

DIABLO CANYON
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE (“DCISC”)
(www.dcisc.org)

Committee Members: Dr. Najmedin Meshkati
Dr. Per F. Peterson
Dr. Raluca O. Scarlat

Tuesday & Wednesday
October 20-21, 2026
Avila Beach House

Point San Luis Room /Seaborn Ballroom
First and San Francisco Streets
Avila Beach, California

PUBLIC MEETING AGENDA

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PARTICIPATION

You may participate in the DCISC’s public meeting in person or in real-time by accessing the Zoom webinar meeting via the weblink and the webinar ID given above or by calling any of the phone numbers provided at the top of this agenda. Instructions on how to access, view and participate in remote meetings are also provided by visiting the DCISC’s home page at <http://www.dcisc.org>. Attendees can make oral comments or ask questions of the Committee Members during the webinar meeting by using the “Raise Your Hand” feature or by pressing *9 on your telephone keypad if joining by telephone only. If you are unable to participate in real-time, you may email to dcsafety@dcisc.org with the subject line “Public Comment Item#___” (insert the item number relevant to your comment) or “Public Comment – Non-Agenda Item.” Comments will be reviewed and distributed before the meeting if received by Noon on Monday, October 19, 2026. Comments received after that will be addressed during the item and/or at the end of the meeting. All comments received will be read into and become part of the record, subject to a time limit determined by the presiding officer. Subject to the requirements to publish an agenda in advance, the Committee will have the option to modify its actions on items based on comments received.

In accordance with the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act (CA Govt. Code §§11120 et seq.) and the Committee’s Policies, for each item on the Agenda the Committee reserves the right, at the discretion of the presiding officer, to limit the total amount of time allocated for public comment on particular issues and/or for each individual public commenter. A time limit for each public commenter will be announced during every session. For any public commenter(s) who previously requested and at the discretion of the presiding officer were granted additional time an announcement will be made at the beginning of the session. Public commenters will not be recognized more than once during public comments on matters not on the agenda or during consideration of an agenda item but may be called upon subsequently to respond to questions from the Committee. Public commenters may not cede time to other public commenters.

Morning Session – 10/20/2026 – 8:30 a.m.

I CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL

II INTRODUCTIONS AND COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

ADVISEMENT

The Committee may consider at any time requests to change the order of a listed agenda item. Information distributed to the Committee at a public meeting becomes part of the public record of the DCISC. A copy of written or electronic material, pictures, etc., must be provided to the Committee's Legal Counsel for this purpose. Those persons making public comments are requested and encouraged to provide copies of any prepared written materials or electronic media they intend to use in their remarks to the Legal Counsel's office prior to addressing remarks to the Committee and in sufficient time such that they may be distributed. Correspondence received and sent by the Committee is on file with the Office of the DCISC Legal Counsel and copies are available upon request. Devices for attendees who may be hearing impaired are available upon request. The meeting will be webcast in real time. Fourth Restated Charter provisions and protocol for addressing remarks to the Committee will be reviewed by Counsel.

III PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. (The public may comment on any matter listed on the morning's Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee.) *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced at the beginning of this session. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

IV INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE I

Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee of PG&E:

- 1) Presentation by PG&E on the State of the Plant Update Including Organizational Changes, Significant Past and Future Plant Activities, Power History, Scope and Status of Unit 1 Refueling Outage 1R26, Significant Equipment Issues, Significant Human Performance Issues, Significant Safety Culture Issues, and Other Station Activities and Industry Awards Received since the DCISC's June 2026 Public Meeting.
- 2) Presentation by PG&E on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation, Open Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Status of Cross-Cutting Issues Matrix, Current and Future License Amendment Requests, Effects of Recent NRC Inspection Program Changes on the Number and Composition of Inspections at DCP, and Other Significant Regulatory Issues/Requests.
- 3) Presentation by PG&E on Emergency Preparedness Department Update and Results of September 2026 Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise Including a Review of All Exercise Objectives and Their Results.

V DISCUSSION, DIRECTION AND ACTION, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE COMMITTEE, CONSULTANTS & COUNSEL

A) Review of Future Meeting Dates, Technical Consultant Contracts and Assignments, and Documents Provided to the Committee.

B) Closed Session, Personnel Matters – Government Code 11126.

VI ADJOURN MORNING SESSION

Afternoon Session – 10/20/2026 -1:15 p.m.

VII RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION

VIII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

IX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. (The public may comment on any matter listed on the afternoon's Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee.) *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced at the beginning of this session. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

X INFORMATION ITEM BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Informational Presentation Requested by the Committee of PG&E (Cont'd.):

- 4) Presentation by PG&E on the Purpose, Organization, and Status of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Programs at DCP

XI TECHNICAL CONSULTANT REPORTS; RECEIVE, APPROVE
AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E

- C) Consultant Mr. Richard McWhorter:
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and approval of
July 6-7, 2026, Fact Finding Report.
- D) Consultant Ms. Lisa Darden:
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and approval of
July 28-29, 2026, Fact Finding Report.

XII ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION

Evening Session – 10/20/2026 – 5:00 p.m.

XIII RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION

XIV COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

XV INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

XVI INFORMATION ITEM BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Informational Presentation Requested by the Committee of PG&E (Cont'd.):

- 5) Presentation by PG&E on the Results of the Analysis of Capsule B from
Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program.

XVII INFORMATION ITEMS PRESENTED BY THE COMMITTEE

- E) Consultant Dr. Mark Kirk Report on the Evaluation of PG&E's Results of the Analysis
of Capsule B from Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program.

- F) Member Dr. Raluca Scarlat Report on the Evaluation of PG&E's Results of the Analysis of Capsule B from Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program.

XVIII PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

The public may comment on any of the three Capsule B- related matters listed on the evening's Agenda immediately following the last matter considered by the Committee. Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only following comments on matters on the evening's agenda. *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced at the beginning of this session. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

XIX ADJOURN EVENING SESSION

Morning Session – 10/21/2026 – 8:30 a.m.

XX RECONVENE FOR MORNING SESSION

XXI COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

XXII PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

The public may comment on the matter listed on the morning's Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so following those comments. *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced after the presentation by the Committee. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

XXIII DISCUSSION, DIRECTION AND ACTION, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE COMMITTEE, CONSULTANTS & COUNSEL

- G) Committee Consideration of Performing Additional Reviews of Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Surveillance Test Program Results.

XXIV INFORMATION ITEM BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Informational Presentation Requested by the Committee of PG&E (Cont'd.):

- 6) Presentation by PG&E on the Results of Aging Management Inspections Conducted at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (Including Multi-Purpose Canisters) in Summer 2026.

XXV TECHNICAL CONSULTANT REPORT; RECEIVE, APPROVE AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT-FINDING REPORT TO PG&E

- H) Consultant Mr. Richard St. Onge:
Fact-finding Topics; Report on and approval of
June 29, August 18-19, and September 1-2, 2026, Fact Finding Report.

XXVI ADJOURN MORNING SESSION

Afternoon Session – 10/21/2026 – 1:15 p.m.

XXVII RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION

XXVIII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

XXIX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. (The public may comment on matters listed on the afternoon's Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee.) *There will be a time limit for each topic and/or speaker as designated by the presiding officer as announced at the beginning of this session. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item, but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.*

XXX DISCUSSION, DIRECTION AND ACTION, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE COMMITTEE, CONSULTANTS & COUNSEL

I) Review and Acceptance of Minutes of June 16 - 17, 2026, Public Meeting.

J) Review of Open Items List and Status of Recommendations.

K) Consultant Dr. Thomas H. Jordan, Report on the October 15, 2026, Meeting of the CPUC Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) for Seismic Studies of DCPD and Environs to Review the PG&E Reply to the IPRP Response to PG&E's 2024 Updated Seismic Assessment [issued on February 19, 2026].

L) Brief Remarks by San Luis Obispo County Supervisor and IPRP Member Dr. Bruce Gibson regarding the IPRP's October 15, 2026, Public Meeting.

M) Committee Regulatory, Administrative and Financial Matters, Public Outreach and Engagement, Interaction with Governmental Agencies Including the California Energy Commission and the IPRP, Consider Ratifying Contracts and Contracts Amendments with Committee Consultants, and Other Committee Discussion.

XXXI ACTION ITEMS

N) Approval of the DCISC 36th Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026.

O) Recognition of 30+ Years of Service - DCISC Technical Consultant Mr. R. Ferman Wardell, P.E and DCISC Legal Counsel Robert R. Wellington, Esq

XXXII CONCLUDING REMARKS & DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS OF FUTURE DCISC ACTIVITIES

P) Future Actions by the Committee.

Q) Further Information to Obtain/Review.

R) Confirmation of Future Site Visits, and Public Meetings.

XXXIII ADJOURNMENT OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEENTH PUBLIC MEETING

The Committee's policy is to schedule its public meetings in locations that are accessible to people with disabilities and to remain in compliance with state guidelines on prevention of communicable disease. Hand sanitizers and face coverings are available in the meeting room. The Avila Beach House Port San Luis/Seaborn Ballroom conference room is a wheelchair accessible facility. A person who needs a disability-related accommodation or modification, including hearing assistance, in order to participate in the meeting may make a request by contacting the DCISC office (in CA 800-439-4688 or (831) 647-1044) or by sending a written request to the DCISC office at P.O. Box 4523, Carmel-by-the-Sea, CA 93921-4523. Providing your request at least five business days before the meeting will help ensure availability of the requested accommodation.

PARKING – The Committee has arranged for the availability of a limited number of parking spaces including parking spaces for disabled persons in the parking lot located at 502 1st Street, Avila Beach, across the street from the meeting room.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:

October 20, 2026

AGENDA ITEM:

V-A

AGENDA TITLE:

Review of Future Meeting Dates,
Technical Consultant Contracts and
Assignments, and Documents Provided to
the Committee.

CONSENT []

ACTION [X]

INFORMATION [X]

Staff Summary: It is expected that the Committee Members will confirm and schedule future activities of the Committee during the remainder of 2026 and for 2027. The Members are also expected to discuss with the Technical Consultants the Consultants' assignments.

The actual and proposed DCISC fact finding and public meeting items, with key dates, prepared by Committee Consultant McWhorter is provided for your use in reviewing and planning Committee activities.

Attached for your information are copies of the transmittal memoranda which list the various documents provided to the Committee by PG&E since your last public meeting in June 2026.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate

DCISC FFPM (July 2026 – February 2028)

2026 – 2027 (37th Annual Report)

July 6-7, 2026, (Previously July 14-15) Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.1)

1. Dropped Control Rod Event Corrective Actions
2. Major Project Planning
3. Reports on 2025 Radiation Releases and Radioactive Environmental Monitoring
4. Observe Leadership Alignment Meeting
5. Condensate and Feedwater System Health
6. Station Update
7. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Report
8. Meet with DCPD Officer
9. Fire Protection Program and System Health
10. Safety-Related Fuse Failure
11. Observe Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee Meeting (Remote)

July 28-29, 2026, (Previously August 11-12) Fact-finding Meeting (NM, LAD, RFW) (AR Exhibit D.2)

1. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Report
2. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors
3. Meet with DCPD Officer
4. Walkthrough of DCPD Dynamic Procedures
5. Boric Acid Corrosion Control Update
6. Emergency Plan Drill Observation Pre-Drill Brief
7. Station Update
8. PG&E Employee Corporate Safety Culture Survey Results Review
9. Emergency Plan Drill Observation

June 28, August 18-19 and September 1-2, 2026, (Previously September 15-16) Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, RSO, GKK, TLS, MTK, ACK) (AR Exhibit D.3)

1. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Report
2. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Spent Fuel Canister Inspections
3. Westinghouse Issuance of 10 CFR Part 21 Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance
4. Spent Fuel Pool Arrangement and Expedited Transfer of Spent Fuel to the ISFSI
5. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspector
6. Meet with DCPD Officer
7. Flow Accelerated Corrosion
8. Station Update
9. 2026 Evaluated Emergency Preparedness Drill
10. Emergency Preparedness Meetings
11. Offsite Emergency Protective Action Measures
12. Public outreach – Interview with Local Radio Station
13. Corporate Safety Culture

October 20-21, 2026, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.3)

December 2-3, 2026, (Previously November) Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.4)

December 8-9, 2026, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, LAD) (AR Exhibit D.5)

January 20-21, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (NM, RSO, GKK) (AR Exhibit D.6)

February 23-24, 2027, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.6)

March 17-18, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, RSO) (AR Exhibit D.7)

April 20-21, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (NM, RDM) (AR Exhibit D.8)

May 11-12, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, *TBD*) (AR Exhibit D.9)

June 16-17, 2027, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.9)

2027 – 2028 (38th Annual Report)

July 12-13, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, RSO) (AR Exhibit D.1)

August 10-11, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (NM, *TBD*) (AR Exhibit D.2)

September 14-15, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, *TBD*) (AR Exhibit D.3)

October 19-20, 2027, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.3)

November *TBD*, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (ROS, *TBD*) (AR Exhibit D.4)

December *TBD*, 2027, Fact-finding Meeting (PFP, *TBD*) (AR Exhibit D.5)

January *TBD*, 2028, Fact-finding Meeting (NM, *TBD*) (AR Exhibit D.6)

February *TBD*, 2028, Public Meeting (AR Exhibit B.6)

DCPP Key Dates

NSOC Meetings (DCISC invited only to the two-hour exit meeting on the final days below)

- December 8, 2025 (Exit Mtg: 12/11/25) – *ROS observed as part of 12/2/25 FFM*
- August 10, 2026 (Exit Mtg: 8/13/2026) – *PFP observed as part of 7/28/26 FFM*
- November 30, 2026 (Exit Mtg: 12/3/26)
- February 22, 2027 (Exit Mtg: 2/25/27)
- June 28, 2027 (Exit Mtg: 7/1/27)
- October 18, 2027 (Exit Mtg: 10/21/27)

Refueling Outages

- 1R26 – Fall 2026, begins mid-October

- 2R26 – Spring 2027
- 1R27 – Spring 2028
- 2R27 – Fall 2028

Emergency Preparedness Exercises

- July 29, 2026 (State Participation Exercise, Unevaluated) – *NM observed as part of 7/28/26 FFM*
- September 2, 2026 (State Participation Exercise, Evaluated) – *ROS observed as part of 9/1/26 FFM*
- Summer 2028 (projected)

Abbreviations

Members: PFP=Per Peterson, NM=Najmedin Meshkati, ROS=Raluca Scarlat

Technical Consultants: RFW=Ferman Wardell, RDM=Rick McWhorter, LAD=Lisa Darden, RSO=Rich St. Onge

Specialty Consultants: ACK=Andy Kadak, MTK=Mark Kirk, GKK=Ken Koves, TLS=Tim Sellnow

May 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
5/7/2026	DCL-26-026	ASME Section XI Inservice Inspection Relief Requests - Limited Coverage Examinations Due to Impractical Requirements
5/19/2026	DCL-26-035	Submittal of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 29
5/26/2026	DCL-26-036, DIL-26-005	Diablo Canyon Quality Assurance Program Description, Revisions 6, 7, & 8
5/27/2026	DCL-26-034	Submittal of the Inservice Testing Program Plan for the Fifth Ten-Year Interval
5/27/2026	DCL-26-037, DIL-26-006	10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Summary Report for the Period of January 1, 2024, through December 31, 2025

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
5/5/2026	Diablo Canyon Emergency Action Level NEI 99-01, Revision 7 audit questions NSIR-01 through -13 dated May 5, 2026 (EPID L-2025-LLA-0139)
5/14/2026	REORGANIZATION AND REASSIGNMENT OF THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BRANCH CHIEFS FOR OPERATOR REACTOR LICENSING
5/19/2026	Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 – Issuance of Amendment Nos. 258 and 260 Re: Adoption of TSTF-585, "Revise LCO 3.0.3 to Require Managing Risk" (EPID L-2026-LLA-0011)
5/26/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – CORRECTION TO ISSUANCE OF RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-80 AND DPR-82 FOR DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (EPID L-2023-RNW-0021)
5/30/2026	Acceptance Review: Diablo Canyon request to revise 10 CFR 50.69 process to incorporate EPRI report, "Enhanced Risk-Informed Categorization Methodology for Pressure Boundary Components" (EPID: L-2026-LLA-0086)

D. PSRC Documents (NSOC/PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no PSRC documents for this month.

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
CE	SAPN 51273257	DA-Momentary U1 PT-526 SSPS bistable tri (2.390)

May 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

CE	SAPN 51262382	DA-ERO inadvertently activated (2.390)
CE	SAPN 51232223	DA-Suspected #2 seal failure on 2-2 RCP (2.390)
CE	SAPN 51275601	DA-Incorrect Sprinkler Head Removed (2.390)
CE	SAPN 51313034	DA-CCE for lifting and landing leads (2.390)
CE	SAPN 51315542	LTCA DA-FWH 1-5C Potential Tube Leak (2.390)
CE	SAPN 51303284	DA-DG 2-2 failed to reach rated speed (2.390)
CE	SAPN 51304400	DA-Fluid Accumulation in RCP 2-3 Cubicle
2 WGE	SAPN 51302688	DA-Cyber Security Basis Document 094 Eva
2 WGE	SAPN 51306653	DA-Sys 21A Unavail. Exceeded – Goal Sett
2 WGE	SAPN 51290613	DA-DDN 2*2226 Material CDA Classificatio
2 WGE	SAPN 51289730	DA-MR PC3 Exceedance – System 18A
Eff. Eval		
5/31/2026		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 5/1/2026-5/31/2026
5/31/2026		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 5/1/2026-5/31/2026
5/31/2026		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 5/1/2026 - 5/31/2026
6/2/2026		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3 as of 6/2/2026
6/2/2026		Open RCE Notifications and Tasks as of 6/2/2026
6/2/2026		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 1 & 2

May 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

May 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

Date	Doc. No.	Title
5/19/2026	QVA 2026-AS- 04	Assessment to Determine Cyber Security Audit Frequency

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
6/9/2026	SAPN 51304442	2026 MUG Conference Benchmarking
	SAPN 51332175	2026 Modex Conference Benchmark Report
	SAPN 51310673	Benchmark – 2026 MRUG Winter Mtg
	SAPN 51299667	Callaway PI&R SA Benchmark
FA	SAPN 51318348	CRE self assessment-due May2026
QHSA	SAPN 51198509	EP Pre-Inspection Assessment 2023
	SAPN 51296336	EP Program Pre-Inspection QHSA 2025

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/18/2025		2026 Nuclear Generation, Roadmap to Generating Excellence
12/18/2025		2025-2030 Strategic Plan Nuclear Generation
Station Initiative		There are no new Station Initiatives for this month.

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
ODM		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
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May 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.
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M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202618	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202619	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202620	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202621	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202622	T+1 Performance Critique
	May	T+1 Performance Critique 2618-2622

June 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
06/08/2026	DCL-26-040	License Amendment Request 26-06 Change in Implementation Schedule for License Amendments 252 and 254
6/15/2026	DCL-26-043	Supplement to License Amendment Request 26-05, Revision to Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergency Plan
6/29/2026	DCL-26-046	Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program Capsule B Technical Report

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
6/1/2026	CALENDAR YEAR 2026 INSPECTION SCHEDULE FOLLOWING REVISIONS TO THE REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS (ROP)
6/15/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – SUMMARY OF AUDIT IN SUPPORT OF LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO UTILIZE ADOPT™ FUEL FOR IMPROVED FUEL PERFORMANCE (EPID L-2025-LLA-0191)
6/18/2026	RFI for Diablo Canyon Power Plant EP Exercise Insp Sept 2026

D. PSRC Documents (NSOC/PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
6/9/2026	2026-004	Physical Security Plan, Revision 22
6/23/2026	2026-005	Emergency Plan App D

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	SAPN 51320287	DA-2-NI-44 Loss of Voltage
2 WGE	SAPN 51332752	DA-Scaffold Finger Injury
2 WGE	SAPN 51306428	DA-SI-2-8801A overthrust during testing
2 WGE	SAPN 51253070	DA-Dropped rod P10 of bank D
06/30/2026		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 06-01-2026-06-30-2026
06/30/2026		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 6-1-2026-06-30-2026

June 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

06/3/2026		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 06-01-2026-06-30-2026
07/13/2026		20 Oldest Non-LTCA DA Notifications as of 07-13-2026
7/13/2026		DCPP CAP Station Index

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no QV documents this month.

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
7/13/2026	SAPN 51273162	INPO Parts & Work Management - 2025
7/13/2026	SAPN 51263411	Benchmarking on HU Evals/Events
7/13/2026	SAPN 51333344	Sec- Columbia .07 Peer Assessment/Bench
7/13/2026	SAPN 51265545	INPO Parts & Work Management 2024
7/13/2026	SAPN 51333345	SEC-Wolf Creek .07 Peer Asstmnt/Bench Mar
7/13/2026	SAPN 51317524	2026 CETI Formal SA
7/13/2026	SAPN 51279002	QHSA on OM15.ID10, Section 5.1.1
7/13/2026	SAPN 5133472	Quick Hit Self Assessment - 2026 MC&A

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/18/2025		2026 Nuclear Generation, Roadmap to Generating Excellence
12/18/2025		2025-2030 Strategic Plan Nuclear Generation
June 2026		Diablo Canyon Power Plant 2Q2026 Station Excellence Plan

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

June 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
ODM		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202623	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202624	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202625	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202626	T+1 Performance Critique
	June	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2623-2626

July 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
7/27/2026	DCL-26-050, DIL-26-010	Emergency Plan Update

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
6/11/2026	Acceptance Review: Diablo Canyon Unit 1 relief requests – limited coverage examinations due to impractical requirements (EPIDS: L-2026-LLR-0030, -0031, and -0032)
7/9/2026	SUMMARY OF JUNE 18, 2026, PRESUBMITTAL MEETING WITH PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY REGARDING (1) ULTIMATE HEAT SINK ANALYSIS AND (2) STEAM GENERATOR INSPECTIONS AT DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 (EPID L-2026-LRM-0060 AND EPID L-2026-LRM-0061)
7/20/2026	Acceptance Review: Diablo Canyon license amendment request to revise Emergency Plan (EPID: L-2026-LLA-0094)
7/23/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 259 AND 261 RE: REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO ADOPT TSTF-529, REVISION 4, "CLARIFY USE AND APPLICATION RULES" (EPID L-2025-LLA-0199)
7/28/2026	DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - NOTIFICATION OF NRC INITIAL OPERATOR LICENSING EXAMINATION 05000275/2027301; 05000323/2027301
7/28/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NOS. 260 AND 262 RE: REVISION TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO ADOPT TSTF-596, "EXPAND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY CONTROL PROGRAM (SFCP)"
8/4/2026	Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 and 2 – Integrated Inspection Report 05000275/2026002 and 05000323/2026002

D. PSRC Documents (NSOC/PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
7/31/2026		Response to Site Visit Report, December 8 – December 11, 2025

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
1 WGE	SAPN	There are no 1 WGEs this month.

July 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

2 WGE	SAPN 51328714	DA-QARMA – OP2.ID2 and STP M-39*
2 WGE	SAPN 51320114	DA-44-01-01 CDA Control Gaps
2 WGE	SAPN 51327868	DA-DDN 2*22189 Error DEG 1-3 GQD Alarm
2 WGE	SAPN 51241381	LTCA-DA- U2 SWIL- perform tube eval
2 WGE	SAPN 51320926	DA-Rewound RHR Motor left outside
Eff. Eval		There are no effectiveness evals this month.
7/31/2026		Significance Level 1 and 2 Work Group Evaluations Created 7/1/2026 - 7/31/2026
07/31/2021		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 7/1/2026-7/31/2026
8/18/2026		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3
8/18/2026		Open RCEs as of 8/18/2026
8/18/2026		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 1 & 2
7/31/2026		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 7/1/2026-7/31/2026

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
07/28/2026	#2026-IA-03	2026 ISFSI & Fuel Management Audit
8/11/2026		Nuclear Quality Digest August 2026

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
8/18/2026	SAPN 51322808	FWH Benchmarking Fermi
8/18/2026	SAPN 51320623	FWH Benchmarking ANO
8/18/2026	SAPN 51317308	Palo Verde FLLE Benchmark
8/18/2026	SAPN 51335076	Chem Benchmark - SampleIQ
8/18/2026	SAPN 51317375	ASME BPV Code Week 2026 Benchmark
8/18/2026	SAPN 51334787	Benchmarking – 2026 NEIL and Reg 4 FPCM

July 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

8/18/2026	SAPN 51326224	FLEX-SAFER Industry Meeting Report
8/18/2026	SAPN 51321114	Benchmark – RP ALARA Conf 2026 Summer
8/18/2026	SAPN 51337722	EPRI Benchmark/ Self Assessment
8/18/2026	SAPN 51332423	Benchmark Report: ASME Code Week 2026
8/18/2026	SAPN 51321158	Svc Contract SOX QHSA
8/18/2026	SAPN 51328518	QHSA – Document Services

I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/18/2025		2026 Nuclear Generation, Roadmap to Generating Excellence
12/18/2025		2025-2030 Strategic Plan Nuclear Generation
Station Initiative		There are no new Station Initiatives for this month.

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
ODM		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202627	T+1 Performance Critique

July 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

	Week 202628	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202629	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202630	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 202631	T+1 Performance Critique

August 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

A. Licensing Basis Impact Evaluations

Date	LBIE No.	Title
		There are no LBIEs for this month.

B. NRC Outgoing Correspondence (incl. LERs, LARs, etc.)

Date	Letter No.	Title
8/10/2026	DCL-26-054, DIL-26-011	Supplement to License Amendment Request 25-06 Request to Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Pursuant to NEI 99-01, Revision 7, "Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors"

C. NRC Incoming Correspondence (including Inspection Reports)

Date	Title
8/4/2026	DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2026002 AND 05000323/2026002
8/5/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - REGULATORY AUDIT PLAN IN SUPPORT OF LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO REVISE 10 CFR 50.69 PROCESS TO INCORPORATE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE REPORT, "ENHANCED RISKINFORMED CATEGORIZATION METHODOLOGY FOR PRESSURE BOUNDARY COMPONENTS" (EPID L-2026-LLA-0086)
8/13/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – REVISED ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE FOR DIABLO CANYON LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ADOPT NEI 99-01, REVISION 7, "DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NON-PASSIVE REACTORS" (EPID L-2025-LLA-0139) - Email
8/20/2026	DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – SUMMARY OF AUDIT IN SUPPORT OF LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ADOPT EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL SCHEME PURSUANT TO NEI 99-01, REVISION 7, "DEVELOPMENT OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS FOR NONPASSIVE REACTORS" (EPID L-2025-LLA-0139)
8/26/2026	NOTIFICATION OF INSPECTION AND REQUEST FOR INFORMATION FOR DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 – ENGINEERING SAFETY PERFORMANCE INSPECTION (ESPI) – NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000275/2027010 AND 05000323/2027010

D. PSRC Documents (PSRC Minutes)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no PSRC documents for this month.

E. CAP Documents (RCAs, WGEs, CAP Effectiveness Evaluations)

Type	Doc. No.	Title
2 WGE	SAPN 51294745	LTCA: DA-D/G 2-3 tripped on overspeed
2 WGE	SAPN 51339866	DA-2Q26 SL IV NRC Violation

August 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

2 WGE	SAPN 51323904	DA-QAAF –Incomplete Leak Seal Forms
2 WGE	SAPN 51297042	DA-Trend Cyber Assessment Technical Rigo
2 WGE	SAPN 51326486	DA-QAAF-EOC Not Complete in Timely Mann
Eff. Eval		There are no Effectiveness Evals this month.
8/31/2026		List of DN 5.1 and 5.2 Created 08-1-2026-08-31-2026
8/31/2026		DCPP 1 WGE and 2 WGE Notifications Completed 8/1/2026-8/31/2026
10/7/2025		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 3 as of 10/7/2025
10/7/2025		Open LTCA DA Notifications Station Significance 1 & 2
10/7/2025		Open RCE Notifications and Tasks as of 10/7/2025

F. QV Documents (QPAR, Audit Reports, Audit Schedule, Assessments)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no QV documents this month.

G. Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Reports

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There is no Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel Report for this month.

H. Self Assessment/Benchmarking (SA/BM Reports/Schedules)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
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I. Performance Information (PPIR, Operating Plan, Station Initiatives)

Date	Doc. No.	Title
12/18/2025		2026 Nuclear Generation, Roadmap to Generating Excellence
12/18/2025		2025-2030 Strategic Plan Nuclear Generation
Station Initiative		There are no new Station Initiatives for this month.

J. INPO

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no INPO documents for this month.

K. Operational Documents (ODM Minutes, POAs)

August 2026
List of Documents Transmitted Electronically

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no ODMs for this month.
POA		There are no new POAs for this month.

L. Safety Limit Violation Report

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Safety Limit Violation Reports for this month.

M. Significance Determination Process Calculations

Date	Doc. No.	Title
		There are no Significance Determination Process Calculations for this month.

N. Miscellaneous

Date	Title
	There are no miscellaneous documents for this month.

O. Functional Area Documents

Subcommittee	Date/Doc	Title
Maintenance	Week 202632	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 20633	T+1 Performance Critique
	Week 20634	T+1 Performance Critique
	July	T+1 Monthly Performance Critique 2627-2630

California Legislature

October 10, 2026

Patti Poppe, CEO
Pacific Gas & Electric Company
300 Lakeside Dr, Suite 210
Oakland, CA 94612

Dr. Per F. Peterson, Chair
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee
Office of the Legal Counsel
SW 4th & Mission, Suite 2, P.O. Box 4523
Carmel, CA 93921-4523

RE: Questions on Artificial Intelligence Usage: Safety and Security at PG&E's Nuclear Facility, Diablo Canyon Power Plant

Dear Ms. Poppe and Dr. Peterson:

Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) and other utility companies face new safety threats from increasingly powerful artificial intelligence (AI). Last month, in response to public revelations about extreme AI threats, Governor Newsom issued Executive Order N-9-26 to strengthen AI safety. Additionally, this year, the California State Legislature passed nation-leading protections against AI harms, including SB 813 (McNerney) and AB 1405 (Bauer-Kahan). However, given frontier AI development, much work remains to ensure our communities are safe from AI activity that may cause catastrophic disaster.

Reported AI incursions now include at least 100 security breaches worldwide in which AI has autonomously infiltrated private and public sector entities. AI developers and third-party evaluators have documented cases in which AI has broken rules, including the law; purposefully deceived humans; exceeded known bounds of its operational capacity; and used language that is not fully comprehensible to humans to communicate among AI agents. Given the modern-day threats posed by AI, I respectfully request that PG&E, as the operator of California's 41-year-old nuclear power plant and utility provider for over 3.5 million Californians, share information about its current and planned usage of AI, and its security protocols protecting against AI

attacks both company-wide and at its Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) nuclear facility.

While DCPP has provided important economic and workforce benefits for the community of San Luis Obispo County where it's located, it also poses potential risks beyond the immediate vicinity. In a nuclear emergency, radioactive contamination could affect air, soil, irrigation water, crops, livestock, and food supplies for our state and nation. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has stated that close to half a million people live within a radius where they could be directly affected by such an emergency.

The DCPP nuclear facility began operating in 1985—decades before today's growing AI-related threats. Today's nuclear safety standards were developed largely around conventional, 20th-century threats, raising important questions about how rapidly advancing AI could affect nuclear safety and security. PG&E must assure the public and taxpayers that the DCPP nuclear facility is protected from AI-enabled threats. This is especially urgent for the 40 million Californians who rely on our state's power grid, the California taxpayers who have provided PG&E more than \$1 billion in public subsidies to operate DCPP under SB 846 (Dodd, Chapter 239, Statutes of 2022), and surrounding communities in San Luis Obispo and Santa Barbara counties.

We respectfully ask that PG&E to share the following information regarding both its DCPP nuclear facility and its company broadly:

SAFETY AND SECURITY

- 1) The standards adopted by PG&E to prevent AI from acting outside human instruction, and for PG&E to be impervious to data leaks, security attacks, or system hacking by AI entities, and the plans to share those standards with ratepayers and the public.
- 2) The extent to which documents being searched and read by AI at its nuclear facility and companywide are secure from being corrupted with embedded information, including via unauthorized prompt insertion, that would cause AI to attack the DCPP nuclear facility or other parts of the grid.

FINANCING, INFRASTRUCTURE, NATURAL RESOURCES

- 3) Ratepayer and taxpayer dollars spent for the adoption of AI usage, and the location and purpose of that AI usage.
- 4) Anticipated grid stress and water resources used for AI infrastructure, including planned data centers, at PG&E facilities.

HUMAN OVERSIGHT AND JOB RETENTION

- 5) The risk analysis of AI initiating its own activity outside the bounds of human PG&E employee instructions.
- 6) The extent and the standards under which human PG&E employees monitor AI.
- 7) The number of human positions eliminated, or departments reduced and replaced with AI, or plans to do so at its nuclear facility and across its company

DATA PRIVACY

- 8) Interaction of AI with PG&E ratepayers, including customer service claims, and how ratepayer data is protected and/or used to train AI by PG&E or its third-party vendors.

PG&E and the California State Legislature share an important duty to ensure safety, transparency, and fiscal responsibility with regard to PG&E's DCPN nuclear facility. This is vital given changes in oversight and response at the federal level, demonstrating California is on its own. While the Trump Administration is championing nuclear power expansion, it is also diminishing existing scientific safeguards, weakening the NRC, refusing to implement needed AI protections, withholding Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) funding from California, and rolling back healthcare programs for millions of people. Just this week, President Trump's comments about sacrificing the safety of San Diego and Los Angeles demonstrate a blatant disregard for California's welfare. Together, these actions pose a grave threat to our communities' well-being, including those that rely on the Central Coast's agricultural products, the security of California's grid, and those based near PG&E's DCPN nuclear facility.

There is no more urgent time than now for PG&E to work with the State Legislature, the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee, and entities such as the California Office of Emergency Services (CalOES) to reaffirm its guarantees of safety and security, assure the public it can and will prevent AI-influenced disasters, and provide increased transparency about the use of taxpayer and ratepayer dollars concerning its DCPN nuclear facility operations.

Sincerely,



Dawn Addis, Assemblymember, 30th District



Liz Ortega, Assemblymember, 20th District



Alex Lee, Assemblymember, 24th District



Ash Kalra, Assemblymember, 25th District



Gail Pellerin, Assemblymember, 28th District

CC: The Honorable Gavin Newsom, Governor, State of California
John Reynolds, President, California Public Utilities Commission
Caroline Thomas Jacobs, California Office of Emergency Services
Adam Schiff, U.S. Senator (CA)
Alex Padilla, U.S. Senator (CA)
Salud Carbajal, Congressman (CA-24)

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:

October 20, 2026

AGENDA ITEM:

V-B

AGENDA TITLE:

Closed Session

CONSENT ☐

ACTION ☒

INFORMATION ☒

Staff Summary: It is expected that the Committee Members will convene in a closed session to consider personnel matters in accordance with California Government Code Section 11126.

DCISC Legal Counsel will subsequently provide a report in open session concerning the reportable actions taken in the closed session.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE**AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM**

MEETING DATE:	October 20-21, 2026
AGENDA ITEMS:	XI-C & D, XXV H
AGENDA TITLE:	Consultant Reports; Receive, Approve and Authorize Transmittal of Fact Finding Reports.

CONSENT [☐] ACTION [☒] INFORMATION [☒]

Staff Summary: It is expected that oral and written reports will be presented at the meeting by Technical Consultants Mr. McWhorter, Ms. Darden and Mr. St. Onge. These reports may be received by the Committee, approved as to form and content and be authorized for transmittal to PG&E for its consideration and response. The Committee reserves the right to revise any fact finding report prior to its inclusion in an Annual Report. Fact finding reports in their final “as approved form” become a part of the DCISC’s next Annual Report. These reports will be included in the DCISC’s 37th Annual Report for the period July 1, 2026 - June 30, 2027.

Approval of a fact finding report constitutes approval of any recommendations made therein, whether to the Committee or to PG&E.

Fact Finding Reports are posted on the Committee’s website at www.dcisc.org prior to a public meeting and made available for public inspection immediately following their approval by the Committee at a public meeting

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION:

Receive and approve reports by Consultants and Members and approve resolutions certifying approval concerning fact-finding conducted on July 6-7, July 28-29, and June 29, August 18-19 and September 1-2, 2026 [Resolutions 2026-07 through 2026-09].

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE**AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM**

MEETING DATE:

October 22, 2026

AGENDA ITEM:

XVII-E

AGENDA TITLE:

Consultant Dr. Mark Kirk - Report on the Evaluation of PG&E's Results of the Analysis of Capsule B from the Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Surveillance Program

CONSENT []

ACTION [X]

INFORMATION [X]

Staff Summary: It is anticipated that the Committee will hold discussion following a presentation by Committee Consultant Dr. Mark Kirk on his report "Surveillance Capsule B from Diablo Canyon Unit 1 - A Review of Data reported in WCAP-19173-NP and its Implications." Dr. Kirk's Report was made available on the Committee's website prior to this public meeting.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION:

As appropriate. Action, if any, to be taken by resolution.

Surveillance Capsule B from Diablo Canyon Unit 1

A Review of Data reported in WCAP-19173-NP and its Implications

Consultant's report to the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee

Submitted by
Mark Kirk
Phoenix Engineering Associates Inc.
Unity, New Hampshire, USA

Date: 9 October 2026



**Phoenix
Engineering
Associates
Inc.**

Disclaimer

This report summarizes the consultant's evaluation of the state of embrittlement in the Diablo Canyon Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel and various questions related to this topic. The report is provided as information to the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC). The consultant has no responsibility for decisions made by the DCISC, or by any other body, based on the information in this report.

Executive Summary

In 2022 the State of California decided to not terminate the operation of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant at the conclusion of its original 40-year operating license in 2024 and 2025. Consequently, in October 2022 the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) informed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that it wished to re-initiate their license renewal application [DCL-22-085]. In November 2023 PG&E submitted a license renewal application to the NRC to extend by 20-years the operating licenses of both Unit 1 and Unit 2. A renewed license was granted by the NRC in 2026. Following this decision to pursue license renewal, members of two organizations, the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace (SLOMFP) and the Friends of the Earth (FOE), have placed before the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) their concerns regarding the state of embrittlement in the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and, consequently, its continued operating safety.

To assist the DCISC in their deliberations on these matters they retained the services of this consultant in 2023. Since that time a number of reports and memorandums have been prepared for the DCISC. For example:

- [Kirk Part 1] is a report that describes embrittlement prediction and condition monitoring practices used in the USA. Further, the report responds directly to a number of public concerns raised before January of 2025.
- [Kirk Part 2] is a report that evaluates Unit 1 with respect to the NRC's PTS and USE screening criteria.
- [Kirk 2024] performs a further evaluation of the status of Unit 1 with respect to the USE screening criteria.

These and several other memoranda can be found on [DCISC Website]. The additional memoranda address questions posed by Mr. Severance and Professor Macdonald concerning Unit 1 and also provide an assessment of possible future changes to embrittlement regulations discussed by the NRC in [SECY-22-0019] and in [NRC 2026b] on Unit 1.

The current report provides an evaluation of data obtained by testing Capsule B from the Unit 1 surveillance program. In April 2025, surveillance Capsule B was removed from Unit 1 and sent to the Westinghouse hot cell laboratory in Pittsburgh Pennsylvania for testing. The results of this testing, which were reported in June 2026, included two new measurements of embrittlement made using Charpy V-notch specimens from weld wire heat 27204. Welds made from heat 27204 are the most sensitive to neutron irradiation embrittlement of the various steels from which the beltline of the reactor pressure vessel in Unit 1 was fabricated and, as such, most limit the operation of that Unit.

This report independently confirms the “credibility” analysis of the Charpy V-notch data set for weld wire heat 27204 reported by Westinghouse in Appendix D of [WCAP-19173]. This data set includes the two measurements from Capsule B not available before June 2026. The available Charpy data (ΔT_{41J} , ΔUSE) for heat 27204 were obtained over a range of neutron exposure spanning conditions characterizing the beginning of Unit 1 operation in the late 1980s to conditions that will not be reached until long after expiration of its current operating license in 2045. More specifically, the data from Capsule B was obtained at a fluence slight less than twice that expected in the Unit 1 RPV at the conclusion of the current 60-year license term.

This report used the new measurements on weld wire heat 27204 along with existing data on this weld wire heat to assess the status of Unit 1 with respect to the NRC’s screening criteria on pressurized thermal shock (PTS) as expressed in [10CFR50.61] and with respect to the NRC’s screening criteria on upper shelf energy (USE) as expressed in [10CFR50-AppG]. The results were as follows:

- **Pressurized Thermal Shock**

- NRC Method: An analysis performed using the NRC’s required analysis procedures as expressed in [10CFR50.61] determined that Unit 1 is forecast to remain 18.4 °C (33.2 °F) below the PTS screening criteria after 60-years of operation and, therefore, remains in compliance with those requirements through that time. The analysis also forecast that the embrittlement of weld wire heat 27204 will not reach the screening criteria until a neutron exposure nearly twice that expected in Unit 1 after 60-years of operation. These results are very similar to prior PTS assessments of weld wire heat 27204 that were based on five measurements, which have been available since 2011 and serve as the current licensing basis
- Supplemental Analysis: Additionally, a supplemental analysis was performed using a more up-to-date analysis method as described in draft ASME Code Case N-914; this method is currently under review by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. Use of CC N-914 provides an independent check on the conclusions based on the NRC’s analysis method. The CC N-914 analysis used fracture toughness data on weld wire heat 27204 that is not used by the NRC. The CC N-914 analysis assessed Unit 1 to be 29.8 °C (53.7 °F) below the NRC’s PTS screening criteria, which confirms the conservatism of the NRC analysis.

- **Upper Shelf Energy**

- NRC Method: An analysis was performed using the new measurements of Charpy samples from weld wire heat 27204 irradiated in Capsule B and reported in [WCAP-19173]. Using the NRC’s required methodology, this analysis predicts that Unit 1 will have a USE after 60-years of 80J, which is 12J (8.9 ft-lb) above the NRC’s USE screening criteria and, thus, complies with this NRC requirement. The analysis also forecasts that the USE of weld wire heat 27204 will not reach the screening criteria until it reaches a neutron exposure over three times that expected in Unit 1 after 60-years of operation.

- Supplemental Analysis: The predictions of the NRC method were checked using a data set consisting of all measurements from weld wire heat 27204, including both data from the sister weld and surrogate weld. Together these data make a set that is 75% larger than that required by the NRC. This supplemental analysis predicts that Unit 1 will have a USE after 60-years of 74J, which is 6J (4.4 ft-lb) above the NRC's USE screening criteria and, thus, complies with NRC requirements. The analysis also forecasts that the USE of weld wire heat 27204 will not reach the screening criteria until it reaches a neutron exposure of approximately 1.8-times that expected in Unit 1 after 60-years of operation.

Finally, this report reviewed possible future changes to embrittlement and surveillance guidelines that have been recently discussed by the NRC to assess their potential impact on Unit 1. These include a possible change to the NRC's method of forecasting embrittlement, a possible change in surveillance requirements after the original 40-year license term, and the possible allowance by the NRC for plants to use fracture toughness data in their assessments. The impact of these changes on Unit 1, were they to occur, is as follows:

- There is no impact of the possible change in embrittlement formula because the NRC does not anticipate changing this formula except for fluence values much higher than Unit 1 will experience in its first 60-years of operation.
- The impact of changes to surveillance requirements on Unit 1 is more difficult to assess because the NRC has provided limited information about its future intentions. If future requirements consider the relationship of capsule fluence to reactor fluence then no more capsules should be required of Unit 1 because Capsule B was withdrawn and tested at a fluence over 2-times the predicted 60-year fluence. However, if the NRC's new capsule withdrawal schedule considers only the interval in years between surveillance capsule withdrawals then another capsule may be required before the end of the 60-year license. If this is the case Unit 1 has three capsules all containing the limiting weld wire heat that could be used to satisfy such a testing requirement.
- In what the NRC has written the use of fracture toughness data has been expressed as an option, not a requirement. The supplemental PTS analysis reported here used fracture toughness data for weld wire heat 27204 along with draft ASME CC N-914. This use of fracture toughness data demonstrated a greater distance between the assessed RT_{PTS} value for Unit 1 and the NRC's screening criteria.

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DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:

October 20, 2026

AGENDA ITEM:

XVII-B

AGENDA TITLE:

DCISC Member Dr. Scarlat's Report on Evaluation of PG&E's Results of the Analysis of Capsule B from Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Surveillance Program.

CONSENT []

ACTION [X]

INFORMATION [X]

Staff Summary: Dr. Scarlat will present her evaluation of PG&E's evaluation of the results of the analysis of Unit 1 Surveillance Capsule B testing results.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate

Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Report

On June 29, 2026, the DCISC FFT received a briefing from PG&E on the report generated from testing and evaluation of Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B (the “Capsule B Report,” Reference 6.1) which was removed from the vessel on April 21, 2025. A follow-up briefing was held on July 1, 2026, in response to additional questions from Dr. Scarlat. In addition to the FFT, the following attended the briefings:

- DCISC Counsel Robert Rathie.
- PG&E staff members Blair Jones, Vice President Business and Technical Services; Tom Jones, Regulatory, Environmental and Repurposing Senior Director; Saul Gomez, Government Relations Senior Director; Philippe Soenen, Strategic Initiatives, Performance Improvement and Organizational Effectiveness Director; Josh Harmon, State Agency Relations Principal; and Michelle Olsofsky, License Renewal Engineer.
- Westinghouse staff members included Michael Frances, Principal Project Manager; Brett Lynch, Principal Vessel Integrity Engineer; Karina Assis, Principal Materials Engineering; Margret Long, Senior Mechanical Engineer; and Andy Hawk, Lead Engineer Radiation Engineering and Analysis.
- The June 29, 2026, briefing was attended by Karina Assis, Michael Frances, Margaret Long, Andrew Hawk, and Brett Lynch. The July 1, 2026, briefing was attended by Karina Assis, Brett Lynch, Margaret Long, and Andrew Hawk. The Capsule B WCAP report identifies Margaret Long and Marcos Alberto Guillen as authors and Donald Lynch and Andrew E. Hawk as reviewers of the report.

In the DCISC’s 34th Annual Report (Reference 6.3), the following recommendation was opened:

Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of Reactor Vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available. (AR23/24AR23-2)

PG&E met the NRC-required timeline of report submission to the NRC no longer than 18 months after capsule withdrawal (Oct. 21, 2026). PG&E kept DCISC apprised of the evolving timeline for submission of the Capsule B report, to allow for scheduling a debrief meeting as soon as the report was available. While initial timeline projections for analysis of Capsule B results were predicting May as a time-frame, the data collection, associated data reduction, curve fitting, and technical evaluation activities continued into late June 2026. Internal report metadata indicate that the Charpy curve-fitting analyses used to establish transition temperature shifts and upper-shelf energy changes were generated between May 28 and June 10, 2026. Specifically,

CVGRAPH analyses for the correlation monitor material were produced on May 28 and May 29, 2026; surrogate weld analyses were generated on June 7, 2026; surveillance weld analyses on June 9, 2026; and lower shell plate analyses on June 10, 2026. The Westinghouse report was finalized and approved on Friday, June 26, 2026, and PG&E transmitted the report to the NRC under Letter DCL-26-046 dated Monday, June 29, 2026.

The first confidential briefing to DCISC occurred the morning of Monday, June 29th, 2026, shortly before submission of the report to the NRC that same day. All of the FFT requests for additional information and additional briefings were met by PG&E and Westinghouse without undue delay.

The Capsule B report concluded that Unit 1 meets the reactor vessel integrity criteria for at least 60 years of operation (through November 2, 2044). The results were identified as consistent with the conclusions contained in the NRC's June 2025 License Renewal Safety Evaluation Report (Reference 6.4) and the existing Reactor Vessel integrity analysis of record (Reference 6.5).

The NRC staff's assessment of the Capsule B report was issued on Sept. 24th, 2026, in a letter from the US NRC Materials Branch Senior Materials Engineer On Yee issued to Branch Chief Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Angela Buford. The NRC staff assessment included a review of the ways in which the methodology for neutron fluence evaluation, temperature of irradiation, credibility analysis, transition temperature shift, and upper shelf energy met the regulatory requirements. The NRC staff's assessment concluded:

- that "the report satisfies the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix H" and
- that PG&E's "assessment of test results were appropriate and based on Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2.", and
- "that a revision to the licensee's currently Pressure and Temperature Limits Report (Revision 17) is not warranted."

A copy of PG&E's presentation materials for this briefing is included as Enclosure 1 to this report and also made available as a stand-alone document on the DCISC website. PG&E staff concluded that the results of the Capsule B Report confirmed that Unit 1 continues to meet NRC requirements for Reactor Vessel integrity and remains safe for at least 60 years of operation. The Capsule B results were identified as consistent with the conclusions contained in the NRC's June 2025 License Renewal Safety Evaluation Report (Reference 6.4) and the existing Reactor Vessel integrity analysis of record (Reference 6.5). PG&E and Westinghouse provided follow-up responses and supporting documentation addressing questions raised during the debrief meetings on June 29th and July 1st. In the two briefings with PG&E and Westinghouse, the following topics were discussed:

Numbers and composition of material samples tested and the test results

Dosimetry (fluence) and thermal data for the sample capsule

Data credibility and criteria for data credibility (as defined by NRC regulations)

Quality assurance/quality control (QA/QC) and metrology for the temperature, dose, and mechanical property testing

Independent review of data post processing and interpretation

Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Inspections (2025 ISI)

To support review of the 2025 Unit 1 reactor vessel in service inspection (ISI) report, PG&E provided the drawing "ISI RPV Unit 1 Weld ID", which identifies the locations and designations of the reactor vessel welds. According to PG&E, all Unit 1 reactor vessel welds were inspected during the 2025 inspection campaign.

Questions were raised regarding reactor vessel weld heat 27204, which is associated with the limiting reactor vessel embrittlement material. PG&E and Westinghouse reported that the following beltline welds were fabricated using weld heat 27204:

Intermediate Shell Longitudinal Weld Seams 2-442A, 2-442B, and 2-442C.

Lower Shell Longitudinal Weld Seams 3-442A, 3-442B, and 3-442C.

Westinghouse further clarified that, from a neutron fluence perspective, Lower Shell Longitudinal Weld 3-442C is the limiting beltline weld for Unit 1. That weld, along with the remaining heat 27204 welds listed above, was ultrasonically examined during the 2025 inspection. The FFT reviewed the inspection report and confirms that the inspection did not identify problematic flaws and met the criteria for the % inspected.

The FFT noted that the ultrasonic examination report previously reviewed appeared to focus primarily on reactor vessel penetrations and questioned whether the limiting beltline welds had in fact been examined. In response, PG&E provided selected pages from the 2025 reactor vessel examination report documenting ultrasonic examinations of welds 2-442A through 2-442C and welds 3-442A through 3-442C.

Previous Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Inspections

Questions were also raised concerning the timing and scope of previous Unit 1 reactor vessel volumetric examinations. Westinghouse clarified that the last full reactor vessel examination was performed in 2005. The subsequent examination conducted in February 2014 was a partial reactor vessel examination. Welds 2-442A, 2-442B, and 2-442C were examined during the 2014 inspection, while welds 3-442A, 3-442B, and 3-442C were among the welds not examined. To support review of historical inspection activities, PG&E provided excerpts from both the 2005 and 2014 reactor vessel examination reports focusing on the beltline welds discussed above.

Extension of Reactor Vessel Inspection Interval

The FFT requested information regarding the basis for extending the Unit 1 reactor vessel inspection interval from 10 years to 20 years. PG&E reported that it submitted the extension request to the NRC in 2014 under correspondence DCL-14-074. Supporting correspondence included PG&E's response to NRC requests for additional information (DCL-15-040) and the subsequent NRC approval package ("150619, Request RPV-U1-Extension"). These documents were provided to the FFT.

Capsule B Thermal Monitors

The FFT requested photographs of the thermal monitors recovered from Capsule B together with examples of melted thermal monitors for comparison. Westinghouse provided three photographs of the Capsule B thermal monitors (files BOT 2.tif, MID 2.tif, and TOP 2.tif). The photographs were obtained using the camera equipment available within the Westinghouse hot cell. Westinghouse reported that an experienced technician visually examined the monitors and determined that none of the thermal monitors had melted. Westinghouse was unable to provide high-resolution photographs of melted thermal monitor wires for comparison because such photographs were not available.

Charpy Testing and Temperature Control

Questions were raised regarding calibration accuracy and measurement uncertainty associated with the Charpy impact testing and temperature measurement systems. For the Charpy impact test machine:

Verification range extends from 6.3 ft-lb to 211 ft-lb, representing approximately 80 percent of machine capacity.

The largest observed deviation from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) reference specimens was 3.2 percent.

Temperature control was provided through calibrated temperature baths, each utilizing a dedicated thermocouple. The temperature controller accuracy was reported as $\pm 1^{\circ}\text{F}$.

Calibration History

Westinghouse reported that annual NIST verification of the Charpy testing machine was last completed on July 10, 2025.

Thermocouple calibrations were completed July 10, 2025, for testing of non-reconstituted specimens, and November 18, 2025, for testing of reconstituted specimens. Thermocouples are calibrated on a six-month frequency.

Dosimetry Standards

The FFT requested identification of the standards used for reactor dosimetry counting and analysis. Westinghouse stated that its internal procedures governing high-purity germanium detector calibration, dosimetry sample preparation, and sample assay were developed in accordance with several ASTM reactor dosimetry standards, including:

ASTM E3376, Standard Practice for Calibration and Usage of Germanium Detectors in Radiation Metrology for Reactor Dosimetry

ASTM E263, Standard Test Method for Measuring Fast-Neutron Reaction Rates by Radioactivation of Iron

ASTM E264, Standard Test Method for Measuring Fast-Neutron Reaction Rates by Radioactivation of Nickel

ASTM E481, Standard Practice for Measuring Neutron Fluence Rates by Radioactivation of Cobalt and Silver

ASTM E523, Standard Test Method for Measuring Fast-Neutron Reaction Rates by Radioactivation of Copper

ASTM E526, Standard Test Method for Measuring Fast-Neutron Reaction Rates by Radioactivation of Titanium

ASTM E704, Standard Test Method for Measuring Reaction Rates by Radioactivation of Uranium-238

ASTM E705, Standard Test Method for Measuring Reaction Rates by Radioactivation of Neptunium-237

These standards form the technical basis for the reactor dosimetry measurements used to support fluence evaluations and reactor vessel embrittlement analyses. The seven elements listed in the standards above covers the entire list of elements irradiated in the Capsule B. Dosimetry wires are thus used for the validation of the calculated fast neutron fluences experienced by the capsule. The FFT did not review the applicability of the above-mentioned standards to the specific condition of Capsule B, but notes that these are otherwise the relevant set of standards to apply.

The following table is reproduced from the Capsule B report and summarizes the conclusions of the neutron dosimetry:

Reaction	Reaction Rate (rps/atom)		M/C
	Measured	Calculated	
$^{63}\text{Cu} (n,\alpha) ^{60}\text{Co}$	2.94E-17	2.68E-17	1.10
$^{54}\text{Fe} (n,p) ^{54}\text{Mn}$	2.88E-15	2.85E-15	1.01
$^{58}\text{Ni} (n,p) ^{58}\text{Co}$	4.02E-15	3.91E-15	1.03
$^{238}\text{U}(\text{Cd}) (n,f) ^{137}\text{Cs}$	1.34E-14	1.38E-14	0.97
$^{237}\text{Np}(\text{Cd}) (n,f) ^{137}\text{Cs}$	1.05E-13	1.06E-13	0.99
$^{59}\text{Co} (n,\gamma) ^{60}\text{Co}$	2.03E-12	1.77E-12	1.15
$^{59}\text{Co}(\text{Cd}) (n,\gamma) ^{60}\text{Co}$	8.12E-13	8.31E-13	0.98
Average of M/C Results			1.02
Standard Deviation (%)			4.9

The measured-to-calculated (M/C) reaction rate ratios for the Capsule B threshold (i.e., non Co-59) reactions range from 0.97 to 1.03, and the average M/C ratio is $1.02 \pm 4.9\%$ (1σ). This direct comparison falls within the $\pm 20\%$ criterion specified in Regulatory Guide 1.190. This comparison, along with the other plant-specific surveillance capsule dosimetry comparisons provided in Appendix A, validates the analytical results described in Section 6.2.

Quality Assurance Oversight

Westinghouse has corporate experience in the performance and reporting of surveillance capsule results dating back to the 1970s. Diablo Canyon is a Pressurized Water Reactor, and Westinghouse performs the testing on virtually all capsules from pressurized water reactors in the USA, of which there are 60 operating units designed and supplied by Westinghouse or Combustion Engineering (acquired by Westinghouse).

Quality assurance programs certify the quality of the data and the transparent documentation of the quality and include such considerations as training, expertise, review and audits. Thus, the FFT inquired into the review the metrology and corresponding quality assurance and quality control pertaining to data reported in the Capsule B report.

The FFT asked when the testing processes had last been independently audited to verify compliance with applicable ASTM standards. Westinghouse responded that its Quality Management System is designed to comply with applicable regulatory and industry standards, including NRC 10 CFR 50 Appendix B requirements and ISO 9001 quality management requirements. Westinghouse reported that the most recent ISO Quality Management System audit was conducted in 2025. In addition, the FFT was informed that a Nuclear Procurement Issues Committee (NUPIC) audit is scheduled. NUPIC audits are conducted by representatives

from multiple nuclear utilities and are used throughout the industry to assess nuclear suppliers and commercial vendors against applicable quality assurance requirements. The FFT was also informed that review of the Westinghouse Quality Assurance Plan by PG&E remains ongoing.

The FFT was given the opportunity to review the confidential document that defines the procedures for and acceptance criteria for “Design and Analysis Documents Prepared by External Contractors.” In the case of Capsule B, Westinghouse performed the measurements, data reduction and analysis of the data, as commissioned by PG&E. The specific technical requirements and quality requirements would be specified in the PG&E-Westinghouse contract. This procedure that was afforded the FFT’s review defines the minimum requirements for PG&E’s acceptance of the quality of the work reported by Westinghouse and generally include review of assumptions, methodology, standards applied, and regulatory requirements met. Since the FFT had the opportunity to discuss with both Westinghouse and PG&E in the two debrief meetings, we can confirm that there was close communication between PG&E and Westinghouse about the content of the Capsule B report. We cannot confirm the level of technical detail of the vendor’s review. All technical questions pertaining to data generation, data reduction and interpretation were handled by Westinghouse staff. Questions pertaining to meeting licensing requirements were responded by PG&E. We can confirm that procedures exist for PG&E to establish acceptance and review criteria for data generated by Westinghouse, and that procedures exist for quality assurance oversight for vendors and suppliers to PG&E.

Regulatory Evolution

The committee has also responded to public inquiries on the topic of Capsule B review, with the correspondence being made publicly available the DCISC website as it was created, and parts of it reproduced here.

“The Westinghouse Capsule B report (ML26180A296) was submitted on June 29, 2026 to the NRC to demonstrate PG&E's regulatory compliance with Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50. This report, together with its PG&E transmittal letter to the NRC references the specific regulations and standards that govern the Reactor Vessel Surveillance program at Diablo Canyon (e.g. 10 CFR 50, 10 CFR 54). Referencing studies other than what is required and accepted by the current NRC regulation would not have been necessary as part of reporting surveillance capsule results to the NRC. For this reason, PG&E and Westinghouse did not discuss the possible future evolution of NRC regulations in the Capsule B report. Regulatory evolution on the topic of embrittlement was discussed by DCISC at the June 2026 Public Meeting; see June 17th, 2026 recording time-stamp 4:02 to 4:35, accessible at: https://slospan.org/meeting/dcisc_20260616/.

A 2023 ASTM paper by the NRC authors Widrevitz and Poehler was among the topics of conversation: D. S. Widrevitz and J. C. Poehler, “History and Development of U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99,” in “Radiation Embrittlement Trend Curves and Equations and Their Use for RPV Integrity Evaluations,” ed. W. L. Server, M. Brumovský, and M. Kirk (West Conshohocken, PA: ASTM International, 2023), 398–416,

<http://doi.org/10.1520/STP164720220041>. ASTM Symposium on Radiation Embrittlement Trend Curves/Equations and Their Use for RPV Integrity Evaluations held in Prague on April 19-22, 2022. The ASTM 2023 paper by Widrevitz and Poehler describes the history and development of Regulatory Guide 1.99, and raises concerns about the use of NRC's correlations for neutron embrittlement for neutron doses above 3×10^{19} n/cm².

Neutron irradiation causes aging (in the form of embrittlement) of the reactor vessel. The magnitude of irradiation dose is quantified by fluence of fast neutrons that the material has experienced at a particular plane in the material (n/cm²). As for all ferritic steels, the reactor pressure vessel steel experiences a transition from brittle behavior at low temperatures to ductile behavior at high temperatures. The temperature at which the steel transitions from brittle to ductile behavior increases with increased irradiation dose. The "limiting material" in a reactor pressure vessel is the steel that has a transition temperature closest to the NRC's pressurized thermal shock screening (PTS) criteria found in 10 CFR 50.61. The limiting material for Unit 1 is the longitudinal weld 3-442C, which was last ultrasonically-inspected following the requirements of the ASME Code in 2025. The thickness of the reactor pressure vessel is more than 8 inches at the beltline, and the inner wall of this weld will, by the end of 2026 have experienced approximately 1.5×10^{19} n/cm² fast neutron fluence (this fluence represents approximately 364 effective full power years (EFPY) of operation at Unit 1). Neutron irradiation scales with power level and hence energy produced; since reactors sometimes operate at reduced power and have outage periods for refueling and maintenance, the EFPY is less than the age of the reactor. For Unit 1, the age of the reactor is referred to as the years that have passed since 1985, irrespective of EFPY of operation. EFPY, and hence fluence, will depend on the power level and duration of outages of the specific unit.

This ASTM 2023 paper is part of on-going communication from the NRC concerning its effort to update its embrittlement regulations. NRC staff requested authorization from the NRC Commissioners to begin rulemaking on this topic in 2022 (SRM-SECY-22-0019). The staff was authorized by the Commission to begin that work in 2025. In June 2026 the NRC issued a "white paper [that] discusses NRC staff's preliminary technical perspectives developed in response to the direction in SRM-SECY-22-0019 [...] intended solely to describe the staff's initial thoughts and to support stakeholder engagement." Thus, as of the date of this letter, the NRC has issued neither revised guidance nor revised rules.

As an example of the type of regulatory developments that the paper proposes, it indicated that NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99 will begin to under-predict the transition temperature at total fast neutron dose in excess of 3×10^{19} n/cm² (see Table 1 below for the relevance of this fluence to DCISC Unit 1), especially for the base metal, and more so beyond 6×10^{19} n/cm². The capsule B data points (plant-specific data) fall in the early region of what the NRC staff have described as higher scatter. The inner wall of the reactor vessel in Unit 1 cannot reach 3×10^{19} until 2066 (see Table 1), which is 25 years after expiration of the plant license.

Table 1. Timeline summary for DCP Unit 1 that correlates the values of fluence with the corresponding operational calendar year, age of reactor, and effective full-power years (EFPY) when these fluence levels have been or could be reached for the Unit 1 RPV[™]. Values are derived from Tables 6-6, 7-1, and 5-10 in Capsule B report (ML26180A296); after 2045, hypothetical projections are made assuming 1 EFPY per year and $(0.04)10^{19}$ n/cm² per EFPY.

Fluence (10^{19} n/cm ²)	Approximate Year Reactor Reaches this Fluence	Corresp. Reactor Age (years)	Corresp. EFPY	Irradiated samples with corresponding fluence
0.293	1993	8	5	Capsule S
1.07	2015	30	26	Capsule Y
1.24	2020	35	31	Capsules C&D (removed from reactor, not analyzed)
1.35	2024	39	34	Capsule V
1.42	2026	41	36	
1.6	2030	45	41	(fluence and EFPY estimated by interpolation)
2.14	2045	60	54	(values per Amendment 1 to the PG&E license renewal application, ML24289A118)
3	2066	81	75	(hypothetical projection)
3.62	2083	98	92	Capsule B (surrogate weld)
3.91	2090	105	99	Capsule B
6	2143	158	152	(hypothetical projection)

The ASTM 2023 paper discusses “additional surveillance testing requirements for long-term operation [...] (e.g., beyond 60 years of operation),” in light of larger data scatter observed at fluences above $3\text{-}6 \times 10^{19}$ n/cm². Subsequently, the 2026 NRC White Paper proposes a revision of surveillance requirements “to ensure that data [...] with a neutron fluence equal or greater than the peak RPV neutron fluence for extended operation is tested at an appropriate periodicity (e.g., every 20 years);” and it recognizes that “some licensees may have already obtained surveillance data that supports long term operation of the RPV” Section 3.1.1. Surveillance. in “Potential Changes to Embrittlement and Surveillance Requirements for High-Fluence Nuclear Power Plants in Long-Term Operation under SRMSECY-22-0019,” Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ML26148A433, June 2, 2026.


The samples of the limiting material removed with Capsule B had accumulated a fast neutron fluence of 3.91×10^{19} n/cm², which would be reached after approximately 105 years of operation. The current scope of DCISC does not include considerations of operations beyond 60 years, or 2.14×10^{19} n/cm², which corresponds to fluence on the inner surface of the Unit 1 vessel (See Table 1). Since currently available surveillance capsule data for Unit 1 exceeds this value, there would not be a benefit to testing of coupons at even higher fluence values. Table 1 above, provides Timeline summary for DCP Unit 1 that correlates the values of fluence with the corresponding operational calendar year, age of reactor, and effective full-power years (EFPY) when these fluence levels have been or could be reached for the Unit 1 RPV. Values are derived from Tables 6-6, 7-1, and 5-10 in Capsule B report (ML26180A296); after 2045, hypothetical projections are made assuming 1 EFPY per year and $(0.04)10^{19}$ n/cm² per EFPY.

Discussion

For aging management of the DCPV "reactor pressure vessels", there are several tools at the disposal of reactor engineers to inspect, and to manage the aging of the reactor pressure vessel. For example, if exceeded, the NRC's PTS screening criteria prompts additional reactor-specific analysis, or mitigation measures. The adjusted reference temperature (ART) also informs the Pressure - Temperature Limits for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The NRC, in its review of Capsule B results, identified that license renewal analysis for reactor pressure vessel integrity remains unchanged, including the time-limited analysis, and including pressure-temperature limits.

Focusing specifically on the PTS screening criterion of not exceeding 270 F transition temperature, the outcomes of the analysis are sensitive to the outcome of the credibility analysis. This is because absent a non-credible, plant-specific data set the margin applied to the embrittlement curve is 2σ (28 oF), whereas the margin applied to a embrittlement curve derived from a credible, reactor-specific embrittlement dataset is 1σ (14 oF). In the former case of using the generic RG1.99 curve, with 2σ (28 oF) margin, the PTS screening criterion is reached in the vicinity of $(1.8) 10^{19}$ n/cm², which would occur between years 2035 to 2040 (See Table 1 above for fluence to year correspondence. See figures below for Case 1 and Case 2 hypothetical analysis; calculations performed by Mark Kirk, July 22nd, 2026.)


Results from Analysis Case 1
Uses only data from the Diablo Canyon Surveillance Weld. Performs RG1.99-R2 analysis.



Credibility Assessment	Data are credible: Capsule V is outside of $\pm 1\sigma$, $\sigma = 15.6^\circ\text{C}$ for welds 25% of data outside is acceptable
Chemistry Factor (best fit to data)	125.3 °C 225.1 °F
RT _{min} at 60 year fluence of 2.13×10^{19} n/cm ² (footnote)	118.3 °C; 14 °C below the PTS screening criteria 244.8 °F; 25 °F below the PTS screening criteria
Fluence at which ART exceeds the PTS screening criteria and corresponding approximate years of service	2.4×10^{19} n/cm ² Approximately 56 years
Margin = $2 \sqrt{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2}$	$\sigma_0 = 9.4^\circ\text{C}$ or 17°F , which is as specified in [10CFR50.61] when a generic RT _{min} is used, see [Vogin 1982] for the basis. $\sigma_1 = 7.8^\circ\text{C}$ or 14.0°F , which is as specified in [RG1.99R2] and in [10CFR50.61], see [Randall 1986] for the basis. Total σ (value of the square root) = 12.2°C or 22.0°F $f = 1.8 \times 10^{19}$ n/cm ²
Fluence function	f is neutron fluence in n/cm ² divided by 1×10^{19}

¹ Fluence from DCL-24-092, Amendment 1 to 60-year LRA, see page 240, NRC ADAMS ML24289A118. Value is for the lower shell longitudinal weld designated as 3 442C.
² Memorandum to S. Hunsauer from M. Vagina, "Findings of the ad hoc working group on the solution of RT_{min} values," 30 August 1982, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Legacy ADAMS Number 8509200138.
³ <https://doi.org/10.1520/STP330345>

Results from Analysis Case 2
Uses only data from the Diablo Canyon Surveillance Weld. Data forced to be not credible



Credibility Assessment	Forced to be "not credible"
Chemistry Factor (best fit, this value is from RG1.89 Tables)	125.1 °C 225.1 °F
RT _{min} at 60 year fluence of 2.13×10^{19} n/cm ²	138.3 °C; 8 °C above the PTS screening criteria 281.0 °F; 11 °F above the PTS screening criteria
Fluence at which ART exceeds the PTS screening criteria and corresponding approximate years of service	1.8×10^{19} n/cm ² Approximately 51 years
Margin = $2 \sqrt{\sigma_0^2 + \sigma_1^2}$	$\sigma_0 = 9.4^\circ\text{C}$ or 17°F , which is as specified in [10CFR50.61] when a generic RT _{min} is used, see [Vagina 1982] for the basis. $\sigma_1 = 15.6^\circ\text{C}$ or 28.0°F , which is as specified in [RG1.99R2] and in [10CFR50.61], see [Randall 1986] for the basis. Total σ (value of the square root) = 16.3°C or 29.3°F $f = 1.8 \times 10^{19}$ n/cm ²
Fluence function	f is neutron fluence in n/cm ² divided by 1×10^{19}

In the latter case, with or without Capsule B data, with or without Pallisades data and surrogate weld date, the PTS screening criterion is not met until after 60 years of operation (year 2045). Since the dataset of Unit 1-specific embrittlement data already contains three plant-specific points and two sister-plant data points and meets already the credibility requirements for this subset of data, additional data points that fall outside of 1σ data points would not make the dataset not credible, because only 65% of the dataset needs to be within 1σ of the fit, and prior to Capsule B data this criterion is already met by 100% of the points. Capsule B data points both fall just outside of 1σ , and this brings the data set to 71% within 1σ , still above 65%. Notably Capsule B data points both fall within 2σ of the fit. Thus, in what concerns current regulation for PTS screening, the primary question to answer with confidence is about the classification of the Unit 1 embrittlement data set as credible or not credible.

Lastly, in order to meet the license extension requirement of having embrittlement measurements at a fluence higher than the fluence at the end of the licensing period, it must be deemed that the Capsule B results are valid results. NRC confirmed that the correct methodologies were employed, and the quality assurance programs ensure that the methodologies were correctly applied. This FFT did not have the opportunity to verify the detailed applicability of the quality assurance program to all of the Capsule B activities, but questions were asked of PG&E and Westinghouse on this topic, and thus a sampling of topics of relevance in this area is provided in this fact finding report. All of the sampling performed thus far demonstrates confidence in the data and competence and expertise of Westinghouse and PG&E in correctly performing and correctly interpreting the measurements.

Conclusion: DCPD presented the results of testing and evaluation of material specimens contained in Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B, which was removed from the vessel on April 21, 2025. PG&E staff concluded that the results confirmed that Unit 1 continues to meet NRC requirements for Reactor Vessel integrity and remains safe for at least 60 years of operation, and made its submission to the NRC on June 29, 2026, 4 months ahead of the 18-month regulatory schedule. Capsule B results and analysis are publicly available.

Recommendations to the DCISC:

The DCISC should issue an explanation for an audience of general public and public officials, written by a panel of three to five experts spanning the disciplines of embrittlement, post-irradiation examination, non-destructive evaluation, neutron dosimetry, reactor safety, quality assurance, and risk communication, evaluating and describing for transparency to the public the following:

1. The pedigree of the data and of the analysis provided by Westinghouse, which was the basis for PG&E conclusions with regards to U1 embrittlement, including verification and certification processes, quality assurance and quality control.
2. The type of decisions that are informed by capsule embrittlement data to improve confidence in plant safety, including but not limited to: the role of standby capsules, coupon reconstitution for fracture toughness measurements, inspections and inspection intervals, RPT limits, annealing, probabilistic fracture toughness analysis. (D9/26FF-3.1)

Recommendations to the DCISC: The DCISC should follow-up on quality assurance oversight of vendor-supplied safety-related data and analysis, including results of the ongoing PG&E review of Westinghouse's Quality Assurance Program and of the upcoming NUPIC audit. (D9/26FF-3.2)

Recommendation to PG&E: The following previous recommendation to PG&E was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of Reactor Vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available.* (AR23/24AR23-2)

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE	
AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM	
MEETING DATE:	October 21, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XXIII-G
AGENDA TITLE:	Committee Consideration of Performing Additional Review of Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Surveillance Test Program Results
CONSENT [] ACTION [X] INFORMATION [X]	
Staff Summary: It is expected that the Committee Members will discuss future actions regarding additional review of the results of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel surveillance test program result of tests of surveillance Capsule B.	
RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate	

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:

October 21, 2026

AGENDA ITEM:

XXX-I

AGENDA TITLE:

Minutes of June 16-17, 2026
Public Meeting

CONSENT []

ACCEPTANCE [X]

INFORMATION []

Staff Summary: Attached are the Minutes which have been prepared from the Committee's one hundred and fourteenth public meeting held on June 16-17, 2026, in Avila Beach, CA and as a Zoom Webinar.

(Each session was also webcast live in real time and is available for subsequent viewing, archived to the meeting agenda, by visiting the links on the Committee's website at www.disc.org or at www.slospan.org. Meetings are videotaped for later broadcast on Channel 21 in the San Luis Obispo, CA area, the governmental access television channel.)

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: Review and accept the Minutes by motion.

MINUTES
of the
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE'S
JUNE 16-17, 2026, PUBLIC MEETING
[For Approval at the October 20-21, 2026, Public Meeting.]

Tuesday & Wednesday
June 16-17, 2026
Avila Beach, California
Also conducted as a Zoom Webinar

Notice of Meeting.

A legal notice of the public meeting was published in the San Luis Obispo Tribune, and a display advertisement was published in the New Times, both local newspapers of general circulation, and mailed and emailed to the media and those persons on the Committee's mailing lists. The informational topics proposed for consideration were posted to the Committee's website at www.dcisc.org and public comment was sought and received. The final meeting agenda and the complete agenda packet for the meeting and the informational presentations made during the meeting together with the fact finding reports and reports of the Seismic Review Team to be considered for approval were posted on the Committee's website at www.dcisc.org prior to the meeting. The meeting agenda contained information on how to access the webinar using a computer or cellphone/telephone. This in-person meeting was also produced as a Zoom webinar by AGP Video, Inc. and was webcast live on SLO-SPAN at <http://www.slo-span.org> and through <http://www.dcisc.org> and was subsequently broadcast on San Luis Obispo, California, local government access television Channel 21. A supply of hand sanitizers and face coverings was available in the meeting room.

I CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL

The June 16-17, 2026, public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC), the one hundred and fourteenth public meeting of the Committee, was called to order by Committee Chair Dr. Per F. Peterson at 9:00 a.m. in the Port San Luis Conference Room at the Avila Lighthouse Suites in Avila Beach, California. Dr. Peterson briefly reviewed the professional backgrounds and appointment to the DCISC for each of his fellow Members: Dr. Najmedin Meshkati, the appointee of the Chair of the California Energy Commission, a Professor of Civil Environmental Engineering, Industrial and Systems Engineering and International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC) with research areas encompassing risk reduction, reliability enhancement and human factors; and Dr. Raluca O. Scarlat, the appointee of the California Attorney General, a Professor of Nuclear Engineering with research area in chemistry and reactor safety at the University of California at Berkeley. Dr. Peterson serves on the DCISC as the appointee of the Governor and is a Professor at the University of California at Berkeley in the Department of Nuclear Engineering, holding the William and Jean McCallum Floyd Chair in the Department. Since April 2026, Dr. Peterson has served as the Chief Executive Officer of Tesser Atomics, an advanced nuclear technology company focused on developing commercial nuclear propulsion technology for cargo ships.

From July 2017 to February 2026 Dr. Peterson served as the Chief Nuclear Officer for Kairos Power, a start-up company developing fluoride salt-cooled high temperature reactors, also known as molten-salt reactors, a type of small modular reactor. Dr. Peterson now serves as a Senior Advisor to Kairos Power.

Present: Committee Member Dr. Najmedin Meshkati
 Committee Member Dr. Per F. Peterson
 Committee Member Dr. Raluca O. Scarlat

Absent: None

II INTRODUCTIONS

Dr. Peterson introduced and briefly reviewed the professional backgrounds of the Committee's Technical Consultants and Assistant Legal Counsel present. Technical Consultant Mr. Richard D. McWhorter Jr. is a U.S. Navy submarine service veteran who served previously as a Senior Resident Inspector for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and as Vice President for Old Dominion Electric Cooperative. Mr. McWhorter holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy. Technical Consultant Ms. Lisa A. Darden a 35-year veteran in the nuclear power industry who worked previously for Dominion Energy at Dominion's Surry and North Anna Power Stations, most recently as Site Vice President at North Anna. Ms. Darden holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering from Virginia Tech and a Master of Business Administration Degree from Virginia Commonwealth University. Technical Consultant Richard St. Onge, a registered Professional Engineer who served as Project Manager at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) for SONGS Unit 1 decommissioning and subsequently as Director of Regulatory Affairs at SONGS. Mr. St. Onge held two NRC Senior Reactor Operator Licenses and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Massachusetts at Lowell and a Master of Business Administration Degree from the University of Phoenix. Technical Consultant Dr. Thomas Jordan, formerly a member of the DCISC Seismic Review Team and a Professor Earth Sciences at USC, who served as the Director of the Southern California Earthquake Center [now the Statewide California Earthquake Center] from 2002 to 2017. Dr. Jordan holds a Ph.D. from the California Institute of Technology. DCISC Assistant Legal Counsel Mr. Robert W. Rathie who holds a Juris Doctor Degree from Monterey College of Law who has worked with his partner DCISC Legal Counsel Robert R. Wellington on DCISC-related matters since 1993.

Dr. Peterson then introduced Mr. Tom Jones, DCPD Senior Director of Strategic Initiatives and Senior Director for Regulatory, Environmental and Repurposing who holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science from U.C. Santa Barbara oversees regulatory and external strategy for both the Diablo Canyon and Humboldt Bay Power Plants, and Ms. Carina Coral, Strategic Initiatives Manager and a communications representative who holds a Degree in Journalism from San Diego State University. Dr. Peterson reported that Mr. Jones and Ms. Corral perform key roles on behalf of PG&E and Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPD or sometimes the Plant) and as principal liaisons with the DCISC in coordinating the Committee's

activities, providing information and facilitating the Committee's public meetings and the frequent fact-finding visits conducted by a single member and a technical consultants.

Dr. Peterson recognized the presence of the technicians from AGP Video, Messrs. Robert Lloyd, Corey Barnes, Nate Brennan and Mario Lombardo and Mr. Rathie reported this meeting is being livestreamed and broadcast on the internet and he welcomed the technicians for AGP Video who provide this important component of the Committee's public meetings.

III PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Dr. Scarlat commented that the Committee's scope is to discuss matters that impact safety in both a positive and negative manner and while a dialogue advocating or opposing nuclear power is important, it is out of scope for the Committee to engage in this debate. Dr. Meshkati wished everyone a good morning, and he welcomed Mr. St. Onge and recognized the presence of representatives of the California Department of Water Resources (DWR). [DWR plays an important role in the SB 846 extension of DCPD operations.] Dr. Peterson requested Mr. Rathie to review the guidance on making public comments to the Committee. Mr. Rathie reported this meeting was also being conducted as a Zoom webinar. He reminded the members and consultants of the importance of exercising discipline in making and responding to comments so that an accurate transcript may be produced. He then reviewed the rules adopted to entertain public comment during each session of this meeting on an equitable basis for all as follows:

- Speakers should come to the podium and identify themselves.
- Speakers will be recognized by the Chair in order, first from among those present in the room and then from among those attending virtually.
- Remarks will be limited to four minutes, but this may be varied for each session,
- Comments from public officials may be taken before those of members of the general public.
- Speakers may not cede their time to other speakers.
- Groups may be asked to appoint a spokesperson.
- Each speaker may only address the Committee once under either time for items not on the agenda, but within the Committee's subject matter jurisdiction (i.e., the operational safety of DCPD) or when a matter listed on the agenda is heard.
- The DCISC Chair reserves the right to stop any speaker if he or she believes the speaker is out of order.
- The Committee reserved the right to modify the rules in the interest of conducting an effective meeting including granting extra time to certain speakers upon request,
- Writings used in conjunction with remarks should be provided to the Committee's Legal Counsel.
- Email comments received will be read into the record subject to a time limit.

The Chair invited the members of the public who wished to address remarks to the Committee on items not appearing on the agenda for the public meeting to do so at this time.

Dr. Gene Nelson, President and Senior Legal Researcher for Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson holds a Ph.D. in Radiation Biophysics from the University of Buffalo. He reported that it has been twenty years since Californians for Green Nuclear Power first began participating in DCISC public meetings and he stated he was glad to have been able to shape the direction of the Committee's deliberations over that time.

IV A. Public Outreach, Site Visits, Review of Future Meeting and Fact Finding Dates Technical Consultant Rotation and Assignments, Guidance for the Preparation for and Conduct of Fact Finding Meetings and other Committee Activities; Documents Provided to the Committee.

Dr. Scarlat reported she conducted a public open house on March 17, 2026, in San Luis Obispo to discuss what it means to think about safety at DCP. The open house was attended by several members of the public and by representatives of a local newspaper, the Native Nuclear organization, San Luis Obispo Mother for Peace, the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility, and Californians for Green Nuclear Power. She stated it is her intent to continue these types of conversations.

Dr. Peterson reported on May 20, 2026, he met with members of the California State Assembly to review questions concerning the potential for legislation to further extend the operation of DCP. He briefed the members of the Assembly on the role of the Committee and updated them on topics including the Committee's focus on seismic safety as well as concerning the integrity of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel. He reported San Luis Obispo County Supervisor Dr. Bruce Gibson also attended this meeting. On April 3, 2026, Dr. Peterson met remotely with the Governor's Senior Advisor for Energy.

Dr. Meshkati reported on April 30, 2026, with Mr. Rathie, he met with Chair Mr. David Hochschild and senior staff members, including Senior Nuclear Policy Advisor and Emergency Coordinator Dr. Justin Cochran, of the California Energy Commission (CEC) to provide a summary of the DCISC Annual Report, seismic safety and the plans to review the results of the examination of Unit 1 surveillance Capsule B to assess the integrity of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel. He reported Chair Hochschild expressed a wish to attend the next public meeting of the DCISC in October 2026.

Members and consultants discussed and confirmed future public meetings of the DCISC for: October 20-21, 2026, February 17-18, 2027 [proposed date change to be confirmed at the October public meeting], June 16-17, 2027, and the Members and Consultants then scheduled a public meeting for October 19-20, 2027.

Mr. McWhorter reported there is a working document which provides all information on fact finding and public meeting topics since 2007 and he offered to provide a copy to the members. Fact-finding visits were then confirmed subject to confirmation by DCP that the plant can support visits on the selected dates and scheduled as follows¹:

¹ Lisa A. Darden (LAD), Najmedin Meshkati (NM), Per F. Peterson (PFP), Richard D. McWhorter (RDM), R. Ferman Wardell (RFW), Raluca O. Scarlat (ROS), Richard St. Onge (RSO), Robert Rathie (RWR). Meeting dates have been updated to include any changes made or proposed after the June 2026 public meeting.

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[2026] July 6-7 [Previously July 14-15 and July 7-8] (PFP/RDM), July 28-29 [previously August 11-12] (NM/LAD/RFW) to observe unevaluated Emergency Exercise, August 13 NM/RDM remote observation NSOC exit meeting, Capsule B briefings conducted on June 29 (ROS, RDM, ACK and RWR), June 30 (NM and RWR), July 7 (PFP, MK), August 18-19 observation of ISFSI cask inspection (ROS/RSO), September 1-2 [previously September 15-16] (ROS/RDM/RSO) to observe evaluated Emergency Preparedness Exercise on September 2, November 30 (ROS/LAD) remote observation NSOC exit meeting, December 2-3 [previously November] (ROS/LAD), December 8-9 (PFP/RDM); and

[2027] January 20-21 (NM/RSO), March 17-18 (ROS/RSO), April 20-21 (NM/RDM), May 11-12 (PFP/LAD), July 12-13 (PFP/RSO), August 10-11 (NM/LAD), and September 14-15 (ROS/RDM).

Members and consultants discussed holding future public tours of DCPD with the Committee member in attendance and their attendance at exit meeting of the PG&E Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC). Mr. McWhorter observed there have been recent changes in the composition of the Committee members and consultants and with DCPD personnel. There have also been changes to the way in which documents are provided to the Committee.

Mr. McWhorter reported efforts have been undertaken to improve and align communications between DCPD and the DCISC staff. He described the timeline developed and a protocol proposed which was included in the public agenda packet for scheduling, preparing in advance, and exchanging information through email and remote meetings and developing topic lists and agendas for Committee fact finding visits. Dr. Scarlat thanked Mr. McWhorter and PG&E for working on this important topic.

V INFORMATION PRESENTATIONS REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF PG&E.

Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones introduced DCPD Station Director Mr. Justin Rogers to make the next presentation and Ms. Corral reported that Mr. Rogers leads a team of more than 650 nuclear professionals in Operations, Maintenance, Chemistry, Radiation Protection organizations and in other safety organizations. Mr. Rogers began his career at DCPD in 2013, received a Senior Reactor Operator License in 2016, and worked in increasing positions of responsibility in the Training and Outage Management organizations. Mr. Rogers is a veteran of the U.S. Navy and holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear Energy Engineering Technology from Thomas Edison State University.

State of the Plant Update Including Organizational Changes, Significant Past and Future Plant Activities, Power History, Significant Equipment Issues, Significant Human Performance Issues, Significant Human Performance Issues, and Other Station Activities since the DCISC's February 2026 Public Meeting.

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Mr. Rogers reported Units 1 and 2 are presently operating safely at 100% power. He reported all NRC Performance Indicators are in Green status.² He reviewed the load profile for the past twelve months for each unit.

For Unit 1 an outage was conducted in December 2025 to repair a feedwater heater. There were two tunnel cleanings for Unit 1 approximately seven days apart to clean Circulating Water System tunnels. Mr. Rogers reported tunnel cleaning is conducted once per operational cycle for each unit. He reported DCPD changed its strategy and worked in consultation with the PG&E grid control team and with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO)³ and determined the best opportunity for tunnel cleaning was over a weekend commencing on two successive Fridays. Training is conducted for all operators in the Simulator Facility⁴ in performing down power operations.

Mr. Rogers reported for Unit 2 the twenty-fifth refueling outage, 2R25, was completed in October 2025 and no post-outage challenges were experienced. He confirmed Consultant McWhorter's observation that Unit 2 will have tunnel cleaning over two successive weekends performed in the fall at a date so as not to coincide with the next planned outage for Unit 1 and he reported there have been no adverse consequences in staging the tunnel cleaning over two weekends which allows personnel to get necessary rest in between.

Mr. Rogers reviewed recently completed activities:

- Unit 1 curtailment to 50% power for tunnel cleaning the weekends of Feb 20-23 and Feb 27- March 2 (each weekend focusing on one of two circulating water tunnels for Unit 1).
- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-3 Maintenance Outage Window (MOW) conducted March 22-29 for preventative maintenance as well as to make reliability upgrades.
- Startup Transformer 2-2 feeder cable/bus maintenance. He reported there was a fault in the copper bus bars which the preliminary Cause Evaluation report indicates may be due to moisture intrusion. The Cause Evaluation report will recommend any corrective actions. DCPD worked with the vendor to replace the bus bars throughout the isolation phase bus and associated testing was performed. He reported the work will be done soon on Startup Transformer 2-2, the startup bus, and the 230kV bus and additional inspections will be conducted. Mr. Rogers reported in response to Consultant McWhorter's query that the Cause Evaluation report should be ready for DCISC review during the July 2026 fact finding. **Dr. Meshkati stated that in 2017 at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant in Florida a high energy arcing fault occurred and Dr. Meshkati inquired as to the criterion or criteria that was used by PG&E to designate this a bus duct arc fault. Mr. Rogers stated the criteria used was related to NRC**

² The safety significance characterizations used for the Performance Indicators as either Green (very low) calling for Baseline inspection, White (low to moderate), calling for additional NRC oversight, Yellow (substantial), requiring more NRC oversight, or Red (high), requiring the most NRC oversight. A Green non-cited violation indicates very low safety significance, with no impact on public health and safety.

³ The CAISO manages the flow of electricity across high-voltage, long-distance power lines, operates a competitive wholesale energy market, and oversees transmission planning.

⁴ The Simulator facility is a full-scale mockup of the Unit 1 Control Room.

guidance and he offered to provide as a follow-up action information on the difference between a bus duct arc fault and a high energy arcing fault. Dr. Meshkati stated it is his understanding that the definition may hinge on the issue of the voltage duration of the arc and the type of material involved, that is, copper versus aluminum. He reported there are two Licensee Event Reports (LERs) on the NRC's ADAMS⁵ site circa 2000 and he stated he hopes PG&E addresses this in the Cause Evaluation. Mr. Rogers confirmed the 2000 event would be addressed and the event in 2000 was a very different situation than experienced recently at DCP. Dr. Meshkati stated he wanted the record to be clear as to the importance of the use of the correct classification.

Mr. Rogers reported on upcoming station events as follows:

- Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1-1 Maintenance Outage Window (MOW) conducted May 31 – June 7.
- EDG MOW EDG 1-2 conducted August 2-13.
- NRC Inspections:
 - (1) Emergency Planning Exercise: August 31-September 4 coordinating with the NRC, San Luis Obispo County and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
 - (2) ISFSI Aging Management / License Renewal inspections: to be scheduled prior to 31 August.

Mr. Rogers reported there have been no notable changes in plant leadership since the last DCISC public meeting.

Dr. Peterson thanked Mr. Rogers and called for public comment.

Ms. Linda Seeley of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Seeley reported she visited the Public Health Department to obtain a new supply of potassium iodide tablets and was informed the NRC is no longer ordering that potassium iodide be available to the public. Dr. Scarlat proposed to table Ms. Seeley's question until later in this meeting during presentations by NRC representatives.

A short break followed.

DCPP Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones introduced DCP Director of Risk and Compliance Mr. Jordan Tyman for an update on DCP regulatory performance. Mr. Jones reported the Mr. Tyman is responsible for oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory and Compliance Programs, enterprise and operational risk management, the procedure programs, nuclear cyber security, and emergency planning. Mr. Tyman has been employed by PG&E for nine years and spent ten years prior to coming to PG&E at Westinghouse Electric Corporation in support of the development of Westinghouse's AP1000 pressurized water reactor and in the nuclear industry in power operations. Mr. Jones reported that Mr. Tyman has various academic partnerships and

⁵ The NRC's ADAMS (Agency Documents and Management System) website is the official way to access public documents from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

holds memberships on numerous industry committees and a Degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Massachusetts.

Update on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation, Open Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Status of Cross-Cutting Issues Matrix, Current and Future License Amendment Requests, Effects of Recent NRC Inspection Program Changes on the Number and Composition of Inspections at DCP, and Other Significant Regulatory Issues/Requests.

Mr. Tyman reported that since the last public meeting of the DCISC in February 2026, oversight of DCP by the NRC included approximately 2,000 hours of inspection time including programmatic inspections and inspections by the NRC regional office by the two full-time resident inspectors who continue to perform inspections at DCP. During this period DCP continued in the highest performance categories measured against the NRC's sixteen identified Performance Indicators with all indicators in Green status.⁶ During this period DCP received no violations and did not initiate an LER. Mr. Tyman reported the NRC plans to conduct the evaluated emergency planning exercise during August 2026, and an inspection of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage installation (ISFSI) is being planned.

Mr. Tyman reported the NRC has approved License Amendment Requests (LARs) including providing for an extension for the limiting condition of operability for Technical Specification 303 (tech spec)⁷ for having two trains⁸ out of operation for up to 24 hours with approval of the tech spec. Previously the tech spec limit was one hour. He commented this change was based on risk-informed insights over a period of thirty years of performance by the nuclear industry. Another LAR was approved for the Auxiliary Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System to extend the completion time from 7 to 30 days which he reported is to allow for operational flexibility for additional maintenance activities.

LARs have been submitted and are under review for emergency planning and updating current industry standards around NRC publication NUREG 06-0654 Rev.2 guidance⁹

Mr. Tyman concluded his presentation by emphasizing that DCP remains in the highest NRC category under the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) for plant performance. In response to Mr. McWhorter's inquiry Mr. Tyman stated DCP has not seen any effect from an operational standpoint or in the level of oversight from changes in the NRC ROP. He reported there have

⁶ The safety significance characterizations used for the Performance Indicators as either Green (very low), qualifies for Baseline inspection; White (low to moderate), requires additional NRC oversight; Yellow (substantial), requires more NRC oversight; or Red (high), requires most NRC oversight. A Green non-cited violation indicates very low safety significance, with no impact on public health and safety.

⁷ As part of an NRC license authorizing operation of a nuclear facility, Technical Specifications establish requirements for items such as safety limits, limiting safety system settings, limiting control settings, limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, design features, and administrative controls.

⁸ An equipment train is the sequential arrangement of machinery, units, or components used to produce a result or to process or move a product. It is often defined as a series of connected components.

⁹ The NRC's NUREG-series publications consist of reports or brochures on regulatory decisions, results of research, results of incident investigations, and other technical and administrative information.

been recent changes with the issuance of revised inspection procedures which DCPD expects to review soon. He reported DCPD continues to have two full time resident inspectors at the site. He stated inspection procedures are being consolidated to make them more risk-informed and to prioritize the work of the inspections.

Dr. Meshkati questioned Mr. Tyman on the NRC moving away from the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) radiation protection guidelines. Mr. Tyman responded he has not had a conversation with the NRC on this topic and he understands the NRC is still working through guidance and the prospective framework for this issue.

In response to Dr. Scarlet's inquiry on DCPD-identified areas of improvement Mr. Tyman cited the those that are generated through the Corrective Action Program which receives between 50 and 100 recommendations daily for improvement and those generated through its own independent oversight organizations such as the Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC). In response to Dr. Scarlet's question Mr. Tyman reported the number of hours of inspections varies based upon the schedule and frequency and the number of inspectors required for certain inspections, but on average inspections average 2,000 hours per quarter. In response to Dr. Scarlet's question if the NRC didn't exist what areas and activities would DCPD refocus its efforts so that self-correcting and self-identifying activities continue Mr. Tyman identified the internal oversight process, self-critical and self-correcting approaches, benchmarking,¹⁰ self-assessments, operating experience from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) and recommendations from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and the Electric Power Research institute (EPRI). He also included the Quality Verification (QV) Program and the QV team which evaluates the station's performance and compliance and reports directly to the PG&E Chief Nuclear Officer. Dr. Scarlet remarked that as there are changes in the NRC's processes a robust strategy will be needed to respond to those changes and it is importance that this be communicated to the public.

In response to Dr. Peterson's comment concerning whether there is a gap in the Corrective Action Program in identifying things that have gone well and how they might be done even better, as opposed to problems that need to be corrected, Mr. Tyman confirmed PG&E has been focused on this topic and the Corrective Action Program has a process where recommendations for improvement are submitted and prioritized through the Innovation Council. The benefits achieved are tracked and Ms. Corral's communication team helps to promote the initiative through media tools and informational processes. Mr. Tyman stated DCPD employees are well trained in adding information to the Corrective Action Program and this includes innovative solutions which are identified and elevated to senior plant leadership for prioritization. Dr. Peterson observed this was extraordinarily important and valuable for safety and for safety culture and for maintaining a questioning attitude and he cautioned against a chilled environment for these types of interactions. Mr. Tyman reported a significant percentage of corrective actions seen on a routine basis are directed at ways to seek improvement in procedures or processes. He reported that the initiative to move forward on dynamic procedures started through benchmarking best practices in the industry and use of dynamic processes at DCPD was accordingly resourced and funded.

¹⁰ Benchmarking is the opportunity to assess DCPD performance against the best practices in the industry.

In response to Dr. Scarlat Mr. Tyman confirmed enhancements represent the largest portion of corrective actions and these are tracked and prioritized by the program. In response to Dr. Scarlat's query as to whether the percentages have varied over time as an indication of the highlights of a good nuclear safety culture, Mr. Tyman and Mr. Jones stated they would look to share that information and a metric with the DCISC in a future fact finding and in a subsequent public meeting. Dr. Scarlat remarked during the last few fact findings examples were given of grass roots input for suggesting improvement across the trades and Mr. Tyman gave the example of recent efforts in the use of artificial intelligence (AI). Mr. Jones reported efforts to eliminate waste and incorporate parts of the Lean Management System concepts employed by PG&E continue. Dr. Scarlat and Ms. Darden pointed to the Safety Champion and Maintenance Craftsmanship Council and the Operating Experience (OE) Program as grassroots efforts with a different level of formality employed by different departments which allows information to flow and the crafts to learn from each other.

The Chair thanked Mr. Tyman for an excellent presentation.

VI CONSULTANT REPORT & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND AUTHORIZE
TRANSMITTAL OF A FACT FINDING REPORT TO PG&E

B. The Chair requested Consultant Ms. Darden to provide a report on the March 18-19, 2026, fact-finding visit conducted with Dr. Scarlat. She reported Technical Consultant Mr. St. Onge participated in the fact finding visit remotely. Ms. Darden reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the March 2026 visit as follows:

➤ Plant Health Subcommittee Observation - the Fact Finding Team (FFT) observed a meeting of the Plant Health Subcommittee, a team of managers and employees responsible for reviewing system and program health and developing actions to address issues identified and to advise the Plant Health Committee (PHC). The PHC is made up of directors and above and is responsible for approving the action plans the Plant Health Subcommittee develops and for securing the necessary funding to proceed. The Plant Health Subcommittee maintains a Top Ten List for equipment issues which Ms. Darden described as a living document available across the plant and the Plant Health Subcommittee also maintains a list of the next ten items which would rise to the Top Ten List as other items roll off. The Plant Health Subcommittee meeting included participation by several operators and she described it as a good collegial discussion. Ms. Darden displayed an example of a 'heat map,' a type of report used by the Plant Health Subcommittee and she confirmed in response to Consultant McWhorter's questions that the heat map is used as an overall tool to visualize the risk of the identified top ten issues and to assess and categorize the issues based upon their unpredictability versus consequences. The Plant Health Subcommittee meeting was well attended and the participation was good. Dr. Scarlat commented that the interaction between participants at the Plant Health Subcommittee meeting was a good example of a strong safety culture.

➤ Meet with NRC Resident Inspector – the FFT met with the NRC Resident Inspector Mr. Eli Garcia to discuss plant performance, the re-baselining being undertaken by the NRC and how it would affect the resident inspectors' role with respect to staffing, training, and career

development. The FFT concluded meetings with the DCISC and the NRC Resident Inspectors are beneficial and should continue.

➤ FLEX¹¹ Support Guidelines for Propping Open Turbine Building Doors - Consultant Darden reported this topic arose from the December 2025 fact finding visit when the scenario of a collapse of the Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) System Discharge Structure was reviewed. She reported the FLEX strategy involves cutting the flexible joints immediately downstream of a component cooling water heat exchanger and re-establishing the saltwater flow through the Turbine Building with the water discharging outside the Turbine Building through doors which would need to be propped open to allow the water to flow. The DCPD staff interviewed were well versed subject matter experts on FLEX and detailed pictures and procedures were reviewed showing the equipment to be used and how the doors could be kept propped open. The necessary equipment is stored in the Control Room complex along with the necessary procedures and directions for what doors need to be open, but Ms. Darden stated that as this is a FLEX response personnel need to execute based upon their experience. Training has been conducted with Operations, Maintenance and DCPD Fire Department personnel and this would enable operators to select the doors to respond appropriately to an event as it was occurring. The FFT was satisfied with the FLEX strategy and the equipment put into place and noted there were several doors that opened outward available and this would make it easier to prop open a door if there was already a water flow established. Dr. Scarlat observed that as this was a FLEX action the FFT was not looking for specific procedures but rather for a scenario where one passive exit among many available would be sufficient. **The FFT recommended closure of the Recommendation D12/2/25FF-3.8.**

Consultant McWhorter confirmed that in accord with the discussion at the DCISC February public meeting the approval of a fact finding report that recommends opening or closure of a recommendation, whether to the Committee or to PG&E, approves those actions which will be reflected on the next edition of the Committee's Open items List.

➤ Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 2-2 Jacket Water Pump Leak Technical Specification Completion Time – Ms. Darden reported DCISC FFTs reviewed this issue in September and December 2025 and this review was regarding the tech spec completion time and how it was met for repair of this seal leak. She stated that the DCISC initially believed this leak was identified during a preceding EDG maintenance package prior to its return to service. However, the FFT learned the maintenance package was completed and EDG 2-2 was run for some time without a leak. It was on September 5, 2025, some days after its return to service that during a monthly surveillance test a leak was identified. The leak rate was determined to be 100 drops per minute and it was immediately evaluated as being within calculated limits and compensatory measures were not required because local alarm and annunciator procedures would ensure the jacket water level was maintained above the minimum level for operability. A sequence of events and a timeline was provided to the FFT and two prudent actions were

¹¹ FLEX is not an acronym but describes a strategy developed by the nuclear industry to provide diverse and flexible coping strategies to address the loss of safety-related systems due to certain beyond design basis events. It is a group of supplemental components, many of them portable, which are seismically stored, and can be made available for timely attachment to permanent plant systems for accident mitigation.

implemented to perform a daily check of the jacket water level when EDG 2-2 was not operating as when the EDG was not running the leak was not occurring. A two-hour check of the water level was implemented as a prudent action when EDG 2-2 was running. The leak was then repaired during a planned emergent maintenance window from September 28 to October 23, 2025. The Notification¹² created in the SAP¹³ system-driven Corrective Action Program stated that a compensatory measure was established which was tied to the operability of the equipment and the FFT learned that the Notification should have simply stated that prudent actions were established which were not tied to the operability of the equipment. Consultant Darden reported the tech spec operability completion time for an EDG is 14 days and a risk-informed completion time allows increasing the duration by up to 30 days with the use of probabilistic risk assessment tools which evaluate other equipment being out of service and certain risk management actions. But since the maintenance package that was done for EDG 2-2 and the emergency package to repair the leak took less than 14 days, risk-informed completion times were used. The FFT concluded that the tech spec required completion time was met for the September and October 2025 EDG 2-2 jacket water pump leak event, the completion time was appropriate and risk-informed completion times could be used in the future for similar events. **The FFT recommended closing Recommendation D12/2/25FF-3.1 and opening a new recommendation D3/26FF-3.4 for the DCISC to review the workflow of interfacing with the NRC Resident Inspector for a hypothetical scenario when a Notification mentions the need for a compensatory action but is later identified that the system was in fact operable and did not require a compensatory action.”**

In response to Dr. Meshkati’s comment about making recommendations to PG&E Dr. Scarlet replied that the issue on which the new recommendation to the DCISC was based was not identified until the end of the fact finding and as it was not fully discussed with PG&E it would not be appropriate to provide a less than informed recommendation to PG&E. Consultant Darden observed that this topic would be appropriate for a future fact finding visit. Dr. Scarlet remarked PG&E went above requirements in implementing prudent actions and the completion times which were reviewed were found not to be relevant given the time involved and she stated it is the issue of why it took the DCISC to understand and the workflow and the documentation with the NRC inspectors that needs to be further explored. Dr. Meshkati stated he believed this lesson and recommendation could be used as part of a preventative maintenance procedure for the EDGs. Dr. Scarlet agreed the event and PG&E’s actions in response can be used as a good example of correct management but the questions on workflow and documentation should receive more review.

➤ Strategic Plan for Compliance with New National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit – The plant’s new NPDES permit and federal Clean Water Act certification were approved by the state Water Regional Quality Control Board on February 26, 2026, and became effective on April 17 and the FFT explored DCP’s readiness to implement the permit. In order to obtain the permit baseline sampling was required for all expected

¹² The notification process creates an input called a Notification into the Corrective Action Program whenever a deficiency is identified and those Notifications then go through multiple reviews.

¹³ SAP (Systems, Applications, and Products) is a leading German software company and provider of enterprise resource planning (ERP) software.

discharge points and a vendor has been engaged to perform new annual sampling along with a chemist and laboratories for the analyses required by the permit. Procedures and training have been updated and implemented for any new sampling and six new sample points were identified and procedures were being written at the time of the FFT visit. Consultant Darden reported certain sampling may require different unit conditions such during a shutdown. The FFT concluded implementation of the NPDES permit and the staffing and training plans for complying with the NPDES permit and the Clean Water Act is on track for meeting the compliance date of April 26, 2026, and the DCISC will continue to monitor through regular chemistry monitoring and through fact finding. **The FFT recommended closure of recommendation D12/2/25-3.1.**

➤ Meet with a DCPD Officer – Ms. Darden reported the FFT met with a DCPD officer to discuss daily station operations and the agenda for the March fact finding. The FFT concluded meeting with DCPD officers and directors continues to be beneficial for both parties.

➤ Field Observation of a Maintenance Activity – Consultant Darden reported the FFT observed the pre-job briefing and a portion of the work as well as the post-job follow up associated with the calibration of a Unit 1 air side fuel oil pump pressure switch by Instrument & Control (I&C) Department technicians. She reported the pre-job brief included two technicians and a supervisor who were very thorough in their review with a strong focus on safety. The FFT observed the technicians using human performance tools in the plant to ensure the correct pressure switch, out of the five available, was identified and flagged. The Control Room was visited for a briefing on the work commencing and contact information was provided. The FFT also attended the post-job critique and follow up and learned the pressure switch was out of specification and required calibration and the technicians were successful in recalibrating the switch. The information was entered into the I&C Department operating experience which includes decades of data on individual components which can be accessed to review previous work. The FFT concluded the I&C team was adequately prepared and exhibited good standards and safety practices in the field.

➤ Safety Related Direct Current (DC) Power System Review – Consultant Darden reported the DC power system is a vital safety-related system important for indications and operations during planned and unplanned evolutions. The system is powered by lead acid batteries that are separated into three trains per unit and normally charged from offsite power. If offsite power is lost they can be used to supply the EDGs. The first quarter 2026 System Health Report showed the system in Green¹⁴ status. Ms. Darden reported that although the system engineer was new in the position he exhibited strong ownership and advocacy for system health and monitoring, trending, and testing for future health improvement. Dr. Meshkati commented during the accident in 2011 in Japan at the Fukushima Daiichi and Daiini nuclear power plants the lead acid batteries were inundated and he commented it is important that their locations be protected. Ms. Darden reported that each battery train at DCPD is located in a separate room with security

¹⁴ An assessment of Green means there is no equipment out of service or some other compromise to safety that would make the relative risk higher than the probabilistic risk assessment baseline for normal operation and maintenance activity and accordingly trigger a classification, in descending order, of White, Yellow or Red.

equipment and the batteries are checked monthly and each outage a full discharge test is performed. The batteries are replaced after ten years' service. Ms. Darden confirmed in response to Consultant McWhorter's question that while the FFT did not inspect the battery rooms they were included in the System Health Report. She confirmed the FFT found good collaboration between Engineering and Maintenance staff and data concerning the batteries is tracked and trended in the system health report. **Mr. McWhorter reported DCISC FFT have visited the battery rooms which are located in the Turbine Building and a visit and a walkdown could be arranged for Dr. Meshkati during the July 2026 fact finding. Dr. Scarlat observed it is also important to understand the failure modes for the batteries and why maintenance actions are taken with regard to the DC system and the batteries.**

➤ Station Update – the FFT received an update on recent station activities, including the cleaning of the circulating water tunnels which was discussed earlier during this meeting by Mr. Rogers. Consultant Darden reported that both tunnel cleanings were completed safely and the biofouling found was less than experienced in the past due to improved health of the Chlorine Injection System and to the use of marine-type paint that resists biofouling on sections of the tunnels. Ther FFT concluded station updates continue to be informative.

➤ Units 1 and 2 Steam Generator Degradation Assessment Error Analysis – this review followed the December 2025 fact finding when the DCISC FFT reviewed the steam generator (SG) tube support plate and anti-vibration bar wear and recommended the DCISC review the error analysis for calculations on a continued degradation assessment for Units 1 and 2. Ms. Darden reported DCISC review found the SGs are very healthy and the primary focus of the FFT inquiry was on the uncertainty calculations for determining the potential through-wall leak of the worst case SG tube locations over the next eight years per NRC guidance. The FFT found the uncertainty calculations followed the prescribed methodology, were fully documented and the results were sufficiently conservative and appropriate. **The FFT recommended Recommendation D12/2/25FF 3.5 be closed.**

➤ Meet with Individual Contributors from Various Departments – Consultant Darden reported the FFT met with five non-supervisory individuals from the Planning, Mechanical Maintenance, Instrument & Control, and Operations Departments. She reported that each of the individuals supported and were involved in the Safety Champion Program as a grass roots effort in support of plant safety and they believed safety was valued at the station. These individuals also gave examples of a supervisor' teaching culture and confirmed that each department employs an internal operating experience database to assist in job preparation. Each of the individuals expressed support for the future use of dynamic (aka electronic) procedures and several were involved in their development. **Dr. Peterson remarked that several years ago DCPD was not successful in implementing dynamic procedures and he stated acceleration of the implementation of dynamic procedures was the subject of a DCISC Recommendation as there is a real potential for a substantial improvement in operational safety with the use of dynamic procedures and he stated the DCISC should continue to closely track this issue.**

➤ Preparations for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Canister Inspections in August 2026 – the last inspection was performed in June 2021 in support of the renewal of the

Aging Management Program for the ISFSI license from the NRC. At that time eight canisters were inspected which were selected based on materiel differences and environmental conditions with no major structural or unusual configurations found. Some canisters were found with small amounts of minor discoloration spots with no observed degradation. The site-specific license for the ISFSI requires inspection of two or more canisters every five years. Consultant Darden reported in August 2026 DCPD plans to inspect the same eight canisters that were inspected in 2021 and the discoloration spots will be reexamined to determine if there is a difference from 2021. She reported a more sophisticated inspection probe with enhanced visual measurement capacity will be used in the 2026 inspection.

Dr. Peterson commented that the topic of canister through-wall cracks caused by stress corrosion cracking has been a subject on which the Committee has had interest in the past. He expressed doubt that there could be any significant radiological release occurring from a [multi purpose] canister with a through-wall crack due to the narrow aperture. **He reported that early after a canister is loaded helium under high pressure is relied upon for heat removal, but by the time a through-wall crack could develop the decay heat will have significantly dropped. He remarked this issue is also of concern to members of the public and the DCISC should explore the safety implications of any type of stress corrosion cracking of a canister. Dr. Scarlat inquired as to the time the atmospheric pressure from helium is sufficient for cooling and Dr. Peterson observed this is something which the DCISC should investigate. Dr. Peterson observed that over time with counter-diffusion eventually oxygen and moisture will enter the canister but the spent fuel assemblies are very robust and should not experience significant degradation. Dr. Scarlat stated that based on public interest in this topic the DCISC should understand at what point in time helium stops playing a role in heat removal and when air ingress into the canister occurs. Dr. Peterson remarked that he is confident that a safety analysis exists as part of the licensing documentation on heat removal and fuel temperature. Consultant Darden reported DCPD is working with the vendor on developing inspection tools to take samples of any residue found and is working on contracts with the vendor that will do the inspection in August 2026. The FFT concluded that the ISFSI inspection team provided the FFT information on the details regarding the procedures, equipment, training, and the contracts for the upcoming August 2026 inspections and the FFT concluded the readiness of the inspection team was on track. The FFT recommended that Recommendation D12/15/25FF-3.11A should remain open to provide for a presentation by PG&E on the 2026 inspection and that Dr. Scarlat be invited to observe the inspection.**

Dr. Peterson asked for public comment on the March 18-19, 2026, Fact Finding Report.

Dr. Robert J. Budnitz, a former member of the DCISC for 18 years, was recognized. Dr. Budnitz stated he recalled reviewing an analysis of the implications of a through-wall crack in a canister and he commented a principal threat from a through-wall crack comes in context of a large earthquake and he stated PG&E's analysis concluded that a design basis earthquake would not produce any important consequences and he described this as a reassuring conclusion. Concerning the EDG 2-2 jacket water pump leak Dr. Budnitz stated that as PG&E did not take any inappropriate actions, no recommendation by the Committee would be in order.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – OCTOBER 8, 2026

On a motion made by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Meshkati the March 18-19, 2026, Fact Finding Report was unanimously approved.

VII ADJOURN MORNING MEETING

The Chair adjourned the morning meeting of the DCISC at 11:50 a.m.

VIII RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING

The afternoon meeting of the DCISC was convened by the Chair at 1:15 p.m. Dr. Peterson welcomed everyone and recognized the presence this afternoon of representatives from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. He introduced his fellow Members, the Consultants and Counsel and briefly described the founding and responsibilities of the Committee and described its mode of operation. He remarked that the Committee's ability to receive and follow up on questions from the public is one of its principal attributes and the Committee has enjoyed success in this regard.

IX COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

Dr. Meshkati welcomed NRC representatives.

X PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. John Geesman, an attorney representing the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Geesman reported that during the DCISC's February 2026 that DCPD was one of only two **nuclear power plants in the U.S. that has a permanent "no fly" zone designation over a portion of the owner-controlled area and he inquired what other plant joined DCPD in having this designation and what distinguishes these two nuclear power plants from others. Dr. Peterson stated the Committee will need to obtain an answer to Mr. Geesman's inquiry during a future fact finding.**

Ms. Rochelle Becker of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Ms. Becker stated the forecast for the coming year is for an El Nino event, meaning warmer ocean water temperatures, higher tides and changes in plankton. **She observed warmer water and increases in seaweed may impact the plant's cooling systems. She asked whether the Committee was in contact with the various agencies that are reviewing these issues. Dr. Peterson replied that the Committee would follow up on Ms. Becker's inquiry during a future fact finding.**

Ms. Linda Seeley of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Seeley remarked that recently there was a 7.4' high tide above the mean high tide level which she stated was extraordinarily high for this time of year and she reported sea levels have risen three inches in the past 20 years. Consultant McWhorter reported the issue of sea level rise and tsunamis were addressed in PG&E's filing before the California Coastal Commission as part of license renewal.

Mr. David Weisman was recognized. Mr. Weisman reported he has been attending public meetings of the DCISC since 2001 and he read from a letter he sent early during that time to the then President of the CPUC concerning why there were no outside consultants on the DCISC who were chosen to be ‘watchdogs’ for the local San Luis Obispo community. He reported when during a DCISC public meeting he raised a comparison with the Atkinson Panel, a panel formed regarding the proposed Ward Valley waste site which included representatives for the Physicians for Social Responsibility and Native American representatives he was told that the subject was not relevant to the DCISC’s agenda and later during the meeting one of the DCISC members castigated him for mentioning the Ward Valley panel. Mr. Weisman then remarked that over the past 25 years that no longer happens and he credited the Committee Legal Counsel for organizing and running the Committee’s meetings differently as well as the subsequent members who engage with the public in a courteous and respectful manner.

XI INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Dr. Peterson introduced the NRC Acting Senior Resident inspector for DCPD Mr. Eli Garcia who will present the NRC’s annual assessment of DCPD end-of-cycle performance for calendar year 2025. Dr. Peterson welcomed Mr. Garcia and commented that the Committee representatives welcome the opportunity to meet with the NRC resident inspectors during each fact finding. Dr. Peterson asked the NRC representatives present to make the next presentation to the Committee.

Presentations by the NRC’s Resident Inspector for DCPD Mr. Eli Garcia on the NRC’s Annual Assessment of DCPD’s End-of Cycle Performance for Calendar Year 2025, and by NRC Region IV, Division of Reactor Projects Ms. Patricia Vossmer on the Changes to the Reactor Oversight Process Recently Approved by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

C. NRC’s Annual Assessment of DCPD’s End-of Cycle Performance for Calendar Year 2025:

Mr. Garcia reviewed the NRC’s Mission Statement and reported it has been updated but holds true to the principles the NRC has adhered to since its inception to protect civilian nuclear energy technologies. He commented the addition of the term “efficient” to the mission statement reflects that the NRC has learned a great deal over 50 years and can now apply that knowledge to being a more efficient and a better regulator. He reported on the strategic goals established which include safety and security, organizational health, and stakeholder confidence. He commented that the term stakeholder encompasses a wide variety of individuals including members of the public, those living in the surrounding communities, the licensees, and members of Congress and the NRC’s goal is to inspire confidence that the NRC is an agency capable of meeting its goals and accomplishing its mission.

Mr. Garcia summarized DCPD’s performance during 2025 and reported both units were operated safely by PG&E in a manner that served public health and protected the environment. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 are in the Licensee Response Column 1 of the NRC Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) Action Matrix. Moving from Column 1 to Columns 2 or 3 is indicative of degraded performance and results in more and enhanced oversight and inspections. Of approximately 90 nuclear plants operating in the U.S. only five or six are in Column 2.

Mr. Garcia reported during 2025 there were approximately 7,500 hours of inspection and inspection-related activities conducted at DCPD for both units, including inspections by the resident inspection team conducting Baseline inspections as well as Baseline inspections performed by NRC Regional Office inspection teams. During 2025 he reported there were three major team inspections for license renewal, fire protection, and for cyber security. He reported in late March 2025 the operating licenses for DCPD Unit 1 and Unit 2 were renewed for an additional 20 years of operation.

Mr. Garcia reported during 2025 all 17 Performance Indicators for each unit remained in Green¹⁵ status and there were 6 Green severity level findings at the site. He described the Performance Indicators as a measurable aspect of the licensee's performance. He stated these findings on multiple occasions stemmed from failure to follow procedures and work instructions. One finding involved a security officer inadvertently keying his radio while in an exclusion zone which sent spurious non-valid information to the Control Room. Another finding involved work done in the Turbine Building, when during replacement of fire sprinkler headers a wrong component was replaced and resulted in water being discharged onto electrical equipment. He reported all NRC Inspection Reports are available through the NRC website.

Mr. Garcia reported for 2026 because all Performance Indicators were Green both units will receive inspections under the Baseline Inspection Programs. He reported that during 2026 the plant will conduct a graded emergency preparedness exercise and in October 2026 in-service inspections will be performed. Mr. Garcia provided contact information for the NRC and public meeting forms were provided in the meeting room.

In response to Dr. Scarlat's question Mr. Garcia estimated of the 7,500 inspection hours the resident inspection team performed approximately 2,000 of those hours per unit. In response to Dr. Peterson's request Mr. Garcia reported each nuclear power plant has two resident inspectors who performed the bulk of the inspection activities but the NRC regional offices provide the inspectors for certain specialist inspections for example for fire protection and these inspectors are trained and qualified through programs similar to that for the resident inspectors. In response to Dr. Meshkati's question concerning inspections during refueling outages Mr. Garcia replied that during refueling outages the two resident inspectors are not augmented in their tasks by having additional inspectors on site to support their activities and he commented that during refueling outages inspectors have an opportunity to review items which may not be reviewed during operation. In response to Dr. Scarlat's query Mr. Garcia reported the DCISC public meetings afford a venue for the NRC to report to the public and the NRC conducts meetings using in-person or remote facilities in other communities in proximity to nuclear power plants. He commented that participation in these end-of-cycle performance assessments varies, as at some sites engender more involvement by the members of the local communities than others. **Dr. Scarlat proposed that the DCISC should consider the role of its public**

¹⁵ The safety significance characterizations used for the Performance Indicators as either Green (very low) calling for Baseline inspection, White (low to moderate), calling for additional NRC oversight, Yellow (substantial), requiring more NRC oversight, or Red (high), requiring the most NRC oversight. A Green non-cited violation indicates very low safety significance, with no impact on public health and safety.

engagement mandate and whether that is to be officially coordinated with the NRC or whether the NRC and DCISC efforts should be independent. She commented the DCISC should evaluate whether it is conducting its efforts effectively and if the correct communities are being engaged and she requested this be added to the Open Items List. In response to Dr. Scarlat's inquiry, Mr. Garcia reported the NRC processes allegations and concerns raised through an Enforcement and Allegations Team established within each regional office.

Ms. Patricia Vossmar, Acting Director for the Division of Reactor Safety for NRC Region IV continued the presentation.

C. Changes to the Reactor Oversight Process Recently Approved by the NRC.

Ms. Vossmar expressed her appreciation for the ability to coordinate with the DCISC and to coordinate with the DCISC's public meetings as a venue to communicate with interested members of the public concerning the performance. Dr. Peterson remarked that in the past sometimes DCISC and NRC meetings would overlap and be conducted separately and he stated combining the meetings in one location represents an excellent solution.

Ms. Vossmar reported the inspectors mentioned by Mr. Garcia who travel to each reactor site to do specialized inspections of DCPD on a periodic basis are part of the Division of Reactor Safety which she oversees. She reported she holds a Bachelor's Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Michigan and her career at NRC spans 20 years including time spent as a Branch Chief for the Resident Inspector Program at several sites including DCPD and as Branch Chief for Operator Licensing based in Region IV and she became the Acting Director for the Division of Reactor Safety within Region IV in November 2025.

Ms. Vossmar reported there have been many changes at the NRC in response to actions under the ADVANCE Act¹⁶ as well as the Executive Orders issued by the current administration¹⁷ focused on the NRC regulatory processes and oversight structure. She remarked these changes were adopted on a bipartisan basis to enable the U.S. to be able to adapt an energy strategy to fit national needs while keeping focus on safety. NRC Commissioner Hon. Matthew Marzano authored the ADVANCE Act. Part of the strategy is to shift the NRC's priorities to the licensing of new technologies and to help improve risk-informing of NRC processes. She reported this drove the NRC to change its Mission Statement to add "enable" to the use and management of safe technology.

Ms. Vossmar reported that the reorganization of the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process began on June 14, 2026, and a number of organizational modernization initiatives were launched with the object of helping streamline decision-making, consolidate functions, and enhance and

¹⁶ The Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act is a bipartisan federal law signed on July 9, 2024, that reforms nuclear regulations to speed up advanced reactor deployment.

¹⁷ President Trump signed four executive orders on May 23, 2025, aimed at overhauling the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and aggressively expanding U.S. nuclear energy capacity fourfold by 2050.]

strengthen alignment with national priorities for the safe use of nuclear technology and to align NRC offices based on function and business lines. Ms. Vossmar displayed several organizational charts and reported that two new NRC offices have been created for the Office of Advanced Reactors and the Office of the Chief Nuclear Reactor Inspector (CNRI) with all four NRC regions aligned under the CNRI. The Office of Advanced Reactors focuses on new and advanced reactors and on moving forward with their efficient licensing while the CNRI focuses on how the NRC is implementing the programmatic functions and the inspections and follow-up on operating nuclear reactors. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation remains focused on rulemaking and licensing as well as on technical programs. The Office of Nuclear Security & Incident Response is now incorporated within the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. She reported that the four NRC Regional Offices are now being aligned for coordination under the CNRI while NRC Headquarters programmatic functions provide oversight of the inspection process.

Ms. Vossmar stated that within the NRC Regional Offices there are now two divisions each focused on operating reactors with the Division of Reactor Processes having oversight of the Resident Inspector Program and the Division of Reactor Safety focusing on the traveling expert inspection teams. The office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards is charged with waste inspection, spent fuel storage and transportation, materials oversight, and decommissioning and she reported the inspectors for these functions, while located within Region IV, will now report to the office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards. She reported this reorganization involved layers of leadership, administrative, and corporate support and some inspection staff have been downsized which has been primarily achieved through attrition. A set of three policy papers to update the Reactor Oversight Process were recently approved to sharpen the focus of inspection on spending less time on repeated low value verification inspections while improving consistency across the region.

Ms. Vossmar stated these efforts represent the first modernization of the Reactor Oversight Process since its creation in 2000 and while ultimately they will change the scope of inspections and regulatory outcomes, the objective remains to never sacrifice safety. She reported the Reactor Oversight Process now has 25 years of experience data and feedback from 200 inspectors which aids in identifying areas for improvement that were either too complex or too repetitive and the intent is to make the program more efficient, flexible and provide assessments which are more representative of actual plant performance. This will allow inspectors to apply judgment and to use their insights based on plant performance to help them with the scope of their inspections. Ms. Vossmar reported that based on the data the performance of the nuclear industry has improved over time as the industry has matured and she stated the industry has worked to address past regulatory issues and to maintain a focus on a strong safety culture.. Combined with industry safety initiatives this has resulted in programmatic changes and institutionalized quality within the industry. She reported from the NRC's perspective, it gives confidence that adjustments to the Reactor Oversight Process can be made safely and the time to do so is appropriate. She commented the larger focus is on being risk-informed, efficient, and focusing on areas where safety is impacted while giving the nuclear industry and plants across the country credit for improved performance. She reported that what has not changed is the NRC's overall mission to focus on safety and security.

Ms. Vossmar stated the inspectors are well trained and well qualified and each operating site has two resident inspectors and that will remain unchanged. Region-based inspectors will still conduct inspections across the cornerstones¹⁸ and that will remain unchanged. A strong and predictive oversight framework involving inspections, investigations, and operator licensing examinations will remain intact. There will continue to be follow-up on allegations and enforcement actions and event response, as well as continuous assessment of licensee performance. Focus will remain on risk significant activities, efficient use of resources, timely and effective decision making and communication with stakeholders.

Ms. Vossmar reported that under the revised Reactor Oversight Process there will be approximately a 42% reduction in inspector effort representing an annual decrease in inspection hours per site from 2018 to 1162 and she remarked this scaling back recognizes the improvement in industry performance while acknowledging that there were some inefficiencies and low value inspections taking place under the former system. Reactor safety inspectors will be given more discretion to define the scope of their inspections based on plant performance and plant-specific risk insights. Some specialized engineering inspections will move from biennial to triennial frequency. For radiation safety during refueling outages the inspectors' activities will be focused on reviewing activities and programs for work that has a higher radiological risk and specialist inspectors will still visit to focus on radiation protection and in-service inspections. Resident inspectors will pick up some day-to-day security reviews with support from the regions. Force-on-force inspections will provide the licensee with more flexibility and a greater role in developing the scenarios and on the outcomes focusing on learning and correcting any weaknesses. The NRC is evaluating making a transition from the NRC conducting force-on-force inspections to a licensee conducted inspection activity akin to what is done now with emergency preparedness. There will still be the ability for the resident inspectors to perform reactive inspections which are event-based.

Ms. Vossmar reported the Problem Identification and Resolution inspections (PI&R) will focus more on the Corrective Action Program on a triennial basis. Focus will be on more than minor screening criteria to make it clear when documenting findings or potential violations, that it is something of more than minor significance. White findings under the Performance Indicators will be somewhat less impactful and more credit will be given to licensee-identified performance issues to encourage self-identification by the plants. She reported the new Reactor Oversight Process goes into effect on July 1, 2026, and inspectors are already being trained on the transition. An effectiveness review will take place in 2028 to capture lessons learned.

Ms. Vossmar reported that Executive Order 14300, one of the Executive Orders issued by President Trump, ordered a wholesale review of NRC regulations and she reported there are many initiatives under review to determine if rulemaking needs to be adjusted with a focus on being risk-informed, reducing redundancy and licensing new nuclear technologies. Ms. Vossmar closed her presentation with the comment the NRC's first priority is safety and core mission

¹⁸ The NRC uses seven core cornerstones in the Reactor Oversight Process divided across three strategic performance areas, reactor safety, radiation safety and safeguards, to evaluate commercial nuclear power plant safety. The cornerstones for each of the three strategic performance areas are as follows: reactor safety: initiating events, mitigating systems, barrier integrity and emergency preparedness.

delivery in a safe, effective, efficient and risk-informed manner. The second priority is to make sure strong safety leadership remains in place and the NRC continues its culture of continuous learning and improvement while shifting to become a more agile regulator.

In response to Dr. Meshkati's inquiry Ms. Vossmar replied there will be a change and a reduction in scope of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) and the ACRS review will be primarily focused on new technologies and the ACRS focus on license extension for operating nuclear power plants will be reduced.

In response to Dr. Scarlet's queries, Ms. Vossmar stated that in the process of managing the reorganization and changes there were some internal stakeholder engagements, but not a lot of external stakeholder engagement which she observed is similar to how change is managed by a business. Ms. Vossmar confirmed there is an internal process that continues to evaluate the effectiveness of the changes with the expectation of an effectiveness review being conducted in 2028. The NRC is working to develop performance indicators to assess the effectiveness of its oversight including tracking events and violations to identify negative performance trends. Regarding public engagement in this process, public input will likely not be solicited for internal metrics but there will be public meetings held on the overall changes and there will be an opportunity for the general public to comment when the proposed rulemaking is published in the Federal Register. Ms. Vossmar confirmed a comment by Dr. Scarlet the process will depend on more reliance on on-demand data streams without the mandatory sampling required under the current process of using data to feed into the Performance Indicator process and Ms. Vossmar confirmed this change overlaps with the implementation of AI.

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated through risk information there are tens of millions of Americans who have received diagnostic and therapeutic radiation doses with no adverse consequences and he stated the ALARA Program currently attempts to push dose below natural background. He inquired how the NRC is planning to reform and, in his view, to get rid of ALARA. Ms. Vossmar replied and stated part of the President's Executive Order includes the modernization of radiation protection standards and on the requirements and the use of ALARA as well as the appropriateness of the linear 'no threshold' theory and this is part of that review. She reported the NRC is in the proposed rule stage and a proposed rule should be published and shared with the public soon and until that time the matter is considered pre-decisional and not suitable for comment.

Ms. Rochelle Becker of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Ms. Becker asked how many people are affected by the reduction in hours for inspection procedures. She commented that during the tenure of the current Administration people who voice their concerns are dismissed or leave employment with the federal agency. She asked whether the metrics Ms. Vossmar described will be transparent to the public and if AI will be used to replace any of the inspections. Ms. Vossmar stated she shares Ms. Becker's concern regarding respect for divergent views and the NRC has an internal process and an internal culture supporting the documentation and disposition of concerns and that has not changed under the Executive Orders. She reported most of the reductions in inspection hours have been addressed through attrition of personnel slated for retirement. She replied to Ms. Becker's concern regarding the use of AI that there are no current plans to have NRC inspectors replaced by AI, but it is a tool that can be

incorporated into processes. Concerning metrics, she stated in her view that it would be appropriate for the NRC to share the metrics with the public.

In response to Dr. Scarlat's question on the NRC's Differing Professional Opinion Program Ms. Vossmar stated differing views are not necessarily being publicly disclosed and there is a process that allows disposition at a lower level rather than through repeated review and appeals.

Ms. Linda Seeley of San Luis Obispo Mother for Peace was recognized. Ms. Seeley stated she was troubled by the 42% reduction in inspection hours without compromising safety and security as that seems incompatible. She stated she was also concerned about eliminating ALARA, as a February 2026 study by the Harvard School of Public Health showed an increased cancer mortality risk in people living near nuclear power plants although the study did not establish causality and this is of great concern to her. She reported the hotline maintained by Mothers for Peace recently received a call from a DCPD worker who reported an "old boys club" mentality for the maintenance culture at DCPD which means instead of maintaining equipment the equipment is run to failure. Ms. Seeley stated she was concerned about the DCISC's impartiality and she commented there is a great deal of pressure being brought by PG&E on lawmakers to extend DCPD operations to 2045.

Dr. Meshkati referred to the 42% reduction in inspection hours with no compromise to safety and security and he questioned how that could be measured as it is too early. Ms. Vossmar replied and stated her statement was prospective and based on a self-assessment that is intended to be complete in two years and will be based on data collected in the interim over that period. She stated the intent is to cut down specifically on redundant activities and samples that really have not yielded tangible safety benefits and some credit is given for licensee performance. She confirmed the resident inspectors will remain on duty each day observing what is happening in the plant and the inspectors are empowered to identify and drive any issues identified to resolution.

Dr. Peterson thanked Ms. Vossmar and Mr. Garcia for their excellent presentations. He then introduced the Hon. Robert J. Feitel, the NRC Inspector General and welcomed Mr. Feitel and his staff to the meeting for a presentation on the role of the Office of the NRC Inspector General.

D. Presentation by the Honorable Robert J. Feitel, NRC Inspector General, and his staff on the Role of the Office of Inspector General in Overseeing the Work of the NRC.

Mr. Feitel thanked the Committee for having him and his staff present today and to address some remarks to the Committee and the public and stated his goal today was to demystify the role of the Inspector General for the NRC, a position he has served in for six years. He provided information about the website for the Office of the BRC Inspector General (OIG) and reported the website provides access to the OIG's reports and he discussed three of those reports of specific importance to the Committee.

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Regarding the Event Inquiry on March 25, 2022, into the NRC's oversight of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System at DCPD Mr. Feitel stated this report produced considerable push-back from the NRC staff which issued a staff assessment of the report. Since the event DCPD has remedied the AFW System failure, improved the AFW System and the plant continues to operate safely in compliance with regulations. The staff assessment recommended inspector training on corrosion under insulation and conducted a review of inspector qualifications for potential improvement and to ensure the objectives, requirements, and associated guidance for the inspection procedure for equipment alignment are clear to internal and external stakeholders across single and multiple unit sites. Staff further recommended the DCPD corrosion under insulation event be communicated in context of operating experience. Mr. Feitel remarked this inquiry demonstrates the impact of the OIG which is independent from and works alongside the NRC. He described the relationship as interactive with the OIG independently overseeing the NRC through highly constructive criticism to help the NRC achieve continuous improvement.

Mr. Feitel gave another example of and referred to the March 2024 Special Inquiry into the appearance of a conflict of interest involving members of the Advisory Committee on the Medical Use of Isotopes (ACMUI) and he reported the OIG oversees NRC interaction with advisory committees relied upon by the NRC, including the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). In the ACMUI inquiry the allegation was related to the NRC's consideration of a petition for rulemaking to amend regulations when two members of the ACMUI were found to have a business relationship with the Society of Nuclear Medicine and Molecular Imaging, a scientific and professional organization that carried out a campaign opposing the subject of the rulemaking, which opposition created the appearance of a conflict of interest and therefore ACMUI procedures were not followed. Mr. Feitel commented that this demonstrates that the OIG is looking at the whole of the NRC's approach to conflicts of interest.

Another example of an OIG assessment concerned the Inspector General's assessment of the most serious management and performance challenges facing the NRC in FY 2026 which Mr. Feitel described as an assessment done each year as required under the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000.

Mr. Feitel then reviewed the mission statement of the OIG as "providing independent objective audit, evaluations, and investigative oversight of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to promote integrity, economy and efficiency. He reported that the OIG is responsible for the oversight of both federal agencies. He reported that one of the purposes of the OIG is to detect and deter fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement. He reported there are four separate types of inspector generals (IGs) including: (1) establishment IGs, which describes Mr. Feitel's service, who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate, of which there are approximately 34 IGs; (2) federal entity IGs appointed by the heads of the agencies they oversee; (3) permanent IGs who serve largely in the legislative branch, and (4) special IGs created by Congress as needs arise.

Mr. Feitel stated the OIG's three strategic goals include safety, strengthening the NRC's effort to protect public health, safety and the environment; security, to strengthen the agency's efforts to address evolving security threats; and corporate support to support and increase the

agency's economic efficiency and effectiveness with which the agency manages and exercises stewardship over its resources. He commented that this diverse reporting ability is supported by the diversity of the OIG staff of 63 employees consisting of attorneys, nuclear engineers, federal law enforcement agents, certified public accountants, auditors, and former NRC inspectors. He displayed an organizational chart for the OIG's senior leadership team and stated the OIG relies on tips provided through whistleblowers, a hotline portal, input from the public and Congress and from the Counsel of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

Concerning reforming and modernizing NRC nuclear regulation and regulatory framework Mr. Feitel reported the NRC is heavily engaged in those efforts in response to the ADANCE Act and Executive Order 14300 and he described this as an ongoing and challenging effort. The NRC is also challenged with enabling safety deployment of advanced reactors including small modular reactors and microreactors as well as with the impacts of AI.

Mr. Feitel thanked the Committee for its attention and then asked Assistant Inspector General for Audits and Evaluations Miss Hruta Virkar to continue the presentation.

Ms. Virkir reported the Audits and Evaluations Division within the OIG is multi-faceted and staffed to independently and objectively evaluate the agency's programs and operations to detect fraud, to eliminate waste and promote efficiency while keeping the NRC management and Congress fully informed. Her Division attests to the accuracy of the financial statement audits and that the NRC develops and documents all the requirements for the information safety program, under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act to protect data and information for operations at all power plants. The Audits and Evaluations Division also addresses public concerns in context of the OIG's public outreach efforts.

Ms. Virkir described a review by the Audits and Evaluations Division as beginning with the planning for the engagement, program and policy review and background research. If gaps or areas of improvement are identified field work then takes place at the site to interview staff and gather data before commencing the reporting phase, formulating findings and conclusions, and then making recommendations. The NRC is then provided with a draft report and the Division engages in a dialogue with NRC management before publishing a final report. The last post audit step she described as resolution and follow up with the NRC having to respond within a minimum of two years to address the recommendations, have a corrective action plan in place, and then to implement that plan.

Ms. Virkir described deliverables by the Audits and Evaluation Division as consisting of three types of statutory audits under the Payment Integrity Information Act, performance audits of any program, contract audit, limited scope audit of management and performance challenges under the Report and Consolidation Act of 2000, and triennial peer reviews under the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Information where offices of other inspector generals' review the workings, standards and accountability of another inspector general's office. She reported that the NRC OIG has received the highest grade on peer reviews conducted She provided a QR code which can be used to review all the reports by her Division issued for the last several years, including the most recent on cyber security audit to ensure that as power plants move from analog to digital they are in compliance with cyber and national security

requirements. She commented that the cyber security programs at the power plants reviewed were fundamentally robust, but several areas were identified for improvement.

Ms. Virkir requested Assistant Inspector General for Investigations Mr. Malion Bartley to continue the presentation.

Mr. Bartley reported as a Presidential appointee and Establishment Inspector General, Mr. Feitel has statutory law enforcement authority and the Investigations Division comprises federal Special Agents who are also nuclear engineers, attorneys who have worked in nuclear power plants, and cyber security specialists with Department of Defense experience. All of whom he reported possess arrest powers and cases brought by the Investigations Division are referred to the Department of Justice for prosecution.

Mr. Bartley gave examples of the types of matters the Investigations Division deals with including criminal matters, fraud, conflict of interest, allegations, waste, abuse and mismanagement and other instances of employer or contractor malfeasance and he reported the Investigations Division follows the same standards as the FBI. The Division also runs the OIG hotline and responds to Freedom of Information Act requests and to allegations from Congress. Mr. Bartley stated the Investigations Division submits a semi-annual report to Congress. Mr. Bartley asked Mr. Pete Snyder and Mr. Natreon Jordan to continue the presentation.

Mr. Snyder stated he serves as one of the OIG Technical Services Section engineers and with Mr. Jordan prior to coming to the OIG they have experience with the NRC as inspectors and licensing reviewers. He reported that the Technical Services Section advises the OIG auditors and investigators and management on technical matters and they try to remain aware of latest technical developments and licensing initiatives. He asked OIG General Counsel Mr. Jeremy Suttenger to continue the presentation.

Mr. Suttenger remarked the Inspector General Act provides for each inspector general to have access to independent legal counsel and he stated he does not coordinate legal advice with the NRC General Counsel. He stated his office advises on policy matters, supports the review of allegations, and reviews the audits, evaluations and investigation work of the OIG for legal sufficiency. Mr. Suttenger reported his office reviews all pending legislation and pending regulations to assess whether the regulation or legislation would weaken fraud prevention in an NRC program or interfere with the OIG's independence and if so a report is provided to Congress. He reported that his office protects the integrity of the whistleblower protection system and interacts with attorneys for the NRC and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to ensure the OIG has access to needed documents and records.

Dr. Peterson thanked Mr. Feitel and all members of his staff for their informative presentations. In response to Dr. Scarlat's questions concerning OIG oversight of the changes being undertaken by the NRC Mr. Feitel replied while additional resources, personnel and budget for his office would be helpful and speed the work of his office, in the current climate it is not easy to get those resources which come directly from Congress. In response to Dr. Meshkati's comment regarding the concept of regulatory capture and whether there was an investigation by the OIG on the recommendations which followed the Fukushima accident in

Japan in 2011 Mr. Feitel replied he was aware of the matter, but as it predated his service as the NRC Inspector General he could not offer any comments other than that the current NRC Chair and Commissioners would be resistant to such a situation.

Mr. John Geeseman, an attorney representing the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Geeseman stated he was familiar with the 2022 report on the AFW System mentioned by Mr. Feitel and he stated his belief the report was handled well including the NRC staff response and the report proved of value to his client in proceedings before the CPUC. Mr. Geeseman inquired as to the Inspector General's view on the 42% reduction in inspection hours discussed previously by Ms. Vossmer and he questioned if the inspections were of so little value that they could be dispensed with entirely. Mr. Feitel stated that an answer to Mr. Geeseman's question devolves into the programmatic operations of the NRC and that an inquiry in that context does not fall within the purview of his office and without credible evidence that something is problematic, fraudulent, or wasteful there is nothing for the OIG to investigate. He remarked the OIG looks at the NRC externally and it is not tasked to tell the NRC how to run its operations.

In response to a question from Ms. Linda Seeley of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace Mr. Feitel replied that the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) did not review the operations of the OIG and no one in his organization was either interviewed or dismissed by DOGE.

Dr. Gene Nelson, Californians for Green Nuclear Power, stated he hopes Mr. Feitel's office will employ its technical expertise in reviewing the rulemaking concerning ALARA when it becomes non-pre-decisional.

Dr. Peterson again thanked Mr. Feitel and his staff for their participation and Mr. Rathie also thanked the representatives of NRC Region IV and the OIG for their cooperation in making the arrangements for this meeting.

A short break followed.

XI CONSULTANT REPORT & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF A FACT FINDING REPORT TO PG&E

E. The Chair requested Consultant Mr. McWhorter to provide a report on the April 13-14, 2026, fact-finding visit conducted with Dr. Meshkati. He reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the April 2026 visit as follows:

➤ Cyber Security Program – Consultant McWhorter reported this review is on the Open Items List for periodic review. The program was established in 2017 and includes implementation of improved NEI and NRC approved guidelines. DCPD has approximately 4,000 pieces of equipment and 66 systems as critical digital assets including control systems and security devices, but it typically does not include any significant safety-related equipment. The Cyber Security Program is targeted to protect critical digital assets. The NRC Cyber Security Inspection Report did not contain any findings due to security concerns. Mr. McWhorter

reported one finding was self-identified by DCPD while the other was identified by the NRC and these general findings consisted of programmatic requirements that were not met but did not represent compromises in cyber security. A quick-hit self-assessment performed prior to the NRC inspection identified several deficiencies and enhancement and the FFT reviewed and found none to be significant. The FFT concluded the Cyber Security Program continues to be implemented effectively.

Dr. Peterson commented that he believes there is a general alignment and a synergy between cyber security and safety as cyber security measures pose difficulties for malicious actors and he inquired whether there were any areas of misalignment between cyber security and operations. Mr. McWhorter replied that data diodes are a fundamental part of cyber security as they allow only one way communication from the plant but not into the plant and through their use an engineer working offsite can observe plant systems but cannot manipulate the system in any way. Dr. Peterson observed this was similar to the design of reactor protection systems which are designed such that non safety-related systems cannot affect safety-related systems. Dr. Peterson remarked there are safety consequences in making things more expensive to accomplish and there is a question of opportunity cost involved. Dr. Meshkati agreed and stated there was an effort by the International Atomic Energy Agency concerning safety culture and security culture and part of security culture related to cyber security. He observed the same defense in depth principles used elsewhere in the plant are incorporated into the architecture for cyber security.

➤ Station Update – the FFT received a station update which Mr. McWhorter reported was similar to that provided by Mr. Rogers earlier in this meeting. **He reported there is a non-material change required to the April Fact Finding Report to report that there were two tunnel cleanings instead of the one reported.**

➤ 2026 Operating Plan – Consultant McWhorter reported the Committee in the past has covered this topic during its February public meeting, but the fact finding format allows more of an interactive discussion and this may be something the Committee should consider for the future. He reported the Operating Plan is considered by PG&E to be the roadmap to generation excellence and it is based on the 2025-2030 Strategic Plan which has four areas of focus for safety, reliability, affordability, and people. The Operating Plan applies focus and detailed tactical implementation plans addressing these focus areas for the current year and these plans are reviewed periodically by station leadership. Mr. McWhorter gave examples for safety of implementing advanced nuclear fuel technologies and new fuel procurement, a focus on the corporate Safety Excellence Management, and on reliability and achieving work management optimization. **Mr. McWhorter reported the Nuclear Power Operations Corporate Evaluation scheduled during 2027 was discussed with the FFT and he reported Item OE-2 on the Open Items List is to periodically review station or management review meetings and he reported the FFT learned these meetings have evolved to a routine review of the Performance Indicators and accordingly the FFT recommend closing Item OE-2 and opening a new Item O-4 to review plant activities since the last fact finding visit to now include review of the Performance Indicators.** He reported the FFT concluded the 2026 Operating Plan was reviewed and found to be appropriately focused on initiating and tracking specific goals and additions that would generate future enhancements in safety and reliability as well as in the other two areas. **The FFT also recommended adding language to Item NS-9 to**

track on a confidential basis [added during discussion] INPO Areas for Improvement and to ensure a review of the INPO Corporate Evaluation to be completed in 2027 and to track INPO Areas for Improvement (D4/26FF-3.3B). The FFT also recommended the DCISC should follow-up on how future uses of AI at DCPD are addressed as part of the Artificial Intelligence Roadmap in the Strategic Plan (D4/26FF-3.3B). The FFT also recommended PG&E should provide the Committee with a confidential [which was added during discussion] oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 INPO corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report (P4.26FF-3.3) [which was deleted during the later discussion]. Mr. McWhorter reported recommendations D4/26 FF-3.3B and P4/26FF-3.3 were additions to the Fact Finding Report after drafts were provided to Drs. Peterson and Scarlat.

The members discussed the reasons for maintaining information on INPOs reviews in confidence as balanced against the desire on the Committee's part for as much transparency as possible. Dr. Peterson observed that any operational safety issues identified through confidential access to INPO information that have not been previously identified by the DCISC are addressed independently by the Committee. Dr. Meshkati commented on the difficulties experienced with oral rather than written briefings. It was mentioned that this information could be conveyed through separate confidential oral briefings to the other members at different times at the time the station update is provided separately to each member during fact finding. In response to Dr. Meshkati's query Mr. McWhorter reported the 2020 Corporate Evaluation was reviewed through an oral briefing on the Areas for Improvement and an assessment whether they matched the DCISC's own observations and an item was opened on the Open Items List regarding the Station Management Review meeting, which at that time was a new initiative taken after the 2020 INPO Corporate Evaluation. Dr. Scarlat observed the value of a confidential environment in context of INPO is to allow PG&E to be vulnerable before an organization that reviews its weaknesses and makes recommendations, and she recognized this is different from the manner in which DCISC operates in a public environment. Mr. Rathie commented PG&E is operating with INPO under the terms of an understanding and can only share information with the DCISC in a manner consistent with that understanding. **Mr. McWhorter reported there is also an Agreement between the NRC and INPO where the resident inspector is allowed to read the report but cannot retain a copy. Dr. Meshkati suggested this topic be reviewed with DCISC Special Consultant Dr. Kenneth Koves as Dr. Koves worked for INPO for many years and may have valuable insights. Dr Scarlat remarked whatever process is worked out it should apply to both the corporate and the plant reviews conducted by INPO.**

➤ Human Performance and Plant Status Control – Mr. McWhorter reported this was a routine review and there were no significant events in the area of human performance or plant status control events. The program was in Green status with no events in the past six months The FFT concluded human performance at DCPD has been excellent. **The FFT reviewed Recommendation P1/26-FF-3.9 concerning PG&E to review and improve the limited guidance provided for completing Common Cause Evaluations and recommended this item remain open.**

➤ Long Term Seismic Program – the Long Term Seismic Program was initiated in 1988 when the station had to reevaluate the seismic hazard early in its operation and significant modifications were initiated at that time. A license condition was created requiring PG&E to

keep abreast of new seismic information and changing knowledge or geologic conditions. PG&E has continued to monitor and study seismic conditions at the site including following the Fukushima accident. Mr. McWhorter reported the Long Term Seismic Program work was reduced during the period of the Joint Proposal¹⁹ which would have closed the plant in 2025. When SB 846²⁰ was passed work under the Long Term Seismic Program was re-initiated and coordinated and resulted in the PG&E Updated Seismic Assessment of 2024. Mr. McWhorter identified supporting and funding areas of further research, responding to inquiries from the CPUC Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) for seismic study of DCPD and its environs and the DCISC, as part of the Long Term Seismic Program. He reported that if the plant were to extend operations beyond 2030, there is a plan to do a full update to the seismic hazard assessment using the Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) process. The FFT concluded the LTSP was being effectively managed.

- Simulator Training Observation – Consultant McWhorter reported the FFT observed an initial license class for operators completing four training scenarios. The Simulator Facility is a full-scale mock-up of the Unit 1 Control Room. The scenarios were run one at a time with critiques in between, and during the visit the FFT reviewed the Emergency Planning Classification Chart that would be used by operators in the Control Room in response to an emergency. The FFT concluded the training session was well-prepared, professionally conducted and contained appropriate objectives.
- Accompany a Nuclear Operator on Rounds – the FFT accompanied a Unit 1 Turbine Building operator on rounds and observed the inspection of equipment and the recording of instrument readings electronically using a tablet. The FFT concluded the operator was knowledgeable and the equipment in the Turbine Building was observed to be in good condition.
- Meet with NRC Resident Inspector – the FFT met with Acting Resident Inspector Mr. Eli Garcia and learned during this meeting that Senior Resident Inspector, Mr. Mahdi Hayes, has been temporarily reassigned to Region IV headquarters. The DCISC representatives discussed with Mr. Garcia the recent changes to the NRC Resident Inspector Program and how those changes were affecting the program and the change to the Differing Professional Opinion Program. The FFT concluded the meeting was beneficial and these meetings should continue.

¹⁹ The Joint Proposal was entered into by PG&E, together with Friends of the Earth, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Environment California, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 1245, Coalition of California Utility Employees and the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility in June 2016 to retire DCPD at the expiration of the current operating licenses for each unit, November 2024 for Unit-1 and August 2025 for Unit-2 and was subsequently approved by the CPUC in 2018 in Decision (D) 18-01-022. D.23-12-036 abrogated those provisions of D.18-01-022 that would have required the plant to cease operations at the end of its current operating licenses on November 2, 2024 (Unit 1) and August 26, 2025 (Unit 2).

²⁰ On September 2, 2022, Governor Newsom signed California Senate Bill 846, codified as Public Resources Code Sections 25233, 25233.2 and 25302.7, Public Utilities Code Sections 712.1 and 712.8, and Water Code Section 13193.5 which, together with the approval by the CPUC on December 14, 2023 of Decision 23-12-036, provides for the conditional extension of operations at Diablo Canyon beyond the current retirement date, up to five additional years, that is no later than October 31, 2029 for Unit 1 and October 31, 2030 for Unit 2, under specific conditions as provided by the legislation including approval by the NRC of extending the operating licenses for Diablo Canyon.

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➤ Observe Notification Review Team Meeting – Consultant McWhorter reported the Notification Review Team is the first “gatekeeper” in the Corrective Action Program and the team remotely reviews each Notification and classifies each regarding significance and follow up actions. A meeting is then held to review those Notifications of particular significance and to achieve consensus on classification and corrective actions. The FFT concluded the Notification Review Team meeting was conducted effectively..

➤ Results of Unit 1 Feedwater Heater Failure Cause Evaluation – Mr. McWhorter reported the tube leak on the Unit 1 5C feedwater heater occurred on December 5, 2025. Each unit has a total of 18 feedwater heaters and a similar failure occurred in October 2021 on Unit 2 feedwater heater 5B. A Root Cause Evaluation was performed for the 2021 event and a Cause Evaluation was initiated for the 2025 event to ascertain if there were any differences in the failures and if different corrective actions were needed. He used a picture of a feedwater heater to describe and identify the location of the leak in the drain cooler area where cold water enters, circulates and exits through the top of the feedwater heater. Mr. McWhorter reported the drain cooler area is the coldest part of the heater and where steam comes down and condenses and accordingly the drain cooler area is subject to mixed vapor-liquid conditions that causes erosion and wear and this is where both leaks occurred. The Cause Evaluation for the 2025 event did not find evidence contrary to that for the 2021 event. There were several new corrective actions identified and during the next refueling outage for Unit 1 all the tubes in Unit 1 feedwater 5C heaters will be reexamined and plugging and stabilization criteria will be reviewed. The FFT concluded the Cause Evaluation was well performed and the conclusions and corrective actions were appropriate. **The FFT recommended closure of Recommendation D12/15/25FF-3.10 to review the cause of the 2025 leak and the FFT recommended a Recommendation to the Committee to follow up on the Cause Evaluation and future plans to address feedwater heater health and future plans taken in response to the Resolution approved at the February 2026 public meeting recommending to the CPUC and other state authorities to support implementation of the Feedwater Heater Replacement Project as soon as practically feasible (D4/26FF-3.10B) and the FFT recommended the Committee should open a recommendation to continue to follow and support DCP's plans for future feedwater heater replacements (D4/26FF-3.10A).**

➤ Meet with DCP's Officer -the FFT met with Vice President of Business and Technical Services Mr. Blair Jones to discuss items of mutual interest.

➤ Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Update – Mr. McWhorter reported the FFT received a written response with an update on the Unit 1 surveillance Capsule B testing and learned the final report is expected in August 2026 after certain delays due to issues at the testing laboratory. Mr. McWhorter reported that after the fact finding Dr. Meshkati met with the CEC Chair and staff and as a result of that meeting letters were exchanged with PG&E on the timing of the Capsule B report. In response PG&E promised to provide confidential briefings to each of the DCISC Members and the Technical Consultants in July 2026. The FFT concluded that progress continues to be made and the report on Capsule B should be finalized by the third quarter of 2026. Mr. McWhorter reported in response to Dr. Scarlat's comment that although

PG&E has offered to provide individual confidential briefings to the Committee it has not committed to provide the DCISC a copy of the Capsule B report before it is made public.

➤ Reactor Vessel Head Corrosion Industry Event Update – the FFT received a written response to its questions about a weld leak on a reactor vessel head at another plant. The information received was this event was not applicable to DCPD as the vessel head at the other plant was made of much more susceptible materials as compared to the DCPD pressure vessel reactor heads which are made from Inconel²¹ and the DCPD heads have better access to weld inspections and are not considered to be vulnerable to these types of leaks.

Approval of the April 13-14, 2026, Fact Finding Report was deferred.

Following their approval of the May 6-7, 2026, Fact Finding Report on Wednesday morning the Members took up discussion of the April 13-14, 2026, Fact Finding Report concerning the insertion of “confidential” in the Recommendations concerning review of INPO assessments made in the review of the 2026 Operating Plan, the Members agreed to (1) delete the Recommendation made to PG&E in the report and (2) approved the insertion of “confidential” in two places in the Recommendations. Mr. McWhorter and Dr. Koves discussed Dr. Koves’ earlier comment.

On a motion made by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Scarlat the April 13-14, 2026, Fact Finding Report was unanimously approved.

F. Nomination and Election of Chair and Vice-Chair,
for a term of office - July 1, 2026 to June 30, 2027.

This item was initially deferred. Subsequently, on the morning of June 17, 2026, after a description of the duties of the Chair and the Vice-Chair by Mr. Rathie, upon a motion made by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Scarlat, the Committee elected Dr. Meshkati to the position of DCISC Chair and elected Dr. Scarlat to the position of DCISC Vice-Chair, both to serve terms of office from July 1, 2026 through June 30, 2027.

XIV ADJOURN AFTERNOON MEETING

The Chair adjourned the afternoon session of the DCISC at 4:55 p.m.

XV RECONVENE FOR EVENING MEETING

Dr. Peterson reconvened the evening meeting of the DCISC at 5:00 p.m. and welcomed those attending in person and remotely. He advised that public comments for the specific discussion and for matters not on the agenda would be deferred until the end of the presentation period.

²¹ Inconel is a superalloy composed mainly of nickel, chromium, and iron that is often used in extreme environments where components are subjected to high temperature, pressure, or mechanical loads.

XVI COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments by Committee Members at this time. Dr. Peterson introduced Committee Consultant Dr. Thomas H. Jordan to make the next presentation.

XVII INFORMATION ITEM PRESENTED BY THE COMMITTEE

Consultant Dr. Thomas H. Jordan Report on the Seismic Review Team's Comments on the Supplemental Response from PG&E to the Nine Seismic Review Team Recommendations Contained in the DCISC's 35th Annual Report. Consider Acceptance of SRT's Comments on Supplemental Response to the Nine Recommendations and Future Committee Actions.

G. Dr. Jordan stated he would present a report by the Seismic Review Team (SRT), which comprises Dr. Jordan, Dr. Michael Oskin and Dr. Scott Marshall. The report was submitted to the Committee on March 30, 2026. He reviewed the timeline of the development of the SRT reports and the PG&E response. The Committee formed the SRT at its February 2025 public meeting. The SRT worked during the spring and presented a report entitled "Review of the Bird Critique"²² at the June 2025 meeting. That report contained nine recommendations on how PG&E might improve the seismic understanding of the thrust faulting beneath the Irish Hills and surrounding areas. PG&E presented an oral response to the nine recommendations at the October 2025 DCISC public meeting and, in December 2025, submitted a brief written comment as part of its response to the DCISC 35th Annual Report. In January 2026 the DCISC requested a more detailed review from PG&E concerning its response to the nine recommendations and, on February 12, 2026, just prior to the DCISC's February public meeting, PG&E submitted its Supplemental Response to the Nine SRT Recommendations (PG&E Supplemental Response). PG&E presented a report on its Supplemental Response at the DCISC's February 2026, public meeting. The SRT made a presentation on the PG&E Supplemental Response at the February public meeting and was asked by the Committee at that time to prepare a written response. The SRT submitted its comments on the PG&E Supplemental Response (SRT Comments) on March 30, 2026. On April 1, 2026, the DCISC disbanded the SRT and retained Dr. Jordan as a Committee Consultant for seismic-related matters.

In its request to the PG&E, the DCISC asked for information sufficient to allow an SRT evaluation of the technical adequacy of each PG&E response, including an individual reply to each recommendation; to state the plans, priorities, and timeframes necessary to address the individual recommendations, and to identify which recommendations could have a potentially significant impact on the PG&E's hazard assessments.

In its Supplemental Response, PG&E described the general priority of the research tasks related to address the reverse faults beneath the Irish Hills. These tasks are considered by PG&E to be of medium importance based on current information and hazard modeling. PG&E stated

²² The "Bird Critique" refers to a seismic risk analysis and subsequent formal declarations submitted by Dr. Peter Bird, a prominent seismologist and Professor Emeritus of Geophysics and Geology at UCLA. Commissioned by the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Dr. Bird's evaluation directly challenged the licensing extensions for DCP.

that the recommendations warrant research under the PG&E Long Term Seismic Program (LTSP) and set a three-year timeframe for addressing them. PG&E considers certain research tasks are of a lower priority than several other research topics now being pursued under the Long Term Seismic Program, including the ground motion model uncertainties, the Hosgri Fault slip rate, and the time dependence of the fault sources. Dr. Jordan described and discussed the PG&E's Supplemental Response as it addressed each of the nine recommendations as follows.

Recommendation No. 1 - concerning fault system modeling of the Irish Hills Southwest Boundary Zone fault system. PG&E assigns a medium priority to this project relative to others in its LTSP. PG&E is expanding work on this topic, and it reports that new research will be focused on the eastern Pismo Basin. PG&E believes it will take approximately three years to address this recommendation. Dr. Jordan reported the SRT agrees with PG&E that the exposures from west to east along the Pismo Syncline provides valuable information to constrain the faulting geometry in this region. The SRT endorses additional research on eastern Pismo Basin where there are more abundant subsurface data and opportunities to use stream terraces as deformation markers. He commented that the purpose of Recommendation No 1 was to urge PG&E to develop a model that not only describes the uplift associated with the Irish Hills, but also the deformation that has occurred in the Pismo Syncline over the past five million years. The SRT also encourages PG&E to continue work on the Morro Bay subsidence and the tilting of the Memorial Terrace, which are items that PG&E had downrated in importance in its response to the SRT's Comments.

Recommendation No. 2 – Dr. Jordan stated Recommendation No. 2 concerned issues associated with dating the low-stand abrasion platforms offshore, south of the Irish Hills. The recommendation addressed constraining the subsidence occurring offshore because this subsidence contributes to the total deformation occurring in that region and can thus increase the required fault slip rates. Dr. Jordan reported PG&E did not endorse Recommendation No. 2 because it would be difficult to accomplish; PG&E believes direct dating is infeasible, could be expensive, and likely would not provide significant information. The SRT noted that constraining the subsidence of this footwall is important because missing subsidence could be the explanation for a discrepancy between the long-term and short-term slip rates on the Southwest Boundary Zone. The SRT found a rate of approximately 0.5 millimeters per year for the long-term (5 million year) slip rate, which compares to about 0.3 millimeters per year over the last 100,000 years. Dr. Jordan stated the SRT did not specifically recommend direct dating, but rather an investigation of how much subsidence has been occurring. PG&E responded this might be done by reviewing other PG&E data including high resolution seismic surveys, and Dr. Jordan agreed that this is a valid approach.

Recommendation No. 3 – Dr. Jordan reported Recommendation No. 3 was made to consider the infrared stimulated luminescence (IRSL) dating that has been done on terraces in the Cayucos region which gave dates earlier than those used in PG&E's model. Dr. Jordan noted that the earlier dates, if proven correct, would have a significant effect on the hazard estimation because it would increase the estimated slip rate on these faults. PG&E reported that, since the SRT submitted its report, newly published U-series dates and the authors' reevaluation of IRSL results show that the existing age assignments are essentially correct, which eliminates the discrepancy.

Recommendation No. 4 – the SRT recommended further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its effects on the pattern of marine terrace uplift. This recommendation was endorsed by PG&E and assigned medium impact. PG&E stated it would increase its activity in terms of reviewing the evidence for strike-slip component on the Los Osos trend. One or more publications from PG&E sponsored projects will address this issue. Dr. Jordan reported the SRT endorses PG&E's renewed emphasis on the Los Osos trend and in understanding its strike-slip component. PG&E in its response indicated a down-weighting in the use of Morro Bay subsidence as a possible constraint on strike slip faulting. The SRT made the point that understanding Morro Bay subsidence and tilting of Memorial Park Terrace are also both important for constraining geometry of SWBZ at depth, especially the dip of the lower fault section.

Recommendations Nos. 5 through 7 – Dr. Jordan stated these recommendations concern geodetic studies and were motivated in part by the preliminary geodetic work in the SRT's report, which examined constraints provided by GPS data on the overall deformation in the Irish Hills region. PG&E has agreed that it will follow up with a program to develop a more complete geodetic study. Dr. Jordan remarked the motivation for geodetic study is that by looking at the geodetic data one can get overall constraints on the total deformation occurring in the region. Although the slip rates of individual faults cannot be isolated, the geodetic data can be used to test the kinematic fault-system models that constitute the seismic source characterization (SSC) used in the DCPD probabilistic seismic hazard assessment (PSHA).²³ The SRT suggested that PG&E follow the multiple-model approach used in the National Seismic Hazard Model (NSHM), in which different fault deformation models were derived from geodetic models based on different methods and used to explore the epistemic uncertainties in the fault slip rates. Dr. Jordan reported that Dr. Marshall is expected to continue his geodetic analysis in the future under contract with PG&E.

Recommendation No. 8 – Dr. Jordan reported that this recommendation concerns the geologic slip rate information along the Rinconada and Huasna Faults. Very little is known about the slip rates on these two faults, but they are important in terms of constraining the overall deformation of the region and using the GPS data to test the fault models. PG&E has started working on this project, initiating a program that will take at least three years to complete. Dr. Jordan reported PG&E has increased its priority on this topic, and SRT agrees that the slip rates are important in terms of properly characterizing the regional deformation. This is a multi-year project and will require substantial effort to identify the appropriate sites and do the field work necessary to get the dates that allow the estimation of slip rates on these faults.

²³ In 2012, the NRC issued a request for information pursuant to 10CFR50.54(f), requiring that all operating nuclear plants in the U.S. perform a site-specific PSHA and develop a ground motion response spectrum (GMRS). Licensees were required to re-evaluate the seismic hazard using present-day NRC regulatory criteria and guidance. For plants in the Western United States, including Diablo Canyon, the directive required that the site-specific PSHA be performed using the SSHAC Level 3 process to develop the seismic source characterization and ground motion characterization models.

Recommendation No. 9 – Dr. Jordan characterized this as an over-arching recommendation, principally that PG&E should conduct modeling experiments to ascertain the sensitivity of its model to modifications recommended by the SRT. This was given a high priority by PG&E. In particular, PG&E is developing a Source Sensitivity Model (SSM) that he described as a stripped down version of the full logic tree model used in the SSC as a computational platform for doing sensitivity analyses. The SSM will likely be released for comment soon and will be applied to fault geometry models during this calendar year. Dr. Jordan noted that sensitive analyses are very important but they are not easy because they involve multiple adjustments to the model components; if one component is perturbed, other coupled components must be also.

Dr. Jordan stated that the DCISC requested in its Supplemental Response that PG&E include information sufficient for the SRT to evaluate the technical adequacy of the response, and he confirmed the information provided by PG&E was adequate for a preliminary assessment. The Committee's second request was for PG&E to respond to each of the nine recommendations individually; PG&E has now done so and agrees that further action is warranted on all nine of the recommendations. Dr. Jordan reported that some of the recommendations will be addressed through the existing projects of Long Term Seismic Program while others will require new initiatives within that program.

Both PG&E and the SRT attempted to assess which recommendations have a potential to make a significant impact on the hazard analysis. SRT recognizes three types of potential impacts: (1) changes to mean hazard values, (2) changes to the epistemic uncertainties of those values, and (3) validation or rejection of alternative models. PG&E maintains that the actual impact is largely unknown because a full evaluation will require the sensitivity studies. Dr. Jordan commented the SRT agrees that this preliminary response by PG&E is adequate, but there are several areas where plans could be verified and refined.

Dr. Jordan reported that PG&E has assigned a medium priority to research on reverse faulting beneath the Irish Hills and gives a higher priority to other important problems such as the Ground Motion Characterization uncertainty, the Hosgri hazard, and the Seismic Source Characterization time dependence. PG&E's Dr. Madugo stated at the October 2025 public meeting that uncertainties in the GMC are much larger than those for the Seismic Source Characterization. Dr. Jordan stated the SRT agrees that those priorities properly account for the *declared* epistemic uncertainties depicted by PG&E's tornado diagrams, but they do not account for the *undeclared* epistemic uncertainties (ontological uncertainty), which can produce unmodeled but potentially consequential surprises. He explained ontological uncertainty describes errors that can occur when a model's full quantification of uncertainty, both aleatory and epistemic, fails to capture the actual behavior of the real world systems. He reported that, while he uses the term "ontological uncertainty," the NRC also recognizes this type of uncertainty and refers to it as "completeness uncertainty." NRC publication NUREG 1855 provides guidance for the treatment of completeness uncertainties in the context of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). Dr. Jordan stated the important point here is that this must be accounted for in the PRA rather than the PSHA hazard analysis. The SRT has speculated that these ontological uncertainties, including the effects of "unknown unknowns," may be larger for the Seismic Source Characterization than for the Ground Motion Characterization, in part because

the physics associated with earthquake ruptures is more complicated and less constrained than the physics associated with the ground motion modeling. The SRT believes the Long Term Seismic Program prioritization should consider this possibility.

Dr. Jordan stated that, while PG&E initially rejected Recommendation No. 2 (the dating of the offshore low-stand abrasion platforms), this recommendation remains important because it addresses one hypothesis for explaining the difference between the 5-Ma²⁴ and the 120-ka²⁵ rates of slip on the Southwest Boundary Zone (SWBZ). He remarked that the SRT understands that the existing data does not favor this subsidence hypothesis, but more rigorous testing would certainly increase confidence in the SWBZ slip rates. Dr. Jordan remarked that, while direct dating the offshore operation platform may not be feasible, the SRT agrees with PG&E that better constraints on subsidence can be obtained from existing high resolution marine surveys. Dr. Jordan reported the SRT agrees with PG&E that the subsidence hypothesis can be tested and probably rejected through further analysis of existing marine surveys. PG&E plans to conduct such tests as a means of addressing Recommendation No. 2.

Dr. Jordan reported there is some difference between the PG&E and SRT assessments of hazard impact. The SRT recognizes three types of potential impacts by improvement to the model: changes to the mean hazard, changes to the epistemic uncertainties, and validation or rejection of alternative models. PG&E and SRT hazard impacts differ because the SRT has considered *potential* impacts, while PG&E has focused on *actual* impacts. PG&E's assessment concluded that for seven of the nine recommendations the actual impacts are unknown, whereas SRT assigned the potential impacts to be low, medium, and high based on what is currently known. For example, for Recommendation No. 3 (monitoring IRSL age dating), the SRT recognized the proposed IRSL-based age assignments, if correct, would have a high impact on the DCPH hazard, i.e., the potential impact and therefore the *pretest* impact is high. Whereas, based on recent research, PG&E discounts the possibility that these age reassignments are correct and therefore assigns the *post-test* impact to be low. Dr. Jordan stated he believes this explains the difference between the assessment of the impacts by the SRT and by PG&E.

Dr. Jordan, in concluding his presentation, pointed out that the preliminary nature of his review. He reported PG&E's Supplemental Response to the nine recommendations includes sufficient information for a preliminary evaluation of its response, and PG&E has put forward preliminary plans to address all nine of these recommendations. He commented there are several PG&E initiatives now underway, including developing the geodetic modeling program to address Recommendations Nos. 5 through 7, but details are not yet available. PG&E is also developing the new Sensitivity Source Model as the computational platform for sensitivity analyses, but its implementation is not yet complete. Dr. Jordan concluded his remarks by stating that additional technical information will be needed for a full review of the PG&E response plan after the main research elements have been developed as components of the LTSP.

There were no comments from the Committee and Dr. Peterson asked for comments from the public.

²⁴ 5,000,000 years.

²⁵ 120,000 years.

Mr. John Geesman, an attorney representing the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Mr. Geesman stated he wanted to remind the Committee once again that PG&E has still not publicly disseminated a deterministic review of a 6.5 magnitude San Simeon-type earthquake on the thrust fault he stated is now understood to be directly beneath the plant. The California Energy Commission in its AB 1632 Report²⁶ first requested this information in 2008 and Mr. Geesman reported in 2012 the CPUC approved \$47.5 million in additional ratepayer funds for Diablo Canyon seismic studies noting that one purpose of those studies was to assess the implications of such an earthquake. Mr. Geesman stated that for nearly two decades PG&E has dissembled about work it has performed that resembles a response to this requirement and he stated PG&E has conflated probabilistic estimates with deterministic calculations and 35 kilometer distances with “directly beneath the plant.” Mr. Geesman stated PG&E has yet to analyze the scenario identified by the two state commissions [the CEC and CPUC] let alone the seismic fragility implications for each of the relevant structures, systems and components of the plant. Mr. Geesman stated PG&E’s most recent evasion comes from the head of its Geosciences Department Dr. Chris Madugo. Mr. Geesman stated Dr. Madugo points to the deterministic review of the San Luis Bay Fault that is contained in PG&E’s 2014 Central Coast Seismic Imaging Project (CCSIP) report and he commented the San Luis Bay Fault does come within 1.2 kilometers of the plant but interestingly 44 of the 48 deterministic calculations in Chapter 13 of the CCSIP report attribute larger ground motions to the San Luis Bay Fault than to the Hosgri Fault and that is the case across the spectral frequencies evaluated except for four average medians below 1.3 hertz.

Mr. Geesman stated it is more significant that the assumed magnitude for the earthquake on the San Luis Bay Fault is limited to 6.4 magnitude in contrast to the 6.5 magnitude San Simeon comparison requested by the AB 1632 Report. He stated a 6.5 magnitude earthquake would release 41% more energy than a 6.4 magnitude earthquake at the same location. Mr. Geesman stated he questions how much of the Hosgri Fault design margin for specific Diablo Canyon systems, structures and components would remain if the comparison were properly sized. He remarked, as documented in the DCISC’s 34th and 35th Annual Reports, he has raised this issue with the Committee on several occasions since the DCISC February 2024 public meeting. Mr. Geesman stated the public is entitled to know the operational impact on each DCCP systems, structures and components stemming from the posited 6.5 magnitude San Simeon-type earthquake directly beneath the plant and the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility asks that the DCISC place this matter on its Open Items List and dispel any impression that this Committee is enabling or acquiescing in PG&E’s continued unresponsiveness. [Mr. Geesman subsequently made this request in a letter to the Committee and the item was added to the Open Items List.]

Dr. Gene Nelson, Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated he was frustrated by Mr. Geesman repeated comments about putting a big earthquake right underneath the plant as in Dr. Nelson’s opinion it is nonsense.

²⁶The AB 1632 Report is a 2008 study by the California Energy Commission (CEC) evaluating the vulnerability, aging, and reliability of the state's major baseload nuclear facilities.

Ms. Rochelle Becker of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility was recognized. Ms. Becker stated she sent a note to remind the Committee that the Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) which represents the CPUC, the California Energy Commission and numerous seismic agencies in the State of California was formed by legislation and she recommended that the earthquake faults under the plant should be addressed. She commented she hoped to have that discussion at this public meeting but was told this was not possible. She reminded those present that the IPRP is the State of California's preferred seismic group to look at this issue independently, that is, independently of PG&E and independently of the experts hired by PG&E and while the IPRP agreed with PG&E on almost all the scientific information submitted, that information is missing the analysis cited by Mr. Geesman regarding a San Simeon-type earthquake beneath the plant and it is still missing.

Ms. Linda Seeley of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Seeley commented it was interesting to her to look at the summary matrix of PG&E response that Dr. Jordan reviewed, in that for all of the PG&E grading on the importance of the various methods of determining the effects of earthquakes PG&E assigned either an unknown designation or a low value to their importance. She remarked this should be a red flag for the Committee as it indicates the importance PG&E places on the work of the DCISC. Ms. Seeley reminded the Committee of its responsibility to do something to make sure that the earthquake fault that runs directly under the plant as assessed, as it has never been, and the Committee needs to take action about this.

Dr. Jordan stated the impact statement table that Ms. Seeley referred to contains a column for PG&E's response based on the actual impact and a column based on the SRT's evaluation of the potential impact and while PG&E deals with its assessment of the actual impact the actual impact for many of the items in the table is not known.

Dr. Chris Madugo, earthquake geologist with PG&E, was recognized. Dr. Madugo stated he wanted to address the issue of a deterministic evaluation of a San Simeon-type earthquake beneath the plant and he commented PG&E stands by the 2014 Central Coast Seismic Imaging Project (CCSIP) Report which he stated addressed the issue and there is a chapter in the CCSIP Report that does a deterministic analysis of that type of fault. He reported to his knowledge neither the IPRP nor the NRC has found that PG&E did not adequately address this issue.

Dr. Madugo stated he also wanted to address an issue that has been raised repeatedly regarding the existence of a fault directly beneath the plant. He stated this conjures the image of a fault coming up into the plant's foundation. Dr. Madugo reported during the studies performed during the design phase for DCCP there was extensive trenching, paleo-seismic trenching that is a standard practice to identify active faults throughout the entire area and no faults were identified beneath the plant during that work. No faults were identified during subsequent site characterizations using geophysics in the vicinity of the plant foundation. He stated he wanted to dispel the idea that there is a fault that comes to the surface beneath the plant.

Following Dr. Madugo's comments, on a motion made by Dr. Meshkati, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the DCISC unanimously accepted the SRT Comments on the PG&E Supplemental Response and directed that the SRT Comments be included in the 36th Annual Report.

Dr. Peterson then requested Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones, to introduce the next speakers.

XVIII INFORMATION PRESENTATIONS REQUESTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF PG&E.

Mr. Jones stated there would be two PG&E presentations this evening by a quartet of presenters. He introduced PG&E Senior Vice President and Chief Risk Officer Maureen Zawalick and reported Ms. Zawalick has been with the company for more than thirty years with much of that time at Diablo Canyon. He reported that Ms. Zawalick holds a Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Wisconsin. Mr. Jones reported that after Ms. Zawalick's presentation Dr. Madugo will continue the presentation, followed by Mr. Nathan Barber and Dr. Albert Kottke to discuss probabilistic risk assessment and risk evaluation.

Presentation by PG&E Updating the Scope and Schedule for Actions Taken in Response to the Nine Recommendations Contained in the DCISC's Seismic Review Team Report and Explaining How Such Actions will be Incorporated into DCP's Long-Term Seismic Program.

Ms. Zawalick stated she values and believes that forums such as the Committee's public meetings are important for public participation in all of PG&E's processes at Diablo Canyon, as well as providing an opportunity to hear from others on their concerns. She described and discussed her long-term involvement with the nuclear industry and with DCP including with its Long Term Seismic Program. She stated in her remarks she would provide an overview of the Long Term Seismic Program and the importance of independent oversight provided by the NRC, the DCISC, and the Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP). She displayed a timeline of DCP's seismic history over 40 years and as further extended in 2022 by SB 846. She reported that when Unit 1 was coming online for commercial power production in May of 1985, the NRC established an operational condition for both units to require a Long Term Seismic Program.

Ms. Zawalick reported that between 2010 and 2015 AB 1632 required additional analyses and studies including offshore and onshore studies and early in that period the CPUC established the IPRP. There were also additional and updated seismic studies required as a result of the event in Japan in March of 2011 and the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Ms. Zawalick reported SB 846 provided for DCP's continued operation until 2029 for Unit 1 and until 2030 for Unit 2 and it also required an updated seismic study. In 2023 the DCISC confirmed no seismic updates were required.

Ms. Zawalick reported PG&E has accepted all nine recommendations from the SRT and those nine recommendations will be addressed in context of the Long Term Seismic Program. She stated DCP seismic safety has been a top priority for PG&E since the plant began operation and the PG&E Geosciences organization now consists of 20-25 geoscientists, geo-technicians, seismologists, and civil engineers and PG&E also funds and is in partnership with the United States Geological Survey (USGS), academia, and leading seismic experts. Ms. Zawalick stated PG&E values the independence and the ongoing work of its partners and makes continuous

adjustments to address that work within the Long Term Seismic Program including during the period when DCPD was scheduled to decommission in 2025.

Ms. Zawalick reported that PG&E supports the Central Coast Seismic Network and conducts earthquake source studies both on and offshore and advance research with USGS, the Statewide California Earthquake Center (SCEC), and other researchers and she remarked the technology to do so continues to advance. She reported that the IPRP plays an important role as well and since 2010 the IPRP has issued over sixteen reports that have been reviewed and those recommendations are incorporated into PG&E's ongoing research. The IPRP conducts field visits and holds public meetings with the next meeting scheduled for fall 2026..

Ms. Zawalick in concluding her remarks stated PG&E is committed to maintaining the seismic safety of Diablo Canyon with over 1,200 coworkers committed and dedicated to the safe operation of the plant, which is one of the highest performing plants in the United States as ranked by the NRC. She reported there are two NRC inspectors onsite with unfettered access to look at anything related to seismic safety and seismic programs. The PG&E Geosciences team travels all over the world to study seismic events and PG&E participates with partners, including partners in Japan, and researchers in those field visits. She commented DCPD is the most seismically studied region in the United States and is the only nuclear power plant with a formal Long Term Seismic Program. The nuclear industry has world-wide collaboration through the sharing of operating experience and that sharing of information and studies gives rise to confidence. Ms. Zawalick stated these efforts are continuous and an investment in ongoing research including the reviews conducted by the DCISC during its fact-finding visits and in its public meetings. Dr. Madugo continued this presentation.

Dr. Madugo stated he would provide an update on PG&E's response to the nine recommendations by the SRT described by Dr. Jordan and show how these recommendations fit into the Long Term Seismic Program. He stated the recommendations are clustered in groups which he described as follows.

Recommendations 1 through 4 - fault system modeling, focusing on fault geometries and slip rates on the faults closest to the plant.

Recommendations 5 through 8 focusing on developing geodetic models that could assess the slip rate budget or provide an independent assessment for geologic slip rate budgets developed by faults near the plant.

Proponent models regarding fault geometries for faults bounding the Irish Hills, both in terms of the orientation of the faults as they go beneath the Hills and the geometries.

Dr. Madugo reported, as Ms. Zawalick described, the Long Term Seismic Program is not a passive program and its research priority is to improve seismic hazard models for DCPD using advancements in earthquake science developed in collaboration with the USGS, the SCEC and seismic experts from academia and industry. He reported that the SCEC recently conducted a workshop which included a visit to DCPD and focused on developing next generation rupture

models using data on the timing of earthquakes and earthquake rates and PG&E is reviewing how to incorporate that work into the Long Term Seismic Program.

Dr. Madugo displayed and discussed a tornado plot²⁷ that included ground motion models, site models, site response models, and seismic source models together based on the PG&E 2024 Updated Seismic Assessment.²⁸ He stated what the tornado diagram shows is different nodes in the logic trees, all three of those logic trees with the branches of those different nodes each given 100% weight and all the other nodes in the models are given standard weights and from this the impact on ground motion can be seen. Dr. Madugo stated PG&E prioritizes research at the top of the tornado diagram where the largest uncertainties are. He reported that ground motion and site response uncertainties are atop the diagram with source parameters below with the top uncertainties. The top source model uncertainties are the Hosgri Fault slip rate and San Luis Pismo Block (SLPB) fault slip rates with slightly lower uncertainty for Hosgri Fault and SLPB time dependence with lower uncertainty for SLPB fault geometries. The SLPB includes the faults on which the SRT provided input. He indicated where the SRT's recommendations, by number, fit within the tornado diagram and observed they are near but not at the top and this is why PG&E gave medium to medium-high priority for inclusion in the Long Term Seismic Program for establishing research to try to reduce the uncertainty related to these topics. He reported that after initial investigation all the SRT recommendations were found to be technically defensible and were included in the Long Term Seismic Program.

Dr. Madugo then described PG&E's plans to address each of the SRT's nine recommendations.

For Recommendation No. 1, developing kinematically constrained structural models, PG&E's plan is to focus on data compilations southeast of the Irish Hills where he stated there is a lot of data that has not been evaluated and then establish academic and USGS partnerships to improve existing models, or develop defensible alternative models which could include the SRT's model. The process of contracting for a data scope and compilation effort is nearing completion and the work should begin shortly and there have been discussions with academia and the USGS as well as with consultants experienced in this area. Dr. Madugo stated PG&E also has plans to develop a manuscript for a peer review publication on the PG&E fault geometry models.

For Recommendation No. 2, dating of the low-stand abrasion platforms discussed by Dr. Jordan, Dr. Madugo stated most of the movement on the faults that bound the Irish Hills is upward on one side, while there could be a small amount of downward movement on the other offshore side. He reported that if the basin is not filled with sediment, that downrate is low and all the offshore geophysics work that has been done shows that there is just a bedrock platform and not a basin filled with sediment. Dr. Madugo stated PG&E believes that there is going to be a very low downward rate and it is not going to impact the hazard models. He reported

²⁷ A tornado plot (or tornado diagram) is a specialized bar chart used in sensitivity analysis and risk management to visualize the impact of varying input variables on a specific outcome. Impacts are organized from largest at the top to smallest at the bottom.

²⁸ The PG&E Diablo Canyon Updated Seismic Assessment was submitted on March 6, 2024, to satisfy a requirement under California Senate Bill 846 extending the plant's operations.

manuscripts are in progress looking at the stratigraphy of the sediments that lap onto that bedrock platform, and ancient shorelines that have been notched into that platform and once published those datasets can be used to establish the rate of downward subsidence which PG&E believes to be low and Dr. Madugo stated the SRT agrees with that assessment. Those manuscripts should be completed in the next two years and then PG&E will continue working on this recommendation.

For Recommendation No. 3, monitoring IRSL-dating efforts, Dr. Madugo reported some initial results that came out when the SRT began their work have been revised and there is no real change to what PG&E has in its existing model and therefore he believes there is no impact. He remarked there are some interesting results in the Santa Maria Basin which is located some distance from the plant. PG&E is working with California State University at Long Beach and San Jose State University to do some independent dating of the deposits to see if the dates that have come out of that area are defensible. Dr. Michael Oskin, a former SRT member, is also involved in that work as a reviewer.

For Recommendation No. 4, Dr. Madugo reported PG&E's plan is to investigate potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend for which he commented work has been done, but never published, in 2011 and 2012 as part of the SHAC process. He reported PG&E is working with Lettis Consultants International to document that work and possibly extend it further along the Los Osos Fault. This work entails looking for laterally offset stream channels and to date there has been no significant evidence or strong evidence of lateral offset. As part of this reporting different parties will be interviewed that have interpretations of lateral offset including IPRP members, the USGS, and Dr. Oskin, to understand why they think there could be a lateral offset signal.

For Recommendations Nos. 5, 6 and 7, Dr. Madugo stated these recommendations are focused on geodetic modeling and PG&E intends to collaborate with Dr. Scott Marshall, a former SRT member, along with a peer review by an independent expert. Dr. Madugo reported since the DCISC February 2026 public meeting several meetings have been held with Dr. Marshall and a scope developed for multi-year research plan, which includes in the first year development of an updated GPS dataset potentially leveraging an updated dataset that USGS is developing for their National Seismic Hazard Map update. In the alternative, PG&E has the option to develop its own GPS dataset and Dr. Madugo reported Dr. Marshall is beginning work this summer to develop three-dimensional fault models of the faults around Diablo Canyon. He reported that next year there will be different modeling teams developing independent models with the purpose of making an independent slip rate estimate, independent of the geologic slip rate estimate, to evaluate geologic rates.

For Recommendation 8, Dr. Madugo stated this involves acquiring slip rate information from the Rinconada and Huasna Faults. Dr. Madugo stated sensitivity studies were done in connection with the 2015 SSHAC to see if these faults mattered to the hazard and they did not. However, Dr. Madugo stated they are important to developing the slip rate budget from the San Andreas to the Hosgi Faults that would be used as a comparison for the geodetic models. Dr. Madugo stated PG&E committed to an initial literature review and geomorphic site assessment and logistics evaluation to determine the study's feasibility and has completed the literature

review and the geomorphic site investigation was undertaken with Dr. Oskin and IPRP members with PG&E's external reviewer expert Dr. Tom Rockwell.

For Recommendation No. 9, Dr. Madugo stated this recommendation was to ascertain as part of the hazard sensitivity study modifications to plant systems, structures and components. He discussed sensitivity source models in this context and he reported the sensitivity source logic tree is a diagnostic tool and simplification of the complex Diablo Canyon seismic source logic tree and provides a quick evaluation of the impact on the hazard due to changes in fault attributes. He showed the difference between the two logic trees and described them as graphical displays of the attributes of active faults that contribute to the seismic hazard and the logic tree form or structure shows model complexity. Dr. Madugo stated this is one of the ways to address ontological uncertainty.²⁹ He remarked the model is very complex and includes all the different potential ruptures scenarios and he stated the second part of addressing that ontological uncertainty is that PG&E's Geosciences personnel attend all the significant seismic and seismic engineering meetings and work with next generation scientists to ensure that the model includes new information.

Dr. Madugo stated that the number of paths through a logic tree is an indicator of model complexity and he reviewed the 2015 and 2024/2025 models. He reviewed the seismic source model which includes fault sources and background sources including the Hosgri Fault, the San Luis-Pismo Block Fault and other regional fault and each of the Hosgri and the San Luis Pismo Block Faults each have different fault geometries. He discussed and described the models that focus on one of the geometries for the Hosgri Fault and San Luis-Pismo Block.

Dr. Madugo gave an example of the sensitivity of the models and reported one of the proponent models for the SRT included the San Luis Bay Fault as a 38% dip, based on bedrock outcrops at the surface and some sub-surface data. Dr. Madugo reported in the PG&E model the average dip for the San Luis Bay Fault is approximately 46% averaged across several cross sections. He observed that with the fault dip change from the PG&E model to SRT sensitivity, an 8% lower dip was produced with the uplift rate staying the same and the slip rate increased approximately 16% which he stated increases the hazard during some periods but remains about the same for other periods.

Dr. Madugo stated in terms of ground motion at different return periods, referring to the tornado diagrams, there was very little change in ground motion if the SRT dip is adopted and he observed that over a return period of 1,000 years this is a plus 2% change; 10,000 years a 1% change; 100,000 years a 1% change, a million years it is a ½% change. The sensitivity study therefore shows that adopting the SRTs proponent dip has very little impact.. Dr. Madugo stated PG&E is still evaluating the flat ramp model and will continue to do that through this year.

²⁹ Ontological uncertainty describes the errors that can occur when a model's full quantification of uncertainty, both aleatory and epistemic, fails to capture the actual behavior of the real-world system. Unlike the traditional aleatory and epistemic uncertainties, for which probabilities can be calculated, ontological uncertainty is inherently unquantifiable.

Dr. Madugo concluded his part of the presentation and stated the nine SRT recommendations are being addressed through collaborative Long Term Seismic Program research, partnerships with the USGS, academia, and the industry, including in-house expertise review by external experts.

Dr. Peterson called for any comments from the Members or Consultants.

In response to Dr. Meshkati's request Dr. Jordan stated that based on the technical work he believes the PG&E response has been very good and addresses all nine recommendations and planning is in the preliminary stage. Dr. Jordan stated he was impressed with sensitivity source model described by Dr. Madugo and he remarked other aspects of the recommendations that the SRT proposed can be tested using that type of sensitivity model. Dr. Meshkati asked concerning Dr. Jordan's judgment about the treatment of the two types of uncertainty. Dr. Jordan responded that ontological uncertainty is very difficult to deal with because basically it cannot be quantified so it is absent from the models, however, there is an NRC guidance document addressing this completeness uncertainty and it shows how in the probabilistic risk analysis one can start to incorporate that type of answer but Dr. Jordan observed you're worried about things that you don't have in your model and all of a sudden your earth surprises you with something.

In response to Consultant McWhorter's questions Dr. Jordan estimated the DCISC should return for an update on PG&E's progress in addressing the nine recommendations in about one year.

Members discussed the roles played by Dr. Marshall and Dr. Oskin as Members of the SRT and Dr. Meshkati commended PG&E for retaining Drs. Marshall and Oskin and for PG&E's openness and willingness to improve the seismic risk analysis or seismic hazard characterization. Dr. Jordan thanked Mike Oskin and Scott Marshall for their service.

Dr. Peterson asked for public comment.

San Luis Obispo County Supervisor and Member for the IPRP Dr. Bruce Gibson was recognized. Dr. Gibson offered his support to Dr. Jordan's observation of the difficulty of establishing the ontological uncertainty of the structure of the Irish Hills. Dr. Gibson observed the surprises Dr. Jordan referred to have been significant in the seismic history of California including the Sylmar and Northridge earthquakes in Southern California. Dr. Gibson called the Committee's attention to the importance of trying to understand that uncertainty, but in a somewhat more quantitative fashion. He reported that the tornado diagrams focus attention on the most important things and tornado diagrams show that the major uncertainty at this point is ground motion under the plant of ergodic³⁰ or non-ergodic pathways of transmission. Dr. Gibson stated what he heard Dr. Jordan say was that the ontological uncertainty of the structure of the Irish Hills is most probably greater than that of the ground motion, so it ends up likely to be at the top of that tornado diagram and to Dr. Gibson it is worthy of the attention of those on the IPRP and within PG&E and all of those of us who care about the seismic hazard analysis.

³⁰ Ergodic means that a system's long-term behavior over time represents the same statistical properties as looking at all parts of the system at once.

Dr. Gibson reported he has experience trying to establish the structure of the Irish Hills during the CCSIP which found seismic imaging of the Irish Hills difficult due to the topography and access and the complicated geology which produced poor images that were difficult to interpret and he stated it is then necessary to focus on what is known. Dr. Gibson stated that his interest and focus are on the terms of the hazard and the risk it visits on the residents of San Luis Obispo County.

Dr. Peterson observed DCPD is located in almost certainly the most studied area from the perspective of seismic assessment and research, and therefore these studies have also driven some of the biggest gains in knowledge and capability regarding this area of science. Dr. Peterson observed this is a public good as in the developed world it is increasing rare that seismic events cause loss of life while in the developing world it remains a significant problem and the ability to understand these hazards and to engineer for them is extraordinarily important. Dr. Peterson observed those persons who work in this area of science are making major contributions to the welfare of humanity and also to the safety of the local community.

Dr. Gene Nelson, Californians for Green Nuclear Power, was recognized. Dr. Nelson observed the seismic setting around Diablo Canyon is nowhere equivalent to that where the Sylmar and Northridge earthquakes took place, where the San Andreas Fault takes a big turn and this makes for a very complex seismic setting which is in no way equivalent to the setting around Diablo Canyon.

Dr. Albert Kottke of PG&E was recognized. Dr. Kottke commented concerning ontological error stating PG&E does not focus only on research that it is interested in, PG&E also funds other research programs in support of the idea that there are some things that are not known. He gave examples of the SCEC and the Cascadia Research Collective as entities receiving PG&E's support for their programs to do a better job of science so that those new ideas can be applied. Dr. Kottke stated in dealing with ontological errors this is a part of the SSHAC framework of establishing the center, body, and range of an issue which is what PG&E is doing in connection with the seismic hazard.

Mr. John Geesman on behalf of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility stated he wanted to clarify that PG&E does not pay for anything. PG&E collects money from the ratepayers as authorized by the CPUC to fund its seismic studies and as a consequence the role of public bodies such as the DCISC, the CPUC, and the CEC should be considered paramount in providing suggestions and guidance for worthy subjects of those studies and the studies should not be kept as simply an internal calculation on PG&E's part. Mr. Geesman observed there is a great deal of public responsibility associated with how those funds are spent.

Dr. Scarlat commented on the perspective Dr. Peterson provided on the public good that comes out of seismic analysis and she stated her belief that this reference is out of scope of the Committee focus on safety because it can be belittling of the importance of making sure that the public has trust in the knowledge that is used to make decisions. She stated as a Committee we are not saying that these studies are needed because they advances science, we are saying that

these studies are needed because they are a part of the safety case to be continuously learning about the seismic risk and she wished to emphasize why it is that these studies are being done.

Dr. Peterson recognized the DCPD Supervisor of Risk and Regulatory Initiatives Mr. Nathan Barber and Dr. Albert Kottke, PG&E Geosciences Consultant, and asked them to make the next presentation.

Presentation by PG&E on the Purpose, Organization, and Status of Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) Programs at DCPD Including How Potential Changes in Seismic Hazard Analyses (Such as Discussed in the DCISC's Seismic Review Team Report) Affect SPRA Results and How Sensitivity Analyses for Such Changes are Performed.

Mr. Barber stated he appreciated the opportunity to address the Committee on the topic of the Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) Program at DCPD for which he has served as Probabilistic Risk Assessment Supervisor for approximately five years. Mr. Barber reported his background is in nuclear engineering at the University of California at Berkeley and the University of Illinois. In his discussion he stated the objective is to tie the seismic hazard analysis into the calculation of actual plant risk and core damage frequency.

Mr. Barber reported the original probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for DCPD was completed in 1988 and supported the original Long Term Seismic Program license. DCPD completed an extensive Seismic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (SPRA) update in 2018 and submitted it to the NRC as part of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) post-Fukushima response. The 2018 effort included incorporating a SSHAC Level 3 updated Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Assessment (PSHA), new foundation input response spectra and developed new structural models for the major structures and updated all the fragilities in the plant PRA model and the plant logic model. Following the update, a peer review process was completed which was observed by the NRC and as part of that process the NRC closed out any concerns with the SPRA model. Mr. Barber stated the PRA model scope included a number of different hazards in addition to seismic including internal events such as loss of coolant accidents, internal flooding and fires and the PRA model is considered a Level 2 PRA in that it can assess both core damage and large early release frequency.

Mr. Barber reported the PRA Program uses guidance procedures to identify when to update and maintain its models. The maintenance of the PRA model includes a review of any design change that occurs at the plant as well as any sort of operational changes, procedural changes or other things that might affect how operators might respond to an accident and any changes in methodology. Mr. Barber observed PG&E's responsibility is to then use this model to develop and update risk informed applications, such as risk informed completion times and online risk assessment programs. He stated PG&E must ensure the PRA model maintains technical adequacy and that is done through an independent peer review process performed whenever there is a significant update to the PRA model.

Mr. Barber reported that as a part of the overall PRA Program, the SPRA model is maintained with the principal focus being of areas of any changes to operational functions and any changes to the seismic hazard. He stated there is also a potential impact from design changes

to the fragility analysis used in the model. From an operational change perspective Mr. Barber commented this involves reviewing the system's logic model which is used to assess in a logical or in a quantitative way how the plant responds to an upset whether an earthquake or a loss of a system. This includes aspects such as operator actions that are included in the model to represent procedural action. Mr. Barber stated impacts to the fragility analysis are specific to the SPRA and PG&E has a comprehensive process where for each design change Mr. Barber's organization coordinates to identify any potential impact to the PRA model and how and whether those impacts might occur.

Mr. Barber stated the hazard impact will be updated and sensitivities studies performance once updated information is received from the Geosciences team to re-quantify the model and develop insights on the effects on plant risk. Mr. Barber described and discussed the results of the latest seismic hazard sensitivity review and he stated the core damage frequency (CDF) increase is less than $1\text{E-}05/\text{year}$ and he reported in this case DCPD remains within Region II for reactor operation.

Dr. Peterson stated his understanding regarding core damage is that the pathways to get there ultimately involves insufficient cooling of the fuel and he referred to the impact of operational failures, specifically initiating events stemming from loss of the auxiliary feedwater, condensate feedwater and then 'feed and bleed.'³¹ With reference to feed and bleed Dr. Peterson stated he was interested in how the FLEX equipment capabilities mitigate this residual risk of not being able to maintain sufficient cooling to the fuel. Mr. Barber replied the examples given are just representative pieces from the model and feed and bleed is not necessarily the dominant contributor although it is important for seismic scenarios. He stated there could be a scenario where an earthquake causes an impact to the Auxiliary Feedwater System or its power supply or any other support system that is required for that system's function. For example, he reported the condensate feedwater option for providing decay heat removal is not necessarily considered for seismic scenarios in context of operational change because there is a non-seismic component, so it would not be credited in the SPRA. Mr. Barber reported feed and bleed is a back-up mechanism for providing core cooling in the event primary core cooling through auxiliary feedwater is lost and operators could revert to a feed and bleed approach which involves starting high-pressure safety injection pumps and opening a power operated relief valve in the Reactor Coolant System. He described feed and bleed as a back-up method to the primary means of providing decay heat removal. Mr. Barber reported there is a limited amount of credit in the model for FLEX, currently crediting only FLEX strategy. Mr. Barber reported looking at manual control of the turbine driven Auxiliary Feedwater System pump in the event of an earthquake with loss of the motor-driven pumps is an important aspect of the model but the model does not take credit for any of the FLEX equipment. It includes and credits operator actions to restore manual control and to understand the steam generator levels in the event of an earthquake that damages those systems. Mr. Barber stated that for several years PG&E has considered including other systems and scenarios in the model but must assess in those cases the ability to move

³¹ In a nuclear power plant, feed and bleed is an emergency cooling procedure used to remove heat from the reactor core when normal and auxiliary feedwater systems fail. Operators "feed" cool makeup water into the reactor coolant system using high-pressure safety injection pumps while simultaneously "bleeding" off hot pressurized water or steam through relief valves.

equipment inside the protective area following an earthquake and he stated this presents some challenges. Mr. Barber reported the PRA model is confined to the first 24 hours following any sort of transient and much of the FLEX equipment is designed for scenarios that go beyond 24 hours and he stated that is another limitation with including it in the model. Mr. Barber remarked on the results showing the sensitivity value for seismic events is less than that for the dominant contributor which is fire. So seismic is a significant contributor but there are other important contributors to plant risk.

In response to Dr. Scarlat's question Mr. Barber replied that PG&E does not have a PRA model for the Independent Spent Fuel Installation (ISFSI) and he observed the ISFSI employs a very reliable cooling mechanism which is natural convection and he stated he was unaware of any utilities that address the risk from ISFSI installations using SPRA models and he stated different hazards that could affect the plant are reviewed and screened out based on the low potential for contribution to core damage and he remarked a similar type of assessment would likely screen out the ISFSI from consideration. He stated that although out of his area of expertise he believes ISFSI seismic considerations are managed on a deterministic design basis.

Mr. Jearl Strickland, now acting as a consultant to PG&E and formerly a long time employee, stated he was responsible for the development of the ISFSI for DCPD and as part of the overall design considerations a deterministic seismic analysis was performed to be able to qualify the storage system. He reported a number of other risks were considered such as after a seismic event if a landslide occurred that could cause debris to fall and potentially block lower vents in the storage overpacks and that is why mitigation measures were put in place including a large catch trench and a rockfall fence and the slope behind the ISFSI is secured by rock bolts put in place on 25' spacing that are 25' deep into the slope to be able to stabilize the slope. Mr. Strickland stated if an earthquake caused fractures of that slope, it would force large blocks of debris to be dislodged and thus would not impact the storage canisters. Mr. Strickland reported there is a detailed seismic qualification for both the storage overpacks and for the multipurpose canisters and the supporting structures within the multipurpose canisters and there is substantial margin in the analysis. He confirmed that the analysis of the design requirements for the ISFSI are deterministic not probabilistic.

Mr. Strickland then introduced PG&E Geosciences Consultant Dr. Albert Kottke to continue this presentation and discuss the SSHAC process.

Dr. Kottke stated he works in the areas of earthquake ground motion and seismic risk and would review with the Committee the SSHAC process and how it fits in context of the Long Term Seismic Program. Dr. Kottke reported the SSHAC process includes two standards that are the modern interpretations of the SSHAC guidance. He stated the PSHA requires considering alternatives in judgment and there are different ways that this can be done. The NRC's SSHAC process was developed to ensure rigor, quality, and that decisions are properly documented during the PSHA process. Dr. Kottke reported the SSHAC processes is followed for hazard studies at DCPD and is also used at other PG&E facilities. He stated PG&E informs its research programs using a SSHAC process including the use of outside participatory peer reviewers.

Dr. Kottke stated that the essence of the SSHAC process is provided in NRC publication NUREG 2213, and he described the SSHAC process as structured interaction among experts to achieve a well-documented hazard study that captures the center, body, and range of technically defensible interpretations.

Dr. Kottke referred to Dr. Jordan's comment concerning ontological error and he stated PG&E is trying to get a group of experts together to capture all of the errors or uncertainties and have a dialog. He reported that a successful SSHAC process requires good interaction between the team members and the participatory peer reviewers that are active during the process to capture the seismic hazard. Dr. Kottke referred to the sensitivity studies discussed by Mr. Barber and how they fit within the SSHAC processes and he stated at present under the NRC SSHAC process sensitivities are not a substitute for epistemic uncertainty modeling as they are diagnostic and decision-support tools. He reported in context of a SSHAC study, one might use sensitivity studies to understand the drivers or hazards of the risk and then to initially evaluate the impact of new information or potential changes and support graded decision making and as a guide for model refinement and simplification.

Dr. Kottke reviewed the roles and responsibilities within the SSHAC process and commented that Dr. Meshkati posed a question about the role of the participatory peer review panel chair's role in the SSHAC process. Dr. Kottke stated only consensus opinions are included in the report and this is enforced through a structure requiring separation of roles and documentation requirements and there are guidance documents that maintain integrity of the process, but this requires that the team members understand the SSHAC process and their roles within the process. He commented that when developing teams experience and past performance are important as is the interaction between team members. Some team members may have particular and better strengths and so it is important in developing the SSHAC team that differences of opinion are considered.

Dr. Kottke stated PG&E has been committed to seismic safety through its unique Long Term Seismic Program and PG&E stands alone in its support of science because of the Long Term Seismic Program and collaborates with research sources to advance techniques of earthquake ground motion modeling, understanding seismic sources and databases by using hazard studies. This research feeds data and models that will eventually be used in SSHAC PSHA process and for continual improvement of the seismic hazard assessment at the plant. Sensitivity analyses are used during this research but they do not replace the SSHAC process to inform the hazard, but rather they inform ongoing studies.

Dr. Peterson called for comments from the other Members.

Dr. Meshkati thanked Dr. Kottke and Mr. Barber and Dr. Meshkati confirmed he has an issue regarding the role of the participating peer review panel chair in the SSHAC process. Dr. Meshkati stated former DCISC Member Dr. Robert J. Budnitz deserves credit as Dr. Budnitz was very involved with the first SSHAC document. Dr. Meshkati stated the participating peer review panel chair plays an important role and governs the process of getting to a consensus and expressed his concern that the team leader could force a consensus and he observed that consensus is different from unanimity and in that context disagreement exists but is not raised.

He stated that is why the role of the SSHAC team leader is extremely important to ensure freedom of expression. Dr. Kottke replied that an important aspect of a SSHAC multi-year study effort is the involvement of the regulator in observing the interaction, while the regulator does not have an official role other than observation the regulator can ensure the questions that are raised through either the technical integration or the peer review panel are answered in the right manner and if someone has a question or a concern they are not quashed by the leader. Dr. Kottke reported when PG&E conducted the SB 846 update the University of California at Los Angeles B. John Garrick Institute for the Risk Sciences was engaged as a review panel to observe both the technical integration team and the participatory peer review panel to ensure their interactions were high level, technical based, and properly engaged.

Committee Consultant Dr. Andrew Kadak asked what kind of seismic source term for ground motion was used as input into this model to be able to show that the core damage frequency only changes by $1E-05/\text{yr}$. Mr. Strickland responded the input to the PRA model came from the latest seismic hazard analysis. Dr. Kottke responded that the PRA model records ground motion using M-R-S Bins³² and at every bin an annual frequency of exceedance is provided which is transformed into a rate of occurrence and those rates of occurrence feed through the PRA and involve a full hazard curve and fractals³³ to capture the uncertainty for other studies. In response to Dr. Kadaks' query on how this relates to the discussion about seismic source term, and whether it includes any of the concerns of the SRT Dr. Kottke replied all that work represents ongoing research. In response to Dr. Kadak's question Dr. Kottke stated this effort fits within the Long Term Seismic Program and PG&E is pursuing research activities and the results will then be used in a SSHAC hazard study where a panel of experts pulls all of that information together to develop a new hazard model and a new hazard curve that can be used in a PRA analysis. Dr. Kottke remarked the model analysis stage is unique to PG&E as most utilities do research as part of the hazard analysis/SSHAC process but PG&E continues to conduct hazard study research and to do long term studies that improve more fundamental aspects of the model. In response to Dr. Kadaks' question on whether any of the sensitivity studies discussed earlier assist PG&E in assessing the impact of various alternative hazard models presented, Dr. Kottke replied in the affirmative and stated PG&E looks at how the hazard changes and while usually stopping at hazard in this case PG&E assessed risk because risk is a parameter related to impact. He stated he could not commit to a deadline for the results.

Dr. Robert J. Budnitz, a former member of the DCISC was recognized. Dr. Budnitz stated he chaired the original SSHAC panel and understands very well the SSHAC process. Dr. Budnitz stated the central point of the SSHAC process is to develop the center, the body, and the range of the outcomes whatever the outcome happens to be. The point being that the center, and body and range all have technically defensible interpretations so if there is technically defensible interpretation for an outcome then it is part of this process and if not that outcome is not part of

³² M-R-S Bins (Magnitude-Distance-Site): These group records by earthquake magnitude (M), closest source-to-site distance (R), and site classification (S, such as rock or stiff soil). Engineers use them to match records to a specific design earthquake. Intensity Measure (IM) Bins: These group records based on specific shaking thresholds, such as peak ground acceleration or spectral acceleration levels, used during incremental dynamic analysis.

³³ A fractal is a never-ending geometric pattern that repeats itself at different scales.

the SSHAC process because the study team decided it was not technically defensible. Dr Budnitz reported that the range goes from the lower bound to the upper bound and given that at the upper bound of the range there is a certain hazard that can be put into the model and from that for seismic events one can calculate the risk from earthquakes, that is, the seismic core damage frequency which is as high as it can get and still be consistent with the technically defensible interpretations. Dr. Budnitz reported when he was a member of the DCISC the Committee collectively concluded that if one takes that upper bound of the range and applies the model the plant is still seismically safe with considerable margin and Dr. Budnitz observed this is an important safety conclusion. After SB 846 was enacted PG&E used a SSHAC-type process and the Committee concluded that the plant was still adequately safe, given the center, body, and range of all the technically defensible interpretations and Dr. Budnitz stated this is a most important finding, that is, the plant is safe enough even if the most extreme technically defensible interpretations are used. He concluded his comments by stating it was important not to forget these determinations were made and endorsed by the Committee and are part of its record.

Dr. Scarlet inquired whether the timing of the release of IPRP Report 16a was within the Committee's scope based upon relevance to safety and whether an open item should be included in the Open Items List. Mr. Rathie observed there was no discussion of the timing of the IPRP and he questioned the appropriateness of adding an item on which there has been no Committee discussion and with the Committee taking a position ahead of hearing from the IPRP. Dr. Gordon Seitz of the California Geological Survey and a Member of the IPRP was recognized. Dr. Seitz stated the IPRP's Report 16a included three requests of PG&E which will be addressed at the next IPRP meeting. He stated Report 16a was completed August 2025 but release of the report was held up by the CPUC. Dr. Seitz remarked the next IPRP meeting may address the separate roles of the IPRP and the DCISC. He stated the IPRP sees its role as addressing the seismic hazard, but not the safety of the plant.

XIX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

There were no public comments at this time.

Dr. Peterson reported that absent any additional comments, he looked forward to the Committee's continuing discussion in the morning.

XX ADJOURN EVENING MEETING

The Chair adjourned the evening session of the DCISC at 7:18 p.m.

XXI RECONVENE FOR MORNING MEETING

The morning meeting of the DCISC was convened by the Chair at 8:30 a.m.

XXII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments by Members at this time.

AGENDA PACKET DRAFT – OCTOBER 8, 2026

Committee Consultant Dr. Ken Koves was recognized. Dr. Koves referred to Recommendations 3.3 and 3.3B³⁴ from Mr. McWhorter's Report of the April 13-14, 2026, fact finding visit and commented he believed one of the two recommendations was unnecessary. Dr. Koves stated he recommended against dropping DCISC regular attendance at management review meetings as Dr. Koves stated it is the communication and conversation which occurs during these meetings that should be of interest to the Committee.

XXIII PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson. Dr. Nelson quoted from the AB 1632 "An Assessment of California's Nuclear Power Plants" which discussed the **deterministic investigation of a San Simeon 6.5 magnitude earthquake directly beneath DCP and the geologic similarities and the understanding of the San Luis-Pismo Block formation in order to refine estimates of ground motion likely to occur at different frequencies**. Dr. Nelson commented the AB 1632 report was counter to the information that has been gathered over twenty years. He urged the Committee to consider Mr. Geesman's comments in that context. **Dr. Peterson thanked Dr. Nelson and reported the Committee would be taking this item up under the Open items list.**

XIV ACCEPTANCE OF MINUTES

H. This item concerned review and acceptance of the Minutes of the Committee's February 2026, public meeting conducted in Avila Beach and as a Zoom Webinar. A draft of the February 2026 Minutes was included in the public agenda packet for this meeting. Mr. Rathie reported that he was greatly assisted by Ms. Denise Righetti who prepared the Transcript from which the Minutes were compiled. Dr. Peterson remarked that the use of **bold** text in the Minutes is important as it captures and describes some action or commitment on the part of the Committee which is then included on the Committee's Open Items List. The Members and Consultants reviewed each page of the Minutes and provided corrections and substantive changes to certain sections of the Minutes which will be included in the final version of the February 2026 Minutes. The Members and Technical Consultants provided clarification concerning typographical errors and the accuracy of certain statements in the Minutes and made editorial comments and changes concerning the draft of the February 2025 Minutes all of which were provided to Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie.

On a motion made by Dr. Scarlat, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the Minutes of the February 18-19, 2026, public meeting were unanimously accepted as revised by the discussion. The Minutes in their final approved version will become a part of the Committee's 36th Annual Report.

³⁴ The FFT recommended the DCISC should follow-up on how future uses of AI at DCP are addressed as part of the Artificial Intelligence Roadmap in the Strategic Plan (D4/26FF-3.3B). The FFT also recommended PG&E should provide the DCISC with a confidential [added during discussion] oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 INPO corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report (P4.26FF-3.3). Mr. McWhorter reported recommendations D4/26 FF-3.3B and P4/26FF-3.3 were additions to the Fact Finding Report after drafts were provided to Drs. Peterson and Scarlat.

Mr. Robert Sarvey was recognized. Mr. Sarvey commented he previously informed the Committee that the CPUC in Decision 25-12-005 Finding of Fact No. 6 states the DCISC made no recommendations in its 34th Annual Report for upgrades for extended operations. [In its 34th Annual Report the DCISC made two Recommendations to PG&E concerning (1) post-earthquake procedures and (2) Surveillance Capsule B test results; and one to the CPUC, supporting the funding of plant upgrade projects.] In response to Mr. Sarvey's question whether a letter to the CPUC he requested from the Committee was sent Legal Counsel Rathie replied that the 34th Annual Report was transmitted to the CPUC and speaks for itself and accordingly a letter was not sent.

XXV CONSULTANT REPORT & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND AUTHORIZE
TRANSMITTAL OF A FACT FINDING REPORT TO PG&E

I. The Chair requested Consultants Darden and Mr. St. Onge to provide a report on the May 6-7, 2026, fact-finding visit conducted with Dr. Peterson. Mr. St. Onge reported the fact finding visit occurred at a time of a great deal of activity at the plant and he reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the May 2026 visit as follows:

- Meet with NRC Resident Inspector – Mr. St. Onge reported a flash-over event occurred on May 4, 2026, on Unit 2 Startup Transformer 2-2 and the transformer was removed from service. The DCISC Fact Finding Team (FFT) continued to receive reports on this event throughout their visit. The FFT discussed the transformer flash-over with the NRC Acting Senior Resident Inspector Mr. Eli Garica and discussed the scheduled appearance of the Acting Senior Resident and other NRC representatives at the DCISC's June public meeting. The FFT concluded meetings with the NRC resident inspectors are beneficial and should continue.
- Meet with DCPD Officers – the FFT met with DCPD Site Vice President Mr. Adam Peck to discuss matters on the fact finding visit agenda and the transformer issue. The FFT concluded meetings with DCPD officers are beneficial for both parties and should continue.
- Station Update – the FFT received an update from Station Director Mr. Justin Rogers which included discussion of the transformer flash-over event issue. Mr. St. Onge stated the FFT learned the original equipment manufacturer was able to provide replacement bus bars within the out-of-service time for Startup Transformer 2-2. The FFT learned about the tunnel cleaning for the Circulating Water System intake which took place over two successive weekends and required a reduction of reactor power to 50%. Mr. St. Onge reported there was also an INPO assist visit taking place to review long-term projects. **The FFT made three recommendations to the Committee: (1) follow up on the Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure (D5/25FF-3.3A); and (2) follow-up on the rational for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation for the Startup Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure (D5/26FF-3.3B); and (3) follow up on reviewing the Long-Term Critical Projects under the Open items List EN-1. Mr. McWhorter observed this review should concentrate on projects following the R25 refueling outages for each unit.**

Dr. Meshkati inquired concerning the term “bus bar failure” or “high energy arcing fault” (HEAF) and stated the NRC defines HEAF as a very intense, abnormal discharge of electrons

between two charged electrodes. He commented it is his view as the Startup Transformer 2-2 failure involved a fire it fits the description of a HEAF and he questioned the use of the term bus bar failure. Mr. St. Onge replied the FFT did not discuss the definition with the NRC Resident Inspector and he reported and Mr. Tom Jones confirmed the resulting flame was extinguished as soon as the protective system tripped the transformer and there was no need for a Fire Department response. Dr. Meshkati referred to a LER in May 2000 for an event with an arc time of 11 seconds which he stated was the highest ever recorded in the nuclear industry and which caused a great deal of damage. **He reported the LER had several recommendations for preventative maintenance and the cause was found to be moisture accumulation due to a problem with a gasket and Dr. Meshkati suggested the recommendations that transpired from the 2000 event should be revisited. Senior Director Tom Jones confirmed a Cause Evaluation report for the 2026 event is being prepared and the definition question Dr. Meshkati raised would be addressed in that Cause Evaluation report.**

➤ Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders – Mr. St. Onge commented dynamic procedures were previously referred to as electronic procedures. Mr. St. Onge stated dynamic procedures are a kind of overlay of actual procedures and DCPD has developed, tested and prototyped implementation of dynamic procedures for equipment rounds in the plant by Operations personnel. Mr. St. Onge reported dynamic procedures have significant potential to reduce human error by ensuring conditions are met prior to advancing to the next step and by ensuring automatic entry of recorded measurements. He stated if off normal conditions are discovered a Notification in the Corrective Action Program is promptly created. Mr. St. Onge reported iPads are used as they do not require fan cooling and will not circulate radioactive air when used in radiation controlled areas. He reported DCPD is using NextAxiom software and there is a large user group for this software. In response to Dr. Scarlat's query Mr. St. Onge reported the user groups are conducted by the vendor and he had no information on other user groups or user networks. He confirmed the NRC is aware of the use of dynamic procedures at DCPD. **Dr. Scarlat recommended the Committee follow up on the topic of relevant user groups and NRC oversight of the integration of dynamic procedures especially since under new NRC procedures there will be more reliance on data streams. Mr. St. Onge stated the FFT concluded the use of dynamic procedures is encouraging and the DCISC should continue to review the development of dynamic procedures on a regular basis. The FFT recommended that the previous recommendation (D12/24FF-3.2) remain open.**

➤ Craftmanship Council Update – Mr. St. Onge reported the FFT met with DCPD Maintenance Director Mr. Mike Brass and received a briefing and an update on the Craftmanship Council which he described as a grass roots initiative, supported by station management, to empower the station craftspeople to improve daily work practices in a collaborative setting. He reported that this initiative is similar to a program at the Wolf Creek Generating Station in Kansas. He reported all plant shops were represented on the Council and it is self-governing and meets regularly to discuss work practices. He stated the Council has undertaken to improve pre-job briefings as part of human performance as pre-job briefing have become overly prescriptive. **The FFT concluded the Craftmanship Council was driving continuous improvement and recommended the previous recommendation (D12/15/25FF-3.1) should be closed and the DCISC should modify the Open Items List to add a new item under Conduct of Maintenance for periodic reviews of the Craftmanship Council within**

the next calendar year. Mr. St. Onge confirmed in response to Dr. Meshkati's question that the Craftsmanship Council was a grass root initiative and included contract workers as well as full time DCPD employees. Dr. Meshkati inquired whether the initiative could be institutionalized. Consultant Darden reported the Maintenance Director was supportive of all the Council's initiatives. Dr. Meshkati commended PG&E for providing the environment for the Craftsmanship Council. Mr. McWhorter cautioned against institutionalizing the initiative as this could result in a loss of its current informality. Dr. Meshkati commented he was advocating institutionalizing to ensure when the program champion retires the program does not fade away and he commented he did not advocate bureaucratizing the initiative. Dr. Scarlet stated she found value in the culture of a grass roots initiative as it encourages ownership.

➤ **Equipment Reliability** – Mr. St. Onge described the decision to continue plant operations to 2030 and possibly longer as seen by DCPD employees as an opportunity to make improvements and to undertake major projects including the plant's Life Cycle Management Plans and long-range asset management plans that are based upon INPO processes. The FFT reviewed the plans for critical spares to be on hand which is part of the equipment reliability efforts. He reported that the FFT discussed with the Equipment Reliability Group the potential use of AI to assist in monitoring and performing analysis to identify early equipment degradation. With the expansion of Wi-Fi in the plant more equipment will be monitored. The FFT concluded that the Equipment Reliability Program is healthy, has appropriate leadership engagement and team involvement to successfully manage long and short-term conditions for station equipment while minimizing risk. **The FFT recommended that: (1) the DCISC should revisit Equipment Reliability Program in 6-12 months to obtain more details on long-term projects and Open item List EN-21 can provide the vehicle for this; and (2) the DCISC should modify the Open items List Item PI-3 to include monitoring and use of AI to develop plant initiatives that improve equipment reliability.**

➤ **Walkthrough of Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders** – Mr. St. Onge stated the FFT met with the supervisor of Engineering and Operations working on this project in response to an open recommendation that a DCISC member participate in a walkdown of the use of dynamic procedures. The FFT observed an operator making rounds using dynamic procedures to demonstrate the systems response. The operator made some intentional errors during his activities to show how the procedure software responded. He reported the data is collected and analyzed and if found out of range a Notification is immediately issued which Mr. St. Onge described as much quicker than in the past prior to implementation of dynamic procedures. Photos and sound recordings can also be used and operator proficiency tracked. Dr. Peterson observed use of dynamic procedures improves performance and an operator can lose qualification status by making mistakes. Dr. Peterson stated the plant has done an excellent job of introducing dynamic procedures and he observed their use and development can improve operational safety. Mr. St. Onge reported the system is operational and communicates on and between both iPads and iPhones. **The FFT concluded dynamic procedures are currently being tested at the station and the results show promise. The FFT recommended closure of the prior Recommendation (D12/15-/25FF-3.14) and Open Item List Item PI-2 should be amended to provide for the other two members of the DCISC [Drs. Scarlet and Meshkati] should be provided a walkdown on the use of dynamic procedures.**

➤ Craftmanship Council Interview with Craft Members – the FFT met with and interviewed craft members who were part of the Craftmanship Council and Mr. St. Onge stated their enthusiasm for the Council was evident. The FFT concluded the Craftmanship Council is beneficial and the Committee should continue periodically to attend meetings of the Craftmanship Council.

➤ Nuclear Insurance – Mr. St. Onge stated there were no findings from the last visit by nuclear insurers. He reported that the insurance industry identified areas of potential claims and collates specific events, estimates, and cost benefit factors for mitigation activities. He reported the mitigation actions could be incorporated into the insurance policy as suggestions or as recommendations. Suggestions are optional while recommendations tend to be mandatory. Dr. Peterson observed insurance comes with requirements and loss control guidelines that improve reliability and safety of the plant and from an operational perspective they are beneficial. American Nuclear Insurers (ANI) and Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL) provide, respectively, nuclear risk insurance and property damage coverage for the plant. They also perform reviews and audit the plant with the goal of objectively improving operational safety. Mr. St Onge reported there were two recommendations made to (1) to add up to six round water sample points, and (2) to have a second portal at the Security Sally Port into the entry to the Protective Area. Mr. St Onge reported the FFT concluded the 2022 inspections by insurers found no major deficiencies. **The FFT made a recommendation to the Committee that the DCISC should follow up on the results of insurance inspections to be conducted mid-2026, The results should be captured on the DCISC Open Items List under NS-11.** Members discussed with Mr. St. Onge some possible scenarios that could trigger insurance involvement including exposure to radiation, environmental conditions and resulting negative health impacts. Dr. Meshkati observed the issue of insurance applies to industrial safety and therefore becomes even more important in context of the DCISC's review. Mr. St. Onge stated that INPO has been a strong driver of plant safety and safety regulation rules and DCPD has a very good program for ensuring work is performed properly.

➤ Crane Program –Mr. St. Onge reported that the FFT reviewed Notifications regarding broken cranes and procedures, operating restrictions including those for heavy loads over safety-related equipment, rigging, and load handling procedures. Mr. St. Onge stated the FFT also reviewed engineered lifts and Notifications, certifications, scheduling, qualifications and other compliance documentation. The FFT concluded that the Crane Program at DCPD is robust and maintenance issues are being addressed to remain compliant with NRC requirements regarding control of heavy loads.

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson referred to the previous station update and stated there were two times in February 2026 when Unit 1 power was reduced to 50% and he reported that two circulating water tunnels serve each unit and are cleaned consecutively over two separate occasions. Senior Director Tom Jones confirmed Dr. Nelson's statement. Dr. Nelson reported on an accident in 2013 involving a crane at the Arkansas One Nuclear Power Plant in Arkansas which resulted in a fatality when a temporary crane moving a generator stator failed and caused major plant damage, Mr. St. Onge stated he was familiar with the Arkansas One accident and he has an extensive background in evaluating crane safety.

Consultant Dr. Ken Koves was recognized. Dr. Koves inquired concerning dynamic procedures and whether there was anything in the software in terms of modifying or dating the procedures as Dr. Koves stated there have been problems in the past with these attributes. Dr. Peterson remarked the electronic format simplifies the issues raised by Dr. Koves, but the FFT did not specifically review that issue.

On a motion introduced by Dr. Meshkati, seconded by Dr. Scarlat, the May 6-7, 2026, Fact Finding Report was unanimously approved.

Following approval of the May report the Member returned to their discussion of the April 13-14, 2026, Fact Finding Report. [See above, B.9-32.]

A short break followed.

XXVI DISCUSSION, DIRECTION AND ACTION, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE COMMITTEE, CONSULTANTS & COUNSEL (Cont'd.)

Committee Regulatory, Administrative and Financial Matters, Public Outreach and Engagement, Interaction with Governmental Agencies, Consideration of New Committee Policy on Response to DCCP Emergencies, Amend Policy on Review of Fact Finding Reports, Ratify and Approve Contract Changes with Committee Consultants and Counsel, and Other Committee Discussion.

J. Legal Counsel Rathie reported under regulatory activities that the next appointment to the Committee will be made by the Governor. Dr. Peterson is the current Governor's appointee and is one of two candidates vetted by the CPUC to serve for the 2026-2029 term. He reported there is an Advice Letter pending with the CPUC Energy Division seeking to increase the hourly compensation furnished to members of the DCISC from \$270 to \$290.

Mr. Rathie reported the process of assembling and reviewing the 36th Annual Report has begun and this public meeting is the final meeting in the report period and the report will come before the Committee during the October 20-21, 2026, public meeting. The report will first be provided to PG&E for its response which will be a part of the final report.

and on April 30, 2026, Dr. Mr. Rathie reported that on April 3, 2026, Dr. Peterson met remotely with the Governor's Senior Advisor for Energy Meshkati met in Sacramento with the Chair of the CEC and senior staff. Mr. Rathie reported he was present at each meeting. He reported he continues to update and coordinate the activities of the DCISC with representatives of the IPRP and a DCISC representative will attend the next IPRP public meeting. [The IPRP subsequently schedule a meeting in San Francisco at CPUC Headquarters for October 15, 2026.] He reported in furtherance of the proposed Committee Policy Response to Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergencies DCISC representatives have sought to meet with the Governor' Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) Radiological Preparedness Unit but to date that meeting has not taken place. In concluding his remarks on administrative matters, Mr. Rathie reported the Committee's website continues to average approximately the same number of users in 2026 as it did in 2025 and the website provides a valuable tool for public outreach.

Concerning financial matters Mr. Rathie reported the Committee is operating for the first time under the new fixed amount funding protocol established by the Fourth Restated Charter which followed the adoption of SB 846. The funds provided for its operation will increase each year in accordance with the California Consumer Price Index or by 3% whichever is greater. Any amount overspent from the amount provided for the prior year would be recouped in the following year. Mr. Rathie cautioned that the Committee must continue to live within its means.

Concerning public outreach Mr. Rathie reported the informational topics for this public meeting were posted in advance on the DCISC's website and comments were solicited, however, the Committee was unable to accommodate certain requests for topics that were not ready for presentation at this meeting including those related to the IPRP's February 19, 2026, Response to the 2024 PG&E Updated Seismic Assessment [Repost 16a] and to the test results for Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel surveillance Capsule B. He reported that a notice of meeting was posted on bulletin boards at local city halls and at the County Government Center. He reported a public outreach session will be convened at the Government Center in San Luis Obispo later during this public meeting. In response to Dr. Scarlat's inquiry Mr. Rathie reported that under the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act the agenda for each public meeting is required to be posted and distributed at least ten calendar days prior to the meeting. The Committee members and consultants discussed various ways of publicizing Committee activities and continuing to assess coordination with the NRC and its meetings and with local agencies and educational institutions. The Committee members discussed the venue for its public meetings including accessibility and parking issues and including the option of holding outreach sessions at other locations during fact finding or after the public meetings. There was also a discussion about the need to reach out to the differing impacted communities and about continuing to conduct tours with members of the public in conjunction with the DCISC's future public meetings.

Ms. Jane Swanson of the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace was recognized. Ms. Swanson stated she welcomed the Committee's discussion and commented she prefers to attend the Committee's public meetings in person but the remote option through the Zoom webinar provides a valuable option. She observed there are limited parking options for disability access in Avila Beach. Dr. Meshkati requested Ms. Swanson to provide a list of compatible venues for the DCISC members' consideration.

Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated public access to the Committee's public meetings is important and he observed the venue in Avila Beach as being the closest to DCPD is an important consideration. He commented the San Luis Obispo County Public Library in downtown San Luis Obispo might offer a good venue for public outreach sessions.

Mr. Rathie called the Committee's attention to consideration of the Committee policies on Response to Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergencies and Review of Fact Finding Reports included in the agenda packet for this meeting. Following a motion made by Dr. Petersson, seconded by Dr. Meshkati, Committee Policy No. 10 Response to Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergencies was unanimously adopted. Following a motion made by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Scarlat, a revision to Committee Policy No. 8 Review of Fact Finding Reports to provide that

approval of a fact finding report constitutes approval of the recommendations made therein to the Committee or to PG&E was unanimously approved. The Committee members then unanimously approved an amendment to the Agreements for Consulting Services with Dr. Jordan. Mr. St. Onge and ratified an agreement with Mr. Rathie and an amendment to the Agreement with Dr. Kirk to provide for respectively, the broadening of the scopes of services for Dr. Jordan and Mr. St. Onge, for the engagement of Mr. Rathie as Committee Legal Counsel to succeed Mr. Wellington, and for an increase in the not to exceed funding level for Dr. Kirk's engagement. A letter from Mr. Wellington who has served as the Legal Counsel to the Committee since 1990 was included in the agenda packet. The Committee members then approved a resolution recognizing the final fiscal expenditure for the SRT. Mr. Rathie then introduced a proposal to increase the compensation for Ms. Denise Righetti to prepare transcript of the public meetings from which the minutes are prepared. On a motion by Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Meshkati, the above described contractual actions were approved.

The members then moved to the matter of election of a Chair and Vice Chair to serve for the period July 1, 2026 through June 30, 2027. [See page 32 above.]

XXVII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

The Chair asked Ms. Corral to introduce the next presenter and topic for PG&E.

Ms. Corral introduced the Manager for the DCPD Dry Fuel Storage Project, Mr. Eric Brackeen and reported that Mr. Brackeen leads a team of engineers and project managers overseeing operations, inspection and maintenance of the ISFSI as well as implementation of the dry fuel loading campaigns. Mr. Brackeen began his career at DCPD in 2003 and worked in positions of increasing responsibility in the Engineering, Decommissioning and Dry Fuel organizations. Ms. Corral reported that Mr. Brackeen holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering from Cal Poly San Luis Obispo.

Presentation by PG&E on Plans for Conducting Aging Management Inspections at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility (Including Multi-Purpose Canisters) in Summer 2026.

Mr. Brackeen reported DCPD uses the HI-STORM 100SA dry fuel storage system manufactured by the Holtec firm. He stated the system has a DCPD site specific license from the NRC under 10 CFR Part 72, initially for a 20-year period to March 22, 2024, which was subsequently extended in 2025 to allow operation of the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) through March 22, 2064. He described the HI-STORM 100SA system as an anchored cask design through a flanged bottom surface on the storage overpack which for seismic considerations allows the system to be secured to the pad. Mr. Brackeen reported that to date PG&E has conducted eight loading campaigns and there are 70 storage casks now within the ISFSI.

Mr. Brackeen described the HI-STORM 100SA design as consisting of an overpack containing a multi-purpose canister (MPC) which is used to house up to 32 spent fuel assemblies. The MPC is an integrally welded pressure vessel with an outer shell ½" thick and a top lid approximately 9 ½" thick which is placed on a bottom base plate which is 2 ½" thick. Within the

overpack the MPC sits upon a 16” pedestal which keeps the MPC above the lower air inlet vents on the overpack. The overpack is constructed of two 1” inner and outer concentric metal shells and the 20” annular space is then filled with high density concrete to provide shielding. The overpack includes a 2” thick baseplate which provides shielding and support for attachment of the overpack to the ISFSI pad and a bolted lid approximately 19” thick. In response to Dr. Meshkati Mr. Brackeen described the pedestal and the baseplate and the overpack as separate and distinct components. The pedestal and the lid are filled with concrete by Holtec and the overpacks are filled with concrete when they arrive at the site. The concrete fill increases the weight of the overpack from 55,000 to 250,000 pounds. In response to Dr. Scarlat’s question Mr. Brackeen reported the seismic anchor in the design of the HI-STORM 100SA is a specific attribute due to the seismic criteria at DCPD to preclude any chance of the cask tipping in response to a seismic event. Mr. Brackeen commented he believes there may be a nuclear power plant in South Africa that uses a similar design to the HI-STORM 100SA and he reported there are user groups sponsored by Holtec as well as by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and support research in the implementation of dry fuel storage.

Mr. Brackeen reported the Aging Management Program for the MPCs requires visual inspection of the accessible external surface areas of the MPCs within the storage overpacks to monitor for structural integrity, radiation shielding, and heat transfer function. He reported that the ISFSI Aging Management Program is consistent with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code Case guidance documents and approved by the NRC. He reported the Code Case guidance is to determine the susceptibility of the MPC to stress corrosion cracking and for performing screening examination in accordance with ASME Code Case VT1 and VT3.³⁵ Mr. Brackeen reported the ASME Code Case requires inspection of a minimum of two MPCs at the ISFSI. In response to Dr. Peterson’s inquiry as to the existence of any degradation underneath areas that have some level of corrosion or rust identified Mr. Brackeen replied that the inspection vendor uses robotic equipment to obtain visual images and to attempt cleaning although this is also governed by the ASME Code Case guidance as there is a concern about the transport of chlorides to a different environment and with mechanical abrasion which could potentially cover up indications sought to be identified.

Mr. Brackeen provided an overview of the inspection process including visual inspection of the MPCs accessible surfaces within the overpack. He reported that very specific robotic equipment is used by the vendor engaged for the inspection, Robotic Technologies of Tennessee, that allows access to the area and retrieval of images for review by qualified DCPD inspectors to determine if there are any concerns or anomalies present. He reported the robotic equipment is deployed into the interior of the HI-STORM 100SA through the upper outlet vents, after the vent screens are removed to allow access for the inspection and the robot is magnetically secured to the wall of the overpack. In response to Dr. Meshkati’s query Mr. Brackeen reported the ASME Code Case allows up to a ten-year frequency for inspections depending on the results, but in the case of DCPD with its marine environment the inspection frequency is five years in accordance

³⁵ ASME Section XI visual examinations VT-1 and VT-3 are distinct non-destructive examination (NDE) methods used to evaluate nuclear components, where VT-1 is a specific, close-up examination for surface discontinuities, and VT-3 is a general mechanical and structural evaluation.

with the DCPD Aging Management Program for the ISFSI. In response to Dr. Meshkati's question Mr. Brackeen confirmed there is no permanently installed instrumentation within the MPCs, but radiation dose levels are routinely surveyed around the ISFSI including around the eight MPCs that DCPD intends to inspect in August 2026 which includes addressing and identifying any potential degradation in the concrete or of the shielding function of the concrete. Mr. Brackeen reported the robotic equipment can survey 180° of each MPC and therefore entry is required to be made through only two of the overpack's upper outlet vents to be able to inspect 360° around the MPC. **In response to Dr. Peterson's inquiry concerning the geometry of the weld connection to the shell along the bottom head of the stainless steel MPC, as stress corrosion cracking can arise due to residual stresses from the thermal conductivity caused by the welding process, Mr. Brackeen stated he believes the weld is applied from the exterior but he would need to review and subsequently provide information on details of the preparations taken for the welds. Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones replied that this information would be provided to the DCISC at the time of the Committee's observation of the MPC inspection in August 2026.** Mr. Brackeen commented an earlier design implemented in some of the MPCs includes two shells that are conjoined with a circumferential weld and have both longitudinal welds and a welded top. He reported Holtec has now transitioned to a new design in use at DCPD which eliminates the circumferential weld while retaining the longitudinal weld.

Mr. Brackeen reported the remote inspection are performed in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements for VT3 and VT1 examinations and the robotic crawler is equipped with probes that satisfy both VT3 and VT1 inspection criteria and therefore the crawler need not be retracted if an area of interest is identified requiring enhanced examination by the qualified examiner. He reported that depending on the results an assessment examination would attempt to characterize the condition of the defect or anomaly. In response to Dr. Meshkati's question Mr. Brackeen reported that in addition to photos the robotic crawler has the ability to collect data on ambient temperature and contact temperature and to deploy some types of cleaning processes as well as to obtain swabs of materials. He concurred with Mr. Meshkati's observation that the responsibility lies with the DCPD qualified inspector to detect any anomaly while the robotic crawler is operated by the vendor. He reported that the inspection is performed in real time but there is the capability to return to subsequently review the data collected. Mr. Meshkati commented this may be an area where AI might be employed to assist in pattern recognition for visual inspection and this could assist in ensuring an indication was not missed by an inspection conducted by a human. Mr. Brackeen replied DCPD will deploy only techniques approved by ASME and the NRC. Dr. Meshkati commented that ASME can only certify the mechanical aspects of the inspections but the visual inspection entails human factors issues.

Mr. Brackeen reported DCPD has contracted with the vendor to provide equipment, images, video feed and the equipment operator and PG&E will be tasked to perform the inspections. **Dr. Scarlat made a request for the in-service ASME training documents for the VT1 and VT3 qualified inspectors to be provided for the DCISC's review during the August 2026 observation of the MPC inspection.** Mr. Brackeen stated he could not provide a response to Dr. Scarlat's question as to the capability of the hardware to conduct an initial pre-screening. He commented that DCPD has data from the 2021 inspection and areas identified

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through that screening will be areas of interest for the 2026 inspection and there is no time constraint on the inspection and time is provided for further inspection detail if required.

Mr. Brackeen described the inspection process including removal of two of the four vent screens from each of the eight MPCs to be inspected which act as gamma shields and then the use of a scissors lift to provide access for and to deploy the robotic probe and connection of the remote control cabling which feeds back to an enclosure approximately 40' in distance from the MPC where the individuals conducting the inspection will be located to view the feed on video monitors. Mr. Brackeen stated the process is controlled, configured, and timed to minimize dose to the inspection team. Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones reported there is also a 1,000' HDMI cable that allows video feed to be provided to an observer stationed outside the ISFSI protected area. He reported the schedule is to conduct the inspection of one MPC each day. He reported that personnel from the DCPM Mechanical Maintenance and Radiation Protection organizations, the vendor, the equipment operators, and the inspectors together with personnel from Mr. Brackeen's Dry Fuel Storage organization will all be involved in the inspection activities.

Mr. Brackeen reported the 2026 inspection will be similar in scope to that conducted in 2021 with inspection data collected for the same eight MPCs that were inspected in 2021 which he stated provides the ability to trend changes over time. The objective is to perform both VT3 and VT1 inspections, to obtain temperature measurements and to clean surfaces where necessary. He reported contracts are in place for the robotic equipment and the operators and DCPM has procedures in place which govern implementation of the Aging Management Program for the MPCs. Work packages for the inspections to be conducted during the week of 17 August 2026 are nearing completion. He reported Monday of that week will include pre-job briefings, review of qualifications, and a readiness review with inspections commencing on Tuesday.

Ms. Jane Swanson of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace was recognized. In response to Ms. Swanson's queries Dr. Peterson replied the MPCs serve multi-purposes in that they function to store, transport, and dispose of spent nuclear fuel. Dr. Peterson reported the determination for the use of ½" thick steel is governed by regulatory requirements. Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones confirmed that DCPM intends to continue with Holtec as the vendor for its dry cask storage system and the evaluation of the Orano dry cask storage system was conducted during the period when the plant was to enter decommissioning. Mr. Jones reported concerning the 6" to 12" thick-walled canister design mentioned by Ms. Swanson as being in use in Japan and Germany and he stated the manufacturer of that system, a single walled design which although thicker than the Holtec MPC design does not offer an overpack and provides less shielding, does not participate or offer services in the United States.

Dr. Robert J. Budnitz, a former DCISC member, was recognized. Dr. Budnitz reported he was present during the 2021 MPC inspection and he wrote a report of his observations. Dr. Budnitz stated his observation on that occasion was very valuable and he urged each of the three DCISC members to avail themselves of the opportunity to observe MPC inspection activities.

XVIII ADJOURN MORNING SESSION

Dr. Peterson adjourned the June 17, 2026, morning session at 12:30 p.m.

XXIX RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION

Dr. Peterson reconvened the Committee for the afternoon session at 1:30 p.m.

XXX COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments by members at this time.

XXXI PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

There were no comments by members of the public at this time.

XXXII INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Mr. Corral introduced Senior Director of Regulatory, Environmental and Repurposing Mr. Tom Jones to make the next presentation. She reported in this capacity Mr. Jones oversees regulatory processes and community and external engagement for both DCP and the Humboldt Bay Power Plant ISFSI. This includes relicensing of DCP and the stewardship of 10,000 acres and 14 miles of coastline which make up the Diablo Canyon properties. Mr. Jones previously served in Corporate Affairs and Local Government Relations with PG&E including as Director of Corporate Affairs for Energy Generation. Mr. Jones joined PG&E in 2001.

Presentation by PG&E on the Regulatory Requirements and Technical Standards for the Testing and Analysis of the Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Surveillance Capsule B and the Planned Submission of Results to the NRC and the DCISC.

Mr. Jones described the process for the testing of the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel Surveillance Capsule B as a confirmatory process required as part of license renewal for DCP as Unit 1 and Unit 2 already satisfy the NRC's 60-year Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Program criteria. He reported the process has two tracks with the first being regulatory and the second engineering and it is the engineering track that is involved with the results of the testing of Capsule B which will be made available to both the DCISC and the NRC. He displayed a photo from 2012 when the Unit 1 reactor core barrel was removed for inspection which showed the location of Capsule B and he described Capsule B as a 13' sleeve which contains the items subject to testing. He reported the location of Capsule B provides for exposure of its contents for more full effective reactor years than the vessel itself due to Capsule B's close proximity to the fission process.

Capsule B was successfully removed from Unit 1 in April 2025 after equipment challenges prevented its removal in the prior refueling outage. Mr. Jones reported additional measurements were made and the strength of the removal tool was increased. He reported there were approximately 50 different items to be tested in Capsule B and this is part of the reason the NRC allows up to 18 months for testing to be completed and reported. Most of these tests are

conducted in a hot cell³⁶ as the components are extremely radioactive having had more exposure to the fission process than the reactor pressure vessel.

Mr. Jones stated that one of the principal tests is the Charpy V-notch tests which he described as a destructive examination to understand how the metal performs at different temperatures that helps inform licensing requirements. Tensile stress tests are performed to assess strength and dosimetry inside the capsule is examined to understand the entire dose received over time. He described the thermal monitor examination as examination of a plastic device which would deform it if the vessel exceeded operational temperature. Mr. Jones reported that this device in Capsule B was found not to be deformed thereby verifying the upper limit of thermal exposure was not exceeded. Mr. Jones reported this testing was performed by the Westinghouse firm under contract to PG&E and the report on Capsule B has been received and is undergoing a validation process for acceptance criteria which is being conducted by PG&E. Mr. Jones commented that once the acceptance criteria is satisfied, concurrently a regulatory filing is made to the NRC which he reported will be submitted within 30 days.

Mr. Jones described the timeline following withdrawal of Capsule B in April 2025 with the capsule being shipped to the testing facility in May 2025, disassembled in June 2025, with testing continuing until February 2026 and completion of the acceptance criteria expected this month. He reported by then the entire process will be completed within 15 months. Mr. Jones reported that individual briefings will be offered to each of the DCISC members and other stakeholders and a report submitted to the NRC.

In response to Consultant St. Onge's question concerning Charpy V-notch testing Mr. Jones confirmed that as there were combined materials to be tested, in order to get adequate sized samples there were 45 specimens and there was also a challenge with the robotics in the Westinghouse hot cell and this resulted in the schedule slipping but still remaining within regulatory requirements. Dr. Meshkati commended PG&E for speeding up the schedule. Mr. Jones stated briefings for the Committee members could be scheduled during the first and second weeks of July with the report on the results of the testing provided to the Committee at the time it is provided to the NRC. Briefings were tentatively scheduled for Dr. Scarlet for the week of July 1, 2026, during a July 5-6, 2026, fact finding visit for Dr. Peterson, Mr. McWhorter and Dr. Kirk, and a briefing will be scheduled for Dr. Meshkati and Mr. Rathie which may include the CEC Chair and his staff including Dr. Justin Cochran. Mr. Jones stated he would need to coordinate with Westinghouse on the availability of its personnel to participate in these briefings. At Dr. Meshkati's request Mr. Rathie will contact the office of the CEC Chair to coordinate the date and time for a briefing.

Committee Consultant Dr. Kirk commented that as he did in his original report to the DCISC he would review new information from the Capsule B test report in context both of his confirmatory analysis of the NRC process and also against the ASME's new process from draft Code Case N914. In response to Consultant Kadak's question Mr. Jones reported it was his understanding that all testing of Capsule B was found to be credible. In response to Dr. Scarlet's query Mr. Jones stated the expertise in the different layers of review for data qualification and

³⁶ A hot cell is a name given to a containment chamber that is shielded against nuclear radiation. The word hot refers to radioactivity.

regulatory interpretation include Mr. Jones' organization and the PG&E Law Department, cross-checking that the report contains all required information for licensing purposes and that information is then conveyed to the NRC by a PG&E officer in a format which includes reference to all correspondence on the matter. For the engineering review, multiple engineers from differing disciplines are engaged for this review and PG&E outsources to Westinghouse for its services as the subject matter focusing on metrology³⁷ and the radiation protection values and different exposure limits. Mr. Jones stated PG&E, as the NRC's licensee for DCP, is responsible for the safety of the facility. Mr. Jones in response to Dr. Scarlat's question confirmed that while PG&E outsources the testing function to Westinghouse, PG&E has the in-house experience to interpret the data. In response to Dr. Meshkati's inquiry Mr. Jones stated an external peer review is not conducted of PG&E's review of the acceptance criteria and PG&E make the determination of the acceptance criteria. **In response to Dr. Scarlat's request Mr. Jones offered to provide the DCISC with a copy of the acceptance criteria used by PG&E.**

In response to Dr. Meshkati's comments, Dr. Kirk confirmed that the NRC released a White Paper³⁸ concerning the NRC's plans for rulemaking concerning embrittlement prediction and reactor pressure vessel surveillance but this action has not resulted in change to any NRC regulations or guidelines on these topics. Dr. Kirk reported there has been a recent technical exchange meeting between the EPRI and the NRC which placed a hold on the matter and no public meetings are planned at this time. Dr. Kirk commented while nothing has changed relative to NRC rulemaking it has been suggested that the NRC may be moving to endorsement of the ASTM International [formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials] standard for embrittlement prediction in addition to the NRC current Regulatory Guide 1.99. Dr. Kirk reported when he receives the results of the Capsule B testing he will check the calculations of RTPTS³⁹ value in view of the new data from Capsule B for the limiting weld and he will use the still developing but close to acceptance ASME procedure in Code Case N914 for embrittlement prediction and assessment. He stated the only difference from a data perspective is since fracture toughness T-zero data are available the limiting weld heat that was tested by the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant in Michigan is not used by the NRC but it is considered supplemental information under the ASME process and Dr. Kirk will consider it in his analysis using the ASME process. He reported that by using the ASME method DCP actually may have a longer licensable life.

Dr. Kirk stated he could not speak for the NRC or comment on Dr. Meshkati's comment about the White Paper having been seen by several distinguished scholars as related to regulatory modernization under Presidential Executive Order 14300. Dr. Kirk stated it was his understanding the NRC was looking to bring its standards up to the current state of the practice as reflected in the ASTM and ASME standards and worldwide knowledge on this topic. Dr. Kirk

³⁷ Metrology is the scientific study of measurement, covering both theoretical and experimental determinations across all fields of science and technology.

³⁸ A White Paper is an authoritative, in-depth report designed to educate readers, explain a complex issue, and propose a specific solution or perspective.

³⁹ RTPTS stands for the Reference Temperature for Pressurized Thermal Shock. In nuclear engineering, it is a key measure used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) under 10 CFR 50.61 to monitor the embrittlement of nuclear reactor pressure vessels over time.

stated this may be long overdue and the concern the NRC is trying to address with rulemaking does not impact Unit 1. He remarked for many years the NRC has recognized its embrittlement trend curve in Regulatory Guide 1.99 produces non-conservative predictions at high fluence values with high fluence being defined as greater than 6×10^{19} N per cm² which he stated is a consideration for some nuclear power plants, but DCPD will not reach that fluence level after 60 years of operation. Dr. Kirk reported the NRC is also considering the schedule for the withdrawal of surveillance capsules during periods of license extension. Dr. Kirk reported that again this will likely not have any practical impact on Unit 1 because even before Capsule B was withdrawn Unit 1 had surveillance data at a fluence level of above 60 years. He stated his view that the NRC is considering updating its rules to bring them up to the current state of engineering practice. In response to Dr. Scarlat's question about the model to which the data from Capsule B will be compared Dr. Kirk stated the fluence for Capsule B is well below the fluence at which the NRC has said that the data shows their predictive model from Regulatory Guide 1.99 produces non-conservative predictions. In response to Dr. Scarlat's comment Dr. Kirk stated there is professional consensus on the ASTM 900 standard adopted in 2015 as that standard is based upon 2,000 data points from welds, plates, and forgings withdrawn from surveillance capsules in the United States and in thirteen other countries that have nuclear reactors of U.S. design and this is the information on which the NRC staff decided to publish its report in 2018 which led the NRC to the conclusion that its model is starting to make non-conservative predictions at high fluences. He reported the model based on those data is an ASTM consensus standard and agrees well with the prediction consensus standard used in Japan for testing of materials. Dr. Kirk stated Japanese PWRs never implemented fuel cycle management to lower the fluence on the reactor welds because the welds all had low copper content and so they have in general higher fluence materials than in the United States and comparing Regulatory Guide 1.99 with the data based consensus standard in Japan the NRC's conclusion is correct that the NRC's formulas need updating. He remarked the fact that the NRC recognized this in 2019 but as of 2026 no changes were made was recognition that most U.S. plants are not now at fluence levels that matter.

Dr. Meshkati commented in 2022 the NRC's Executive Director of Operations issued a document entitled "Policy Issue" to address rulemaking for revision of embrittlement and surveillance requirements for high fluence nuclear power plants. Dr. Kirk replied and stated in order to begin a rulemaking process the NRC staff make a recommendation to the Commission through the Executive Director of Operations. Dr. Meshkati stated he found some differences between the White Paper and the Policy Issue documents which he attributed to Executive Order 14300. Dr. Kirk stated he could not comment because he does not know if the differences identified by Dr. Meshkati were related to Executive Order 14300 but the differences could also be due to new technical information developed in the interim between 2022 and 2026. In response to Dr. Meshkati's request Dr. Kirk agreed to provide a memo comparing and contrasting the 2022 and 2026 documents. [On July 10, 2026, Dr. Kirk provided this memo which is available on the Committee's website.]

Dr. Scarlat commented that there are two issues that connect the embrittlement question, one being the result of the Capsule B testing and the other a discussion of the changes in regulation and if the knowledge is being applied correctly in light of regulations and are the regulations appropriate. **Dr. Scarlat recommended that in the interest of transparency at the**

next public meeting the Committee should foster a dialogue so that it is clear to the public how consensus and confidence is reached in this field. Dr. Scarlet observed nothing has changed regarding the current regulation and the Committee's initial task is to determine if the data is credible and how the data compares in light of the regulations.

Consultant McWhorter commented that Dr. Kirk will be performing a second analysis outside of the regulations so the Committee is not depending solely upon the regulations and he questioned whether the Committee should expend its resources in analyzing regulatory changes that have no impact on DCP. Dr. Meshkati stated his opinion that regulations are the floor for safety in the nuclear and aviation fields and are based upon the least or lowest common denominator of all stakeholders. He stated his view that regulations are a very important criterion for the Committee. Dr. Scarlet stated she agreed the current proposed change in the regulation does not have an impact on the fluence of Capsule B, but a case study of a regulation being modified is illustrative to the public on how that regulation evolves and Dr. Scarlet stated her belief this is a valuable use of Committee resources. Dr. Peterson stated the Charter of the Committee is to assess the operational safety of DCP and he is unsure as to the applicability of the foregoing discussion to the Charter for the Committee. Consultant Dr. Kadak commented that Dr. Kirk completed a regulatory analysis as required, but Dr. Kirk went beyond that to complete a supplementary analysis and this means the Committee has two independent pathways to achieve an embrittlement condition for the Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel.

Ms. Kara Woodruff, District Director for California State Senator John Laird who represents much of San Luis Obispo County including where DCP is located, was recognized. Mr. Woodruff stated she appreciated Dr. Scarlet's comments concerning fostering a dialogue with the public regarding confidence in the Committee's decision. She referred to a letter dated June 15, 2026, from Senator Laird in which the Senator expressed his view that the license for DCP should not be extended until after the embrittlement testing results are available and further that they are found to definitively demonstrate the integrity of Unit 1. Senator Laird in his letter also expressed his position that when the results of Capsule B testing are available they should be provided to and subject to review and concurrence not only by the DCISC but also by the IPRP as independent review is consistent with standard science protocols and provides greater confidence to the local community. Ms. Woodruff stated the Senator's position was consistent with the position of San Luis Obispo County Supervisor Dr. Bruce Gibson who is also a member of the IPRP. The members discussed with Ms. Woodruff the principal focus of the IPRP as being on seismic review and Dr. Gibson's email to the Committee in which he recommended independent per reviewers be tasked to review the result of the testing of Capsule B.

Dr. Gene Nelson of California for Green Nuclear power was recognized. Dr. Nelson stated he was puzzled by the referral to the IPRP and the members of the IPRP are geologists and other geological related experts and an independent review of the Capsule B results would involve participation by metallurgists and other structural experts.

Dr. Robert J. Budnitz was recognized. Dr. Budnitz stated he did not believe Dr. Meshkati's comment regarding regulations representing a regulatory floor was appropriate. Dr. Budnitz stated regulations represent neither a floor nor a ceiling and the DCSC has an obligation

in accordance with its Charter to come to its own judgement as to what is acceptably safe. Dr. Budnitz suggested the Committee may want to consider Dr. Gibson suggestion concerning empaneling an independent peer review of the Capsule B testing results. Dr. Budnitz stated his option the testing results would demonstrate there would be considerable margin found in any such analysis.

Dr. Scarlat stated her opinion it is important to convey to the public how confidence is developed in the interpretation of the Capsule B data and she requested the Committee consider the issue of an independent review of the testing performed on Capsule B. Consultant McWhorter observed that in the empaneling of the SRT the Committee made a decision at one public meeting and then interviewed potential candidates for the panel and returned at another public meeting to engage the panel and define the path forward for review. Dr. Meshkati agreed and recommended the Committee keep its options open concerning the data and need for an independent review and he stated he would defer to Dr. Scarlat's judgment on the need for further review. Dr. Scarlat stated she did not agree that the determination of the need for an independent peer review was dependent upon the data but rather upon the confidence of the public in the review process. Dr. Peterson commented the Committee has not selected or identified experts and the results of the tests should be reviewed before any decision on an independent peer review process and he stated at this point the Committee members will each have an opportunity to review the test results as will the Committee's technical consultants. Dr. Meshkati observed that in contrast to the SRT review of Dr. Bird's contentions, the Committee has experience in this field. Dr. Peterson commented while he is not expert in material science he does have knowledge of how a reactor vessel would respond to experience a pressurized shock transient and he reported there is a tremendous amount of conservatism in the existing approach to analyzing that transient. Dr. Peterson remarked the Committee will return to further consideration of this matter at the October 2026 public meeting.

XXXIII DISCUSSION, DIRECTION AND ACTION, AS APPROPRIATE, BY THE COMMITTEE, CONSULTANTS & COUNSEL (Cont'd.)

K. Review of Open Items List and Status of Recommendations.

Dr. Peterson requested Consultant McWhorter lead a review of items on the Open Items List, which Dr. Peterson described as an important tool used by the Committee to set priorities, track and to follow issues, concerns, information requests and activities identified for subsequent action or receipt during fact-finding or public meetings. Mr. McWhorter reported newly added or changed items since the February 2026 public meeting were shown in *red italics* while items for which follow up was scheduled at the next three fact finding meetings prior to the October 2026 public meeting were shown in *yellow*, and items which were deleted or changed were shown in ~~strike-out~~ on the version of the Open Items List included with the agenda packet and certain items on the list were identified for closure. He described the changes made to the list and reported the Open Items List now consists of four sections: open items, recommendations to the Committee, recommendations to PG&E, and plant systems and components.

Items discussed or concerning which action was taken which differed from the notations on the Open Items List provided with the agenda packed included the following:

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Open Items List⁴⁰

Item	Re:	Action Taken/Next Action
<u>Open Items (Existing):</u>		
DO-2	Avila Beach Location for public meetings	2/27 6/27 and 10/27
DO-3	Posting public meeting agenda for comment	Close
RA-6	Response to 10 CFR 50.69	Close
NS-9	Track INPO AFIs/Evaluations	Split Item Between Plant (NS-9) & Corporate (NS-12)
NS-11	Meet with SNO representatives	Retain in Recommendations
SF-8	MPC Canister Integrity	Next Action 4Q26FF
OE -2	Excellence Plan/Management Review Meeting	Close & Add Confidential INPO PI Review to FF Station Updates
SE-49	Emergency Diesel Generators	Update Last Action
SC-14	Monitor IPRP & Future Reports/Incl. PG&E Reply to IPRP Report 16a.	IPRP Meeting (Dr. Jordan) & 10/26 PM
SC-16	Review Seismic Hazard & SPRA	6/27PM
SC-17	Follow up SRT Recommendations	6/27PM
LD-6	Observe Operator License Requalification	Add Review Impact of NRC Changes to Licensing Impacting DCP
<u>Open Items (New):</u>		
EP-4	Oversight of State EP Protective Action Zones	FF tbd - ROS
NR-7	NRC-DCISC PM Coordination	FF tbd - ROS
DO-4	Engage Public Outreach Consultant	3/27 FF-ROS
DO-4	Plan for DCISC Public Outreach	PM tbd -ROS
SC-18	Deterministic analysis of San Simeon-type event	TBD
DO-5	DCISC independence	TBD

Public Meeting Items:

6/25PM-34	Process Map	Close to Policy
6/25PM-36	SRT/Hazard Evaluation	Close
10/25PM-20	Downtime Decision-Making	NM 7/26 FF
10/25PM-22	Emergency Response - Cal OES	Last Action 3/26 ROS FF Next Action 9/26 FF
2/26PM-7	Effect Approval- FF Report re Recommendation(s)	Close per Policy revision
2/26PM-10	MPC Use of Helium	Review word change in

⁴⁰ Key to the abbreviations used and not defined elsewhere: Fact-finding (FF), Performance Indicators (PI), Public Meeting (PM), Quarter (Q), to be determined (tbd).

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2/26PM-13	SRT Recommendation Rating Disparity	Feb. Minutes & Close to SF8
2/26PM-14	SRT Recommendation 9 – Impact Rating	Close
2/26PM-15	Sensitivity Study Prediction	Close

Recommendations to the DCISC:

D3/25FF-3.12	Committee Emergency Response Policy	Close
D4/26FF-3.3B	INPO Oral Briefing	Add “Confidential”
D5/26FF-3.3B	Basis for Cause vs Root Cause Evaluation U-2 Start-up Transformer 2-2 Bus Bar failure\	Match Wording in FF Report

Recommendations to PG&E:

P12/24FF-3.2	Electronic procedures	Reference [“dynamic”] re Electronic procedures
P8/25FF-3.1	Periodic meetings with the SNO Committee	Delegate preparation of letter To NM & RWR for 36 th AR

Dr. Meshkati referred to a May 28, 2026, letter from Senior Director Tom Jones responding to DCISC Recommendation P8/25FF-3.1 to PG&E recommending periodic meetings between representatives of the DCISC and the PG&E Board of Directors Safety and Nuclear Oversight (SNO) Committee. In his letter Mr. Jones, in declining the DCISC’s request for regular meetings stated that “maintaining a clear distinction between the DCISC and SNO Committee roles helps preserve the independence of the DCISC, while ensuring strong, internal accountability within PG&E.” Instead, recurring meetings with PG&E’s Chief Nuclear Officer, who provides briefings to the SNO Committee on DCPD-related activities were offered.

Dr. Meshkati stated his opinion that this statement in the letter was condescending and although he recognized the DCISC cannot compel meetings with the SNO Committee Dr. Meshkati stated that Mr. Jones in his letter fundamentally misapprehends the source of the Committee’s independence which is based upon the ethical and professional responsibility of its members. **Dr. Meshkati asked his fellow members to agree to develop a formal response to Mr. Jones’ letter.** Dr. Meshkati stated he believes it is a strategic mistake by the PG&E Board of Directors not to agree to meet with the DCISC. Mr. Rathie suggested the Committee may want to delegate to him and to Dr. Meshkati the preparation of a response which could be included in the 36th Annual Report.

Dr. Peterson commented that it is his understanding PG&E’s Chief Risk Officer is responsible for coordinating and working with the SNO Committee and the Chief Risk Officer is potentially the best interface between the SNO Committee and the DCISC. Mr. Jones replied the Chief Nuclear Officer is the person who makes presentations to the SNO Committee at its meetings on behalf of DCPD and his letter conveyed a commitment from the Chief Nuclear Officer to meet more regularly with the DCISC. Dr. Meshkati observed that the Chief Nuclear Office is not an independent director or member of the Board of Directors and it is the independent directors who oversee the corporation’s executives and the corporation’s executives

do not have access to the same level of information as the independent directors. He remarked that a Delaware court in the matter of the Boeing Board of Directors found that a board of directors bears a mission critical responsibility. Dr. Meshkati stated he recognized there are areas of the SNO Committee's responsibility that do not intersect with DCPD operations, but he observed based on his years of research that there are areas involving safety where the responsibilities of the DCISC and the SNO Committee do intersect.

Dr. Meshkati, in response to Dr. Scarlat, stated his meeting with two representatives of the SNO Committee in June 2025 was cordial, but he believes that this meeting was reluctantly granted by PG&E and during the meeting the SNO Committee representatives seemed to be relying on prepared talking points. Dr. Meshkati stated his understanding that this matter represents the first time PG&E has rejected a Committee Recommendation and he commented there appears to be a desire to shield the Board of Directors from the DCISC and avoid meeting with the DCISC members. Dr. Meshkati stated his opinion that Mr. Jones' letter addresses issues concerning the independence of the Committee and should not be left unanswered.

Dr. Scarlat remarked that how the Committee defines its independence has been raised in the past by members of the public and it is a worthwhile topic for the Committee to consider, but she stated she does not have a position at this time on the issue raised by Dr. Meshkati. Dr. Meshkati agreed the issue of the Committee's independence is a broader topic, but the issue raised by the letter from Mr. Jones is a separate topic. **Dr. Scarlat and Dr. Meshkati agreed a separate item should be opened on the general question of DCISC independence.**

Dr. Peterson remarked that the question is whether the DCISC should have periodic access to members of the PG&E Board of Directors serving on the SNO Committee and the role of the Board of Directors and of the DCISC. Dr. Peterson stated he recognizes the Board of Directors has specific responsibilities and needs to be judicious in where it focuses its attention. He stated the DCISC routinely meets with PG&E officers in leadership roles at DCPD, usually at every fact finding visit, and he stated he would like to explore periodic meetings with the Chief Nuclear Officer and he did not know how meetings with members of the Board of Directors would result in actionable results and he wanted to understand how this set of interactions would compare with the DCISC's interactions with other review bodies such as the NSOC. Dr. Peterson observed the Board of Directors do not have direct oversight or control over the safety of the plant and the DCISC meets now with the people who do have that oversight and control responsibility. Dr. Scarlat observed she would like to review the impact of corporate culture on safety culture and how this objective might be achieved in other ways that are more appropriate and more efficient and resource efficient and while she stated she did not have a stance on the matter, if she were to do so her focus would be not only on the product but also on the relationship established and what that serves.

Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones stated that the intent of his letter was not to offend, but to express that the SNO Committee has an internal and a strong role for the safety of the entire utility of which DCPD is a small portion. He observed that the SNO Committee is an internal committee to PG&E and it meets now with two outside groups, those being with the NSOC for confidential insight based on the NSOC's guidance on plant operations and with the CPUC to follow up from previous operational matters. Dr. Meshkati observed the SNO Committee bears

responsibility for monitoring and review of the adequacy of the corporate safety function and he stated this is not a passive responsibility and the only way to credibly assess the adequacy of that safety function is to compare management's self-assessment against the findings of an independent body that conducts its own investigations and that body is the DCISC. Dr. Meshkati observed that in his opinion the SNO Committee's oversight mandate requires it to engage with the DCISC and declining to do so is not a scheduling matter but a substantive failure to fulfill the SNO Committee's charter responsibilities.

Dr. Scarlet stated without revisiting the August 2025 Fact Finding Report she could not take a stance on this matter. **Dr. Peterson commented this is a matter that the Committee should take up at the next public meeting with a substantive discussion and in the meantime a draft letter might be circulated to each member to do an individual review in preparation for that substantive discussion.**

Dr. Gene Nelson of California for Green Nuclear Power was recognized. **Dr. Nelson observed the Committee had yet to take up the matter of a deterministic analysis of a San Siemon type earthquake beneath DCPD as related to AB 1632. Mr. Rathie confirmed the accuracy of Dr. Nelson's observation and reported the matter of the deterministic analysis should be added to the Committee Open Item List and with Dr. Meshkati he would work together with Dr. Jordan on the matter.**

Dr. Robert J. Budnitz was recognized. Dr. Budnitz, a former member of the DCISC, stated in his opinion sending a letter to PG&E responding to Mr. Jones letter concerning the SNO Committee matter without first having discussed the matter with plant management would be a grievous error. He stated in his experience having served as a member of the DCISC the Committee has excellent relationships with plant personnel and consulting with plant management prior to sending a letter should be essential and not doing so could cause damage to the DCISC-PG&E relationship.

XXXIV ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. Rathie commented the Committee had concluded all business under Item XXXVI M, N & O on the meeting agenda and at the conclusion of the public outreach session to follow the afternoon session the meeting would stand in adjournment.

The Public Meeting was the recessed to be reconvened at the San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors' Chambers located at the New Government Center, 1055 Monterey Street, San Luis Obispo.

XXXV PUBLIC OUTREACH SESSION.

L. The Committee Members, Consultants and Counsel held a public outreach session and received comments and questions and provided responses to interested members of the public on matters concerning operational safety at Diablo Canyon Power Plant. Mr. Rathie confirmed the meeting was recessed to this location in downtown San Luis Obispo and reviewed the charge from the CPUC to the DCISC to review operational safety at DCPD.

The public outreach session was attended by Dr. Raluca Scarlat, the appointee to the DCISC of the California Attorney General, and Dr. Najmedin Meshkati, the appointee to the DCISC of the Chair of the California Energy Commission, and a quorum was present for purposes of continuing the public meeting. Dr. Peterson, the appointee to the DCISC of the Governor of California was unable to be present. Committee Technical Consultants McWhorter, Darden and St. Onge were all present as was Legal Counsel Rathie.

Dr. Scarlat commented that the scope of this afternoon's meeting was to provide information to the public and as a forum for discussing issues relevant to the safety of DCPD.

Attendees in person in the Board of Supervisors Chambers were Ms. Jane Swanson, a representative of the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and Dr. Gene Nelson of Californians for Green Nuclear Power. Dr. Chris Madugo, Mr. Jeff Bachhuber, and Mr. Jearl Strickland, representing PG&E were in attendance remotely as was Mr. Chuck Anders, facilitator for the Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel, and Dr. Robert J. Budnitz, a former DCISC member.

The following topics were discussed during the public outreach session. As the discussion was by intention free-ranging and speakers sometime returned to topics at various times during the public outreach session the comments are organized here by topics for purposes of clarity and do not necessarily reflect the order in which they were made by the speakers.

Deterministic Study of San Simeon-type Seismic Event Beneath DCPD:

Dr. Nelson remarked in his discussions with Dr. Jordan he understands that the type of rock beneath the plant is very young and not very strong rock and this creates interesting properties in terms of propagation of seismic events. He commented on the interplay between geology and public policy which has fascinated him. He commented on the aseismic 'creep' which takes place on a natural gas pipeline in the far eastern corner of San Luis Obispo near Cholame, California.

In response to Ms. Swanson question, Dr. Scarlat described the difference between a probabilistic study and a deterministic study. She explained determination of a probabilistic risk analysis is based on identification of various scenarios with differing end points and for each end point the probabilistic analysis generates for these scenarios a metric relative to safety based upon probability, i.e., the frequency, and consequences. She reported this is referred to as the risk triple because of its three elements: the scenario, the frequency of the scenario, and its consequences. She observed that society uses this methodology to make decisions as to what level of risk is acceptable and decision making based on probabilistic analysis is referred to as risk-informed decision making which accordingly focuses on improving the issues that are more risk significant. Deterministic analysis unlike probabilistic analysis does not have the weakness of having to identify all scenarios to prove completeness, rather a single field specific bounding case is chosen and analyzed.

Mr. Jearl Strickland, a PG&E consultant and long-time employee was recognized. Mr. Strickland commented in the seismic context in the review of the design of a nuclear facility a defined seismic hazard is established that is the most probable event that will take place and the then plant's structures, systems, and components that are important to safety are analyzed to that event such that they are required to be functional and operational after a design basis earthquake. He commented that this is a substantially more rigorous analysis than undertaken under a Uniform Building Code analysis which simply requires the structure be safe for life safety so that persons can be removed from the structure after a severe earthquake, but the structure may no longer be operational or usable in the future. In contrast, Mr. Strickland stated structures, systems and components that are important to safety at a nuclear power plant after a severe earthquake must be operational.

Review of Unit-1 Surveillance Capsule B:

In response to Ms. Swanson's comments, Dr. Meshkati commented that Capsule B was removed and sent in April 2025 to the Westinghouse testing facility and the DCISC has been informed the report should be available to the public and the DCISC in July 2026. He reported that the Committee has received expression of support for conducting an independent peer review of the Capsule B results and while he stated he personally welcomed this proposal this matter is expected to be on the agenda for the October 2026 DCISC public meeting.

Dr. Scarlat stated her professional experience includes materials and chemistry but she is not a metallurgist or an expert on embrittlement, but her expertise extends to the ability to read the analyses, the codes, and the literature and to form an assessment of the consensus and comparison to the available data. Dr. Scarlat observed this matter entails development of a process amongst all the parties involved.

Dr. Nelson remarked the Committee has data available showing the Unit 1 pressure vessel material will perform for up to 60 effective full power years (EFPY) and he commented the analysis of the report on Capsule B is about reducing uncertainty as the data that is necessary to operate the plant for 60 EFPYs is already known. Dr. Scarlat remarked decreasing uncertainty is not needed for the licensing case and the regulatory requirements are met by the current data and accordingly the Capsule B analysis is considered a confirmatory datapoint.

DCISC Public Outreach:

Dr. Nelson observed one of the important aspects of public outreach is developing public confidence that the plant is being managed in a safe manner and much of this comes from person to person communication and he strongly endorses the Committee in doing this. Dr. Scarlat remarked the DCISC's role is to give transparency to how the safety of the plant is ensured, but the Committee is not an advocacy group but two-way communication with the public is important in this role. Dr. Meshkati commented the DCISC's role is not to be an advocate for PG&E but rather for safety and he remarked that his goes beyond simply regulatory compliance to include advocacy with state agencies concerning items that could have an impact on safety and reliability.

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Mr. Chuck Anders was recognized and he stated he serves as the facilitator for the PG&E Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel and the panel conducts public outreach and he appreciates the Committee's efforts. Mr. Anders commented when there is an imminent action taking place it is relatively easy to get public engagement but with a long timeframe it is difficult and he observed the panel's public meetings do not get a good cross-section of the public in attendance and it is difficult to reach particularly young families. Mr. Anders commented he believes the Committee's outreach session this evening is a great example of providing accessibility. Mr. Anders reported the Decommissioning Engagement Panel would hold its next public meeting on August 5, 2026, and will include an open house.

In response to Dr. Meshkati's request, Ms. Swanson stated over the many years she has attended DCISC public meetings her initial discouragement has been alleviated. She commented earlier in its existence she felt the Committee was patronizing in its treatment of the public and tended not to be very accommodating to questions from laypersons. Since that time, she stated the Committee has become much more welcoming and open in its relationship with persons who attend its meetings. She commented in response to Dr. Meshkati's query that at times she attends the DCISC public meetings through the Zoom webinar and she was pleased to know that the informational presentations made during the public meetings are available online on the Committee's website. She commented that both the Committee and PG&E have done a better job in explaining the meaning of acronyms. Ms. Swanson stated she does not have any criticism of the present Committee in allowing the public to participate and she feels the Committee treats the public with respect. Ms. Swanson commented Mothers for Peace sometimes requests items be placed on a DCISC public meeting agenda and when they are not it would be helpful to understand why they could not be considered.

In response to Dr. Scarlet's query Mr. Rathie remarked that when comments are made by members of the public which require or for which a response is directed to be prepared, those items are indicated in **bold** text and placed on and tracked through review of the Open Items List. Mr. Rathie stated his opinion the Open items List is one of the Committee's most useful tools and a copy is included with each public meeting agenda packet.

Dr. Nelson suggested that in the interim between its public meetings the Committee might focus on what it believed had been done correctly between the prior meeting and the next meeting. Dr. Meshkati thanked Dr. Nelson for the many news and other articles he has provided to the Committee over several years and he asked Dr. Nelson to continue to keep bringing these matters to the Committee's attention.

Mr. Anders was recognized and he commented many residents of San Luis Obispo County are unaware of the Committee's existence. He remarked the community is lucky to have the Committee in operation as there are no other similarly constituted nuclear safety committees in operation and certainly none with the credentials of the members of the DCISC. He commented it would be beneficial in instilling a greater sense of safety in the community to inform the public of the Committee's role and its operation.

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Dr. Nelson stated that the Committee is unique in the nation as the only independent safety committee that is truly independent as safety committees at other nuclear power plants are funded by the plant operator while the DCISC is funded by PG&E's ratepayers.

Ms. Swanson commented on the Mothers for Peace past role in the creation of the Committee and she recalled that the DCISC was created following legal proceedings having to do with the effort by Mothers for Peace to have the spent fuel pools re-racked to reduce the density of the stored spent fuel. [The CPUC in 1988, recognizing the safety implications of establishing performance based pricing for electric power produced by DCPD in D.88-12-083 established the DCISC.] Ms. Swanson commented that without the involvement of laypersons and their attorneys, the DCISC would not exist.

Dr. Meshkati commented that to his knowledge the DCISC is unique and he commented the DCISC bears a heavy responsibility entrusted to it by the public he commented that the Committee members can best fulfill that responsibility by hearing from and listening to the members of the public.

In her closing remarks, Ms. Swanson stated her belief that more members of the public would have attended if they realized the open nature of the public outreach session.

In his closing remarks, Dr. Nelson stated the format for tonight's session was similar to that for the March 17, 2026 Open House conducted by Dr. Scarlat in connection with her fact finding visit on that date. He commented a less formal setting might be referable but should continue to include the online community.

Emergency Planning:

Ms. Swanson commented she believes there is concern and uncertainty within the local community that if something was to happen at DCPD that it would require the evacuation of local areas or schools. Dr. Scarlat replied that the Committee has opened an item on its Open Item List on the topic of emergency planning and she stated this would be a focus area for Dr. Scarlat for the coming year. Dr. Scarlat stated she draws inspiration for this subject from discussions in tribal communities about stewardship of land and people. She observed when the Committee discusses emergency planning it is in context of the community and community preparations. She observed that aid during an emergency to an urban area will be very different from aid to a remote rural area and it is very important to review these topics.

Dr. Nelson remarked that emergency planning should be tightly coupled with what goes on at the plant and he commented the most plausible scenario for the release of radiation at DCPD is the release would likely remain within plant boundaries and he stated this was important knowledge. He stated he attended a program entitled "Nuke 101" which was offered to all public officials in San Luis Obispo County and he described the purpose of the program as to alarm people and not to educate them on the basics of a radiation release. Dr. Scarlat stated she agreed with Dr. Nelson that a release beyond the site boundaries has a very low probability. She reported the NRC has established emergency protective zones within ten miles of DCPD and the State of California has additionally established and public education zones outside of the 10-mile

zones as well as an agricultural response regions and she commented these actions were taken not because of the likelihood of a release of radiation but because community response in the nuclear context is important. Dr. Nelson remarked there were unnecessary evacuations in Japan after the accident to the Fukushima Daiichi plant and this is a reason why understanding and education play a significant role and there needs to be more outreach. Dr. Scarlat remarked she chooses not to use the word ‘education’ in context of emergency preparedness. She remarked the issue in Japan referred to by Dr. Nelson was the result of emergency planning not having been done with community engagement. Dr. Nelson commented fear is a powerful emotion and he agreed there needs to be much more outreach but this requires funding that his organization does not have access to. Dr. Scarlat remarked the DCISC’s role is to assess how emergency planning is done at this time and whether it is effective and to present the Committee’ findings.

Distinction Between Safety and Non-Safety Related Equipment:

Ms. Swanson commented on references in NRC inspection reports to the “non-safety side” of the Plant. Dr. Scarlat explained that certain equipment is classified as safety-related while other equipment is non-safety related and there are differences in expectations for inspections, quality, maintenance, quality assurance, and documentation depending upon the equipment’s classification. Dr. Scarlat commented this is an important distinction. Dr. Meshkati provided the example of the feedwater heaters as equipment that improve efficiency and performance but do not affect plant operation in context of damage to the nuclear core. Consultant McWhorter observed safety-related systems or components are required to prevent an accident and to ensure the core stays cool and covered with no release of radioactivity. He observed the non-safety related equipment, can have an implication on safety even though it is not directly related. In response to Dr. Meshkati’s request Mr. McWhorter gave an example of the ventilation for the Turbine Building as a non-safety related system as it does not affect the operation of the nuclear reactor while the ventilation system for Containment is a safety related system, as should Containment, which is pressurized, overheat the assumptions for an accident analysis would no longer be met.

XXXVI CONCLUDING REMARKS & DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS
OF FUTURE DCISC ACTIVITIES

Dr. Scarlat thanked the members of the public present in person and attending in remotely.

XXXVII ADJOURNMENT OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND
FOURTEENTH PUBLIC MEETING

There being no further business, the one hundred and fourteenth public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was adjourned following the conclusion of the public outreach session at 7:15 p.m.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:

October 22, 2026

AGENDA ITEM:

XXX- J

AGENDA TITLE:

Review and Discussion of the
Open Items List and Status of
Recommendations.

CONSENT []

ACTION [X]

INFORMATION [X]

Staff Summary: It is anticipated that the Committee will hold discussion concerning the items appearing on its Open Items List prepared by Committee Technical Consultant McWhorter with the assistance of Consultants Darden and St. Onge and Legal Counsel Rathie.

The Open Items List now includes a record and the current status of recommendations made by the Committee for future Committee actions and review and recommendations made by the Committee to PG&E.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate, review and provide direction.

Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Open Items List

Open Item Type: **M= Monitor** **F = Follow-up** **I = Issue** Items in **Red (Tracked Changes)** are new or revised
Items in **Yellow** are for the next PM and 3 FFMs

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
OPEN ITEMS:				
DO		DCISC Outreach (D)		
DO-1	F	Conduct public tours (including simulator) in conjunction with Public Meetings. [Last tour at 2/26PM. None at 6/26 PM due to full agenda and none at 10/26PM due to outage.]	2/26PM	2/27PM ?
DO-2	F	Consider changing location of Public Meetings to enhance public access. [Contract binding for 10/26PM in Avila; 10/26PM decision to stay at Avila through 6/27PM.]		6/27PM
DO-4	F	The DCISC should review the effectiveness of its public outreach, including how it can aid the NRC in their public outreach. Engage consultant(s) as needed. [Public Outreach session held in SLO during 6/26PM.]	6/26PM	
DO-5	F	The DCISC should review how it defines its role to be "Independent."	6/26PM	
CO		Conduct of Operations (CO)		
CO-7	M	Review DCP storm response experience and strategy every two years [or as necessary] during or after annual winter storm season.	5/17FF 3/21FF	As necessary
CO-8	M	Monitor all reactor trips – automatic and manual – and forced outages. (review trip LERs at public meetings).	9/24FF	Post-trip FFs & PMs
CO-9	F	Reactivity Management – review every 18-24 months.	List end of OIL 4/24FF 7/25FF	Regularly
CO-10	M	Mispositioning Errors (Equipment Status) – monitor the status of mispositioning errors and actions to resolve.	5/24FF 4/26FF	2Q28FF or following incident
CM		Conduct of Maintenance (QM)		
CM-7	I	Review PG&E's progress in complying with (1) the amendment to 10CFR50.55a, which provides the requirements for ISI of containment structures (degradation) and (2) ASME Code requirements for steel liner weld inspections.	7/22FF 12/25FF#2	Each Pair of RFOs
CM-10	M	Online Maintenance: review the implementation of online maintenance bi-annually, including the 12-week Rolling Maintenance Schedule about how well it is working & impacting risk. Review trend of amount of online maintenance. DCP Assessment of Maintenance Risk and Online Maintenance Risk Procedures have been substantially upgraded with the addition of an Integrated Risk Review Team.	See list at end of OIL 11/24FF 12/25FF#2	Regularly
CM-13	M	Review Maintenance Department performance measures, staffing, etc. approximately annually.	5/24FF 12/25FF#2	12/26FF#1
CM-14	M	Periodically R review the work of the Maintenance Department's Craftsmanship Council	5/26FF	2Q27FF

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
EN		Engineering Programs (EN)		
EN-16	F	DCPP Systems – review a system (or structure or component), system health, long-term plan, Maintenance Rule performance & walkdown with System Engineer at FFs. [Note: Systems reviewed are listed with dates at the end of this Open Items List.]	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
EN-19	F	Review every 12-18 months major Engineering Programs, including Configuration Management, Management, System Engineering (system health & long-term plans), Valve Testing, Margin Management, Staffing, etc. [Note: Programs reviewed are listed with dates at the end of this Open Items List.]	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
EN-20	F	Each Member should review or observe Plant Health Committee, Notification Review Team (NRT), Corrective Action Review Board, Performance Review Quarterly Meeting, Plant Health Prioritization Committee, Plant Health Working Group, Outage Management Team and other regular meetings.	See list at end of OIL	Regularly
EN-21	F	Regularly review projects long-term planning. Reviews of planned projects completed through 2R25.	5/26FF <u>7/26FF#1</u>	<u>4Q27FF</u>
HP		Human Performance: Human Errors and Improving Safety & Efficiency of Plant Performance		
HP-1	M	Review human performance & human behavior items (including error reduction programs, HP Pls, aberrant behavior statistics, FFD, stress reduction programs, Personnel Accountability Policy, Human Performance Steering Committee & Subcomm, Centers of Excellence, Org. Development).	1/25FF 4/26FF	2Q28FF
HP-25	M	Further observations and improvements in the Management Observation Program should be reviewed by DCISC.	12/23FF 5/25FF	<u>7/26FF#1</u> <u>1/27FF</u>
HS		Health, Nuclear Safety and Safety Conscious Work Environment		
HS-6	F	Follow DCCP progress in establishing/improving its safety culture (and its subset Safety Conscious Work Environment, including Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel (NSCMP), and their periodic reports, and including Employee Concerns & Differing Professional Opinion Programs).	8/25FF <u>9/26FF</u>	<u>1/27FF</u>
PI		Performance Improvement Programs		
PI-1	M	DCPP Performance Improvement Programs: Corrective Action, Self-Assessment, Operating Experience, Benchmarking, etc. Programs reviewed are listed with dates at the end of the Open Items List. [CAP reviewed 8/24FF] [Reviewed Cause Evaluation Process 1/25FF and 4/25FF - satisfactory.]	See list at end of OIL 4/25FF 1/26FF	Annually 2Q27FF
PI-2	F	Follow DCCP's use of dynamic procedures and work orders to begin in 2025. [See also Recommendations D12/24FF-3.2, D12/15/25FF-3.14, and P12/24FF-3.2.] PFP provided walkthrough of new dynamic procedure tool at 5/26FF. <u>NM provided walkthrough at 7/26FF#2.</u> <u>NM and ROS</u> should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during a future FF Meetings.	5/26FF PFP <u>7/26FF#2</u> <u>NM</u>	<u>12/26FF#1</u> <u>ROS</u>

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
PI-3	F	Because the application of Artificial Intelligence tools has significant potential to change and to improve DCCP's operational safety, the DCISC should review this topic frequently. Possible applications include: Corrective Action Program; Design and Licensing Information Data; Design Change Process; Procedure Generation; Plant Improvement Initiatives/Projects to Improve Equipment Reliability. [See also Recommendation D12/24FF-3.4.] Monitor the risks to include reports from foundation model companies regarding the catastrophic failures of other models. Also, monitor for 'sycophancy' risk; meaning, the generation of incorrect information based on user desires/bias. <u>Monitor DCCP's participation in industry user groups related to AI. Monitor SLO County future uses of AI in Emergency Preparedness.</u>	8/25FF 10/25PM 5/26FF	<u>12/26FF#2</u>
EP		Emergency Preparedness (EP)		
EP-2	M	Attend and observe DCCP emergency drills and exercises annually [including Hostile Action Based Exercises], paying special attention to JIC communications to the media and public, including radiation release communications to the public, use of social media, coordination of information release with SLO County, and extension of drills to better exercise FMTs & JMC. DCISC drill attendees should assure the confidentiality of the drill scenario by keeping the scenario hidden and under their control at all times. [Observed Evaluated Exercise <u>7/31/24</u> 9/2/26]	<u>7/29/26</u> <u>NM</u> <u>9/2/26</u> <u>ROS</u>	Next evaluated exercise - <u>3Q28</u>
EP-3	F	Meet with Emergency Preparedness Group for updates and performance in years with no major exercises. Met with SLO County OES 3/25FF and 12/25FF#1.	10/25PM 12/25FF#1	3Q27FF
<u>EP-4</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>The DCISC should review the responsibilities for and status of public outreach and public education in Emergency Planning zones beyond 10 miles.</u>	<u>9/26FF</u>	
RA		Risk Assessment and Management (RA)		
RA-5	M	Review overall [non-seismic] PRA program annually. Include Fire PRA Upgrade & Shutdown Analysis. Review PRA Group resources/capabilities. (see SC-6).	11/24FF 12/25FF#2	<u>6/26PM</u> <u>10/26PM</u>
NS		Nuclear Safety Oversight and Review (NS)		
NS-5	M	Monitor NSOC meetings periodically to observe their processes and their review of nuclear safety issues.	6/27/25 NM 12/11/25 ROS <u>8/13/26</u> <u>PFP</u>	<u>12/26FF#1</u>
NS-9	M	Monitor DCCP's program to track INPO Areas for Improvement <u>for plant evaluations. Reviews should include INPO Corporate Assessments performed about every six years. Last reviewed 2020 Corporate Assessment (1/21FF), 2024 WANO Peer Review (1/24FF), and 2025 Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment (9/25FF). Recommend receiving a briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Corporate Assessments following 2027 report issuance. [See also Recommendations D4/26FF-3.3B and P4/26FF-3.3.]</u>	11/24FF 9/25FF	<u>1/27FF</u> (station) 2Q27FF (corp.)
NS-10	M	Monitor Insurance Programs including the results of insurer inspections and reports. The DCISC should follow up on the insurance inspections expected to be completed in mid-2026.	7/24FF 5/26FF	<u>12/26FF#2</u>

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
NS-11	F	Meet with representatives of the PG&E Corporation Board Safety and Nuclear Oversight Committee members periodically to monitor their processes and their reviews of nuclear safety issues. [NM met with two members on 6/17/25.] Recommendation response received from PG&E 5/28/26.	8/25FF <u>6/26PM</u>	<u>10/26PM</u>
<u>NS-12</u>		<u>Monitor DCCP's program to track INPO Areas for Improvement for corporate evaluations performed about every six years. Last reviewed 2020 Corporate Assessment (1/21FF). Recommend receiving a briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Corporate Assessments following 2027 report issuance. [See also Recommendation D4/26FF-3.3B.1]</u>	<u>1/21FF</u>	<u>2Q27FF</u>
RP		Radiation Protection (RP)		
RP-3	M	Review Radiation Protection performance. Observed ALARA Committee meeting at 4/24FF.	6/25PM 12/25FF#2	Regularly
RP-12	M	Review annual DCCP radioactivity release report each year. Review at Summer or Fall FFs.	7/25FF <u>7/26FF#1</u>	<u>3Q27FF</u>
QP		Quality Programs (QP)		
QP-3	M	Review the activities, organization and results of QV audits as well as PG&E's outside biennial audits, including timeliness of corrective actions. Review annually – include 4 th quarter QPAR with yearly results.	12/24FF 1/26FF	3Q27FF
QP-9	F	Software QA Program	See list at end of OIL	<u>7/26FF#1</u> <u>12/26FF#2</u>
NF		Nuclear Fuel Performance (NF)		
NF-9	M	Nuclear Fuel Performance & Issues (review after RFOs). Observed new fuel receipt and inspection 8/22FF.	1/24FF 3/25FF	Each pair of RFOs
OE		Organizational Effectiveness & Development (OE)		
OE-1	F	Review DCCP Operating Plan each January after development.	2/25PM 4/26FF	2/27PM
SE		System and Equipment Performance/Problems (SE)		
SE-39	F	Review and tour the inspections and repairs of concrete Intake Structures following selected refueling outages. [See if Outfall has similar issues – Toured 4/25FF, satisfactory.]	4/25FF 5/25FF 12/25FF#1	Next RFO
SE-49	F	Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)	See list at end of OIL 9/25FF <u>9/26FF</u>	Regularly
SE-50	F	Maintenance Rule Functional Failures.	11/23FF 7/25FF	Regularly
OM		Outage Management (OM)		
OM-3	M	During outages, monitor Outage Coordination Center, Control Room, and containment walkdown/inspection (end of outage). Review outage turbine work. Review Steam Generator performance metrics and inspection results.	5/25FF 12/25FF#2	Each RFO
OM-4	M	Review Outage Safety Plan, safety margin trends, outage results, including clearances, following each outage at FFs and PMs.	9/25FF 12/25FF#2	Each RFO <u>12/26FF#1</u>

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
OM-5	M	Review FME Program Performance.	See list at end of OIL 12/25FF#2	Each RFO 12/26FF#1
SEC		Security (SEC)		
SEC-3	M	Monitor interaction of Security and Operations, Engineering, Maintenance, and Emergency Preparedness for effects on nuclear safety. Plant security per se not reviewed but reviewed only in the context of impact on plant operation.	3/25FF 1/26FF	1Q28FF
SEC-4	M	Review status of DCPD cyber security (but not physical security) program in compliance with NRC requirements.	3/24FF 4/26FF	2Q28FF
SF		Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation – ISFSI (SF)		
SF-1	F	Monitor ISFSI operations. Review and observe <u>2026-planning and execution of</u> loading campaigns. (See Also D12/15/25FF-3.11A)	3/26FF 9/26FF	2Q28FF
SF-2	M	Follow technical advances of relative risks of existing (Holtec) casks and pool storage. (See Also D12/15/25FF-3.11B)	9/25FF 12/25FF#2	As Needed
SF-4	F	Review the adequacy of the design for new (Orano) spent fuel TBD storage system focusing on items of safety significance including seismic adequacy, criticality control, storage of damaged fuel, thermal analyses, effects of extreme environmental conditions, long-term (>100 years) integrity assurance, radiation/neutron shielding, and accident analyses.	1/23FF 8/23FF#2	TBD
SF-5	F	Monitor the submittal and approval of license amendment(s) for the Orano spent fuel storage system.	6/23PM 8/23FF#2	TBD
SF-7	M	Monitor Plans for Storage of Greater than Class C Waste that would be generated during decommissioning operations.	8/22FF	TBD
SF-8	M	Evaluate the dose consequences of a crack in a spent fuel storage canister. EPRI study [Radiological Consequences of a Release of Radionuclides from a Spent Fuel Storage Cask] has not yet finished although some supporting studies have been concluded regarding source term and what flow rate should be estimated for use in the study. Update 12/25 – study completion deferred to obtain additional research data from DOE. Completion date unknown. <u>12/26 and 6/26PMs – Dr. Peterson stated it would be useful for the DCISC to develop an independent assessment of this concern particularly as it is unlikely to be of any significance for older spent fuel assemblies with low decay heat.</u>	12/25FF#2	4Q27FF
SF-9	M	Monitor the implementation of aging management plans including any evaluations of canister corrosion indications by DCPD and the nuclear industry.	9/26FF 10/26PM	4Q27FF
SF-10	F	<u>Follow up on correspondence from Dr. von Hippel on reducing danger of fire for wet storage of spent fuel.</u>	9/26FF	Close
SF-11	F	<u>Follow up on DCPD response to Westinghouse notification of new fuel pool storage criticality calculation error.</u>	9/26FF	Close
SC	M	Seismic, Tsunami and Other External Events		
SC-3	M	Long-Term Seismic Program: review periodically. (See also EO-9.). Met with Geosciences Staff 11/24FF (LTSP, IPRP, Dr. Peter Bird) 11/24FF. [See also SRT Recommendations 1-9.]	11/24FF 4/26FF	2Q28FF
SC-12	F	Workplace seismic safety – review annually.	5/25FF 7/25FF	4Q26FF

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
SC-14	M	Monitor the Work of the Independent Peer Review Panel, Including Future Reports. Need to review new IPRP report (16A) issued on 2/19/2026 regarding the 2024 Updated Seismic Assessment. <u>Dr. Jordan to review report 16A after PG&E response received (expected fall 2026).</u> <u>Dr. Jordan to attend future IPRP meetings for the DCISC. TSJ and NM scheduled to attend meeting on 10/15/26.</u>	9/24FF 10/24PM	10/26PM
SC-15	M	Review significant seismic events with the potential to affect DCCP as they occur.		As needed
SC-16	F	Review any new or updated information on the seismic hazard at DCCP for potential impact on the overall understanding of seismic safety risk at DCCP. This includes evaluating the impact of changes to seismic hazard evaluations on the fragilities of DCCP's structures and equipment and on the results of the plant's overall Probabilistic Risk Assessment.	6/26PM	6/27PM
SC-17	F	Follow-up on actions taken by DCCP in response to the nine recommendations of the Seismic Review (34 th AR Recommendations SRT-1 through SRT-9).	2/26PM 6/26PM	6/27PM
SC-18	F	<u>Monitor progress on the CEC's 2008 request for a deterministic risk study of a San Simeon-type earthquake beneath the DCCP.</u>	6/26PM	10/26PM
FP		Fire Protection (FP)		
FP-5	M	Review NFPA-805-based Fire Protection Program and Systems every two-three years, including QV audits and NRC triennial inspections. Review the health and correction of degraded systems every six months. Monitor fire doors (Plant Door Life Cycle Management Plan) for correction of impairments.	See list at end of OIL 9/24FF	Regularly 3Q26FF
LD		Learning & Development Programs (LD)		
LD-3	M	Review non-license technical, operations & accredited training programs at least annually. [Reviewed Learning Services 5/24FF – satisfactory.]	5/24FF 9/24FF	12/26FF#1
LD-6	M	Observe operator license, re-qualification, classes periodically in FF meetings. <u>Need to review effects of recent regulatory changes at the NRC on Operator Licensing.</u>	8/25FF 4/26FF	9/26FF 12/26FF#1 Simulator Trg. ROS 12/26FF#1
LD-7	F	Review the impact of Artificial Intelligence on training programs.		
NR		Nuclear Regulatory Commission Items (NR)		
NR-3	M	Monitor the Non-Cited Violations at every Public Meeting.	Each PM	Each PM
NR-4	F	Meet with NRC Resident Inspectors regularly.	Most FFs	Regularly
NR-5	F	Follow proposed Presidential Executive Orders driven changes to NRC as to their impact on DCCP. [10/25PM Presentation delayed due to government shutdown, reschedule for 2/26PM.]	6/25PM 6/26PM	2/27PM
NR-6	M	Review any NRC Inspector General Reports or NRC employee Differing Professional Opinion filings which may relate to DCCP.	6/26PM	As needed
NR-7	F	<u>The DCISC should continue to support the NRC's presentation of its annual assessment results at DCISC PMs.</u>		6/27PM
DEC	F	Decommissioning		

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
DEC-1	F	Review DCPD decommissioning plans periodically as a result of the Joint Proposal plant shutdown in 2025. Review the timing of spent fuel transfer from wet to dry storage and when the spent fuel pools are decommissioned the plant will lose the capability to open multipurpose canisters for inspection. DCISC should actively review the decommissioning plans for DCPD because of the potential impact on staffing and future options with respect to managing spent fuel.	2/23PM 6/23PM	TBD
DEC-4	F	Emergency preparedness during decommissioning.	11/22FF 2/23PM	TBD
DEC-5	F	DCPD's approach to submitting LAR requests for decommissioning appears appropriate and the DCISC should continue to follow from a safety perspective all the regulatory activities which will define the reduction in requirements which will occur at shutdown.	9/22FF 9/22PM	TBD
EO		Extended Operations (EO)		
EO-1	M	Monitor the Purchasing of New Fuel [12/22FF fuel performance & future purchases satisfactory for 2030 operation.]	12/22FF 3/25FF	2Q27FF
EO-5	M	Monitor Staffing for Extended Operations	1/26FF 2/26PM	2Q27FF
EO-9	F	Review new seismic safety-related information from the IPRP, Dr. Peter Bird, NRC petitions, and any other third-party sources. Consider all future actions. [See also SC-17.]	6/25PM 6/26PM	As needed
EMB		Unit 1 RPV Embrittlement		
EMB-3	F	[Former SE-26] Review reactor pressure vessel compliance status after next set of surveillance samples (Capsule B) is analyzed and effective vessel lifetime projections are updated. [See also AR23/24AR23-2.] PG&E to briefed DCISC representatives in <u>June and late-July 2026</u> . <u>Dr. Kirk reviewed and report issued October 2026</u> .	6/26PM 7/26FF#1 7/26FF#2 9/26FF	10/26PM then Close
EMB-6	F	Review and comment on all new questions or requests for information related to vessel embrittlement in LRA proceedings. M. Kirk reviewed LRA NRC Safety Evaluation Report Section 4.2, letter dated 1/13/26.		As-needed Close
O		Other Items (O)		
O-1	F	Perform observations of evolutions (work processes) within the plant periodically. Continue with these about annually. Work process observations: Observe in the plant work processes important to nuclear safety, such as operator rounds, Control Room shift turnover, surveillance tests, preventive and corrective maintenance, system modifications, system walk downs with system engineers; outage activities, etc.	3/26FF 4/26FF 5/26FF	Regularly
O-3	F	Review studies/reviews of drone activity at DCPD.	2/21PM 12/25FF#2	As Needed
O-4	F	Review plant activities since previous FF meeting ("Station Update"). Include the following topics: power production, status of station INPO performance indicators (considered confidential), equipment problems, human performance/mispositioning events, major maintenance activities, major projects, and NRC inspections/performance.		Each FF

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
PUBLIC MEETING ITEMS: (Reference: Public Meeting Minutes)				
2/25 PM 5	F	Dr. Peterson observed that sometimes during fact finding a Notification is generated which enables the item to be entered into the Corrective Action Program. He commented the creation of a process map would be useful and he recommended the Committee take an action to create a process map, first for PG&E's review and comment and for the member's review and discussion at the next public meeting.	2/25PM	6/26PM 10/26PM
20	F	In response to Consultant Wardell's inquiry as to whether workplace seismic safety training is part of the initial or continuous training for new employees Mr. Jones stated he would need to check on and follow up during subsequent fact finding and he stated he did not believe specific workplace seismic safety training was part of initial training for new employees.	2/25PM	Response received 1/29/26 12/26FF#2
10/25 PM 19	F	[Dr. Nelson provided a] form of improved public outreach regarding DCPD operational status and plant health and his stated his belief this falls within the public outreach mission of the DCISC and he suggested a joint PG&E/DCISC effort. He stated CGNP is working on legislation to extend DCPD operations beyond 2030 and he believes public outreach should be one component of this legislative package. Dr. Peterson suggested the DCISC should follow up on opportunities to provide more information on the status of the plant.	10/25PM	
20	F	He [Mr. Rogers] reported DCPD has clear guidance with other entities within PG&E that addresses the interface and the decision-making associated with the plant and the down time of the plant and no authorization or clearance from outside DCPD is required. He offered to provide Dr. Meshkati with a copy of the guidance document at a future fact finding.	10/25PM 7/26FF#2	Close to 7/26FF#2
21	F	He [Dr. Peterson] reported Dr. Scarlat and Dr. Meshkati will both have the opportunity to observe an emergency response exercise and the focus of their respective fact finding visits should be on how much information can be obtained and made available to the Committee outside the EOF if in the judgment of PG&E the presence in the EOF itself of Committee representatives could be disruptive.	10/25PM 7/26FF#2 9/26FF	Close to 9/26FF
22	F	Mr. Jones commented he believes the DCISC should consider working with the State of California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) on the policy and Dr. Peterson agreed that additional investigation would be warranted.	10/25PM	Close to 9/26FF?
23	F	Mr. Jones reported there is a bifurcation of tribal recognition between the federal and state governments and the nearest federally recognized tribe are the Santa Ynez Chumash and they are located outside of the Emergency Planning Zone, but the state has a Native American Heritage Commission which recognizes several tribes that are mostly likely descendants from the village sites in the area. He stated there are several tribes in the area including the Yak Tityu Tityu Yak Tihini tribe that are in the Emergency Planning Zone but they do not have facilities and live in the general population. Dr. Scarlat stated this is an area where the DCISC should follow up concerning representation and that all necessary connections are being made.	12/25FF #1	TBD-ROS

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
<u>2/26 PM</u> 2	F	Safety-related fuse blown requiring review of Maintenance Rule interval. Life-cycle bases for replacement/preventative maintenance reevaluated and entry made in the Corrective Action Program. In response to Dr. Peterson's question Mr. Tyman agreed to provide the service life of the blown fuse. Mr. Tyman agreed with Dr. Peterson that while DCCP evaluates timeliness of replacement of components, online monitoring which is a new focus for the industry might be employed to manage these types of assets. Mr. Tyman stated that during the system inoperability a backup system was available. Dr. Peterson remarked this would be a good subject for a fact finding meeting.	2/26PM <u>7/26FF#1</u>	<u>Close to 7/26FF#1</u>
16	F	Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones suggested a meeting during a future fact finding with the Director and Manager of the Emergency Planning organization, Mr. Jordan Tyman and Mr. Andy Warwick, would be productive as to whether there could be an opportunity to test the DCISC policy during the Committee's observation of a future emergency exercise.	2/26PM	2027 or 28 EP Exercises
<u>6/26 PM</u> <u>1</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Dr. Meshkati stated that in 2017 at the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant in Florida a high energy arcing fault occurred and Dr. Meshkati inquired as to the criterion or criteria that was used for PG&E to designate this a bus duct arc fault. Mr. Rogers stated the criteria used was related to NRC guidance and he offered to provide as a follow-up action information on the difference between a bus duct arc fault and a high energy arcing fault</u>		<u>Close to 7/26FF#2</u>
<u>2</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>In response to Dr. Scarlat, Mr. Tyman confirmed enhancements represent the largest portion of corrective actions and these are tracked and prioritized by the program. In response to Dr. Scarlat's query as to whether the percentages have varied over time as an indication of the highlights of a good nuclear safety culture, Mr. Tyman and Mr. Jones stated they would look to share that information and a metric with the DCISC in a future fact finding and in a subsequent public meeting.</u>		
<u>3</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>In response to Dr. Meshkati's comment about making recommendations to PG&E Dr. Scarlat replied that the issue on which the new recommendation to the DCISC was based was not identified until the end of the fact finding and as it was not fully discussed with PG&E it would not be appropriate to provide a less than informed recommendation to PG&E. Consultant Darden observed that this topic would be appropriate for a future fact finding visit. Dr. Scarlat remarked PG&E went above requirements in implementing prudent actions and the completion times which were reviewed were found not to be relevant given the time involved and she stated it is the issue of why it took the DCISC to understand and the workflow and the documentation with the NRC inspectors that needs to be further explored.</u>		<u>Close to 9/26FF</u>
<u>4</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Mr. McWhorter reported DCISC FFT have visited the battery rooms which are located in the Turbine Building and a visit and a walkdown could be arranged for Dr. Meshkati during the July 2026 fact finding. Dr. Scarlat observed it is also important to understand the failure modes for the batteries and that it is important to understand why maintenance actions are taken with regard to the DC system and the batteries.</u>		<u>1/27FF</u>
<u>5</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Dr. Peterson remarked that several years ago DCCP was not successful in implementing dynamic procedures and he stated acceleration of the implementation of dynamic procedures was the subject of a DCISC Recommendation as there is a real potential for a substantial improvement in operational safety with the use of dynamic procedures and he stated the DCISC should continue to closely track this issue.</u>		<u>Close to D12/24FF-3.2 & P1-2</u>

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<u>6</u>	<u>F</u>	He reported that early after a canister is loaded helium under high pressure is relied upon for heat removal, but by the time a through-wall crack could develop the decay heat will have significantly dropped. He remarked this issue is also of concern to members of the public and the DCISC should explore what are the actual safety implications of any type of stress corrosion cracking of a canister. Dr. Scarlat inquired as to the time the atmospheric pressure from helium is sufficient for cooling and Dr. Peterson observed this is something on which the DCISC should investigate. Dr. Peterson observed that over time with counter-diffusion eventually oxygen and moisture will enter the canister but the spent fuel assemblies are very robust and should not experience significant degradation. Dr. Scarlat stated that based on public interest in this topic the DCISC should understand at what point in time helium stops playing a role in heat removal and when air ingress into the canister occurs.		
<u>7</u>	<u>F</u>	The FFT recommended that Recommendation D12/15/25FF-3.11A should remain open to provide for a presentation by PG&E on the 2026 inspection and that Dr. Scarlat be invited to observe the inspection.		Close to 9/26FF and 10/26PM
<u>8</u>	<u>F</u>	Mr. Geesman reported that during the DCISC's February 2026 that DCPD was one of only two nuclear power plants in the U.S. that has a permanent "no fly" zone designation over a portion of the owner-controlled area and he inquired what other plant joined DCPD in having this designation and what distinguishes these two nuclear power plants from others. Dr. Peterson stated the Committee will need to obtain an answer to Mr. Geesman's inquiry during a future fact finding.		
<u>9</u>	<u>F</u>	She [Ms. Becker] observed warmer water and increases in seaweed may impact the plant's cooling systems. She asked whether the Committee was in contact with the various agencies that are reviewing these issues. Dr. Peterson replied that the Committee would follow up on Ms. Becker's inquiry during a future fact finding.		Close to D7/6/26FF-3.5
<u>10</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Scarlat proposed that the DCISC should consider the role of its public engagement mandate and whether that is to be officially coordinated with the NRC or whether the NRC and DCISC efforts should be independent. She commented the DCISC should evaluate whether it is conducting its efforts effectively and if the correct communities are being engaged and she requested this be added to the Open Items List.		Close to new DO-4
<u>11</u>	<u>F</u>	He [Mr. McWhorter] reported there is a non-material change required to the April Fact Finding Report to report that there were two tunnel cleanings instead of the one reported.		Close, 4/26FF Revised
<u>12</u>	<u>F</u>	Mr. McWhorter reported the Nuclear Power Operations Corporate Evaluation scheduled during 2027 was discussed with the FFT and he reported Item OE-2 on the Open Items List is to periodically review station or management review meetings and he reported the FFT learned these meetings have evolved to a routine review of the Performance Indicators and accordingly the FFT recommend closing Item OE-2 and opening a new Item O-4 to review plant activities since the last fact finding visit to now include review of the Performance Indicators.		Close, OIL Revised

ITEM NO.	TYPE	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
<u>13</u>	<u>F</u>	The FFT also recommended adding language to Item NS-9 to track on a confidential basis INPO Areas for Improvement and to ensure a review of the INPO Corporate Evaluation to be completed in 2027 and to track INPO Areas for Improvement. The FFT also recommended PG&E should provide the Committee with a confidential oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 INPO corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report.		<u>Close, NS-9 revised, added new NS-12, see also D4/26FF-3.3B</u>
<u>14</u>	<u>F</u>	Mr. McWhorter reported there is also an Agreement between the NRC and INPO where the resident inspector is allowed to read the report but cannot retain a copy. Dr. Meshkati suggested this topic be reviewed with DCISC Special Consultant Dr. Kenneth Koves as Dr. Koves worked for INPO for many years and may have valuable insights. Dr. Scarlat remarked whatever process is worked out it should apply to both the corporate and the plant reviews conducted by INPO.		<u>1/27FF</u>
<u>15</u>	<u>F</u>	In response to Consultant McWhorter's questions Dr. Jordan estimated the DCISC should return for an update on PG&E's progress in addressing the nine recommendations in about one year.		<u>Close to SC-17</u>
<u>16</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Nelson quoted from the AB 1632 "An Assessment of California's Nuclear Power Plants" which discussed the deterministic investigation of a San Simeon 6.5 magnitude earthquake directly beneath DCCP and the geologic similarities and the understanding of the San Luis/Pismo Block.... Dr. Nelson commented the AB 1632 report was counter to the information that has been gathered over twenty years. He urged the Committee to consider Mr. Geesman's comments in that context. Dr. Peterson thanked Dr. Nelson and reported the Committee would be taking this item up under the Open items list.		<u>Close to new SC-18</u>
<u>17</u>	<u>F</u>	The FFT made three recommendations to the Committee: [(1) and (2) are recommendations D5/26FF-3.3A D5/26FF-3.3B separately added to OIL] and (3) follow up on reviewing the Long-Term Critical Projects under the Open items List EN-1. Mr. McWhorter observed this review should concentrate on projects following the R25 refueling outages for each unit.		<u>Close to 7/26FF#1</u>
<u>18</u>	<u>F</u>	He reported the [May 2000] LER had several recommendations for preventative maintenance and the cause was found to be moisture accumulation due to a problem with a gasket and Dr. Meshkati suggested the recommendations that transpired from the 2000 event be revisited. Senior Director Tom Jones confirmed the cause evaluation for the 2026 event is in process and the definition question Dr. Meshkati raised would be addressed in the Cause Evaluation [for the Unit 2 SUT 2-2 bus bar failure].		<u>Close to D5/26FF-3.3A</u>
<u>19</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Scarlat recommended the Committee follow up on the topic of relevant user groups and NRC oversight of the integration of dynamic procedures especially since under new NRC procedures there will be more reliance on data streams.		<u>12/26FF#1</u>
<u>20</u>	<u>F</u>	The FFT concluded the Craftsmanship Council was driving continuous improvement and recommended the previous recommendation (D12/15/25FF-3.1) should be closed and the DCISC should modify the Open Items List to add a new item under Conduct of Maintenance for periodic reviews of the Craftsmanship Council within the next calendar year.		<u>Close to CM-14</u>
<u>21</u>	<u>F</u>	The FFT concluded the Craftsmanship Council is beneficial and the Committee should continue periodically to attend meetings of the Craftsmanship Council.		<u>Close to CM-14</u>

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<u>22</u>	<u>F</u>	The FFT recommended that: (1) the DCISC should revisit Equipment Reliability Program in 6-12 months to obtain more details on long-term projects and Open item List EN-21 can provide the vehicle for this; and (2) the DCISC should modify the Open items List Item PI-3 to include monitoring and use of AI to develop plant initiatives that improve equipment reliability.		Close to <u>EN-21 and PI-3</u>
<u>23</u>	<u>F</u>	The FFT recommended... Open Item List Item PI-2 should be amended to provide for the other two members of the DCISC [Drs. Scarlat and Meshkati] should be provided a walkdown on the use of dynamic procedures.		Close to <u>PI-2</u>
<u>24</u>	<u>F</u>	The FFT concluded the Craftsmanship Council is beneficial and the Committee should continue periodically to attend meetings of the Craftsmanship Council.		Close to <u>CM-14</u>
<u>25</u>	<u>F</u>	The FFT made a recommendation to the Committee that the DCISC should follow up on the results of insurance inspections to be conducted mid-2026. The results should be captured on the DCISC Open Items List under NS-10.		Close to <u>NS-10</u>
<u>26</u>	<u>F</u>	In response to Dr. Peterson's inquiry concerning the geometry of the weld connection to the shell along the bottom head of the stainless steel MPC, as stress corrosion cracking can arise due to residual stresses from the thermal conductivity caused by the welding process, Mr. Brackeen stated he believes the weld is applied from the exterior but he would need to review and subsequently provide information on details of the preparations taken for the welds. Senior Director Mr. Tom Jones replied that this information would be provided to the DCISC at the time of the Committee's observation of the MPC inspection in August 2026.		Close to <u>9/26FF</u>
<u>27</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Scarlat made a request for the in-service ASME training documents for the VT1 and VT3 qualified inspectors to be provided for the DCISC's review during the August 2026 observation of the MPC inspection.		Close to <u>9/26FF</u>
<u>28</u>	<u>F</u>	In response to Dr. Scarlat's request Mr. Jones offered to provide the DCISC with a copy of the acceptance criteria used by PG&E [for the Capsule B evaluation].		Close to <u>Capsule B</u> evaluations
<u>29</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Scarlat recommended that in the interest of transparency at the next public meeting the Committee should foster a dialogue so that it is clear to the public how consensus and confidence is reached in this field [of embrittlement regulations].		Close to <u>10/26PM?</u>
<u>30</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Meshkati asked his fellow members to agree to develop a formal response to Mr. Jones' letter [Re: SNO Committee meetings].		Close after <u>10/26 PM</u> discussion
<u>31</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Scarlat and Dr. Meshkati agreed a separate item should be opened on the general question of DCISC independence.		Close to <u>new DO-5</u>
<u>32</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Peterson commented this is a matter [Re: SNO letter] that the Committee should take up at the next public meeting with a substantive discussion and in the meantime a draft letter might be circulated to each member to do an individual review in preparation for that substantive discussion.		Close after <u>10/26 PM</u> discussion
<u>33</u>	<u>F</u>	Dr. Nelson observed the Committee had yet to take up the matter of a deterministic analysis of a San Siemon type earthquake beneath DCP as related to AB 1632. Mr. Rathie confirmed the accuracy of Dr. Nelson's observation and reported the matter of the deterministic analysis should be added to the Committee Open Item List and with Dr. Meshkati he would work together with Dr. Jordan on the matter.		Close to <u>new SC-18</u>

ITEM NO.	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
RECOMMENDATIONS to the DCISC:			
D11/24FF-3.13	The DCISC should follow up on future corrective actions that may be initiated in response to an August 2024 dropped rod event.	11/24FF <u>7/26FF#1</u>	<u>Close to 7/26FF#1</u>
D12/24FF-3.2	Because expanded use of electronic <u>[now "dynamic"]</u> procedures can enhance plant operational safety subject to proper human systems integration, the DCISC should review this topic regularly. [See also PI-2. Now referred to as "dynamic" procedures. PFP provided walkthrough of new dynamic procedure tool at 5/26FF. NM and ROS should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during future FF Meetings.] <u>[NM walkthrough completed at 7/26FF#2.]</u>	5/26FF PFP <u>7/26FF#2</u> <u>NM</u>	<u>9/26FF</u> <u>12/26FF#1</u> <u>ROS</u>
D12/24FF-3.4	Because the application of Artificial Intelligence tools has significant potential to change and to improve DCCP's operational safety, the DCISC should review this topic frequently. The DCISC should maintain a list of potential future Artificial Intelligence applications that could enhance safety under item PI-3 on its Open Items List. [See also PI-3.]	12/25FF#1 12/25FF#2 1/26FF	<u>12/26FF#2</u>
D1/25FF-3.9A	The DCISC should review the results of a PG&E employee safety culture survey following its completion.	1/26FF <u>7/26FF#2</u>	<u>1/27FF</u>
D12/15/25FF-3.2	The DCISC should review the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Containment concrete inspection reports, expected to be available after Refueling Outage 1R26 in the fall of 2026. The DCISC should also review DCCP's disposition of this report and any resulting Notifications and repairs.	12/25FF#2	<u>12/26FF#2</u>
D12/15/25FF-3.11A	The DCISC should request that PG&E make a presentation on the summer 2026 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation inspection campaign at the June or October 2026 Public Meetings and that Member Raluca Scarlat be invited to observe some of the inspections.	3/25FF <u>6/26PM</u> <u>9/26FF</u>	<u>10/26PM</u> <u>then Close</u>
D12/15/25FF-3.11B	The DCISC should continue to monitor advances in canister inspection methods. [Summer 2026 ISFSI inspections to use improved methodologies.]	<u>6/26PM</u>	<u>10/26PM</u> <u>then Close</u> <u>to SF-8</u>
D12/15/25FF-3.13	The DCISC should request that PG&E make a presentation at its June 2026 Public Meeting on updates Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) tools and methods, how PRA is being used in the plant, and the NRC's role in approving PRA tools and methods	12/25FF#2	<u>10/26PM</u> <u>then Close</u>
D1/26FF-3.3	Based on industry experience with boric acid corrosion, DCISC should implement rigorous and systematic follow-up of boric acid corrosion monitoring at DCCP.	1/26FF <u>7/26FF#2</u>	<u>12/26FF#2</u>
D3/26FF-3.4	The DCISC should review the workflow of interfacing with the NRC Resident Inspector for a hypothetical scenario when a Notification mentions the need for a Compensatory Action but is later identified that the system was in fact operable and did not require a Compensatory Action.	3/26FF <u>9/26FF</u>	<u>Close to 9/26FF</u>
D4/26FF-3.3A	The DCISC should follow-up on how Artificial Intelligence is being addressed as a part of the Artificial Intelligence Roadmap in the Strategic Plan. [See also D12/24FF-3.4 and PI-3.]	4/26FF	<u>7/26FF#1</u> <u>12/26FF#2</u>
D4/26FF-3.3B	The DCISC should follow up on receiving an <u>confidential</u> oral briefing on the results of the 2020 and 2027 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations corporate reviews following issuance of the 2027 report. [See also NS-12]	4/26FF	2Q27FF

ITEM NO.	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
D4/26FF-3.10A	The DCISC should continue to follow and support DCP's plans for future Feedwater Heater replacements.	4/26FF <u>7/26FF#1</u>	<u>2Q27FF</u>
D4/26FF-3.10B	The DCISC should follow actions taken in response to the resolution approved at its February 2026 Public Meeting recommending that the California Public Utilities Commission and other cognizant state authorities support the implementation of the Feedwater heater replacement project at DCP as soon as practically feasible.	4/26FF	<u>2Q27FF</u>
D5/26FF-3.3A	The DCISC should follow-up on the Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026.	5/26FF <u>7/26FF#2</u>	<u>1/27FF</u>
D5/26FF-3.3B	The DCISC should follow-up on the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026.	5/26FF <u>7/26FF#2</u>	Close to <u>7/26FF#2</u>
<u>D7/6/26FF-3.1</u>	The DCISC should review current practices and recent results for the surveillance testing of Control Rod Drive Mechanisms during a future Fact-Finding Meeting.	<u>7/26FF#1</u>	<u>12/26FF#2</u>
<u>D7/6/26FF-3.5</u>	The DCISC should review the results of DCP's 2025 Climate Vulnerability Assessment and the associated Climate Hazard Information and Projections Report during a future Fact-Finding Meeting.	<u>7/26FF#1</u>	<u>12/26FF#2</u>
<u>D7/28/26FF-3.4</u>	Human factors issues and lessons learned, NRC reviews, and industry group involvement associated with Dynamic Procedures should be included in the DCISC Open Item List (OIL) for review at future fact-finding meetings. Relevant industry groups include EPRI, INPO, and vendor users' groups. At a minimum, the review should address the following: (a) Regulatory review. Has the NRC reviewed or inspected DCP's use of Dynamic Procedures? To what extent has PG&E applied the CBP system guidelines in NUREG-0700, Rev. 3, and the CBP review guidance in NUREG/CR-6634 to their design and implementation? (b) Human factors and human-computer interface assessment. How are human factors and human-computer interface issues for Dynamic Procedures assessed, by whom, and on what timeline? Is the assessment performed solely by the Operators who use the system, or does it include independent human factors verification and validation? Specific topics include: • situation awareness • the allocation of functions between the software and the Operator • crew communication • management of multiple concurrent procedures • backup procedures and the Operator's transition to them if the system fails (c) Industry participation and operating experience. Besides the vendor's users' group, does PG&E participate in EPRI working groups relevant to Dynamic Procedures, such as the Work Planning Users Group (WPUG)? Does DCP follow Procedure Professionals Association (PPA) guidelines (e.g., PPA AP-907-005), and do its procedure writers hold PPA certification or membership? Is operating experience on implementing Dynamic Procedures available through INPO or WANO, and how has DCP used it?	<u>7/26FF#1</u>	<u>1/27FF</u> NM
<u>D7/28/26FF-3.5</u>	The DCISC should meet with the members of the Boric Acid Review Team (BART) at a future fact-finding meeting to review the overall performance of the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program as well as the status of the Red indicator associated with LK3 leaks.	<u>7/26FF#1</u>	<u>1/27FF</u> NM

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<u>D7/28/26FF-3.8</u>	The DCISC should review the <u>July 29, 2026, DCCP drill critique in a future fact-finding meeting when it is completed.</u>	<u>7/26FF#2</u>	<u>1/27FF</u> <u>NM</u>
<u>D9/26FF-3.1A</u>	The DCISC should initiate and issue an explanation for an audience of general public and public officials, written by a panel of three to five experts providing multiple perspectives and spanning the disciplines of embrittlement, post-irradiation examination, non-destructive evaluation, neutron dosimetry, reactor safety, quality assurance, and risk communication, evaluating and describing for transparency to the public the following: 1. The pedigree of the data and of the analysis provided by Westinghouse, which was the basis for PG&E conclusions with regards to Unit 1 embrittlement, including verification and certification processes, quality assurance and quality control. 2. The type of decisions that are informed by capsule embrittlement data to improve confidence in plant safety, including but not limited to: the roles of standby capsules, coupon reconstitution for fracture toughness measurements, inspections and inspection intervals, RPT limits, annealing, probabilistic fracture toughness analysis.	<u>9/26FF</u>	<u>10/26PM</u>
<u>D9/26FF-3.1B</u>	The DCISC should follow-up on quality assurance oversight of vendor-supplied safety-related data and analysis, including but not limited to the results of the ongoing PG&E review of Westinghouse's Quality Assurance Program and of the upcoming Nuclear Procurement Issues Committee (NUPIC) audit.	<u>9/26FF</u>	<u>10/26PM</u>
<u>D9/26FF-3.2</u>	When the ISFSI final inspection report is available, DCISC should review the observations and conclusions recorded in the report, including comparisons with the prior inspection report, and the recommendations that will be made by the report with regards to whether changes are needed to future inspection plans, and including conclusions about the use of the emory cloth robotic arm.	<u>9/26FF</u>	<u>2Q27FF</u>
<u>D9/26FF</u> Unnumbered Item (Sec. 3.4)	Review of spent fuel transfer campaign planning should be added to the recurring open items list routinely reviewed by DCISC.	<u>9/26FF</u>	Close to <u>SF-1</u>
<u>D9/26FF-3.9</u>	The DCISC should review the DCCP September 2, 2026, Evaluated Emergency Preparedness Exercise critique and NRC and FEMA evaluations in a future fact-finding meeting when they are completed.	<u>9/26FF</u>	<u>12/26FF#1</u> <u>ROS</u>
<u>D9/26FF-3.10</u>	The DCISC should follow-up with SLO County to identify the effectiveness with which public communication goals are met, as described in the DCCP Emergency Plan, license document, and Federal Emergency Management Agency Program Manual for Radiological Emergency Preparedness Planning, Standard G for Public Communication, including in PEZs 13-15 and in PAZs 6-12, including public communication to transient populations, people with access and functional needs, limited English proficiency communities, parents/guardians, agricultural communities, people for whom evacuation may be difficult, and facilities housing incarcerated populations.	<u>9/26FF</u>	
<u>D9/26FF-3.11A</u>	The DCISC should follow-up with the California Men's Colony (CMC) regarding a meeting with building facilities who can describe the ventilation options and corresponding time-scales during a sheltering in place event.	<u>9/26FF</u>	
<u>D9/26FF-3.11B</u>	The DCISC should follow-up with CMC with a meeting of the Inmate Family Council to learn about public communication and management of radiological emergencies at CMC.	<u>9/26FF</u>	

ITEM NO.	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
<u>D9/26FF-3.11C</u>	The DCISC should follow-up with SLO County to understand procedures for sheltering in place, including ventilation guidelines and corresponding timelines for sheltering in place implementation for large buildings, and to evaluate appropriateness of plans and communication of plans for KI distribution and usage.	<u>9/26FF</u>	
<u>D9/26FF-3.11D</u>	The DCISC should follow-up with SLO County on the integration of emergency preparedness, training, and drills with state and county correctional facilities, all of which are located in PAZ 8, and all of which have the unique feature of sheltering in place as the designated protective action measure.	<u>9/26FF</u>	
<u>D9/26FF-3.12A</u>	Establish a plan and allocate the necessary resources for DCISC's public engagement scope.	<u>9/26FF</u>	

ITEM NO.	OPEN ITEM CATEGORY/DESCRIPTION	Last Actions	Next Action
RECOMMENDATIONS to PG&E: (SB 846 requires the DCISC to "make recommendations appropriate to enhance the safety of the operation at the Diablo Canyon powerplant.")			
AR23/24AR23-2	Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of reactor vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available. [Capsule B removed 4/25; Close after Capsule B evaluation complete (12-18 mos. after 4/25).] <u>Capsule B evaluation received 6/29/26.</u>	6/26PM 7/26FF#1 7/26FF#2 9/26FF	10/26PM <u>Close?</u>
P12/24FF-3.2	The DCISC recommends that PG&E further expand their use of electronic <u>[dynamic]</u> -procedures-type applications, subject to proper human systems integration, because the improved human performance and documentation of work can directly improve the safety of operations. [See also PI-2.]	5/26FF 7/26FF#2	12/26FF#2
P8/25FF-3.1	PG&E should support and facilitate regular meetings (in-person or remotely) between the DCISC and designated members of the Board of Directors' Safety and Nuclear Oversight Committee (SNO) to learn about the Board's safety-related goals, priorities, administrative oversight, and budgetary policies vis-à-vis DCCP, and to review and coordinate strategic issues affecting the plant's equipment systems and occupational safety. [See also new NS-11. <u>Response received 5/28/26. 6/26PM – Chair/counsel action to draft response letter.</u>]	8/25FF 9/26FF	10/26PM
P1/26FF-3.3	PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to repair the high number of leaks classified as "LK3" in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (SAPN 51323599)	1/26FF 7/26FF#2	1/27FF
P1/26FF-3.4	Regarding the interoperability of PG&E radio systems with San Luis Obispo County, PG&E should initiate targeted efforts with SLO County to coordinate and test the current means of establishing interoperability between the two systems as soon as possible. Additionally, PG&E should investigate finding another means to establish interoperability between the two systems more easily and quickly during an emergency at DCCP. (SAPN 51323660)	1/26FF 9/26FF	1/27FF
P1/26FF-3.9	PG&E should review and improve the limited guidance in procedures for completing Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) and elaborate when a CCE should be performed, how it should be systematically completed, and how it should be acted upon. (SAPN 51323661)	1/26FF 4/26FF	7/26FF#2 1/27FF
<u>P7/28/26FF-3.5</u>	<u>PG&E should develop a proactive action plan to reduce the high number of leaks classified as "LK3" in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals.</u>	7/26FF#2	1/27FF

DCPP Systems/Components Reviewed Periodically (See EN-16)

- 4 kV – July 2022
- 230 kV & 500 kV – Sep 2025 (include grid stability/inertia)
- Auxiliary Feedwater – Mar 2024
- Auxiliary Saltwater – Mar 2024
- Auxiliary Building Ventilation – July 2025
- Chemical & Volume Control System and High Pressure Injection – Nov 2024
- Component Cooling Water – Mar 2023
- Compressed Air – Apr 2023
- Condensate & Feedwater – ~~Nov 2024~~ July 2026
- Containment Structure – Dec 2025 #1
- Containment Spray – May 2022
- Containment Ventilation and H₂ Purge – July 2023
- Control Room Simulator – May 2024
- Control Room Ventilation – July 2023
- Digital Systems – April 2024
- DC Power – Mar 2026
- Emergency Diesel Generators – Sept 2025
- Fire Protection & Detection Systems – ~~Apr 2023~~ July 2026
- Nuclear Instrumentation & In-core Instrumentation – Aug 2025
- Plant Protection System – Mar 2023
- Radiation Monitoring – May 2023
- Radwaste Processing – Mar 2024
- Reactor Coolant System & Pumps – Apr 2023
- Buried Piping & Tanks – May 2023
- RCS Process Control System – Dec 2024
- Refueling Equipment – May 2024
- Residual Heat Removal – Nov 2024
- Rod Control & Indication – Aug 2023
- Safety Injection Pumps – Nov 2024
- Spent Fuel Pool Cooling & HVAC – Mar 2025
- Steam Generators – Mar 2026
- Special Protection System – Mar 2020
- Turbine-Generator – Jan 2023

DCPP Programs Reviewed Periodically (See EN-19)

10CFR50.59 Program – Nov 2024

ALARA – May 2022

Aging Management Programs – Dec 2025 #1

Air Operated Valves – Jan 2024

Benchmarking – Mar 2022

Boric Acid Corrosion Control – Jan 2026

Chemistry – Dec 2025 #1; March 2026

Cranes – May 2026

Configuration Management – Mar 2025

Emergency Preparedness – March 2026

Employee Concerns Program – Aug 2023

Equipment Environmental Qualification – Dec 2022

Equipment Reliability – May 2026

Fire Doors & Door Life Cycle Mgm't. Plan – Jan 2022

Fire Protection Program (NFPA-805) – ~~Sep 2024~~ [July 2026](#)

FLEX Program – Mar 2026

Flow Accelerated Corrosion – ~~May 2022~~ [Sep 2026](#)

Foreign Material Exclusion – Dec 2025 #2

Greater Than Class C Waste – Aug 2022 PFP

In-service Inspection Program – Jul 2023

Integrated Risk Assessment Program – Mar 2022

Large Motors – Jul 2023

Long-Term Capital Planning Process – May 2023

MIDAS – May 2024

Maintenance Rule – Jul 2025

Margin Management Program – April 2024

Motor Operated Valves – Jan 2024

Nuclear Fuel Program – Mar 2025

Nuclear Insurance Programs – July 2024 May 2026

Online Maintenance – Dec 2025 #2

Online Monitoring – Dec 2025 #2

Operating Experience – Jul 2025 (review biennially)

Operability Assessment Program – Jan 2022

Operational Decision Making – April 2024

PRA Programs (non-seismic) – Dec 2025

Performance Improvement – Sep 2023 PM

Reactivity Management – July 2025

Safety-Security Interface – Jan 2026

Self-Assessment – Jan 2023

Single Point Vulnerabilities – Sept 2025

Seismic PRA – Feb 2025

Seismically Induced System Interactions – Mar 2024

Software QA - Aug 2021

Spent Fuel Management – Dec 2025 #2

System Engineering – Mar 2022

Transformers, Large – May 2025

Troubleshooting – Dec 2022

Tsunami Hazard Analysis – Jan 2025

Vibration Monitoring – July 2025

October 2026 Public Meeting

FF = Fact-finding Meeting

PM = Public Meeting Q = Quarter

DCPP Meetings Reviewed Periodically (See EN-20)

Corrective Action – CARB – May 2025
Notification Review Team – Apr 2026
Nuclear Safety Operating Committee – Dec 2025 #2
Plant Health Committee/Subcommittee – Mar 2026
Plant Health Prioritization Committee – Aug 2023
Plant Staff Review Committee – Nov 2024

October 2026 Public Meeting

FF = Fact-finding Meeting

PM = Public Meeting Q = Quarter

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:

October 21, 2026

AGENDA ITEM:

XXX-K

AGENDA TITLE:

Report on October 15, 2026, Meeting of
the Independent Peer Review Panel.

CONSENT []

ACTION [X]

INFORMATION [X]

Staff Summary:

Committee Consultant Dr. Thomas H. Jordan will report on the October 15, 2026, public meeting of the CPUC Independent Peer Review Panel for seismic studies of Diablo Canyon Power Plant and its environs including to review the PG&E Response to the IPRP's Response to the PG&E 2024 Updated Seismic Assessment.

A copy of the agenda for the IPRP's meeting is provided.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate

Agenda

Diablo Canyon Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) Meeting

October 15, 2026

California Public Utilities Commission Offices Hearing Room A
505 Van Ness Ave, San Francisco, CA

Limited call-in and remote options available.

10:00 AM Introduction (Gordon Seitz, California Geological Survey)

- Welcome
- Status of PG&E Seismic Update

The Great California Shakeout, Earthquake Drill at 10:15 am
<https://www.shakeout.org/california/whyparticipate/>

10:20 AM IPRP Function (Bruce Gibson, IPRP Representative - San Luis Obispo County)

- IPRP and DCISC roles and responsibilities, per the charter of each body and SB 846
 - IPRP: seismic hazards, sources to ground motions
 - DCISC: overall plant safety, operations and fragility
- IPRP and CPUC roles and authorities regarding preparation and publication of technical reports
 - IPRP technical members draft, discuss and finalize
 - CPUC publishes and distributes
- IPRP Discussion and public comments

11:00 AM PG&E response to IPRP Request 1: Ground motion response spectra

- PG&E Presentation regarding IPRP Request to provide documentation of the Ground Motion Response Spectrum (GMRS) based on their evaluation of the impact of using the Hosgri fault slip rate of 2.6 mm/yr.
- IPRP Discussion and public comments

11:30 PM M6.5 San Simeon Deterministic Earthquake Scenario Discussion with input from the Seismic Review Team (Justin Cochran, California Energy Commission)

- California Energy Commission requested that PG&E provide a deterministic ground motion analysis using the 2003 San Simeon earthquake M6.5, as an analogy.
- IPRP Discussion and public comments

Noon - 13:30 PM Lunch

(IPRP member lunch with DCISC members present)

1:30 PM PG&E response to IPRP Request 2: Hosgri fault slip rate inputs, weighting criteria

- PG&E presentation regarding IPRP requests to provide additional documentation regarding the inputs used for the Hosgri fault slip rate and slip rate weighting.
- Higher slip rate published result at Point Sal
- IPRP Discussion and public comments

2:30 PM PG&E response to IPRP Request 3: Casmalia fault

- PG&E presentation regarding IPRP request that PG&E evaluate the implications of the published Casmalia fault study (McGregor and Onderdonk. 2021)
- IPRP Discussion and public comments

3:00 PM **IPRP assessment of the Seismic Review Team (SRT) evaluation of Dr. Bird's critique of the DCPP seismic source characterization. (Phil Johnson, California Coastal Commission)**

- SRT recommendations
- IPRP Discussion and public comments

3:30 PM **Seismic Source Characterization Research Update by PG&E**

- New Offshore seismic profiling on the Hosgri, San Luis Bay and Los Osos faults
- Fault slip rate studies motivated by geodetic deformation modelling
- OSL chronology evaluations
- IPRP Discussion and public comments

4:00PM **adjourn**

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE	
AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM	
MEETING DATE:	October 20, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XXX-M
AGENDA TITLE:	Committee Regulatory, Administrative and Financial Matters, Public Outreach and Engagement, Interaction with Governmental Agencies Including the California Energy Commission and the IPRP, Consider Ratifying Contracts and Contracts Amendments with Committee Consultants, and Other Committee Discussion.
CONSENT [☐] ACTION [☒] INFORMATION [☒]	
Staff Summary: It is expected that the Committee Members will receive information and discuss regulatory, administrative, and financial matters including their public outreach efforts and interactions with other governmental agencies. Committee members will also discuss contractual matters.	
RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: As appropriate	

AMENDMENT No. 7
to
AGREEMENT FOR CONSULTING SERVICES
With MARK KIRK, Ph.D.

This Amendment No. 7 to the Agreement for Consulting Services between the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee ("Committee") and Consultant Mark Kirk ("Consultant") is made as of October 7, 2026.

In consideration of the mutual promises contained herein, Committee and Consultant agree that the Terms and Conditions set forth herein are incorporated into the Agreement for Consulting Services between Committee and Consultant dated September 13, 2023 (the "Agreement") as amended by Amendment No. 1 on December 11, 2023, by Amendment No. 2 on February 21, 2024, by Amendment No. 3 on May 22, 2024, by Amendment No. 4 on August 19, 2024, by Amendment No. 5 on February 27, 2025, and by Amendment No. 6 of April 14, 2026. Only the paragraph number of the Terms and Conditions of said Agreement which is being modified or otherwise revised is set forth in this Amendment.

Paragraph 2. "Compensation. Effective on the date first written above, for the services to be provided by Consultant under this agreement, Consultant shall be compensated at the hourly rate of \$200.00 per hour, not to exceed the total amount of \$164,250.00 without the written consent of the Committee's Chair. Time spent by Consultant for the services hereunder shall be recorded under generally accepted accounting practices and shall be itemized on any billings to the Committee. In addition to compensation for the Consultant's time above, the Committee shall also reimburse Consultant directly for all out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred by Consultant in connection with providing services to the Committee including, but not necessarily limited to, printing of any reports, photocopies, facsimile, postage, long-distance telephone and internet charges and for any travel specifically requested by the Committee and for lodging and subsistence (meals and incidental expenses) incurred during such travel. Time and expense reporting shall be in accordance with Committee Policy No. 6 "Consultant Guidelines" attached to the Agreement as **Exhibit "B."**

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Chair of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee has executed this Amendment as evidence of the Chair's authorization for Consultant to exceed the "not to exceed" total amount of \$152,000.00 provided by Amendment No. 6 in accordance with Committee Policy No. 6, Section 7, and the Consultant and the Chair have executed this Amendment on the date(s) and year written below. This Amendment No. 7 may be executed in counterparts, including counterparts transmitted by electronic mail in so-called pdf format and shall be legal and binding and have the same full force and effect as if paper originals with handwritten signatures had been exchanged. All executed counterparts shall constitute one agreement, and each counterpart shall be deemed an original.

This Amendment No. 7 shall be subsequently ratified by vote of the Members at the earliest opportunity, the October 20-21, 2026, public meeting, or at the next legally noticed public meeting of the Committee, whichever shall occur first.

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

By 
Dr. Najmedin Meshkati, Chair

5 October 2026
Dated: _____

CONSULTANT
By 
Dr. Mark T. Kirk

7 October 2026
Dated

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM

MEETING DATE:	October 21, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XXXI - N
AGENDA TITLE:	DCISC 36th Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; July 1, 2025 - June 30, 2026.

CONSENT [] ACTION [XX] INFORMATION []

Staff Summary: The Settlement Agreement creating the DCISC provided
"The Committee shall prepare an annual report and such interim reports
as it deems appropriate, which reports shall include any recommendations of the
Committee." A draft report covering Fiscal Year 2025-2026 has now been prepared by
Committee Members Dr. Meshkati, Dr. Peterson and Dr. Scarlet, with contributions
from the Technical Consultants and Legal Counsel, and is presented at this meeting for
consideration and adoption. This is the Committee's thirty-sixth annual report.

In considering the approval of the 36th Annual Report the attention of the Members is
directed to the need to resolve the issue posed by the two bracketed sections of the
enclosed Executive Summary on pages ES-7 and ES-8. This issue concerns the
inclusion or exclusion of information on the Committee's technical review of Reactor
Vessel Embrittlement received after the end of the report period, June 30, 2026, to the
date of the October 20-21, 2026, public meeting at which the 36th Annual Report is on
the agenda for consideration for approval.

Upon adoption, Public Utilities Code §712.1(e)(2) directs the Committee to annually
transmit its findings and recommendations for improved safety to the Legislature (in
accordance with California Government Code §9795), the Governor, the California
Public Utilities Commission, the California Energy Commission, the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Pacific Gas & Electric Company, and to include
the response to the DCISC's annual reports that Public Utilities Code §712.1(f) directs
Pacific Gas & Electric Company to provide. The Committee's annual reports are
available to members of the public on the Committee's website (www.dcisc.org) and
through the California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo Kennedy Library,
Special Collections and Archives Department, and through local public libraries.

RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: Motion to approve the DCISC 2025-2026 Thirty-Sixth
Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations, provide the Report to PG&E and
incorporate the PG&E response and to then transmit the complete report in accordance with Public
Utilities Code §712.1(e)(2).

Executive Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

History and Introduction

The concept of an independent safety committee for Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) arose in the context of the opposition by the California Public Utilities Commission's (CPUC) Division of Ratepayer Advocates (now known as the Public Advocates Office) and the California Attorney General to Pacific Gas & Electric's (PG&E's) request for recovery from its ratepayers for the cost of building DCPP and its two four-loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactors, each of which produces 1,100 megawatts.

The Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC or the Committee) was established as part of a settlement agreement entered into in 1988 which arose from the rate proceedings for DCPP. The settlement agreement provided for a three-member Independent Safety Committee for the purpose of reviewing and assessing the safety of operations and making recommendations for safe operations. The DCISC has continued to function and fulfill its responsibilities as established under the settlement agreement as amended by subsequent CPUC decisions. In those decisions the CPUC has found the establishment of the Committee was "in the public interest" and that it remains a key element of monitoring the operation of DCPP. Neither the Committee nor its members have any responsibility or authority for plant operations and have no authority to direct PG&E personnel.

The Committee was formed in late 1989, began its review activities on January 1, 1990, and conducted its first site visit on April 20, 1990, and first public meeting in San Luis Obispo on May 22, 1990. The Committee issued an interim report for the period January 1 - June 30, 1990, and has issued an annual report every year since. This 36th Annual Report was approved at the DCISC's public meeting on October 21, 2026. These Annual Reports, together with CPUC Decision 88-12-083 and subsequent CPUC decisions, serve as source documents for the Committee's formation, continuing role, and activities.

The operating license for DCPP Unit 1 was issued on November 2, 1984, and Unit 1 commenced commercial operation on May 7, 1985, and was initially licensed to operate until November 2, 2024. The operating license for Unit 2 was issued on August 26, 1985, and Unit 2 commenced commercial operation on March 3, 1986, and was initially licensed to operate until August 26, 2025. As directed by California Senate Bill 846 (SB 846), on December 15, 2023, the CPUC authorized, with certain conditions, extended operation of DCPP until October 31, 2029 (Unit 1) and October 31, 2030 (Unit 2). On April 2, 2026, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved PG&E's 20-year license renewal application for extended operation of DCPP to November 2, 2044 (Unit 1) and August 26, 2045 (Unit 2). Extending operations past 2030 would require additional action by the California Legislature. As of the conclusion of this report's period (June 30, 2026) the Legislature had not acted on a further extension of DCPP operations.

The Committee continues to monitor, review, assess, and report on the safety of operations at DCPP while the plant generates electricity, and the DCISC will continue its review after cessation of electrical generation operations until such time that all spent nuclear fuel has been transferred from the in-plant Spent Fuel Pools to the on-site Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

Additional details on the formation and matters governing the operation of the DCISC are contained in Volume I, Section 1.1 of this report.

Committee Membership

The DCISC members serve three-year staggered terms and remain on the DCISC until a new appointment or their reappointment is made. To fill an expired term or a vacancy, the CPUC issues a public notice soliciting applications from interested persons. Up to three candidates are selected by the President of the CPUC from the applications plus the incumbent if willing to continue to serve. The candidates must be “persons with knowledge, background and experience in the field of nuclear power facilities and nuclear safety issues.” From a list of candidates, the new or returning member is appointed by the Governor of California, the Attorney General of California, or the Chairperson of the California Energy Commission (CEC), whichever made the original appointment.

On October 10, 2007, Robert J. Budnitz, Ph.D. was appointed by California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown Jr. to a term on the Committee. Dr. Budnitz was subsequently reappointed several times with his last term concluding on September 9, 2025. Dr. Budnitz’s extraordinary service to the Committee over his term was recognized and celebrated at the DCISC’s October 2025 Public Meeting.

On September 10, 2025, Raluca O. Scarlat, Ph.D. was appointed by California Attorney General Rob Bonta to a term on the DCISC expiring June 30, 2028. Dr. Scarlat is an Associate Professor in the Nuclear Engineering Department at University of California (UC) Berkeley. Dr. Scarlat began her work with the Committee with partial participation in the September 2025 Fact-Finding Meeting followed by full participation at the DCISC’s October 2025 Public Meeting.

On July 9, 2008, California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger appointed Per F. Peterson, Ph.D., PE, to a three-year term on the Committee through June 30, 2011. Dr. Peterson was subsequently reappointed several times and on December 7, 2023, Governor Gavin Newsom reappointed Dr. Peterson to a seventh three-year term commencing July 1, 2023, and ending on June 30, 2026. On June 11, 2026, CPUC President John Reynolds selected Dr. Peterson as one of two candidates for appointment by the Governor for a term on the Committee beginning on July 1, 2026 and ending on June 30, 2029. As of approval of this report, the Governor’s appointment remained pending and Dr. Peterson continued to serve as a member until the time such appointment would be made. Dr. Peterson served as DCISC Chair during this report period.

On July 3, 2024, Najmedin Meshkati, Ph.D., CPE, was appointed by California Energy Commission Chair David Hochschild to a three-year term on the DCISC commencing July 1, 2024, through June 30, 2027. Dr. Meshkati is a Professor of Civil/Environmental Engineering, Industrial and Systems Engineering; and International Relations at the University of Southern California (USC); and an Associate (ex-Research Fellow) with the Project on Managing the Atom at Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. Dr. Meshkati served as DCISC Vice-Chair during this report period and will serve as the DCISC Chair for the July 1, 2026, to June 30, 2027, report period.

Although this report covers a period during which Dr. Peterson served as Chair, it was approved during Dr. Meshkati's term as Chair.

Additional details on the backgrounds of the DCISC Members, Consultants, and Counsel are contained in Volume I, Section 1.2 of this report.

Overview of Activities

This thirty-sixth annual report covers the period July 1, 2025, to June 30, 2026. The DCISC held three public meetings on the following dates:

- October 22-23, 2025, Avila Beach, CA and remotely by Zoom
- February 18-19, 2026, Avila Beach, CA and remotely by Zoom
- June 16-17, 2026, Avila Beach, CA and remotely by Zoom

These public meetings are described in Volume I, Section 2.0 of this report.

The Committee regularly performs the following activities:

- Three two-day public meetings each year as reported above.
- Nine or more fact-finding visits annually by individual Committee Members with one or more technical consultants to assess issues, review plant programs and activities, and interview PG&E and other personnel.
- Reviews of technical documents received from PG&E, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, various state and local agencies, and other interested parties. The DCISC requests, and PG&E routinely provides copies of relevant documents generated by PG&E, the NRC, and other parties.
- Visits from time-to-time by the DCISC Members and legal counsel to offices of the CPUC and appointing officials (the Governor of California, California Attorney General and California Energy Commission) to update them on DCISC activities.
- Use of regular part-time technical consultants to assist the DCISC to perform its assessments and reviews.
- Use of legal counsel to advise on its activities.
- Use of expert specialty consultants, as needed.

The DCISC issues a report for each reporting year which runs from July 1 to June 30. The report is approved by the Committee Members at the fall public meeting following the end of the reporting period. This thirty-sixth annual report covers the period July 1, 2025, to June 30, 2026.

The technical items covered during its public meetings were selected by the DCISC based on the DCISC's own priorities concerning which technical issues were important to cover. PG&E then

responded by providing presentations and experts to participate in the public meetings as requested. The DCISC also occasionally requested presentations on relevant issues from others in addition to presentations by PG&E. The following significant items were reviewed during the three public meetings and nine fact-finding visits held during this reporting period:

- Operations, Maintenance, and Training Activities
- Unit 2 Power Reductions in Response to Area Wildfires
- Performance During the 25th Refueling Outage for Unit 2
- Health of Plant Systems and Engineering Programs
- Feedwater Heater Health and Planned Replacements
- Major Project Planning and Implementation
- Aging Management Programs
- Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program
- Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Embrittlement
- Innovative Technology Initiatives, including the use of dynamic (previously “electronic”) procedures and Artificial Intelligence
- Human Performance and Performance Improvement Program
- Cause Evaluations and Corrective Action Program
- Nuclear Safety Culture and Corporate Safety Culture
- Nuclear Safety Oversight and Quality Verification
- Radiation Protection Program and Radiation Releases to the Environment
- Emergency Preparedness
- Seismic Safety
- Spent Fuel Transfers and Storage
- Regulatory Performance and License Renewal
- Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) Activities

Individual Committee Members and consultants reviewed many other items in nine fact-finding visits, inspections, meetings, and tours at DCCP. The DCISC keeps track of past, current and future items for review in its Open Items List (Volume II, Exhibit C). The Committee's conclusions below are based on direct observations, interviews, and document reviews conducted on a sampling basis during public meetings and fact-finding visits. They are not audits or certifications, and as such, qualified language such as “appeared” reflects that sampling basis rather than any reservations of the Committee about the underlying findings.

Access and Independence

[The following paragraph is subject to further modification that may come from points that one member desires to discuss during the DCISC's October Public Meeting.]

The Committee's independence of assessment of the safety of the plant derives from the CPUC-approved settlement and the decisions that established the Committee in 1988, beginning with D.88-12-083 and reaffirmed by D.97-05-088, which are implemented through the Committee's Charter. The Charter provides for independent review and assessment of Diablo Canyon safety, access to information necessary to perform that function, and the issuance of independent reports

and recommendations as stated, “The Committee shall have the right to receive on a regular basis such of the following operating reports and records of Diablo Canyon as the Committee may request... [and] Such other reports pertinent to safety as may be produced in the course of operations and may be requested by the Committee,” and “The Committee shall have the right to conduct examinations of the Diablo Canyon site. If the Committee requires additional information regarding a specific issue, the Committee may request such information.”

During the reporting period, PG&E provided the Committee and its consultants with access to the documents, facilities, and personnel requested in connection with the Committee's public meetings and fact-finding activities. Public documents were made available by PG&E to the Committee through an electronic reading room, and confidential documents were made available in a separate, “read-only” section of the electronic reading room. PG&E made arrangements for meetings, inspections and access to additional information on topics requested by the Committee. The Committee is not aware of any instance during the period of this report in which the Committee's requests for access were delayed or limited.

The Committee is not limited to information provided by PG&E. It also draws upon publicly available documents, NRC records, and information from other regulatory and governmental agencies. The use of multiple independent sources helps corroborate information and provides a broad basis for the Committee's conclusions and recommendations.

Member Meetings with California State Agencies

The DCISC's preference is to schedule annual meetings with its members and their respective appointing entities and with the Commissioners or staff members of the California Public Utilities Commission to provide background and information regarding current activities of the Committee. More information on these meetings may be found in Volume I, Section 1.5.1 of this report.

On April 3, 2026, Dr. Peterson and Counsel Rathie met remotely with Governor Newsom's Senior Energy Advisor Christine Hironaka, the Governor's Chief Deputy for Legal Affairs Brian Goldman, and Appointments Secretary Morgan Carvajal. The purpose of the meeting was to provide an overview of Committee transition and relicensing review activities since the passage of SB 846 including the Committee's review of seismic safety upgrades and maintenance.

On April 30, 2026, Dr. Meshkati and Counsel Rathie met in Sacramento, at the offices of the California Natural Resources Agency, with the Chair of the California Energy Commission, Hon. David Hochschild, and members of his senior staff including Chief of Staff Robert Chun, CEC Executive Director Drew Bohan, Senior Nuclear Policy Advisor and Emergency Coordinator Dr. Justin Cochran, and two members of CEC Vice Chair, Dr. Siva Gunda's staff, Dr. Jane Park, Dr. Gunda's Chief of Staff, and Senior Policy Advisor Raja Ramesh. The purpose of the meeting was to provide an overview of the DCISC's recent reviews including the recent work of the Committee's Seismic Review Team, and the timing of the release by PG&E of the results of testing of Unit 1 surveillance Capsule B under the Reactor Pressure Vessel Surveillance Program.

During this report period the DCISC has been in frequent contact during its public meetings and fact-finding visits to DCPD with representatives of the California Department of Water Resources

(DWR). The DWR is a key state agency in administering the statutory mandate created by the passage of SB 846 in 2022. DWR representatives with whom the DCISC Members, Technical Consultants, and Counsel have met include Deputy Director Statewide Water and Energy Delphine Hou, Energy Regulatory Manager Harpreet K. Bhalla, and DWR's Consultants Dr. Deb Luchsinger and Mr. Jerry Bischof. DWR representatives attended each of the DCISC's public meetings and have participated remotely in some sessions of DCISC fact finding visits to DCPD conducted during this reporting period.

Significant Conclusions

The DCISC concludes that overall PG&E operated DCPD safely during the period July 1, 2025, to June 30, 2026. This is based on information gathered in three two-day public meetings, nine onsite fact-finding visits, a large number of documents reviewed, input from multiple consultants, and a breadth of departments and programs sampled.

Significant Issues

The DCISC continued to address the following two significant issues during this operating period:

Reactor Vessel Embrittlement

Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS) refers to a specific situation of high pressure and low temperature conditions within the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) that could challenge the integrity of the vessel. These conditions could occur during shutdown operations or during transient situations involving an inadvertent actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling System that could result in the injection of cold water at high pressure into the Reactor Coolant System. As for all ferritic steels, the RPV steel has brittle behavior at low temperatures and ductile behavior at high temperatures, and the temperature at which the steel transitions from brittle to ductile behavior increases with increased neutron irradiation dose. The temperature at which steel transitions from brittle to ductile behavior is referred to as the "nil ductility transition temperature." It is desired that the RPV steel should remain ductile under all steady state and transient conditions when the vessel is pressurized.

To address this risk, screening criteria (temperature) for an RPV transition from brittle to ductile behavior have been established based upon analyses of vessel material properties and PTS transients. These screening criteria are used in comparison with the nil ductility transition temperature measured for vessel material samples exposed to neutron irradiation in the RPV. The DCISC previously reviewed PTS in detail and concluded that the nil ductility transition temperature screening criteria provided appropriate confidence of safe RPV performance during a PTS event.

During the DCISC's 34th Annual Report period, there were extensive public comments by individuals and by non-governmental organizations on embrittlement, including some requesting that Unit 1 be shut down immediately. The DCISC engaged an expert on embrittlement as a Technical Consultant, Dr. Mark Kirk, who performed several in-depth reviews and analyses of DCPD Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement. The DCISC

found that from an embrittlement perspective, Diablo Canyon Unit 1's Reactor Pressure Vessel continued to be safe to operate for the next 20 years. (See Volume I, Section 4.26, and Exhibits D.11 through D.16 of the DCISC's 34th Annual Report.)

During the DCISC's previous report period (the 35th Annual Report), the DCISC reviewed additional public concerns on Dr. Mark Kirk's 2024 evaluations of Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel Embrittlement along with questions related to reactor vessel embrittlement calculation uncertainties and to Reactor Pressure Vessel performance monitoring. The DCISC continued to conclude that from an embrittlement perspective, Diablo Canyon Unit 1's Reactor Pressure Vessel was safe to operate for the next 20 years. (See Volume I, Section 4.27, and Exhibit D.11 of the DCISC's 35th Annual Report.) In April 2025, DCPD successfully retrieved Reactor Pressure Vessel neutron embrittlement surveillance sample Capsule B from Unit 1. The Committee's prior conclusions regarding reactor pressure vessel integrity were based on the predictive analytical methods and surveillance data available at the time they were reached. The Committee will evaluate the Capsule B results on their merits and may revise those conclusions if the measured data and further analyses warrant it.

During this report period, the DCISC monitored the status of follow-on testing and analysis for Reactor Pressure Vessel neutron embrittlement surveillance sample Capsule B. The DCISC will review this information as a part of its 37th Annual Report. The DCISC did not revisit PTS phenomenology during this report period, and references here its earlier work that concluded that the screening criteria are appropriate.

Additionally during this report period, DCISC Consultant Dr. Mark Kirk completed evaluations of Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement information contained in the NRC's 2025 Safety Evaluation of PG&E's 2023 License Renewal Application and of potential future changes to the NRC's Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement regulations. (See Volume I, Section 4.26, and Volume II, Exhibits D.10.1 and D.10.2 of this report.)

[The following paragraph is subject to further edits and approval at the DCISC's October Public Meeting. Note that one member has proposed that this report should include sources of information that were available between June 30, 2026, and the October Public Meeting, and another member has expressed the opinion that this should not be done in this report. As the consultant could not resolve this clear and substantive difference between members without violating Bagley Keene, the next section was written in the context of the first opinion but is subject to modification should the majority of members prefer to exclude any information dated after June 30.]

[Between the end of this report's period and its approval at the Committee's October 21, 2026, Public Meeting, the Committee continued its review of technical information contained in PG&E's evaluation of the surveillance samples removed from Capsule B which was completed and its formal report made available to the DCISC and the public on June 29, 2026 (in the final days of this report's period). During this timeframe, members and consultants received briefings from PG&E and Westinghouse, reviewed the Capsule B report, issued questions to PG&E regarding information contained in the evaluation, and Consultant Kirk completed a review of information contained in the Capsule B evaluation. The Committee's work on this

topic will continue in the subsequent reporting period, and that information will be made available to the public and discussed at the Committee's October Public Meeting. The NRC also issued the results of its review of the Capsule B evaluation and concluded that all applicable regulatory requirements had been satisfied¹. The content and schedule for additional evaluations were discussed and approved at the October 2026 Public Meeting, and any new information resulting from additional reviews by the Committee will be included in the DCISC's 37th Annual Report.]

Seismic Safety

Included in SB 846 was the directive for the CPUC to review the reports and recommendations of the DCISC including those related to seismic safety or deferred maintenance which may have arisen in expectation of the plant closing sooner. In response to its mandate, the DCISC performed a comprehensive review of seismic safety at DCPD during the DCISC's 34th Annual Report period. The DCISC concluded at that time that no upgrades or improvements to seismic safety would be needed to ensure that the seismic safety of the DCPD reactors will be adequate for extended operations beyond 2025. (See Volume I, Sections 3.2 and 4.20, and Volume II, Exhibit D.10 of the DCISC's 34th Annual Report.)

During the DCISC's previous report period (the 35th Annual Report), the Committee received a technical challenge from Dr. Peter Bird to the seismic hazard characterization at DCPD. Rather than rely on its own staff or on PG&E, it commissioned three independent peer reviewers of standing (the Seismic Review Team, SRT). They evaluated the claims on the merits and did not sustain them. In the course of doing so, they identified nine areas where further work would improve the characterization of seismic hazard beneath the Irish Hills. The Committee adopted these as recommendations to PG&E and has since tracked them to closure with a follow-up item opened for the Committee to evaluate PG&E's long-term actions in the future. The SRT members were Drs. Thomas H. Jordan, Michael E. Oskin, and Scott T. Marshall. The SRT's findings were compiled in a report that was presented to the DCISC at its June 2025 Public Meeting at which time the Committee adopted and endorsed its conclusions and recommendations. (See Volume I, Section 4.20, and Volume II, Exhibit D.12, of the DCISC's 35th Annual Report.) Overall, the SRT concluded that the best available science did not support Dr. Bird's claims. Additionally, the SRT made nine recommendations for future effort and research that could further elucidate and quantify the seismic hazards associated with faulting beneath the Irish Hills. These nine recommendations were adopted by the DCISC and included as recommendations to PG&E in the 35th Annual Report.

During this report period, the SRT reviewed a critique from Dr. Bird of the SRT's June 2025 review and concluded that the best available science did not support Dr. Bird's critique of the SRT's work. (See Volume I, Section 4.20, and Volume II, Exhibit D.11.1 of this report.)

Additionally during this report period, the SRT evaluated (on behalf of the DCISC) PG&E's supplemental responses to the nine SRT recommendations included in the DCISC's 35th

¹ "Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 – Staff Assessment of Reactor Vessel Material Surveillance Capsule Report (Capsule B)," September 24, 2026, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC ADAMS Accession Number ML26264A267.

Annual Report. The DCISC concluded that PG&E's responses were acceptable and the nine SRT recommendations were closed to a consolidated follow-on item on the DCISC's Open Items List. (See Volume I, Section 4.20, and Volume II, Exhibit D.11.2 of this report.)

Specific Conclusions

Based on its activities, the DCISC had the following specific conclusions from the major review topics examined during the current reporting period. The conclusions below reflect the Committee's collective judgment, informed by individual Fact-Finding Reports and by information developed at public meetings and through document reviews. They may incorporate some information received after the individual Fact-Finding Reports were issued. Fact-finding Reports are located in Volume II, Exhibit D of this report.

1. NRC Assessments: During this period, there were no Licensee Event Reports submitted to the NRC, and NRC inspections identified six Non-Cited Violations all of which were of very low safety significance. All NRC Performance Indicators and Cross-Cutting Indicators remained "Green" (good). The DCISC's periodic meetings with the NRC Resident Inspectors were beneficial to understanding and aligning areas of concern for the DCISC's own reviews. The DCISC found this to be good regulatory performance. (Volume I, Section 3 of this report)
2. Conduct of Operations: DCP's Reactivity Management Program appeared effective and the regular updates on station operations were informative. The DCISC found that decisions initiated by DCP to reduce Unit 2 power levels during two local wildfire events were proactive and precautionary. The decisions precluded the possibility of incurring an automatic unit trip initiated by the Special Protection System if multiple 500kV transmission lines were disabled due to the wildfire events. The DCISC found that the Operability Determination for a Jacket Water Pump Seal Leak on Emergency Diesel Generator 2-2 in September 2025 was appropriate. Proactive measures and the pump's subsequent replacement were also correctly timed and commendable. The DCISC reviewed how a similar event would be handled in the future using Risk-Informed Completion Time and found use of the Completion Times to be appropriate. Meetings with operators provided good insights into the roles and daily routine, recruiting, career prospects, training programs, the culture of Industrial Safety, use of internal Operating Experience, and the future use of dynamic (previously "electronic") procedures and Artificial Intelligence. DCP's Chemistry Program was performing well and was on track to comply with the new National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit and Clean Water Act 401 certification. (Volume I, Section 4.1 of this report)
3. Conduct of Maintenance: DCP's Maintenance Department performance was healthy and there was evidence of a continuous improvement culture. The Online Maintenance Program had appropriate procedural controls in place to successfully accomplish maintenance during plant operations while minimizing risk. A DCP Maintenance Team adequately prepared for a calibration activity and exhibited good standards and safety practices in the field as observed by DCISC representatives. (Volume I, Section 4.2 of this report)

4. Engineering Programs: DCPD effectively implemented its Maintenance Rule Program, and Aging Management Programs for instrumentation and electrical cables were being appropriately managed by DCPD. (Volume I, Section 4.3 of this report)
5. Human Performance: DCPD's Human Performance has been excellent over the last two years based on data and trends in Human Performance events. There were no events classified with the highest significance of a Station Level Event since April 2021, and the number of Plant Status Control events remained low. (Volume I, Section 4.4 of this report)
6. Nuclear Safety Culture, and Safety Conscious Work Environment: DCPD's Safety Conscious Work Environment appeared to be healthy and effective. PG&E's efforts to improve its corporate safety culture included an appropriate use of benchmarking against other non-nuclear industries. The results of a corporate-wide survey of employee safety culture completed in 2025 were generally positive. *Note: the DCISC is in the process of reviewing new information on this topic from its July 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting and will include its findings as a part of its 37th Annual Report.* (Volume I, Section 4.5 of this report)
7. Performance Improvement Programs: DCPD's Performance Improvement and Operating Experience Programs were healthy and implemented effectively. DCPD's Corrective Action Program was performing well in that issues at the station were being effectively identified, evaluated, and tracked for resolution. The DCISC endorsed DCPD's decision to pursue Dynamic procedures. Dynamic procedures provide many benefits in improving human reliability and documenting work, thereby creating substantial opportunities to improve the plant's operational safety. DCPD's initiative to implement the use of an Artificial Intelligence (AI) platform named Neutron for document and data search, retrieval, and reporting continued to be positive, along with engagement with the relevant external user groups pertaining to use of AI tools for pro-active identification of possible new failure modes and vulnerabilities. There were no identified significant safety concerns associated with DCPD's current plans for the possible use of AI at the station. The DCISC will continue to evaluate the use of AI as it has significant potential to enable improved operational safety if used with appropriate attention to human-systems integration, proactive identification of possible new failure modes and vulnerabilities, and the verification of AI-generated output. (Volume I, Section 4.6 of this report)
8. Emergency Preparedness: The DCISC's interactions with the San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services Nuclear staff and the Public Meeting presentation from the county's Nuclear Power Preparedness Manager were beneficial to learn about the status of the county's emergency preparedness programs. The DCISC in its tour of emergency response facilities at PG&E's Kendall Road offices found that the facilities had broad capabilities, were versatile in function, and were in good condition. PG&E's emergency response communication systems were very capable and well planned; however, the DCISC was concerned about the lack of a means for quickly and easily establishing interoperability between the PG&E and San Luis Obispo County radio systems and a recommendation was opened on the matter. (Volume I, Section 4.7 of this report)

9. Risk Assessment and Management: The Online Monitoring program was implemented in accordance with regulatory guidance and appears to have the proper level of ownership and oversight. The capability of Online Monitoring has clear potential to increase plant operational safety by focusing maintenance activities on components that require maintenance. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment Program and team continued to provide excellent support for enhancing the safety of plant operations and for extended operations. (Volume I, Section 4.8 of this report)
10. Nuclear Safety Oversight and Review: DCISC Member Meshkati's meeting with two members of the PG&E Board of Directors' Safety and Nuclear Oversight (SNO) Committee was informative for the DCISC, demonstrating the board's seriousness about corporate safety. A recommendation to PG&E was opened requesting that PG&E facilitate regular future meetings between the SNO Committee and DCISC members, and a response was received from PG&E on May 28, 2026, denying the request and offering an alternative approach. At the end of this report's period, the Committee continued to follow up on this matter. DCPD satisfactorily completed its Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment which was performed as a part of programs overseen by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). DCISC was interested in reviewing the results of INPO assessments for corporate operations, and a follow-up item was opened on the matter. DCPD's Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (NSOC) appeared to be thorough and comprehensive in their evaluations and candid in their reports. (Volume I, Section 4.9 of this report)
11. Radiation Protection: DCPD's Radioactive Effluent Release Program and Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program appeared satisfactory in calculating, monitoring, and measuring radioactivity in the environment. During 2024 (as reviewed in summer 2025), there were no abnormal releases of radioactivity nor were there any abnormal levels of radioactivity detected in the environment surrounding DCPD. DCPD site operations had no significant radiological impact on the health and safety of the public or the environment, and radioactive releases were a factor of 1,000 or more below regulatory limits. The DCPD Radiation Protection department was healthy and properly staffed with qualified personnel. (Volume I, Section 4.10 of this report)
12. Quality Programs: The Quality Verification Department continued to be effective in providing expectations for high-quality oversight for the plant and in reporting on the quality of plant performance. (Volume I, Section 4.11 of this report)
13. Equipment Reliability: DCPD's Equipment Reliability program has been effective, and station equipment reliability was excellent during this period based on a low rate of unplanned outages. The focus on Single Point Vulnerabilities has resulted in a significant reduction of the Critical Components list and it provides more clarity on the remaining critical components at the station. (Volume I, Section 4.13 of this report)
14. Organizational Effectiveness and Development: A Readiness Review Board meeting was conducted efficiently and effectively. Representatives from various departments focused on ensuring that outage secondary system shutdown and startup activities were

appropriately scheduled. DCP's Operating Plan for 2026 was reviewed and found to be appropriately focused on defining and tracking specific goals and actions that would generate future enhancements in station safety and reliability. (Volume I, Section 4.14 of this report)

15. System and Equipment Performance: The DCP Plant Health Committee and Subcommittee were effective in fulfilling their function to assure plant systems and equipment remain healthy or have action plans to return to good health. The DCISC's reviews of system health and plant tours generally found that all equipment and areas of the facility appeared to be clean, well maintained, and in good material condition. DCP's Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program was being implemented in accordance with applicable industry guidelines; however, the number of leaks being tracked by the program was unusually high and a recommendation was opened on the matter. DCP's Cause Evaluation for the December 2025 Unit 1 Feedwater Heater (FWH) failure which drove an unplanned plant shutdown to facilitate repairs was well performed. Conclusions of the Cause Evaluation regarding causes and future actions that should be taken were appropriate and supported by all the available information. DCP is proceeding with procuring 12 replacement Feedwater Heaters for each unit, and the new equipment will arrive on site in late 2026 and early 2027; however, no plan has yet been approved for installation of the replacement heaters in the units. The DCISC will continue to follow this topic and supports DCP's plans for future FWH replacements. (Volume I, Section 4.15 of this report)
16. Steam Generator Performance: DCP's Steam Generators were in excellent health based on the results of recent inspections (2019 and 2023), and plans for future Steam Generator inspections were appropriate. The DCISC reviewed the methodology and corresponding error analysis of the Steam Generator tube examination results and found that the methodology followed established industry standards and documentation of error analyses was complete and appropriate. (Volume I, Section 4.16 of this report)
17. Outage Management: DCP prepared well for Refueling Outage 2R25, and the outage was executed well without any major issues or problems. All outage goals were achieved except in the area of industrial safety. Actions were taken to address deficiencies in industrial safety performance. (Volume I, Section 4.17 of this report)
18. Safety-Security Interface: All elements of the Safety-Security Interface Program at DCP were properly designed and implemented satisfactorily. (Volume I, Section 4.18 of this report)
19. Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI): DCP continues to monitor the potential for stress corrosion cracking on Multi-Purpose Canisters (MPCs) in DCP's marine environment at the ISFSI via various industry technical meetings and conferences. An industry study on the topic is anticipated to be published in late 2026 or early 2027 and should provide additional information. Improvements to the equipment used to inspect existing MPCs are expected to provide additional details on the health of the MPCs during inspections planned for the summer of 2026. (Volume I Section 4.19 of this report)

20. Seismic and Tsunami Safety: The DCISC found no furniture or shelving unbraced or unweighted which would cause a hazard to personnel during or following an earthquake. A review of objections raised by Dr. Peter Bird to the DCISC Seismic Review Team's (SRT's) June 2025 report found that the best available science did not support the four main assertions of Dr. Bird's critique of the SRT's work. A review by the SRT of PG&E's supplemental responses to the nine SRT recommendations that were a part of the DCISC's 35th Annual Report found the responses to be adequate for PG&E's plans to address the recommendations. The SRT endorsed most elements of PG&E's response plan but identified several areas where the plans should be broadened and refined. PG&E's work under the Long Term Seismic Program was being effectively managed and contributed significantly to improving seismic knowledge and safety at DCPD and in the surrounding area. (Volume I, Section 4.20, and Volume II, Exhibit D.11 of this report)
21. Fire Protection: The health of DCPD Fire Protection Systems continued to be good overall, and the Fire Protection Program was effectively implemented. (Volume I, Section 4.21 of this report)
22. Learning and Development Programs: Initial License Operator Training simulator sessions were well prepared and conducted by the Training staff, had appropriate objectives, and were well executed by the Operators responding to the simulated off-normal events. (Volume I, Section 4.22 of this report)
23. Beyond Design Basis Events: DCPD adequately reviewed whether additional FLEX guidelines should be developed for a possible blockage of the Auxiliary Saltwater System discharge from a collapse of the Discharge Structure, and it was found that no additional FLEX guidelines were needed. The DCPD FLEX Team demonstrated an innovative approach to address Beyond Design Basis Events and to ensure that the Operators, Maintenance, and other key personnel are properly trained and evaluated to ensure competency. DCPD's FLEX Response Procedures were appropriately integrated with other procedures for responding to emergency events and severe accidents. (Volume I, Section 4.23 of this report)
24. Extended Operations: PG&E's plans for future projects and staffing at DCPD were appropriate to support continued operations through 2030. (Volume I, Section 4.25 of this report)
25. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement: Testing and evaluation of the Unit 1 Capsule B surveillance materials were delayed relative to the initial projections of PG&E and Westinghouse. Nevertheless, the NRC-required timeline of 18 months after capsule withdrawal (October 21, 2026) was met, with PG&E issuing its evaluation of the Westinghouse-conducted analysis report on June 29, 2026, and concluding that Unit 1 meets the reactor vessel integrity criteria for at least 60 years of operation (through November 2, 2044). The Committee's review began on June 29, 2026, in the last two days of this report period, and continued into the following reporting period. The Committee has not yet completed its own evaluation of these results and may revise its prior conclusions if warranted. (See

above discussion under, “Reactor Vessel Embrittlement,” and Volume I, Section 4.26, and Exhibit D.10 of this report.)

26. **Other Reviews:** The regular meetings between DCISC Members and DCPD Officers and Directors continued to be beneficial for both organizations. PG&E’s general programs for public outreach and engagement were appropriate for educating and informing the public about the station and its activities. Property and equipment insurance policies as well as radiological insurance policies were being properly maintained by PG&E. (Volume I, Section 4.27 of this report)
27. **Operational Performance:** DCPD’s operational performance during this period was excellent as indicated by well managed refueling outages, a low number of operating events, and other performance metrics. (Volume I, Section 5 of this report)

Recommendations to PG&E:

Over this and the previous reporting periods, the DCISC tracked the following numbers of recommendations to PG&E:

	<u>36th Annual Report</u>	<u>35th Annual Report</u>
Recommendations Open at Start	15	2
New Recommendations Opened	4	15
Recommendations Closed	13	2
Recommendations Open at End	6	15

Oldest Open Recommendation: Open Items List number AR23/24AR23-2, regarding Capsule B test results, from October 2024

The DCISC made the following four new recommendations to PG&E during this reporting period:

PG&E Recommendation No. P1/26FF-3.9:

PG&E should review and improve the limited guidance in procedures for completing Common Cause Evaluations (CCEs) and elaborate when a CCE should be performed, how it should be systematically completed, and how it should be acted upon. (Volume I, Section 4.6 of this report)

PG&E Recommendation No. P1/26FF-3.4:

Regarding the interoperability of PG&E radio systems with San Luis Obispo County, PG&E should initiate targeted efforts with the county to coordinate, test, and evaluate the current means of establishing interoperability between the two systems as soon as possible. Additionally, PG&E should investigate finding another means to establish interoperability between the two systems more easily and quickly during an emergency at DCPD. (Volume I, Section 4.7 of this report)

PG&E Recommendation No. P8/25FF-3.1:

PG&E should support and facilitate regular meetings (in-person or remotely) between the DCISC and designated members of the Board of Directors' Safety and Nuclear Oversight Committee (SNO) to learn about the Board's safety-related goals, priorities, administrative oversight, and budgetary policies vis-à-vis DCP, and to review and coordinate strategic issues affecting the plant's equipment systems and occupational safety. (Volume I, Section 4.9 of this report)

PG&E Recommendation No. P1/26FF-3.3:

PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (Volume I, Section 4.15 of this report)

Additionally, the following two recommendations to PG&E from previous reporting periods were reviewed during this reporting period and remained open:

PG&E Recommendation No. P12/24FF-3.2:

PG&E should further expand their use of electronic [dynamic] procedures-type applications, subject to proper human systems integration, because the improved human performance and documentation of work can directly improve the safety of operations. (Volume I, Section 4.6 of this report)

PG&E Recommendation No. AR23/24AR23-2:

Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of reactor vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available. Note: The Committee's prior conclusions regarding reactor pressure vessel integrity were based on the predictive analytical methods and surveillance data available at the time they were reached. The Committee will evaluate the Capsule B results on their merits and may revise those conclusions if the measured data and further analyses warrant it. (See above discussion under, “Reactor Vessel Embrittlement,” and Volume I, Section 4.26 of this report.)

PG&E Response to the DCISC Recommendations:

California Public Utilities Code Section 712.1 requires the Committee to annually transmit its findings and recommendations for improved safety to PG&E and for PG&E to respond to the Committee’s annual report. The annual report, incorporating PG&E’s response, is then transmitted to the Legislature, the Governor, the Public Utilities Commission, the Energy Commission, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and to PG&E.

When received PG&E's Response will be incorporated as Volume I, Section 9.0 of this 36th Annual Report and subsequently reviewed by the DCISC during the next reporting period.

Future Committee Focus Items:

[The following paragraph is subject to further edits and approval at the DCISC's October Public Meeting.]

[The DCISC plans to focus its future reviews in the following areas:

- Continued review of the results of Capsule B evaluation and Reactor Pressure Vessel integrity
- Aging management, given the effects of age on plant systems, structures, and components after four decades of operation
- Boric acid leak management
- ISFSI Multi-purpose Canister integrity in a coastal environment, including monitoring industry studies and the results of inspections performed in the summer of 2026
- Opportunities to improve plant operational safety through the deployment of innovative technologies such as dynamic (previously "electronic") procedures and Artificial Intelligence (AI) in safety-related work with an attention to human-systems integration
- Emergency communications interoperability with San Luis Obispo County
- Monitoring the impacts of wildfires and other climate change-driven hazards
- Emergency preparedness effectiveness in Protective Action Zones 1-12 and Public Education Zones 13-15, including public education effectiveness and sheltering in place plans and guidelines
- The DCISC's public outreach goals, approaches, activities, and initiatives
- The impact of changes to NRC reactor oversight program and other NRC regulatory changes on PG&E operations and DCPD safety oversight]

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE	
AGENDA TRANSMITTAL FORM	
MEETING DATE:	October 21, 2026
AGENDA ITEM:	XXXI-O
AGENDA TITLE:	Recognition of 30+ Years of Service: Technical Consultant R. Ferman Wardell and Legal Counsel Robert R. Wellington..
CONSENT ☐ ACTION ☐ INFORMATION ☒	
Staff Summary: It is expected that the Committee Members will confirm and recognize the long service of Technical Consultant Wardell and Legal Counsel Wellington.	
RECOMMENDED COMMITTEE ACTION: Adopt Resolutions of Appreciation and Commendation.	