

DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE

Report on

Fact-Finding Meeting at DCPD on June 30, July 28, and July 29, 2026

by

Najmedin Meshkati, Member, with Lisa Darden and Ferman Wardell, Consultants

1.0 SUMMARY

The results of the DCISC June 30, July 28, and July 29, 2026, Fact-Finding Meeting at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) in Avila Beach, CA, are presented. The subjects addressed and summarized in Section 3 are as follows:

1. Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Report
2. Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors
3. Meet with DCPD Officer
4. Walkthrough of DCPD Dynamic Procedures
5. Boric Acid Corrosion Control Update
6. Emergency Plan Drill Observation Pre-Drill Brief
7. Station Update, Including:
 - Discuss documents for DCPD decision making concerning plant operations
 - Unit 2 12 kV Bus Duct/Start-Up Transformer Cause Evaluation Update
8. PG&E Employee Corporate Safety Culture Survey Results Review
9. Emergency Plan Drill Observation

2.0 INTRODUCTION

This Fact-Finding Meeting at the DCPD was held to evaluate specific safety matters for the DCISC. The objective of the evaluation was to determine if Pacific Gas and Electric's (PG&E's) performance is appropriate and whether any areas revealed observations which are important enough to warrant further review, follow-up, or presentation at a public meeting. These safety matters include follow-up and/or continuing review efforts by the Committee, as well as those identified as a result of reviews of various safety-related documents.

Section 4 – Conclusions, highlights the conclusions of the Fact-Finding Team (FFT) based on items reported in Section 3 – Discussion. These highlights also include the FFT's suggested follow-up items for the DCISC, such as scheduling future Fact-Finding Meetings on the topic, presentations at future public meetings, and requests for future updates or information from DCPD on specific areas of interest, etc.

Section 5 – Recommendations, presents specific recommendations to the DCISC and PG&E proposed by the FFT. These recommendations will be considered by the DCISC. After review

and approval by the DCISC, this Fact-Finding Report, including its recommendations, will be provided to PG&E. The Fact-Finding Report will also appear in the DCISC Annual Report.

3.0 DISCUSSION

3.1 Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Report

The DCISC last reviewed the status of Capsule B's analysis during its July 6, 2026, Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.2), when it concluded the following:

DCPP presented the results of testing and evaluation of material specimens contained in Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B, which was removed from the vessel on April 21, 2025. PG&E staff concluded that the results confirmed that Unit 1 continues to meet NRC requirements for Reactor Vessel integrity and remains safe for at least 60 years of operation. The DCISC will continue to perform its own reviews of the test results which will be further discussed at its October 2026 Public Meeting.

Additionally, in the DCISC's 34th Annual Report (Reference 6.3), the following recommendation was opened:

Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of reactor vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available. (AR23/24AR23-2)

On June 30, 2026, the DCISC Member, Dr. Meshkati received a virtual briefing on the report generated from testing and evaluation of Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B (the "Capsule B Report," Reference 6.1) which was removed from the vessel on April 21, 2025. In addition to the FFT, the following attended the briefing:

- DCISC Counsel Robert Rathie.
- California Energy Commission Chairman David Hochschild, and staff members Justin Cochran, Robert Chun, Ken Rider, and Drew Bohan.
- PG&E staff members Blair Jones, Vice President Business and Technical Services; Tom Jones, Regulatory, Environmental and Repurposing Senior Director; Saul Gomez, Government Relations Senior Director; Philippe Soenen, Strategic Initiatives, Performance Improvement and Organizational Effectiveness Director; Josh Harmon, State Agency Relations Principal; and Michelle Olsofsky, License Renewal Engineer.
- Westinghouse staff members Michael Frances, Principal Project Manager; Brett Lynch, Principal Vessel Integrity Engineer; Alberto Guillen, Senior Engineer Radiation Engineering and Analysis; Karina Assis, Principal Materials Engineering;

Margret Long, Senior Mechanical Engineer; and Andy Hawk, Lead Engineer Radiation Engineering and Analysis.

The following topics covered by the Capsule B Report were discussed in this briefing:

- Numbers and composition of material samples tested and the test results
- Dosimetry (fluence) and thermal data for the sample capsule
- Data creditability (as defined by NRC regulations)
- Consistency of the results with previous tests and evaluations

Westinghouse and PG&E discussed each of these topics briefly during the June 30, 2026 meeting. For further elaboration on these four bullets, please refer to the “Capsule B Report” Reference 6.1, and the DCISC commissioned review of this report by DCISC Special Consultant Dr. Mark Kirk which is to be released and reviewed by DCISC at the October 2026 Public Meeting.

PG&E staff concluded that the results of the Capsule B Report confirmed that Unit 1 continues to meet NRC requirements for Reactor Vessel integrity and remains safe for at least 60 years of operation. The results were consistent with the conclusions contained in the NRC’s June 2025 License Renewal Safety Evaluation Report (Reference 6.4) and the existing Reactor Vessel integrity analysis of record (Reference 6.5). A copy of PG&E’s presentation materials for this briefing is included as Enclosure 1 to this document.

The DCISC will continue to perform its own reviews of the test results, which will be further discussed at its October 2026 Public Meeting.

Conclusion: DCPD presented the results of testing and evaluation of material specimens contained in Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B, which was removed from the vessel on April 21, 2025. PG&E staff concluded that the results confirmed that Unit 1 continues to meet NRC requirements for Reactor Vessel integrity and remains safe for at least 60 years of operation. The DCISC will continue to perform its own reviews of the test results which will be further discussed at its October 2026 Public Meeting.

Recommendations to the DCISC: None

Recommendations to PG&E: The following previous recommendation to PG&E was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of reactor vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available.* (AR23/24AR23-2) Note: The Committee's prior conclusions regarding reactor pressure vessel integrity were based on the predictive analytical methods and surveillance data available at the time they were reached. The Committee will

evaluate the Capsule B results on their merits and may revise those conclusions if the measured data and further analyses warrant it. (See discussions in the DCISC 36th Annual Report under Executive Summary - “Reactor Vessel Embrittlement,” and Volume I, Section 4.26.). (Reference 6.6)

3.2 Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Resident Inspectors

The DCISC FFT met with Mahdi Hayes, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, and Eli Garcia, NRC Resident Inspector, for an update. The DCISC last met with the NRC Resident Inspectors during its May 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.7), when it concluded the following:

The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.

The participants discussed the following items:

- DCP Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 Bus Duct Arc Event Cause Evaluation Progress.
- Reportability requirements in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73, and the NRC Event Reporting Guidelines NUREG-1022.
- The Main Annunciator Replacement Project risk assessment.
- NRC review of the DCP Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B analysis results

Conclusion: The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspectors was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue these meetings.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.3 Meet with DCP Officer

The DCISC FFT met with Paula Gerfin, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, for a general update. The DCISC last met with a DCP officer during its July 6, 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.8), when it concluded the following:

The regular meetings with DCP Officers and Directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.

The participants discussed the current meeting agenda items and other items of mutual interest.

Conclusions: The regular meetings with DCP Officers and Directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.4 Walkthrough of DCPD Dynamic Procedures

The DCISC FFT met with Jake Glabe, Engineering and Operations Procedure Supervisor, and Bryan Galvan, Operations Manager, to observe and participate in the walkthrough of a typical Operator evolution using the enhanced Dynamic Procedure application with DCISC Member Dr. Meshkati. The DCISC participated in a walkthrough of the enhanced Dynamic Procedure application with DCISC Member Dr. Peterson during the May 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.9) when it concluded the following:

The Dynamic Procedures under development at DCPD are currently being tested by the Station Procedure Writers and the results to date show promise of significant improvement in human error reductions and Operator proficiency in the execution of Operator rounds.

The Dynamic Procedure walkthrough began with the PG&E staff providing some background on the development of the main software used to develop smart procedures. The platform for these procedures is provided by the NextAxiom Software company, which uses the platform for industrial use across several industries. There is an NextAxiom Users group, consisting of 30 users, that is focused on bringing this technology to operating nuclear plants. There is a mix of users that are working mostly on the application of the software for Work Orders, and they are gaining confidence in the software technology. DCPD has selected Dynamic Procedures as their entry point to this technology, and it appears that DCPD users are ahead of the industry on developing & implementing Dynamic Procedures.

Mr. Glabe stated that the station had created an Electronic Procedure program years earlier which was not received well by the station users. The complaints centered around the fact that the “Electronic Procedure” was in fact a PDF of the existing procedure, with a blank overlay screen on which the user could check off completed items. This technology could not provide the benefits of digital data collection for a large workforce.

It was reported that using the NextAxiom Technology was a breakthrough for DCPD’s workers. The software technology operates on an iPad, iPhone, or Laptop. The procedure is downloaded to the user’s device, generally an iPad, and is activated using a security protocol. The “Operator” conducting the evolution for this walkthrough was Mr. Glabe and Mr. Galvan served as “Second Checker.” The procedure led the group through a virtual “Fan Bank A” swap to “Fan Bank B.” As the group proceeded into the Dynamic Procedure, the Operator would demonstrate how a mistake was recognized by the software and how it would alert the Operator that a step was missed. Similar mistakes by an Operator (wrong switch, not enough time before turning off the Fan Bank A, etc.) were also recognized by software and prompted for correction by the Operator. The FFT witnessed the steps to ensure that Fan Bank A was shut off after a four-minute waiting period to ensure Fan Bank B had started properly. The software would not let the Operator turn off Bank A Fan until the full four-minute period had passed. What the FFT was shown in this instance was that the procedure interaction with the Operator is essentially “on hold” during the four minutes. The operator can see the procedure and can read it, but they cannot interact with it. The operator cannot sign off the “wait four minutes” until it comes off of “hold”.

In another scenario during the walkthrough, Mr. Glabe simulated identifying a leaking valve in the field. The Operator was able to initiate a Notification, to include a quick written problem statement, to take a picture of the leak, and to record the sound the valve was making. The Notification was initiated and assigned to a work group within minutes. Normally, those activities were done after the round was complete and the Operator was back at their normal place of work, which would take an hour or more to initiate a Notification.

The Fact-Finding Team inquired about the data that would be available to an Operator taking rounds with Dynamic Procedures. Mr. Glabe explained that previous rounds data is available to view as an Operator is taking their current rounds, making trending or identification of sudden changes immediately identifiable. Prior to Dynamic Procedures, there was no previous data available in the field. Instead, the Operator would have to come back to their shop location to look up the data.

The data collection process using the Dynamic Procedures also offered an opportunity to assess Operator proficiency based on a standard time period required to complete the rounds. The Dynamic Procedures can also signal to the Operator that the procedures have been updated since the last time the Operator used the procedure.

Operators are currently using the Dynamic Procedures for all Operator Rounds (data gathering on plant equipment). Mr. Glabe stated that the Operators are providing feedback on their experiences with their usage which is helping with improving the overall product. He shared that overall feedback continues to be positive.

Overall, the novel Dynamic Procedure model in use at DCPD appeared to offer an opportunity to reduce human error and improve Operator performance. The broader technical literature supports this, with an important caveat. In its NRC-sponsored review of computer-based procedures (CBPs), Brookhaven National Laboratory concluded that there is evidence CBPs can support and enhance operator performance. Comparisons with paper procedures indicate that operators may finish tasks faster, carry a lower cognitive workload, and make fewer transition errors. However, the same study found that poorly implemented CBPs can reduce human reliability. It identified unresolved human performance issues to be evaluated system by system:

- Effects on situation awareness and team communication
- The appropriate level of automation of procedure functions
- “Keyhole” effects when operators must work in several procedures at once
- The transition to paper backup procedures if the electronic system fails in a complex situation (NUREG/CR-6634, 2000).

The NRC now maintains review guidelines for CBP systems in Part II of NUREG-0700, Revision 3 (2020), and design review procedures in NUREG-0711, Revision 3 (2012).

Human factors issues and lessons learned, NRC reviews, and industry group involvement associated with Dynamic Procedures are therefore important areas of interest to the DCISC. Relevant industry groups include the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Institute of

Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and vendor users' groups. These areas should be included in the DCISC Open Item List (OIL) to ensure review at future fact-finding meetings.

Conclusion: The Dynamic Procedures in use and under development at DCPD show promise for reducing human error and improving Operator performance in Operator rounds and other evolutions. Realizing that promise depends on a systematic, independent human factors evaluation of the system's design, implementation, and failure modes, not on Operator acceptance alone.

Recommendation to the DCISC: The DCISC Open Item List item PI-2 should be modified from, *"The other two Members of the DCISC (Drs. Meshkati and Scarlet) should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during future FFM's"* to *"The other Member of the DCISC (Dr. Scarlet) should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during a future FFM."* D12/24FF-3.2

Recommendation to the DCISC: Human factors issues and lessons learned, NRC reviews, and industry group involvement associated with Dynamic Procedures should be included in the DCISC Open Item List (OIL) for review at future fact-finding meetings. Relevant industry groups include EPRI, INPO, and vendor users' groups. At a minimum, the review should address the following:

(a) Regulatory review. Has the NRC reviewed or inspected DCPD's use of Dynamic Procedures? To what extent has PG&E applied the CBP system guidelines in NUREG-0700, Rev. 3, and the CBP review guidance in NUREG/CR-6634 to their design and implementation?

(b) Human factors and human-computer interface assessment. How are human factors and human-computer interface issues for Dynamic Procedures assessed, by whom, and on what timeline? Is the assessment performed solely by the Operators who use the system, or does it include independent human factors verification and validation? Specific topics include:

- situation awareness
- the allocation of functions between the software and the Operator
- crew communication
- management of multiple concurrent procedures
- backup procedures and the Operator's transition to them if the system fails

(c) Industry participation and operating experience. Besides the vendor's users' group, does PG&E participate in EPRI working groups relevant to Dynamic Procedures, such as the Work Planning Users Group (WPUG)? Does DCPD follow Procedure Professionals Association (PPA) guidelines (e.g., PPA AP-907-005), and do its procedure writers hold PPA certification or membership? Is operating experience on implementing Dynamic Procedures available through INPO or WANO, and how has DCPD used it? D7/28/26FF-3.4

Recommendation to PG&E: None.

3.5 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Update

The DCISC FFT met with Mike Brass, Maintenance Director, for an update on the Boric Acid Corrosion Control (BACC) Program at DCP, specifically the progress of repairing the high number of BACC leaks classified as “LK3” – Dry Discolored or Excessive Leaks. Delphine Hou, Deb Luchsinger, and Jerry Bischof from the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) participated remotely in the meeting. (DWR is the state agency charged with overseeing state funds allocated to facilitate the extension of DCP power operations under Senate Bill 846.) The DCISC last reviewed the BACC Program during its January 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.10), when it concluded the following:

DCP's Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program was being implemented in accordance with applicable industry guidelines; however, the number of leaks being tracked by the program was unusually high. PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” (inactive leaks) in the plant.

During the DCISC's January 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.9), the following recommendation to PG&E was opened:

PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (P1/26FF-3.3)

DCP, like other nuclear power plants, uses boric acid in the Reactor Coolant System. for long-term, slow reactivity control along with the fast-acting control rods. Boron absorbs neutrons, and as the reactivity in the nuclear fuel drops due to burnup, the concentration of boron in the coolant is reduced. The use of boric acid makes the coolant more corrosive to carbon steel components, and this potential for corrosion must be properly managed to avoid equipment damage. Most primary system components are formed from stainless steel and are not susceptible to corrosion from boric acid. The DCP BACC Program is controlled by procedures ER1.ID2, “Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program,” Revision 9, and AD4.ID2, Plant Leakage Evaluation, Revision 15, copies of which were provided to and reviewed by the FFT.

The BACC Program procedure provides instructions for documenting and evaluating boric acid leaks and any resulting material damage. Plant staff including operators, engineers, and mechanics are trained specifically in how to visually identify and report boric acid leaks during their routine area inspections. Leaks are typically identified visually by the white coating of boric acid crystals on the leak area.

Any identified leaks are recorded via Notifications into the Corrective Action System and reviewed by the Boric Acid Review Team (BART). BART is made up of representatives from many station functional areas and determines the required corrective actions and schedule for completion. The

BACC Program status is reflected in part by the significance and number of boric acid leaks being tracked, and the number of leaks is regularly included as a performance indicator in the monthly Plant Performance Improvement Report. Plant leaks are classified as follows:

- LK1: Affects personnel safety or causes plant shutdown
- LK2: Active leak; exhibits visual evidence of wetness.
- LK3: Inactive leak that could cause equipment damage; dry, discolored, or excessive buildup (deposits on adjacent fasteners)
- LK4: Pump seal or valve seat leakage tracked by a system engineer

During the January 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting, the FFT reviewed the program performance indicator for December 2025. The Boric Acid Leak performance indicators showed “Red” (Unhealthy) statuses for both units for the previous three months due the number of unrepaired leaks categorized as LK3 being about twice the goal for both units. This was a significant reduction in program performance when compared to the significantly lower number of LK3 leaks and the “Green” performance indicators present at the time of the DCISC’s previous review in 2021. The FFT considered this to be degrading performance and recommended that PG&E devote additional resources as needed to repair the high number of LK3 leaks in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. The DCISC developed the following recommendation for PG&E during its January 2026, Fact-Finding Meeting:

PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (P1/26FF-3.3)

During this Fact-Finding Meeting, the FFT reviewed the most recent program performance indicator (for June 2026) which included monthly data for the previous six months. It was noted that the performance indicators showed “Red” (Unhealthy) status for both units for the last six months with the leaks categorized as LK3 remaining at about twice the goal for both units. Unit 1 showed a slight decreasing trend and Unit 2 a slight increasing trend, although the number of leaks on each unit remains approximately double the goal (the actual number of leaks could not be included in this report as the information was declared as confidential by PG&E.). The FFT considered this to be continuing degraded performance and recommends that the previous recommendation to PG&E remain open with a follow up to be performed after the Unit 1 fall 2026 refueling outage 1R26. Notification 51323599 remains open tracking this issue.

Mr. Brass stated that each leak has been reviewed by the maintenance and outage teams for opportunities for repair or inclusion in the outage schedule. He noted that approximately one third of the Unit 1 LK3 leaks will be repaired during the upcoming fall Unit 1 Refueling outage 1R26. Note that this will not decrease the number of Unit 1 LK3 leaks to less than or equal to the established goal. The DCISC asked how the established goal was determined and Mr. Brass stated it was from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO) industry guidance. He also stated that DCPD does not remove an LK3 item from the list after repairs are made or cleaning is performed until the component is back in service and verified to be leak-free and, to his knowledge,

that this is different than the industry practice. Some of the LK3 items cannot be verified until a refueling outage or the unit is shut down due to radiological conditions.

The FFT asked Mr. Brass what actions the DCPD Station Indicator Program require when there was a “Red” (Unhealthy) indicator. It was noted that there was no established action plan to address the “Red” performance and drive improvements to “Green” (Healthy). He was not sure and took this question as a “Look-up”. The FFT considered this to be contributing to the degraded performance and recommends that PG&E develop a proactive action plan to reduce the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals.

Conclusion: DCPD’s Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program was being implemented in accordance with applicable industry guidelines; however, the number of leaks being tracked by the program continues to be unusually high and there is no formal action plan to improve performance. The DCISC recommendation for PG&E to devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” (inactive leaks) in the plant should remain open. PG&E should also develop a proactive action plan to reduce the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals.

Recommendations to the DCISC: The DCISC should meet with the members of the Boric Acid Review Team (BART) at a future fact-finding meeting to review the overall performance of the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program as well as the status of the Red indicator associated with LK3 leaks. (D7/28/26FF-3.5)

Recommendations to PG&E:

The following previous recommendation to PG&E was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (P1/26FF-3.3)*

PG&E should develop a proactive action plan to reduce the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (P7/28/26FF-3.5)

3.6 Emergency Plan Drill Observation Pre-Drill Brief

The DCISC FFT met with Andy Warwick, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, for a pre-evolution brief for the Emergency Plan (EP) Drill the FFT would be observing the next day (July 29, 2026). This brief provided an opportunity for the FFT to understand the expectations for observers when at the different PG&E EP facilities, learn the pre-drill conditions, and ask questions to support a successful observation. The following topics were discussed:

- Review of the pre-drill conditions.
- Arrival time for the DCISC team to obtain confidential drill sequence of events.
- Start time for the Operations Team simulator brief.
- Expectations for maintaining confidential information provided to the DCISC team.
- Expectations for interacting with drill participants, facilitators, and other observers during the drill.
- Information on the Facility Critiques conducted upon conclusion of the drill.
- Information on the issuance of the Final Critique (30 – 45 days after the drill).

Conclusion: PG&E’s pre-drill brief to the DCISC Fact-Finding Team provided a helpful review of expectations and information prior to the execution of the Emergency Plan drill.

Recommendations to the DCISC or PG&E: None.

3.7 Station Update

The DCISC FFT met with Justin Rogers, Station Senior Director, for a Station Update. The DCISC last received a Station Update during its July 6, 2026, Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.11), when it concluded the following:

DCPP’s update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified.

Mr. Rogers reported that both units had run at full power since the last update and that the station was focused on and preparing for the upcoming fall Unit 1 Refueling Outage 1R26. Two specific topics that are being tracked on the DCISC Open Items List (OIL) were discussed in detail:

First, a discussion was held related to an OIL action to obtain documents that provide PG&E and DCPP guidance on decision making and interfacing communications associated with changing power or shutting down the station. This action was created during the October 2025 Public Meeting during the DCPP presentation on the station’s response to wildfires in the area in 2025. During the meeting, DCISC Member Dr. Meshkati requested information on the decision-making authority of the plant when there is a need to reduce power or shut down. A summary of the open action is as follows:

The Station Manager reported that DCPP has clear guidance with other entities within PG&E that addresses the interface and the decision-making associated with the plant and the down time of the plant and no authorization or clearance from outside DCPP is required. DCPP offered to provide Dr. Meshkati with a copy of the guidance document at a future fact-finding meeting.

Mr. Rogers provided the FFT with guidance documents OP J-2 VIII, “Guidance for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP,” Revision 43, OP B-01, “Communications with Generation and Transmission Organizations,” Revision 31, and OP B-40, “Operations Response to Wildfires,” Revision 4 and an overview of how operators and other plant staff use them at the station. Emphasis was provided in the areas where the station’s Shift Manager and Operations team make

decisions to reduce power, realign the plant, or shut down to ensure the safety of the station. These guidelines and the examples provided in the overview by Mr. Rogers provided the FFT the confidence that the DCPD Shift Manager and the Operations team have sufficient guidance and autonomy to make the operational decisions necessary to protect the plant.

Mr. Rogers shared that after there is an event, when they have to use these procedures, PG&E Transmission and DCPD station personnel involved will perform a critique of their performance, including any procedure issues or improvement opportunities. Procedures are revised based on these learnings. The DCISC believes this is a good example of a continuously learning culture.

Second, a discussion was held on the Unit 2 12kV Bus Duct/Start-Up Transformer 2-2 arc flash event that occurred on May 4, 2026. Specifically, the status of the Cause Evaluation and the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation. During the May 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.12), the FFT was at DCPD while the station was addressing repairs to the Bus Duct. The following two recommendations were made to the DCISC:

The DCISC should follow-up on the Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3A)

The DCISC should follow-up on the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3B)

Mr. Rogers described the actions the station has taken since the last fact-finding meeting in May 2026. During the investigation of the event, the cause evaluation team recommended further inspection and replacement of the 12 kV Bus/Transformer 2-2 feeder cable stress cones based on a visual inspection identifying a potential anomaly (insulation sponginess). Stress cones are specialized geometric devices used in medium- and high-voltage cable terminations to prevent insulation failure. Stress cones require specialized electrical qualifications to install properly, which the DCPD electricians had. However, their proficiency was low since stress cone installation is an infrequently performed activity. DCPD set up a practice shop for the qualified electricians to practice the technique of installing the specific stress cones for this application. Other departments such as Training and Engineering supported by providing teaching and learning on the techniques. Several weeks of practice were allowed to improve proficiency, and when the transformer was taken out of service the week of July 20, 2026, the stress cones were successfully replaced. The Cause Evaluation Team will evaluate the old stress cones and include this in their assessment. Mr. Rogers stated the final Cause Evaluation is currently targeted to go to the Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) the last week in August 2026.

Mr. Rogers and the FFT also discussed the details of the arc event as it occurred. Pertinent to the discussion was footage from a security video of the bus duct and transformer with the low-level arc/flame that was observed. The station used this information in their decision to perform a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation, as the evidence did not show it raised to the level of an industry High Energy Arc Fault (HEAF) event such as presented in NRC Information Notice 2017-04, "High Energy Arcing Faults in Electrical Equipment Containing Aluminum Components." While it did not rise to this level, Mr. Rogers said the station is committed to performing a thorough

cause evaluation which he stated was supported by the team's identification of a potential contributing issue with the feeder cable stress cones and the station's response to address it.

Conclusion: DCP's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified. The Fact-Finding Team appreciated the Station Manager providing information to address some of the DCISC Open Item List items.

Recommendations to the DCISC:

The following DCISC Open Action Item from the October 2025 Public Meeting was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *He [Mr. Rogers] reported DCP has clear guidance with other entities within PG&E that address the interface and the decision-making associated with the plant and the down time of the plant and no authorization or clearance from outside DCP is required. He offered to provide Dr. Meshkati with a copy of the guidance document at a future fact finding. PM 10/25 Item 20*

The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *The DCISC should follow-up on the Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3A)*

The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and should be closed: *The DCISC should follow-up on the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3B)*

Recommendations to PG&E: None.

3.8 PG&E Employee Corporate Safety Culture Survey Results Review

The DCISC FFT met with Dan Winterberg, Safety Manager, to get an update on the results of a 2025 PG&E Employee Corporate Safety Culture survey results review. The DCISC last discussed this topic during its January 2026 Fact-Finding Meeting (Reference 6.13), when it concluded the following:

PG&E's efforts to improve its corporate safety culture included an appropriate use of benchmarking against other non-nuclear industries. The results of a corporate-wide survey of employee safety culture completed in 2025 were generally positive and demonstrated an improving trend in perception of corporate safety culture by employees.

Regarding the 2025 survey of employee safety culture, Mr. Winterberg provided a report with an overview of the survey results. The survey is related to California requirements for utilities. The survey was a standard product from the National Safety Council -- "2025 NSC Safety Barometer Results" -- previously used by over 1,400 companies and targeted to measure employee safety perception. He reported that PG&E's overall score on the survey was 84, which was considered a high (positive) score and indicated that PG&E scored higher than 84% of the companies surveyed.

There were 22,430 employees (out of about 28,400 total employees) that completed the survey, and PG&E was committed to performing the survey every few years.

The FFT reviewed the data and posed several follow-up questions to Mr. Winterberg, some concerning the intent of particular survey questions and others aimed at better understanding specific results. A company-wide score, however favorable, is an aggregate that can mask meaningful variation among business units, and the DCISC's mandate concerns the safety of operations at Diablo Canyon specifically. The functional-group results bear this out. The "Generation" group (782 respondents) achieved an overall percentile of 94.8, the second highest in the company. Yet even within this high-performing group, several components scored notably lower, including workforce stability, the status and availability of safety specialists, the effectiveness of department safety committees, and the adequacy of safety staffing.

Of particular interest, therefore, is the Generation-level data posted in the Electronic Reading Room on Certrec. Page 32 of that document shows that Nuclear Generation accounts for 557 of the 782 Generation respondents, or about 71 percent, a population that likely corresponds closely to the DCPD workforce. The FFT has requested that PG&E provide the survey results for this group, disaggregated from the company-wide and Generation-wide data. This will allow the DCISC to assess employee safety perceptions at DCPD directly and determine whether the strong Generation-wide results hold for the nuclear workforce. It will also help identify any areas warranting further attention as DCPD operates beyond its original licensing period.

To ensure the requested data covers the right population, the FFT has also asked PG&E to confirm four points. First, whether all DCPD employees are captured under the "Generation" functional group rather than the separate "Power Generation" group (999 respondents). Second, whether the "Nuclear Generation" subgroup includes staff outside DCPD, in particular personnel assigned to the Humboldt Bay ISFSI in Eureka, and if so, how many. Third, whether staff-augmentation workers assigned to DCPD are included among the 2,065 staff-augmentation respondents. Fourth, whether results can be reported for DCPD alone, separate from Humboldt Bay and any corporate nuclear support staff.

Conclusions: The results of a PG&E corporate-wide survey of employee safety culture completed in 2025 were generally positive. The DCISC continues to work with DCPD to better understand the specific results that are reflective of DCPD culture.

Recommendations to the DCISC: The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *The DCISC should review the results of a PG&E employee safety culture survey following its completion. (D1/25FF-3.9A).*

Recommendations to PG&E: None.

3.9 Emergency Plan Drill Observation

The DCISC Fact-finding Team (FFT) observed key phases of the July 29, 2026 DCPD emergency exercise drill. DCPD performs one major exercise and several limited exercises annually with NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) evaluations

occurring every other year. This particular exercise was a Hostile Action-Based (HAB) Exercise drill, which resulted in a radioactivity release to the environment. A HAB drill is a specialized emergency preparedness exercise that tests how a nuclear power plant, local law enforcement, and off-site agencies coordinate their response to a simulated security threat or armed attack. The last DCISC observation of a DCPD emergency exercise was in July 2024 (Reference 6.14) when it concluded the following:

The July 31, 2024 DCPD NRC-Evaluated Emergency Exercise appeared well designed and implemented. The scenario involved a sufficiently large release to require declaration of a General Emergency and to exercise Ingestion Pathways response. All exercise objectives were met. The NRC evaluation was not yet available, and the DCISC will review its evaluation when released. The DCISC should review the DCPD drill critique and NRC evaluation in a future fact-finding meeting when they are completed.

Subsequently, in September 2024 (Reference 6.15) the DCISC reviewed the critique of the July 31, 2024, emergency exercise and concluded the following:

The DCPD July 31, 2024 NRC-Evaluated Emergency Exercise was performed successfully based on DCISC observation and PG&E critique measures.

The purpose of this July 29, 2026 exercise drill was to develop and maintain the Emergency Response Organization's (ERO's) key skills to protect public health and safety in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency. Since this was a drill (also referred to as a “dress rehearsal” by participants) and not an evaluated exercise, Drill Controllers and Emergency Planning staff were allowed to provide coaching to the drill participants, although efforts were made to minimize these interactions. The scenario involved a simulated release large enough to require declaration of a General Emergency. The Emergency Plan Exercise was designed to evaluate the proficiency of DCPD personnel in implementing the principal Emergency Plan functions in response to a radiological emergency. The Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), joint DCPD/San Luis Obispo (SLO) County Unified Dose Assessment Center (UDAC), and Joint Information Center (JIC) participated. The plant simulator acted as the Control Room. The simulator computer is connected to all DCPD Emergency Response Facilities and drives indications for the participants at all locations.

The NRC, Sheriff's Watch Commander, County Emergency Operations Center, and the State of California Office of Emergency Services Warning Center participated along with offsite agencies within the DCPD Emergency Planning Zone as described in the County's extent of play agreement with FEMA.

The exercise had as its objective to evaluate the following activities:

- Communications between onsite and offsite Emergency Response Facilities
- Coordination with offsite response organizations
- Dissemination of information to the public via media channels
- Operational and engineering assessment of accident sequences

- Engineering assessment, repair plan development, and repair of critical equipment under emergency conditions
- Mitigative action implementation through the simulated repair of equipment
- Protection of workers (radiological or physical) during emergency response

The DCISC FFT began its observation in the simulated Control Room, which was the Reactor Simulator. The exercise scenario is summarized as follows:

- 7:00 am - Drill Setup
- 7:15 am - Briefing held for Operations crew
- 8:00 am - Initial Conditions: both units at 100% power; a plant holiday was simulated and plant staffing was reduced to essential personnel only.
- 8:04 am - Transmitter FT-128A fails high, causing the flow control valve for all reactor coolant pump seals to reduce flow. Operations takes manual action and corrects.
- 8:12 am - Gunboat attack on the plant Protected Area (PA) (Site Area Emergency conditions)
 - Security Watch Commander notifies Drill Shift Manager
 - Drill Shift Manager evaluates for a Site Area Emergency for a Hostile Action in the Protected Area and activating the augmented ERO.
- 8:22 am - Site Area Emergency Declared
 - Emergency Response Organization responds to Site Area Emergency
 - EOF, TSC, OSC and JIC begin activation
- 8:24 am - Operators make notification to NRC of a Hostile Action on-site
- 8:25 am - Helicopter crash in the plant PA
 - A fire is ignited
 - Operations is notified and works with the Security Watch Commander to call out the fire team
- 8:35 am - Operators hear an explosion near the Control Room
 - Security Watch Commander reports new information to Drill Shift Manager
- 8:50 am - Security reports an apparent explosive device in the plant.
 - Offsite Law Enforcement Command Post to address ordinance disposal
- 8:55 am - The DCISC FFT travels to the EOF
- 9:05 am - Unit 1 H Bus trips on differential

- Supply and load breakers on the bus are locked-out in the open position
 - ERO teams to diagnose a faulty differential relay
- 10:20 am
- Explosion in Unit 1 Containment causing General Emergency conditions
 - o Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)
 - o 3% Fuel damage
 - o Loss of Containment Integrity
 - Containment Spray pump 1-1 seized shaft and breaker overcurrent
 - An insider planted explosive charges in Unit 1 containment resulting in this damage and a path from containment to the environment.
- 10:28 am
- General Emergency declared
 - Radiation release to the environment
 - Protective Action Recommendations (PARs): Evacuate affected Protective Action Zones
 - The DCISC FFT travels to the JIC
- ~11:45 pm
- PARs upgraded based on radiation dose assessment results
- ~2:00 pm
- Drill terminated
 - Individual facility critiques began
 - Overall critique began

The FFT observed activities in the EOF, which was staffed by recovery management personnel from all functional areas of the plant, the SLO County Emergency Services personnel, various County functional departments, and the Unified Dose Assessment Committee (UDAC). Upon conclusion of the exercise drill, the FFT observed the EOF post-drill critique and found it to be sufficiently critical and inclusive of all attendees. Over 100 action items were identified and were reviewed for entry into the Corrective Action Program. It was noted that many drill participants stated that they were new to the role and that they learned a lot and sought feedback throughout the drill. Although the FFT could not observe all the various and final critiques, it appeared that all drill objectives were met.

The FFT also observed activities in the JIC, which consisted of a PG&E Spokesperson, a PG&E Public Information Officer, an SLO County Spokesperson, and the SLO County Certified Public Health Physicist. The spokespersons held periodic mock news conferences with mock media asking questions. There were also numerous written press releases by PG&E, SLO County, and the City of Pismo Beach, issued as printed hand-outs available at the simulated press conference in English and Spanish. The news releases appeared accurate and publicly understandable.

Conclusions: The July 29, 2026, DCPD Emergency Exercise Drill appeared well designed and implemented. The scenario involved a sufficiently large radioactive release to require declaration of a General Emergency. The critique observed was sufficiently critical and action items were documented. The DCISC should review the DCPD drill critique in a future fact-finding meeting when it is completed.

Recommendations to the DCISC: The DCISC should review the July 29, 2026 DCPD drill critique in a future fact-finding meeting when it is completed. (D7/28/26FF-3.9)

Recommendations to PG&E: None.

4.0 CONCLUSIONS

- 4.1 DCPD presented the results of testing and evaluation of material specimens contained in Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B, which was removed from the vessel on April 21, 2025. PG&E staff concluded that the results confirmed that Unit 1 continues to meet NRC requirements for Reactor Vessel integrity and remains safe for at least 60 years of operation. The DCISC will continue to perform its own reviews of the test results which will be further discussed at its October 2026 Public Meeting.**
- 4.2 The meeting with the NRC Resident Inspector was beneficial, and the DCISC should continue the meetings.**
- 4.3 The regular meetings with DCPD Officers and Directors continue to be beneficial for both organizations.**
- 4.4 The Dynamic Procedures in use and under development at DCPD show promise of improvement in human error reductions and Operator performance in the execution of Operator rounds and other evolutions. Realizing that promise depends on a systematic, independent human factors evaluation of the system's design, implementation, and failure modes, not on Operator acceptance alone.**
- 4.5 DCPD's Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program was being implemented in accordance with applicable industry guidelines; however, the number of leaks being tracked by the program continues to be unusually high and there is no formal action plan to improve performance. The DCISC recommendation for PG&E to devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as "LK3" (inactive leaks) in the plant should remain open. PG&E should also develop a proactive action plan to reduce the high number of leaks classified as "LK3" in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals.**
- 4.6 PG&E's pre-drill brief to the DCISC Fact-Finding Team provided a helpful review of expectations and information prior to the execution of the Emergency Plan drill.**
- 4.7 DCPD's update on recent station activities was informative, and no new major issues were identified. The Fact-Finding Team appreciated the Station Manager providing information to address some of the DCISC Open Item List items.**

- 4.8 The results of a corporate-wide survey of employee safety culture completed in 2025 were generally positive. The DCISC continues to work with DCPD to better understand the results that are reflective of DCPD.
- 4.9 The July 29, 2026, DCPD Emergency Exercise Drill appeared well designed and implemented. The scenario involved a sufficiently large radioactive release to require declaration of a General Emergency. The critique observed was sufficiently critical and action items were documented. The DCISC should review the DCPD drill critique in a future fact-finding meeting when it is completed.

5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations to the DCISC:

- 5.1 The DCISC Open Item List item PI-2 should be modified from, *“The other two Members of the DCISC (Drs. Meshkati and Scarlat) should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during future FFM’s”* to *“The other Member of the DCISC (Dr. Scarlat) should be provided with a walkthrough of the Dynamic Procedures during a future FFM.”* D12/24FF-3.2
- 5.2 Human factors issues and lessons learned, NRC reviews, and industry group involvement associated with Dynamic Procedures should be included in the DCISC Open Item List (OIL) for review at future fact-finding meetings. Relevant industry groups include EPRI, INPO, and vendor users’ groups. At a minimum, the review should address the following:
- (a) Regulatory review. Has the NRC reviewed or inspected DCPD’s use of Dynamic Procedures? To what extent has PG&E applied the CBP system guidelines in NUREG-0700, Rev. 3, and the CBP review guidance in NUREG/CR-6634 to their design and implementation?
 - (b) Human factors and human-computer interface assessment. How are human factors and human-computer interface issues for Dynamic Procedures assessed, by whom, and on what timeline? Is the assessment performed solely by the Operators who use the system, or does it include independent human factors verification and validation? Specific topics include:
 - situation awareness
 - the allocation of functions between the software and the Operator
 - crew communication
 - management of multiple concurrent procedures
 - backup procedures and the Operator’s transition to them if the system fails
 - (c) Industry participation and operating experience. Besides the vendor’s users’ group, does PG&E participate in EPRI working groups relevant to Dynamic

Procedures, such as the Work Planning Users Group (WPUG)? Does DCPD follow Procedure Professionals Association (PPA) guidelines (e.g., PPA AP-907-005), and do its procedure writers hold PPA certification or membership? Is operating experience on implementing Dynamic Procedures available through INPO or WANO, and how has DCPD used it? D7/28/26FF-3.4

- 5.3 The DCISC should meet with the members of the Boric Acid Review Team (BART) at a future fact-finding meeting to review the overall performance of the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program as well as the status of the Red indicator associated with LK3 leaks. (D7/28/26FF-3.5)
- 5.4 The following DCISC Open Action Item from the October 2025 Public Meeting was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting (Section 3.7) and should be closed: *He [Mr. Rogers] reported DCPD has clear guidance with other entities within PG&E that address the interface and the decision-making associated with the plant and the down time of the plant and no authorization or clearance from outside DCPD is required. He offered to provide Dr. Meshkati with a copy of the guidance document at a future fact finding. PM 10/25 Item 20*
- 5.5 The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting (Section 3.7) and remains open: *The DCISC should follow-up on the Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3A)*
- 5.6 The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting (Section 3.7) and should be closed: *The DCISC should follow-up on the rationale for performing a Cause Evaluation vs. a Root Cause Evaluation for the Unit 2 Start-Up Transformer 2-2 bus bar failure that occurred on May 4, 2026. (D5/26FF-3.3B)*
- 5.7 The following previous recommendation to the DCISC was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting (section 3.8) and remains open: *The DCISC should review the results of a PG&E employee safety culture survey following its completion. (D1/25FF-3.9A).*
- 5.8 The DCISC should review the July 29, 2026 DCPD drill critique in a future fact-finding meeting when it is completed. (D7/28/26FF-3.9)

Recommendations to PG&E:

- 5.9 The following previous recommendation to PG&E was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting and remains open: *Recognizing that Capsule B test results are not necessary to assure Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel embrittlement acceptability, the DCISC recommends that the Capsule B be removed at the next outage in 2025 and that a re-evaluation of reactor vessel integrity, including both PTS and USE, be performed once the new data from Capsule B become available. (AR23/24AR23-2)*

- 5.10** The following previous recommendation to PG&E was reviewed in this Fact-Finding Meeting (Section 3.5) and remains open: *PG&E should devote additional resources as needed to the Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program and to repair the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (P1/26FF-3.3)*
- 5.11** PG&E should develop a proactive action plan to reduce the high number of leaks classified as “LK3” in the plant with the aim of achieving the Boric Acid Leak Maintenance performance indicator goals. (P7/28/26FF-3.4)

6.0 REFERENCES

- 6.1 “Analysis of Capsule B from the Pacific Gas and Electric Company Diablo Canyon Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program,” WCAP-19173-NP, Revision 0, June 2026, submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an attachment to PG&E letter DCL-26-046, June 29, 2026, NRC ADAMS Accession Number ML26180A296.
- 6.2 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Seventh Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2026 – June 30, 2027,” Scheduled for approval at the October 19, 2027, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.1, Section 3.7, “Reactor Vessel Embrittlement Sample Capsule B Report.”
- 6.3 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fourth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2023 – June 30, 2024,” Approved October 10, 2024, Executive Summary, Recommendations, “PG&E Recommendation No. 23-2.”
- 6.4 “Safety Evaluation Related to the License Renewal of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2,” June 2025, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC ADAMS Accession Number ML25153A508.
- 6.5 “WCAP-18924-NP, Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Initial License Renewal: Time-Limited Aging Analyses (TLAAs) on Reactor Vessel Integrity (RVI),” Revision 0, August 2024, submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as Enclosure 5 to PG&E letter DCL-24-092, October 14, 2024, NRC ADAMS Accession Number ML24289A118.
- 6.6 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Executive Summary – “Reactor Vessel Embrittlement,” and Volume I, Section 4.26, “Reactor Vessel Embrittlement.”
- 6.7 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,”

- Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.9, Section 3.1, “Meet with Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector.”
- 6.8 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Seventh Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2026 – June 30, 2027,” Scheduled for approval at the October 19, 2027, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.1, Section 3.8, “Meet with DCPD Officer.”
- 6.9 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.9, Section 3.7, “Walkthrough of Dynamic Procedures and Work Orders.”
- 6.10 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.6, Section 3.3, “Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program.”
- 6.11 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Seventh Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2026 – June 30, 2027,” Scheduled for approval at the October 19, 2027, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.1, Section 3.6, “Station Update.”
- 6.12 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.9, Section 3.3, “Station Update.”
- 6.13 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Sixth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2025 – June 30, 2026,” Scheduled for approval at the October 21, 2026, DCISC Public Meeting, Volume II, Exhibit D.6, Section 3.6, “Corporate Employee Safety Culture.”
- 6.14 “Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Thirty-Fifth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2024 – June 30, 2025,” Approved October 23, 2025, Volume II, Exhibit D.1, Section 3.1, “Observation of the July 31, 2024 NRC-Evaluated Emergency Exercise.”
- 6.15 Ibid., Exhibit D.3, Section 3.9, “Results of July 31, 2024 Evaluated Emergency Preparedness Exercise.”

PG&E Presentation Slides from June 30, 2026, Briefing on Sample Capsule B Test Results

DCPP Unit 1 Capsule B Testing and Analysis

Results Briefing to DCISC

June 30, 2026



Together, Building
a Better California



Summary

- Westinghouse performed extensive testing on Surveillance Capsule B per NRC requirements and guidance
- Results further confirm Unit 1 continues to meet Federal reactor vessel integrity requirements and remains safe for at least 60 years of operation
- Results support NRC's previous June 2025 License Renewal Safety Evaluation Report conclusions and the existing reactor vessel integrity analysis of record
- Results documented in non-proprietary report WCAP-19173-NP and will be submitted to NRC on June 29, 2026

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PG&E Presentation Slides from June 30, 2026, Briefing on Sample Capsule B Test Results (continued)



Comparison to WCAP-18924-NP

- **WCAP-18924** is the reactor vessel integrity analysis of record
 - Cited in NRC's License Renewal Safety Evaluation Report
 - Previously evaluated by DCISC
 - Referred to as the "previous analysis" in these slides
- Previous analysis **conclusions remain valid** when considering Capsule B results:
 - No change in credibility conclusions (i.e., results follow expected trends)
 - Neutron fluence projections roughly equate to those in previous analysis
 - RT_{PTS} inputs are bounding or equal to previous analysis (e.g., increase in the average Charpy V-notch 30 ft-lb temperature [ΔRT_{NDT}], margin term [M], unirradiated RT_{NDT} , etc.)
 - Upper Shelf Energy (USE) inputs are bounding or equal to previous analysis (e.g., copper content, 1/4T fluence at 54 EFPY, unirradiated USE)

EFPY = Effective Full Power Years

Public

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Credibility Evaluation

- Evaluated per the five criteria from Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.99, Rev 2: **no change to conclusions since previous analysis**
 - Credible for weld heat # 27204/flux Linde 1092 (used in the Intermediate & Lower Shell Longitudinal Welds 2/3-442A, B, C)
 - Includes use of Palisades "sister plant" data (same heat #/flux)

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PG&E Presentation Slides from June 30, 2026, Briefing on Sample Capsule B Test Results (continued)



Neutron Fluence

- **Capsule B exposure equivalent:** $3.62 \text{ E}19 \text{ n/cm}^2$
 - ✓ Within 1-2 times (~ 1.7 times) the peak vessel fluence expected at 60 years (range $2.14 - 4.28 \text{ E}19 \text{ n/cm}^2$), per NUREG-1801, Rev. 2, XI.M31
- **Projection Methodology:** satisfies the requirements set forth in RG 1.190, Rev 0
 - ✓ Approved by the NRC; described in WCAP-18124-NP-A and WCAP-18124-NP-A, Rev 0, Supplement 1-NP-A
- **Limiting Fast Neutron Fluence Beltline Results at 54 EFPY (60 years):**
same limiting locations as previous analysis

Public

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Key Takeaways

- Report (WCAP-19173-NP) satisfies NRC surveillance capsule withdrawal and testing requirements
- Comprehensive report shared with DCISC for review
- Surveillance capsule withdrawal and testing actions are satisfied for license renewal
- Ongoing dosimetry monitoring and periodic reactor vessel inspections continue through the 20-year renewed license period
- Both Units 1 and 2 are safe for at least 60 years of operations

Public

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