

Recommendations to PG&E:

The DCISC made the following fifteen recommendations to PG&E during this reporting period (references to sections of this report are shown in parentheses):

PG&E Recommendation No. P11/24FF-3.11:

PG&E should continue to evaluate why a 2018 Root Cause Evaluation for a failed Auxiliary Saltwater Pump motor bearing did not result in sufficiently effective procedure changes. (Section 4.3)

PG&E Recommendation No. P1/25FF-3.3A:

PG&E should review its cause evaluation processes and initiate actions to ensure that deficiencies observed via the Organizational Learning Tool and Safety Culture Assessment are captured and tied to the initiation of appropriate corrective actions. (Section 4.3)

PG&E Recommendation No. P1/25FF-3.3B:

PG&E should review its cause evaluation processes and initiate actions to ensure that periodic trending is performed across the multiple Organizational Learning Tools and Safety Culture Assessments that are performed as a part of Cause Evaluations and Root Cause Evaluations. (Section 4.3)

PG&E Recommendation No. P12/24FF-3.6:

PG&E should review why an extent of condition review for an unbraced cabinet found by the DCISC in July 2024 did not prevent the identification of a similar condition by the DCISC in December 2024. *This recommendation was subsequently completed and closed during this period.* (Section 4.20)

PG&E Recommendation No. P4/25FF-3.6:

PG&E should review if DCPD should have considered developing FLEX guidelines for providing an alternative discharge path for the Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) System following a Beyond Design Basis event that may cause a collapse of the Discharge Structure or otherwise obstruct the ASW System discharge. (Section 4.23)

PG&E Recommendation No. P12/24FF-3.2:

PG&E should further expand their use of electronic procedures-type applications, subject to proper human systems integration, because the improved human performance and documentation of work can directly improve the safety of operations. (Section 4.27)

The following nine recommendations from the DCISC's Seismic Review Team (SRT) were endorsed and approved by the DCISC for inclusion in this report as DCISC recommendations to PG&E. (Exhibit D.12)

PG&E Recommendation No. P/SRT-1:

The Committee recommends the development of a set of kinematically constrained structural models for reverse faults underlying the Irish Hills that can explain the folding observed since 5 Ma. (Exhibit D.12, Section 3.0)

PG&E Recommendation No. P/SRT-2:

The Committee recommends dating of low-stand abrasion platforms offshore, south of the Irish Hills, to further constrain the rate of footwall subsidence and its contribution to the Southwest Boundary Zone slip rate. (Exhibit D.12, Section 3.0)

PG&E Recommendation No. P/SRT-3:

The Committee recommends monitoring of IRSL-dating efforts and reassessment, if necessary, of the MIS 5 age assignments for the Q1 and Q2 terraces surrounding the Irish Hills. (Exhibit D.12, Section 3.0)

PG&E Recommendation No. P/SRT-4:

The Committee recommends further investigation of potential strike-slip faulting along the Los Osos trend and its impacts on the pattern of marine-terrace uplift. (Exhibit D.12, Section 3.0)

PG&E Recommendation No. P/SRT-5:

The Committee recommends that PG&E should follow up the SRT's preliminary work with a more complete study of the available GPS data. (Exhibit D.12, Section 3.0)

PG&E Recommendation No. P/SRT-6:

The Committee recommends that the fault slip models that underlie the DCPD Seismic Source Characterization should be developed into kinematic and mechanical models that can predict the interseismic deformation and can thus be directly tested against the GPS data. (Exhibit D.12, Section 3.0)

PG&E Recommendation No. P/SRT-7:

The Committee recommends that PG&E should compute the relative contributions of strike-slip and reverse faulting to the regional deformation predicted by the SSC24 (Seismic Source Characterization 2024) slip models and compare the values with the geodetic constraints. (Exhibit D.12, Section 3.0)

PG&E Recommendation No. P/SRT-8:

The Committee recommends Geologic slip-rate information should be acquired from the Rinconada and Huasna faults to permit better modeling of the shear component evident in the GPS data. (Exhibit D.12, Section 3.0)

PG&E Recommendation No. P/SRT-9:

The Committee recommends that PG&E should conduct modeling experiments to ascertain the sensitivity of DCPH hazard to the SSC modifications recommended by the SRT. (Exhibit D.12, Section 3.0)

PG&E Response:

California Public Utilities Code Section 712.1 requires the Committee to annually transmit its findings and recommendations for improved safety to PG&E and for PG&E to respond to the Committee's annual report. The annual report, incorporating PG&E's response, is then transmitted to the Legislature, the Governor, the Public Utilities Commission, the Energy Commission, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and to PG&E.

When received PG&E's Response will be incorporated as Section 9.0 of the 35th Annual Report and subsequently reviewed by the DCISC during the next reporting period.