin later this year, or early next year, on Dynamic Work Orders.

The FFT later observed a hands-on, simulated rounds using a Dynamic Procedure (See Section 3.7). This is a very strong application to reduce Operations and other Divisions procedure driven activities.

Conclusions: DCP's update of its Dynamic Procedure and Work Orders development was encouraging and is likely to reduce station equipment errors across all the work divisions. The DCISC should continue to review the development of Dynamic Procedures regularly.

Recommendations to DCISC: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should remain open: *“Because expanded use of electronic procedures can enhance plant operational safety, subject to proper human systems integration, the DCISC should review this topic regularly.” (D12/24FF3.2)*

Recommendations to PG&E: None.

3.5 Craftsmanship Council

The FFT met with Michael Brass, Director of Maintenance Services, for an update on DCP's Craftsmanship Council. The DCISC last reviewed Maintenance Department Performance during its December 15, 2025, Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.6), when it concluded the following:

DCPP Maintenance Department performance was healthy and there was evidence of a continuous improvement culture.

Additionally, during the DCISC's December 15, 2025, Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.6), the following recommendation was opened:

The DCISC should review the charter for the Maintenance Department's new Craftsmanship Council after its development is complete. (D12/15/25FF-3.1)

The Craftsmanship Council has been formed at DCP as an initiative that empowers Station Craftsmen and Craftswomen to improve the administrative work practices that they use every day. In the Craftsmanship Council, volunteers from the various maintenance disciplines periodically gather together to drive grassroots assessments of “how we do work.” The Council has approximately 25 members from all the maintenance shops onsite that allows them to discuss issues and provide improvement opportunities. The council has developed an initial charter that includes self-governing principles which allow sharing the leadership, insights, and actions needed to improve work practices. Maintenance management provides support for the Craftsmanship Council and helps guide initiatives through station management.

Mr. Brass received the conceptual outline of what a Craftsmanship Council could look like during a benchmarking trip to the Wolf Creek Station, a nuclear power plant located in Coffey County, Kansas. There, he was able to observe the workings of the Wolf Creek Craftsmanship Council and brought the concept back to DCP. At first, the initial attempts at forming the council were met by only a few interested crafts. After several months, the crafts began to appreciate the empowerment that was gained by having the self-governed Craftsmanship Council. The Council now meets on a regular basis.

Mr. Brass provided the FFT group with a current example of the types of issues the Craftsmanship Council was working to improve. As an example, the Council has been using existing station Pre-Job Briefs (PJBs) as expected, but the Craft found that over time the original intent of a PJB had been absorbed into a 4-page PJB document that took 30 to 45 minutes to complete. The challenge

for the Council was to make meaningful changes to the existing PJB. After much discussion and critical thinking, the Council formulated a reduced PJB that was more focused on the work to be done and the associated safety precautions needed to protect the worker. This revised PJB was with station management now for review and to provide any final feedback. The acceptance of this two-page (a single sheet with INPO guidance on the back) was viewed as a station success from the Craftmanship Council. The FFT requested a copy of the improved PJB sheet from Mr. Brass.

The Council has other topics it would like to improve (such as housekeeping, training, the Safety Fair, area ownership) that it plans to consider at future meetings. The FFT also requested a later face-to-face meeting with a several members of the Craftmanship Council (see Section 3.8). The DCISC should review the work of the Craftmanship Council and assess its progress under the Council's revised charter within the next calendar year. This and future reviews should be tracked under a new item to for periodic reviews of the Craftmanship Council program to be added to the DCISC's Open Items List.

Conclusion: The actions the Maintenance Department was taking to drive continuous improvement through the Craftmanship Council were a novel and well accepted process on site.

Recommendations to the DCISC:

The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *The DCISC should review the charter for the Maintenance Department's new Craftmanship Council after its development is complete. (D12/15/25FF-3.1)*

The DCISC should modify its Open Items List as follows: Add a new open item under Conduct of Maintenance (CM) for periodic reviews of the work of the Craftmanship Council. The next such review should be performed within the next calendar year.

Recommendations to PG&E: None.

3.6 Equipment Reliability Program

The FFT met with Michael Jackson, Engineering Service Director, and Dallas Adams, Program Engineering Manager, for an update on DCP's Equipment Reliability Program. Harpreet Bhalla and Jerry Bischof from DWR also participated remotely in the meeting. The DCISC last reviewed the Equipment Reliability Program during its May 2024 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.7), when it concluded the following:

DCP's Equipment Reliability programs have been effective, and station reliability has improved over the last two years. With the transition to extended operations, the station is focusing on implementation of future equipment replacements and upgrades to maintain and improve reliability.

Mr. Jackson and Mr. Adams provided the FFT with the following information in the context of the station shifting from previously planned permanent shutdown of the DCPD units to an approved NRC License Renewal for both units. This has importance as the License Renewal extends power operations for a minimum 5-year period, as dictated by the state of California, or potentially a 20-year operating period as allowed by the NRC. Projects will be planned for the future and will be reviewed in the context of the 5-year or 20-year operating life of the units. Some projects may not be approved as Cost Beneficial for a 5-year plan, while the same projects may be Cost Beneficial for a 20-year operating plan.

Three areas that the Reliability Engineering (ER) Team has selected for major action were 1) update of the Life Cycle Management Plans, 2) reevaluate and populate the Long-Range Asset Management Plans, and 3) reassess the Critical Spares Inventory. These three actions were largely performed by the System and Component Engineers. Regarding the Life Cycle Management Plans, Engineering is updating those plans to reflect current thinking on managing an extended life beyond the original 40-year plant life cycle. The Long-Range Asset Management Plans were being modified to layout a program which would levelize the work over time to properly manage the equipment issues expected during the equipment's service life. Also, the Long-Range Asset Management Plans will be initially focused on major scopes of work that need to be undertaken to better ensure a reliable power plant. Reassessment of the Critical Spares Inventory will determine what additional equipment and materials will be needed to repair/replace critical operating systems and equipment.

During the discussion on Best Practices for Improving Equipment Reliability, there was an understanding that Equipment Reliability was previously focused on looking backwards and preventing repeat equipment failures. This continues to be important, but the latest trends are focused more on data analysis, as there are methods in the power industry to use equipment analysis tools to identify potential improvements in preventative maintenance practices.

This discussion with the FFT then centered on the role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the collecting and analyzing of running equipment data. This included the reduction of Human Error during the execution of Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders. The plant instrumentation that was already in place provided readable data that could be analyzed using current methods. Many of these methods were well known (e.g., thermography, operator rounds, oil sampling, surveillances, etc.) and with the planned increase of Wi-Fi connectivity at DCPD, the opportunity to gather and analyze data represents a new phase of digital communication progress.

Mr. Adams indicated that the ER Team was deploying Power Business Intelligence (Power BI) to assist in management of the projects screened into long-term plan. Power BI provides a platform to look at a Life Cycle Management, share point collection of projects and run scenarios for work levelizing, financial aspects, budget analysis, programmatic impacts, and other project planning aspects.

The DCISC requested access to the Stations Top Ten Equipment Issues, from a tactical perspective, and this list was posted in Certrec for our viewing. The list looked appropriate for an operating nuclear unit.

The DCISC inquired about the plan to replace the Feedwater Heaters (FWHs) on both units. The ER Team indicated that a contract was implemented to manufacture the replacement FWHs for future replacement. The ER Team also indicated that the initial manufacturing started by focusing on the new FWHs that may be needed to replace some of the existing FWHs, should their condition continue to degrade. The DCISC should continue to follow and support DCP's plans for future FWH replacements. (D4/26FF-3.10A).

Conclusion: The DCP Equipment Reliability Program was healthy and had appropriate leadership engagement and team involvement to successfully manage the short- and long-term condition of the station's equipment, while minimizing risk.

Recommendations to the DCISC:

DCISC should re-visit the Equipment Reliability Program in 6 – 12 months to obtain more details concerning Long Term Projects planned by the Station. This can be monitored under Open Item List EN-21

The DCISC should modify its Open Items List Item PI-3 to include the monitoring and use of AI to develop plant initiatives that improve plant equipment reliability.

Recommendations to PG&E: None.

3.7 Walkthrough of Dynamic Procedures

The Fact-Finding Team met with Jordan Tyman, Director of Risk and Compliance, and Jake Glabe, Engineering and Operations Procedure Supervisor, to observe and participate in the walkthrough of a typical Operator round using the enhanced Dynamic Procedure application. This was in follow-up to the topics discussed in Section 3.4, above.

Additionally, during the DCISC's December 15, 2025, Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.8), the following recommendation was opened:

*The DCISC should schedule an observation of electronic procedure usage in the plant during the next FFM of which Member Per F. Peterson is a participant.
(D12/15/25FF-3.14)*

The Dynamic Procedure walkthrough began with the PG&E staff providing some background on the development of the main software used to develop smart procedures. The platform for these procedures is provided by the NextAxiom Software company, which uses the platform for industrial use across several industries. There is an NextAxiom Users group, consisting of 30 users, that is focused on bringing this technology to operating nuclear plants. There is a mix of users that are working mostly on the application of the software for Work Orders, and they are gaining confidence in the software technology. DCP has selected Dynamic Procedures as their entry point to this technology, and it appears that DCP users are ahead of the pack on developing & implementing Dynamic Procedures.

Mr. Glabe stated that the station had created an Electronic Procedure program years earlier which was not received well by the station users. The complaints centered around the fact that the “Electronic Procedure” was in fact a pdf of the existing procedure, with a blank overlay screen on which the user could check off completed items. This technology was not capable of providing the benefits of digital data collection for a large workforce.

Using the NextAxiom Technology was a game changer for DCPD’s workers. The software technology operates on an iPad, iPhone, or Laptop. The procedure is downloaded to the user’s device, generally an iPad, and is activated using a security protocol. The “Operator” conducting the rounds for this walkthrough was Mr. Glabe and Mr. Tyman served as “Second Checker.” The procedure led the group through a virtual “Fan Bank A” swap to “Fan Bank B.” As the group proceeded into the Dynamic Procedure, the Operator would demonstrate how a mistake was recognized by the software and how it would alert the Operator that a step was missed. Similar mistakes by an Operator (wrong switch, not enough time before turning off the Fan Bank A, etc.) were also recognized by software and prompted for correction by the Operator. The FFT witnessed the steps to ensure that Fan Bank A was shutoff after a four-minute waiting period to ensure Fan Bank B had started properly. The software would not let the Operator turn off Bank A until the full four-minute period had passed.

In another demonstration, the Operator and the Second Checker swapped roles and this was acknowledged and recognized by the software. In another scenario during the walkthrough, a hydraulic valve was weeping hydraulic fluid on to the floor. The Operator was able to initiate a Notification, include a quick written problem statement, take a picture of the leak, and record the sound the valve was making. The Notification was initiated and assigned to a work group in minutes. Normally, those activities were done after the round was complete and the Operator was back at their normal place of work, which would take an hour or more to initiate a Notification.

The data collection process using the Dynamic Procedures also offered an opportunity to assess Operator proficiency based on a standard time period required to complete the rounds. The Dynamic Procedures can also signal that the procedures have been updated since the last time an Operator used the procedure.

Overall, there appeared to be an opportunity to reduce human errors and improve Operator proficiency based on using this novel Dynamic Procedure model. Below is a photo of the DCISC and DCPD personnel conducting a Walkthrough session on the Dynamic Procedure for plant operator rounds, currently under development at the station.



From Right to Left: Dr. Per Peterson, DCISC Chairman/Member; Rich St. Onge and Lisa Darden, Consultants to the DCISC; Jake Glabe, Engineering & Operations Supervisor; and Jordan Tyman, Risk & Compliance Director.

Conclusions: The Dynamic Procedures under development at DCPD are currently being tested by the Station Procedure Writers and the results to date show promise of significant improvement in human error reductions and Operator proficiency in the execution of Operator rounds.

Recommendations for the DCISC:

The following DCISC open item was reviewed during this meeting and can be closed: *The DCISC should schedule an observation of electronic procedure usage in the plant during the next FFM of which Member Per F. Peterson is a participant.* (D12/15/25FF-3.14)

The following should be entered in the DCISC Open Item List item PI-2. *“The other two Members of the DCISC (Drs. Meshkati and Scarlet) should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during future FFM’s.”*

Recommendation to PG&E: None.

3.8 Maintenance Craftsmanship Interactions with Participating Craft Members.

The FFT met with station Craft members to have a discussion regarding the newly formed Craftsmanship Council. In follow-up to the topics discussed in Section 3.5 above, the FFT requested the opportunity to speak directly with the participating craft members to hear their thoughts on the Craftsmanship Council.

The FFT met with the Craft members in the Simulator Building. It was pointed out to the FFT that several of the Craft members were unable to attend due to the recent Start-Up Transformer 2-2 arc strike event and the investigation and repair needed to return the affected transformer to service. The Craftsmanship Council meeting was held every third Thursday of the month.

The conversation was opened by the FFT asking, in an open forum, why each member had joined the Craftsmanship Council. The responses were candid, and generally many members felt they could contribute to make work flow better and more efficiently. The Council was self-governed under its Charter, and members often engaged other members with recent insights to lead the inquiry on specific topics and bring them back for discussions with the larger group. The Council Rules provided the ability to have discussions outside of the typical management chain, which empowered them to have conversations with their fellow Crafts during the Council meetings. This feeling of openness seemed to settle the Council Members' concerns about sharing their thoughts and suggestions with other craft members.

One of the recent changes that the Craftsmanship Council developed was an update to the Stations Pre-Job Brief package (discussed in Section 3.5 above).

Another change the Craftsmanship Council was working on was to establish a plan for ownership on areas across the site. Many nuclear plants have an Area Ownership Program which designates a specific owner and his/her backup, with contact information posted in the areas. The program's concerns are largely focused around the areas' material conditions. The FFT considered it a worthwhile endeavor to engage plant staff with the Area Ownership responsibilities. Other topics discussed included Clearance Tags, housekeeping, Measurement and Test Equipment replacements, Craft recognition, and other important station functions.

Conclusions: The meeting with the Craftsmanship Council was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue periodically attend the Council meetings.

Recommendation to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.9 Nuclear Insurance Programs

The FFT met with John Cote, Engineering Programs Supervisor, and Kelly Kessloff, Fire Protection Engineer, to discuss the status of Nuclear Insurance policies and inspections. The DCISC last met with DCP's Nuclear Insurance Programs personnel during its July 2024 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.9), when it concluded the following:

Property and equipment insurance policies were being properly maintained by PG&E, and a 2022 inspection by the insurer found no major deficiencies. Similarly, the DCPM maintains a radiological insurance policy.

Mr. Cote reviewed with the FFT the current status of the plant relative to Insurance findings. There were no substantial Insurance findings open at DCPM at this time from the May 2024 Insurance inspection. The FFT asked if the Insurance Premium and other details of the insurance policy were available. The Insurance team indicated they could provide the details of the current policy. This data was reviewed with Mr. Cote and Ms. Kessloff as part of the FFT agenda item. The FFT was told that the Insurance Policy for 2024 was posted in Certrec, and contained the most recent data. Mr. Cote stated the next Insurance Inspection, for the years 2024 through 2026, would be later in May of this year and the inspection update would be available for the DCISC in the fourth quarter of 2026.

Insurances are provided through the following:

- Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL)
- European Mutual Association for Nuclear Insurance (EMANI)
- Radiological protection (radiation exposures and releases) insured by American Nuclear Insurers (ANI)

The FFT and Nuclear Insurance Program Team had a good discussion about changes in the Nuclear Insurance Industry and focused specifically on two pending items in the Insurance Terms and Conditions which were optional in the past but expected to be raised to a recommendation in the next Inspection.

The first recommendation discussed was to add five additional groundwater monitoring wells to the station, and this recommendation was under consideration. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) believed that additional monitored groundwater wells would better protect against a claim of injury by providing more evidence that no nuclides concentrations (above the licensed limits) were discharged to groundwater. The operating plant cooling water discharge were currently monitored as required under the discharge permit, and the additional groundwater wells would provide a data record similar to the cooling water discharge monitoring. This was under consideration with the DCPM Management Team.

The second recommendation discussed with DCPM was to add an additional Portal Monitor (PM) at or near the plant's main vehicle access point (also referred to as the Sally Port) to the Protected Area (PA). The reason given for this was to ensure that every truck driver was monitored when the driver exited the plant through the Sally Port. The issue of concern was not related to the security of the truck driver's entry into the PA, as they are thoroughly screened for contraband when they are escorted into the PA. The issue of concern was that drivers face delays and inconvenience in completing their exit radiological scan when leaving the PA. The additional PM would provide a radiological measurement recording of the exit of every truck driver. Currently, Security has to escort the driver into the PA through the security screening portals, and then the driver travels back to their truck at the Sally Port to continue into the PA. On the way out of the PA, the driver should go back through the PA exit portals in the Security Building and return to

the Sally Point on the exterior side of the PA. The concern was that evidence was not collected if the driver/security officer fails to ensure the driver receives an exit portal radiological scan. Having the portal at or near the Sally Point would simplify the process and ensure radiological exit data were collected. This is also under consideration with the DCPM Management Team.

Conclusions: Property and equipment insurance policies continued to be properly maintained by PG&E, and the results of the 2022 inspection by the insurer found no major deficiencies and no deficiencies are expected from the upcoming Insurance Inspections.

Recommendation to the DCISC: The DCISC should follow-up on the results of the Insurance inspections to be conducted in mid-2026. This recommendation should be captured in the DCISC Open Items List item number NS-10.

Recommendations to PG&E: None.

3.10 Crane Program

The FFT requested an update on the Crane Program at DCPM. The DCISC last reviewed the Crane Program topic during its December 2021, Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.10), when it concluded the following:

DCPM's Crane Program appeared to be implemented effectively. Appropriate plans were in place to manage the reliability of fuel handling cranes and associated equipment.

PG&E provided the FFT with a written response to facilitate its assessment of the station's Crane Program, and the FFT reviewed the Crane Program documents that were provided.

The FFT reviewed the list of Notification's written dating back to the DCISC's last assessment of the Crane Program. In general, there did not appear to be any reports of challenges concerning Heavy Load events in the Notification list provided. It was apparent that the DCPM staff was diligent in generating Notifications to document issues and ensure they are resolved. This was good sign of a positive safety culture.

The FFT also reviewed the procedures provided which included, Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 & 2, Design Criteria Memorandum T-11, "Control of Heavy Loads," Revision 21, dated August 20, 2019. This procedure continued to meet the requirements provided to the Nuclear Industry through NUREG-0612, "Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants," and its associated support documents from the NRC, Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI).

The FFT also reviewed the procedure, MA1.ID14, "Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Crane Operating Restrictions," Revision 31, dated October 3, 2023, which confirmed commitments in its scope to ensure, "All instructions and restrictions herein comply with or implement commitments to

NUREG-0612 (Heavy Loads), MA1.ID11”, “Rigging and Load Handling, and FSAR Chapters 9 and 13.”

The FFT found that the station continued to maintain a well-managed Crane Program. DCPD has kept site Crane Certification dates current, minor issues are scheduled to be quickly resolved, and significant issues get prompt attention. Notifications where written identifying conditions on some of the Cranes in the Protected area, these conditions may require repair or replace activities. In other cases, the conditions are reviewed and then scheduled based on the needs of plant. Corrective actions are implemented ahead of planned use of the Cranes. Some Notifications were scheduled for the next refueling outage, this indicates that the plant will be in operation and access will be strictly limited. No reports of Crane related mishaps or Procedural incidents were found in the notifications reviewed. DCPD has properly addressed maintenance issues to remain compliant with NRC commitments regarding control of heavy loads.

Conclusions: The station continued to maintain a robust Crane Program, and PG&E properly addressed maintenance issues to remain compliant with the NRC commitments regarding control of heavy loads.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

- 4.1 The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.**
- 4.2 The regular meetings with DCPD Officers and Directors continued to be beneficial for both organizations.**
- 4.3 DCPD’s update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.**
- 4.4 DCPD’s update of its Dynamic Procedure and Work Orders development was encouraging and is likely to reduce station equipment errors across all the work divisions. The DCISC should continue to review the development of Dynamic Procedures regularly.**
- 4.5 The actions the Maintenance Department was taking to drive continuous improvement through the Craftsmanship Council were a novel and well accepted process on site.**
- 4.6 The DCPD Equipment Reliability Program was healthy and had appropriate leadership engagement and team involvement to successfully manage the short- and long-term condition of the station’s equipment, while minimizing risk.**

- 4.7 The Dynamic Procedures under development at DCPD are currently being tested by the Station Procedure Writers and the results to date show promise of significant improvement in human error reductions and Operator proficiency in the execution of Operator rounds.
- 4.8 The meeting with the Craftsmanship Council was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue periodically attend the Council meetings.
- 4.9 Property and equipment insurance policies continued to be properly maintained by PG&E, and the results of the 2022 inspection by the insurer found no major deficiencies and no deficiencies are expected from the upcoming Insurance Inspections.
- 4.10 The station continued to maintain a robust Crane Program, and PG&E properly addressed maintenance issues to remain compliant with the NRC commitments regarding control of heavy loads.

5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to the DCISC:

- 5.1 The DCISC should follow-up on the Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3A)
- 5.2 The DCISC should follow-up on the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3B)
- 5.3 The DCISC should follow up on reviewing the Long-Term Critical Projects for DCPD. This will be tracked on the DCISC's Open Items List under item number EN-21.
- 5.4 The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should remain open: *"Because expanded use of electronic procedures can enhance plant operational safety, subject to proper human systems integration, the DCISC should review this topic regularly."* (D12/24FF3.2)
- 5.5 The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *The DCISC should review the charter for the Maintenance Department's new Craftsmanship Council after its development is complete.* (D12/15/25FF-3.1)
- 5.6 The DCISC should modify its Open Items List as follows: Add a new open item under Conduct of Maintenance (CM) for periodic reviews of the work of the Craftsmanship Council. The next such review should be performed within the next calendar year.

- 5.7 The DCISC should re-visit the Equipment Reliability Program in 6 – 12 months to obtain more details concerning Long Term Projects planned by the Station. This can be monitored under Open Item List EN-21.
- 5.8 The DCISC should modify its Open Items List Item PI-3 to include the monitoring and use of AI to develop plant initiatives that improve plant equipment reliability.
- 5.9 The following DCISC open item was reviewed during this meeting and can be closed: *The DCISC should schedule an observation of electronic procedure usage in the plant during the next FFM of which Member Per F. Peterson is a participant. (D12/15/25FF-3.14)*
- 5.10 The following should be entered in the DCISC Open Item List item PI-2. *“The other two Members of the DCISC (Drs. Meshkati and Scarlat) should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during future FFM’s.”*
- 5.11 The DCISC should follow-up on the results of the Insurance inspections to be conducted in mid-2026. This recommendation should be captured in the DCISC Open Items List item number NS-10.

6.0 REFERENCES

- 6.1 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.8, Section 3.8, “Meet with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors.”
- 6.2 Ibid., Exhibit D.8, Section 3.11, “Meet with DCCP Officer”
- 6.3 Ibid., Exhibit D.8, Section 3.2, “Station Update”
- 6.4 Ibid., Exhibit D.2, Section 3.6, “Dynamic (formerly Electronic) Procedures.”
- 6.5 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fifth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025,” Approved October 23, 2025, Volume II, Exhibit D.5, Section 3.2, “Electronic Procedures.”
- 6.6 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.5, Section 3.1, “Maintenance Department Performance (re: Craftmanship Council)”

- 6.7 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fourth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2023 – June 30, 2024,” Approved October 10, 2024, Volume II, Exhibit D.9, Section 3.14, “Equipment Reliability.”
- 6.8 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.5, Section 3.14, “Station Update,” (re: Dynamic Procedures).
- 6.8 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.5, Section 3.1, “Maintenance Department Performance” (re: Craftsmanship Council)
- 6.9 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fifth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025,” Approved October 23, 2025, Volume II, Exhibit D.1, Section 3.6, “Nuclear Liability Insurance.”
- 6.10 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Second Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2021 – June 30, 2022,” Approved September 28, 2022, Volume II, Exhibit D.5, Section 3.5, “Crane Program.”