

**Diablo Canyon
Independent
Safety Committee**

**Public Meeting
June 16 and 17, 2026**

Avila Lighthouse Suites

Diablo Canyon Power Plant: State of the Plant Update

June 16, 2026



Justin Rogers - Diablo Canyon Station Director


Plant Operation

- Units 1 & 2 are safely operating at 100% power
- All Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Performance Indicators (PIs) are Green



Daily Load Profile: Past 12 Months

Daily Capacity Factor Power History Curves



Key Events - Recently Completed Activities

- **Unit 1 curtailment to 50% power for tunnel cleaning the weekends of Feb 20-23 and Feb 27- March 2 (each weekend focusing on one of two circulating water tunnels for Unit 1)**
- **Diesel Generator (DG) 1-3 Maintenance Outage Window (MOW) conducted March 22 – 29**
- **Startup Transformer (SUT) 2-2 feeder cable/bus maintenance**
- **DG 1-1 MOW conducted May 31 – June 7**

Key Events - Upcoming Station Activities

- **Diesel Generator (DG) Maintenance Outage Windows (MOWs): DG 1-2 August 2-13**
- **NRC Inspections:**
 - **Emergency Planning Exercise and PI: August 31-September 4**
 - **ISFSI aging management / license renewal inspection: to be scheduled prior to August 31**

Leadership Changes

- **No notable leadership changes this last quarter**



Diablo Canyon Power Plant: State of the Plant Update

Questions?

Justin Rogers
Diablo Canyon Power Plant



Diablo Canyon Power Plant Regulatory Performance Update

Jordan Tyman
Director, Risk & Compliance

June 16, 2026



February – June 2026

- DCPP continues to provide safe, clean, and reliable electricity to Californians
- Since the last update to the DCISC, the NRC oversight of DCPP included approximately ~2,000 hours of inspection time
- No violations received since the last DCISC update
- DCPP remains in the highest performance category for all NRC Performance Indicators
- End of Cycle Assessment – “NRC concluded that overall performance at your facility preserved public health and safety”

DCPP remains in the highest performance category

- In addition to performing inspections, the NRC also evaluates every nuclear plant using performance indicators
- NRC gauges licensee performance using 16 separate indicators related to various aspects of plant operation
- DCPP remains in the highest performance category of the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix
 - No inspection findings or violations received since the last DCISC update
 - Performance indicators within the expected range (i.e., green)

Unplanned Scrams (G)	Safety System Functional Failures (G)	Reactor Coolant System Activity (G)	Drill/Exercise Performance (G)	Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (G)	RETS/OCDE Radiological Effluent (G)	Protected Area Equipment (G)
Unplanned Power Changes(G)	Emergency AC Power Systems(G)	Reactor Coolant System Leakage(G)	ERO Drill Participation(G)			
Unplanned Scrams with Complications(G)	High Pressure Injection Systems(G)		Emergency Response Facility and Equipment(G)			
	Heat Removal Systems(G)					
	Residual Heat Removal Systems(G)					
	Cooling Water Systems(G)					



Regulatory Update



February – June 2026

NRC Violations

- DCPP received no violations during this period

Licensee Event Reports (LER)

- There were no LERs issued during the reporting period



Upcoming Inspections



Upcoming NRC Inspections

Emergency Planning Evaluated Exercise – August 31, 2026

License Amendments

- DCPP received NRC approval of several License Amendment Requests (LARs) since the last update to the DCISC
 - TSTF-585, Rev. 2, “Provide an Alternative to the LCO 3.0.3 One-Hour Preparation Time”
 - Aux Bldg. HVAC Completion Time Extension to 30 Days
- DCPP has submitted a number of LARs, which are with NRC for review and approval (e.g., NEI 99-01 Rev 7, E-Plan rebaseline to NUREG-0654 Rev. 2 etc.)



DCPP Regulatory Performance



DCPP Regulatory Performance

- DCPP remains in the highest NRC regulatory performance category
- DCPP continues to provide safe, clean, and reliable electricity to 4 million Californians



Thank You

Jordan Tyman
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Director, Risk & Compliance





Raluca Scarlat, Member, with Lisa Darden and Richard St. Onge (remote), Consultants

1. Plant Health Subcommittee Observation
2. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspector
3. FLEX Support Guidelines for Propping Open Turbine Building Doors
4. Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Pump Leak Technical Specification Completion Time
5. Strategic Plan for Compliance with the New National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit
6. Meet with a DCCP Officer
7. Field Observation of a Maintenance Activity
8. Safety Related Direct Current (DC) Power System Review
9. Station Update
10. Units 1 and 2 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment Error Analysis
11. Meet with Individual Contributors from Various Departments
12. Preparations for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Inspections in August 2026



Plant Health Subcommittee Observation

- The Plant Health Subcommittee (PHSC) is responsible for reviewing system and program health, developing actions to address issues, and advising the Plant Health Committee (PHC).
- PHC is responsible for the status of station health and approving/funding actions to address issues.
- The PHSC develops and maintains the Top Ten Equipment Issues List. The PHC approves changes to the list and monitors progress of issue resolution.
- DCPD uses a Unpredictability vs Consequence “Heat Map” to show the risk associated with each issue and the aggregate risk of all issues combined (see example of a Heat Map on next slide).
- The PHSC meeting was well attended and included operators from the shift that day.
- All PHSC members and attendees participated in the discussions, asked questions, and challenged proposed outcomes. Actions were taken for any unresolved questions.



Plant Health Subcommittee Observation (continued)

Example of a Unpredictability vs Consequence Heat Map





Plant Health Subcommittee Observation (continued)

Conclusion: The Plant Health Subcommittee (PHSC) meeting was conducted efficiently, and attendee participation was strong which added to the effectiveness on the meeting.



Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspector

- Discussed general plant performance and upcoming NRC inspection activities.
- Discussed the NRC inspection program re-baselining effort that is currently in progress.
- Discussed NRC inspector staffing, training, and career development.

Conclusion: The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.



FLEX Support Guidelines for Propping Open Turbine Building Doors

- During the December 2, 2025 FF Meeting, the DCISC reviewed the scenario of a collapse of the DCPD Discharge Structure and one of the FLEX strategies to cut the flexible joints immediately downstream of the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger to re-establish Auxiliary Saltwater flow, and prop open Turbine Building doors to discharge water through to the outside.
- The DCISC Team asked which doors would need to be propped open to allow this flow of water, and if the normal opening direction of a normally closed door would be affected by water flow against it.
- FLEX Support Guidelines may be needed during a severe accident scenario, or a Beyond Design Basis (BDB) event.



FLEX Support Guidelines for Propping Open Turbine Building Doors

(continued)

- An overview was provided to the Fact-Finding Team (FFT) of equipment and procedures developed by DCCP staff in the event they are faced with a severe accident scenario.
 - Equipment and procedures for securing plant doors in the open or closed position are stored in the control room complex. Equipment includes doorstops, wedges, ropes, fasteners, ratcheting devices, etc.
- DCCP described to the FFT the training that the operators, maintenance, Fire Department, and other staff receive on FLEX equipment and procedures.
 - FLEX training received by operators would enable them to select the doors and the equipment appropriate for the event.
- Procedures show the relevant part of the Turbine Building with multiple options of doors available.



FLEX Support Guidelines for Propping Open Turbine Building Doors

(continued)

Conclusion: Based on its reviews of DCCP's FLEX Procedures, Equipment, and Training, the DCISC concluded that the readiness of the FLEX tools for the propping-open of doors is appropriate. Based on its review of the building layout, it concluded that it is possible to ensure water flow from the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger to the outside of the building with the propping open only of doors that open outwards, and the FLEX equipment available was appropriate for achieving this. The staff embraced preparedness for identifying alternate methods to maintain control of the power plant during Beyond Design Basis events. DCISC will periodically review the FLEX Program in future Fact-Finding Meetings.

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *The DCISC should review FLEX Support Guidelines for how doors can be propped open, should this action be needed in a severe accident scenario. The propping open of doors can be a useful tool in responding to an unforeseen scenario, and the plant would be well positioned to have tools and training for how operators can effectively achieve the propping open of doors. (D12/2/25FF-3.8)*



Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Leak Technical Specification Completion Time

- This topic was originally discussed during the September 2025 and December 2, 2025 FFMs. The DCISC had a follow-up question regarding how the Technical Specification Completion Time was met for the Jacket Water Pump repair. The DCISC originally thought the leak was identified during Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-2 return to service testing after a schedule maintenance package.
- A Jacket Water Pump seal leak was identified on September 5, 2025 during monthly surveillance testing. No maintenance had been performed immediately prior to the test.
- The leak was measured at 100 drops per minute (dpm) while the EDG was running.
- The leak was immediately evaluated as within calculated limits therefore a compensatory measure was not required because the local alarm and existing annunciator procedure would ensure jacket water level was maintained above minimum level for operability.



Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Leak Technical Specification Completion Time (continued)

- **DCPP established the following as Prudent Actions:**
 - **Daily checks of jacket water level when EDG 2-2 was not running, and**
 - **Two-hour checks of jacket water level when EDG 2-2 was running.**
- **EDG 2-2 was returned to service after the successful surveillance test on September 5, 2025.**
- **The jacket water pump seal leak was repaired during a planned emergent maintenance window from September 28, 2025 – October 2, 2025.**
- **The associated Notification (SAPN 51300035) stated a Compensatory Measure was established. Compensatory Measures are tied to operability of equipment. DCPP stated that the Notification should have stated Prudent Actions were established, which are not tied to operability of equipment.**



Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Leak Technical Specification Completion Time (continued)

- Discussion of the use of Risk Informed Completion Times (RICTs) for EDGs at DCPD:
 - The DCPD Technical Specification (TS) Completion Time for EDGs is 14 days.
 - RICTs allows increasing this up to 30 days with the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools, evaluating other equipment out of service, and the implementation of various Risk Management Actions (RMAs).
 - Since the maintenance window was less than 14 days, RICTs was not used.

Conclusion: The DCISC reviewed how the Technical Specification required Completion Time was met for an October 2025 Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Pump leak event as well as how a similar event would be handled in the future using Risk-Informed Completion Times and found use of the Completion Times to be appropriate.



Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Leak Technical Specification Completion Time (continued)

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *As a case study for Risk-Informed Completion Time, the DCISC should further review how the Technical Specification-required Completion Time was met for an October 2025 Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 Jacket Water Pump leak event as well as how a similar event would be handled in the future following approval of the License Amendment Request and implementation of a risk-informed Completion Time. (D12/2/25FF-3.1)*

Recommendation: The DCISC should review the workflow of interfacing with the NRC Resident Inspector for a hypothetical scenario when a Notification mentions the need for a Compensatory Action but is later identified that the system was in fact operable and did not require a Compensatory Action. (D3/26FF-3.4)



Strategic Plan for Compliance with the New National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit

A new NPDES permit and Clean Water Act certification were approved by the California Regional Water Quality Control Board, Central Coast Region, on February 26, 2026, and became effective on April 17, 2026. DCCP provided the March DCISC FFT the following status of preparedness:

- **Baseline sampling for all expected sample points were submitted prior new permit application submittal, as required.**
- **Contracted with a vendor to perform new annual sampling with Chemistry oversight.**
- **Updating contracts with certified labs to perform any new types of sample analysis.**
- **Updating all station procedures to comply with the new permit requirements.**
- **Updating and implementing training for the new sampling requirements.**
- **Six new sample points were identified:**
 - **New procedures are being written.**
 - **Station schedule being updated for compliance.**



Strategic Plan for Compliance with the New National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit (continued)

Conclusions: DCCP's implementation, staffing and training plans for the new National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) and Clean Water Act 401 Water Quality Certification were reviewed and are on track for meeting the compliance date of April 17, 2026. DCISC will periodically review the Chemistry Program in future Fact-Finding Meetings.

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *The DCISC should follow up on the implementation, staffing and necessary training plans for complying with the new National Pollution Discharge Elimination System and Clean Water Act 401 Water Quality Certification, and the overall strategic plan for the Chemistry Department and its interface with Operations and License Renewal. (D12/2/25-3.11)*



Meet with DCPD Officer

- Discussed the Fact-Finding Agenda Items and other items of mutual interest

Conclusion: The regular meetings between DCISC and DCPD Officers and Directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.



Field Observation of a Maintenance Activity

The FFT observed the Pre-Job Brief (PJB) and a portion of the calibration of the Unit 1 Air Side Seal Oil Pump Pressure Switch as performed by Instrument and Control (I&C) Technicians

- During the PJB, the technicians reviewed job steps, drawings, recent field pictures, previous maintenance performed, risk, safety and hazards in the job area.
- The technicians transported their tools to the job site while pointing out hazards to the FFT.
- The technicians performed an initial walkdown, job site setup, and identified the correct pressure switch using the Human Performance simultaneous verification tool.
- The technicians notified the Unit 1 operators of the start of work, alarms the operators could expect to receive, and points of contact.
- The lead technician informed the FFT that the pressure switch was found out of specification requiring additional action to calibrate.
- Post-job review was observed with the technicians updating the job order paperwork and adding information about the job to the DCCP I&C internal “operating experience” database.





Field Observation of a Maintenance Activity

(continued)

- **Conclusion:** DCCP Maintenance Team adequately prepared for the calibration activity and exhibited good standards and safety practices in the field. Upon conclusion of the job, Maintenance ensured post-job documentation was entered into their internal “operating experience” database, providing a useful tool for the future.



Safety Related Direct Current Power System Review

- The Safety Related (SR) Direct Current (DC) Power System is a vital system that provides SR functions and indications during normal operations and unplanned events.
- Provided by lead-acid batteries that are separated into three “trains” per unit and are normally charged from off-site power or from the Diesel Generators should off-site power be unavailable.
- The first quarter System Health Report for both units’ SR DC Power Systems was rated Green – or “Healthy”.
- DCPD presented plans to continue to improve the system and better manage necessary updates/repairs.

Conclusions: DCPD’s Safety Related Direct Current Power System is rated Green (Healthy). The System Engineer for the system showed ownership and a healthy attitude towards continuous improvements. Generally, the DCISC Team was appreciative of the professional dialog and behaviors of the participants.



Station Update

- **Station Update:**
 - **Unit 1 Circulating Water (CW) Tunnel Cleaning completed in February.**
 - **Discussion on the reasons for the observed reduction in biofouling in Unit 1 CW Tunnel.**
 - **Improved health of the chlorine injection system. DCPD previously assigned the system a higher priority to improve reliability and availability.**
 - **Portions of the tunnel have been painted with a marine paint that resists biofouling.**

Conclusion: DCPD's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.



Unit 1 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment Error Analysis

- During the December 2, 2025 Fact-Finding Meeting, the DCISC reviewed the DCPD Steam Generator Tube Support Plate (TSP) and Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) wear and recommended that DCISC review the error analysis for calculations contained in the Degradation Assessment for Unit 1 and Unit 2.
- PG&E provided all necessary documents for full transparency of the error analysis methodology, including the relevant chapter of the examination guidelines, and relevant examination specification sheets. DCPD Steam Generator Engineers provided a detailed walk through of the data and methodologies.
- Primary focus was on the uncertainty calculation for determining the potential through wall leak of a worst-case Steam Generator Tube location over the course of an eight-year duration as the NRC Guidance recommended.
- DCISC agreed that the uncertainty calculation followed the prescribed methodology and was fully documented.



Unit 1 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment Error Analysis

(continued)

Conclusion: The DCISC reviewed the error analysis with the DCPD Steam Generator (SG) engineers to better understand the conclusions of the SG inspection reports. Based on the third-party reports and assessments, including the April 2025 Unit 1 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment Report and the October 2025 Unit 2 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment Report, the DCPD Unit 1 and Unit 2 Steam Generators appear to be in excellent health. The methodology and analysis of the Steam Generator tube examination results were sufficiently conservative and appropriate.

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *The DCISC should review the error analysis for calculations contained in the October 2025 Degradation Assessment for the Unit 2 Steam Generators. (D12/2/25FF-3.5)*



Meet with Individual Contributors from Various Departments

- The DCISC FFT met with five individual contributors from DCPD for an informal discussion on their experiences working at DCPD.
- Items discussed include:
 - The Safety Champion Program
 - Safety issue reporting including anonymous Notifications and the Employee Concerns Program
 - Examples of a Teaching Culture at DCPD
 - Expectations for mitigating Risk and Safety
 - Support for development of departmental Operating Experience (OE) data
 - The future of electronic procedures, work orders, and artificial intelligence tools
 - Employee interaction and familiarization with the NRC Resident Inspector



Meet with Individual Contributors from Various Departments

(continued)

Conclusion: An informal discussion with five DCPD employees was enjoyable and informative and provided insights into the culture of Industrial Safety, employee development, use of internal Operating Experience, and the future use of electronic procedures and Artificial Intelligence.



Preparation for Future Independent Spent Fuel Installation Inspection in August 2026

- Previous inspection performed in June 2021 to support NRC License Renewal Aging Management Program (AMP) to ensure the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) is in good condition for the next 40 years of potential operation.
 - Performed on eight canisters that represented different material and environmental conditions at the ISFSI site.
 - No major structural or unusual configurations were found. Some canisters had small amounts of minor discoloration spots with no observed degradation.
- DCCP ISFSI Site-Specific License requires an inspection of two or more canisters every five years.
- Next inspection scheduled the week of August 17, 2026.
- DCCP plans to test the same eight representative canisters which will allow for follow-up inspections.



Preparation for Future Independent Spent Fuel Installation Inspection in August 2026 (continued)

- DCCP plans to use a more sophisticated inspection probe that has enhanced visual measurement capability for further examining the previously identified discoloration spots and will assist in recording any abnormalities.
- DCCP is working with a vendor on developing inspection tools that can take samples of and clean any areas exhibiting residue.
- Contracts with the vendor providing the canister inspections was in final negotiations at the time of this Fact-Finding Meeting.



Preparation for Future Independent Spent Fuel Installation Inspection in August 2026 (continued)

Conclusion: The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) inspection team provided DCISC information on the details regarding the procedures, equipment, training, and contract for the upcoming August 2026 inspection campaign. The DCISC concluded that the readiness of the ISFSI Inspection Team was on track.

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *The DCISC should request that PG&E make a presentation on the summer 2026 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation inspection campaign at the June or October 2026 Public Meetings and that Member Raluca Scarlat be invited to observe some of the inspections. (D12/15/25FF-3.11A)*



Raluca Scarlat, Member, with Lisa Darden and Richard St. Onge (remote), Consultants


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NRC Annual Assessment for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (CY2025)

Eli Garcia

NRC Senior Resident Inspector (Acting) at DCPD

Our Mission



The NRC protects public health and safety and advances the nation's common defense and security by enabling the safe and secure use and deployment of civilian nuclear energy technologies and radioactive materials through efficient and reliable licensing, oversight, and regulation for the benefit of society and the environment.

NRC Strategic Plan Goals

- Safety and Security – Ensure the safe and secure use of radioactive materials
- Organizational Health – Continue to foster a healthy organization
- Stakeholder confidence – Inspire stakeholder confidence in the NRC

NRC Annual Assessment Summary

Diablo Canyon, Units 1 & 2

- PG&E operated the plant safely and in a manner that preserved the public health and safety and protected the environment.
- Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2 were in the Licensee Response Column of the NRCs ROP Action Matrix at the end of 2025.

NRC Inspection Activities

Diablo Canyon in 2025

- ~7500 hours of inspection and related activities
- 2 resident inspectors on site – residents issue four quarterly inspection reports per year and walk through the plant every day
- 10 region-based inspections
- 3 major team inspections
 - License Renewal
 - Fire Protection
 - Cybersecurity

Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2 Licenses Renewed

- NRC approved the Diablo Canyon License Renewal request granting another 20 years of continued operation



Diablo Canyon PIs and Findings

January 1 through December 31, 2025

- All 17 Performance Indicators for each unit (including Security) were Green
- 6 Green / Severity Level IV inspection findings

NRC Resident Inspection Findings

- Multiple Examples of Failure to Follow Procedures and Work Instructions (IR 2025-001)
- Failure to Perform Preventive Maintenance Replacement Strategy (IR 2025-003)
- Failure to Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality for Emergency Diesel Generator 2-3 (IR 2025-003)

NRC Inspection Plans for 2026

- NRC plans baseline inspections at Diablo Canyon for the remainder of 2026. This includes:
 - Graded emergency preparedness exercise
 - Inservice inspections during Unit 1 outage

Significance Threshold

Performance Indicators

- **Green** Baseline Inspection
- **White** Requires additional NRC oversight
- **Yellow** Requires more NRC oversight
- **Red** Requires most NRC oversight

Inspection Findings

- **Green** Very low safety or security significance finding
- **White** Low to moderate safety or security significance finding
- **Yellow** Substantial safety or security significance finding
- **Red** High safety or security significance finding

Contacting the NRC

- Report an emergency
 - (301) 816-5100 (call collect)
- Report a safety concern
 - (800) 695-7403
 - Allegation@nrc.gov
- General information or questions
 - www.nrc.gov

NRC Social Media Connections



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<https://www.linkedin.com/company/u-s--nuclear-regulatory-commission/>

GovDelivery: <https://service.govdelivery.com/accounts/USNRC/subscriber/new>

Feedback / Comments / General Questions

- Public Meeting Feedback Form:
- Use the QR code or navigate to <https://feedback.nrc.gov/pmfs/>
- Enter meeting code number:
20260557



Changes to the Reactor Oversight Process Recently Approved by the Commission

Patricia Vossmar

NRC Region IV, Division of Reactor Projects


The ADVANCE Act & EO 14300

- The **Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear Power for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act** passed with bipartisan support in July 2024
 - Through the Act, NRC completed several actions, particularly in areas of licensing new reactors and fuels, including:
 - Enhancing the regulatory framework for advanced reactors and fusion machines
 - Initiatives to support efficient, timely, and predictable license reviews
- May 23, 2025 - **Executive Order 14300** *“Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission”*
 - Including review and wholesale revision of regulations and guidance documents


New NRC Organization



New NRC Organization (cont'd)



New NRC Organization (cont'd)



ROP Revision: Commission Direction

SECY-25-0045 & SRM-SECY-25-0045

- Approved changes to White findings, Action Matrix criteria, cross-cutting area characterization, and operator licensing exam preparation

SECY-26-0014 & SRM-SECY-26-0014

- Approved revisions to the baseline inspection program, including triennial PI&R and a revised engineering inspection approach

SECY-26-0015 & SRM-SECY-26-0015

- Approved revisions to the security baseline inspection program, including updated Force-on-Force expectations

Why Update the ROP Now?

These updates are based on almost 25 years of experience with the Reactor Oversight Process


Inputs from about 200 inspectors and staff helped identify where the baseline could be simplified

The goal is to remove redundant, low-value activities so the baseline better reflects plant performance

Key Takeaways

- **Decision-making** on inspection activities moves **closer to the field**
- Resources **shift away from repetitive verification** toward higher-value inspection work
- Several standalone procedures are sunset, with **key attributes absorbed into other baseline procedures**
- The revised baseline **keeps program risk-informed, improves efficiency** and flexibility
- Data indicates industry performance has improved over time, ROP adjustments warranted

Core Mission Delivery Unchanged



Change w/o Compromising Safety & Security

- At least two resident inspectors maintained at each nuclear power plant
- Consolidated inspection procedures
- Revised periodicity of multiple inspections
- ~42% reduction in baseline inspection hours with no compromise to safety and security

Inspection Procedure Series	Program Annualized Hours (2025)	Revised Program Annualized Hours	% Change Resource Usage
Reactor Safety Inspection Procedures (IP 71111 Series)	1145	734	-36%
Emergency Preparedness Inspection Procedures (IP 71114 Series)	144	63	-56%
Radiation Protection Inspection Procedures (IP 71124/71125 Series)	115	71	-36%
Security Inspection Procedures (IP 71130 Series)	287	149	-48%
PI Review, PI&R, Event Follow-up Inspection Procedures	327	145	-55%
Total:	2018	1162	-42%

Overarching Changes – By Strategic Areas

- **Reactor Safety**

- Sunsets 5 Inspection Procedures (IPs), consolidating efforts over 12 IPs, including a triennial engineering IP
- **Emergency Preparedness** shifts some program elements to biennial review; EP exercise and training/drill performance reviews remain

- **Radiation Safety**

- Consolidation of 7 IPs to 4 IPs to better focus on issues with most radiological safety significance
- 1 RP IP each refueling outage, plus 3 IPs completed over triennial cycle

- **Security**

- Streamlines from 11 IPs on varying cycles to 2 annual IPs and 2 triennial IPs
- Future force-on-force exercise changes (2029 & beyond) - move to single licensee-conducted, NRC inspected exercise in the triennial period

PI&R and Other Assessment Changes

Problem Identification & Resolution Team Inspection

- PI&R team inspection retained
- Shift to a triennial frequency (vs biennial)
- Reduce the team size to 2 members (vs 4)
- Narrow the scope to licensee corrective action programs

Enhanced Consistency in More-Than-Minor (MTM) Screening

- Clarified MTM screening criteria to reduce subjectivity
- Eliminates Green findings that involve speculative or negligible impact (e.g., small losses of margin)
- Only impacts documentation, licensees are still required to restore compliance for all NRC violations

Performance Assessment Enhancements


- **White findings**
 - Clarified White finding definition (low to moderate → low safety significance)
 - Licensee-identified White findings no longer count as Action Matrix inputs; encouraging robust licensee problem identification and resolution
 - Column 2 White inputs no longer aggregate to Column 3
- Cross-cutting issues characterized at the area level (vice aspect level), reducing time spent on detailed classification

Transition to the Revised ROP

Key Transition Actions & Milestones

- **Effective Date:** Revised procedures take effect July 1, 2026
- **Guidance Updates:** Updated IMCs and IPs are being finalized to support 7/1/2026 implementation
- **Training:** Inspectors in progress of receiving training on revised procedures and expectations
- **Inspection credit & Transition alignment:**
 - 2026 inspections completed under the IPs in effect at the time will be credited to revised requirements, as applicable
 - Remaining 2026 inspection work will be aligned to the revised program after the 7/1/2026 implementation date

Transition focus

- 
- Issue guidance
 - Train staff
 - Credit 2026 work
 - Reconcile schedules

Baseline Goals of the Revised ROP

The revised baseline is meant to stay risk-informed while cutting duplication and supporting a more focused, flexible inspection program

What stays constant

Safety-significant work remains in scope

Baseline oversight still anchors performance monitoring

Inspection guidance still points to documented attributes

What improves

Less redundant verification

More integration across related procedures

Better alignment between effort and observed plant performance

What to watch during rollout

Consistent field implementation

Clear handoffs when attributes move between procedures

Ongoing staff and stakeholder feedback



#NRCForward

Reactor Safety Cornerstones Changes

	5 IPs Sunset	12 IPs Remain	1 New Engineering IP
Flood Protection		Absorbed into IP 71111.01 (Adverse Weather) and .04 (Equipment Alignment)	
Heat Exchanger		Absorbed into IP 71111.24 (Testing & Maintenance of Equip Important to Risk)	
Maintenance Effectiveness		Requirements moved into IP 71111.24	
Plant Modifications		Shifted into IP 71111.04, .11 (LORQ), and engineering inspection (.21T)	
Performance Indicators		Reduced verification shifts to plant status / PI&R / other IPs	
Engineering Inspections		Quadrennial IPs are consolidated into a new triennial engineering IP	

Highlights

- **Equipment alignment**
Internal flood protection and temporary modification attributes move here; samples are reduced but the walkdown remains central
- **Fire Protection**
Guidance encourages coordination with equipment walkdowns and trims sample expectations where appropriate
- **Testing and maintenance**
The procedure expands to absorb maintenance effectiveness elements while keeping focus on equipment important to risk

EP & RP Cornerstones Changes

1 EP, 3 RP IPs Sunset	7 EP IPs Remain	4 RP IPs Remain
EP Program (71114.02, .03, .04, .05, & .06)	• Biennial, non-exercise year. E-Plan change reviews, maintenance of EP systems, EP PI reviews • Biennial, Resident Inspector EP Drill observations.	
EP Exercise (14.01, 14.08)	• Biennial, integrates hostile action-based scenarios into overall exercise IP 71114.01, sunset 71114.07	
Refueling Outage RP (71125.01)	• Direct inspection of radiological planning & controls execution and worker protection during refueling outages	
Remote RP (25.02)	• Triennial, completed remotely. Internal dosimetry, public dose calculations, & source term characterization	
Occupational RP (25.03)	• Triennial, onsite. In-plant RP instrumentation, external dosimetry, & worker respiratory protection	
Public RP (25.04)	• Triennial, onsite. Effluent and environmental monitoring & sampling; and radioactive material control & shipping	

Highlights

- **Emergency Preparedness (EP)**
Shift of some program elements to biennial review; consideration of fleet performance to improve efficiency and remove duplication of effort
- **Radiation Protection (RP)**
Consolidation of 7 IPs to 4 IPs to better focus on issues with most radiological safety significance
1 RP IP each refueling outage + 3 RP IPs completed triennially

Security Cornerstone Changes

	10 IPs Sunset	4 IPs Remain	1 IP changed to as needed
Security Operations (Annual)	- Completed by Resident Inspectors - Observation of normally scheduled security activities; select walkdowns of security equipment		
Security Performance (Annual)	- Completed by Regional Security Inspectors - Rotating selection of 3 of 8 inspectable areas previously inspected in varying cycles - Review PI&R of security issues and Security PI, if warranted		
Cybersecurity (Triennial)	Moved to Triennial starting Jan. 1, 2026 (formally Biennial)		
Force-on-Force Exercise (Triennial)	- NRC driven and inspected, but with Licensee option for greater involvement in scenario development - Win/Lose Paradigm replaced with focus on identification of deficiencies/officer training		
Material Control & Accountability	Changed to IMC 2515, App. C (as needed) inspection		

Highlights

- **Streamlined from 11 IPs on varying cycles to 2 Annual IPs and 2 Triennial IPs**
 - Retains comprehensive coverage of critical security functions, including access controls, response capabilities, and contingency planning
- **Future FOF changes (2029 & beyond)**
 - Move to single licensee-conducted, NRC inspected exercise in the triennial period

Office of the Inspector General

*U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board*

June 16, 2026





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OIG's Mission:

Providing independent, objective
audit, evaluations, and investigative
oversight of the operations of the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

and the

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

to promote integrity, economy, and efficiency.



Today's presentation:

- OIG Overview
- OIG Structure
- Questions



OIG Overview

OIG Purpose

Provide

Independent, objective audit, evaluations, and investigative oversight of agency operations.

Promote

Independence, integrity, economy, and efficiency in agency programs and operations.

Review

Regulations, legislation, and directives, and provide comments, as appropriate, regarding any significant concerns.

Detect and Deter

Fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.



Four Types of Inspectors General

Establishment IGs

Designated Federal Entity IGs

Other Permanent IGs

Special IGs



OIG Strategic Goals



Safety

Strengthen the NRC's efforts to protect public health, safety, and the environment.

Strengthen the DNFSB's efforts to oversee the safe operation of Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities.



Security

Strengthen the agencies' efforts to address evolving security threats.




Corporate Support

Increase the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness with which the agencies manage and exercise stewardship over their resources.

OIG Staff Experience



OIG Organizational Chart



What Drives OIG Work?



Examples of Agencies' Top Management and Performance Challenges



Reforming and
Modernizing Nuclear
Regulation and Regulatory
Frameworks



Enhancing
Financial
Efficiency



Enabling Safe Deployment
of Advanced Reactors,
Small Modular Reactors,
and Microreactors



Advancing
Decommissioning
Policy and Regulatory
Approaches



Ensuring an
Effective
Information
Security Program



Assessing the
Impact of
Artificial
Intelligence



OIG Structure

Audits & Evaluations Division

AIGA
Hruta Virkar

Promote

Cost-effective management
Funds put to better use
Compliance and internal controls
Identification of fraud, waste, and abuse

Attest to

Accuracy of financial statements

Address

Congressional, public, and
agency concerns



Audits & Evaluations Division

Four Phases of Engagements

Survey

- Gather information on specific aspects of the agency's organization, programs, activities, and functions.
- Determine whether further review is needed.

Fieldwork

- Gather detailed information.
- Develop and support findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Reporting

- Prepare a draft report.
- Hold exit conferences with agency management.
- Publish final report.

Resolution

- Agency management acts on OIG recommendations.
- The OIG monitors agency actions, closing recommendations when they have been addressed.



Audits & Evaluations Division

Deliverables



Audits & Evaluations Division

Example Audit Topics

- Cybersecurity
- Emergency Diesel Generators
- Financial Statements
- Management and
Performance Challenges



Investigations Division

AIGI
Malion A. Bartley

Prevent & Detect

- Fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement
- Criminal violations
- Administrative violations
- Failure to adequately regulate

Guidance Documents

- CIGIE standards
- DOJ guidelines
- OIG policy (Special Agent Manual)



We investigate...



Procurement
and
contract fraud

Theft of funds
or property

False claims
and
false statements

Unauthorized
disclosure or theft
of sensitive agency
information

Purchase card
and
travel card fraud

Unauthorized use
of computers
or resources

Failure to
adequately
regulate

Conflicts
of interest

Reporting examples



Improperly
handled
allegations



Undue
influence
by industry



Inappropriate
interactions with
public interest
groups, individual
allegers, and
industry workers



Apparent
shortcomings in
regulatory
oversight



Inappropriate
handling of
regulatory activities
related to nuclear
safety and security
matters



Misconduct by
agency employees
and contractors,
such as conflicts of
interest and theft of
government
property

Investigations Division

Case Examples


- Small Entity Reduced Annual Fee Program Fraud
- Release of Predecisional Information
- Misappropriation of Pandemic Relief Funds
- Oversight of Research and Test Reactors
- Inspections of ISFSIs at Operating Reactors



Technical Services Section

Pete Snyder &
Natreon Jordan
Senior Technical Advisors

TSS supports OIG activities
with technical expertise.



Technical Services Section

Areas of Responsibility

Knowledge


Advises senior leadership on highly technical matters.

Support

Supports audit and evaluation and investigation teams with the accurate assessment of technical information.

Awareness

Keeps current on emerging issues important to nuclear safety and security.



OIG Legal Work

Jeremy Suttенberg,
General Counsel

Mary Frances Woods,
*Chief of Staff &
Deputy General Counsel*



Examples of OIG Legal Work

Advising

On
Whistleblower
Protection
Matters

Interacting

With lawyers
for the NRC or
the DNFSB

Representing

The OIG in
dealings with
outside
counsel



Questions?

Contact the OIG



Call the OIG Hotline

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1-800-201-7165**

7:00 a.m. – 4:00 p.m. (EST)
After hours, please leave a message.



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Write

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of the Inspector General
Hotline Program
Mail Stop O12-A12
11555 Rockville Pike
Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738

**DO NOT send classified information.
Call 1-800-233-3497.**



Najmedin Meshkati, Member, with Richard McWhorter, Consultant

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Cyber Security Program

- Core elements of the Cyber Security Program focus on identifying and implementing protection for all the Critical Digital Assets (CDAs) at DCPD. About 4,000 CDAs in program across 66 critical systems (including Security).
- Mature program focused on actively monitoring the protection of CDAs.
- Recent NRC Cyber Security inspection had generally positive results with two Green Non-Cited Violations.
- Conclusion: DCPD's Cyber Security Program continued to be implemented effectively in support of maintaining plant operational safety. The results of an NRC inspection in August 2025 were generally positive with two findings of low safety significance which were properly rectified.



Station Update

- **Station Update:**
 - **Unit 1 Circulating Water Tunnel Cleaning (February/March)**
 - **Emergency Diesel Generator 1–3 Maintenance Outage Window (March)**
 - **License Renewal Issuance (April 2, 2026)**

Conclusion: DCCP's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.



2026 Operating Plan

- Annual topic (typically in February Public Meeting).
- Plan based on 2025–2030 Strategic Plan with four major areas – Safety, Reliability, Affordability and People.
- 2026 “Roadmap to Generating Excellence” contained specific high-level goals and initiatives for 2026 based on Strategic Plan.
- Initiatives tracked via Tactical Implementation Plans reviewed periodically by Senior Leadership Team.
- Also discussed Institute for Nuclear Power Operations corporate evaluation scheduled for early 2027.
- Also discussed former Station Management Review Meeting (OIL OE–2).



2026 Operating Plan (continued)

Conclusion: DCPD's Annual Plan was reviewed and found to be appropriately focused on initiating and tracking specific goals and actions that would generate future enhancements in station safety and reliability.

Recommendations:

The DCISC should follow-up on how future uses of Artificial Intelligence at DCPD are being addressed as a part of the Artificial Intelligence Roadmap in the Strategic Plan. (D4/26FF-3.3)



2026 Operating Plan (continued)

Recommendations (continued):

The DCISC should modify its Open Items List as follows:

- Item OE-2, “Station Excellence Plan and Management Review Meeting,” should be closed.
- Item O-4, “Review plant activities since previous FF meeting (Station Update),” should be modified to include periodic reviews of the status of station Performance Indicators.
- Item NS-9, “Monitor DCCP’s program to track INPO Areas for Improvement,” should be modified to include reviews of the INPO Corporate Evaluation completed in 2020 as well as the next corporate evaluation planned for 2027.



2026 Operating Plan (continued)

Recommendations (continued):

- The DCISC should follow-up on how future uses of Artificial Intelligence at DCPD are being addressed as a part of the Artificial Intelligence Roadmap in the Strategic Plan. (D4/26FF-3.3A)
- The DCISC should follow up on receiving an oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Institute for Nuclear Power Operations corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report. (D4/26FF-3.3B)
- PG&E should provide the DCISC with an oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Institute for Nuclear Power Operations corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report. (P4/26FF-3.3)



Human Performance and Plant Status Control

- **Human Performance Events:**
 - **No Station Level Events since April 2021.**
 - **One Department Level Event (DLE) since January 2025.**
 - **No longer use Discretionary DLEs.**
- **One area of Human Performance concern, the lifting and landing of leads, was the subject of a Common Cause Evaluation (Reviewed)**
- **Plant Status Control Events Performance Indicator showed strong performance (Green; zero events in last six months)**



Human Performance and Plant Status Control (continued)

Conclusion: DCCPP's Human Performance has been excellent over the last two years based on data and trends in Human Performance events.

Recommendations:

The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *PG&E should review and improve the limited guidance in procedures for completing Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) and elaborate when a CCE should be performed, how it should be systematically completed, and how it should be acted upon. (P1/26-FF-3.9)*



Long Term Seismic Program (LTSP)

- Briefly discussed most recent report from the Independent Peer Review Panel
 - PG&E planned to complete a response in the fall of 2026.
- Overview provided on the of history of the LTSP.
 - Completed a reevaluation of the seismic hazard in 1988
 - Kept abreast of new scientific knowledge.
 - Supported earthquake monitoring (Central Coast Seismic Network).
 - Performed Updated Seismic Assessments following the Fukushima Event.
- Work reduced following signing of the Joint Proposal in 2016.
- Following the decision to extend operations, PG&E focused on the completion of the Updated Seismic Assessment (2024).



Long Term Seismic Program (continued)

- Current work includes multiple areas of research.
 - Numerous grants to universities for specific areas of seismic research.
 - Coordinating information sharing efforts with government entities.
 - Responding to inquiries and information as needed (such as from the IPRP or the DCISC).
 - If operations are extended past 2030, PG&E plans to perform a full update to the Seismic Hazard Assessment using the Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) process to be completed in 2030.

Conclusion: PG&E's work under the Long Term Seismic Program was being effectively managed and contributed significantly to improving seismic knowledge and safety at DCPD and in the surrounding area.



Simulator Training Observation

- Observed Initial Licensed Operator Training session in Simulator.
- Four short simulator scenarios prompting trainees to respond to off-normal events.
- Reviewed training objectives, operator actions, and communications practices.
- Reviewed use of Emergency Plan Classification Chart used by Operators in the Control Room.

Conclusion: An Initial License Training session in the simulator was well prepared, contained appropriate objectives, and was professionally conducted by the Training staff. Operators performed well in responding to the simulated off-normal events.



Accompany a Nuclear Operator on Rounds

- Observed Nuclear Operator on rounds in Unit 1 Turbine Building Ground Level.
- Operator inspected equipment and recorded instrument readings electronically.
- Operator was knowledgeable and observed equipment was in good condition.

Conclusion: The Nuclear Operator was very knowledgeable about their responsibilities, including the logging and trending of operating parameters and setpoints for equipment in their assigned area. Observed areas of the Turbine Building were found to be clean and orderly with all observed equipment in good material condition.





Meet with NRC Resident Inspector

- **Items Discussed Included:**
 - The temporary duty reassignment of the NRC Senior Resident, Mahdi Hayes, to a position in the Region IV office.
 - NRC reorganization and changes being implemented to improve efficiency in the Reactor Inspection Program.
 - Recent NRC inspection findings and concerns, including a Non-Cited Violation that resulted from a human performance-related event.
 - Recent changes to the NRC's Differing Professional Views program.

Conclusion: The meeting with the Acting NRC Senior Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.



Observe Notification Review Team


- The Notification Review Team (NRT) reviewed approximately 70 Notifications from the previous day.
- Members provided electronic feedback prior to the meeting and actively participated in the meeting.
- Two Notifications were discussed in detail.

Conclusion: The April 14, 2026, meeting of the Notification Review Team was conducted efficiently, and the NRT effectively dispositioned approximately 70 Notifications from the previous day in accordance with plant procedures.



Results of Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Failure Cause Evaluation

- Follow-up to event on December 15, 2025 – Tube leak in Unit 1 Feedwater Heater (FWH) 5C. (Recommendation D12/15/25FF-3.10)
- Unit 1 shutdown for repairs December 16 – 18, 2025.
- Event similar to Unit 2 5B FWH tube leak in October 2021 after which a Root Cause Evaluation (RCE) was performed.
- 2021 RCE concluded that the tube failures were caused by fatigue fracture of the FWH tubes driven by excessive vibration of unsupported tube lengths due to breaches in the drain cooler shroud.
- Corrective actions focused on increasing monitoring program (tube inspections).
- Following picture is from a 2022 presentation by PG&E at the DCISC's February 2022 Public Meeting.



Location of FWH tube failure



Results of Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Failure Cause Evaluation (continued)

- **Cause Evaluation (2025) concluded that there was no evidence contrary to the conclusions of the earlier 2021 RCE in that the failures were caused by erosion and associated damage from mixed flows in the area of the drain cooler.**
- **Failure did not correlate to any indications found during the last inspection (spring 2025).**
- **Several new corrective actions initiated to review/improve various aspects of the FWH condition monitoring plan, perform additional inspections of the Unit 1 5C FWH during the next refueling outage (fall 2026), and consider operating procedure changes.**
- **Ultimately, the FWHs have operated beyond their expected lifetimes and should be replaced to assure continued reliability.**



Results of Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Failure Cause Evaluation (continued)

Conclusion: DCPD's Cause Evaluation for the December 2025 Unit 1 Feedwater Heater (FWH) failure which drove an unplanned plant shutdown to facilitate repairs was well performed. Conclusions of the Cause Evaluation regarding causes and future actions that should be taken were appropriate and supported by all of the available information. The DCISC should continue to follow-up on and support DCPD's plans for future FWH replacements.

Recommendations: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *The DCISC should follow-up on the findings and cause evaluation for the Feedwater Heater tube leak that occurred on December 15, 2025, as well as future plans to address Feedwater Heater health (D12/15/25FF-3.10).*



Results of Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Failure Cause Evaluation (continued)

Recommendations (continued):

The DCISC should continue to follow and support DCPD's plans for future Feedwater Heater replacements. (D4/26FF-3.10A)

The DCISC should follow actions taken in response to the resolution approved at its February 2026 Public Meeting recommending that the California Public Utilities Commission and other cognizant state authorities support the implementation of the Feedwater heater replacement project at DCPD as soon as practically feasible. (D4/26FF-3.10B)



Meet with DCPD Officer

- **Meeting with Blair Jones, Vice President Business and Technical Services.**
- **Discussed the Fact-Finding Agenda Items and Other Items of Mutual Interest**

Conclusion: The regular meetings between DCISC and DCPD Officers and Directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.



Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update

- Written update provided by PG&E.
- Testing laboratory experienced delays in completing the testing of material specimens due to test equipment failures and the subsequent need for repairs.
- Final report expected August 2026 (as of April Update).
- Following the Fact-Finding Meeting and a meeting between Dr. Meshkati and members of the California Public Utilities Staff, the DCISC and PG&E exchanged letters regarding the timing of the final report.
- In its letter of May 15, 2026, to the DCISC, PG&E offered to provide a confidential briefing on the analysis results to members and consultants in July 2026.



Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update (continued)

Conclusion: PG&E reported that the testing and evaluations for materials removed from Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Sample Capsule B were delayed but continued to be in progress. Results were expected to be finalized and made available to both the DCISC and the public in the third quarter of 2026.



Reactor Vessel Head Corrosion Industry Event Update

- Written update provided by PG&E.
- March event at another plant where vessel head weld found degraded.
- DCPP had not yet formally reviewed event but did not believe there would be any changes necessary to corrosion prevention and inspection programs.
- DCPP's Reactor Vessel Heads have been replaced with heads of a different material (Alloy 690 versus Alloy 600) and containing better access to welds for inspections than the subject plant.

Conclusion: A recent industry event in which a defect was found in a weld on a Reactor Vessel Head did not pose any urgent safety concern for DCPP based primarily on the fact that DCPP's Reactor Vessel Heads have been replaced with a material that has better resistance to stress corrosion cracking.



Najmedin Meshkati, Member, with Richard McWhorter, Consultant

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SRT Review on PG&E Response to Nine DCISC/SRT Recommendations

Seismic Review Team

Thomas H. Jordan

Professor, Department of Earth Sciences, University of Southern California

Michael E. Oskin

Professor, Earth and Planetary Sciences Department, University of California Davis

Scott T. Marshall

Professor, Department of Geological and Environmental Sciences, Appalachian State University

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Public Meeting

June 16, 2026

Timeline of SRT Reviews and PG&E Responses

2025

- February 19-20, 2025, DCISC public meeting
 - SRT constituted by DCISC
- June 10-11, 2025, DCISC public meeting
 - SRT presented “Review of the Bird Critique” with 9 recommendations to PG&E
- September 10, 2025
 - SRT met with PG&E technical staff to clarify recommendations
- October 22-23, 2025, DCISC public meeting
 - SRT reported on Dr. Bird’s response to “Review of the Bird Critique”
 - PG&E presented preliminary response to SRT recommendations
- December 18, 2025
 - PG&E responded to DCISC 35th Annual Report, including preliminary response to SRT recommendations

2026

- January 14, 2026
 - DCISC requested supplemental information from PG&E on response to SRT recommendations
- February 18-19, 2026, DCISC public meeting
 - PG&E presented supplemental response to SRT recommendations
 - SRT commented on PG&E supplemental response
- March 30, 2026
 - SRT submitted written report “Comments on the Supplemental Response by Pacific Gas and Electric”
- April 1, 2026
 - SRT disbanded by DCISC; Dr. Jordan retained as DCISC consultant
- June 16-17, DCISC public meeting
 - Presentation and discussion of SRT written report on PG&E’s Supplemental Response

DCISC Request to PG&E for Supplemental Information

In its Jan 14th request, the DCISC asked PG&E to provide:

1. Sufficient information for the SRT to evaluate the technical adequacy of the PG&E response
2. Individual responses to each recommendation, stating whether PG&E agrees that further research is warranted and, if so, the plans, priorities, and time frames assigned to that research
3. Identification of which recommendations have the potential to make a significant impact on the DCPD hazard assessments, i.e., are technically defensible and likely to yield meaningful results

Summary of the PG&E Response

In its written response of Feb 12, 2026, PG&E states:

- “In general, the relative priority of research tasks related to reverse faults beneath the Irish Hills is considered of **medium** importance based on current information and hazard model results, warranting ongoing LTSP research with the goal of reducing SSC uncertainties over a time frame of **multiple years**.”
- “Research tasks that are currently considered to be of a higher or equal priority under the LTSP, based on evaluation of tornado plots, include projects addressing:
 1. **ground motion model uncertainties**
 2. **uncertainties in the Hosgri fault slip rate, and**
 3. **uncertainties related to time dependent behavior of fault sources.**”

PG&E provided individual responses to each of the nine recommendations

Summary of the PG&E Response

	Rec #	Recommendation	PG&E endorsement	PG&E/LTSP priority	Project status	Project timescale	Potential for hazard impact	
							PG&E	SRT
Fault system modeling	1	Kinematically constrained fault models	yes	medium	Existing LTSP goal; preliminary research underway	~3 yr	unknown	medium
	2	Dating of low-stand abrasion platforms	no	low	Dating infeasible; subsidence rate addressed by ongoing research	–	low	low
	3	Monitoring of IRSL dating	yes	medium	Ongoing effort w/recent reports. Will initiate study of Onderdonk terrace ages	2027	low	high
	4	Strike-slip faulting along Los Osos trend	yes	medium (seismotectonics), low (Morro Bay subsidence)	Multifaceted research program underway, including USGS CRADA	Reports by 2027	unknown, likely low	medium
Geodetic modeling	5	GPS modeling	yes	medium	Initiating geodetic research program to address SRT recommendations 5-7	TBD	unknown	medium
	6	Fault kinematic/mechanical modeling						
	7	Transpression ratio						
	8	Rinconada and Huasna slip rates	yes	medium	Initiating project with literature review and site evaluations; partner with academics and graduate student(s)	Plans by 12/26, ~3 yr study	unknown	low
SSC modeling	9	SSC sensitivity analysis	yes	high	Developing sensitivity source model (SSM) as evaluation platform for SRT-recommended model changes	SSM operational by 6/26, SRT FGM tested in 2026	unknown	medium

Recommendation #1

The SRT recommends the development of a set of kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults underlying the Irish Hills that can explain the folding observed since 5 Ma.

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Unknown (PG&E), medium (SRT)*
- **Project status:** *Expanded LTSP goal; new research focused on eastern Pismo Basin*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 3 yr*

SRT comments

1. Outcrop exposures from west to east along the Irish Hills provide valuable information to constrain SWBZ fault geometry at different structural depths within deformed Pismo basin
2. SRT therefore endorses additional research on eastern Pismo Basin where there are more abundant subsurface data and opportunities to use stream terraces as deformation markers
3. SRT encourages continued work on understanding Morro Bay subsidence and tilting of Memorial Terrace to understand uplift north of Irish Hills to constrain deep SWBZ geometry

Recommendation #2

The SRT recommends dating of low-stand abrasion platforms offshore, south of the Irish Hills, to further constrain the rate of footwall subsidence and its contribution to the SWBZ slip rate.

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *No*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium (ongoing research) to low (direct platform dating)*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Low (PG&E), low (SRT)*
- **Project status:** *Dating infeasible; subsidence rate addressed in ongoing research*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 3 yr*

SRT comments

1. Constraining footwall subsidence is important for understanding complete rate of slip across the SWBZ, including San Luis Bay fault, Oceano fault and Los Berros fault
2. A missing subsidence component may be indicated by the difference between 0.50 ± 0.10 mm/yr long-term slip rate and 0.29 ± 0.07 mm/yr slip rate from marine terrace uplift
3. SRT recommendation to date low-stand abrasion platforms need not involve direct sampling. Stratigraphic constraints on low-stand platform position and stability would be sufficient

Recommendation #3

The SRT recommends monitoring of IRSL-dating efforts and reassessment, if necessary, of the MIS 5 age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces surrounding the Irish Hills.

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Low (PG&E), high (SRT)*
- **Project status:** *Ongoing effort; initiating study of Onderdonk terrace ages*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 2 yr*

SRT comments

1. Recently presented IRSL results from Cayucos proposed younger dates for Q1 and Q2 terraces that would substantially increase hazard
2. Newly published U-series dates and author reevaluation of IRSL results shows that existing MIS 5 age assignments are correct
3. Dr. Oskin is willing to participate as an advisor to new work to re-date Orcutt formation to test high slip rate estimates for Casmalia Hills thrust

Recommendation #4

The SRT recommends further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its impacts on the pattern of marine-terrace uplift.

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium (seismotectonics), low (Morro Bay subsidence)*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Unknown but likely low (PG&E), medium (SRT)*
- **Project status:** *Multifaceted research program underway, including USGS CRADA*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 3 yr, new reports by 2027*

SRT comments

1. SRT endorses renewed focus on offshore and onshore evidence for strike-slip faulting along Los Osos trend
2. Updated study of strike-slip/dip-slip strain partitioning along the Los Osos trend using observed seismic source mechanisms will further address this recommendation
3. Understanding Morro Bay subsidence and tilting of Memorial Terrace are both important for constraining geometry of SWBZ at depth, especially the dip of lower fault section

Recommendations #5-7 (Geodetic Studies)

- #5 *PG&E should follow up SRT's preliminary work with a more complete study of the available GPS data.*
- #6 *The fault slip models that underlie the DCPD SSC should be developed into kinematic and mechanical models that can predict the interseismic deformation and can thus be directly tested against the GPS data.*
- #7 *PG&E should compute the relative contributions of strike-slip and reverse faulting to the regional deformation predicted by the SS C24 slip models and compare the values with the geodetic constraints*

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Unknown (PG&E), medium (SRT)*
- **Project status:** *Initiating geodetic research project within the LTSP*
- **Project timeline:** *TBD (PG&E), ~3 yr (SRT)*

SRT comments

1. Much to be done, but PG&E can leverage existing geodetic datasets
2. Should follow overall NSHM approach: multiple models based on different methods
3. Dr. Marshall is willing to participate; may require other researchers

Recommendation #8

Geologic slip-rate information should be acquired from the Rinconada and Huasna faults to permit better modeling of the shear component evident in the GPS data

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *Medium*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Unknown (PG&E), low (SRT)*
- **Project status:** *Initiating literature review & site studies; seek academic partners*
- **Project timeline:** *~ 3 yr, plans by 12/26*

SRT comments

1. PG&E's increase in the priority of this topic recognizes its potential to improve geodetic modeling
2. SRT agrees that the potential hazard impact at DCPD is low but that these slip rates are needed to properly characterize the regional geodetic deformation
3. Identifying, mapping, and dating of slip-rate sites will require multiple years to complete; literature review and site assessments are a logical first step

Recommendation #9

PG&E should conduct modeling experiments to ascertain the sensitivity of DCPH hazard to the SSC modifications recommended by the SRT.

- **Endorsed by PG&E:** *Yes*
- **PG&E/LTSP priority:** *High*
- **Potential hazard impact:** *Unknown (PG&E), medium (SRT)*
- **Project status:** *Developing sensitivity source model (SSM) as computational platform for sensitivity analyses*
- **Project timeline:** *SSM operational by 6/26, SRT FGM tested in 2026*

SRT comments

1. SRT agrees with PG&E that hazard sensitivity analyses of the SSC are seldom straightforward because they can involve adjustments of many model elements
2. We strongly endorse development of the SSM software, which should facilitate the hazard sensitivity studies recommended by the SRT
3. The SSM will be focused on faults closest to the plant; SRT looks forward to examining the implementation details

PG&E Supplemental Response to DCISC Requests

1. DCISC request: Supplement PG&E response to include information sufficient for the SRT to evaluate the technical adequacy of the response.
 - ***Information in the PG&E supplemental response was adequate for a preliminary assessment of PG&E's plans to address the SRT recommendations***
2. DCISC request: Respond to each of the nine recommendations individually, stating whether PG&E agrees that the Committee's recommendation for action by PG&E is warranted.
 - ***PG&E responded to each recommendation and agrees that further action is warranted on all nine recommendations***
 - Recommendations #1-#4, #9 are currently being address by on-going research
 - Recommendations #5-#8 will be addressed by new or expanded research projects
3. DCISC request: Evaluate which recommendations have the potential to make a significant impact on the hazard or have the potential to raise potentially significant uncertainties
 - ***Largely unknown; full evaluation will require results from planned sensitivity studies***

Overall Evaluation of PG&E Supplemental Response

- SRT generally agrees with the preliminary response plans put forward by PG&E but notes several areas where the plans could be clarified and refined
 1. LTSP research priorities
 2. PG&E's initial rejection of Recommendation 2
 3. Assessment of impacts of proposed research on hazard estimates
 4. Preliminary nature of this review

Overall Evaluation of PG&E Supplemental Response

1. LTSP Research Priorities

- PG&E assigns a medium priority to research on reverse faulting beneath the Irish Hills and gives higher priority to GMC uncertainty, Hosgri hazard, and SSC time-dependence
 - Dr. Madugo has noted that the “uncertainties for GMC items are much larger than for the SSC items.”
- Priorities based on declared epistemic uncertainties as depicted in “tornado diagrams”
- Do not account for undeclared epistemic uncertainties (ontological uncertainties), which can produce unmodeled, but potentially consequential, surprises
 - Ontological uncertainties describe the errors that can occur when a model’s full quantification of uncertainty, both aleatory and epistemic, fails to capture the actual behavior of the real-world system
- The SRT speculates that ontological uncertainties of the SSC might be more consequential than those of the GMM. LTSP prioritization should consider this possibility
 - An example of an ontological error in the DCPD SSC would be the occurrence of a very large ($M \geq 7.5$) thrust earthquake on the SWBZ. Such an event is assigned zero probability in the current SSC

Overall Evaluation of PG&E Supplemental Response

2. PG&E's initial rejection of R2 (dating of offshore low-stand abrasion platforms)

- Motivating hypothesis: *The difference between the 5-Ma and 120-ka rates of slip on the SWBZ can be explained by offshore subsidence.*
 - SRT: Existing data do not favor the subsidence hypothesis, but more rigorous testing would increase our confidence in the SWBZ slip rates
 - PG&E: Direct dating of the offshore abrasion platforms is not feasible, but constraints on subsidence can be obtained from existing high-resolution marine surveys
- SRT agrees with PG&E that the subsidence hypothesis can be tested, and probably rejected, through further analysis of existing high-resolution marine surveys
 - PG&E plans to conduct such tests and will thus address R2

Overall Evaluation of PG&E Supplemental Response

3. Impacts on hazard estimates

- The potential impacts include:
 - a. Changes to mean hazard values
 - b. Changes to the epistemic uncertainties of those values
 - c. Validation or rejection of alternative models
- PG&E and SRT assessments of the potential hazard impacts are different
 - PG&E assessments are conservative: actual impacts for 7 of the 9 are listed as unknown
 - SRT assigns potential impacts to be low (R2, R8), medium (R1, R4, R5, R9), and high (R3)
- R3 example: monitoring of IRSL age dating
 - SRT recognizes that proposed IRSL-based age assignments, if correct, would have a high impact on DCPH hazard; i.e., claims that the potential impact (pre-test) is high
 - Based on recent research, PG&E discounts the possibility that the proposed IRSL age reassignments are correct; i.e., claims that the actual impact (post-test) will be low

Overall Evaluation of PG&E Supplemental Response

4. Preliminary nature of this review

- PG&E's *preliminary* response to the DCISC/SRT recommendations included sufficient information for a *preliminary* evaluation of the planned response
 - PG&E has put forward *preliminary* plans to address all nine of the SRT recommendations
- Examples of PG&E initiatives now underway:
 - PG&E is developing a new geodetic modeling program to address R5-R7, but the details are not yet available
 - PG&E is testing a new Sensitivity Source Model (SSM) as the computational platform for sensitivity analyses recommended in R9 and will begin these analyses later this year
- Additional technical information will be needed for a full review of the PG&E response plan after the plan's elements have been fleshed out as components of the LTSP

End

PG&E Long-Term Seismic Program Update Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Commission Public Meeting June 16, 2026

Maureen Zawalick, Senior Vice President and Chief Risk Officer




Chris Madugo, Geosciences Department Geologist

Seismic Safety Presentation Outline

- Overview of seismic studies for Diablo Canyon Power Plant
- Review of DCISC Seismic Review Team (SRT) recommendations
- Long Term Seismic Program (LTSP) research priorities and how actions to address SRT research recommendations fit into the LTSP
- Progress report on research and assessments that address SRT recommendations

Diablo Canyon Seismic Safety Timeline





DCPP Seismic Safety: Long Term Seismic Program

Long Term Seismic Commitment to Safety

- Seismic safety has been a top priority of PG&E since before Diablo Canyon began operations
- Performed additional, extensive seismic research upon discovery of Hosgri fault
- PG&E committed to the NRC, as an operating license condition, to develop a Long-Term Seismic Program (LTSP) and continue the research as long as Diablo Canyon operates
- Geosciences department staffed with experts in geology, geophysics, seismological and seismic engineering
- Installed a regional seismic network connected with data shared to the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
- Partnership with academia and leading seismic experts



Research Partner Agencies and Institutions



University of Nevada, Reno



IMPERIAL



UNIVERSITY of NEBRASKA
LINCOLN

THE UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS
AT AUSTIN



Caltech




LAMONT-DOHERTY EARTH OBSERVATORY
COLUMBIA CLIMATE SCHOOL



Geosyntec
consultants



GeoPentech
Geotechnical & Geoscience Consultants



M
MOTT
MACDONALD



UC DAVIS
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA



Berkeley
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA



USC University of
Southern California



UCLA ENGINEERING

B. John Garrick Institute for the Risk Sciences

Continuous Process as Condition of NRC License to Operate

- Ongoing reviews and updates on seismic safety provided to the DCISC in both fact finding and public meetings (approximately 10 times per year)
- DCISC recommendations part of ongoing research for DCPP seismic safety
- Updates provided to the CPUC Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP), including input of recommendations for future research and analysis

LTSP Ongoing Research

- Ongoing NRC license requirement
- Maintain, monitor, and evaluate Central Coast Seismic Network (CCSN) with instruments on and around plant site
- Earthquake Source studies onshore and offshore
- Participation in advanced research with the USGS, Southern California Earthquake Center, University Research and PH.D studies
- Advancing Ground Motion Research (Non-ergodic ground motion models and core sciences)
- Continued Evaluation of new techniques and technologies including
 - o Time dependent hazard
 - o Independent testing of Ground Motion Models (precariously balanced rocks)
 - o Advances in fault mapping
 - o Next generation fault displacement models

CPUC Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP)

- Established in 2010 to review studies performed under Assembly Bill (AB)1632
- IPRP has issued 16 reports that reviewed previous studies and made recommendations for ongoing research
- Report 16 focused on the SB846 Seismic Update and provided recommendations for future considerations under the LTSP
- IPRP members attend various LTSP technical meetings and field visits
- Update in Fall 2026 at IPRP public meeting



DCPP Seismic Safety Key Takeaways

Seismic Safety and an Update to the DCISC Recommendations

- We are committed to maintaining the seismic safety for Diablo Canyon
- LTSP ensures plant seismic safety as a "living program" keeping abreast of new seismic knowledge, models, regional earthquakes and performing sensitivity evaluations for potential hazard impacts
- Because of LTSP, Diablo Canyon is the most seismically studied region in the U.S.
- We're never done - continuous investment and ongoing research

R1 Develop kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults beneath the Irish Hills

R2 Date low-stand abrasion platforms to constrain footwall subsidence and its contribution to SWBZ slip rate

R3 Monitor IRSL dating efforts and reassess, if necessary, MIS 5 age assignments for Q1 and Q2 terraces

R4 Further investigate strike slip faulting along Los Osos trend and pattern on marine terrace uplift




Figure 5-38. Hosgri Fault Slip Rate Sites (from PG&E, 2015a, Figure 8-13)

Review of DCISC SRT Recommendations


Geodetic Modeling

R5 Follow up on SRT's preliminary work with more complete study of GPS

R6 Develop slip models for faults that underlie DCPD into kinematic and mechanical models that can be tested against GPS

R7 Compute relative contributions of strike slip and reverse faulting and compare to geodetic constraints

R8 Geologic slip-rate information should be acquired from the Rinconada and Huasna faults to improve modeling of the shear evident in the GPS data



SSC Modeling

R9 Conduct modeling experiments to ascertain sensitivity of DCPD hazard to SSC modifications recommended by the SRT




Figure 5-38. Hosgri Fault Slip Rate Sites (from PG&E, 2015a, Figure 8-13)

Improve seismic hazard models for DCPD using advancements in earthquake science developed in collaboration with the United States Geological Survey and seismic experts from academia and industry



Seismic researchers learning about LTSP as part of a June 2026 workshop by the Statewide California Earthquake Center to improve earthquake modeling

- Tornado plots highlight where research can reduce uncertainty in hazard models
- LTSP research focuses on parameters at the top of the tornado




Figure 6-5. Tornado plot for DCPD for the SSC, GMC, and site response models for the 5 Hz frequency and the 1×10^{-5} hazard level. The size of the symbols is proportional to the logic tree weight assigned to each branch.

- Ground Motion Models
- Site Response
- Hosgri Fault Slip Rates
- **San Luis Pismo Block Faults Slip Rates (SRT Focus Area)**
- Time Dependence
- **San Luis Pismo Block Fault Geometries (SRT Focus Area)**





Figure 6-5. Tornado plot for DCPD for the SSC, GMC, and site response models for the 5 Hz frequency and the 1×10^{-5} hazard level. The size of the symbols is proportional to the logic tree weight assigned to each branch.

San Luis Pismo Block Faults Slip Rates



San Luis Pismo Block Fault Geometries





Figure 6-5. Tornado plot for DCPD for the SSC, GMC, and site response models for the 5 Hz frequency and the 1×10^{-5} hazard level. The size of the symbols is proportional to the logic tree weight assigned to each branch.

R1: Develop Kinematically Constrained Structural Models

Plan: 2026 research focus on data compilation southeast of Irish Hills and establishing academic or USGS partnerships to improve existing models or develop defensible alternative models

Update:

- Scoping for data compilation effort complete
- Discussions with candidate modeling teams progressing
- Plan to develop manuscript on PG&E fault geometry models



Update:

- Manuscripts on both datasets in progress
- Will review recommendation R2 with external expert reviewers once manuscripts complete



Plan: Sponsor research to test unexpected Santa Ynez River and coastal terrace ages in Santa Maria Basin using alternative Quaternary dating methods

Update:

- California State University Long Beach and San Jose State University funded to evaluate terrace ages
- New IRSL and alternative dating method samples collected in May
- Michael Oskin (UC Davis; former SRT) and PG&E Geosciences personnel observed field work




Sample collection for IRSL and cosmogenic dating of Late Quaternary deposits in the Santa Maria Valley

Plan: Develop technical report on legacy stream-channel offset analysis from 2012 SSHAC

Update:

Lettis Consultants International funded to document 2012 research findings; ongoing work




Extent of 2012 mapping and offset stream analysis along Los Osos fault

Recommendations 5, 6, 7: Geodetic Modeling

Plan: Collaborate with Dr. Scott Marshall (Appalachian State; former SRT), along with peer review from an independent expert, to accomplish tasks outlined in SRT geodetic Recommendations 5 through 7

Update:

- Scoped out a three year research plan with Dr. Marshall to develop local geodetic deformation models for comparison with geologic slip rates
- Year one plan (2026):
 - Develop new GPS dataset
 - Produce 3D model of faults around DCPD based on existing PG&E fault geometry models




GPS Velocities for Central Coast (Zeng, 2022); utilizes stations from LTSP sponsored Central Coast GPS station network

R8: Acquire Slip Rate Information for the Rinconada and Huasna Faults

Plan: Complete initial literature review, geomorphic site assessment, and logistics evaluation to determine study feasibility

Update: To date, PG&E Geosciences completed:

- Literature review; identified no Late Quaternary slip rates [highlights data need]
- Desktop assessment by PG&E geologist of >200 potential slip rate study sites in Rinconada, Huasna, other faults
- Field reconnaissance of 8 sites, partnering with Dr. Kim Blisniuk (San Jose State); observed by Dr. Mike Oskin (UC Davis; former SRT) and Dr. Gordon Seitz (CGS, IPRP); Dr. Thomas Rockwell (External reviewer)



Potential slip rate study sites



Researchers standing on Rinconada fault

R9: Ascertain the Sensitivity of DCPD Hazard to the SRT SSC Modifications

Plan: As part of the hazard sensitivity analyses, PG&E will explore alternative fault geometry models and assess the potential for each to impact mean hazard.

Update:


Sensitivity model review ongoing. Model progress and initial sensitivity shown in the following slides:

Sensitivity Source Logic Tree


- Simplification of the complex DCCP seismic source logic tree
- Diagnostic tool for quick evaluation of the relative impact on hazard due to changes in fault attributes
- Following slides show:
 - Full logic tree vs simplified logic tree
 - San Luis Bay fault sensitivity (fault dip)

- Graphical display of the attributes of active faults that contribute to the seismic hazard
- Logic tree form (structure) shows the model complexity. Each path through a logic tree represents a possible “true” model for calculating the seismic hazard
- The number of paths through a logic tree is an indicator of the model complexity


DCPP Seismic Source Model Logic Tree 2015-2025



DCPP Seismic Source Model Logic Tree 2015-2025




Full Hosgri H85 Logic Tree 2015-2025




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Full SW Model Logic Tree, 2015-2025




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SLPB SW Vergent Model




Full Seismic Source
Model:
28,307,070
Hosgri+SLPB
combinations

Simplified Seismic Source Model Logic Tree



Simplified Logic Tree 2026



Hosgri:

82 Combinations (1% of full model)

SW:



10 Combinations (1% of full model)

Total:

2,460 Combinations (0.01% of full)

Example of Sensitivity Logic Tree Use


SRT Interpretation of San Luis Bay fault: 38° Dip



SRT Report (2025)

Sensitivity: San Luis Bay Fault Dip and Slip Rate Adjustments Hazard Ratios

Parameter	PG&E 2025 Update	SRT Sensitivity	Change
Fault Dip	46°	38°	-8°
Uplift Rate, Mean (mm/yr)	0.18	0.18	0%
Dip Slip Rate, Mean (mm/yr)	0.25	0.29	+16%




Notes:

- Basecase is the total Hosgri+SW model.
- A slip rate adjustment is required because it is a function of the measured uplift (vertical) rate. See PG&E (2015).
- Shapes of Hazard Ratio curves are different because the percent contribution from the San Luis Bay fault to the total changes based on ground motion amplitude

Internal

Sensitivity: San Luis Bay Fault Dip and Slip Rate Adjustments Ground Motion Ratios

Annual Exceedance Probability	Equivalent Mean Return Period (yr)	Ground Motion Ratio, SRT Sensitivity to 2026 SW Basecase	Change
1×10^{-3}	1,000	1.02	+2%
1×10^{-4}	10,000	1.01	+1%
1×10^{-5}	100,000	1.01	+1%
1×10^{-6}	1,000,000	1.005	+0.5%



Notes:

-Sensitivity case to the 2025 weighted baseline model results in no increase in ground motions at 10^{-4} to 10^{-6} hazard levels.

Conclusions

- SRT recommendations addressed through collaborative LTSP research
- Partnership with USGS, academia and industry, including in-house expertise, and review by external experts
- Commitment of continuous research to ensure safe operations

QUESTIONS?

Thank You

Maureen Zawalick, Senior Vice President and Chief Risk Officer

Chris Madugo, Geosciences Department Geologist



Purpose, Organization, and Status of Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) Programs at DCP

June 16, 2026



Nathan Barber, Supervisor, Risk and Regulatory Initiatives

Albert Kottke, PG&E Geosciences Consultant

- Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) background
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) program overview
- PRA impact assessments
 - Operational
 - Design Change
 - Hazard
- Results of Seismic Sensitivity Assessment
- Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) process



DCPP SPRA Background

The original DCP SPRA was completed in 1988 and supported the original LTSP license condition for operation

Major SPRA update/upgrade completed in 2018 and submitted to NRC as part of 50.54(f) Fukushima response


- SSHAC Level III PSHA update
- New Foundation Input Response Spectra (FIRS) developed
- Screening and Walkdowns performed
- New structural models developed
- All fragilities updated
- Plant logic model updated
 - Updated Human Reliability Analysis
 - Contact Chatter Analysis
 - PRA Quantification
- Peer review process completed

Hazard Scope

- Internal Events (Loss of Coolant Accidents, Reactor Trip, etc.)
- Internal Flooding
- Internal Fires
- Seismic
- All other hazards screen out using ASME/ANS standard guidance

High Level Model Scope

- DCCP has Level 1 and Level 2 PRAs
- Level 1 PRAs assess core damage frequency (CDF)
- Level 2 Assesses Large Early Release Frequency (LERF)



DCPP PRA Program Overview

DCPP's PRA program has the following scope:

- DCPD Procedures TS3.NR1 and AWP E-028 provide guidance on maintaining, updating and upgrading the DCPD PRA model
- Internal, Seismic, Fire and Flooding hazards are assessed
- Maintenance of PRA model (review and incorporation of design, operational and methodological changes)
- Development and update of risk informed applications
- Assurance of PRA model technical adequacy


The Seismic PRA program is maintained as part of the overall PRA program. Main inputs include:

- Changes to operational assumptions
- Changes to seismic hazard
- Potential design changes that may impact fragility analyses for components or structures are evaluated prior to implementing changes

Impact of Operational Changes

PRA models consist of:

- Event Trees to describe accident sequences
- Fault Trees to describe system function and estimate reliability
- Data – used for initiating event frequency, component failure probabilities, testing and maintenance duration and frequency etc.
- Quantification – combines output from fault trees and event trees to estimate event probability



Impact to Fragility Analyses

Each design change at DCCP is assessed for impact to the PRA program including the SPRA


- CF3.ID9, “Design Change Development,” describes the process for design change development and review
- CF3.ID9 contains guidance for LTSP impact review—
Considerations include:
 - Is the replacement like-for-like? Does the test response spectra for the replacement component envelop spectra for the original component?
 - Modifications to seismically rugged components such as:
 - o Manual valves
 - o Check valves
 - o Strainers, etc.

New information is used to develop an updated hazard that is compatible for use in the SPRA:

- Geosciences develops hazard and provides new information to the DCCP PRA group
- The DCCP PRA model is re-quantified using the updated hazard information



Results of Hazard Sensitivity

- Using the modified hazard results, CDF increase is less than 1E-05/yr.
- The total CDF and LERF for DCCP remains in Region II (changes in risk of less than 1E-05/yr are allowed in this region)
- Structure and component fragility importance results (both Fussell-Vesely and RAW) were compared to the baseline case
- No significant change in structure or component importance was identified – all less than 5% change




SSHAC Process for Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA)

- PSHA requires considering alternatives and using judgment
- The NRC SSHAC process was developed to ensure rigor, quality, and that decisions were properly documented
- SSHAC process is followed for hazard studies at DCPP and other PG&E facilities



From NRC NUREG-2213:

The essence of the SSHAC process is the structured interaction among experts to achieve a well-documented hazard study that captures the center, body, and range of technically defensible interpretations



Under NRC/SSHAC principles, sensitivities are not a substitute for epistemic uncertainty modeling; they are a diagnostic and decision-support tool used to:

- Understand drivers of hazard and risk
- Evaluate impact of new information or model changes
- Support graded decision-making
- Guide model refinement and simplification

Roles and Responsibilities Within SSHAC Process

DCISC raised a question about the Participatory Peer Review Panel Chair ensuring only consensus opinions are included in the report:

- This is enforced through the SSHAC process structure via role separation and documentation requirements
- It requires that team members:
 - understand the SSHAC process,
 - their roles with the project, and
 - follow the SSHAC process
- Experience and past performance are important in developing a SSHAC team



Continued Work of the Long-Term Seismic Program

- PG&E is committed to seismic safety through our Long-Term Seismic Program
- We collaborate with researchers to advance:
 - Techniques for modeling earthquake ground motions
 - Understanding of seismic sources
 - Databases used in seismic hazard studies
- Research feeds data and models into SSHAC PSHA for continuous assessment
- Sensitivity analyses conducted during this research do not replace the SSHAC process, rather inform ongoing studies

QUESTIONS?

Thank You

Nathan Barber, Supervisor, Risk and Regulatory Initiatives

Albert Kottke, PG&E Geosciences Consultant





Per F. Peterson, Member, with Richard St. Onge and Lisa Darden, Consultants

- 1. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspector**
- 2. Meet with DCCP Officers**
- 3. Station Update**
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- 10. Crane Program**



Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors

- **Items Discussed Included:**
 - **Recent flashover event occurring on the DCPD Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer (SUT)**
 - **Confirmed NRC presentation for the June 2026 Public Meeting**
 - **NRC approval of significant revisions to Reactor Oversight Process**
 - **NRC consideration of additional organizational changes in the Agency**

Conclusion: The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspectors was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.



Meet with DCPD Officer

- The Fact-Finding Team met with Adam Peck, Site Vice President.
- The group discussed the Fact-Finding agenda and other issues of mutual interest.

Conclusion: The regular meetings with DCPD Officers and Directors continued to be beneficial for both organizations.



Station Update

- The Fact-Finding team (FFT) was provided with additional information on the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar flashover event and the repair options under discussion. The vendor was able to provide replacement busbars within the equipment out of service time limits.
- DCCP has instituted Circulating Water Tunnel cleaning during weekends rather than during the work week. The system power demand during the weekend is lower than the weekday. Each reactor must reduce power by 50% during cleaning.
- During the time FFT Team was onsite, an Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Assist Visit was underway. The Assist Visit was conducted by successful project managers from across the U.S. nuclear fleet, focusing on Long Term Critical Projects. The assist visit was a strategic move to improve station project planning and refocus on continued plant operation.



Station Update (continued)

Conclusion: DCPD's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.

Recommendations to the DCISC:

The DCISC should follow-up on the Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3A)

The DCISC should follow-up on the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3B)

The DCISC should follow up on reviewing the Long-Term Critical Projects for DCPD. This will be tracked on the DCISC's Open Items List under item number EN-21.



Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders

- DCPD has developed, tested, and prototyped the implementation of Dynamic Procedures (DP) for Operations equipment rounds.
- DPs show significant potential to reduce human errors.
- DPs ensure that conditions are met prior to advancing to the next step.
- DPs ensure automatic entry of recorded measurement data into the station's Data Historian, Notifications are created for off normal conditions
- Apple iPads are the preferred tablet technology since iPads do not require fan cooling, eliminating internal contamination from travel in radiation areas.
- NextAxiom software is used and supported by a robust Users Group.



Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders (continued)

Conclusion: DCPD's update of its Dynamic Procedure and Work Orders development was encouraging and is likely to reduce station equipment errors across all the work divisions. The DCISC should continue to review the development of Dynamic Procedures regularly.

Recommendation: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should remain open: “*Because expanded use of electronic procedures can enhance plant operational safety, subject to proper human systems integration, the DCISC should review this topic regularly.*” (D12/24FF3.2)



Craftsmanship Council Update

- **Craftsmanship Council is an initiative that empowers Station Craftsmen and Craftswomen to improve their daily work practices in a collaborative setting.**
- **The Council was introduced by the Maintenance Director after his positive observations of a similar initiative at the Wolf Creek plant.**
- **Council members are self governed and meet regularly to discuss work practices that have potential to be made more efficient and effective.**
- **The Council has undertaken the Pre-Job Brief (PJB), part of the stations Human Performance Tool box, as its first work practice improvement. The existing PJB tool had grown to 4 pages, creating an overly prescriptive set of precautions. The renewed PJB tool is now 1 page of precautions with the back page reflecting the INPO safe work practices.**



Craftsmanship Council Update (continued)

Conclusion: The actions the Maintenance Department was taking to drive continuous improvement through the Craftsmanship Council were a novel and well accepted process on site.

Recommendation:

The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *The DCISC should review the charter for the Maintenance Department's new Craftsmanship Council after its development is complete.*
(D12/15/25FF-3.1)

The DCISC should modify its Open Items List as follows: Add a new open item under Conduct of Maintenance (CM) for periodic reviews of the work of the Craftsmanship Council. The next such review should be performed within the next calendar year.



Equipment Reliability Program

- Members of the DCCP Equipment Reliability (ER) Program provided context on the license renewal approval and its impact on future project cost benefits in a 5–and 20–year span. Projects may not be cost beneficial (CB) in a 5–year operating analysis yet may be CB for a 20–year plan.
- Currently the ER program is focusing on three aspects:
 - Life Cycle Management Plans
 - Long–Range Asset Management Plans
 - Critical Spares Inventory
- The FFT discussed the potential of having Artificial Intelligence (AI) assist in monitoring equipment and performing analysis to identify early equipment degradation. Maintenance practices may need to be updated.



Equipment Reliability Program (continued)

Conclusion: The DCCP Equipment Reliability Program was healthy and had appropriate leadership engagement and team involvement to successfully manage the short- and long-term condition of the station's equipment, while minimizing risk.

Recommendations:

DCISC should re-visit the Equipment Reliability Program in 6 – 12 months to obtain more details concerning Long Term Projects planned by the Station. This can be monitored under Open Item List EN-21.

The DCISC should modify its Open Items List Item PI-3 to include the monitoring and use of AI to develop plant initiatives that improve plant equipment reliability.



Walkthrough of Dynamic Procedures (continued)

- DCISC had an open recommendation that a Member participate in a Walkthrough of Dynamic Procedures (DP). The FFT attended the walkthrough, the following are observations of the process.
- The Operator Rounds procedure was used to demonstrate the capabilities of this new, interactive Procedure tool.
 - The Operator performed steps in the procedure, including incorrect steps, to show the procedure software system response.
 - While data is collected it is analyzed, if the data was out of normal range, Notifications were issued automatically. Operator proficiency can be monitored and tracked and used to ensure everyone on shift is competent for conducting Rounds.
 - Operators can take pictures and record sounds if they find equipment acting unusual and transmit that data back to the system for further review. The preferred device for the Dynamic Procedures is the iPad, as the tablets can be brought into Rad Areas.



Walkthrough of Dynamic Procedures (continued)

Conclusion: The Dynamic Procedures under development at DCPD are currently being tested by the Station Procedure Writers and the results to date show promise of significant improvement in human error reductions and Operator proficiency in the execution of Operator Rounds.

Recommendations:

The following DCISC open item was reviewed during this meeting and can be closed:
The DCISC should schedule an observation of electronic procedure usage in the plant during the next FFM of which Member Per F. Peterson is a participant.
(D12/15/25FF-3.14)

The following should be entered in the DCISC Open Item List item PI-2. *“The other two Members of the DCISC (Drs. Meshkati and Scarlet) should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during future FFM’s.”*



Craftsmanship Council Interviews with Craft Members

- The Craftsmanship Council membership has grown significantly since its inception. According to the craft members, all of the shops on site are now participating in the monthly Council meetings. Early participation was small but has grown significantly.
- Craft members are very upbeat on the establishment of the Council, and many of them are relieved that both DCPP Units were relicensed recently. It appears many of them feel they can contribute to making things better at the plant now that the plant has an extended license in hand. They seem to have put the uncertain past behind them and are ready to move on to making DCPP a better place to work.
- The Craftsmanship Council is largely self-governed; this gives them a good feeling that Management will let their discussions and debates remain in the Council until a consensus is reached. Any member can join the Council and can contribute or critique changes that are proposed by the members.



Craftsmanship Council Interviews with Craft Members (continued)

Conclusions: The meeting with the Craftsmanship Council was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue periodically to attend the Council meetings.



Nuclear Insurance

- **DCISC met with DCPD's Nuclear Insurance Programs personnel.**
- **There were no substantial Insurance findings open at DCPD at this time from the last May 2024 insurance inspection.**
- **The industry continues to; identify areas of potential claims, collate the specific events, and estimate cost/benefit factors for mitigation actions.**
- **The mitigation actions maybe incorporated into the insurance policy as suggestions or recommendations. Suggestions are optional, while recommendations tend to be mandatory.**



Nuclear Insurance (continued)

Conclusion: Property and equipment insurance policies continued to be properly maintained by PG&E, and the results of the 2022 inspection by the insurer found no major deficiencies and no deficiencies are expected from the upcoming Insurance Inspections.

Recommendation: The DCISC should follow-up on the results of the Insurance Inspections to be conducted in mid-2026. This recommendation should be captured in the DCISC Open Items List item number NS-10.



Crane Program

- The DCISC last reviewed the Crane Program at the December 2021 FFM.
- DCCP provided the FFT with a written response to facilitate its assessment of the site's Crane Program. The following documents were reviewed:
 - Control of Heavy Loads Procedure; Follows NRC NUREG 0612 requirements for Heavy Loads
 - Crane Operating Restrictions Procedure; Complies with or implements commitments to NUREG 0612
 - Rigging and Load Handling Procedure; Ensures Heavy Loads are restricted over in use safety related equipment
 - UFSAR – Chapters 9 and 13
 - Notifications, Certifications, Qualifications, Scheduling, and NRC Crane Compliance

Conclusions: The station continued to maintain a robust Crane Program, and PG&E properly addressed maintenance issues to remain compliant with the NRC commitments regarding control of heavy loads.



Per F. Peterson, Member, with Richard St. Onge and Lisa Darden, Consultants

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Diablo Canyon Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Update on Multi-Purpose Canister Aging Management Inspections

Presented by:
Eric Brackeen

June 17, 2026



Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Generating Excellence

- Overview of Diablo Canyon (DC) Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
- HI-STORM 100SA Design
- Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) Aging Management Program (AMP)
- Aging Management Inspection Process and Status



Overview of DC ISFSI

- **Site-specific 10 CFR Part 72 License**
 - Original 20-year license was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3/22/2004.
 - On 6/20/2025, the NRC issued the renewed license for the DC ISFSI to allow its operation through March 22, 2064.
- **Holtec HI-STORM 100SA system**
 - Anchored cask design for seismic considerations.
 - PG&E has completed 8 loading campaigns and has 70 storage casks in service.



HI-STORM 100SA Design

Scale Model

- **MPC – houses the fuel (up to 32 assemblies)**
 - Integrally-welded pressure vessel
 - Includes an outer shell (0.5” thick), a lid (9.5” thick), and a base plate (2.5” thick)
 - Sits on pedestal within the overpack (fabricated as a metal-encased concrete disc, up to 16” thick)
- **Overpack – houses the MPC**
 - Made of 1” thick inner and outer concentric metal shells
 - provides approximately 30” of annular space that is filled with high density concrete
 - Includes a baseplate (2” thick), and a bolted lid (fabricated as a metal-encased concrete disc, up to 19” thick)

Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC)



MPC sits on pedestal

Overpack



MPC Aging Management Program

- The DC ISFSI MPC AMP requires visual inspection of the accessible external surface areas of the MPC within the storage overpack.
- The AMP is a condition monitoring program, implemented through inspection and trending, that ensures safety functions of the MPC are maintained.
 - Confinement
 - Structural Integrity
 - Radiation Shielding
 - Heat Transfer Functions
- The DC ISFSI AMP is consistent with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME*) Code Case N-860 and has been approved by the NRC.
 - Determines the site and MPC susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking
 - Performs screening exam, assessment exam (if required)
 - Sets scope and inspection frequency based on results and susceptibility
- A minimum of two (2) MPCs must be inspected at the DC ISFSI based on EPRI ISFSI Susceptibility Assessment Criteria (Technical Report 3002005371, Chapter 3).

*ASME is a not-for-profit membership organization that is known for setting codes and standards for mechanical applications. ASME conducts one of the world's largest technical publishing operations and holds numerous technical conferences and hundreds of professional development courses each year.

MPC Inspection Process


- **Accessibility**

- MPCs are accessible for inspection using remote robotic systems.
- Robotic system is deployed into the HI-STORM outlet vents and secures to the inner wall of the overpack.

- **Qualification**

- Remote inspections of the MPCs are performed per ASME Code Section XI, for VT-3 visual examinations.
 - Qualified and Calibrated Equipment
 - Certified Examiners

RTT Magnetic Crawler System



Inspection Set-up for Crawler System



MPC Inspection Process




MPC Aging Management Preparations

• Scope

- 2026 inspection will consist of eight (8) MPCs, like the pre-application inspections performed in 2021
- Temperature Measurements
- Surface Cleaning Demonstration

• Status

- Contract for Robotic equipment and operators is in place
- Procedures have been issued
- Work packages are nearing completion
- Inspections are scheduled for week of August 17th



Thank You

Eric Brackeen
Diablo Canyon Power Plant
Manager, Dry Fuel Storage & Decommissioning Projects



Capsule B Testing Results Update Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Commission Public Meeting June 17, 2026




Tom Jones, Sr. Dir., Regulatory, Environmental,
and Repurposing



Background: DCPD Unit 1 Capsule B

- PG&E complies with Federal regulations (10 CFR 50 Appendix H) that require a Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program for DCPD Units 1 and 2
 - Periodically removes the surveillance capsules that contain metallic specimens to test and analyze; confirms the reactor vessels continue to remain safe
 - Existing capsule data evaluations also demonstrate both Units meet reactor vessel integrity criteria for 60 years through 2045
- To support 60 years of operation:
 - Unit 1 Capsule B data for confirmatory purpose
 - Already removed four Unit 2 capsules; no additional data needed to confirm acceptability
- **Capsule B successfully removed on April 21, 2025 to confirm previous predictions are still valid**




Location of
Capsule B



Background: DCPP Unit 1 Capsule B

**Withdrawn
Capsule B**





DCPP Unit 1 Capsule B Testing and Analysis

- Capsule B contained weld and base metal specimens of the same heat # (batch) as the Unit 1 reactor vessel; also contained dosimetry and thermal monitors
- Rigorous testing conducted by Westinghouse per NRC-approved methods/standards
- Independent laboratory testing included over 50 specimens:
 - Charpy V-notch impact testing: over 45 specimens
 - *Measures material toughness (how metal will perform under stress – bend/deform or shatter)*
 - Tensile testing: 4 specimens
 - *Helps identify and quantify material characteristics used in analyses by understanding how the metal behaves when subjected to pulling forces*
 - Neutron dosimetry measurements
 - *Measures and calculates the absorbed dose of neutron radiation*
 - Thermal monitor examination
 - *Informs the maximum temperature experienced by the test specimens during irradiation*



DCPP Unit 1 Capsule B Testing and Analysis

- Testing data were analyzed by Westinghouse (industry expert) per NRC-approved methodologies:
 - Neutron exposure projections for 60 years of operation
 - Credibility evaluation to determine what NRC-approved methodology to apply
 - Determination of shift of temperatures from Charpy V-notch testing and decrease in upper shelf energy with a comparison to guidance predictions (i.e., are the actual results as-predicted)




DCPP Unit 1 Capsule B

Next Steps

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
W: Westinghouse Electric Corp.

- PG&E uses an established proceduralized process to review and accept the testing and analysis report from Westinghouse
 - Approved report will be submitted to NRC for independent review and confirmation
- Publicly available report will also be available to DCISC for independent review
- Future reactor vessel monitoring:
 - Periodically remove ex-vessel dosimetry to confirm the fluence projections
 - Periodic non-destructive examinations of reactor vessel to confirm material condition



* NRC regulations require results to be submitted no more than 18 months following withdrawal.

15 months

QUESTIONS?

Thank You

Tom Jones,

Sr. Director, Regulatory, Environmental, and Repurposing