Past Public Meetings

The Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee Notice of Public Meeting

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on February 12–13, 2020, at the Avila Lighthouse Suites Point San Luis Conference Facility located at First & San Francisco Streets, Avila Beach, California, a public meeting will be held by the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC) in five separate sessions, at the times indicated, to consider the following matters:

1. Morning Session: (02/12/2020)–9:00 A.M. Opening comments and remarks; receive public comments and communications to the Committee; approve the Minutes of the DCISC's October 23–24, 2019 public meeting; discussion of administrative matters, including receipt of PG&E's response to the DCISC 29th Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations for the period July 1, 2018—June 30, 2019; an update on financial matters and activities; review of the Open Items List; reports by Committee Members, a DCISC Technical Consultant and Assistant Legal Counsel; accept fact finding report; and scheduling of future fact-finding visits and public meetings and review of documents received.
2. Afternoon Session: (02/12/2020)–1:30 P.M. Committee member comments; receive public comments and communications to the Committee; Committee discussion of possible alternatives for amending the DCISC's Restated Charter to provide for a post-shutdown role for the DCISC including submission of an Application or other communication to the California Public Utilities Commission; reports by DCISC Technical Consultants and acceptance of fact finding reports; receive informational presentations related to plant safety and operations requested by the Committee from PG&E, including on the "State of the Plant" regarding key events, organizational changes, update on PG&E bankruptcy and any effect on current and future plant operations, station activities since October 2019; and an informational presentation on plant performance during the 2R21 Unit-2 refueling outage including results achieved, fuel and steam generator inspections results, unexpected equipment issues and open items.
3. Evening Session: (02/12/2020)–5:30 P.M. Committee member comments; receive public comments and communications to the Committee; receive informational presentation by the San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services Manager on emergency preparedness programs; and an informational presentation by PG&E related to plant safety and operations on the Quality Verification organization's perspective on plant performance, Quality Verification's top issues, and the latest Quality Performance Assessment Report.

4. Morning Session: (02/13/2020)–9:00 A .M. Comments by Committee members; receive public comments and communications to the Committee; receive further informational presentations requested by the Committee from PG&E relating to plant safety and operations, including an update on NRC Performance Indicators, recent Licensee Event Reports, NRC Notices of Violation, and issues raised by NRC Resident Inspectors; a presentation on the results of the 2019 Operating Plan and key elements of the 2020 Operating Plan; and a report by a DCISC Technical Consultant and acceptance of a fact-finding report.
5. Afternoon Session: (02/13/2020)–1:30 P.M. Comments by Committee members; receive public comments and communications to the Committee; consider informational presentation from PG&E on a topic relating to plant safety and operations, including the current status of programs to monitor human performance, human performance indicators and trends in human performance; and wrap-up discussion by Committee members, and confirmation of future site visits, study sessions and public meetings.

The DCISC's policy is to schedule its public meetings in locations that are accessible to people with disabilities. The Avila Lighthouse Suites and the Point San Luis Conference Facility are accessible facilities and hearing assistance devices are available upon request. A person who needs a disability-related accommodation or modification in order to participate in the meeting may make a request by contacting the DCISC office at (800) 439-4688 or by sending a written request to the DCISC office at 857 Cass Street, Ste. D., Monterey, CA 93940. Providing your request at least five business days before the meeting will help ensure availability of the requested accommodation.

The meeting will be webcast in real time at: http://www.slo-span.org/local_webcast/DCISC/stream_index.htm, and through dcisc.org.

The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and materials regarding the above meeting agenda items will be available for public review commencing Monday, February 10, 2020, at the Reference Department of the Cal Poly Library in San Luis Obispo and online at www.dcisc.org.For further information regarding the public meeting, please contact Robert Wellington, Committee Legal Counsel, 857 Cass Street, Suite D, Monterey, California, 93940; telephone: 1-800-439-4688 or read the agenda on line by visiting the Committee's website at www.dcisc.org.

Dated: February 2, 2020

DCISC Agenda for the February 12–13, 2020 Public Meeting

Committee Members:

• Robert J. Budnitz
• Peter Lam
• Per F. Peterson

Wednesday & Thursday, February 12–13, 2019
Point San Luis Conference Room
Avila Lighthouse Suites, First & San Francisco Streets, Avila Beach, California

Public Meeting Agenda

This public meeting will be webcast in real time at: cal-span.org and through dcisc.org. Note. This link will only be live during the meeting.

Morning Session: 2/12/2020–9:00 A.M.

I Call To Order–Roll Call

II Introductions

Advisement

The Committee may consider at any time requests to change the order of a listed agenda item. Information distributed to the Committee at a public meeting becomes part of the public record of the DCISC. A copy of written material, pictures, etc. must be provided to the Committee's Legal Counsel for this purpose. Correspondence received and sent by the Committee is on file with the Office of the DCISC Legal Counsel and copies are available upon request. Devices for attendees who may be hearing impaired are available upon request. This meeting will be webcast in real time.

III Public Comments and Communications

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. The public may comment on any matter listed on the Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. There will be a time limit for each speaker as designated by the presiding officer. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.

IV Approval of Minutes

1. Minutes of October 23—24, 2019 Meeting: Accept

V Action Items

1. Receive PG&E's Response to DCISC's 29th Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations, July 1, 2018—June 30, 2019. Accept
2. Update on Financial Matters & Committee Activities. Discussion/Action
3. Review and Discussion of the Open Items List. Discussion/Action

VI Committee Member Reports and Discussion

1. Public Outreach, Site Visits and Other Committee Activities; Agenda Items, Scheduling and Confirmation of Future Fact-finding Visits and Public Meetings
2. Documents Provided to the Committee

VII Technical Consultant & Legal Counsel Reports & Receive, Approve and Authorize Transmittal of Fact-finding Report to PG&E

1. Consultant R. Ferman Wardell: Fact-finding Topics; Report on and Approval of November 6–7, 2019 Fact Finding Report
2. Assistant Legal Counsel Robert W. Rathie: Administrative, Regulatory and Legal Matters

VIII Adjourn Morning Meeting

Afternoon Session: 2/12/2020–1:30 P.M.

IX Reconvene for Afternoon Meeting

X Committee Member Comments

XI Public Comments and Communications

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. The public may comment on any matter listed on the Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. There will be a time limit established by the Presiding Officer for each speaker. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.

XII Action Items (Cont'd.)

4. Discussion of Possible Alternatives for Amending the DCISC's Restated Charter presented by a Proposed Settlement Agreement in the California Public Utilities Commission 2018 Nuclear Decommissioning Cost Triennial Proceedings; Approval of Submission of an Application and/or Other Communication to the California Public Utilities Commission Regarding a Second Restatement of the DCISC Charter to Provide for a Continued Role, following DCPP's Cessation of Electricity Generating Operations, for the DCISC to Review Nuclear Fuel-Related Issues and to Terminate that Review Upon Completion of the Safe Transfer of all Nuclear Fuel to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.

XIII Technical Consultant Report & Receive, Approve and Authorize Transmittal of Fact-finding Report to PG&E (Cont'd.)

2. Consultant Ferman Wardell: Fact-finding Topics; Report on and Approval of July 22–23, 2019 Fact Finding Report
3. Consultant Richard D. McWhorter Jr: Fact-finding Topics; Report on and Approval of the December 10–11, 2019 Fact Finding Report

XIV Information Items Before the Committee

1. Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee of PG&E Representatives:

1. State of the Plant Update including Key Events, Highlights, Organizational Changes, Update on PG&E Bankruptcy and any effect on Current and Future Operations, and Station Activities since DCISC's October 2019 Public Meeting.
2. Performance During the 21st Refueling Outage for Unit 2 (2R21) including Generator Stator Refurbishment, Key Activities, Performance Indicators, Results Achieved, Fuel and Steam Generator Inspection Results, Unexpected Equipment Issues and Open Items.

XV Adjourn Afternoon Meeting

Evening Session: 2/12/2020–5:30 P.M.

XVI Reconvene for Evening Meeting

XVII Committee Member Comments

XVIII Public Comments and Communications

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. The public may comment on any matter listed on the Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. There will be a time limit established by the Presiding Officer for each speaker. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.

XIX Information Items Before the Committee (Cont'd.)

2. Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee:

3. Presentation by the Emergency Services Manager for the San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services on Emergency Preparedness Programs.
4. Presentation by PG&E on the Quality Verification Organization's Perspective on Plant Performance, Quality Verification's Top Issues, and the Latest Quality Performance Assessment Report

XX Adjourn Evening Meeting

Morning Session: 2/13/2020–9:00 A.M.

XXI Reconvene for Morning Meeting

XXII Committee Member Comments

XXIII Public Comments and Communications

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. The public may comment on any matter listed on the Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. There will be a time limit established by the Presiding Officer for each speaker. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.

XXIV Information Items Before the Committee (Cont'd.)

3. Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee of PG&E Representatives:

5. Update on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation, Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors, Open Compliance Issues and License Action Requests.
6. Results of the 2019 Operating Plan and Key Elements of the 2020 Operating Plan.

XXV Technical Consultant Report & Receive, Approve and Authorize Transmittal of Fact-finding Report to PG&E (Cont'd.)

4. Consultant R. Ferman Wardell: Fact-finding Topics; Report on and Approval of January 29–30, 2020 Fact Finding Report

XXVI Adjourn Morning Meeting

Afternoon Session: 2/13/2020—1:30 P.M.

XXVII Reconvene for Afternoon Meeting

XXVIII Committee Member Comments

XVIX Public Comments and Communications

Anyone wishing to address the Committee on matters not appearing on the Agenda may do so only at this time. The public may comment on any matter listed on the Agenda immediately following the time the matter is considered by the Committee. There will be a time limit established by the Presiding Officer for each speaker. No action will be taken by the Committee on matters brought up under this item but they may be referred to staff for further study, response or action.

XXX Information Items Before the Committee (Cont'd.)

4. Informational Presentations Requested by the Committee of PG&E Representatives.

7. Current Status of Programs that Monitor Human Performance – Human Performance Indicators and Trends in Human Performance (including Personnel Error, Mispositioning, Station and Department Level Events and Safety Incidents).

XXXI Concluding Remarks & Discussion By Committee Members Of Future DCISC Activities

1. Future Actions by the Committee
2. Further Information to Obtain/Review
3. Confirmation of Future Site Visits, and Public Meetings

XXXII Adjournment of Ninety–fifth Public Meeting

The DCISC's policy is to schedule its public meetings in locations that are accessible to people with disabilities. The Avila Lighthouse Suites Point San Luis Conference Facility is a wheelchair accessible facility. A person who needs a disability-related accommodation or modification in order to participate in the meeting may make a request by contacting the DCISC office at (800) 439-4688 or by sending a written request to the DCISC office at 857 Cass Street, Ste. D., Monterey, CA 93940. Providing your request at least five business days before the meeting will help ensure availability of the accommodation.

Minutes of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee's, February 27–28, 2019 Public Meeting (Approved at the June 4-5, 2019 Public Meeting)

Wednesday & Thursday

February 12-13, 2020

Avila Beach, California

A legal notice of the public meeting and several display advertisements were published in local newspapers and mailed to the media and those persons on the Committee's service list.  A copy of the meeting agenda was posted on the Committee's website at www.dcisc.org.

Agenda

I CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL

The February 12, 2020, public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee (DCISC), the ninety-fifth public meeting of the Committee, was called to order by Committee Chair Dr. Peter Lam at 9:00 A.M. in the Point San Luis Conference Room at the Avila Lighthouse Suites in Avila Beach, California.  The public meetings of the Committee are viewed in live streaming video at www.dcisc.org and www.slospan.org and are videotaped for later broadcast on the local public access television station.  Dr. Lam briefly  reviewed the professional backgrounds and appointment to the DCISC for each of the other DCISC Members, Dr. Robert J. Budnitz, the appointee of the California Attorney General, and Dr. Per F. Peterson, the appointee of the Governor of California, and Dr. Lam introduced himself as the appointee of the California Energy Commission and current serving DCISC Chair.

Present:	Committee Member Robert J. Budnitz Committee Member Peter Lam Committee Member Per F. Peterson
Absent:	None

II INTRODUCTIONS

Dr. Lam introduced the Committee's Technical Consultants Mr. Richard D. McWhorter Jr. and Mr. R. Ferman Wardell and DCISC Assistant Legal Counsel Robert W. Rathie.  Dr. Lam then introduced Mr. Thomas R. Baldwin, P.E., Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) Director Generation Business Planning and Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Chief Nuclear Officer Support Manager Mr. Hector M. Garcia.  Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Garcia play key roles on behalf of PG&E in working with the DCISC in coordinating activities, providing information, and facilitating its public meetings and the frequent fact-finding visits to DCPP conducted by a member and a technical consultant.  Mr. Garcia then introduced DCPP Team Member Ms. Lindsey Miller and stated Ms. Miller would be assisting him during this public meeting.

Dr. Budnitz announced that Dr. Peterson has recently been elected to the National Academy of Engineering which Dr. Budnitz stated was one of the most distinguished honors an engineer can earn.  Dr. Peterson received the congratulations of all the DCISC representatives present and Dr. Budnitz stated that the Academy, while it consists of several hundred members spread amongst all engineering disciplines, has less than thirty members from the field of nuclear engineering.

III  PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

The Chair invited any members of the public present who wished to address remarks to the Committee on items not appearing on the agenda for the public meeting to do so at this time and he briefly reviewed the advice from the agenda concerning items or issues which are brought to the attention of the DCISC by the public during public meetings.  There was no response to his invitation.

 IV CONSENT AGENDA

The only item on the Consent Agenda was approval of the Minutes of the Committee's October 23-24, 2019, public meeting held in Avila Beach, California.  A draft of the October 2019 Minutes was included in the public agenda packet for this meeting.  The Members and Consultants reviewed the Minutes and provided corrections and substantive changes to certain references which will be included in the final version of the October 2019 Minutes. The Members and Technical Consultants discussed some of the follow-up actions to be taken, provided clarification concerning typographical errors and the accuracy of certain references in the Minutes and made editorial comments and changes concerning the draft of the October 2019  Minutes.

In response to a comment by Ms. Sherry Lewis of the group San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace Mr. Rathie reported a draft of the Minutes together with the completed agenda packet for each public meeting is provided on the DCISC's website at www.dcisc.org and is sent to the California Polytechnic University at San Luis Obispo (Cal Poly) R.E. Kennedy Library reference department in advance of each public meeting.

The Minutes of the Committee's public meetings in their final accepted form become part of its Annual Reports on Safety of Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Operations (Annual Report). On a motion by Dr. Budnitz, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the Minutes of the Committee's October 2019 public meeting were accepted subject to inclusion of the changes provided to the Committee's Assistant Legal Counsel.  The October 2019 Minutes will become a  part of the Committee's 30th Annual Report.

V ACTION ITEMS

A.  Receive PG&E's Response to DCISC's 29th Annual Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019. Mr. Rathie reported that upon its approval at a public meeting the DCISC's annual reports are required to be provided to PG&E for a response and PG&E then has up to 45 days to provide its response. PG&E is only required to respond substantively to any recommendation made by the DCISC in an annual report and for the 29th Annual Report the Committee made no recommendation relative to DCPP's safe operation.

The DCISC Annual Reports are made available in two bound volumes, as a compact disk, on a USB thumb drive and on the Committee's website at www.dcisc.org. The report is made available to the public and sent to the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) and the entities appointing members of the DCISC and to other interested parties and provided for inclusion in the collections of the Cal Poly Library and local libraries in San Luis Obispo County.

On a motion by Dr. Budnitz, seconded by Dr. Lam, the Committee unanimously accepted PG&E's Response to its Twenty-ninth Annual Report on the Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations for the period July 1, 2018 - June 30, 2019.

Following the Committee's acceptance of the 29th Annual Report Mr. Tom Marre was recognized.  Mr. Marre observed that PG&E is presently going through a bankruptcy and has plans to decommission DCPP and these are issues of great concern.  He encouraged the DCISC to closely review these matters and he stated his opinion that the Committee should not be approving PG&E's actions.  Drs. Budnitz and Lam observed that the Committee's action with reference to the 29th Annual Report was to simply accept PG&E's Response.  Dr. Lam remarked that in the past when the DCISChas made a recommendation in an annual report there is usually an intensive discussion as to the merits of PG&E's response and any action taken or to be taken as a result.

B.  Update on Financial Matters and Committee Activities.

Mr. Rathie reported that for calendar year 2019 the DCISC will once again have completed its work within the amount of the grant funding provided by PG&E's ratepayers for the Committee's operations and accordingly it would be appropriate for a motion to direct that any funds received which were not expended during 2019 be returned for credit to the ratepayers.  Dr. Lam remarked the Committee has a duty and obligation to impose budgetary discipline and in his view the Committee has been exceptionally sensitive to its fiduciary responsibility which is shown by the Committee having returned funds for credit to the ratepayers for several successive years.  Mr. Rathie observed the task of budgeting funds for the Committee's operations is challenging as the Committee incurs expenses at different periods during a calendar year and must remain responsive should an emergent issue require its immediate attention.  Upon a motion made by Dr. Budnitz, seconded by Dr. Peterson, the DCISC unanimously accepted the financial report by Mr. Rathie for calendar year 2019 and authorized the return to the ratepayers of any funds remaining unexpended for that year. Mr. Rathie then reported the Committee has submitted its first invoice for calendar year 2020 and he thanked Mr. Brian DeCaires of the DCPP Accounting Department for his valuable assistance in creating the documentation necessary for the Committee to access the funding provided by the PG&E ratepayers.  Mr. Rathie remarked that there has been no impact from the PG&E bankruptcy on funding for the DCISC's operations.  Finally, he reported that the Committee has now completed the transition to Mission Bank as its bank of record.

C.  Discussion of Issues on Open Items List.

Dr. Lam requested Consultant Wardell lead a review of items on the Open Items List, which he described as a very important tool used by the Committee to track and also to follow issues, concerns, and information requests identified for subsequent action or receipt during fact-finding and public meetings. Dr. Peterson commented the Open Items List identifies items for continued and/or periodic review, adds new items and in order for the Committee to accomplish its work within budgetary constraints items are removed from the Open Items List which he described as a necessary tool focusing attention on items that are most important for safety and which allows the Committee to adjust the resources devoted to different topical areas. Mr. Wardell stated newly added or changed items are shown in red italics and certain items are being identified for closure.

Items discussed or concerning which action was taken included the following[1]:

Item	Re:	Action Taken
CO-10	Mispositioning Error	Next Action 3/20 FF or TBD
CO-11	Operator Concerns & Issues	Next Action 3/20 FF or TBD
CO-14	Operator Retention Project	Next Action 3/20 FF or 4Q20FF
CM-10	On-line Maintenance Review	Next Action 4/20FF
EN-16	System Health Aux. Saltwater System Health Aux. Feedwater System Health Aux Building Ventilation System Health Component Cooling Water	Next Action 3/20FF Next Action 3/20FF Next Action 4/20FF Next Action 4/20FF
HP-1	Human Performance	Next Action 4Q20
EP-3	Decommissioning Emergency Preparedness	Next Actions 8/20 Emergency Exercise Then 1Q21
RA-6	Seismic Fragility	Next Action 4Q20 Add Review on 9/18 & 9/19FF
SE-40	Transformer & Leakage Failure	Close Here Leave on Systems List
SF-1	Monitor ISFSI Operations	Next Action Next Loading Campaign
FP-5	Review NFPA-805 Fire Protection Program	Next Action 3Q20FF
DEC-1	Review DCPP Decommissioning Plans (Suggested by A4NR's Ms. Becker)	Change "forced" to "required" and "in" to "by" on first line of description
Q-1	Work Evolution Observations	Add criteria re "material to safety considerations"
02/19PM-9	Meeting with SLO OES Manager	Follow under Emergency Preparedness (EP) Items
10/19PM-4	NRC Inspector Concern Decline in Human Performance re Low Level Events	2Q20FF & Close Pending Report @ 2/20PM

Items identified on the list and not included in the above were identified by Mr. Wardell for closure and were so approved.  Mr. Wardell then called the Committee's attention to Page 9 of the Open Items List which tracks the dates on which system and component reviews were completed or are scheduled.  Items identified for review were adjusted as follows:

DCPP Systems/Components Periodic Review

System or Component	Date
Auxiliary Feedwater	3/20FF
Auxiliary Saltwater	3/20FF
Auxiliary Building Ventilation	4/20FF
Component Cooling Water	4/20FF
Boric Acid Corrosion Control	1Q21
Employee Concerns Program	8/19FF
Tsunami Hazard Analysis	Delete

During the discussion on Item SF-1, monitoring of Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) operations, Mr. Baldwin stated he would follow up concerning the Committee's inquiry as to the schedule if any for the next spent fuel loading campaign and he reported this matter was now under continuing discussion with station leadership.  In response to an inquiry from Ms. Lewis of Mothers for Peace, Dr. Peterson replied the Committee will receive information on the Spent Fuel Risk Study commissioned by PG&E during this public meeting.

A short break followed consideration of the Open Items List.

VI  COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION

A.  Public Outreach, Site Visits and Other Committee Activities:

The Members confirmed public meetings of the DCISC for  June 24-25 [subsequently changed to July 1-2] with a tour of the power plant with members of the public [subsequently, due to the coronoavirus pandemic a decision was made, if allowed under the requirements of the Bailey-Keene Open Meeting Act, to conduct the July 1-2, 2020 public meeting entirely by remote means and accordingly not to conduct a public tour], September 30-October 1, 2020 [subsequently changed to October 22-23, 2020], February16-17, 2021, and the Members and Consultants then scheduled a public meeting for June 23-24, 2021.

Fact-finding visits were confirmed and scheduled as follows:

[2020] March 17-18 RJB/RDM; April 15-16 PL/RFW; May 12-13 PFP/RDM; July 14-15 PFP/RFW; August 19-20 PL/RDM [Evaluated Emergency Exercise 8/19]; September 1-2 RJB/RFW; November 9-10 RJB/RDM; December 8-9, 2020  PFP/RFW; and

[2021] January 27-28, 2021 PL/RDM; March 17-18 RJB/RFW; April 20-21 PL/RDM; May 11-12 PFP/RFW.

Dr. Peterson reported that along with Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie he met with Governor Newsom's Senior Advisor for Energy Alice Reynolds, Esq. to provide her with information concerning the Committee's activities including an assessment of the status of DCPP operations, review of the formation, history and background of the DCISC, review of the formulation, use and function of the Open Items List and the transparency and structure of DCISC public meetings, and to discuss the role of the DCISC in comparison to the roles of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). The DCISC representatives also discussed workplace seismic issues and the use of the FLEX[2] Program at DCPP.  Dr. Peterson commented Ms. Reynolds had several questions concerning the matter of the PG&E bankruptcy including the possibility that DCPP might be sold and transferred to another licensee prior to its planned closure and she discussed with the DCISC representatives post-shutdown risks and a possible post-shutdown role for the DCISC to continue to review issues related to the safe storage of spent nuclear fuel after the plant ceases to generate electricity.

B.  Documents Provided to the Committee:

The Chair observed that a list of documents received by the DCISC since its last public meeting in October 2019 was included in the public agenda packet for this meeting and Dr. Lam remarked the Committee strives to always conduct its business in a transparent fashion.  

VII  STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND  AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E

The Chair requested Consultant Wardell to report on the November 6-7, 2019, fact-finding visit with Dr. Budnitz to DCPP. He reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the November 6-7, 2019, visit as follows:

•  Meeting with NRC Resident Inspector - Mr. Wardell reported the DCISC representatives met with NRC Senior Resident Inspector Mr. Christopher Newport to discuss the items on the agenda from the DCISC's October 2019 public meeting:  good performance during the Main Generator Stator Rewind project conducted during refueling outage 2R21, an issue with an equipment lifting sling failure, good performance during 2R21with respect to foreign material exclusion efforts, a clearance issue related to a hydrogen flash event, gaps identified by the NRC to fire barriers, and paint discovered on some sprinkler heads which events Mr. Wardell reported have been entered into and are being addressed through the DCPP Corrective Action Program.

•  Containment Structure Review - the fact-finding team reviewed the Containment structure which Mr. Wardell described as functioning during normal and accident conditions to protect the public and the DCPP workforce from a release of radiation and to protect the reactor and equipment located inside Containment from external missiles or weather-related phenomena.  The DCPP Containment, which Mr. Wardell described as quite robust is approximately four feet thick and is designed for a pressure of 47 psig (pounds per square inch gauge).  Mr. Wardell reported a number of inspections are conducted of the Containment structure including of its concrete surface every five years and the plant is now using a drone with a very high resolution camera for these inspections.  Dr. Peterson inquired whether the camera has stereoscopic visualization capabilities and Mr. Wardell reported the DCISC could follow up on that question.  Dr. Budnitz reported the Containment inspections are conducted in accordance with American Concrete Institute national codes which are applicable to a harsh marine environment such as DCPP experiences. Mr. Wardell reported the steel liner inside Containment is visually inspected every 40 months, every ten years an Integrated Leak Rate Test is performed, and the DCPP Containment structures have passed all tests since commencement of operations.  Dr. Peterson observed that operability tests of this type are quite important.  Mr. Wardell reported the DCISC representatives concluded the Containment structures were sound and without significant issues.

•  Plant Tour of Outage 2R21 Activities - the DCISC representatives toured the plant to observe activities during 2R21 including the work underway to modify the stator coil cooling water system as part of the Main Generator Stator Rewind Project.  Mr. Wardell reported the Main Generator is cooled by hydrogen and the hydrogen is cooled by the Stator Coil Cooling Water System.  The DCISC team also reviewed maintenance activities on the Unit-2 Main Feedwater Pump.  All work was found to be professionally conducted and the plant was observed to be maintained in a very clean and orderly condition.

•  Observe Corrective Action Review Board (CARB) Meeting - Mr. Wardell reported the CARB is a senior management oversight group that reviews root cause evaluations and other performance measures.  During the DCISC's observation the CARB reviewed an injury to a security officer, a breaker test which was stopped after a surveillance test, a Unit-2 reactor trip and the 20 oldest condition reports documented in the Corrective Action Program.  Mr. Wardell reported the CARB meeting was satisfactory, included good discussion and appeared to meet all its objectives.

•  Engineering Excellence Plan Update - the DCISC fact-finding team met with the Engineering Director to discuss the Engineering Excellence Plan which Mr. Wardell described as focusing on engineering and other technical personnel in advocating for an engineering conscience. Mr. Wardell stated this is an important concept with reference to the personal obligation of leaders and individuals to internalize and to exercise judgment to ensure plant operation, maintenance and engineering activities are conducted in a manner that upholds plant design requirements and preserves operating design and safety margins. Mr. Wardell stated the DCISC representatives found the engineering conscience concept to be effective.

•  Quality Verification (QV) Assessment of Fire Protection Procedures - Mr. Wardell stated that a QV assessment of a sampling of fire protection procedures written by a contractor found a number of technical errors.  The extent of condition review conducted in response prompted the Operations Procedure group to review all 91 fire protection procedures.  Errors were corrected and improvements made in accordance with the latest procedure writing standards. Mr. Wardell reported the QV assessor was effective in identifying this issue and the DCISC team found the procedure corrections to be satisfactory.

•  Reactivity Management Update - Mr. Wardell stated reactivity management is focused on the control of the potential for a nuclear core to increase or decrease its chain reaction rate and accordingly the power level of the reactor. He reported the Reactivity Management Leadership Team oversees management of reactivity management operations at DCPP and reactivity performance is rated in Green[3] health status.  Mr. Wardell reported the Reactivity Management Program appeared to be well managed.

•  WANO (World Association of Nuclear Power Operators) Evaluation - Mr. Wardell reported the WANO is the worldwide equivalent of the INPO in the United States and WANO and INPO work together to review performance of domestic and international nuclear stations, conduct evaluations and promote excellence in operations.  While Mr. Wardell reported that for reasons of confidentiality he could not provide details, he was able to report that the recent WANO evaluation of DCPP found good performance by the plant with both strengths and areas for improvement identified for which DCPP in its response to WANO has created action plans.  Dr. Budnitz reported WANO inspection teams include U.S. representatives as well as inspectors from other countries and the WANO inspections are intense, intrusive, provide a valuable perspective and represent good safety practice. 

•  Outage 1R21 Corrective Action Items Update - Mr. Wardell reported the DCISC fact-finding team reviewed issues with the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal leakage during refueling outage 1R21 and an issue with the Polar Crane having stopped operating during the reactor head lift operation during 1R21.  He reported these two issues were initially found to have been caused  by ineffective corrective actions which failed to prevent recurrence.  However, further review has determined that ineffective correction actions were not the cause and a recommendation made in the July 2019 Fact Finding Report should be revisited and deleted.  Dr. Budnitz reported the issue with the Polar Crane was not nuclear-safety related, but unabated RCP seal leakage could lead to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and a core damage accident but the actual leakage experienced at DCPP was far from that.

•  Observe Video of Listening and Learning Session - Mr. Wardell stated the station's top leadership team including Senior Vice President Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. James Welsch and DCPP Site Vice President Ms. Paula Gerfen conduct these sessions which sometimes include other corporate officers to communicate with employees regarding the current state of the plant as well as concerning corporate issues. The DCISC representatives reviewed the session by their observation of a video and found the Listening and Learning Session to be an effective communication method.

•  Meet with DCPP Officer, Site Vice President Ms. Paula Gerfen - the DCISC fact-finding team discussed areas covered during the fact-finding with Ms. Gerfen and other areas of interest.

Upon a motion made by  Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Lam, the November 6-7, 2019 Fact Finding Report was accepted by the DCISC and its transmittal to PG&E was authorized.  The report will become a part of the Committee's 30th Annual Report.

The Chair requested Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie to report on administrative, regulatory, and legal matters. Mr. Rathie reported that with Dr. Peterson, he attended a meeting in November with the Governor's Senior Advisor for Energy.  He remarked the next appointment for a term on the DCISC will be made by the Governor and that process is now in progress and is being conducted as in the past by the CPUC Energy Division and Dr. Peterson is one of the candidates and is under consideration for reappointment to a three-year term on the DCISC.  Mr. Rathie commented that although the DCISC is not a party to the 2018 Nuclear Decommissioning Trust Triennial Proceedings (2018 NDCTP), having had its Application for party status denied,

the Committee does receive regular notices of the proceeding.  He reported a settlement has been proposed in the 2018 NDCTP between a number of the parties, some of whom were parties to the Joint Proposal[4] which was approved to retire DCPP at the end of its current operating licenses.  He reported the settlement proposal in the 2018 NDCTP if approved would provide for a post-shutdown role for the DCISC until all fuel was within the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) which is essentially the same role which has been discussed and recommended by the Committee in several past discussions during its public meetings and will be discussed later at this public meeting.  In closing his remarks, Mr. Rathie thanked the Members for submitting their Form 700 Statements of Economic Interest as required by the CPUC Decisions which created and continued the Committee.  He reported that the Committee's website www.dcisc.org has averaged 740 unique visits every month during 2019 with the greatest number of visitors being from the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, the Russian Federation and Canada.

VIII ADJOURN MORNING MEETING

The Chair adjourned the morning meeting of the DCISC at 11:45 A.M.

IX  RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING

The afternoon meeting of the DCISC was convened by the Chair at 1:30 P.M.

X COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments from any Members at this time.

XI  PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Dr. Lam invited members of the public to address the Committee on matters not on the agenda for this meeting.  There was no response to this invitation

XII  ACTION ITEM (Cont'd.)

Discussion of Possible Alternative to Amend the DCISC's Restated Charter to Provide for a Continued Role for the DCISC following DCPP's Cessation of Electricity Generating Operations to Review Nuclear Fuel-Related Issues and to Terminate that Review Upon Completion of the Safe Transfer to all Nuclear Fuel to the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI); Approval of Submission of an Application or Other Communication to the California Public Utilities Commission.

Dr. Lam requested Assistant Legal Counsel Rathie to introduce and lead the discussion on this item. Mr. Rathie introduced Mr. Martin Mattes, an attorney with the Nossaman LLP law firm who was present for this public meeting and Mr. Rathie reported Mr. Mattes has on numerous occasions ably assisted the Committee with regulatory matters and has provided sound advice concerning the instant matter and other matters which may come before the CPUC.

Mr. Rathie commented that the discussion this afternoon follows previous discussions by the Committee and comments by members of the public concerning amending the present Restated Charter for the Committee approved by the CPUC in 2007 to propose a continued role for the DCISC to review, assess and report on safety of operations at DCPP after the cessation of electricity generating operations by DCPP.  He stated the 2007 Restated Charter is ambiguous as to the meaning of "assessing safety of operations" after the plant ceases to generate electricity. He reported the cessation of generation is currently expected to begin with the shutdown of Unit-1 in 2024 [followed by Unit-2 in 2025]. Mr. Rathie stated the proposed Second Restated Charter for the DCISC which the Committee proposed for adoption at its October 2019 public meeting was one of three alternative proposed restatements previously considered by the Committee and was provided as part of the agenda packet for this public meeting with only very minor typographical changes from the version which was considered by the DCISC in October 2019.  The proposed Second Restated Charter would, if adopted,  provide for continued safety review of nuclear fuel-related matters until all the fuel was safely transferred and stored within the ISFSI.

Mr. Rathie reported that with Mr. Mattes he has had two conversations with Mr. David Zizmor of the CPUC's Energy Division, who serves as the Committee's principal point of contact with the Energy Division, concerning the Settlement Agreement proposed as a part of the 2018 NDCTP which proceeding is now under consideration before a newly assigned CPUC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).  The Settlement includes PG&E and a number of parties who were also parties to the Joint Proposal.  The Settlement Agreement in the 2018 NDCTP would if approved address a number of issues one of which is a summary proposal to continue the Charter of the DCISC following cessation of electricity generating activities.  However, there are no details in the Settlement Agreement as to the nature of a continuing role for the DCISC.  After discussions with Mr. Mattes and Mr. Zizmor Mr. Rathie reported it appears there may be a pathway and a possibility that the matter of a Second Restated Charter for the DCISC might be addressed and resolved in context of the 2018 NDCTP or a subsequent associated proceeding, even though the Committee's previous Application for party status in that proceeding was denied by the previously assigned ALJ.  Alternatively, the DCISC also continues to have an option to file a separate Application with the CPUC for a Second Restated Charter but this option is expected to require more time and expense than offered in context of the 2018 NDCTP for which a decision is expected this year.  Mr. Rathie remarked that after the appointment of a DCISC Committee member by the Governor this year, the next appointment will be by the Chair of the California Energy Commission for a term of service on the DCISC from July 1, 2021 through June 30, 2024, ending just prior to the anticipated shutdown of Unit-1 in November 2024 and it would be preferable to have a Second Restated Charter in place before the CEC Chair is scheduled to make that appointment, if the Committee were to have a continuing role after cessation of electricity generating operations.

Mr. Rathie reported the DCISC Legal Counsel's office was seeking authority from the Members to continue to work with the Energy Division and specifically with Mr. Zizmor to set up a process to continue a path to approve a Second Restated Charter for the DCISC.

The Chair called for comments from the Members.  Dr. Budnitz stated the 2007 Restated Charter changed the nomination process for DCISC membership to eliminate the participation of the Dean of Engineering at the University of California, Berkeley, and of PG&E in vetting candidates for appointment.  The Second Restated Charter under consideration is proposed to clarify and establish a post-generation role for the Committee along with effecting several other changes which are proposed to bring the charter for the DCISC into conformity with certain post 2007 regulatory requirements. If approved, a Second Restated Charter would continue the work of the Committee until all nuclear fuel is safely within the ISFSI upon which the DCISC's activities would cease. Dr. Budnitz reported in the past Members have discussed and judged that at that point with all fuel safely within the ISFSI any remaining safety issues are not large and, crucially that safety at that time would, with the exception of security, be entirely passive with no active equipment required.  Dr. Budnitz reported the Committee considered other options including terminating its review earlier or later than is now proposed.  He stated his opinion the value of the Committee lies not only in its review of safety but also its ability to call attention to safety issues, provide information to the public during its meetings and to provide a ready conduit to documents,  Dr. Budnitz reported there is no other nuclear power plant in the United States where the public has the access which is provided by the DCISC.

Dr. Peterson remarked after all the spent nuclear fuel has been safely and fully transferred to the ISFSI in his judgment there is no longer a logical reason to continue the DCISC as, compared to the very long list of open items now reviewed by the Committee, he concluded that almost everything the Committee does would no longer be necessary once the fuel is safely within the ISFSI.  He commented the discussions at previous public meetings have resulted in a consensus about a post-generation role and the focus is now on how to get a Second Restated Charter considered and implemented by the CPUC.

Dr. Lam stated his earlier concern that this Committee's efforts might be seen as the Committee attempting to prolong its existence has now been addressed and the current discussion is focused on safety and what contribution a post-generation continuance of the Committee might add to safety.  

Dr. Budnitz remarked on a recent visit he made to the site of the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station in western Massachusetts which was shut down in 1992.  He reported all the plant's facilities have been completely removed and only its ISFSI remains and while the canisters are occasionally inspected and measurements are taken, the site is now guarded only by a single individual who is armed and has the ability to call for additional assistance if needed.  Accordingly, Dr. Budnitz stated that if DCPP were to reach a decommissioned state akin to Yankee Rowe there would be very little for an independent safety oversight group such as the DCISC to do.

Mr. Mattes stated regarding 2007 when the Committee submitted its last proposal for a Restated Charter, the CPUC processes and procedures are quite different than they were in 2007 and the Restated Charter approved in 2007 was processed and a decision was reached in approximately four months.  Since then Mr. Mattes reported the California Legislature has imposed more structure on the manner in which the CPUC operates including the requirement that every proceeding must include a prehearing conference and have a scoping memo issued by the assigned Commissioner.  There are now also very strict rules on ex parte communications.  The result is that proceedings before the CPUC now take longer and are more complex than was previously the case and it is rare that a decision in response to an application is issued in less than one year's time.  Mr. Mattes commented that unlike the Application filed by the DCISC in 2007 an application filed now would not likely be as efficiently processed as in 2007.

Mr. Mattes stated it was fortunate that the Settlement Agreement in the 2018 NDCTP includes a reference to the continuance of the Committee beyond the point at which the plant ceases generating electricity as this provides a viable alternative path which could prove to be faster and may prove to be more economical for the Committee, in that the Committee would not be taking the initiative but rather would serve as a resource for others who have taken the initiative regarding its continuance.  Mr. Mattes reported Mr. Zizmor has taken an interest in this matter and has indicated he is willing to facilitate consideration of how to implement that element of the proposed Settlement Agreement with the issue now being how to get the proposed Second Restatement before the CPUC for approval.  While it is not clear at this time how that will or might be accomplished the first step is to get the Second Restatement to Mr. Zizmor so that he might serve as a means of communication between the DCISC and the assigned ALJ.  Mr. Mattes observed that while it is possible the Energy Division could provide a resolution for adoption by the CPUC, Mr. Zizmor has indicated his preference at present would be to have the Second Restatement approved through the 2018 NDCTP as part of the decision to be drafted by the ALJ.  Mr. Mattes stated the ALJ could simply approve the proposed Settlement Agreement or in the alternative the ALJ's proposed decisions might establish a process to either approve the proposed Second Restatement or put it out for comment in some manner in which there would be a subsequent decision to consider its approval. Mr. Mattes stated either of those paths would be relatively expeditious and more likely to reach a conclusion sooner than if the  Committee were to submit an application in a separate proceeding.

In response to Dr. Budnitz' inquiry, Mr. Mattes replied the simplest approach in his opinion would be for the ALJ to draft the proposed decision to recognize that a consensus exists on having the DCISC's role be clarified such that it would remain in place in a manner which would need to be defined but could certainly be in accord with the proposed Second Restated Charter recommended by the Committee.  However, Mr. Mattes stated it was more likely the ALJ would include in the proposed decision a process for consideration of the Second Restated Charter in a separate fashion and make its approval subject to a separate decision in the same proceeding.  In confirming Dr. Budnitz' observation that the option still exists for the Committee to file a separate application Mr. Mattes stated that whether such an application would be accepted for filing is now an open question given that the DCISC was denied party status in the 2018 NDCTP.

Dr. Lam observed the Committee's existing Restated Charter is unambiguous as to the Committee's duty and obligation to continue to review safety through at least the 2024-2025 time frame while the plant continues to generate electricity and other options might present themselves in the interim.

Ms. Rochelle Becker, Executive Director of the Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility (A4NR) was recognized.  Ms. Becker stated the A4NR has been a party to the 2018 NDCTP for many months and she stated in her opinion there is no reason that the 2018 NDCTP should be delayed or placed in abeyance to consider the matter of the continuance of the DCISC as the Committee remains fully funded and its mandate allows the Committee to continue its safety review while the plant continues to generate electricity.  She stated her belief that the matter of a post-shutdown role for the DCISC might be better considered in the 2021 NDCTP.  By raising the matter in the 2018 NDCTP Ms. Becker stated all that would be achieved is to delay that proceeding as there has been nothing filed in the 2018 NDCTP that includes the proposed Second Restatement of the DCISC's Charter.  Ms. Becker stated it is not that she opposes a second restatement of the DCISC Charter but only that it would delay the 2018 NDCTP and many of the parties involved now in the 2018 NDCTP are also involved in matters and in the proceedings concerning the PG&E bankruptcy.  She commented that A4NR is concerned about how the bankruptcy might affect DCPP and it is necessary at this time to keep the focus on those matters.  Dr. Budnitz commented in the event of an unexpected event, such as occurred at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) in southern California, which would force a sudden shutdown of DCPP the Committee might be left in an ambiguous status as to a continuing role. Mr. Becker responded that A4NR was also involved in the SONGS shutdown and she observed the SONGS shutdown involved many emergency statutes and decisions which were put in to place to make sure that what was needed continued to be available and she has no doubt that would happen as well if DCPP were to be suddenly shut down.  Ms. Becker stated that the CPUC finds the DCISC to be of value and she commented that a sudden shutdown of DCPP would most likely be brought about for financial reasons which would not involve the immediacy that was associated with the SONGS shutdown.

Mr. David Weisman representing A4NR was recognized. Mr. Weisman remarked the 2021 NDCTP will be filed with the CPUC in approximately one year's time and he stated this represents an opportunity for the DCISC to make its request for the CPUC to consider a Second Restatement of the DCISC's Charter and he opined because of the inclusion of the matter in the 2018 NDCTP the Committee should not have difficulty achieving party status in the 2021 proceeding which would only result in a delay of 12 to 18 months and therefore would not impact Committee's operations under its present Restated Charter.  Dr. Budnitz observed the 2021 NDCTP would likely not be finalized until 2023 and he stated in his view it would be preferable to have an earlier resolution of this matter. Mr. Weisman replied that consideration of the proposed Second Restatement would require all the parties in the 2018 NDCTP to have the opportunity to review the Committee's recommended proposal for a Second Restated Charter and this would delay the proceedings and if disagreement were to result, the approval of the Settlement Agreement in the 2018 NDCTP could also be delayed.

Mr. Mattes replied that Mr. Weisman's concern reinforced his recommendation to pursue the most expeditious manner by which a Second Restated Charter might be approved, that is, by the ALJ in the 2018 NDCTP making its approval a part of the proposed decision.  However, Mr. Mattes commented he recognized that a more conservative approach would be to attach the Second Restated Charter to the proposed decision in the 2018 NDCTP to clarify the DCISC's mandate but as an object for further comment and subsequently as part of a separate decision, albeit in the 2018 NDCTP but by way of a separate phase from the ALJ's proposed decision.  In that manner Mr. Mattes stated there would be no need for delay in taking action on approval of the Settlement Agreement because the proposed decision would provide that venue.  Alternatively, Mr. Mattes remarked the ALJ could simply open up a second phase of the 2018 NDCTP and invite the submission of a Second Restated Charter by the Committee.  Mr. Mattes stated he remains skeptical that the Commission would allow party status to the DCISC  in a subsequent CPUC proceeding  due to the precedent created by the denial of party status in the 2018 NDCTP.  In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry Mr. Mattes stated the Energy Division has an advisory role with the ALJ.  Dr. Lam stated that he found Mr. Mattes' suggestion to be an excellent approach to the matter.  In response to Mr. Rathie's comment as to whether the Second Restated Charter for the Committee is already a part of the 2018 NDCTP, Mr. Mattes replied while true the ALJ could simply choose to pass over the matter and not further mention the reference in the Settlement Agreement to a revised Charter for the Committee.

Dr. Budnitz recommended that the Committee make a determination as to the proposed Second Restated Charter for the DCISC in this public forum and Mr. Mattes stated as part of such a determination direction could be given to provide the Second Restated Charter for the Committee to Mr. Zizmor or to the CPUC President or the assigned Commissioner, but he observed the ALJ previously assigned to the 2018 NDCTP had advised the Committee to work through Mr. Zizmor.  Mr. Rathie reported the Committee took action at its October 2019 public meeting to approve a proposed Second Restated Charter and the version before the Committee this afternoon contained only very minor non substantive changes shown in underlined text in the version included with the public agenda packet for this meeting.  Dr. Lam then made a motion to approve the revised Second Restated Charter for the DCISC and forward same to the Energy Division. 

Dr. Peterson recommended that the Committee follow the advice of Counsel to achieve the most expeditious and efficient manner to seek approval, recognizing the Committee's responsibility to the PG&E ratepayers who provide funds for its operations.  Dr. Budnitz suggested in the alternative that the Committee could consider authorizing a second process channel aside from the Energy Division.  Drs. Peterson and Lam both recommended deferring seeking a recourse other than through the Energy Division.  Dr. Budnitz seconded Dr. Lam's motion and the Committee then unanimously approved and adopted as its proposed restatement of a Charter  for a post-shutdown role  for the Committee the revised Second Restatement of a Charter for the Committee included with the agenda packet.

Following approval of the first motion, a second motion was introduced by Dr. Lam for Committee Counsel to provide the adopted proposed Second Restated Charter for the Committee as approved at this public meeting to the CPUC Energy Division staff with the recommendation that the Energy Division pursue the most expeditious avenue to bring the second restatement to the attention of the ALJ assigned to the 2018 NDCTP with reference to a procedure to be found for the Commission to approve it. Dr. Peterson provided a second to Dr. Lam's motion and the vote to approve was unanimous.  Mr. Rathie confirmed that the text of the proposed second restatement of a Charter for the Committee is posted on the Committee's website.

XIII TECHNICAL CONSULTANT REPORTS & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND   AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E

The Chair requested Consultant Wardell to report on the proposal to revise and adopt for approval a revised July 22-23, 2019 Fact-finding Report concerning the visit by Dr. Peterson and Consultant McWhorter to DCPP.  Mr. Wardell reported that during the November 2019 fact-finding visit Mr. Wardell made with Dr. Budnitz, the DCISC representatives inquired further concerning a recommendation made as a result of the July 2019 visit and received information that the conclusion reached during the July 22-23, 2019, fact-finding visit that two issues which occurred during the 1R21 refueling outage and previously believed to have been the result of ineffective corrective actions were not related to or due to ineffective correction actions. Accordingly the Recommendation made in the July 2019 Fact Finding Report, presented to the Committee at its October 2019 public meeting, has now been better informed by new information received and accordingly the Recommendation should be removed and the July Fact Finding Report revised to include information subsequently received.

Upon a motion made by  Dr. Peterson, seconded by Dr. Budnitz, the July 22-23, 2019 Fact Finding Report was accepted as revised by the DCISC and transmittal of the revised Fact Finding Report to PG&E was authorized.  The report as revised will become a part of the Committee's 30th Annual Report.

The Chairman requested Consultant McWhorter to report on the December 10-11, 2019, fact-finding visit with Dr. Peterson to DCPP. Mr. McWhorter reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the December 10-11, 2019 visit as follows:

•  Meet with NRC Senior Resident Inspector -  Mr. McWhorter reported the fact-finding team met with Senior NRC Resident Inspector Mr. Christopher Newport to discuss NRC inspection activities, refueling outage performance, recent human error events and recent inspection findings and perspectives on plant performance.

•  Cause Evaluation and Corrective Actions for Inadvertent Unit-2 "F" Bus Transfer - Mr. McWhorter reported this event occurred while Unit-2 was at power when an error by technicians performing maintenance surveillance testing on undervoltage relays for F Bus caused F Bus to transfer automatically to its alternate power supply.  The error occurred when the technicians engaged in removing a jumper placed for the testing failed to timely coordinate removal of the jumper from the front and back of the panel so that when the switch closed a short circuit was created and blew a fuse on the control circuit for F Bus causing it to transfer to its alternate power supply.  Mr. McWhorter reported work was stopped and the event caused the plant to enter into a condition identified in the plant's Standard Technical Specifications (Tech Specs) which required the plant to shut down within 12 hours if proper alignment were not restored.  The plant developed and implemented a recovery plan and no damage other than the blown fuse was found.  The fuse was replaced and the plant realigned to normal conditions and the Tech Spec condition was exited.  Mr. McWhorter reported this event was significant due to being the first human performance error requiring a station-level event clock reset since August 2014 and a formal root cause evaluation was performed which determined inadequate three-way communication and a poor pre-job briefing as primary causes for the event.  Corrective actions included a hands-on training activity conducted for Maintenance technicians, training conducted for supervisors, and meetings to discuss expectations for pre-job briefings. The DCISC representatives found the corrective actions to be adequate and to have been properly implemented.

•  Intake Structure General Condition and Walkdown - Mr. McWhorter stated a walkdown of the condition of the Intake Structure is a recurring item on the Open Items List due to the environmental conditions the Intake Structure experiences in a harsh marine environment.  DCPP's inspection program includes both the submerged and above-water portions of the Intake Structure with the submerged portions being inspected during each refueling outage and the non submerged portions being inspected every two years.  The latest inspection was performed by a third party civil engineering specialty firm and 100% of the Intake Structure including its cathodic protection system was inspected visually and 75% of the structure was inspected through the use of soundings.  Approximately 5% of the areas inspected were found with delamination or other deficiencies.

The DCISC fact-finding team also reviewed the security changes planned for the Intake Structure for any potential impact to reactor safety.  Mr. McWhorter reported with these changes the Auxiliary Saltwater (ASW) System will remain a safety-related system, but it will no longer be considered as a vital system from the perspective of security.  He reported the plant is not required to be analyzed for the simultaneous occurrence of a design basis accident and an unrelated security event and the loss of the ASW System due to a security event could be compensated for by other decay heat removal methods such as are available through the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) or operation of the steam generators' power-operated relief valves. Dr. Budnitz observed the plant is designed such it would continue to be able to shut down safely if these two types of events were to occur simultaneously due to separation of components and the inclusion of redundant system trains.  Dr. Peterson noted that the methodology described by Dr. Budnitz is independent of safety and the Committee would not be involved in reviewing the classification of the AFW System as to its vital or non-vital status with respect to security and Dr. Peterson stated it was his opinion that the overall increase in the safety of the plant by the changes discussed was not altered in any substantive way by modifications made to the plant to defend itself against post 9/11 design basis threats.  He observed the current security classification of the Intake Structure does in many ways impede performing work because of the present level of access control requirements. Dr. Budnitz commented the plant must be capable of demonstrating it can respond to a design basis threat although the security aspects of any such scenario are confidential safeguards information and he observed that an analysis, including a numerical reliability analysis, of such events has not to Dr. Budnitz' knowledge been done. The Members vigorously discussed and agreed the DCISC does not have a role to assess how the plant would respond under a physical security attack and the classification of its systems and the probability of such an attack and the occurrence of a simultaneous unrelated accident in that context are not an appropriate topics for the Committee's public discussion.  Mr. McWhorter observed the Fact Finding Report, however, does make the statement that the changes to security protocol at the Intake Structure will not impact safety and this includes a qualitative decision that the plant is no longer relying on ASW System as a vital system in context of security but the plant will continue to rely on the AFW System which Mr. McWhorter stated makes sense from a safety perspective.  Dr. Budnitz commented this is an important distinction that is within the Committee's purview.

Mr. McWhorter reported the DCISC fact-finding team also reviewed physical changes to the Intake Structure involving fences and alarm systems and he remarked none of these changes were found to have an impact on safety.  Dr. Peterson observed the Committee has not been briefed on what the plant would rely upon in order to respond to design basis threats and could not reveal such information in public if it had been.  All that can be reported in public is that there has been a decision that the plant does not need to maintain the ASW System as a vital security area but anything more in the realm of speculation as to why should not be the subject of the Committee's review. Mr. McWhorter displayed a photograph and a drawing from the inspection report on the Intake Structure and stated these were useful tools for the DCISC fact-finding team so as to be able to walkdown the Intake Structure with the inspection report in hand in order to see the areas inspected.   

•  Meet with DCPP Officer -  Mr. McWhorter reported the DCISC representatives met with DCPP Site Vice President Ms. Paula Gerfen to discuss the PG&E bankruptcy situation and its effect, if any, on DCPP as well as the recent changes made to the INPO training accreditation process.

•  Future Spent Fuel Movement - Mr. McWhorter reported the DCISC team discussed with the plant staff issues relative to future spent fuel management and the status of the Spent Fuel Risk Study now being prepared by UCLA at the request of PG&E.  He reported a draft of the Study was completed in December 2019 but the DCISC has not been provided with a copy of the Study but during discussions with plant staff the Committee representatives received a general overview of the summary and conclusions which Mr. McWhorter stated were consistent with expectations and did not include anything of surprise to the DCISC representatives with regard to the relative risk of dry storage as compared to wet storage of nuclear fuel.  He reported the Study is expected to be final in February 2020 and will be used to inform the requests for proposals PG&E expects to issue in May 2020 for procurement of spent fuel dry storage casks.  Mr. McWhorter recommended that the DCISC follow-up on this matter at the fact-finding scheduled for March 2020.  Mr. Baldwin offered to provide information on when the Spent Fuel Risk Study might be made public and he subsequently reported PG&E plans to make the final Study available to the Diablo Canyon Decommissioning Engagement Panel at the Panel's meeting in September 2020.  

•  Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System -  Mr. McWhorter reported the RHR System is used for cooling when the reactor is shut down as well as for low pressure safety injection during an accident.  He reported the RHR System for Unit-1 is currently rated in Green health status while the RHR System for Unit-2 is manually flagged as in Red health status due to a single issue related to a recent failure of a recirculation valve on RHR Pump 2-1.  Following a surveillance test the valve demonstrated erratic operation and a relay that controls the valve was found to have failed due to age-related degradation.  Other similar relays were inspected with none found with similar problems and a design change was implemented to replace the relay with a different type. The DCISC team found the corrective action to be appropriate and the systems with the different relays to be in otherwise good condition.

•  Transmission System and Unit-2 Reactor Trip Corrective Actions - Mr. McWhorter stated this issue involved a follow up item to the corrective actions which followed a Unit-2 reactor trip.  He reported overall the transmission system for both the 500kV and the 230kV switchyards and the interconnecting wiring and cabling were found to be in good health.  Upgrades have been made to insulators to make them less susceptible to saline deposits in a marine environment and there are no major issues being tracked for either system for resolution.  The DCISC team also discussed with DCPP representatives PG&E's Public Safety Power Shutoff Program and DCPP's participation in that program.  Mr. McWhorter reported DCPP is kept informed with information on a 7-day look-ahead as well as by forecasts for use of the Program.  Mr. McWhorter reported it is unlikely that the Public Safety Power Shutoff Program would require DCPP to shut down its power lines as they are considered to be low risk in that they are not located in areas of high population or significantly at risk due to fire damage.  Any  power line shutdown would be conducted in accordance with the plant's Tech Specs to maintain the minimum number of operable lines and if that could not be achieved to shut down the units.  The fact-finding team also reviewed the modifications made after a December 2018 trip of Unit-2 due to the Special Protective Systems for both units which modifications now enable the System to receive input of breaker position indications from the substations at the other end of the power lines.  Mr. McWhorter reported these modifications have been completed and the associated grid instability study was also completed as have all other corrective actions from the December 2018 Unit-2 trip and items on the Open Items List relative to that event can now be closed.

•  Control Room Observation During Startup - during the DCISC representatives' visit to the Control Room to observe Unit-2 startup activities, a minor issue was experienced with one of the rod position indicators and the issue was under resolution during the visit.  The plant remained in a stable and safe condition with all nuclear instrumentation operational during resolution of this issue which involved one of the control rod banks of which there are a total eight with four control rod banks for normal control and four banks for shutdown control.  The DCISC representatives did have an opportunity to discuss reactivity control, startup procedures, staffing and the operation of nuclear instrumentation with the operators as well as to walk down the Unit-1 control boards.  Mr. McWhorter reported Control Room operations were conducted in a very professional atmosphere with appropriate formal procedures and methods for startup being employed.    

•  T+1 Critique Meeting - Mr. McWhorter reported the T+1 documents are received and reviewed by the DCISC and are a critique of the scheduled work performed during the previous week at the station.  The T+1 documents track metrics such as overdue preventive maintenance tests, outage window performance, scope stability and schedule adherence.  Mr. McWhorter characterized the T+1 document as a fairly strong process for critiquing work and he stated the T+1 process appeared to be effectively implemented.

•  Refueling Outage 2R21 Performance - Mr. McWhorter stated that as there is a presentation scheduled later during this public meeting to discuss this fact-finding item he would defer making a report at this time. He reported that the Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) Program during 2R21 had particularly good performance by the contractor in connection with the work on the Main Generator. He reported there were no issues during 2R21with radiation protection or nuclear fuel.  A cable on the Upender in Containment was repaired during the outage.  Results of the steam generator inspections were generally very good and Mr. McWhorter suggested the results be reviewed by the DCISC during subsequent fact-finding.

Following Mr. McWhorter's report Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized.  Ms. Lewis stated Mothers for Peace is interested in the Spent Fuel Risk Study being prepared by UCLA.  Ms. Lewis also inquired as to the discussion on the Intake Structure security change and the occurrence of a security event simultaneously with an unrelated event.  Dr. Budnitz stated the plant is not required by the NRC to be designed to protect against the occurrence of two such events simultaneously which determination by the NRC is based upon the probability of their occurrence but there are protections included in the plant's design to assure that redundant equipment cannot be compromised by such a simultaneous occurrence.  Dr. Budnitz remarked NRC regulations do not provide absolute assurance of safety but implement probabilistic safety goals for core damage frequency of less than 10^-4 per year.

Upon a motion made by  Dr. Budnitz, seconded by Dr. Lam, the November 6-7, 2019 Fact Finding Report was accepted by the DCISC and its transmittal to PG&E was authorized.  The report will become a part of the Committee's 30th Annual Report.

A short break followed.

XIV INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

The Chair requested PG&E Director of Generation Business Planning Mr. Thomas Baldwin to introduce the first of the informational presentations for this public meeting.  Mr. Baldwin introduced DCPP Station Director Mr. Cary Harbor who has given many presentations to the Committee in the past. Dr. Peterson expressed his sincere congratulations to Mr. Harbor with whom Dr. Peterson has a long acquaintance on Mr. Harbor's present assignment as DCPP Station Director.

Presentation on the State of the Plant including Key Events, Highlights, Organizational Changes, Update on PG&E Bankruptcy and Any Effect on Current and Future Operations and Station Activities since the DCISC's October  2019 Public Meeting.

Mr. Harbor reported Unit-1 and Unit-2 continue to operate safely at 100% power and in terms of probabilistic risk analysis the station is in Green status meaning it is in a very safe condition.  All NRC Performance Indicators are in Green status and the DCISC will receive a separate presentation on these Performance Indicators later during this public meeting.

Mr. Harbor stated the review by World Association of Nuclear Power Operators (WANO) reviewed all elements of station operation with the exception of security. The WANO team included members from INPO and members from various other nuclear power plants in the United States and around the world.  He stated that the results as to the grade received by DCPP from the WANO review are proprietary but the  review concluded DCPP was one of the strongest performing nuclear power plants in the world which Mr. Harbor described as a testament to the hard work of the DCPP team.  In response to Dr. Peterson's request Mr. Harbor reported INPO was created the year after the accident in 1979 at the Three Miles Island Nuclear Generating Station in Pennsylvania and WANO was created the year following the accident in 1986 at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant located in the Ukraine in the former Soviet Union.  WANO and INPO are both oversight organizations that look at the performance of nuclear power plants to help develop excellence in performance and in that regard WANO and INPO are very similar.  Each performs evaluations of plant performance and identifies actions to improve performance and then follows up on those evaluations to see how the identified actions were addressed and to ensure performance continues to improve.  Dr. Peterson observed that participation in these types of national and international organizations is very important and he stated that participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also requires member counties to provide increased access to nuclear facilities which is important for nonproliferation.  He stated that the United States as a nuclear weapons state in order to comply with IAEA protocols reports all of its nuclear fuel cycle-related research activities to the IAEA.  Mr. Harbor stated that the nuclear industry is open to learning to ensure that it does not become insular and to continue to seek excellence.

Mr. Harbor reported that in November 2019 an INPO accreditation team visited DCPP to review the effectiveness of its training programs for reaccreditation and he reported that during this public meeting information was received that INPO has reaccredited all twelve of DCPP's training programs which Mr. Harbor described as a significant milestone and great accomplishment.  In response to Dr. Peterson's inquiry, Mr. Harbor reported approximately 20-30 persons are involved over a two or three-month period with preparation for reaccreditation to support and create a very methodical manner to support the INPO team which consists of approximately 15 persons.  In response to Consultant McWhorter's query Mr. Harbor confirmed that DCPP served as the pilot program for a process whereby DCPP personnel were not required to attend the re accreditation board's proceedings at INPO's headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.  In response to Dr. Lam's question Mr. Harbor observed the new protocol simplifies the process and has advantages for INPO as well as for the plants whose programs INPO reviews.

Mr. Harbor reported DCPP completed refueling outage 2R21on December 18, 2019, which he stated was one of the longest refueling outages in terms of duration in the last 20 years, including refurbishment of the Main Generator stator with a considerable amount of work done by the Siemens firm.  Mr. Harbor described the 2R21outage as very successful with Unit-2 running continuously since the outage and the stator continuing to perform very well.  Unit-1 power operation was curtailed in December 2019 to conduct planned condenser cleaning.  Mr. Harbor reported 2R21ocucpied 87 days and achieved excellent safety performance in terms of industrial safety with no lost work days' and no recordable injuries.  In response to Dr. Peterson's inquiry concerning a graph showing Unit-1 performing above 100% power Mr. Harbor stated this was related to colder than normal Pacific Ocean temperatures which make the unit somewhat more efficient.  In response to Dr. Peterson's question concerning a slight rise in U-1 power operation just prior to its curtailment to 89% power operation to address an issue with supplemental grid protection Mr. Harbor stated he did not believe the rise in U-1 power was related or linked to U-2 returning to full power operation at the same time and Mr. Harbor agreed to review with the DCISC the slight power rise for Unit-1 in December 2019 during a future fact-finding.

During 2019 Mr. Harbor reported performance for both units was very successful including a very successful refueling outage for Unit-1 with Unit-1 generally running during 2019 at 100% power and with good performance also by Unit-2.

Mr. Harbor reported on a recent organizational change that has returned the Nuclear Generation organization to within a single  PG&E Generation organization under the direction of  PG&E Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. James Welsch.  He reported the Nuclear Business organization has been separated from the Power Generation organization and a new Business Operations organization has been formed within Generation which includes decommissioning, compliance, and risk functions.  Mr. Harbor reported Mr. Jan Nimick has been named Vice President of Power Generation and Mr. Nimick reports directly to Mr. Welsch as does DCPP Site Vice President Ms. Paula Gerfen and Ms. Maureen Zawalick who is serving as interim head of the Business Operations organization.

Mr. Harbor reported concerning the PG&E bankruptcy that claims on behalf of the victims of wildfires have been resolved within context of a settlement as have claims from insurance and other corporate and governmental entities and a separate plan of reorganization offer by the Elliott Management Group has been withdrawn as part of a settlement.  Complete resolution of the bankruptcy is now pending negotiations with Governor Newsom.  Concerning the Nuclear Generation organization Mr. Harbor reported the bankruptcy has had no effect on budgets or any of the resources needed to safely operate DCPP and he commented the NRC continues to monitor that situation.  In response to Dr. Peterson's query, Mr. Harbor reported DCPP continues to monitor for any effect on the morale of its workforce by continuously engaging with the workforce and conducting pulse surveys.  He pointed to the safe operation of the power plant as an indication that these efforts are having the desired result.  

Mr. Harbor reported a class of 15 persons will take the NRC examination during the week of February 24, 2020, to be initially licensed as a nuclear operator and there is an NRC evaluated emergency exercise scheduled for August 2020.  Unit-1 is scheduled for refueling outage 1R22 during October 2020 and there will be a considerable number of activities in connection with that outage.  In response to Consultant McWhorter's inquiry, Mr. Harbor stated that beside the class that will take examinations the week of February 24, 2020, there is one additional class ongoing at this time which, unless it is found that more licensed operators are needed to support operations, will be the last class conducted by DCPP.  In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry concerning Mr. Harbor's priorities as the Station Director, Mr. Harbor identified safety as his number one priority followed by reliability and affordability for the benefit of PG&E's ratepayers as second and third priorities behind safety.

Following Mr. Harbor's presentation Ms. Rochelle Becker of A4NR was recognized.  Ms. Becker remarked that as the Main Generator stator which was just replaced in 2R21 has an expected service life of approximately 20 years and it is planned to close the plant at the end of five years, whether there are plans as was done for the closure of SONGS to sell the stator to another utility and have those funds returned to PG&E's ratepayers.  Mr. Harbor stated this was a possibility and DCPP has a team working on the disposition of spare parts or surplus equipment.

The Chair thanked Mr. Harbor for a very informative presentation.

Mr. Baldwin introduced Mr. Ken Johnston, Chief of Nuclear Industry Relations at DCPP and reported Mr. Johnston began his career as an NRC inspector and has held a Senior Reactor Operator License.

Performance During the 21st Refueling Outage for Unit-2 (2R21) Including Generator Stator Refurbishment, Key Activities, Performance Indicators, Results Achieved, Fuel and Steam Generator Inspection Results, Unexpected Equipment Issues and Open Items.

Mr. Johnston reported 2R21commenced on September 22, 2019 and concluded on December 18, 2019.  He reviewed and briefly discussed key activities during the refueling outage as follows:

• Main Generator Stator rebuild which drove the outage duration;
• Reactor Coolant Pump 2-3 rotor and stator preventative maintenance replacement;
• Containment Fan Cooler Unit 2-5 cooling coil replacement;
• Steam Generator eddy current inspection with no tubes requiring plugging;
• Main Feedwater Pump 2-1 internal inspection;
• Circulating Water Pump 2-1 motor overhaul;
• 500 kV tower insulator replacement;
• 230 kV tower repair as part of PG&E's inspection of  transmission system components;
• Safety Injection Pump 2-1 motor replacement as an emergent repair;
• Containment Upender cable replacement, a part of the fuel transfer system.

Mr. Johnston reported that the Main Generator stator rebuild resulted in 600,000 pounds of steel and copper parts being removed, replaced, and recycled and more than 40 truckloads of material were sent to be recycled and 170,000 thousand man-hours were required to safely complete the rebuild the Unit-2 Main Generator stator.  He reported this project took seven years to complete from initial scoping to final installation by the Siemens firm.  He stated the Unit-2 Main Generator provides enough energy to power a city of one million people. The generator produces up to 30,000 Amps at 25,000 Volts.  In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry Mr. Johnston confirmed the expected lifetime of the Main Generator after the rebuild is estimated to be 20 years and while the Unit-2 Main Generator did not fail or show incipient signs of failure it was replaced at the end of its expected service lifetime.  Mr. Johnston then displayed and described a time-lapse video of disassembly activities during the Main Generator stator rebuild project which went on continuously for a period of two months on a 24-hour a day, seven days per week, basis.

Mr. Johnston reported that during 2R21 defense-in-depth principles were employed to maintain and ensure key safety function requirements were satisfied.  He described and discussed some of the high-risk and infrequently performed tests and evolutions during 2R21 including:

• Initial drain to lowered reactor coolant inventory for reactor disassembly and reassembly;
• Refueling cavity drain to lowered reactor coolant inventory following core reload;
• Vital bus transfer and integrated safeguards testing;
• Initial criticality of the new reactor core;
• Performance of heavy lifts over the reactor core;
• Main Generator ventilation test.

Mr. Johnston stated that these activities were supported by the highest levels of engagement by senior leadership at the plant.

Mr. Johnston reviewed the performance metrics developed for 2R21 in comparison to goals established for the outage as follows:

Performance Measure	Goal	Actual
Serious Near Hit events	0	0
Nuclear Safety Events	0	0
Site Clock resets	0	1
Outage duration (Days)	80	87.4
ALARA – (person-rem)	33/27.1	22.4
Power Ascension (Days)	5	4.0

In response to Consultant McWhorter's inquiries Mr. Johnston reported a site clock reset occurred during a transition from Mode 4 to Mode 5 when operators made an error by disabling the Containment spray system prior to entering Mode 5.  Mr. Johnston described the safety significance of this error as minimal, but it did violate the plant's Tech Specs. He further reported that the increased duration for 2R21 was a result of a number of factors including concluding the Main Generator rebuild, the need to add reinforcements to Operations activities in the plant and due to some equipment challenges when returning to power operations.

Mr. Johnston reviewed the results achieved during 2R21 as including:

• Main Generator successful rebuilt –running smoothly at 100% power;
• Successfully managing normal outage scope and the Main Generator project during an extended outage;
• Line ownership of ALARA which continues to be a strength;
• Safely completing emergent scope work on Safety Injection Pump motor 2-1;
• Safely completing the Containment underwater Upender cable replacement  with very low dose;
• Fuel and Steam Generator inspection results with no fuel defects found, no significant fuel   inspection findings and no steam generator tube plugging required.

In response to Consultant McWhorter's query Mr. Johnston confirmed there was contingency planning for the Containment Upender cable replacement project.  Dr. Budnitz observed the fact that there were no fuel defects represents a considerable improvement from years ago when fuel defects were more frequently encountered and Dr. Budnitz commented this was a result of improved manufacturing and fuel-handling techniques.  Mr. Johnston agreed and stated that improved foreign material exclusion practices relative to the Reactor Coolant System also contributes to fewer fuel defects.

Mr. Johnston reported during 2R21 DCPP brought in 904 temporary workers to assist in outage-related work activities and he confirmed Dr. Budnitz observation that female workers

made up a significant number of temporary workers which he agreed was a change from the past.  In response to Dr. Budnitz' inquiry as to how many temporary workers were also local residents Mr. Johnson stated he did not have details on the numbers but he remarked that DCPP has a number of temporary worker returnees for refueling outage work.

Mr. Johnston identified items to be followed up after 2R21 as:

• Fuel handling equipment reliability, continuing to focus on cable replacement;
• Timely and accurate schedule updates;
• Translating procedures into schedule logic.

In response to Consultant McWhorter's inquiry concerning the item regarding translating procedures into schedule logic Mr. Johnson stated this effort involves identification and communication of logical predecessor and successor items on the outage execution schedule and ensuring that logic is incorporated and translated into the outage schedule.  He used the example of safety injection testing as an illustration where if procedures change during an outage regarding the sequence of those tests there would need to be schedule changes. Mr. Johnson concluded his presentation by confirming that the above items are documented to track corrective actions.

Following Mr. Johnston presentation Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized.  In response to Ms. Lewis' question Mr. Johnston reported a contractor team of three or four nuclear-qualified divers were used to work underwater for the Containment Upender underwater cable replacement work.

XV  ADJOURN AFTERNOON MEETING

The Chair observed the evening meeting of the Committee would be convened at 5:30 P.M. and he adjourned the afternoon meeting of the Committee at 4:45 P.M.

XVI RECONVENE FOR EVENING MEETING

Dr. Lam reconvened the evening meeting of the DCISC at 5:30 P.M.

XVII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments by Members at this time.

XVIII  PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS

Dr. Lam invited members of the public to address the Committee on matters not on the agenda for this meeting.  Ms. Jane Swanson of San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace was recognized.  In response to Ms. Swanson's inquiry the Members confirmed that when PG&E makes a decision concerning ordering new spent nuclear fuel dry storage casks the Committee will be involved in reviewing the attributes of the new casks, as well as in reviewing the comparative Risk Study being conducted by UCLA of wet and dry spent fuel storage methods and the differing capabilities of available casks which has now been completed by UCLA and is under review.  Dr. Lam observed the issues are both procedural and technical and stem from requests by the California Energy Commission (CEC) and the CPUC to assess whether DCPP can move fuel from wet to dry storage on a schedule akin to that achieved by SONGS.  Dr. Lam observed that much time has and will continue to be required in the effort to complete the Risk Study as well as subsequently to develop a request for proposals for new casks as well as to go through a licensing procedure for new casks and Dr. Lam stated his view that the window to complete these tasks if faster transfer is to be achieved may be rapidly closing.  Dr. Budnitz remarked that at the present time DCPP has no casks in its inventory available for the storage of spent fuel.

Mr. David Weisman representing A4NR was recognized.  Mr. Weisman stated the present situation, including the fact that no new casks have been ordered, was the result of PG&E having unilaterally abandoned in spite of the CEC's request plans for a spent fuel loading campaign which was to have taken place during 2017-2018.  Dr. Lam observed that Mr. Weisman's statement was true but the hiatus in the loading campaign was also a consequence of the requests made that PG&E explore the ability to effect a faster transfer than is possible given the capacities of the casks used to date by DCPP.  Dr. Peterson observed that even with more rapid offload of fuel from the spent fuel pools to dry storage, under current rules for casks and the need to thermally manage the process requires that a certain amount of spent fuel must continue to remain in the pools for a longer period of time, with the alternative being to delay loading campaigns with the result that the pools would empty sooner. Dr. Peterson observed the Risk Study being done by UCLA is expected to provide an analysis of the risk of the different alternatives.

XIX INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)

The Chair introduced Mr. Joe Guzzardi, Emergency Services Manager for the County of San Luis Obispo Office of Emergency Services.

Presentation by the Emergency Services Manager for the San Luis Obispo County Office of Emergency Services on Emergency Preparedness Programs.

Mr. Guzzardi reported the Office of Emergency Services (OES) is part of the San Luis Obispo County Administrator's office which he stated he believes to be the appropriate location for OES within the County's organizational structure.  OES is staffed by Mr. Guzzardi as the Manager and also by six additional staff members, three of whom have been longtime OES staff whom Mr. Guzzardi described as subject matter experts on the implementation of OES programs related to DCPP.  Mr. Guzzardi reported he has been employed in county government for 32 years and previously served in emergency services-related capacities in Santa Barbara and Santa Clara Counties and in those positions he has dealt with wildfires, mud slides, airline crashes, active shooter incidents and large events such as the Super Bowl which required activation of emergency operations centers.

Mr. Guzzardi reported he has been OES Manager in San Luis Obispo County since January of 2019 and in past assignments during his tenure with Santa Barbara County he participated with the previous San Luis Obispo OES Manager, Mr. Ron Alsop, in tri-county meetings along with representatives from Ventura County.

Mr. Guzzardi remarked the presence of DCPP in San Luis Obispo County provides a steady funding stream to permit the County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to be operationally ready at all times and to make equipment purchases to enable the cities within the emergency planning zone to be outfitted with adequate equipment.  Mr. Guzzardi commented that in his experience having the budget resources realized because of DCPP is an anomaly in emergency services work.  The OES' overall annual budget is now funded by approximately $2,100,000 from PG&E, which makes up approximately 75% of the OES budget, and by $275,000 in County general fund support as well as by some grant funds and OES' budget is tied to a cost-of-living index. In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry Mr. Guzzardi replied that more than half of the OES budget is allocated to equipment purchases and he stated his opinion that the present budget is very adequate to OES needs.  He remarked the budget allows San Luis Obispo's OES to offer slightly higher compensation to its employees and this assists in recruiting the best qualified staff and OES is presently in the process of hiring an additional person.  Mr. Guzzardi reported that the passage of California Senate Bill 1090 (SB 1090) provides funding to the County to compensate it for a portion of the revenue that will be lost when DCPP closes and he reported that funds made available to OES under SB 1090 could be used for activities unrelated to nuclear operations.   

Mr. Guzzardi reported emergency operations organizations in California follow a  standardized emergency management system in their internal interaction within each county, with cities being the first responders and the county organizations assisting as needed to activate their EOCs for larger incidents such as wildfires. The next level in the emergency response hierarchy is for the State of California to become involved and following state involvement, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) organization would become involved which typically follows a Presidential declaration of an emergency.  Mr. Guzzardi stated this hierarchy is well understood by the organizations involved and from the County perspective it allows the OES to work with cities, special districts and with DCPP and to interact as necessary at the state and federal levels.  He commented OES works within operational areas and with any jurisdiction that has an elected body as well as with educational institutions such as Cal Poly and Cuesta College and with volunteer groups. He reported that DCPP is a significant partner with OES in its work of planning and preparing for emergencies.  OES also works with the County's Public Health Department and has recently had conversations concerning a response to the threat now posed by the novel coronavirus.

Mr. Guzzardi described the process used by OES as consisting of preparing, responding, recovering, and then identifying mitigation activities to ensure mistakes made are not repeated.  He reported of these aspects, recovery is a major part of OES operations on many levels and is also tied to economic recovery from events such as wildfires.  He reported federal grants are available for mitigation activities and to facilitate interaction with various entities such as water districts and public works organizations to assist in improving local infrastructure.  Mr. Guzzardi reported his organization has recently increased its efforts to train and conduct drills to familiarize personnel, including DCPP personnel, with the concepts, roles, and responsibilities he described to the DCISC.  He reported a FEMA-graded  emergency exercise is scheduled to be conducted during July and August 2020 with the involvement of 60-70 persons at the EOC to respond to a simulated release of radioactive material.  Dr. Budnitz commented the Committee routinely attends and observes these exercises. Mr. Guzzardi stated in the past he participated in FEMA-graded exercises while stationed in the San Luis Obispo County EOC as the representative of Santa Barbara County in support of assessing ingestion pathways and decontamination issues.  He confirmed Dr. Budnitz' comment that if it becomes necessary neighboring counties can be called upon for mutual aid.

In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry Mr. Guzzardi confirmed that OES staff engage in weekly duty officer rotations with someone from OES assigned at all times and OES works very closely with the 9-1-1 San Luis Obispo County dispatch center and the County's watch commander has the ability to trigger an emergency alert at any time.  He reported the DCPP emergency siren warning system is maintained by the plant and is fully tested every year.  The County also has access to the nationwide emergency alert system, a reverse 9-1-1 system and a newer wireless-based emergency alert system that uses cell phones.  He reported for the latter system there is an opt-in element for which people are now being encouraged to sign up in order to develop a system called Alert SLO that can be used in what he described as smaller conversations such as in the event of an electric power shutdown and other events which are not necessarily urgent emergency situations.  Dr. Peterson remarked the Committee has reviewed the use of social media in context of emergency response and he described social media as an excellent way to communicate during an emergency. Dr. Peterson suggested scheduling a future fact-finding to further review how these capabilities may be evolving.

Dr. Peterson commented the Committee has spent a considerable amount of time investigating how decisions around protective actions are made as such decisions can have consequences which may or may not be intended and therefore the decision to trigger an emergency alert needs to be fully informed. Mr. Guzzardi agreed and stated that many members of the public do not fully understand the differences in emergency alert levels.  He reported there are technological issues remaining with wireless emergency alert systems which are dependent on cell towers due to what he described as "fuzzy' transmission issues which cause the wireless messages to "bleed out" to communities which may not need to be involved in the response.  Mr. Guzzardi reported cell phone companies now claim to have capabilities of geocoding to within one-tenth of a mile but each carrier and each cell phone operating system has different capacities and capabilities and he remarked that while he believes technology is improving he questions the current claims made by cell phone service providers.

Dr. Peterson remarked technology is advancing in ways where computers can increasingly  provide more intelligent support and the problems described by Mr. Guzzardi should benefit from this evolution which will produce better tools than are available today.  Dr. Peterson observed there is not a great  incentive to produce these better tools but the need to create more incentives for better systems and software is an important policy question as there is a real need for first responders to be able to talk to one another and communicate with the public during emergencies and to avoid the situation encountered during the 1988 fire in the hills of Oakland, California.  Mr. Guzzardi reported the  State of California's Standardized Emergency Management System was a result of the Oakland hills' fire to ensure the issues that prevented interoperability of communications and equipment during that event would not recur.

Dr. Peterson stated he has deep admiration for all those persons who choose to work in the field of emergency response which involves not only being prepared but actually responding to events. Dr.  Budnitz commented the DCISC intends to schedule future fact-finding visits to discuss with Mr. Guzzardi and his colleagues OES' plans and the preparations being developed to manage the transition that will be necessary as DCPP prepares and closes its electricity generation activities.  Mr. Guzzardi reported that the funds made available by SB 1090 are intended to assist in these efforts and that once DCPP closes there will still be a need to protect the community.  When DCPP closes there may be a need to increase funding to continue to address non nuclear issues and the OES organization is now looking into the transition period that will take place. Mr. Guzzardi stated his organization does not intend to provide input as to DCPP decommissioning scheduling or issues regarding the storage of spent nuclear fuel but OES will respond and react as directed by the County's Board of Supervisors.  He stated that the time available prior to the plant closing affords the opportunity for further conversations and the risk as it exists today will remain for several more years. He reported OES has hired a consultant to assist the organization in planning for continuity of operations for the entire County and in this effort OES is having conversations with each County department.

In response to Dr. Budnitz' inquiry Mr. Guzzardi stated the OES organization continues to enjoy an excellent working relationship with DCPP's Emergency Planning Organization which is led by Mr. Mike Ginn who has made a number of informational presentations to the DCISC during the Committee's previous public meetings.  Mr. Guzzardi observed the foundation of emergency management is cultivating good relationships with the people one works with.  Dr. Peterson remarked that many aspects of nuclear emergency response that were logical in the 1970s and 1980s could benefit from an update due to improvements in technology and he offered as an example the use and broad deployment of drones which can employ very flexible platforms in place of or in partial replacement of the role of radiation field monitoring teams.  Dr. Peterson stated a great deal of effort has also gone into plume modeling which given the complex topography in the vicinity of DCPP is a challenging issue.  He remarked the best method to leverage available resources invested in emergency response is to make those resources more holistic in their approach so as to be capable of responding to a wider range of different natural and other disasters rather than focusing one's resources on a single function and Dr. Peterson remarked the changes required to transition to that approach are particularly difficult in the nuclear context.

Following Mr. Guzzardi's presentation, Mr. David Weisman, representing A4NR was recognized.  Mr. Weisman quoted from a portion of PG&E's testimony in the 2018 Nuclear Decommissioning Cost Triennial Proceeding (2018 NDCTP) and he stated it was his understanding that funding would continue into the future for the costs of emergency planning related to DCPP  subject to the CPUC's approval and funding of elements of PG&E's revised decommissioning study in the 2018 NDCTP in accordance with the assurance contained in the Joint Proposal and in CPUC Decision 18-01-022 which approved the closure of the plant and by the

provisions of SB 1090.  He said it is his understanding that PG&E would include and continue to support by funding maintenance of the emergency siren system and for community and statewide emergency planning until such time as the plant's 10 CFR Part 50 licenses from the NRC are terminated,.  Mr. Weisman inquired whether PG&E has in any way changed or removed budget items from the decommissioning estimate with reference to the budget provided to the County OES or whether there has been a breakdown in negotiations over these issues with the County.  Dr. Peterson remarked that it was his understanding once all spent fuel is within the ISFSI a 10 CFR Part 72 License is required for DCPP spent fuel storage.  Dr. Budnitz stated and Mr. Baldwin confirmed that the plant's Part 50 Licenses are required to remain in effect until any contamination remaining at the site is reduced to a very low levels which Mr. Baldwin stated was very close to the conditions now existing at PG&E's Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP) located south of Eureka, California which ceased power generation operation in 1976.  Mr. Baldwin remarked that does not mean all the fuel is gone from the HBPP site as the ISFSI facilities continue to be located at HBPP and Mr. Baldwin estimated that for at least the next ten to twelve years DCPP will be required to maintain its Part 50 Licenses.  Mr. Weisman stated Mr. Baldwin's estimation was consistent with A4NR's understanding that the Part 50 Licenses would not be terminated at the time all spent nuclear fuel was stored at the ISFSI and the Part 50 Licenses would continue to be required until at least circa 2032-2035 at the earliest and he asked the Committee for confirmation as to that understanding.

Mr. Weisman stated during the San Simeon earthquake in 2003 a total of 56 of the 131 emergency sirens failed due to loss of power and this was the reason the sirens were subsequently provided with backup battery power.  He observed that in the DCPP Unit-1 and 2 Integrated Inspection Report dated January 23, 2020, an open unresolved issue (URI) was identified concerning a possible failure to replace early warning system siren batteries as periodically required by the Alert and Notification Design System.  Mr. Weisman commented that even with backup batteries if those batteries are not being replaced the sirens may not necessarily be effective and the system would not be representative of defense-in-depth principles and he wondered if one battery was found in that condition or did the extent of condition involve multiple batteries not being replaced.  He asked the Committee for a response concerning the resolution of this issue.

Mr. Baldwin stated that he would take Mr. Weisman's inquiry as to the status of funding through the end of the Part 50 Licenses as an item for follow-up action.  Dr. Budnitz stated and Mr. Baldwin agreed that funding is secured to maintain emergency planning for the duration that DCPP continues to generate electricity and Mr. Baldwin commented PG&E also has an obligation to maintain an emergency plan through the Party 50 License period but aspects of emergency planning will change when the plant is no longer producing electricity.  Mr. Guzzardi commented that his organization will react to whatever County leadership does relative to the OES funding and the Part 50 license issue and he recognizes that at some point funding levels will change.

Concerning Mr. Weisman's second inquiry Consultant McWhorter stated a URI is designated when the NRC finds an item for which it does not have all the technical information necessary to judge whether there has been a violation of requirements and a URI should be covered in more detail by a later report and closed out as to whether it constituted a violation.  Mr. McWhorter suggested the DCISC could review Mr. Weisman's inquiry regarding the emergency siren battery URI with the NRC Resident Inspectors during a future fact-finding visit.

Dr. Lam thanked Mr. Guzzardi for an interesting and informative presentation.

Mr. Baldwin introduced DCPP Director of Quality Verification Mr. Ken Cortese to make the next presentation to the DCISC.  Mr. Baldwin stated Mr. Cortese has more than 35 years' experience in the nuclear power field beginning with the U.S. Navy and previously worked at the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant in Maryland and has held positions at DCPP in the Chemistry, Environmental, Operations, and Nuclear Industry Relations organizations.

Presentation by PG&E on the Quality Verification Organization's Perspective on Plant Performance, Quality Verification's Top Issues, and the Latest Quality Performance Assessment Report.

Mr. Cortese stated that the Quality Verification organization (QV) is an independent organization which reports directly the plant's Chief Nuclear Officer and QV maintains a very low threshold for identifying issues and gaps to excellence before they can become serious issues.  During the period from May 15, 2019 to December 1, 2019, Mr. Cortese reported  DCPP exhibited traits reflecting a strong nuclear safety culture and effectively implemented the Quality Assurance Program (QA) consistent with regulatory requirements of Chapter 17 of the plant's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and in accordance with its commitments to the NRC.

Mr. Cortese discussed each of the disciplines rated by QV and summarized by stating the Chemistry, Radiation Protection, Nuclear Work Management, Emergency Planning and Learning Services organizations demonstrated overall excellent performance. The Maintenance, Engineering, Fire Protection and Performance Improvement organization's overall performance consistently met expectations while Operations performance is considered adequate with improvement opportunities identified in various aspects.  He reported actions are now in place to address these opportunities. Mr. Cortese stated that in reaching these results performance indicators, self-assessment results, audits and inspections were all considered as were interviews and observations as well as data from the Corrective Action Program.  He confirmed Dr. Budnitz' comment that benchmarking was also a part of QV's assessment effort but Mr. Cortese stated the station's performance indicators are related to industry performance by plants in the top quartile or decile of industry performance.

He then reviewed the Quality Performance Assessment Report (QPAR) as follows:

•  Engineering - Overall performance is consistently meeting expectations.  Mr. Cortese stated the Engineering organization's refueling outage performance was excellent and no delays were experienced due to engineering issues.  The equipment reliability trend continues to be very good due to a focus on that area and timeliness of maintenance rule evaluations has improved with the time span dropping from 49 days previously to seven days at the present time.

•  Radiation Protection (RP) - Overall performance is considered excellent.  Mr. Cortese reported there has been excellent organizational support in managing dose with lowest ever outage dose levels for a DCPP refueling outage having been recorded during 2R21which included steam generator eddy current testing and steam generator sludge lancing which Mr. Cortese described as impressive performance. The RP organization has been recognized by the industry for its use of technology in dose reduction with remote dose monitoring now being conducted from the second floor of the Administration Building.  Mr. Cortese reported the RP organization has experienced some issues with qualification lapses and this is an issue RP is currently working on.

•  Chemistry - Overall performance is considered excellent.  DCPP continues to be an industry leading organization as to chemistry effectiveness with an indicator of 0.0 for both units which is the best achievable result and the Chemistry organization continues to contribute to outage and online dose reduction through the use of zinc injection control and pH adjustments to result in lower source.  Mr. Cortese reported Unit-1 continues to have performance issues regarding condensate polisher resin performance and actions have been taken to mitigate these issues.  However, no limits are being approached that would cause steam generator degradation but extra work is required.

•  Emergency Planning (EP) - Overall performance is considered excellent.  Mr. Cortese reported on continued strong drill and exercise performance by the DCPP Emergency Planning organization and he pointed to the successful implementation of a 90-minute License Amendment Request in January 2020.

•  Operations/Operational Focus - Overall performance is not meeting expectations.  Mr. Cortese stated Operations has experienced gaps in plant status control and unplanned entries into Tech Spec limits related to plant status control events.  Operations has also experienced issues with equipment tagging requirements.  Consultant McWhorter observed the three issues identified by Mr. Cortese represent fundamental Operations responsibilities and he inquired as to whether Mr. Cortese knew why these issues were occurring.  In response, Mr. Cortese stated Operations leadership is interacting and being intrusive in the field concerning how operators are using standard human performance procedures and extensive action plans have been developed.  In response to Consultant McWhorter's inquiry Mr. Cortese stated personnel turnover in Operations has not been significantly different from the recent past and he stated he would not attribute the issues Operations is experiencing personnel turnover. In response to Dr. Peterson's inquiry Mr. Cortese confirmed there have been additional issues to those described earlier during this public meeting by Mr. Johnston concerning the Operations error made during 2R21 during a transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4.  Mr. Cortese reported that at present Operations has gone two months without experiencing any plant status control issues.

•  Maintenance - Overall performance is consistently meeting expectations with what Mr. Cortese described as a strong performance during 2R21 with no events attributed to maintenance.  He reported that shortfalls in maintenance fundamentals and ineffective use of human performance tools early in the QPAR period contributed to some events and there were issues related to dropped objects at the start of 2R21 which were not all attributable to the Maintenance organization.

In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry, Mr. Cortese confirmed that DCPP compares its performance with its peers in the nuclear industry as to the performance measures used in developing the QPAR and as industry performance continues to improve expectations for performance continue to be elevated meaning the plant should always be on a continually improving trend.

•  Fire Protection -Overall performance is consistently meeting expectations.  Mr. Cortese reported control of combustibles was noteworthy during 2R21 during which there was a great deal of equipment on the site during the Main Generator stator replacement work and combustible control was done very well with only three issues noted.  He reported personnel safety is a focus area for improvements in the Fire Protection organization as a good deal of physical work is required.  He reported that procedure deficiencies were noted by QV and have been corrected in support of the transition to National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805 Regulations (NFPA 805) and he reported the transition to NFPA 805 is now complete.

•  Performance Improvement - Overall performance is consistently meeting expectations.  Mr. Cortese stated the Corrective Action Notification screening process has improved but some gaps were noted in the determinations made as to whether a Notification represented a condition adverse to quality. [A "Notification" is the term used to initiate an input into the plant's Corrective Action Program.]  Mr. Cortese stated the screening process involves reviews of hundreds of Notifications each day and each is screened.  Mr. Cortese stated the Performance Improvement Coordinators work in support of each line organization in the Observation Review Meeting process and this represents an opportunity for continuous improvement through the identification of commonalities.

•  Learning Services - Overall performance is considered excellent.  Mr. Cortese reported the INPO Operations and Maintenance training accreditation visit very recently concluded with all twelve training programs being reaccredited with no identified findings.  He reported a strong partnership between the workforce and DCPP training efforts has been identified by several outside peer review organizations as a strength.

Mr. Cortese reported during the period May 2019 through December 2019 QV conducted four audits, four assessments and 59 observations with internal audits being conducted for Engineering, the Corrective Action Program, the ISFSI and fuel management, and Special Processes.  These audits resulted in four findings, 34 deficiencies, and 20 recommendations.  In response to Dr. Budnitz' inquiry Mr. Cortese stated the results are generally consistent with a period over the last three or four years and deficiencies are identified at a very low level with approximately 300 identified during 2019.  Mr. Cortese stated that if  QV were to identify a significant drop in identified deficiencies, the first issue for his organization would be to determine whether QV was continuing to be as intrusive as in the past or whether improvement was actually taking place. Assessments conducted, including an Assessment of the 80+-day 2R21 refueling outage, resulted in one escalation, 40 deficiencies, and 12 recommendations.  In response to Dr. Peterson's request Mr. Cortese stated an escalation represents an issue which QV does not believe is being addressed as expeditiously as necessary or the plan to address the issue is insufficient and the matter is therefore escalated from the department level to the Station Director level.  He reported plant status control is an issue that is currently in escalation.  A deficiency represents an issue that does not meet DCPP's requirements but does not represent a program issue  If an issue affects a program or is for some other reason is broader than a deficiency, then the issue would be characterized as a finding.  He stated a recommendation is a discretionary form of advice as to achieving increased efficiency.

In response to Consultant Wardell's inquiry Mr. Cortese stated departmental response to the findings has been focused and there is a time limit of 180 days on any finding which Mr. Cortese reported has not been exceeded during his tenure as Director of QV.  Mr. Cortese reported that every other Wednesday at the Senior Leadership Team meeting he reviews his top concerns, the age of the findings and any significant observations and these are then discussed with senior leadership by the owners of the issues so identified.  In response to Dr. Peterson's inquiry Mr. Cortese confirmed that information identified by QV is managed within the Corrective Action Program and a finding can only be closed with QV's concurrence.  In response to Consultant Wardell's question Mr. Cortese reported QV's performance is itself assessed by the Nuclear Industry Evaluation Program process consisting of six experts coming from other nuclear power plants using an extensive checklist maintained by a standards committee to assess QV's performance.  This includes an assessment of the quality supply inspection process, vendor audits, and the QV audit and assessment programs in context of the requirements of Chapter 17 of the FSAR as to how audits are to be performed, timeliness of audits and the Quality Control (QC) process including the qualifications of workers, and how field observations are to be documented.  The Nuclear Industry Evaluation Program representatives issue deficiencies and recommendations that are entered into the Corrective Action Program and their report goes directly to the Chief Nuclear Officer.  Mr. Cortese stated that QV's relationship with INPO is increasing with reference to the quality of QV's programs and when INPO's reviews identify areas for improvement which have not been identified by QV the plant is issued an OR-5 finding by INPO.

In concluding his presentation, Mr. Cortese identified his top three improvement areas as including operator fundamentals, improvements in plant status control and  keeping a focus on equipment reliability.  In summary, he stated overall plant performance remains strong and on a stable trajectory and the QV organization will continue to monitor and challenge the organization.  Dr. Budnitz remarked that he regularly receives and utilizes the QPAR in the Committee's safety review activities.  In response to Consultant McWhorter's question, Mr. Cortese stated that at this time his organization has seen no effect on performance due to PG&E's bankruptcy situation and QV continues to monitor for any effect on the areas of safety and employee engagement.

Dr. Lam thanked Mr. Cortese for an excellent presentation.

XX ADJOURN EVENING MEETING

The Chair adjourned the evening meeting of the Committee at 7:10 P.M.

XXI RECONVENE FOR MORNING MEETING

The February 13, 2020, public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was called to order by its Chair, Dr. Peter Lam at 9:05 A.M.  Dr. Lam welcomed those persons present in the audience and watching the proceedings on live streaming video.  Dr. Lam requested any of the members who wished to make remarks to do so at this time.

XXII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments by Members of the Committee at this time.

XXIII  PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATION

The Chair reviewed the invitation to address the Committee on matters not on the agenda for this public meeting and  invited any comments from members of the public who wished to address the Committee to do so now.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace was recognized.  Ms. Lewis inquired whether the DCISC would have input as to the design of new spent nuclear fuel storage casks for future use at DCPP.  Dr. Budnitz responded that any new cask selected for use at DCPP would be designed by experts at the manufacturing company and whether the DCISC would have any input concerning the choice of a new cask amongst the several possibilities is an open question. Dr. Peterson observed the existing ISFSI was designed to accept a specific type of storage cask that is anchored to the pad and to change to a different type of design for the overpack would be expensive and time consuming as the ISFSI is built on the same bedrock as the plant itself and is enveloped by the plant's seismic analysis. He observed the licensing process for the ISFSI took almost a decade to complete and if the goal is to meet the current schedule or an expedited schedule to remove the spent fuel from the spent fuel pools the dry storage system must likely continue to be designed to use the existing ISFSI foundation. Dr. Peterson observed there could be modifications to the canister design but DCPP's implementation of completely new storage system is, in his opinion, highly unlikely as doing so would cause a significant additional delay in offloading spent fuel from the spent fuel pools.  Dr. Peterson remarked it would also represent a major undertaking in expense and time to change the casks which are already located in the ISFSI. He stated it is likely if the goal remains to get spent nuclear fuel out of the spent fuel pools in a timely manner practically speaking the plant will need to have a dry storage system that will continue to use the ISFSI's existing foundation and work within the risk profile of the existing ISFSI and the most likely potential changes would be to substantially modify the existing canister design and to license that new design to be able to accept somewhat fresher fuel to expedite offloading the spent fuel pools rather than implementation of a completely different system.

In response to Ms. Lewis observation regarding the Holtec firm, the firm that provided the casks now in use at DCPP, Dr. Peterson observed it would be difficult but not entirely infeasible for another vendor to install a different cask system at the ISFSI and PG&E by seeking a request for proposals from Holtec and other vendors is essentially doing due diligence in this regard to explore all possible options but it is unlikely that an option that would force a substantial delay in offloading the spent fuel pools would be worth the incremental cost and effort.  However, Dr. Peterson commented updating a design to go on the same pad might be merited if the new design enabled faster offloading and closing the spent fuel pools sooner and the DCISC would review, opine and provide any recommendations concerning safety issues the Committee might identify with a modified design. Dr. Budnitz commented the DCISC's remit to review safety would extend to assessing whether differing designs have comparable safety performance but the Committee would not be in a position to extend a recommendation beyond that statement.

Dr. Lam stated the impetus for a new cask design is not driven by safety considerations per se but rather it was driven by the CPUC and the CEC seeking to determine if DCPP could achieve a schedule for removing spent fuel from the plant's spent fuel pools akin to that of SONGS.  PG&E submitted a proposal that indicated it would be able to meet an expedited schedule with a different cask design, however, Dr. Lam observed that achieving that new cask design has turned out to be more time consuming than described in PG&E's submittal.  Dr. Lam reported that 25 years ago he sat on the NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) Panel that approved the license for the ISFSI for DCPP and he stated the inquiry is really twofold involving how realistic is the proposed schedule and on a technical basis how would the new cask design differ from the current design.  He reported the prior efforts to license the ISFSI occupied five or six years of extensive scrutiny and any new inquiry would need to assess the phenomena for failure due to stress corrosion cracking observed on the Holtec casks which was not part of the prior ASLB inquiry and any new design would need to be more thermally capable due to the need to store high burn-up fuel and to expedite offloading fuel from the spent fuel pools. Dr. Lam stated these are some of the reasons it has taken two years for PG&E to prepare its request for proposals for new casks and he reported the DCISC has not had the opportunity to review that request for proposals.  Dr. Peterson noted the proposal for new casks would include switching from the use of 304 to 316L stainless steel which has better characteristics with respect to welding and cracking.  Dr. Peterson noted with respect to high burn-up fuel, the key concern is the drying process used by vendors other than Holtec which employ a vacuum drying process that due to poor heat transfer exposes the fuel to temperatures in excess of what it experiences in service in the reactor and this can cause hydrating and embrittlement of the fuel's cladding.  In response to Ms. Lewis' inquiry as to why the canisters cannot be left full of water and must be dried Dr. Peterson replied that water causes corrosion and drying and backfilling the cannister with helium, an inert gas, is a much better solution as the fuel is never exposed to temperatures greater than it experienced in the reactor and this is the system that has always been in use at DCPP for spent nuclear fuel dry storage using the Holtec design.

XXIV  INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)

The Chair requested Mr. Baldwin to introduce the next presenter. Mr. Baldwin introduced DCPP Manager of Regulatory Services Mr. Hossein Hamzehee and reported Mr. Hamzehee has more than 35 years of experience in the nuclear industry and holds  Master of Science Degrees in Mechanical Engineering, is a registered Professional Engineer and brings extensive leadership experience with the NRC including at the level of an NRC Branch Chief.  Mr. Baldwin reported Mr. Hamzehee's team manages DCPP's NRC inspections and interaction with the NRC including providing support for the two NRC Resident Inspectors.

Update on the Status of NRC Performance Indicators, Licensee Event Reports, NRC Inspection Reports and Notices of Violation and Issues Raised by NRC Resident Inspectors and Major Regulatory Issues (Open Compliance and License Action Requests).

Mr. Hamzehee reported DCPP is rigorously inspected by the NRC and is committed to the highest standard of safety.  Mr. Hamzehee stated in his presentation he would provide an overview of DCPP performance based on NRC's Performance Indicators since the last meeting of the DCISC in October 2019 through the end of January 2020.  He remarked his presentation would cover approximately four months of NRC inspections involving approximately 1,800 hours of inspection time.  During this period DCPP met all Green performance expectations for all NRC performance indicators. One licensee event report (LER) was issued by PG&E and four violations of very low safety significance were issued by the NRC since the last DCISC meeting in October 2019.

Mr. Hamzehee reviewed and briefly discussed some of  the 16 performance indicators reviewed and used to collect data by the NRC, and concerning which data is collected daily, as currently being within Green[5] status for both units as follows.

• Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hrs.
• Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hrs.
• Unplanned Scrams with Complications
• Safety System Functional Failures
• Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Emergency AC Power System
• Mitigating Systems Performance Index, High Pressure Injection System
• Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Heat Removal System
• Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Residual Heat Removal System
• Mitigating Systems Performance Index, Cooling Water Systems
• Reactor Coolant System Activity
• Reactor Coolant System Leakage
• Drill/Exercise Performance
• ERO Drill Participation
• Alert & Notification System
• Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
• Radiological Effluent Occurrence

Mr. Hamzehee reported on the non cited violations (NCV) issued by the NRC for the period October 2019 through January 2020 and he stated there were four such violations issued as described:

•  Non Cited Violation (Green) - A fire barrier seal was found to be outside its design configuration. (Cross-cutting Aspect H.7 –Documentation).  Mr.  Hamzehee stated this NCV resulted from a fire boundary gap not being properly sealed during a walkdown of a Unit-2 switchgear room.  He reported the fire barrier was still functional and could have performed its function in the event of a fire and accordingly there were no performance functionality issues but the issue should have been documented.

•  Non Cited Violation (Green) - Paint was found on various fire sprinklers in the plant. (Cross-cutting Aspect H.1 –Resources).  This condition was identified during a walkdown of Unit-2 during the 2R21outage with NRC staff.  In response to Drs. Lam and Peterson's inquiries Mr. Hamzehee reported the paint did not interfere with the capability of the sprinklers and it was not located on the sprinklers' spray arms but rather on the body of the sprinklers.  Mr. Hamzehee reported under NFPA criteria this situation might not have resulted in a violation but DCPP has internal procedural guidelines which state no paint should be on the sprinklers.

•  Non Cited Violation (Green) - No evaluation was performed to justify performance of as-left rather than as-found testing of the fuel transfer tube hatch. (No Cross-cutting Aspect).  This violation occurred during 2R21 when Containment was open and involved the fuel transfer tube quick opening hatch for which an integrity test was performed to ensure there was no leakage.  Mr. Hamzehee reported this testing can be performed on an as-found or on an as-left basis but the hatch must be tested before it is closed (i.e., in its as-left condition). The NRC determined an evaluation should have been conducted to show there were no previous issues with the hatch and this evaluation was not done.

•  Finding (Green) - Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 2-3 seal return line was inadvertently isolated during venting of lines. (Cross-cutting Aspect H.12 –Avoid Complacency).  Mr. Hamzehee reported this occurred during venting of the RCP seal return line when Valve 1-C was inadvertently closed so as to isolate the RCP seal and if this were to have continued for a long period of time it could have potentially impacted the integrity of the seal.  However, Mr. Hamzehee reported that the Valve 1-C was left in this condition for less than fifteen minutes and temperature increase was minimal.  Mr. Hamzehee reported Westinghouse has reviewed this event and determined there was no impact on the functionality or integrity of the RCP seal.

Dr. Lam inquired as to what extent, with limited resources, one should pursue these very low risk events to determine whether a low level safety event could lead to something more severe and he used the example of an accident to a Boeing 737 aircraft due to the failure of the aircraft's altitude sensor which for each prior failure was determined to be of minor safety significance. Dr. Lam observed that in the case of the aircraft, coupling this level of risk analysis with a single-failure criterion created a situation that resulted in a tragic accident.  Dr. Budnitz observed that probabilistic risk assessment is an ideally structured tool for such an analyses, as the probabilistic method requires identification of each event in the scenario in detail and then an estimate of the probability or the contingent probability of occurrence and he stated that for those events where data is minimal risk significance estimates are reasonably attainable and whether to engage in a probabilistic assessment is dependent upon the resources available and he stated the resulting probabilities will determine whether there is continued need for concern.  Dr. Budnitz reported DCPP's Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) group does these types of analyses routinely in support of the Engineering and Operations organizations and the PRA group is recognized as among the very best in the industry. Mr. Hamzehee agreed and stated the approach  Dr. Budnitz described represents a well-known and broadly applied approach in the industry and is termed the risk-informed approach to regulations, inspections, and evaluations.  Mr. Hamzehee reported DCPP has assessed and ranked hundreds of plant systems and components on their risk significance and prioritizes those on the basis of their core damage or large early release frequencies and he confirmed Dr. Budnitz' observation that this data is shared with the Engineering, Maintenance and Operations organizations.

Dr. Budnitz stated there are important techniques and measures providing insight into risk importance including the Fussell-Vesely and the Birnbaum methods.  Mr. Hamzehee observed concerning the RCP 2-3 seal event one could determine the consequence of seal failure and perform an accident sequence analysis and a probabilistic risk assessment which would determine the risk-significance of the failure and whether the contribution to plant risk is minimal or serious and these types of analyses enable the plant to prioritize issues.  Mr. Hamzehee reported DCPP is one of the few plants in the U.S. to have installed the most recently designed RCP shutdown seals which are highly reliable and contribute to an improvement in fire protection risk.  He reported that every violation received is entered into the Corrective Action Program and a team is assigned to evaluate each in more detail including the possibility of other failures at the same time and, dependent upon their significance, cause evaluations may be performed which may include full-scope root cause evaluations.  Dr. Budnitz observed the new RCP seals also offer an advantage because maintenance is easier to perform and therefore the seals are less prone to failure due to maintenance and although these new seals are not in widespread use in the industry and therefore data is not abundant a probabilistic analysis could be performed by assuming that the new seals are only as good as the previous seals for which there is considerable data and this is a common technique in understanding the hierarchical and comparative importance of issues.

Dr. Lam stated he felt dismissing an issue based on probability while it may be systematic can be dangerous and his preference would be to see the dismissal of an issue based upon fundamental observations and predefined limits.  Mr. Hamzehee agreed and stated  Drs. Lam and Budnitz' comments illustrate the school of thought around the contrast between the risk-based approach, also referred to as the risk-informed approach, which is based on probabilities and the absolute engineering approach which involves maintenance aspects and operational concerns.  He stated that both approaches may be employed in reaching a decision.

Mr. Hamzehee reported one licensee event report (LER) was issued in January 2020 (Unit 2 LER 2019-001-00).  This LER involved the Containment Spray System spray pumps 2-1 and 2-2 which function to remove heat from Containment having been inoperable during 2R21 while the unit was in Mode 4. He reported Unit-2 was in transition from Mode 4 to Mode 5 and in Mode 5 the Containment Spray System can be isolated but the isolation of the Containment spray pumps occurred for a short time while the unit was in Mode 4 due to a maintenance activity which removed power from pumps 2-1 and 2-2 for approximately ten to fifteen minutes.  Mr. Hamzehee reported this was a violation of Tech Specs and accordingly required a report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.  Mr. Hamzehee reported this was the first LER issued in 2020 although the event occurred during 2019.

Mr. Hamzehee stated DCPP's overall performance is Green with respect to NRC Performance Indicators over the period of the past four months. He reviewed inspection activities since the last meeting of the DCISC in October 2019 as follows:

• 3rd Quarter 2019 Integrated Inspection Report(2019-003, 10/30/2019)
• 4th Quarter 2019 Integrated Inspection Report(2019-004, 1/23/2020)

Mr. Hamzehee reported on the status of two other major licensee activities including the 90-Minute Emergency Response Organization (ERO) staff augmentation license amendment request (LAR) which was approved by NRC in August 2019 and was fully implemented in January 2020 and the Intake Structure reclassification for which a LAR was submitted to NRC in February 2019 and was subsequently approved and will be implemented during 2020.

Mr. Hamzehee concluded his presentation with a discussion of the NRC's designation and assignment of cross-cutting aspects to violations and identified issues.  He stated the NRC's intent in developing the cross-cutting identification process was to use common cause evaluations to identify issues that could impact more than one of the NRC's safety cornerstones. He used as examples the Human Performance and Problem Identification and Resolution cornerstones and their constituent traits such as leadership, safety, values, and actions, continued learning, questioning attitude and stated that under each trait there are various identified aspects and he gave several examples of how these aspects are assigned to traits.  He reported the NRC assigns staff to make a determination as to which aspect of a cross-cutting issue should be assigned to a specific violation or finding.

Mr. Hamzehee reported that through the first quarter of 2020, DCPP has a total of six cross-cutting aspects identified in the area of human performance with one in resources, one in documentation, one in procedure adherence and use, one in challenging the unknown and two in avoiding complacency.  He reported there are currently no cross-cutting aspects identified for problem identification and resolution and he reported identified aspects are retained in the database over a four-quarter rolling average period.  Mr. Hamzehee reported the rolling average of cross-cutting aspects for DCPP is presently below the NRC's threshold and DCPP maintains a threshold for cross-cutting aspects that is stricter than the NRC threshold and DCPP's assessments involve review by a team consisting of Operations, Maintenance and Engineering to determine if an opportunity is present to improve processes and procedures. In response to Consultant McWhorter's request, Mr. Hamzehee agreed to include in the materials Mr. Hamzehee regularly provides for review at the DCISC's public meetings a matrix that tracks the present status of identified cross-cutting aspects for the current performance period.

In response to Mr. McWhorter's inquiry concerning an unresolved item identified in an NRC inspection report concerning replacement of the batteries for the emergency sirens Mr. Hamzehee reported this item arose from an inspection conducted during the latter part of 2019 of emergency planning,  The unresolved item was initiated due to the NRC not having sufficient guidance as to whether the issue represented a concern, a finding or a violation with respect to the requirement for the periodic replacement of batteries on the early warning emergency sirens as required by the design report for the plant's Event Notification System.  The action taken was to review the issue with the County and with NRC headquarters to determine the interval required for replacement of the emergency siren batteries.  Dr. Budnitz remarked the Committee will review the monthly documentation received from PG&E or inquire during a future fact-finding to follow up on this issue.

Mr. Baldwin introduced Mr. Shane Guess, Manager in the Generation Business Planning Team in the DCPP Business Operations Department and reported Mr. Guess holds a Senior Reactor Operator License, a Master's Degree in Business Administration and a Bachelor of Science Degree in Nuclear Engineering and has 18 years' experience with PG&E.

Results of the 2019 Operating Plan and Key Elements of the 2020 Operating Plan

Mr. Guess began his presentation by reviewing a table showing what he described as the elements of DCPP's line-of-sight to generation excellence for the Generation Operating Plan which he stated is intended to define the organization's mission and vision in order to provide safe, reliable and affordable energy to PG&E's customers.  While he commented the focus areas have not changed he reported the PG&E Generation organization is now comprised of three separate component organizations consisting of Nuclear Generation, Power Generation and Generation Business and Technical Operations. All these component organizations report to Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. James Welsch.  In response to Dr. Budnitz' query Mr. Guess replied all PG&E generation assets are tied to the Generation Operating Plan with reference to their specific and key focus areas.  Mr. Guess identified safety, people, reliability, affordability, risk, compliance and ethics, and regulatory and external strategy as the elements which are sought to be aligned within the Generation organization to accomplish the goals outlined in the Operating Plan.  In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry Mr. Garcia stated that Mr. Welsch's predecessor as Chief Nuclear Officer, Mr. Edward Halpin, also had the same responsibilities as Mr. Welsch has now assumed with reference to power generation and the entire PG&E Generation organization benefits from Mr. Welsch's expertise in the field of safety including nuclear safety.  Mr. Guess reported Mr. Welsch remains engaged with the DCPP workforce and in Mr. Garcia's opinion he does not foresee any issues with Mr. Welsch's attention being focused on other elements of the Power Generation organization in addition to Nuclear Generation.  Mr. Jan Nimick currently leads the Power Generation component and Ms. Maureen Zawalick current leads the Generation Business and Technical Operations component of the Generation organization and both organizations report directly to Mr. Welsch.

Mr. Guess reported collaboration within the Generation organization has increased and committees are in place for all focus areas with increased cooperation between the Power Generation and Nuclear Generation organizations.  Mr. Guess agreed with Dr. Budnitz' observation on the need for all the generation assets to interface with the PG&E Transmission organization and that accordingly there could be opportunities afforded for lessons learned as to how that interface may work to improve reliability and safety.

Mr. Guess described the successes for the Nuclear Generation in 2019 as including:

• Organizational change to integrate PG&E Generation into one team;
• Completed 1R21 and 2R21 refueling outages, including Unit 2 Main Generator stator   upgrade;
• WANO peer evaluation of DCPP and INPO reaccreditation of Operations and   Maintenance & Technical Training Programs;
• NRC issuance of a License Amendment for 90-minute Emergency Response Organization   response time;
• NRC performance resulted in DCPP in the highest performance category: Column 1, Licensee Response;
• NRC Triennial Force-on-Force Security Inspection.

Mr. Guess reported the Tier 1 Employee Retention Program will conclude as scheduled in August 2020 and as a result the DCPP workforce will likely be reduced.  He reviewed and briefly discussed measurable results from 2019 which he stated represented a composite of performance during 2019 as follows:

Metric	Goal	Actual
•  Reliability & Safety Indicator	93.7	93.7
•  1R21 Outage Radiation Exposure	<27.0 REM	30.2 REM
•  2R21 Outage Radiation Exposure	<27.1 REM	22.4 REM
•  Preventable Motor Vehicle Accidents	≤1	2
•  Days Away, Restricted or Transferred Cases	5	7
•  Lost Work Days	3	4
•  Regulatory Findings	No Significant	No Significant
•  NRC Reactor Oversight Process	Column 1 and No Cross-Cutting	Column 1 and No Cross-Cutting

Mr. Guess reported that key elements of the 2020 Operating Plan will again focus on safe, reliable, and affordable operation through 2025 and on a leadership model to engage, enable and sustain the DCPP workforce in achieving high performance while reacting quickly to any sign of a decline in performance however minor.  This includes a focus on leadership in the field for both Nuclear Generation and Power Generation organizations to continue to encourage employees to speak up and for leadership to listen and to follow up on information received from employees so as to remove obstacles to the employees achieving success.  He reviewed activities scheduled during 2020 as follows:

• One refueling outage (1R22) in October 2020 with a scheduled 33-day duration;
• Fourth (and final) year of Tier 1 employee retention period ends August 31;
• Tier 2 employee retention period begins on September 1, 2020 and extends to 2023;
• NRC Evaluated Emergency Planning Exercise, a full scope emergency drill with all facilities operable in August 2020;
• "Leader in the Field" engagement;
• Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment during October 2020.

In response to Consultant Wardell's question Mr. Guess reported the NRC will conduct regular, quarterly, and special inspections during 2020 including a Cyber Security Inspection, a 10 CFR 50.59 Inspection, and a Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection.  Dr. Budnitz reported an evaluated emergency exercise will take place on August 19, 2020, and a DCISC fact-finding team is scheduled to visit the plant to observe this exercise.  Mr. Garcia clarified that the 1R22 refueling outage planned during 2020 is now scheduled for a duration of 40 days.

Dr. Peterson reported that China has seen a serious outbreak of a novel coronavirus and it is unknown whether this will result in a significant stress placed on public health systems in the United States and on individuals' ability to travel and he stated DCPP's capabilities and plans for coping with the impact of a global pandemic should be scheduled for review during a future fact-finding visit.  Mr. Baldwin stated he would follow-up on Dr. Peterson's request and arrange meetings with station leadership on this issue.  Mr. Guess replied that in the past the plant developed plans to address the SARS (Severe Acute respiratory Syndrome) and H1N1 (a novel influenza virus also known as swine flu)  diseases and Dr. Peterson observed the experience from the SARS outbreak would be quite relevant and the issue should be also reviewed from the industry level as when one is in a public health emergency one of the most important requirements is to maintain stable access to basic services including the capability to provide electricity which supports all other efforts taken with respect to public health.

Dr. Peterson observed that loss of electric power poses a challenge to the fossil fuel infrastructure including the ability to deliver fossil fuel such as natural gas on which California relies each evening and California does not have sufficient energy storage capabilities to cope with grid scale problems to enable it to meet evening electric demand.  Dr. Budnitz reported that during the SARS event the entire nuclear industry mobilized and each plant took cognizance of the issue and incipient plans were developed by DCPP station leadership.  Dr. Lam commented this was the right approach based on the latest information from the World Health Organization concerning coronavirus infection rates, the virus' incubation period, the rapid transmission rate of the disease, and the fatality ratio all of which indicate this new coronavirus is having impacts different from SARS.

Mr. Guess described the focus areas of the 2020 Generation Operating Plan as follows:

 ? Safety - Mr. Guess described this as the most important focus area and the leader-in-the-field concept will be used to achieve first quartile industry performance and to respond to concerns and remove safety hazards and improve OSHA recordable accident performance and vehicle incidents.  Mr. Guess reported these efforts include nuclear safety in outage performance and training.

•  People - Mr. Guess reported the Generation People Committee integrates Generation organization resources with human resources and personnel are being rotated from Nuclear Generation to other lines of PG&E's business and this effort included Quality Verification and QV will now assist the Power Generation organization. Mr. Guess reported PG&E is also assisting DCPP employees with planning for their future after the plant ceases generation operations.

•  Reliability - Mr. Guess stated efforts to maintain and improve reliability will focus on performance during maintenance outage windows and outage performance to ensure equipment issues are resolved.  A committee has been formed to assess reliability issues across the Generation organization and the Nuclear Generation Plant Health  and Plant Health Prioritization Committees will be used as models to address and continually refresh the top ten reliability-related issues list.

•  Affordability - Mr. Guess reported the focus in this area is to make work more efficient in order to reduce costs to PG&E's customers while continuing to put safety ahead of affordability in all contexts which he described as a key insight of Nuclear Generation.

•  Risk, Compliance and Ethics - Mr. Guess described the use of probabilistic risk assessment to perform quantitative risk analysis and the use of operating experience to inform decisions in the Nuclear Generation context and to expand their use to the Power Generation organization.

•  Regulatory & External Strategy - Mr. Guess stated this area includes the decommissioning of DCPP which he described as a multiyear process in terms of preparation and execution.  Another initiative will be to divest Power Generation's hydro generation assets and to do so in full compliance with all laws and regulations.

In concluding his presentation Mr. Guess returned to the table on which the elements of DCPP's line-of-sight to generation excellence were shown and he stated these define the mission and vision of the Generation organization and provide a road map for the delivery of safe, reliable and affordable energy to PG&E customers.  In response to Consultant Wardell's inquiry, Mr. Guess replied that each employee is able to link their individual performance goals directly to the high level goals and visions included in the 2020 Operating Plan as the goals which are included in an individual's performance plan are categorized by the focus areas in the Operating Plan and incentives for represented and unrepresented employees are tied to the focus areas as defined by the Operating Plan.

The Chair thanked Mr. Guess for an excellent presentation and a short break followed.

Following the break, Mr. Baldwin reported he was able to confirm the Control Room Simulator Facility would be available for a visit by the DCISC during a public tour planned for the July 1, 2020 portion of the July 1-2, 2020, public meeting.  [Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a decision was subsequently reached to conduct the July 1-2, 2020 remotely and accordingly no tour will be conducted in conjunction with that meeting.]  In response to queries posed earlier during this public meeting Mr. Baldwin reported that during the 2R21 refueling outage 904 workers were employed as temporary workers for the outage with 33% of those workers coming from the area from Lompoc, California north to San Miguel, California, and 67% came from outside this area which numbers included specialty workers as well as contractor firms such as Westinghouse and Siemens personnel.  Of the total outage temporary workforce 11.3% were female.

Mr. Baldwin reported that, as required by the NRC, funds from the Nuclear Decommissioning Trust will be used for maintenance of the Emergency Plan including the emergency siren system after the plant ceases generating electricity and PG&E has included this commitment in its 2018 NDCTP rate case.  Mr. Baldwin reported the PG&E Telecommunications Department maintains the emergency sirens and accordingly this is not the responsibility of the County.  He clarified that the unresolved issue identified by the NRC inspection report discussed early during the meeting concerned a determination of whether the siren batteries required replacement on a three-year or a five-year interval.  This determination requires the involvement of FEMA and the receipt by the NRC of documentation from FEMA to resolve the issue. As PG&E does not have the required documents this unresolved issue is pending resolution between the NRC and FEMA and when the required documentation is received from FEMA the NRC will document the resolution of this unresolved issue in an inspection report.

XXV TECHNICAL CONSULTANT REPORTS & RECEIVE, APPROVE, AND   AUTHORIZE TRANSMITTAL OF FACT FINDING REPORTS TO PG&E

The Chair requested Consultant Wardell to report on the January 29-30, 2020 fact-finding visit with Dr. Lam to DCPP. He reviewed the topics discussed with PG&E during the January 29-30, 2020, visit as follows:

•  Attend Plant Health Committee Meeting - Consultant Wardell reported participation of senior management and leadership in the Plant Health Committee (PHC) allows leadership to monitor and take action on the health of various systems, components, and programs on a regular basis.  He reported the DCISC team reviewed the updated procedures and determined them to be adequate.  The PHC reviewed issues related to the reliability of the 4kV breakers including  a presentation by the component engineer for the breakers to discuss problems experienced and corrective actions taken and action plans put in place to ensure the breakers are reliable, can be repaired and that there are in adequate supplies available at the plant's warehouse. Mr. Wardell reported an augmented preventive maintenance program is in place for the 4kV breakers to ensure breaker availability and there has been a change to the preventive maintenance performed for insulators on the 500kV towers.  The insulators separate the wiring from the metal towers and in the marine environment of DCPP the accumulated effects of salt spray, rain, wind, and dust can cause shorts or flashes.  DCPP was required to periodically wash these insulators to eliminate contaminants and this preventive maintenance period has been extended from every year to every second refueling outage, that is, to a period of between 18-20 months and Mr. Wardell reported the replacement of the old insulators with new ceramic materials allowed this extension, as the new materials do not need to be washed as frequently.

•  Maintenance Department Update and Performance Indicators - Consultant Wardell reported the DCISC team reviewed the key performance indicators in the Maintenance Department and, except for control room workarounds which were in Yellow status, all were in Green status and he reported this was indicative of good performance.  Mr. Wardell reported the Maintenance Department's current staffing level of more than 300 persons will be reduced by approximately 60 persons as the first retention period for the Employee Retention Program comes to its scheduled conclusion.  He reported some personnel in key positions will be replaced while others will not, due to reductions in workload and preventive maintenance optimization having streamlined and reduced maintenance requirements.  Contract personnel will continue to be engaged for certain required maintenance work.

•  Troubleshooting - Mr. Wardell stated the Troubleshooting Program employs a systematic approach to problem solving and the program has been reviewed before by the DCISC and found to be adequate and Mr. Wardell reported the program remains adequate with clear procedures and responsibilities on the use of troubleshooting.  Mr. Wardell reported troubleshooting involves two levels with Level A assigned to items affecting safety-related systems and/or plant reliability and Level B for other issues. The DCISC fact-finding team reviewed a Level A troubleshooting activity concerning the Cardox System, a fire mitigation system in the emergency diesel generator room.  The issue reviewed concerned a nonfunctional reset button which made the Cardox System inoperable and Mr. Wardell reported the plant's Tech Specs require the system to be returned to service within a specified time.  A faulty relay was found and replaced and the Cardox System returned to service.  Level B troubleshooting activities were observed for a reactor coolant pump motor vibration indication which proved to be the result of a faulty vibration monitor due to a loose lead or a faulty relay, and for a pressurizer heater group Control Room light malfunction again due to a faulty relay.  The DCISC team concluded that troubleshooting procedures and their implementation were satisfactory.

•  Maintenance Work Package Review & Observe Work - The DCISC fact-finding team reviewed the work packages for work performed on the Unit-2 lube oil centrifuges which are used to purify lube oil and the team observed performance of the work to sample and change gearbox oil between the motor and the centrifuge and to clean and inspect the centrifuge.  The DCISC observed use of procedures involving a circle and slash technique to track work as it is performed, use of personnel protective equipment and tools and the installation of a foreign material exclusion barrier.  Mr. Wardell displayed photos of the centrifuge area and the DCPP and DCISC personnel inspecting the area.

•  Unit-2 Generator Stator Refurbishment Video - Mr. Wardell reported this was the video screened for the DCISC earlier at this public meeting and no further discussion was necessary.

•  Meet with DCPP Site Vice President Ms. Paula Gerfen - Dr. Lam reported he and Vice President Gerfen discussed the new portfolio of responsibilities now carried by Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. James Welsch and the concept of affordability which Dr. Lam stated is always a concern as to its potential for an adverse impact on safety.  He commented that a move to do more with less may not be motivated only by savings but could also mean that a particular program was not necessarily efficient.  Dr. Peterson observed this is an important concept and one of the reasons the DCISC has taken an interest in the overall budget for DCPP.  He stated that working within a constant budget allows one to stop doing activities that add lesser value and to initiate new activities that add greater value.  Dr. Peterson stated there is a logical basis for a reduced budget for DCPP as the plant is approaching the end of its service life because certain types of activities such as preventive maintenance and equipment replacements become no longer necessary as the date for such activities extends beyond the closure dates. Dr. Peterson reported that during the PG&E bankruptcy period the budget for DCPP has stayed stable and accordingly there has not been a reason for the Committee to have a significant concern but this is an area that should be closely monitored. 

•  Meet with NRC Resident Inspector - Consultant Wardell reported the DCISC representatives met with the NRC Resident Inspector to discuss the NRC's reduction of inspection hours for the ISFSI in furtherance of an effort by the NRC to focus its resources on the most important aspects of ISFSI condition.  Dr. Lam reported this is part of a generic effort by the NRC to conduct regional inspection programmatic activities less frequently and in that effort to employ and emphasize risk-informed regulations and he remarked this has been the case since the NRC adopted assessing fees to its licensees who have an interest in seeing that the funds they provide are well spent. Dr. Budnitz stated that even with reduced inspection activities the NRC will still continue to identify deficiencies in performance but some of the periodic inspection frequency requirements may have been developed many years ago and in intervening period more may have been learned that leads to reducing the frequency of inspection activity without compromising safety. He remarked and Dr. Peterson agreed there is generally some marginal benefit to more inspections but this can reach a situation of diminishing returns and at a certain point there may be no extra benefit and therefore it is important to bear in mind that as the plant continues to perform inspections the NRC inspections are confirmatory in that sense.  Consultant Wardell reported the fact-finding visit included review of DCPP's implementation of the Nuclear Energy Institute's Delivering the Nuclear Promise initiative including the use of preventive maintenance optimization to achieve efficiencies. The DCISC team also discussed with the NRC Resident Inspector the NRC's protocol to rotate inspectors who are allowed to remain at one site for approximately no more than seven years and also the issue of the resulting potential loss of institution memory.  Mr. Wardell also reported the DCISC team learned that certain NRC facilities are now vacant due to cutbacks in personnel by the NRC.

•  Unexpected Energy Release During Modification Work -  Consultant Wardell reported that the Main Generator stator when in operation is cooled by hydrogen and the hydrogen is itself cooled by the Stator Coil Cooling Water System.  Because of the refurbishment of the stator during the 2R21 refueling outage DCPP took the opportunity to modify the hydrogen cooling system and as a pipe was being cut there was a hydrogen gas ignition.  He reported there were no personnel injuries or fires and no collateral damage as a result although a foreign material exclusion blanket was blown off and a sign blown down.  The cause was determined to be that the work order did not contain sufficient procedural precautions for flammable gas.  Mr. Wardell reported the plant has in the past purged hydrogen many times but in this case the procedures proved to be inadequate.  Procedures have been changed and training and counseling conducted.  Sampling techniques have been augmented and additional guidance has been implemented.  Consultant Wardell stated the corrective actions appeared appropriate to the DCISC representatives.  Dr. Lam observed as the inventory of hydrogen was limited and the energy involved very small and as there was no impact due to the physical proximity of safety equipment the event taken in isolation was of low safety significance but with a larger inventory of hydrogen the consequences would have been much different and Dr. Lam stated this illustrates the complexity and difficulty in making safety assessments of events.

•  4kV Breaker Replacement - Mr. Wardell reported as this issue was reviewed during his report on the Plant Health Committee he would not discuss it again.

•  Transition from Mode 5 to Mode 4 with Main Bank 500kV Unavailable - Mr. Wardell reported that as the plant was coming out of 2R21 and making the transition through Mode 6 (refueling) through Modes 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 (full power operations)  Tech Specs require certain systems and equipment to be available.  Following the outage when moving from Mode 5, (cold shutdown), with the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) at a temperature of less than 200^o F., to Mode 4 when the RCS temperature can raise to 350^o F and when if not under pressure water will boil the 500kV offsite power is to be available per Tech Specs to power emergency equipment to mitigate an accident.  Operations requested a probabilistic risk assessment as the 500kV power was not available for the Mode 5 to Mode 4 transition and it was determined the risk profile was Green, that is, indicative of defense-in-depth, because all emergency diesels were operable and instead of 500 kV power the plant had in place access to offsite 230kV power.  Mr. Wardell stated the DCISC fact-finding team was satisfied with this deterministic approach as there were three possible sources of power availability and only one source was lost.  Mr. Wardell displayed the logic chart used to make this assessment and the steps gone through to make the assessment.  He reported that defense-in-depth requires the requisite number of components be available plus one additional component.

Dr. Lam stated that the items were selected for the  January 29-30, 2020, fact-finding visit  from the Open Items List on the basis of the Committee's priorities and timeliness and this process is representative of a careful process in selecting items for review.

Ms. Sherry Lewis of Mothers for Peace inquired how long the NRC has been implementing efficiencies to which Dr. Peterson responded that this initiative has been ongoing for a number of years and was undertaken at the direction of the U.S. Congress.  Dr. Budnitz remarked that the NRC as a federal agency was not singled out by Congress in its direction and the safety mission of the NRC remains intact.  Dr.  Lam confirmed the NRC has for many years focused on efficiency and risk-based and risk-informed regulations.

Following a motion by Dr. Budnitz seconded by Dr. Peterson the January 29-30, 2020 Fact Finding Report was accepted by the Committee.

XXVI ADJOURN MORNING MEETING

The Chair adjourned the morning meeting of the Committee at 11:55 A.M.

XXVII RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON MEETING

The February 13, 2020, afternoon session of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was called to order by its Chair, Dr. Peter Lam at 1:30 P.M.  Dr. Lam welcomed those persons present in the audience and those watching the proceedings on live streaming video.  Dr. Lam requested any of the members who wished to make remarks to do so at this time.

XXVIII COMMITTEE MEMBER COMMENTS

There were no comments by Members at this time.

XXIX PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATION

The Chair reviewed the invitation to address the Committee on matters not on the agenda for this public meeting and  invited any comments from members of the public who wished to address the Committee to do so now. There was no response to his invitation.

XXX INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Cont'd.)

Dr. Lam requested Mr. Baldwin to introduce the next presentation. Mr. Baldwin introduced Ms. Anne Shatara, Performance Improvement Manager at DCPP, and he reported Ms. Shatara has more than twenty years' experience in the nuclear industry, holds a Master's Degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University of Tennessee and has held positions at DCPP in the Engineering, Radiation Protection and Performance Improvements organizations.

Current Status of Programs that Monitor Human Performance, Human Performance Indicators  and Trends in Human Performance (Including Personnel Error, Mispositioning, Station and Department Level Events and Safety Incidents).

Ms. Shatara reported she has now managed the DCPP Performance Improvement organization for two years after having served in that organization as a supervisor for nine years prior to assuming the Manager position.  She described performance improvement as a closed cycle which consists of looking, learning, and improving because in order to avoid a decline in performance an organization must constantly improve its performance.  The performance improvement model consists of finding issues followed by analyzing and fixing those issues.  Ms. Shatara stated the Corrective Action Program (CAP) is the essential foundation for everything her organization does at the station as the CAP provides an avenue for employees to identify issues and for the Performance Improvement organization to document its evaluations of those issues and the results achieved in addressing them.  The CAP also functions as a repository and reference for internal operating experience.

Ms. Shatara described the Self-assessment Program as a unique evaluation to allow a comparison of current operation to established standards and procedures and to identify gaps prior to their identification by outside reviewers or to identify areas of and the reasons for performance challenges.  She described the Benchmarking Program as directing inquiries to others in and outside the nuclear industry as to how those organizations address identified issues and using the results to learn from the experience of others.  Ms. Shatara described the Operating Experience Program and as an effort to address a regulatory requirement that plants must share challenges with others in the industry.  Drs. Peterson and Budnitz observed the regulatory requirement for the nuclear industry to share operating experience emerged very shortly after the accident in 1979 at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in Pennsylvania and the formation of INPO during the same period also contributed to the impetus in the industry for stations to share experience. Dr. Peterson observed it is very much in the interest of regulated utilities to share operating experience.  Dr. Budnitz remarked that due to NRC regulations the operating experience initiative has now come to involve private companies such as General Electric and Westinghouse and at that time operating experience programs were being developed in the nuclear industry there was a precedent in the aircraft industry where firms such as Boeing and McDonald Douglas were already sharing operating experience to advance air travel safety.  Consultant Wardell reported that efforts to deregulate electric power have in the past challenged the sharing of operational experience.  However, Dr. Budnitz and Ms. Shatara commented those challenges have now been overcome and the sharing of operating experience within the U.S. nuclear industry is now universal.

Ms. Shatara reported internal operating experience is also captured within the CAP which allows review of past corrective actions and permits the assessment of whether a trend has or might develop.  She stated field engagement and coaching also contribute to performance improvement and provide an opportunity for station leadership to observe and discuss with the plant's workforce from their own as well as from other work groups in the effort to assist employees in performing their jobs with greater safely and effectiveness.  All information gathered by field engagement and coaching is documented in a database that allows access across various disciplines in the effort to identify common issues and minimize human error.

Ms. Shatara reported approximately 20,000 issues are identified within the CAP each year and each is ranked as to its risk significance and assigned a significance level.  Certain issues are then assigned a type of evaluation and the actions taken as a result of the evaluation are documented and reviewed by senior leadership and when an issue is set for closure the individual who initially identified the issue is notified by email of the actions taken and given the opportunity to comment on those actions.  In response to Dr. Lam's inquiry Ms. Shatara stated  the Performance Improvement organization consists of  approximately ten individuals in various roles, all of whom are qualified in cause evaluation and all of whom are subject matter experts in performance improvement programs and procedures.  She stated that in the Performance Improvement organization's interacting with other organizations such as Operations, Engineering or Maintenance her staff looks to those organizations for technical knowledge and subject matter expertise. She agreed with Dr. Lam's characterization of the Performance Improvement organization as undertaking administrative, developmental, implementation and enforcement roles.  Dr. Budnitz stated and Ms. Shatara concurred that a technical role should also be recognized for the Performance Improvement organization as a significant and important number of issues can likely be directly dispositioned by Performance Improvement organization staff without further reference to technical experts.  Dr. Lam concurred and remarked that the staff's capabilities, experience, and motivation are also matters of importance.

Ms. Shatara stated there is a hierarchy consisting of three different levels of evaluations developed to address performance issues including root cause evaluations, which are reviewed against NRC standards, cause evaluations and work group evaluations.  She reported during 2019 a total of 43 documented self-assessments were performed to identify issues and develop solutions with reference to a particular defined activity.  She reported self-assessments involve the assessment of an identified implementation against specific procedures and each one usually involves seven to fourteen days of assessment of how the plant is performing in implementing procedures through document review, interviews and by convening small groups to discuss the issues and from that process areas area identified where the plant may be challenged and recommendations are developed.  Ms. Shatara confirmed Dr. Budnitz' observation that in addition to formal self-assessments many individual organizations also informally assess their performance and other types of assessments are also performed by the Quality Verification organization. In response to Consultant Wardell's observation Ms. Shatara reported the Performance Improvement organization is preparing for a Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection self-assessment at the end of February 2020 in order to have advanced knowledge for the upcoming NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection and she stated that self-assessments can prove their worth when results are achieved and individuals see performance improving.

Ms. Shatara reported benchmarking efforts with other nuclear facilities and other industries are formal documented activities involving contact with peers at other stations concerning activities and experiences at those stations and while the Performance Improvement organization does not generally conduct benchmarking activities it works to facilitate and provide guidance on benchmarking which is then conducted by the line or other organizations and groups.

Ms. Shatara stated with reference to operating experience during 2019 a total of 638 issues were screened from experiences of the U.S. and international facilities and DCPP shared a total of 57 issues which usually included a cause evaluation as an attachment.  She reported INPO facilitates the distribution of information concerning a significant number of nuclear industry events which her organization reviews on a daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly basis to identify any themes or trends and to schedule and conduct evaluations, benchmarking or self-assessment as necessary in seeking to improve performance.  She confirmed in response to Consultant Wardell's inquiry that Performance Review meetings continue to be held quarterly and she remarked that these meetings are very metric-driven.  Mr. Wardell commented that he would follow up with Ms. Shatara concerning the DCISC again having an opportunity to observe a Performance Review meeting during a future fact-finding and Ms. Shatara committed to provide dates for future meetings during 2020.

Ms. Shatara stated human error at DCPP is categorized in tiers as department level or station level events and while the plant strives to avoid both station and departmental level events their occurrence can often mean there is a low level for reporting human error which is representative of a high level of safety culture.

In response to Consultant Wardell's comment that the NRC has identified a concern based on an increase in low level human performance events Ms. Shatara stated her organization has identified the same concern which she described as a slight increase from 2017 through 2019 in the numbers of such events although she stated this was an improvement from 2012.  Ms. Shatara remarked the criteria for these events have not changed but DCPP is consistently raising the bar on performance expectations and like the NRC the plant is presently seeing some challenges in the area of human performance which are being addressed through targeted action plans which a focus on identifying the differences from error-free performance to what might have led to the occurrence of a particular human performance event.  She reported 2019 closed with one event in December 2019 concerning an inadvertent entry into Tech Specs discussed previously with the DCISC at this meeting and the Operations organization has been challenged in several areas over the past six months and the Performance Improvement organization together with the Operations Director and Operations Manager, as well as the NRC, are reviewing the matter.  Ms. Shatara reported DCPP has experienced challenges and a common theme has been identified with procedure use and adherence and the plant is now in the process of reviewing,  revising, improving, and clarifying procedures.

Dr. Budnitz observed there is a tension in numbers of events reported in that fewer numbers can mean fewer things are happening but it can also mean fewer things are being reported and Ms. Shatara replied the Performance Improvement organization and the NRC constantly monitor the numbers of Notifications written to assess whether Notifications are being written for items of all levels of significance and to determine if reporting thresholds have changed.  Part of this effort includes the numbers of Notifications that are reported anonymously and the number that are self-disclosed.

Ms. Shatara reported field engagement and coaching efforts represent a collegial effort to engage with the plant's workforce to learn what is working and what is not working in the field and to determine whether a particular issue is specific to a certain department or generic to the station.

Following Ms. Shatara's presentation Mr. Tom Marre, a resident of Avila Beach was recognized.  Mr. Marre commented he believed Ms. Shatara's presentation was possibly the most important presentation made during this public meeting as it touched upon the morale of the DCPP staff who operate a plant which is now scheduled to be decommissioned by a licensee that is presently in bankruptcy and he further observed that PG&E does not have what Mr. Marre described as a lily-white record of never dealing in bad faith.  He asked that his comments be noted by the DCISC.

Dr. Lam thanked Ms. Shatara for an excellent presentation.

XXXI  CONCLUDING REMARKS & DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS   OF FUTURE DCISC ACTIVITIES

Dr. Lam reported that all matters on the Committee's agenda for this public meeting have now been addressed.  In response to Dr. Budnitz' comment the Members confirmed that since Dr. Budnitz' presentation to PG&E's Decommissioning Engagement Panel the DCISC has had no further active engagement or interaction with the Decommissioning Engagement Panel.  Mr. Rathie reported the Panel is scheduled to meet on March 11, 2020, to review and discuss issues related to the California Environmental Quality Act and the California Coastal Act and to meet again on June 24, 2020, to discuss the topic of transportation relative to decommissioning DCPP.

Dr. Budnitz reported the Independent Peer Review Panel (IPRP) which was created by and appointed by the CPUC to review and report on technical matters of seismic safety at DCPP periodically holds public meetings and for those persons interested information on the IPRP can be found on the Panel's website.  Dr. Budnitz reported to date the IPRP has been positive in its assessment and endorsement of PG&E's seismic programs and he remarked that PG&E's Geosciences organization is recognized as one of the leading organizations of its type anywhere in the world and the Geosciences organization is doing advanced work in understanding seismology and in this effort the organization supports not only DCPP but other areas of PG&E's operations concerning seismic-related matters.  Dr. Budnitz reported PG&E has committed to fully fund the Geoscience organization's seismic activities until it is no longer necessary for the safety of DCPP and since making that commitment the organization's budget has been sustained.

Mr. Rathie reported the next public meeting of the Committee is scheduled to be held on July 1-2, 2020, at the Avila Lighthouse Suites in Avila Beach, California. [Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, a decision was subsequently taken to hold the July 1-2, 2020, public meeting remotely.]  Mr. Garcia verified that all future fact-finding and public meeting dates confirmed and set by the Committee during this public meeting were acceptable to PG&E.  Mr. Rathie expressed his appreciation to the technicians of AGP Video who provide sound and video recording and internet live-streaming of the DCISC's public meetings for their exemplary and important efforts to secure electrical cords and video cabling to keep the meeting room in a safe condition.

Dr. Lam expressed the Committee's appreciation to the members of the public who attended and participated in this public meeting or watched the proceedings through live streamed broadcast on the internet and also to the senior management of PG&E including Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Garcia and their associates. The Chair also expressed the appreciation of the Committee to the technicians of AGP Video who provided audio and visual recording and programming services for this public meeting.

XXXII ADJOURNMENT OF NINETY-FIFTH PUBLIC MEETING

There being no further business the ninety-fifth public meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee was then adjourned by its Chair, Dr. Peter Lam, at 2:27 P.M.